TY - JOUR AU - Czaika, Mathias AB - Abstract How do emerging economies compete for international skilled workers? To explore policies used by non-Western countries to attract or retain high-skilled workers in the context of the ‘race for talent’, this article analyses and compares governmental measures employed in three emerging economies: Brazil, India, and Malaysia. Based on insights from 17 expert interviews, we describe the practices and strategies of these three countries to reverse ‘brain drain’—that is, the loss of human capital through migration. The article argues that the design and development of migration and skill recruitment policies are at different stages and of varying relevance to respective national actors. While Malaysia has become an active player and innovator on the international talent recruitment market, the other two countries still consider themselves as ‘self-sufficient’, relying on either their domestically produced human resources or, in the case of India, their skilled diaspora. The three countries are situated at different, mostly early stages of a ‘migration policy transition’, with rising demand for human capital, but still insufficient legal, administrative, and economic provisions to recruit and admit many skilled foreign workers. The ‘global race for talent’ is less of a race for the global South as it is in the global North. To achieve the aim of Malaysia to become a world-class economy, we have to implement initiatives to attract, develop and retain skilled human capital.        Najib Razak, Former Prime Minister of Malaysia (2009–18) in 2010 1. Introduction As part of deepening economic integration, many emerging economies develop into new international migration hubs by creating economic opportunities for an increasing number of internationally mobile highly skilled workers, students, and investors. Economic progress and rising aspirations for better professional opportunities stimulate intentions to migrate temporarily or permanently both from and towards those emerging economies. This rapid economic transformation of middle-income countries like Brazil, India, and Malaysia may increasingly impact upon established international migration patterns by shifting flows of skilled and high-skilled professionals towards these emerging economic hubs (Artuc et al. 2015). Talent-attracting policies increasingly target students, high-skilled workers, and investors. In many countries, students are solicited as a highly desirable group of migrants because of the skills and ‘potential’ they bring in the form of their ‘semi-finished human capital’ (Khadria 2001). As a consequence, countries are increasingly trying to attract international students, not only for reasons related to universities’ interest in generating income but, more importantly, to increase the skill base of domestic labour markets if students can be persuaded to stay after graduation. Since the 2000s, the competition for high-skilled professionals has become an established practice among most Western countries. More recently, a growing number of non-Western (middle-income) countries are also trying to tap the global talent pool in order to spur domestic human capital accumulation (Figure 1). In the future, a continuation of this trend may possibly reduce the relative attractiveness of traditional Western (Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)) immigration states in the global race for talent (Artuc et al. 2015; PWC 2012b). Figure 1. Open in new tabDownload slide High-skilled migration policy objectives (percentage of countries). Source: Own calculations based on World Population Policies database (various years): accessed Feb 2019. Figure 1. Open in new tabDownload slide High-skilled migration policy objectives (percentage of countries). Source: Own calculations based on World Population Policies database (various years): accessed Feb 2019. Information on government views towards and policies on high-skilled migration, collected biennially by the United Nations (UN) Populations Division for all 193 UN Member States, indicates that in most high-income (especially OECD) countries raising high-skilled immigration has been an important policy objective since 2005 (Figure 1). This policy development has become particularly prominent in the majority of highly developed countries but also in middle-income and even low-income countries, so that by 2015 almost half of all UN Member States had the intention to increase the inflow or retention of high-skilled migrants. Largely in the global South regions and countries, where high percentages of high-skilled workers emigrate (such as the Caribbean or South Africa in the health sector), policy measures to lure ‘talent back’ are seen as crucial. Consequently, brain circulation policies are often considered as ‘the solution’ (Clemens, Özden and Rapoport 2015), creating ‘triple win’ outcomes for countries and migrants involved (Saxenian 2006). There is a growing literature on how OECD countries attract and retain talent (Cerna 2016), but the scholarly literature on developing and emerging countries’ strategies towards high-skilled migrants is still rather limited (some exceptions are Lowell and Findlay (2001), Wiesbrock (2008), Jonkers (2008), Güngör and Tansel (2008), Solimano (2008), Czaika and de Haas (2013), Czaika (2018), Clemens (2013), and Li et al. (2019). While some countries have been much more active than others, most have at best some ad hoc policies in place—often with limited success (Devadason and Meng 2014). The knowledge on the effectiveness of these policies is limited despite an increase in interest. This article seeks to fill this research gap by providing insights about the role of national policies play in attracting and retaining high-skilled migrants to emerging migration hubs. We describe the changing role of three emerging economies, Brazil, India, and Malaysia, on the international talent market and explore the extent to which these economies are perceived as ‘attractive’ for domestic and foreign high-skilled workers and the attention paid in public and political debates to attracting and retaining talent. By reviewing recent trends in migration policies and practices, it assesses how stakeholders interpret the emerging role of these countries as regional and global migration hubs in terms of their relative importance as origins and destinations of international migration. The article argues that these three emerging economies are representing larger groups of countries, which are situated at different stages in a ‘migration policy transition’. This is largely reflected by slowly changing policy priorities along with the transition from net emigration to(wards) net immigration countries. 2. Research methods The article uses the case study comparative method, which refers to the systematic analysis of a small number of cases (Lijphart 1971). Comparative case studies allow for a rich understanding of certain phenomena (Heady 2001). Our findings are based on detailed qualitative case studies on Brazil, India, and Malaysia, three emerging economies, which are in the process of implementing policies to retain foreign and attract domestic talent. The cases are selected for a most different case design (Przeworski and Teune 1970) within emerging economies in order to examine whether they are any general trends in high-skilled migration, which cannot be explained by a close similarity of the case study countries. The three countries are heterogeneous in terms of the migration context and considerable case variation in terms of population size, culture, social, political, and economic conditions, historical linkages as well as migration flows. They have also varying capacities to attract and retain talent. The 2020 Global Index of Talent Competitiveness ranked Malaysia 28th (up from 35th in 2017) out of 132 countries for attracting talent, far ahead of Brazil (96th, down from 73th in 2017) and India (92th, up from 114th in 2017). Considering the ability to retain talent, Malaysia ranked 34th (up from 39th in 2017), again ahead of Brazil (70th, up from 77th) and India (95th, up from 104th) (INSEAD 2017, 2020). While each of the three countries is embedded in a distinct regional context, they also share some common features. All three are large economic systems with a history of central planning and draw successfully on their diasporic communities overseas. In addition, they have experienced a large outflow of high-skilled workers in the last decades while simultaneously becoming countries of destination. Despite their large populations (especially in the case of Brazil and India), they all are in need of skill-specific labour. More recently, immigration policies need to be considered against the backdrop of rising nationalism in Brazil and India, especially since the coming to power of President Bolsonaro in Brazil and the entrenchment of Prime Minister Modi in India. The policy review and analysis of the three case countries is based on a mixture of elite interviews, as well as analysis of policy documents and websites for background information (Cerna 2016; Paul 2015). Seventeen representatives from policy-making, academia, and media were interviewed in the three countries. The interviewees were selected for their expertise on the topic of high-skilled migration and identified by publications in journals, books, or newspapers, membership in expert commissions or snowballing technique. The interviews were conducted by Skype (except one for which we received a written response) over the period between August 2015 and June 2016. They lasted on average one hour, were recorded, and then transcribed. To keep the interviewees anonymous, codes were assigned to the different categories of interviewees (the Appendix). These interviews serve two objectives. First, they complement available information and policy statements of ministries. Secondly, they are key for identifying past, existing, and planned policies on talent migration in the respective countries, as official information is often sparse. Despite great efforts, it was challenging to obtain a representative sample of interview partners in the respective countries, which was partly due to the lack of existing migration experts and partly due to the lack of interest and experience in high-skilled migration. As interviews pose some limitations because of respondents’ bias, secondary data from official documentation, websites, and other publicly available sources were used as much as possible to support findings. 3. Migration and policies in transition: some conceptual reflections Figure 2 displays the evolution of net migration and income per capita for all three countries over the past three decades. India has hereby by far the largest gross and net emigrant population of the three, but also Brazil is a net emigration country even though on a much smaller scale, while Malaysia is the only net immigration country of the three. Contrasting net emigration figures with levels of development (measured by income per capita) provides supportive evidence of a migration transition process where the three countries are situated at different stages of the ‘migration hump’.1 Figure 2. Open in new tabDownload slide Net migration versus income per capita, 1990–2019. Sources: UN Migrant Stock database (UNPD 2019); World Development Indicators (World Bank 2019). Figure 2. Open in new tabDownload slide Net migration versus income per capita, 1990–2019. Sources: UN Migrant Stock database (UNPD 2019); World Development Indicators (World Bank 2019). While in all three countries under investigation migration policies targeting citizens often date back to the 1980s–1990s, those regulating the entry and stay of foreigners have been developed over the last decade. This seems to reflect each nation’s role as a country of both emigration and immigration. However, as countries develop, emigration and immigration patterns and dynamics change and adapt to newly emerging economic, social, and political structures. International migration is an inherent part of socio-economic and political transformations. Less developed countries, which often suffer under a severe economic and political vulnerability and fragility, are mostly characterised by net emigration, that is, the number of people leaving those countries due to economic or political reasons is usually larger than the number of people moving in the opposite direction. Emerging economies, on the other hand, have usually entered a more stable growth path and have institutionalised more reliable governance structures, are becoming more attractive places not only for international investors but also for skilled (and low-skilled) workers. As a consequence, the migration balance between inflows and outflows is likely to shift gradually towards greater net immigration, first of nationals living abroad and later of international migrant workers. The three countries under consideration, Brazil, India, and Malaysia, are positioned at different stages of an economic, political, and social transformation, which is usually associated with a transition from a net emigration towards a net immigration country. While India is still much dominated by high net emigration, Malaysia has turned into a net immigration country already some decades ago. Brazil is situated somewhat in between, with important intra- and extra-regional immigration flows, but also a significant outflow of skilled workers and students. Contrary to most developing countries and the three emerging economies studied, the majority of OECD countries have developed highly sophisticated immigration systems employing a variety of policy instruments targeting different immigration groups, including students, workers (including high-skilled immigrants), family reunification, intra-company transfers, investors/entrepreneurs, and asylum-seekers (OECD 2016). However, also industrialised or now post-industrialised OECD countries have been going through this so-called migration transition, which suggests an integrated relationship between the level of economic development, state formation, and respective patterns of population mobility (Zelinsky 1971). Highly developed countries are hereby integrated into often complex migration systems, consisting of significant global, regional, and local movements, whereas less advanced economies are mostly characterised by migration systems that are mainly local or regional (Skeldon 1997). During the transition process from less developed to potentially highly developed economies, the dominant migration direction is gradually turning from net emigration (i.e. gross emigration is higher than gross immigration) to(wards) net immigration, that is, to a country with continuously growing and diversifying immigrant populations (Czaika and de Haas 2014; de Haas 2010). From a political–institutional perspective, we conceptualise that a migration transition à la Zelinsky is usually associated with a concomitant ‘migration policy transition’ by which, over time, migration regimes and regulations become more elaborate and fine-grained not only by establishing multiple immigration categories for temporary, circular and permanent, economic and non-economic, forced and voluntary migrants, etc. but also by changing respective policy priorities. Despite some variation in the timing and sequencing of new migration policy measures and instruments, most countries ‘in transition’ are moving slowly sometimes rapidly towards more advanced and sophisticated immigration and skill recruitment systems. Consequently, emerging economies are gradually developing immigration policies resembling those of the OECD model, although they may still have slightly different needs and policy priorities compared to the most advanced OECD countries. Figure 3 illustrates these non-linear relationships between level of development, net migration, and migration policy priorities in which we locate our three case countries at different stages of the migration policy transition. We consider Malaysia to be situated at one end of this transition process, with significant immigration flows from the regional neighbourhood and actively seeking to attract foreign professionals more globally, ultimately aiming to increase its share and influence on the international talent market. Based on our analysis, India sits rather at the other end of the spectrum, as its focus is still on the protection of mostly low-skilled workers and the return of high-skilled diaspora, including graduates, scientists, and investors. Brazil can be situated between Malaysia and India as the country is still a net emigration country, but with increasing immigration regulations. Figure 3. Open in new tabDownload slide Migration transition and changing policy priorities (‘migration policy transition’). Figure 3. Open in new tabDownload slide Migration transition and changing policy priorities (‘migration policy transition’). 4. Emergence of skill-attracting policies in Brazil, India, and Malaysia: a comparative policy analysis In 2019, more than 17 million India-born migrants have been living abroad, of which the majority are low skilled. However, in OECD countries, there are more than 2 million high-skilled Indians, which is about two-thirds of all Indian migrants in OECD destination countries (OECD 2017). Both India and Brazil are net emigration countries with a larger number of citizens living abroad than foreign citizens hosted. For both countries, though, the propensity of (skilled and unskilled) emigration to an OECD country is relatively low, at about 0.4 and 0.7 per cent, respectively. Migration rates for skilled people, though, are significantly higher, at 2.6 per cent for Brazil and 5.2 per cent for Malaysia, reflecting a (‘positive’) self-selection of migrants along lines of educational attainment (OECD 2017). However, this level of losing high-skilled workers seems moderate as high-skilled emigration rates for these three countries are relatively similar to total emigration rates. Malaysia is the only net immigration country of the three and has an immigrant population of about 3.4 million (only a small proportion is likely to be high skilled) in 2019 (UNPD 2019). Over the past decade, international outbound mobility of students from emerging economies has more than tripled and has become a major route of entry for (prospective) high-skilled migrants. In absolute terms, India and China are the main countries of origin, contributing collectively more than half a million internationally enrolled students. The number of Indian students abroad stood at 234,000 in 2015, which is the second largest group of outbound students after China, and was considerably larger than the number of students coming from countries like Brazil or Malaysia, although Brazil’s Science without Borders programme has led to some growth in out- and inbound mobility of students and scientists (UNESCO/UIS 2017). While all three countries are significant emigration countries for students, they are also important destinations for international students, mostly from geographically proximate countries with historical, cultural, or linguistic ties. An important evolution in migration policies over the last decade has been the emergence of measures specifically targeting high-skilled professionals. Countries worldwide, however, diverge in the extent and types of strategies implemented to encourage the integration of international talent in their economies and societies. The three countries under consideration represent this policy diversity as they have gradually rearranged their migration policies, and particularly have stepped up their initiatives to attract international talent. While Brazil concentrates its recruitment efforts on regions, which are historically or geographically proximate—South America and Southern Europe—India mostly focused on attractive return policies for its citizens abroad (interviews with IN-UNI1 and IN-UNI3). Of the three countries, Malaysia has become the most active player and innovator on the international talent recruitment market. Table 1 reports on overall trends in national policies and government views on four aspects of migration.2 Since 2011, Brazil and Malaysia aim to raise their numbers of high-skilled immigrants, while India’s overarching policy objective since 2005 has been to maintain respective levels of immigration and emigration. More recently, Brazil has policies to encourage the return of citizens. Malaysia did not intervene with regard to its emigrants until 2011, but since the early 2000s has instead sought to encourage the return of its citizens. Table 1. Changing migration policy objectives, 2005–15. Country . Year . Policy on immigration . Policy on high-skilled workers . Policy on emigration . Policy to encourage the return of citizens . Brazil 2015 Raise Raise No intervention Yes 2013 Maintain Raise No intervention NA 2011 Maintain Raise No intervention No 2009 Maintain Maintain No intervention No 2007 Maintain Maintain No intervention No 2005 Maintain Maintain No intervention No India 2015 Maintain Maintain Maintain NA 2013 Maintain Maintain Maintain NA 2011 Maintain Maintain Maintain NA 2009 Maintain Maintain Maintain NA 2007 Maintain Maintain Maintain NA 2005 Maintain Maintain Raise NA Malaysia 2015 Lower Raise Lower Yes 2013 Lower Raise Lower NA 2011 Lower Raise Lower Yes 2009 Maintain Maintain No intervention Yes 2007 Maintain Maintain No intervention Yes 2005 Maintain Maintain No intervention Yes Country . Year . Policy on immigration . Policy on high-skilled workers . Policy on emigration . Policy to encourage the return of citizens . Brazil 2015 Raise Raise No intervention Yes 2013 Maintain Raise No intervention NA 2011 Maintain Raise No intervention No 2009 Maintain Maintain No intervention No 2007 Maintain Maintain No intervention No 2005 Maintain Maintain No intervention No India 2015 Maintain Maintain Maintain NA 2013 Maintain Maintain Maintain NA 2011 Maintain Maintain Maintain NA 2009 Maintain Maintain Maintain NA 2007 Maintain Maintain Maintain NA 2005 Maintain Maintain Raise NA Malaysia 2015 Lower Raise Lower Yes 2013 Lower Raise Lower NA 2011 Lower Raise Lower Yes 2009 Maintain Maintain No intervention Yes 2007 Maintain Maintain No intervention Yes 2005 Maintain Maintain No intervention Yes Source: UN World Population Policies database (various years) accessed 3 Apr 2020. Bold text indicates policy change. Open in new tab Table 1. Changing migration policy objectives, 2005–15. Country . Year . Policy on immigration . Policy on high-skilled workers . Policy on emigration . Policy to encourage the return of citizens . Brazil 2015 Raise Raise No intervention Yes 2013 Maintain Raise No intervention NA 2011 Maintain Raise No intervention No 2009 Maintain Maintain No intervention No 2007 Maintain Maintain No intervention No 2005 Maintain Maintain No intervention No India 2015 Maintain Maintain Maintain NA 2013 Maintain Maintain Maintain NA 2011 Maintain Maintain Maintain NA 2009 Maintain Maintain Maintain NA 2007 Maintain Maintain Maintain NA 2005 Maintain Maintain Raise NA Malaysia 2015 Lower Raise Lower Yes 2013 Lower Raise Lower NA 2011 Lower Raise Lower Yes 2009 Maintain Maintain No intervention Yes 2007 Maintain Maintain No intervention Yes 2005 Maintain Maintain No intervention Yes Country . Year . Policy on immigration . Policy on high-skilled workers . Policy on emigration . Policy to encourage the return of citizens . Brazil 2015 Raise Raise No intervention Yes 2013 Maintain Raise No intervention NA 2011 Maintain Raise No intervention No 2009 Maintain Maintain No intervention No 2007 Maintain Maintain No intervention No 2005 Maintain Maintain No intervention No India 2015 Maintain Maintain Maintain NA 2013 Maintain Maintain Maintain NA 2011 Maintain Maintain Maintain NA 2009 Maintain Maintain Maintain NA 2007 Maintain Maintain Maintain NA 2005 Maintain Maintain Raise NA Malaysia 2015 Lower Raise Lower Yes 2013 Lower Raise Lower NA 2011 Lower Raise Lower Yes 2009 Maintain Maintain No intervention Yes 2007 Maintain Maintain No intervention Yes 2005 Maintain Maintain No intervention Yes Source: UN World Population Policies database (various years) accessed 3 Apr 2020. Bold text indicates policy change. Open in new tab Brazil does not seem to have a particular programme to recruit high-skilled migrants but favours the settlement of high-skilled migrants through the implementation of attractive integration policies, including facilities to transfer from a temporary visa to a permanent visa. Recent policy developments point towards future facilitations for skilled workers in line with the objective of increasing the foreign labour force. Malaysia has attempted to facilitate the immigration and settlement of high-skilled workers, issuing since 2011 permanent residence permits to certain high-skilled foreigners who have been in the country for three years or longer. In India, rules for foreign high-skilled workers in the last decade have become stricter. In 2009, for instance, the country required companies to cap the number of foreign workers they employ in India to 1 per cent of their total personnel, and since 2010, skilled workers have to earn a minimum annual salary of USD 25,000 to be eligible for an employment visa. Overall, in all three countries, migration policies are a ‘mixed bag’, characterised by a variety of measures regulating the emigration of citizens, courting their diasporas, as well as regulating the entry and stay of foreigners (Czaika and de Haas 2013). Table 2 provides a more detailed overview of policy priorities and measures for attracting and retaining talent. According to their stage of development and the current state in the long-term processes of a migration policy transition, each of the three countries has implemented a slightly different policy configuration (‘policy mix’) and employs varying measures to recruit and retain talent. These range from providing tax incentives, improving educational/research opportunities, engaging with the (skilled) diaspora, to bilateral labour agreements and recognition of qualifications. Table 2. Comparison between priorities and measures to attract and retain talent. Factors to attract and retain talent . Brazil . India . Malaysia . Priority Domestic talent x x Foreign talent x x Diaspora x x Measures Financial incentives (tax breaks/exemptions) for domestic and foreign talent x x Educational/research opportunities for domestic talent x x Diaspora engagement x x Bilateral labour agreements x x Right of free circulation x x Mutual recognition of degrees/credentials x x Factors to attract and retain talent . Brazil . India . Malaysia . Priority Domestic talent x x Foreign talent x x Diaspora x x Measures Financial incentives (tax breaks/exemptions) for domestic and foreign talent x x Educational/research opportunities for domestic talent x x Diaspora engagement x x Bilateral labour agreements x x Right of free circulation x x Mutual recognition of degrees/credentials x x Open in new tab Table 2. Comparison between priorities and measures to attract and retain talent. Factors to attract and retain talent . Brazil . India . Malaysia . Priority Domestic talent x x Foreign talent x x Diaspora x x Measures Financial incentives (tax breaks/exemptions) for domestic and foreign talent x x Educational/research opportunities for domestic talent x x Diaspora engagement x x Bilateral labour agreements x x Right of free circulation x x Mutual recognition of degrees/credentials x x Factors to attract and retain talent . Brazil . India . Malaysia . Priority Domestic talent x x Foreign talent x x Diaspora x x Measures Financial incentives (tax breaks/exemptions) for domestic and foreign talent x x Educational/research opportunities for domestic talent x x Diaspora engagement x x Bilateral labour agreements x x Right of free circulation x x Mutual recognition of degrees/credentials x x Open in new tab All three countries employ various policy measures to attract and retain domestic and international talent, although with slightly different priorities. India, for instance, is much more focused on domestic talent and its diaspora than on foreign talent (Li et al. 2019), whereas both Brazil and Malaysia have at times considered attracting foreign talent an important policy objective. Also, while Brazil and Malaysia are able to rely on skilled workers from respective regional regimes, India does not have similar ‘skill reserves’ in the neighbourhood but rather focuses on domestic skill creation and supply. These policy priorities and configurations are discussed in greater detail in the following case studies. 4.1 Brazil Brazil’s emerging role as a regional migration hub within Latin America and beyond has characterised its recent policy developments in relation to the creation of Mercosur (Mercado Común del Sur) as a regional economic community regulating inter alia intra-regional mobility of citizens of Member States but also the entry and stay of foreigners more generally. The relation between migration policy developments and respective regional integration is reflected in measures such as facilitated access to citizenship and socio-economic rights for citizens from neighbouring countries. The implementation of the Mercosur free mobility agreement in 2002 (initially signed by Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay, and Venezuela, and by Bolivia in 2012, with associate members Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Peru, and Suriname) automatically grants a (temporary) residence and work permit to Mercosur citizens, with permanent residence rights available after an initial two-year residence permit. Consequently, given that the supply of (skilled) migrant workers seems largely to be satisfied by migrants either from Mercosur countries or the Lusophone countries, pro-active talent recruitment policies are largely considered superfluous. Brazil aims to retain foreign students from Mercosur countries through 2009 agreements on standardisation of qualifications across these countries. It is also becoming a relevant hub for students from Portuguese-speaking African countries and is drafting policies to incite its talented young diaspora back from Europe and the USA. For instance, Brazil’s 2011 Science without Borders programme has emerged as a significant government-funded student mobility programme, granting about 23,000 study and research fellowships by 2015, which is, however, far below the 2010 target announced. Reasons for this shortfall are a lack of applicants with sufficient fluency in English or French (Schwartzman and Schwartzman 2015). Brazil has not (yet) implemented a particular recruitment programme for high-skilled migrants due to ‘… a still very protectionist mind set … So immigration is not actually encouraged in terms of skilled workers’ (interview with BR-MGMT). Brazil rather favours self-organised or company-driven recruitment and settlement of highly skilled migrants through the implementation of attractive integration policies, including facilities to transfer from a temporary visa to a permanent visa. However, bureaucratic inefficiencies and other regulative barriers, including validation of diplomas and credentials, are major obstacles in this process (interview with BR-UNION, The Economist 2015). Companies often complain about administrative obstacles to recruiting foreign talent (interview with BR-MD), at the same time, Brazilian companies are becoming increasingly active in recruiting specific skills outside the countries (interview BR-MGMT; Schroevers 2014). Brazil is in the process of changing its immigration policy to attract global talent (especially in engineering, IT, and healthcare sectors) and has engaged in policy learning from countries with established high-skilled immigration regimes. The country has taken advantage of the economic crisis to attract high-skilled immigrants, including Portuguese engineers. From 2008 to 2013, the number of visas issued to foreign professionals increased by 60 per cent (Momo 2014). However, challenges remain especially in the domain of recognition of qualifications. For example, Brazil and Portugal signed a memorandum of understanding in 2013, which facilitated the recognition of qualifications between its institutions (Universidade Nova de Lisboa 2016). However, regulations on foreign employment are still relatively restrictive and work permits often issued in connection with the establishment of foreign companies (Schwartzman and Schwartzman 2015). Besides the recruitment of foreign talent, Brazil aims to attract investment and entrepreneurship through the diaspora and through the entry of foreign investors and business people Return schemes have been put in place that should facilitate the return of the diaspora, often including particular support regarding the opening of a business. For investors of a minimum USD 160,000 and plans to create new jobs, Brazil also grants permanent residence and offers citizenship eligibility after four years. At least USD 48,000 is required for those investing in innovation, applicable or basic research, with scientific and technological purposes (PWC 2016). 4.2 India In terms of skill supply, India can be considered the most ‘self-sufficient’ country among the three under consideration as it is predominantly trying to develop domestic talent for industries with projected skills shortages such as IT (interview with IN-UNI1). With regard to India’s domestic talent abroad, the main factor of attraction is not particular policy schemes or programmes but rather that ‘… it is their home country’ (interview with IN-UNI4). While both Buga and Meyer (2012) and Giardano and Terranova (2012) argue that the 2008 economic crisis was one of the reasons why Indian emigrants returned home, some interviewees claim that the decrease in job opportunities abroad did not result in a considerable return of Indian emigrants (interview with IN-UNI3). While, according to some, there is no targeted effort to recruit foreign talent, India has developed comprehensive strategies to attract its diaspora back (Naujoks 2010; Li et al. 2019). In contrast to low-skilled immigration, most of high-skilled immigration is self-regulated. Some interviewees argue that India does not lack talented individuals, so it is not a priority to attract them from elsewhere. Nonetheless, in the future, there might be a larger focus on attracting talent for particular sectors due to increasing skills shortages from developed countries and emerging countries (interviews with IN-UNI2, IN-UNI3 and IN-UNI4; PWC 2012a). Indian institutions are also seeking talent from abroad to advance in international university rankings as few Indian universities rank highly (various interviews; PWC 2012a). Universities have opened centres in India (such as Harvard University) to attract both Indian and international researchers (interview with IN-UNI4). For example, the Harvard Global Research Support Centre India supports different activities and services across India on behalf of several Harvard Schools (including on T.H. Chan School of Public Health) and centres, such as facilitating research and programming, disseminating research, and providing assistant to students (Harvard University 2020). Many Indian companies have CEOs and senior officials from around the world, and those such as the Tata group began hiring international talent at high levels 10–15 years ago (interview with IN-UNI4). Large companies also recruit Indian nationals from business schools abroad (interview with IN-UNI1), which is more challenging for small- and medium-sized companies because they do not often have the resources required for successful international recruitment and are less attractive to graduates. Additionally, some suggest that the country is not doing enough to recruit sufficient skilled labour. The private sector has its own human resource strategies to attract talent, but the public sector is lagging behind (Athawale, Todkar and Ghansawant 2013). A long-term strategy for attracting talent and rapidly implementing immigration proposals is important (interviews with IN-UNI2 and IN-UNI3). Particularly IT companies seek talent from abroad because many Indian IT professionals work outside the country. Citizens of most countries are given visas on arrival which facilitates the recruitment process (interview with IN-UNI4). A controversy exists over the question of whether or not India is an attractive destination for talented individuals (Radjou 2009; Ooi 2010). Some argue that India is attractive because of a considerable presence of research and development centres, a large number of computer and IT companies as well as business process outsourcing promoted by the government, the development of ‘tech cities’ such as Bangalore and Hyderabad, a welcoming culture, the affordable cost of living, quality of life, climate, investment opportunities, economic and political stability, high economic and salary growth, and the presence of a skilled workforce (various interviews; Chacko 2007; Buga and Meyer 2012; Giordano and Teranova 2012). However, others argue that some factors exist which decrease the attractiveness of the country, including hierarchical and conservative traditions in economic industries, institutes and the private sector, poor infrastructure, limited career opportunities, and lower salaries (interview with IN-UNI1). Therefore, to make India more attractive for talent, more fundamental changes in working conditions and the governance of organisations, as well as improvement in physical infrastructure, would be needed (interview with IN-UNI1; Nankervis et al. 2014). One interviewee sums it up in this way: ‘For foreign talents, certainly India is not number one, there are other destinations which are more attractive. For Indians overseas, whether they are diaspora or permanent residents abroad for a long time, it is attractive because it’s their home country. So that’s one dominant factor, which may over-ride other factors’ (interview with IN-UNI2; Buga and Meyer 2012). India has a strong focus on engaging with its diaspora. About 17.5 million Indians are estimated to live abroad (UNPD 2019),3 who generated an annual income equal to about 25 per cent of India’s gross domestic product (The Economic Times 2013). Most of the debate around diaspora involves talking about investment rather than talent attraction (interview with IN-UNI3). The Indian government has actively encouraged diaspora participation, for instance, by streamlining investment procedures, consulting on technology and education policies, and creating networks and institutional mechanisms to draw more effectively on their human and financial capital (Chanda and Sreenivasan 2006; Naujoks 2010; Li et al. 2019). The interviews suggest that India is mostly concerned with engaging its diaspora and focusing on its talent abroad, rather than trying to attract foreign talent. One interviewee argues that ‘India is not very proactive in terms of bringing them [Indians abroad] back. India rather facilitates that they have good positions abroad … And they contribute to the development by not necessarily coming back to India, but being in the global space, being in the trans-national city, they can still participate in India’s development’ (interview with IN-UNI2). Domestic talent abroad can contribute to India through ways other than being present in the country, such as remittances, overseas networks, portfolio investments, and skills and technology transfer (interview with IN-UNI1; Naujoks 2010; World Bank 2018). Losing high-skilled individuals seems to be less of a concern in India, mostly due to the large population size, large presence of (unskilled and skilled) labour, and the relatively small proportion of migrants. This reduces the need to attract migrants back and makes it difficult to raise wage levels (Chanda and Sreenivasan 2006). A number of measures are in place to attract and retain both domestic and foreign talent such as tax incentives. Some argue that tax incentives are not that important for attracting talent as most high-skilled migrants are in the highest tax bracket. But interest rates worldwide including in India have decreased, so this might become less beneficial in the future (interview with IN-UNI2). In contrast, foreign companies investing in India receive a number of tax exemptions by state governments, for instance, to boost spending on corporate social responsibility projects and invest in building infrastructure (interview with IN-UNI3). Several educational and research opportunities enable researchers, especially in life sciences and biotechnology, to apply for a large grant and to return to India to conduct a project. At the state level, a number of policies exist whereby individuals receiving a scholarship at a public institution are bound to serve the state upon their return (interview with IN-UNI1). In addition, scholarships exist for non-resident Indians to return to India (e.g. scholarship programme for diaspora children), while Indian companies, research and development institutions, and academic institutions try to hire Indian graduates from abroad (interview with IN-UNI4; Ministry of External Affairs 2019). The recognition of qualifications is considered a relatively smooth process for foreigners, as they only need to have their documents legalised and receive an apostil agreement in their country (interview with IN-UNI1). It is more complicated for professions including medicine, however, where foreigners often have to pass an examination by professional associations (interview with IN-UNI2) unless there are reciprocal agreements with countries (Sahai 2016). India’s extensive and active diaspora engagement started during the Bharatiya Janata Party government (1998–2004) as a nation-building project (Gangopadhyay 2005). The country has sought to draw on its networks of high-skilled emigrants to attract their investment and to engage in knowledge exchange. India set up a Ministry of Diaspora Affairs in 2004 to encourage flows of remittances, investments, and other resources and to stimulate interaction between overseas Indians and their country of origin (Wiesbrock 2008; Naujoks 2010; interview with IN-UNI1). Indian authorities are active in attracting Indians abroad to return through schemes such as the 2004 Study India programme as well as in fostering the internationalisation of their higher education through the Educational Exchange Programme, which establishes cooperation between countries to facilitate the exchange of students at undergraduate and postgraduate levels (India Council for Cultural Relations 2017). To encourage its diaspora to make greater financial investments, India has provided taxation privileges to expatriates using Indian banks for their savings (UN 2013). The country has also tried to improve the coordination between different ministries involved in migration issues and changed its tax policies to facilitate emigrants to invest in India (such as in software or R&D outsourcing firms) or spend some time there as entrepreneurs and professionals. Nonetheless, India has not actively promoted the return of scientists to public sector research institutes and universities, despite having implemented some (smaller) programmes and scholarships (Jonkers 2008). For example, India put in place numerous tools and programmes for their citizens in the diaspora to access rights, such as Innovation in Science Pursuit for Inspired Research programme, which aims to attract young talent to science, and for young researchers abroad to pursue a scientific career in India (Department of Science and Technology, Li et al. 2019). The current Prime Minister Narendra Modi has engaged more with the Indian diaspora and has tried to increase the ease of doing business in India and make (potential) returnees feel welcome. Every year a meeting, called Pravasi Bharatiya Divas or Non-resident Indian Day, is organised in India for foreign citizens and foreign residents (interviews with IN-UNI1, IN-UNI3, and IN-UNI4; Naujoks 2010; Li et al. 2019). The government has also introduced People of Indian Origin (POI) card for Indian residents abroad, which enables them to return to India within 10 years of leaving without a visa. This card entitles its bearer to free movement in the country, purchase of land and investment in infrastructure or education (interview with IN-UNI3; Chanda and Sreenivasan 2006; Li et al. 2019). Additionally, remittances play an increasing role in diaspora engagement, and the Indian government has implemented a liberalised scheme in which USD 250,000 per year can be remitted for school fees. India receives high amounts in remittances (USD 79 billion in 2018; World Bank 2018), which help to ease the country’s current account deficit (interviews with IN-UNI1 and IN-UNI2). The Indian government seems more concerned with securing investment and remittances from the diaspora than in the return of its expatriates (Giordano and Teranova 2012). This is supported by one interviewee who states that ‘we are not talking about attracting talent, we are looking for investment’ (IN-UNI3). India seeks to attract investors through the foreign investment route, and especially the Make in India policy. This 2014 government policy aims to bolster the manufacturing industry in India by increasing its share from 10–15 per cent of GDP to 25 per cent by 2022, according to the Department of Industrial Policy and Promotion (). Previously, India had already tried to attract capital investment from its large diaspora through programmes including the 1998 Resurgent India Bonds, the 2000 India Millennium Deposits, and the 2007 Overseas Indian Facilitation Centre. These, together with the Reserve Bank of India, eased the ability of Persons of Indian Origin to participate in Indian companies. Overall, India focuses more on diaspora engagement than foreign talent attraction (Li et al. 2019). There is no particular immigration policy for the latter, while the importance of the diaspora is visible in the creation of the Ministry of Diaspora Affairs. India seems not to be in a need to recruit foreign talent as it is not particularly proactive in long-term policy-making to attract such migrants, having mostly only short-term strategies in place. However, this may gradually change in the future given that India continues on a development path, which will create greater demand and employment opportunities for foreign skilled and high-skilled workers. Limited return mobility of the skilled Indian diaspora may trigger policy initiatives targeting the international talent pool more generally. But India still has a long way to go until turning into a net immigration country for skilled workers. 4.3 Malaysia The Malaysian government began two decades ago to adopt more aggressive measures to attract talented Malaysians and foreigners to the country. This is also in response to the development of the Indonesia–Malaysia–Singapore growth triangle to attract multinational corporations and the preceding economic links between Singapore and especially Johor in Malaysia (Smith 1997). It allowed developing Malaysia’s economic and research activities and created a need to attract back many talented Malaysians from Singapore and other countries (Ho and Tyson 2017). For example, the 1994 Returning Scientist programme aimed particularly to attract expertise to undertake research and development activities for priority areas under the Intensification of Research in Priority Areas Programme. Until its suspension in 1998, the scheme recruited 93 scientists, of which 23 were Malaysians and 70 foreigners (Thiruchelvam et al. 2004). Policies to attract scientific talent were criticised for having limited success as many incentives, including income tax breaks and exemptions, fast-track citizenship for foreign spouses and children, and education for children, were unable to compensate for systemic disadvantages in the labour market, namely low wages, both in the civil service and the private market, slow and inefficient administration leading to slow processing of applications, no guarantee of jobs, no organisation proactively recruiting overseas talent, and weak infrastructure supporting scientific endeavours in the first place (Thiruchelvam et al. 2004). In 2011, Talent Corp, a governmental organisation under the auspices of the Prime Minister’s Department, was implemented with the aim of formulating and facilitating initiatives ‘to address the availability of talent in line with the needs of the country’s economic transformation’ towards a high-income economy (Talent Corporation 2016a). To do so, the government designed a Talent Roadmap for leveraging the talents of all Malaysians and highly educated expatriates to meet its growth objectives and development goals (World Bank 2015). The Talent Corp policies have been able to partly alleviate some disincentives of earlier programmes. While the government has been mostly driving the talent development and recruitment, it has started to encourage industry engagement, for instance by creating an Industry Working Group under the Human Capital Council in Talent Corp (interview with MY-GOV1). A number of programmes and scholarships were implemented to attract domestic talent back. For example, Talent Corp is working with other ministries, stakeholders, and Malaysian companies, especially in the finance, medical, biotechnology, oil, and gas industries to recruit overseas Malaysian students upon their graduation. This joint work with companies has been in the form of, for example, career fairs in international cities (interview with MY-UNI1). The government has also focused on foreign talent. Foreign talent is considered helping address skills shortages in the short-term, and, in the long-term, providing greater diversity to the pool to help achieve Malaysia’s aspirations for an innovation-led economy (Talent Corporation 2016a). The government has a Critical Skilled Occupation List to attract talent to fill these (59) occupations in 2018/2019, such as engineers, accountants, nurses, doctors, and researchers (interview with MY-GOV2; Talent Corporation 2019). Some Malaysian states (e.g. Penang) have been proactive in talent attraction to increase investment in more advanced services and manufacturing, and to fill talent shortages in companies with financial, accounting, and IT services (Bin Yahya and Knaur 2010). Nevertheless, companies are often looking for unskilled workers, who experience fewer difficulties in obtaining work permits than high-skilled immigrants (interview with MY-RGOV2). The country seeks to attract foreign talent through various permits and retain talent through its Residence Pass-Talent (RP-T)—a 10-year renewable pass. The 2011 RP-T allows its holder to change employer, bring their family to Malaysia, and give working rights to any spouse. Workers can apply for this pass after working for three years in Malaysia (Talent Corporation 2016b). In addition to the RP-T, the Employment Pass is a work permit that enables expatriates to take up employment subject to a contract of employment (up to 60 months) and approval by the Expatriate Committee (interview with MY-RGOV1). One country expert (MY-UNI1) we interviewed states that ‘Malaysia is not very attractive [for talent]. Because even for Malaysians, a lot of them would have left the country because probably they think other countries are more attractive. So now we see that the government is trying to implement some return migration or more specially return talent migration policies, it hasn’t been attracting a large number of people’. This was echoed by other interviewees. There was already an unsuccessful returning expats programme put in place by the Ministry of Science in the 1990s. That is why there is a more recent focus on attracting domestic and foreign talent. Under the New Economic Policies, certain key industries have been identified for development over the next 20 years, and attracting talent is one objective to fulfil this development aim (interview with MY-UNI1). Additionally, attracting talent is seen as a stimulus to research and development (interview with MY-UNI2; Azman, Sirat and Pang 2016). Nonetheless, some concern exists that inflexible and bureaucratic policies, as well as social injustice in the country, are the main impediments for talent attraction, retention, and diasporic return (Balluch, Abdullah and Mohtar 2014). Besides trying to attract foreign talent, Malaysia has increasingly focused on its diaspora. As a government official summarises, ‘the government is no longer looking at people who leave the country as lost. Diaspora is considered as a group you can leverage to build connections and use these connections to benefit Malaysia. That is how the government perspective is changing’ (interview with MY-GOV1; Azman, Sirat and Pang 2016). Malaysia has a number of additional measures to attract and retain domestic and foreign talent. For instance, several tax incentives and exemptions exist for returning domestic talent but are less significant for individuals with higher earning potential abroad (also due to currency depreciation). For example, workers returning to Malaysia are taxed at a flat rate of 15 per cent instead of 20 per cent for the first five years of their return under the Returning Expert Programme (REP) (Orbitax 2018) and offered a tax-free car if purchased in Malaysia. There are greater tax incentives in place for companies investing in Malaysia—the Malaysian Investment and Development Authority offers greater tax incentives for companies investing in Malaysia, including tax exemptions, incentives for starting a company, grants for training, and funding for research and development (interviews with MY-UNI2, MY-RGOV1, MY-RGOV2, and MY-GOV2). Some educational and research opportunities for (domestic) workers also exist. Several companies (including Shell, Asiata, BASF, and Petronas) are developing domestic talent from an early age through scholarships and access to higher education (interview with MY-UNI2). The Scholarship Talent Attraction and Retention(STAR) programme has been effective in channelling scholarship students from renowned universities around the world to companies involved in the Economic Transformation Programme or the National Key Economic Area (NKEA) (interviews with MY-RGOV1 and MY-GOV2). The government scholars work and serve their scholarship bond with Malaysia’s leading private sector companies (Talent Corporation 2016c). However, some interviewees point out that this system has been mostly ineffective as the government does not track students. There are currently efforts to make bonding more effective (interviews with MY-GOV2). Some studies show that students intend to work overseas for better salaries and benefits, better general economic conditions, family influence, and career satisfaction, but some policies could reverse this loss of qualified personnel (Wahab 2014). Malaysia does increasingly engage with its diaspora, such as through foreign visits of the Prime Minister in order to tap into established networks (interview with MY-RGOV2; Yee Koh 2015). Politicians recognise the loss of highly qualified personnel as a problem and have ‘paid lip service’ to it (interview with MY-RGOV1), but many institutional problems including discrimination, corruption, red tape, and affirmative action have not been addressed (Hassan and Talib 2013). Nonetheless, some programmes have been effective in reversing the loss of highly skilled personnel, particularly the ‘My Second Home’ policy. Successful applicants need to deposit at least USD 80,000 into a Malaysian bank and maintain at least USD 40,000/year to receive a 10-year residence permit for Malaysia. However, this policy mostly attracts investors near retirement age rather than younger ones (interview with MY-UNI1). For diaspora engagement, Talent Corp is the most active and effective organisation and also works with private companies who are encouraged to recruit in overseas universities. Additionally, different embassies carry out outreach activities with Malaysians abroad (interview with MY-RGOV1). However, some argue that the factors driving the loss of personnel are systematic and cannot be tackled by single agencies such as Talent Corp (Varma and Budhwar 2014). Despite existing policies for talent attraction, the implementation of programmes as well as the research environment and funding are not always conducive for returnees (interviews with MY-UNI2 and MY-RGOV1). Affirmative action policies might reduce work opportunities for domestic talent in Malaysia. Difficulties stem from the fact that many Malaysians leave at an early age to pursue educational opportunities abroad and do not have a strong attachment to Malaysia, reducing their desire to return home (Gooch 2010). While some overseas Malaysian graduates have returned, efforts to bring back established Malaysian professionals have been less successful (interview with MY-UNI1). Domestic talent might prefer to stay in the country of study (e.g. Australia, Canada, the USA, the UK, and Singapore) due to better pay, job opportunities, and quality of life (Gooch 2010). However, recent work permit restrictions in these countries and the consequences of the economic crisis might have prevented talent from finding work abroad, and helped attracting Malaysians back home (interview with MY-RGOV1). Besides Malaysian professionals, the government is targeting Malaysian students abroad through the Semester Break Programme (Talent Corporation 2020). Talent Corp holds a series of events for students returning during the summer break such as industry insights and trips to visit companies and connects them with employers (interview with MY-GOV2). Additionally, regular career fairs with Malaysia’s top employers are organised in the UK (such as the Malaysian Career Fair4), Japan, and Australia. Talent Corp sends out a monthly newsletter with job offers and engages with Malaysian student associations abroad (interview with MY-GOV2). The recognition of qualifications poses some challenges. Larger companies have developed human resource departments, which can help with selecting talent and recognising their qualifications. This is usually a challenge in small- and medium-sized companies, which tend to rely more on the assistance of the Ministry of Higher Education who have positive lists of recognised universities (interviews with MY-UNI2, MY-RGOV2, and MY-GOV1). Besides a memorandum of understanding between ASEAN countries that their citizens can move freely and work in those countries without a work visa (interview with MY-GOV1; Testaverde et al. 2017), there is also a specific recognition agreement for nurses, and mutual regional ASEAN recognition agreements are still in progress (interview with MY-GOV1; ASEAN 2012). All three countries have enacted some migration policy reforms within the last few years, suggesting a certain degree of convergence in migration policy-making, despite significant diversity of their migration systems and the timing of this transition process. Brazil, for instance, has been negotiating a major reform of the country’s migration law since 2012 and has ultimately been enacted in May 2017.5 Malaysia has enacted considerable policy reforms since 2011 in order to attract and retain foreign talent. This legislative dynamism reveals the increasing importance of these countries in sending, channelling, and attracting international migrants. Indeed, emerging countries will not only continue to send high numbers of emigrants from their emerging middle classes but also increasingly attract international migrants: integration into the international economic system seems to be followed by integration into the international migratory system, both on the level of flows as well as policies. 5. Conclusions There is no ‘one size fits all’ policy by which countries attract talent. Despite some similarities in policies and practices between the three countries, each of the studied cases has been or is in the process of developing a unique configuration of measures, initiatives, and institutions which to some extent reflect a country’s idiosyncratic priorities in managing the international recruitment of high-skilled migrants. All three countries are still in the process of identifying effective strategies and learning how to adapt these to rapidly changing skill supplies and demands. Among other factors, this article has identified the increasing importance of ‘soft factors’ such as quality of life, open and tolerant societies, provision of certain amenities, an international reputation of a country, or certain mobility schemes. Social media and (diaspora) networks are increasingly used to reach out to their target groups and to promote the attractiveness of the country, certain regions, or clusters of innovation. Cooperation between the public and private sectors seems to be increasingly important in order to speak with one voice and to offer a coherent and attractive immigration or return option. However, at the same time, all three countries are relatively slow in accepting and recognising foreign diplomas. An interview with a management consultancy operating in all three countries identifies a ‘… protectionist attitude exists in Brazil but also in Malaysia, and also in India. And that’s a major obstacle to foreigners who want to move to these countries’ (BR-MGMT). To become more successful in attracting and retaining talent, these countries (and their companies or institutions) need to offer an effective immigration package, including career prospects, attractive salary, family opportunities, conducive living environment, quality of education, personal freedoms, strength of currency, and political situation in their home country. Government policies can only have a limited impact on immigration or return decisions. The modernisation of migration policies in emerging economies throughout the last decade has been decidedly led by domestic economic and political interests, dominated by the desire to become serious players in the global race for talent. However, the growing integration of these countries in the global migration system seems to have led also to a slow adaptation to international standards regarding integration and provision of migrant rights (including protection). This reflects the growing acknowledgement and need to develop integration prospects for long-term migrants, be they returnees, international migrants, or regional migrants. While most emerging economies have granted socio-economic and sometimes even political rights to their citizens abroad, this is not the case for incoming migrants. However, and although these developments are still very tentative, this may change in the future. Despite the fact that high-skilled migration policies are rapidly proliferating across both OECD and non-OECD countries, it is important to assess their effectiveness, as there is little existing literature so far. The effectiveness of migration policies in attracting international talent seems dependent on the broader ‘immigration package’ (Papademetriou et al. 2008), which includes not only the wider socio-economic environment and overall attractiveness of a particular destination (Doomernik et al. 2009) but also combinations of particular policy instruments. For instance, Czaika and Parsons (2017) finds that a combination of demand- and supply-driven policy elements can increase the efficacy of policy instruments. Both the REP and the RP-T programmes of TalentCorp policies in Malaysia have been found effective in attracting and retaining talent (World Bank 2015). However, comprehensive evaluations of Indian and Brazilian policies are missing so far. This should be examined in further research. Finally, in many emerging economies, the interest in attracting foreign investors is sometimes stronger than in attracting foreign workers. Policies to attract investment from abroad focus on either the diaspora or foreign investors and entrepreneurs. Recent policy reforms aim to make India ‘… the most open economy in the world for FDI … with the objective of providing major impetus to employment and job creation in India’, according to Prime Minister Modi. The Indian example particularly shows that the transformation of many developing and developed countries in knowledge- and capital-intensive economies may not only enhance the global race for talent but also intensify the competition for capital by facilitating the immigration of international investors. Acknowledgements We thank Zahra Babar, Nabil Khattab, Michael Ewers, the two referees and the editor for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of the manuscript. We are also grateful to Sally Khallash and Tze Yeen Liew for their excellent research assistance. Funding This work was supported by the British Academy/Leverhulme under Small Research Grant [SG132533] and the Center for International and Regional Studies, Georgetown University-Qatar. Conflict of interest statement. None declared. Footnotes 1. India’s average income is still significantly lower compared to Brazil and Malaysia. Technically, India is still on the ascending side of the ‘migration hump’, which is empirically identified to be peaking at around 6–8 thousand US dollars of per capita income (Clemens 2014). Brazil is marginally beyond this level and therefore at the descending side of the ‘hump’ with declining net emigration. Malaysia, the country with the highest level of development and income of the three, has entered some time ago the stage where more people are immigrating than leaving. 2. This information is collected biannually by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs based on an expert survey implemented in all Member States and non-Member States of the UN. 3. The Indian statistical system is underdeveloped in terms of availability and quality of data, and thus it is not clear how many Indians leave the country or how many skilled immigrants are in India (interviews with IN-UNI1, IN-UNI2, and IN-UNI3). 4. See , last accessed 3 April 2020. 5. The new migration law defines the set of basic rights including the right of association, for example, in trade unions, a reduction and redefinition of visa types (incl. humanitarian visa), the possibility for residence authorisation category requests for purposes of research, teaching, study, extending academic studies, work, health treatment, humanitarian care, religious activities, and family reunion, and also higher penalties for non-compliant employers and foreign nationals. 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Brazil  University1 Researcher BR-UNI1 3 August 2015  Media Journalist BR-MD 5 August 2015  Management consultancy Official BR-MGMT 6 August 2015  University2 Professor BR-UNI2 14 August 2015  University3 Researcher BR-UNI3 19 August 2015  Union Official BR-UNION 19 August 2015  Multinational corporation HR specialist BR-MNC 26 October 2015 India  University1 Professor IN-UNI1 4 August 2015  University2 Professor IN-UNI2 3 September 2015  University3 Professor IN-UNI3 2 October 2015  University4 Professor IN-UNI4 13 October 2015 Malaysia  Regional government1 Member of Parliament MY-RGOV1 24 September 2015  Regional government2 Member of Parliament MY-RGOV2 10 June 2016  University1 Assistant Professor MY-UNI1 17 September 2015  University2 Associate Professor MY-UNI2 16 October 2015  TalentCorp1 Official MY-GOV1 17 June 2016  TalentCorp2 Official MY-GOV2 31 May 2016 Organisation . Position . Code . Date . Brazil  University1 Researcher BR-UNI1 3 August 2015  Media Journalist BR-MD 5 August 2015  Management consultancy Official BR-MGMT 6 August 2015  University2 Professor BR-UNI2 14 August 2015  University3 Researcher BR-UNI3 19 August 2015  Union Official BR-UNION 19 August 2015  Multinational corporation HR specialist BR-MNC 26 October 2015 India  University1 Professor IN-UNI1 4 August 2015  University2 Professor IN-UNI2 3 September 2015  University3 Professor IN-UNI3 2 October 2015  University4 Professor IN-UNI4 13 October 2015 Malaysia  Regional government1 Member of Parliament MY-RGOV1 24 September 2015  Regional government2 Member of Parliament MY-RGOV2 10 June 2016  University1 Assistant Professor MY-UNI1 17 September 2015  University2 Associate Professor MY-UNI2 16 October 2015  TalentCorp1 Official MY-GOV1 17 June 2016  TalentCorp2 Official MY-GOV2 31 May 2016 Open in new tab Organisation . Position . Code . Date . Brazil  University1 Researcher BR-UNI1 3 August 2015  Media Journalist BR-MD 5 August 2015  Management consultancy Official BR-MGMT 6 August 2015  University2 Professor BR-UNI2 14 August 2015  University3 Researcher BR-UNI3 19 August 2015  Union Official BR-UNION 19 August 2015  Multinational corporation HR specialist BR-MNC 26 October 2015 India  University1 Professor IN-UNI1 4 August 2015  University2 Professor IN-UNI2 3 September 2015  University3 Professor IN-UNI3 2 October 2015  University4 Professor IN-UNI4 13 October 2015 Malaysia  Regional government1 Member of Parliament MY-RGOV1 24 September 2015  Regional government2 Member of Parliament MY-RGOV2 10 June 2016  University1 Assistant Professor MY-UNI1 17 September 2015  University2 Associate Professor MY-UNI2 16 October 2015  TalentCorp1 Official MY-GOV1 17 June 2016  TalentCorp2 Official MY-GOV2 31 May 2016 Organisation . Position . Code . Date . Brazil  University1 Researcher BR-UNI1 3 August 2015  Media Journalist BR-MD 5 August 2015  Management consultancy Official BR-MGMT 6 August 2015  University2 Professor BR-UNI2 14 August 2015  University3 Researcher BR-UNI3 19 August 2015  Union Official BR-UNION 19 August 2015  Multinational corporation HR specialist BR-MNC 26 October 2015 India  University1 Professor IN-UNI1 4 August 2015  University2 Professor IN-UNI2 3 September 2015  University3 Professor IN-UNI3 2 October 2015  University4 Professor IN-UNI4 13 October 2015 Malaysia  Regional government1 Member of Parliament MY-RGOV1 24 September 2015  Regional government2 Member of Parliament MY-RGOV2 10 June 2016  University1 Assistant Professor MY-UNI1 17 September 2015  University2 Associate Professor MY-UNI2 16 October 2015  TalentCorp1 Official MY-GOV1 17 June 2016  TalentCorp2 Official MY-GOV2 31 May 2016 Open in new tab © The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com This article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (https://academic.oup.com/journals/pages/open_access/funder_policies/chorus/standard_publication_model) TI - Rising stars in the global race for skill? A comparative analysis of Brazil, India, and Malaysia JF - Migration Studies DO - 10.1093/migration/mnaa009 DA - 2021-03-07 UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/rising-stars-in-the-global-race-for-skill-a-comparative-analysis-of-r7WI8dP9mx SP - 21 EP - 46 VL - 9 IS - 1 DP - DeepDyve ER -