TY - JOUR
AU1 - Martimort, David
AU2 - Sand‐Zantman, Wilfried
AB - We take a mechanism design perspective to investigate how environmental agreements should account for multilateral externalities, incentive compatibility, and voluntary participation by sovereign countries. The optimal mechanism involves a tradeoff between a free rider problem in the effort provision of participating countries and the necessity of inducing countries to ratify the agreement. This mechanism can be approximated by a simple menu with attractive implementation and robustness properties. Limits on enforcement and commitment might nevertheless hinder the performance of this menu, making the “business as usual” scenario more likely.
TI - A MECHANISM DESIGN APPROACH TO CLIMATE‐CHANGE AGREEMENTS
JF - Journal of the European Economic Association
DO - 10.1111/jeea.12150
DA - 2016-06-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/a-mechanism-design-approach-to-climate-change-agreements-vkilWV0s0g
SP - 669
EP - 718
VL - 14
IS - 3
DP - DeepDyve
ER -