TY - JOUR
AU - Vives, Xavier
AB - COMPLEMENTARITIES AND INFORMATION: AN INTRODUCTION Douglas Gale Xavier Vives New York University IESE Business School and UPF The study of economies and markets with dispersed information has attracted much attention since the pioneering work of Radner (1979) and Grossman (1989). The importance of informational efficiency in markets is well under- stood (see Vives 2008). In a relatively recent development, the analysis of complementarities has been advanced by tools from the theory of supermod- ular games (Vives 1985, 1990; Milgrom and Roberts 1990a, 1990b; see also Vives 2005 for a survey that includes games of incomplete information). In many situations, strategic complementarity interacts in a rich way with information structures to provide deeper insights into the workings of the economy. The papers in this Symposium present the state of the art in the field—from theory to empirics and experiments and from the analysis of markets to the analysis of organizations. The contribution by George-Marios Angeletos and Alessandro Pavan ana- lyzes economies with private information. The objective is to design taxation instruments, contingent on ex post public information on fundamentals and aggre- gate activity, that will improve market allocations when the government cannot observe the dispersed information that agents have on 
TI - Complementarities and Information: An Introduction
JF - Journal of the European Economic Association
DO - 10.1162/JEEA.2009.7.1.1
DA - 2009-03-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/complementarities-and-information-an-introduction-sVQ0MZXIJc
SP - 1
EP - 10
VL - 7
IS - 1
DP - DeepDyve
ER -