TY - JOUR
AU1 - Ballester, Coralio
AU2 - Zenou, Yves
AU3 - Calvó-Armengol, Antoni
AB - Delinquents are embedded in a network of relationships. Each delinquent decides in a non-cooperative way how much delinquency effort he will exert. We characterize the Nash equilibrium and derive an optimal enforcement policy, called the key-player policy. We then extend our characterization of optimal single player network removal to optimal group removal, the key group. We also characterize and derive a policy that targets links rather than players. Finally, we endogenize the network connecting delinquents by allowing players to join the labor market instead of committing delinquent offenses. The key-player policy turns out to be much more complex because it depends on wages and on the structure of the network.
TI - Delinquent Networks
JF - Journal of the European Economic Association
DO - 10.1111/j.1542-4774.2010.tb00494.x
DA - 2010-01-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/delinquent-networks-pmUZhFrKbg
SP - 34
EP - 61
VL - 8
IS - 1
DP - DeepDyve
ER -