TY - JOUR
AU1 - Dehmej, Salim
AU2 - Gambacorta, Leonardo
AB - Using a simple New Keynesian model of a monetary union that incorporates finan- cial frictions, we show that country-targeted macroprudential policy could comple- ment a single monetary policy at the union level. In particular, macroprudential policy helps taming financial and economic imbalances in the presence of counter - cyclical financial shocks and imperfect transmission of monetary policy to financial conditions in a monetary union. These results are even stronger when different econ- omies are hit by asymmetric shocks that cancel out without provoking any monetary policy reaction. In addition, we show that when coordinated with monetary policy, country-targeted macroprudential policy (implemented by national or supranational authorities) has advantages over a federally implemented policy that reacts to aver- age financial indicators. Keywords Monetary union · Macroprudential policy · New Keynesian model JEL Classification E12 · E50 · F45 · G18 The authors thank Paul Wachtel (NY Stern), Pierre-Richard Agénor (University of Manchester), Maria Canelli, Boris Hoffman (BIS), Jézabel Couppey Soubeyran (Université Paris 1), Andres Murcia Pabon (Banco de la Republica-Colombia), Tomislav Ridzak (Croatian National Bank), Carmelo Salleo (ECB), and all participants in seminars and conferences (Bank of England, Labex ReFi, Université Paris 1, Université Paris Nanterre, CEPII, Bank Al-Maghrib, Stony Brook University, Dubrovnik Economic Conference) 
TI - Macroprudential Policy in a Monetary Union
JF - Comparative Economic Studies
DO - 10.1057/s41294-019-00085-0
DA - 2019-03-27
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/springer-journals/macroprudential-policy-in-a-monetary-union-zJGXA3d0t9
SP - 1
EP - 18
VL - OnlineFirst
IS - 
DP - DeepDyve
ER -