TY - JOUR
AU - Devlen, Balkan
AB - Abstract The purpose of this article is to understand and predict the Iranian behavior during the nuclear crisis. The model presented here provides a simple framework for structuring strategic interaction (game theory), a way to capture the beliefs of the actors prior to the crisis and deduce likely behavior from them (operational code analysis), and identify key factors (large-group identity and political survival) to monitor real time to determine preferences independent from observed behavior. The main finding of this analysis is that Iranians would like to negotiate a settlement but they have a very conflictual view of the United States. They fear that if they show willingness to negotiate, the United States could exploit it. This lack of trust and the relatively low cost of maintaining the current deadlock prevent the Iranians coming to the table. Iran's quest for nuclear power goes way back to the Shah period, and its details need not detain us.1 The “true” nature of the Iranian nuclear program, whether it is peaceful or not, should not concern us either.2 This is because regardless of the true intentions of the Iranians, their nuclear program created an international crisis. The existence of an Iranian nuclear crisis is the focus of this article. The purpose is to understand the Iranian behavior during the nuclear crisis, to provide a sketch of what they might do in the future if the current situation continues and to suggest alternative policy options for the international community. I am trying to see the situation through the eyes of the Iranian regime. This can be termed as “realistic empathy” (Malici and Buckner 2008). It does not mean to approve or legitimize the Iranian regime's behavior. It only means that one has to understand how the other side sees the situation if one hopes to resolve it. The main finding of this analysis is that Iranians would like to negotiate a settlement but they have a very negative/conflictual view of the United States. They fear that if they show willingness to negotiate, the United States could exploit it to its advantage. This lack of trust and the relatively low cost of maintaining the current deadlock prevent the Iranians coming to the table. The analysis, however, also suggests possible ways to overcome this deadlock and move the parties toward a negotiated settlement without fundamentally changing Iranians' beliefs about the United States. They are discussed in the concluding section. Prediction and forecasting in international relations is a risky business. We are dealing with sentient beings who respond, react and change their environment; complex and open systems that evolve according to rules we cannot fully grasp; and multiple causes and equifinalities. However, this fact should not stop us from trying as every policy prescription entails a forecast, explicit or implicit. We, as scholars, can contribute and improve the public debate on policy choices if we can provide accurate forecasts. The model developed in this article can be used to predict foreign policy behavior in other international crises. It provides a simple framework for structuring strategic interaction (game theory), a way to capture the beliefs of the actors prior to the crisis and deduce likely behavior from them (operational code analysis), and identify key factors (large-group identity and political survival) to monitor real time to determine preferences independent from observed behavior. It can profitably be used as a roadmap about the likely behavior of actors in the crisis, based on what is known prior to the crisis as well as publicly available information during the crisis. O'Brien (2010), in his article in this issue, discusses different methods used in crisis early warning. Although my model benefits from some of the approaches described in O'Brien's article, such as operational code analysis, it differs from them in two respects. First, they mostly focus on early warning systems before crises happen. I am concerned with predicting behavior during crisis. Therefore, this is a model that can be helpful for crisis decision-making. Second, models in O'Brien's article are about detecting generalizable patterns to use for early warning purposes. The model developed in this article is more actor-centric, although it taps into the extant literature on crisis behavior. For instance, a different crisis might require a different game to model the strategic interaction while still using operational codes and similar domestic constraints. In other words, my model uses tools from social sciences to understand and predict the behavior of a specific actor. It is not about uncovering patterns in crisis behavior, although if similar studies are done in the future they might reveal certain patterns. The article is organized around three sections. Theoretical and methodological foundations of the analysis are discussed in the following section. It is followed by the analysis of how Iran sees the issue and what could their behavior be. Policy implications conclude the article. Theoretical Foundations3 Theoretical models suppose to identify the essential features of reality and by simplifying it bring forth what really matters. The model developed here incorporates the beliefs and considerations of the Iranian regime regarding the nuclear crisis without creating a kitchen-sink model to understand, explain, and predict their behavior. I used a modified version of Zagare and Kilgour's (2000) asymmetrical escalation game to describe the strategic environment faced by Iran and the United States. It is meant to convey how the Iranian leadership sees the current crisis situation, its possible outcomes, and options available to them and to the United States. I used operational code analysis to get at the beliefs of the Iranian leadership regarding the United States. They are used to derive the preference ordering of the United States in the modified asymmetrical escalation game. As it is a subjective representation of the crisis, the preference ordering of the United States is what the Iranians believe they are. I identify two constraints operating on the Iranian leadership, material and ideational, and derive the preference ordering of Iran based on them. I use large-group identity framework of Volkan (1997, 2004) to operationalize ideational constraints and political survival framework of Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, and Morrow (2003) to operationalize material constraints. The asymmetrical escalation game, as discussed below, is developed to model extended deterrence situations in which the Challenger is not threatening the physical security of the Defender, but its vital interests or allies. It provides a stylized representation of the crisis situation and allows us to investigate the dynamics of the strategic interaction between the adversaries. The combination of operational code analysis, large-group identity, and political survival, on the other hand, provides us with a theory of preferences, which we can use in the asymmetrical escalation game. We do not have to take the preferences of the actors in the game as given or exogenous but can derive them theoretically. This provides us with a replicable methodology to derive preferences. Operational code analyses have already been used to model and predict foreign policy behavior of various leaders successfully.4 In the following I provide a brief overview of these theoretical and methodological foundations and the way how they come together to model the nuclear crisis between Iran and the United States before getting to actual analysis. Modified Asymmetrical Escalation Game Game theory provides appropriate tools to model strategic interaction such as the Iranian nuclear crisis. In this article, I use a modified version of the Asymmetric Escalation Game developed by Zagare and Kilgour (2000). This game, shown in Figure 1, involves two players, Challenger and Defender. After a demand is made by the Defender, Challenger begins to play by choosing whether to concede (C) or defy (D). If Challenger concedes, the game ends with Challenger Concedes as the outcome; if he defies, Defender must choose how to respond. At decision node 2, Defender can concede (C), respond-in-kind (D), or escalate (E). Depending on Defender's choice, Challenger can either escalate first (at node 3a) or counter-escalate (at node 3b), or not. If Challenger escalates first, Defender has an opportunity, at node 4, to counter-escalate. The outcomes associated with the various choices in the Modified Asymmetric Escalation Game are summarized in Figure 1. 1 View largeDownload slide Modified Asymmetric Escalation Game. 1 View largeDownload slide Modified Asymmetric Escalation Game. I kept Zagare and Kilgour's (2000) notation for the actors (Challenger and Defender) and the actions available to them (Concede, Defy/Respond-in-kind, Escalate) in the discussion below for the sake of convention and compatibility. However, I make two modifications to the model. First, if the Challenger chooses to concede (C) in the first node, the outcome is Challenger Concedes instead of Status Quo as in the original model developed by Zagare and Kilgour (2000). The main reason for this modification is that their model also considers crisis initiation while I am only interested in the behavior after the crisis is initiated. Therefore, complying with a Defender demand is not going back to Status Quo for the Challenger but accepting the Defender's demand, thus backing down and conceding. Second, if the Challenger chooses to respond-in-kind (D) in the node 3a, the outcome is labeled as Negotiation instead of Limited Conflict as in the original model. Zagare and Kilgour (2000) are mainly concerned with deterrence relationships between nuclear powers. Therefore, in their model escalation meant escalation to nuclear war and everything else––including negotiation, limited use of force, conventional warfare, compromise, etc.,––situations that are all categorized under the outcome Limited War. My concern, on the other hand, is to differentiate between outcomes that can be military in nature on the one hand and non-military on the other. Therefore, I prefer to label the outcome in node 3a as Negotiation. We still need to determine the preference orders of the actors in the game and the following two sections discuss the theories and methods I use to determine them. Operational Code Analysis Operational code analysis focuses on the beliefs of political leaders as causal mechanisms in explaining foreign policy decisions (Leites 1951, 1953; George 1969, 1979; Walker 1983, 1990; Walker and Schafer 2005; Schafer and Walker 2006). It was originally developed by Leites (1951, 1953) to analyze the decision-making style of the Soviet politburo members and later developed and refined by George (1969, 1979), Holsti (1977), and Walker (1983, 1990). According to the concept of operational codes, a leader's cognitive schema or belief system has two components. The first component contains five sets of philosophical beliefs about the political universe in which the leader finds himself or herself and the nature of the “other” faced in this environment. Second, there are five sets of instrumental beliefs that represent the image of “self” in this political universe and the best strategies and tactics one could employ to achieve one's ends (George 1979; Walker 1990). Taken together, these beliefs “explain diagnostic and choice propensities of the agents who make foreign policy decisions” (Walker and Schafer 2005:1).5 P-1 (nature of the political universe), I-1 (strategic approach to goals), and P-4 (ability to control historical development) are considered “master beliefs,” as they are key in determining the remaining answers. For our purposes two of them are important; P-1 and P-4 as they are about the other in the political universe. Holsti (1977) developed an operational code typology by formulating likely answers to George's (1969) questions regarding philosophical and instrumental beliefs. He developed six types of operational codes (A, B, C, D, E, F), which were later reduced to four (A, B, C, DEF) by Walker (1983, 1990). This typology is based on the perceived nature (temporary vs. permanent) and source (individual/society/international system) of conflict in the political world, deduced from the answers to P-1, I-1, and P-4 (Walker and Schafer 2005).6 Contemporary operational code analysis uses an automated content analysis system called the “Verbs in Context System” (VICS), introduced by Walker et al. (1998). VICS focuses on the verbs in leaders' public statements and their attributions regarding exercise of power to the Self and Others to construct quantitative indices that correspond to the philosophical and instrumental beliefs in Table 1 (Walker and Schafer 2005). The VICS indices for the master beliefs, P-1, I-1, and P-4 are mapped on the vertical (P-1/I-1) and horizontal (P-4) axes in Table 1 to locate leaders' images of Self and Other in one of the four quadrants. The locations for Self (I-1, P-4a) and Other (P-1, P-4b) lead to predictions regarding strategic preference orderings among the general goals of settle, submit, dominate, and deadlock (Walker and Schafer 2005; Schafer and Walker 2006). In other words, these four general goals are regarded as the basic possible outcomes that can be reached as a result of strategic interaction with others in the international arena. The key operational code indices of a given leader are used to make inferences about his or her preference ordering among these general goals. 1 Theory of Inferences About Preferences* Self Other Values Preference Order in a 2×2 Strategic Game I-1 & P-4a P-1 & P-4b + & > Settle>Deadlock>Submit>Dominate (Appease) I-1 & P-4a P-1 & P-4b + & = Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit (Deter/Reward) I-1 & P-4a P-1& P-4b + & > Settle>Dominate>Deadlock>Submit (Exploit) I-1 & P-4a P-1 & P-4b − & < Dominate>Settle>Submit>Deadlock (Bluff) I-1 & P-4a P-1 & P-4b − & = Dominate>Settle>Deadlock>Submit (Punish/Compel) I-1 & P-4a P-1 & P-4b − & > Dominate>Deadlock>Settle>Submit (Bully) Self Other Values Preference Order in a 2×2 Strategic Game I-1 & P-4a P-1 & P-4b + & > Settle>Deadlock>Submit>Dominate (Appease) I-1 & P-4a P-1 & P-4b + & = Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit (Deter/Reward) I-1 & P-4a P-1& P-4b + & > Settle>Dominate>Deadlock>Submit (Exploit) I-1 & P-4a P-1 & P-4b − & < Dominate>Settle>Submit>Deadlock (Bluff) I-1 & P-4a P-1 & P-4b − & = Dominate>Settle>Deadlock>Submit (Punish/Compel) I-1 & P-4a P-1 & P-4b − & > Dominate>Deadlock>Settle>Submit (Bully) *“+” indicates above and “−” indicates below the norming mean, and “<”, “>”, “=” indicate below, above, or within the norming average range, which is P4a ±1 SD. Norming averages P-1 (0.28), I-1 (0.39), P4a (0.21, SD 07) N=35. Norming averages are from Marfleet and Miller (2005), courtesy of Mark Schafer. Source: Walker and Schafer (2006). View Large 1 Theory of Inferences About Preferences* Self Other Values Preference Order in a 2×2 Strategic Game I-1 & P-4a P-1 & P-4b + & > Settle>Deadlock>Submit>Dominate (Appease) I-1 & P-4a P-1 & P-4b + & = Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit (Deter/Reward) I-1 & P-4a P-1& P-4b + & > Settle>Dominate>Deadlock>Submit (Exploit) I-1 & P-4a P-1 & P-4b − & < Dominate>Settle>Submit>Deadlock (Bluff) I-1 & P-4a P-1 & P-4b − & = Dominate>Settle>Deadlock>Submit (Punish/Compel) I-1 & P-4a P-1 & P-4b − & > Dominate>Deadlock>Settle>Submit (Bully) Self Other Values Preference Order in a 2×2 Strategic Game I-1 & P-4a P-1 & P-4b + & > Settle>Deadlock>Submit>Dominate (Appease) I-1 & P-4a P-1 & P-4b + & = Settle>Deadlock>Dominate>Submit (Deter/Reward) I-1 & P-4a P-1& P-4b + & > Settle>Dominate>Deadlock>Submit (Exploit) I-1 & P-4a P-1 & P-4b − & < Dominate>Settle>Submit>Deadlock (Bluff) I-1 & P-4a P-1 & P-4b − & = Dominate>Settle>Deadlock>Submit (Punish/Compel) I-1 & P-4a P-1 & P-4b − & > Dominate>Deadlock>Settle>Submit (Bully) *“+” indicates above and “−” indicates below the norming mean, and “<”, “>”, “=” indicate below, above, or within the norming average range, which is P4a ±1 SD. Norming averages P-1 (0.28), I-1 (0.39), P4a (0.21, SD 07) N=35. Norming averages are from Marfleet and Miller (2005), courtesy of Mark Schafer. Source: Walker and Schafer (2006). View Large Walker and Schafer (2004) further refined the preference orderings based on the key operational code indices and developed a “theory of inferences about preferences.”7Table 1 provides specific predictions about the actors' preferences based on Walker and Schafer's theory of inferences about preferences. These preference orders are used in the model to determine the preference order of the United States. Domestic Constraints The political leaders are not free to act upon their beliefs alone and are constrained by domestic factors. In the following section I discuss the two concepts that are crucial in identifying the domestic constraints that further affect the foreign policy behavior of leaders. Identity-Related Factors The first set of domestic constraints is the concept of large-group identity developed by Volkan (1997, 2004). Volkan (2004:24) suggests that “the experience of oneself as a member of an ethnic, racial, national, or religious group” constitutes what can be termed a large-group identity. Volkan likens the large-group identity to a tent-canvas held up by a pole: “[T]he people surrounding the pole is determined to keep the pole upright so that the canvas remains taut, a protective cover for the individuals beneath. That is to say, large-group activities center on maintaining the integrity of the group's identity.” (Volkan 2004:36). He further notes that “all of the people under the tent—men and women, rich and poor—wear that collective large-group identity as if it were a shared skin. At times of collective stress—such as economic crises, social upheaval, war, terrorist attack, or drastic political change—the tent's covering can take on a greater importance than the various garments worn by the individual members” (Volkan 2004:37). Volkan identifies seven threads that together form the large-group identity.8 Of those, the two threads of “chosen glories” and “chosen traumas” are crucial for our theory, as they are especially likely to be activated by the leader during crises (Volkan 2004:37). They refer to historical events (real or constructed) that are crucial in defining who the group is. Defeats, occupations, war, famine, or revolutions are examples of chosen traumas, while military victories, times of wealth, prosperity, and prestige (in other words golden times) are examples of chosen glories. When a current crisis is linked with either chosen traumas or chosen glories, and the adversary with the historical “enemy,” the domestic environment tends to be highly emotionally charged, which in turn might affect what is politically rational for the leader to do in the international realm, given the possible consequences at home. For our purposes it is here sufficient to point out that issues related to the maintenance of large-group identity during crisis might preclude certain policies for the political leaders.9 Political Survival-Related Concerns Concerns with political survival form the second core component of domestic constraints on a leader making foreign policy decisions during crisis. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) suggest that the primary motivation for every political leader is to retain power. Thus, domestic and foreign policies that might lead to the removal of the leader from office will probably not be implemented. The characteristics of the “selectorate” and the winning coalition will determine what policies are good politics and what policies are bad politics for the political survival of a leader. The selectorate is “the set of people whose endowments include the qualities or characteristics institutionally required to choose the government's leadership and necessary for gaining access to private benefits doled out by the government” (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003:42). The winning coalition is defined as “a subset of the selectorate of sufficient size such that the subset's support endows the leadership with political power over the remainder of the selectorate as well as over the disenfranchised members of the society” (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003:51). Authoritarian leaders generally rely on a smaller winning coalition, meaning that the constituency they have to satisfy to stay in power is smaller than that of democratic leaders. They are less likely to be limited by other branches of the government and more likely to act on their beliefs, as long as those beliefs do not lead to policies that will undermine their power base. However, even the most authoritarian rulers have to rely on a group of people to preserve their regimes. Thus, that critical constituency has to be protected and the leader should be wary of possible challengers to his rule. Crises provide both opportunities for increased rent for the supporters of the regime and risk of loss of profits, property, or even life if the crisis ends in conflict. According to selectorate theory, a political leader can be expected to conduct a cost-benefit analysis regarding the expected outcome of the crisis with regards to the welfare of his supporters and the extension of his rule. Thereby, the policies adopted by the political leader will be based on an assessment of (i) the expected costs of conflict for the power base of the leader along with (ii) large-group identity salience at the time of the crisis. The relations between these two factors in domestic politics will be discussed below. Putting It Together To summarize, a leader's foreign policy behavior in an international crisis depends on (i) his beliefs about the opponent, which is captured by his operational code, (ii) whether and how the crisis is related with large-group identity concerns, and (iii) the expected cost (political and economic) of conflict for the leader and his support base compared to the other possible outcomes of the crisis. They enable me to determine the preference orderings of the United States and Iran in the modified asymmetrical escalation game. The political leader has certain beliefs regarding the nature of the political universe and the best ways to deal with adversaries. The operational code identifies expectations regarding the likelihood of certain policies and strategies the adversary can use. These operational codes are used to determine the preference ordering of the United States in the model. The political leader is constrained by domestic considerations that are inherently complex and interrelated. The fundamental concern for every political leader is to survive in office or at least in a comparable position of power and status. In order to ensure his political survival, the leader has to satisfy a group of people. He has to provide certain material and ideational goods to his supporters. During times of international crisis, the political leader has to mind the costs of crisis and of his actions in dealing with it for his support base and also be weary of any potential challenger to his rule emerging within or outside the political elite. The leader also has to take into account the large-group identity concerns of the public, even if they are not a part of the winning coalition. This is important for two main reasons. First, the issues that can clearly be considered related to large-group identity are not many, but they are deeply rooted in the psyche of the people and are central to the legitimacy of the regime. Second, most of the time the members of the winning coalition also “wear” the same large-group identity; thus it is likely that they will also care about it. What precisely is the relationship between these different domestic factors? It is a difficult question to answer without reference to specific cases. However, I can suggest a few mid-level propositions about the expected relations between different domestic factors and crisis behavior. Large-group identity concerns are expected to dominate other concerns regarding political survival when they are salient. This is so for three main reasons. First, if the crisis is closely entwined with large-group identity, like the issue of Kosovo for the Serbs, it is more likely that both the public and the elite will care deeply about the issue. Secondly, most of the time the regime claims legitimacy based on upholding precisely the values that the public feels are threatened by the crisis. By not protecting/defending/maintaining large-group identity, the leader might become vulnerable to the rise of a potential challenger within the ruling elite or among the opposition. Lastly, the political leader himself is usually a product of the particular cultural milieu that dominates in the public; therefore he also “wears” the same large-group identity. The need to repair/maintain/protect large-group identity is not only a political necessity but also a psychological need for the leader himself. Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003) and Sherman (1998) show that failure in foreign policy crises does not automatically increase the likelihood of removal from office for authoritarian rulers.10 Thus, they are more risk-acceptant and their tolerance threshold with regards to costs of conflict is higher, compared to democratic leaders. They do not necessarily have to win the conflict. All an authoritarian leader has to do is to ride it out without being overthrown, either by the enemy as a result of a full-scale war or by a coup or revolution. On the one hand, an autocrat whose domestic power base is unstable might be less willing to risk the regime's survival by engaging in a militarized conflict. On the other hand, engaging in conflict might enable the political leader to further strengthen his hold on power. Therefore, when the expected cost of conflict for the power base of the leader is low, the constraints on authoritarian leader's freedom of action are also low. When the costs are expected to be high, the political leadership is likely to adopt more conciliatory policies in order to avoid military conflict. What Will Iran Do? I used two public letters sent by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad to the American people and George W. Bush in 2006 to construct Iranian regime's operational code about the United States.11 I chose those two letters for three reasons. First, for the first time since the Islamic Revolution an Iranian President engages in a direct communication with the United States; the letters are of great symbolic importance and reflect how the Iranian regime sees the United States and its people. Second, given the importance of those documents as representing the official position of Iran, they are most likely the product of an intense intra-regime debate and their wording represents the consensus of different factions in Iranian regime.12 Third, the Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei, has the final say in matters of foreign and security policy and it is unlikely that Ahmedinejad sent those letters without the blessing of Khamenei.13 Therefore, I assume that those letters are accurate representations of Iranian beliefs regarding the United States.14 Analysis of those two letters suggests a very conflictual view of the United States, with a more than average control over historical developments (P-1: −0.43, P-4b: 0.81).15 That corresponds with B-type philosophical beliefs in the revised Holsti typology. It suggests the following preference ordering for the United States in the modified Asymmetrical Escalation Game16: Challenger Concedes > Defender Wins > Deadlock > Negotiation > Defender Concedes > Challenger Wins. This is essentially the same strategy as “Bully” described in Table 1. I made two modifications to accommodate additional outcomes available in asymmetrical escalation game, however. First, the Defender always prefers Challenger Concedes to all other outcomes because essentially it is costless. Second, I replace “Submit” in the original order with “Defender Conceded > Challenger Wins.” Here I maintain the standard assumption in the literature (for example, Fearon 1995; Zagare and Kilgour 2000) that when it comes to losing, the actors prefers the least costly way of doing so, thus they will always prefer Defender Concedes to Challenger Wins. The same modifications also apply for the Challenger's preference ordering. This particular preference ordering, also called “Bully” suggests that Iranians believe that the United States is willing to endure the current situation or even escalate to a militarized conflict, rather than negotiating with Iran. What makes the US prefer (according to Iran) deadlock over negotiation is not only a hostile view of the world (P-1) but also that they have greater control over historical developments (P-4b). To determine the preference order of Iran in this game we need to look at the domestic constraints regime faces. First, we need to ask to what extent is the nuclear crisis related with large-group identity concerns? In other words, how much does the Iranian public care about the issue? We can turn to Iranian history, particularly its strategic culture, and some recent work done about Iranian public opinion for answers.17 Iran is a country with a long history about which its people are proud. They are fiercely independent and very weary of foreign influences/meddling in domestic affairs. Therefore, when the current crisis is portrayed as foreign interference with the development/independence of Iran the majority of the people will refuse to stop the nuclear program. A recent poll suggests that 91 percent of Iranians support the development of full-enrichment capability (PIPA 2007).18 However, it is important to differentiate between support for a civilian/peaceful nuclear capability and support for nuclear weapons program. Again, according to the same poll, 76% of the respondents believe they need the nuclear program for Iran's energy needs, 60% oppose the idea of withdrawing from NPT, and 71% of the respondents support the idea of a Middle East nuclear weapons-free zone. Furthermore, 39% of the respondents are willing to support the suspension of uranium enrichment in return for Iran's membership to WTO for instance. Several other incentives are also supported by a significant portion of the public. On the other hand, Khomenei himself openly opposed nuclear weapons on several occasions and called their use “un-Islamic” (Cain 2002; Kartchner 2006). Similarly current Supreme Leader Khamenei issued a fatwa declaring his opposition to nuclear weapons (Khamenei 2005, quoted in Beeman 2005:160). Although those statements could be seen as “cheap talk,” reversing such a public stance against nuclear weapons could mean substantial domestic costs for the clerical regime. Taken together with the recent public opinion data, opposition from the religious leaders to nuclear weapons suggests that the issue of a nuclear program may not be intimately related with Iranian large-group identity. In other words, negotiating on Iran's nuclear program is possible. Developing nuclear weapons does seem to have opponents among the public and the religious establishment, and the public seems to be willing to trade the nuclear program for certain incentives (Sadjadpour 2004; Lotfian 2008:160–171).19 It can only be linked with the Iranian large-group identity if, and only if, international opposition to Iran's program can be portrayed as an attack against Iran's pride and independence. What about the cost of possible conflict for the regime? The military option is highly risky and problematic at best. Given how overstretched the US Army is, a ground invasion is out of question. Airstrikes seem to be the only military option available and their effectiveness is highly questioned by experts (Eisenstadt 2004; Rogers 2006; Kam 2007; Crane, Lal, and Martin 2008; Ozcan and Ozdamar 2009,). Not only Iran's nuclear facilities are widespread geographically, they are also built underground to protect them from such attacks. Furthermore, one has to destroy the nuclear know-how in order to seriously stop/reverse Iran's nuclear program, which means killing most of the people working on the project. Otherwise, as Rogers (2006) pointed out, you can only set back the program for few years but ensure the development of an overt nuclear weapons program. Even proponents of military option admit that it is highly risky.20 In short, there seems to be a consensus about the ineffectiveness of the military option for the long-term goal of preventing Iran from developing nuclear weapons. Iranian leaders are undoubtedly aware of such assessments and are likely to consider the costs of a low-probability military conflict acceptable when considered against the political cost of bowing to the international pressures. When we consider all of the above together what can we say about the Iran's preference order? Everyone would like to win with minimal cost to oneself in a crisis therefore, we can assume that Iran prefers Defender Concedes > Challenger Wins to all other options as it is the least costly option for Iran. Given the relatively low cost of conflict they will prefer Deadlock over Challenger Concede > Defender Wins. What about the choice between Negotiation and Deadlock? Here I argue that because the issue is not closely related with the large-group identity concerns it can be negotiated. Also although the expected costs of conflict might be low, there is always the possibility of miscalculation and war is always an uncertain undertaking. Abrahamian (2008:165–166) provides an interesting quote from Khomeini in which he argued that “[t]he government of Islam is a primary rule having precedence over secondary rulings such as praying, fasting, and performing the hajj. To preserve Islam, the government can suspend any or all secondary rulings.” What this quote suggests is that for the clerics the preservation of the Islamic regime is the ultimate goal, overriding any other concern. Risking war while you can negotiate is not the best way to preserve one's own regime. Furthermore, continuing the deadlock will further isolate Iran, while on the other hand, negotiating can bring benefits along with a possibility of having nuclear energy in some form. In short, it is better to have something rather than nothing in this circumstance. Therefore, I argue that Iran prefers Negotiation to deadlock. This produces the following preference order for Iran: Defender Concedes > Challenger Wins > Negotiation > Deadlock > Challenger Concedes > Defender Wins. This preference order is generally associated with “Punish/Compel” types of strategies that value tit-for-tat behavior. In other words, Iran is ready to negotiate about its nuclear program, however, it is also willing to continue the deadlock and risk conflict to avoid submitting to the US demands. The game and the expected outcome are presented in Figure 2. 2 View largeDownload slide Iran– US game. 2 View largeDownload slide Iran– US game. The standard solution for extensive form games is backward induction, that is, working backwards in the game to see what is rational for the United States to do in node 4. The United States prefers Deadlock over Iran Wins thus would choose to Escalate at node 4. Knowing this, what would Iran do at node 3a and 3b? If Iran chooses not to escalate the crisis (D) in 3a the game ends in Negotiation and if Iran escalates (E) at node 3a the game will end in Deadlock as the United States will choose to Escalate at node 4. Iran prefers Negotiation over Deadlock, thus will choose D at node 3a. Iran will choose to escalate at node 3b as it prefers Deadlock to the US Wins. Knowing that Iran would choose to escalate at node 3b and not escalate in 3a, the United States will choose escalate (E) at node 2 as it would lead to Deadlock and the United States prefers Deadlock to US Concedes or Negotiation. Knowing that the United States would choose E, leading to Deadlock, Iran would choose to defy (D) at node 1 instead of conceding (C) as Iran prefers the outcome Deadlock over Iran Concedes. The expected outcome of the game is Deadlock. This represents how Iran currently sees the situation. Note that although Iran prefers Negotiation over Deadlock, Iranian regime believes that the United States prefers Deadlock over Negotiation and therefore will not respond even if Iran attempts to settle the issue through negotiations. Therefore, Iran would refuse American demands, the United States will escalate the crisis, and Iran would respond to American escalatory behaviors by counter-escalating in order to avoid submission. The history of the current nuclear crisis largely fits into this picture.21 Since 2002 Americans largely refuse to deal with Iran directly and try to increase the pressure by getting a UN Security Council resolution against Iran. After showing an initial willingness to stop enrichment in 2003, Iran refused a deal package put together by EU-3 in 2005. In response, the IAEA referred Iran to UNSC and Iran speed up enrichment program in 2006. Convincing the European Union, Russia, and China to impose harsher economic sanctions against Iran was and still is a corner stone of American policy. Repeated attempts by the European Union to stop Iran from enriching uranium failed throughout the crisis. Latest IAEA reports in March 2009 express frustration with Iran and argue that Iran is not totally forthcoming about its nuclear program, continues to enrich uranium, does not implement the Additional Protocol, and prevents IAEA verification missions.22 Today Iran refuses to stop enriching uranium and its nuclear program moves at full speed. Iranian refusal to stop enrichment and allow additional verification by IAEA is intimately linked with what they perceive as the American escalation of the situation by refusing to deal with Iran directly and attempting to convince UNSC to impose harsher sanctions on Iran. Iranians do not believe that the United States is sincerely interested in engaging with Iran as demonstrated recently by the Iranian rebuke of President Obama's overtures.23 What is to be done? What can be done to overcome this deadlock and prevent it from escalating to a military conflict? Clearly time favors Iran, as its uranium enrichment program advances at full speed. It is also clear that there is a consensus among Iranian elites and the public about mastering civilian nuclear technology, including full uranium enrichment capabilities within Iran, although the issue of nuclear weapons seems to be hotly debated (Dobbins, Harting, and Dassa Kaye 2007; Cordesman and Seitz 2008; Lotfian 2008:160–171). As the 2007 NIE suggested, although Iran might have halted its nuclear weapons program in 2003, it is likely to keep that option open. NIE conceded that the only thing that can stop Iran from completely mastering the nuclear technology is a political decision by Iran to do so (Cordesman and Seitz 2008:55–62). Therefore, given the preceding discussion about Iranian motives, consensus among the public and the elite, and their calculations regarding the cost of conflict, it seems Iran will eventually become a nuclear power state. This, of course, is not the same thing as a nuclear-armed Iran. Efforts by the international community, especially by the United States, should focus on preventing Iran to develop nuclear weapons as having the ability to produce weapons-grade uranium or plutonium is not the same thing as developing deliverable nuclear weapons (Cordesman and Seitz 2008). How can this be achieved once Iranians have the know-how and material to develop nuclear weapons without resorting to military force? The international community, including the United States might have to accept a nuclear-powered Iran eventually, however, they are not willing to accept a nuclear-armed Iran. The continuation of the current deadlock beyond the point where Iran successfully enriched enough uranium therefore carries the risk of military action by the United States or possibly Israel. The model presented above also suggests certain ways to overcome the deadlock. Two options suggest themselves when we examine the game above. One is to force Iran to concede (Iran Concedes in the game) and other is to reach a negotiated settlement (Negotiation in the game). First, the United States can try to alter Iranian cost calculus. In other words, the United States could try to increase the expected cost of conflict for the Iranian regime to such levels that Iran will decide not to develop nuclear weapons and concede to American demands. It can be done by increasing military preparedness and overcoming the hurdles to the military option discussed elsewhere. It can also be done by “promising” regime change by whatever means necessary unless Iran capitulates. There are several other ways of increasing the cost for the regime. The point is to convince Iranian leadership that developing nuclear weapons would increase the vulnerability of the regime, not decrease as they hope. These options, however, carry a high risk of escalation to military conflict. Second, the United States could try to alter Iran's beliefs about the United States. This does not necessarily require a radical shift from a negative/conflictual view to a positive/benign one. That is, in any case, does not solely depend on American actions and will be hard to achieve at any rate. However, current Iranian belief about the US preferences is not only a factor of whether the United States is seen as conflictual or cooperative but also a factor of to what extend the United States can control historical developments. The same conflictual view of the United States (a low level of P-1), when coupled with a sense of equal control over historical developments (P-4a and P-4b roughly equal) is likely to shift Iranian beliefs about US preferences. In the case of equal control over historical developments, the United States will prefer Negotiation over Deadlock.24 This is the case because Iran believes that the United States could control the developments and therefore, takes the risks associated with Deadlock outcome. However, when Iran believes that it also has important control over the developments in the nuclear crisis, then its image of the United States as “Bully” will change. In other words, if the US actions can convince the Iranians that they are also in control of the developments, we might move out of this deadlock. How this can be achieved? First, as suggested above, the issue of a nuclear program and nuclear weapons program should be separated and dealt as such. This will also make it hard for the hardliners in the Iranian regime to play the “foreign interference with Iran” card with the public. It should be made clear that the United States and its allies do not, in principle, object to Iran's right to develop civilian nuclear energy in accordance with NPT guidelines but will punish Iran severely, including regime change, if a nuclear weapons program is found to exist. Second, the United States could offer direct negotiations with Iran on a variety of subjects (Iraq, Afghanistan, low-level diplomatic representation etc.) which may or may not include the nuclear issue. This can increase Iran's self-confidence and alleviate its fears of being exploited by the United States. Lastly, an implicit admission of the Iranian interests in the Middle East could go a long way in convincing Iranians that they are not victims of a bully but an equal player in the international game. Iran expects to be treated as an equal on the international scene and is very sensitive to slights (Beeman 2005:43–44, 52, 160). Being told what they can or cannot do infuriates the Iranians as this implies an inferior social position, which they cannot accept (Beeman 2005:160). This last point is perhaps the hardest to achieve as it requires the United States to accept Iran as a regional power and deal with it accordingly. It would mean the reversal of 30 years of American foreign policy toward Iran. Furthermore, the nuclear crisis cannot be divorced from the broader foreign policy objectives of both Iran and the United States regarding the Middle East (Ozcan and Ozdamar 2009). Iran sees itself as the natural hegemon in the Middle East and perceives the United States as a direct threat to its regional interests and ambitions. The United States, on the other hand, fears that a nuclear-armed Iran will be able to exert greater influence in the region and harder to deter. Whether the United States will be able to accommodate Iranian interests without sacrificing its own remains to be seen. 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( 2000 ) Perfect Deterrence . Cambridge, UK : Cambridge University Press . Zahedi Dariush . ( 2000 ) The Iranian Revolution: Then and Now . Boulder, CO : Westview . Footnotes 1 Earlier versions of this article were presented in APSA 2007, ISA 2009, and in a seminar in University of Southern California in September 2008. I am grateful to the participants in these panels for their helpful criticisms. I also would like to thank the editors and reviewers for their comments. 2 Overview of the history of Iranian nuclear program can be found in Kerr (2008), Burr (2009), Barnaby (2005), Sokolski and Clawson (2004, 2005), and various reports by International Crisis Group, available at http://www.crisisweb.org 3 This section is based on Devlen (2008) and Devlen and Ozdamar (2009). 4 See Walker and Schafer (2004); Schafer and Walker (2006); Walker, Schafer, and Young (1998); Malici and Buckner (2008); Malici and Malici (2005); Feng (2005); Devlen (2008); Devlen and Ozdamar (2009) for examples of operational code analysis used for modeling purposes. 5 They represent the answers to the questions developed by George (1969, 1979). They are available in the journal's Web page as an appendix due to space constraints (Table S1). 6 The revised Holsti typology is presented in the appendix, available on the journal's Web page (Table S2). 7 Details for this can be found in Schafer and Walker (2006). 8 Those threads are: (i) shared, tangible reservoirs of images associated with positive emotion; (ii) shared “good” identifications; (iii) absorption of others'“bad” qualities; (iv) absorption of leaders' internal worlds; (v) chosen glories; (vi) chosen traumas; and (vii) formation of symbols that develop their own autonomy (Volkan 2004:37). 9 The impact of large-group identity on crisis behavior can be seen as similar to Fearon's (1995) discussion of issue indivisibility as a rationalist explanation of war and Nincic's (2005) discussion of ideational factors as a source of renegade behavior. What is common in all three concepts is the presence of deeply seated socio-psychological factors affecting the reading of the crisis at the elite and societal level that influence the decision-making process and relevant preference orderings, particularly with regards to the acceptability of conflict compared to submission. 10 For a detailed discussion of different approaches of democratic and authoritarian leaders to foreign policy crisis, see Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2003), chapter 6. 11 The letters are dated May 8 and November 29, 2006. 12 For a recent work on Iranian domestic politics and its impact on foreign policy see Rakel (2008). 13 On Iranian domestic structure see Rakel (2008), Katouzian, Homa, and Shahidi (2008), and Buchta (2000). 14 Malici and Buckner (2008) derive the operational code of Ahmedinejad from thirteen speeches and their results are similar to mine. 15 I hand-coded the documents therefore one cannot use norming group to compare the results. Instead I took 0.50 as the mid-point for P-4b to suggest equal control over historical development. Therefore, 0.81 suggests the Other has significantly more control over historical developments. See Schafer and Walker (2006) for more on this issue. 16 Iran is the Challenger and the United States is the Defender in the game. 17 For overviews of Iran's history Mackey (1996), Zahedi (2000), Abrahamian (2008) and Clawson and Rubin (2005), and for Iranian strategic culture Stanley (2006), Cain (2002), Beeman (2005) and Giles (2000). 18 The results of this opinion poll are available at http://www.worldpublicopinion.org 19 This of course does not suggest that a secret nuclear weapons program does not exist. It might very well be the case, and although the 2007 National Intelligence Estimate argues that Iran stopped its nuclear weapons program that decision is inherently reversible. As NIE makes it clear, Iran might not be actively pursuing nuclear weapons today but it for sure would like to keep that option open. 20 The report of Bipartisan Policy Center Task Force, “Meeting the Challenge: US Policy Toward Iranian Nuclear Development,” published in September 2008. 21 A timeline of the Iranian nuclear crisis is available from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty at http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1060639.html 22 Statement of IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei on March 2, 2009 is available at http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Statements/2009/ebsp2009n002.html 23 See http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123763763332603841.html for excerpts from Khamenei's speech. 24 See Table 1, the fifth preference order. Supporting Information Supplementary Data Table S1. George's (1969, 1979) Questions Table S2. Revised Holsti Operational Code Typology* Please note: Wiley-Blackwell are not responsible for the content or functionality of any supporting materials supplied by the authors. Any queries (other than missing material) should be directed to the corresponding author for the article. © 2010 International Studies Association
TI - Dealing or Dueling with the United States? Explaining and Predicting Iranian Behavior during the Nuclear Crisis
JF - International Studies Review
DO - 10.1111/j.1468-2486.2009.00912.x
DA - 2010-03-09
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/dealing-or-dueling-with-the-united-states-explaining-and-predicting-yhYhhxizQ0
SP - 1
EP - 68
VL - Advance Article
IS - 1
DP - DeepDyve
ER -