TY - JOUR
AU1 - Blackburn, Robert
AB - INTRODUCTORY: MOMENTUM AND RELEVANCE The celebrations this year for the 800th anniversary of Magna Carta, the most famous English constitutional document of all time, that came to symbolize the core principles of constitutionalism ever since—the rule of law, fundamental rights of the individual, and government by agreement and consent1—has served to highlight once again, the extraordinary absence of a modern documentary constitution for the United Kingdom today, one of only three remaining democratic states in the world without a codified (or ‘written’2) constitution.3 The question has been posed, and much discussed in a series of seminars, conferences, and lectures this year, whether the time has arrived for the government to take steps towards a written constitution for the United Kingdom, and if one were to be adopted, what its nature and content would be, and how one might be prepared, designed, and implemented. This comes against a background of steadily rising support and advocacy in recent decades for a written constitution, one that demarcates the institutions and powers of government, the boundaries between executive, legislature, and judiciary, and sets out the rights of ordinary people in their relationship with the bureaucracies of state and in their means of involvement in the politics and general welfare of the country. Although support for a written constitution currently tends to be associated with the centre-left, the earliest post-War advocates were from the Conservative side,4 and in fact whether one is for or against a written constitution is not really a matter of party political ideology at all, something the vast majority of politicians around the world would agree with. There may be ideological issues around the balance of power between the different branches of state, particularly between the elected legislative and non-elected judiciary, but this is not a reason for not writing down whatever the agreed system of balance is to be. In the 2005–10 Parliament during his tenure as Prime Minister, Gordon Brown declared to the House of Commons that he was in favour of a written constitution,5 expressing a personal wish that the anniversary year of Magna Carta in 2015 might be the appropriate date for its implementation. His wide-ranging Green Paper on The Governance of Britain6 ushered in several important political reforms of the ancient Crown prerogatives, notably the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 that established the civil service in statute and made ratification of treaty-making subject to statutory parliamentary approval, and a promise to set up a commission to inquire into a written UK constitution was contained in Labour’s 2010 general election manifesto.7 The Liberal Democrats in their 2010 manifesto repeated its policy objective of a written constitution that it had supported for more than two decades.8 Subsequently, in the 2010–15 Parliament, the House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee took the first official steps towards a written UK constitution by launching a cross-party select committee inquiry into the whole question of a written UK constitution, its desirability or otherwise, and what its implications would be.9 This inquiry lasted throughout the whole five years, taking much oral and written evidence, and engaging in a national consultation involving numerous seminars and conferences, over 3000 participants, and around 180 written responses, the great majority which supported the United Kingdom now adopting a written constitution. At the same time, political and social developments in the past few years have made the subject of the constitution a more relevant and topical subject in public affairs and opinion. Euro-scepticism has reached new levels, with the UK Independence Party now seriously challenging the Conservatives (and in some constituencies, Labour), creating added pressures for a redefinition of the United Kingdom’s membership of the European Union (EU). The fears of the establishment over the secession of Scotland from the Union,10 that for a while looked a very real possibility during the 2014 independence referendum, has caused a major rethink on the whole political geography of the country. It has posed heated questions at Westminster of how to achieve fairness and parity in the governance arrangements across the four nations of England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland,11 and even before the referendum suggestions have been made by senior politicians that devolution would inevitably lead to a written constitution containing some form of federalist or quasi-federal system across the four nations within a written constitution.12 In society more widely, the ease with which the entire voting population can communicate directly with one another over the Internet is causing a revolution in attitudes towards the political process and public engagement, at a time when our professional politicians are suffering a low point in levels of credibility, trust, and respect. All this makes the momentum towards a new written constitutional settlement for the British state, one that addresses these various concerns, a powerful and significant impulse that our rulers would be wise not to ignore. THE CASE FOR A WRITTEN CONSTITUTION So what are the arguments for enacting a written UK constitution?13 The reasoning needs to be clearly understood (and in ways that ordinary people can understand) before embarking on its preparation or putting forward any forms of draft blueprint for consideration. To state the obvious—and it is important to do so, lest its architects become so clever they lose sight of the wood for the trees—if there is to be a written UK constitution, it should be one that addresses the arguments for having one, while taking into account the concerns of undertaking such a major exercise. The primary argument for a written constitution is that it would enable everyone to know and see what the rules and institutions were that governed and directed ministers, parliamentarians, civil servants, and all senior state officials and public office holders, in performing their public duties. The present mass of common law rules to be gleaned in law reports, convoluted Acts of Parliament that are unreadable to most people, and unwritten conventions some of which are unclear even to politicians, is utterly impenetrable to most people. A written constitution would replace this by a single document of basic law easily accessible and intelligible to all, as is the case in the overwhelming majority of other countries in the world. Indeed some very basic rules about how the country is governed do not exist in any legal form at all, but rely on traditions, most of which only the political elite understands and are inaccessible or unintelligible to ordinary people. Most of the rules governing the office of Prime Minister, for example together with its powers and method of appointment, are not written down in legislation but rely instead on unwritten conventions about the monarchy and its ancient royal prerogatives. This abstract and mysterious constitution may work after a fashion and fitted the deferential and class-orientated structure of society in earlier times, but in today’s more equal society, and for the health of its democratic institutions, the constitution should be clear to see by all. This case for a written constitution does not advocate, necessarily, any changes in what we have now, simply that whatever it is should be committed into a documentary source which we can all see and possess a copy of for our reference and educational purposes. The educative benefit of a written constitution is one of the strongest arguments for having one. It can be pointed out that a process of constitutional codification has already been taking place in recent times, but in an informal, disparate, and disconnected manner. Numerous areas of government are now covered by quasi-constitutional codes. They include, for example, codes unilaterally prepared by the Cabinet Office on the regulation of government ministers and civil servants, such as the Ministerial Code (on terms and conditions under which ministers hold office), the Cabinet Manual (describing the law, convention, and practices of central government), and Osmotherly Rules (on the conduct of select committee and civil servants appearing before them); soft law regulations on the conduct of parliamentarians (such as the Code of Conduct for Members of Parliament, and the Code of Conduct for Members of the House of Lords, issued by each House of Parliament); a code of human rights and freedoms enacted by the Human Rights Act 1998 (citizenship rights); codes provided by the Freedom of Information Act 2000 for access to official information; a civil service code provided for by the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 and a set of procedures governing treaty-making provided by the same Act; and a Fixed-term Parliaments Act 2011 codifying the regulation of general election timing. This process of codifying different areas of government and parliamentary conduct should, it is maintained, be subsumed and completed in one comprehensive document forming a written constitution. A different argument is that rules of a constitutional nature are of a fundamentally different character to ordinary laws and should be clearly demarked out as such and treated differently, both in the status they are afforded generally and in the way they are changed, which should not be simply on the whim of a government majority in the House of Commons.14 The basic laws about our core institutions of government, especially the executive (ministers and civil servants), the legislature (the two Houses of Parliament), devolved and local government, and the judiciary, as well as human rights and civil liberties, should be separated from other kinds of legislation and be clearly distinguished and codified into a special document that is written down and called the Constitution of the United Kingdom, as in other countries. Because at present one can reform the law on when general elections are held, or the terms of our membership of the EU, in precisely the same way as changing the law on buying and selling land or the sale of goods in supermarkets, the process by which some constitutional reforms of a fundamental character have been made in recent years has become seriously flawed, often with inadequate public and parliamentary consultation. At present governing parties can too easily push measures onto the statute book to change the country’s constitutional rules simply to benefit themselves. A written constitution could redress this problem, setting down a special process for major constitutional changes. Linked to the educative benefit that a written constitution would have, as a reference point in everyone’s upbringing and education, and for people to turn to in public policy debates on constitutional matters, there is the argument that a written constitution would be a confident expression of national identity, both at home and internationally. Such a document would be an assertion of Britishness and the institutions, values, and principles the country espouse. It would delineate the legal and political boundaries of the British state in its international relationships, especially those with the EU, but also with its Overseas Territories, the British Commonwealth, and the rest of the world. Every other major democratic country in the world except two has a written constitution serving as a national symbol for its people, and it is ironic that England was in the vanguard of producing landmark constitutional documents in its history, notably Magna Carta, but has failed to produce one for the democratic era. A written constitution could strengthen public confidence and trust in the political system, through a better understanding of how it works and clearer knowledge of people’s rights and the duties of those who hold public office. A second case is a reformist one, seeking changes in our constitutional law at the same time as setting it down in one documentary source. The argument goes that, however fond or sentimental we may be of our history, the present situation is quite obviously an anachronism riddled with principles and procedures derived from our ancient past, at odds with principles of social and political democracy today, and unsuited to the representation, involvement, and aspirations of the British people. In particular, it fails to emphasize democratic values and popular participation. In a democracy it should be the people, not Parliament, who are sovereign, and this needs clearly stating. By contrast, present claims for ‘parliamentary sovereignty’ operating in a constitutional vacuum are out of time and belong to the political conflicts between the Crown and Parliament in the 17th century.15 It is an untenable doctrine today that there should be no constitutional limitations at all upon what parliamentarians can do or legislate about during their five years terms of office, however repugnant, totalitarian, or unpopular. This out-dated dogma, it is maintained, needs replacing by a constitution that expresses the sovereignty of the people and circumscribes the powers and duties of those who sit in Parliament, along with the executive, judiciary, and other agencies or branches of state. Related to this is the view that our constitutional arrangements are inadequate to deal with the consequences of major political changes that have occurred over the past 150 years, for example in the party system, advent of democracy, and relations between the two Houses, and has now become one of elective dictatorship, without proper checks and balances that only an entrenched constitution can now address. It has been argued that the policies and actions of the Cabinet now dominate the whole legal and political system through its party majority in the House of Commons, with little safeguards from a weak House of Lords with minimal powers of delay, a Head of State who acts on the advice of her Prime Minister, and a judiciary with inadequate power to override executive or legislative excesses.16 A final argument, but one that also envisages reforms to be included in the document, is to point out that an initiative on enacting a written constitution would provide a good opportunity for consideration and resolution of a number of outstanding constitutional problems, ones either where despite cross-party agreement that something must be done, no outcome has been forthcoming, or where new policy objectives or commitments have arisen and await implementation. Such areas of reform include extending parliamentary control over the executive prerogative powers17; considering a local government code to further strengthen local authorities following the Localism Act 201118; a coherent constitutional settlement reached for the governance and Union of England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, following the further devolution promises and related questions arising out of the Scottish referendum 2014; a permanent solution to membership of the House of Lords; and a British Bill of Rights and Responsibilities to accompany or replace the Human Rights Act. The chief and legitimate reservation about adopting a written constitution, apart from opposition by those who are simply wedded to the traditional constitution in all eventualities and disagree with the advantages and arguments in favour of having one, revolves around the relationship between the courts and Parliament. This view maintains that Parliament is and must remain the ultimate determinant of law, rather than an unelected judiciary applying constitutional articles to override Acts of Parliament.19 In short, opponents argue, a written constitution would politicize the judiciary, requiring the courts to form judgments on questions of a political nature that should more properly be dealt with by politicians through the normal parliamentary process. However, as is elaborated below, this ground for opposition is misconceived, as it puts the cart before the horse. It is by no means an essential element of a written constitution that it provides for judicial supremacy. This all depends on the nature and type of the document being prepared, and even if it were to be entrenched in law, an issue of content to be resolved and agreed by the body drafting the document would be able to settle the precise constitutional jurisdiction and powers of the courts. THE NATURE AND TYPE OF DOCUMENT If a future UK government were to consider taking steps to prepare a written constitution, then it would be preferable that an initial decision be made at the same time on the general nature and scope of the document it was proposing be drawn up. For UK purposes it is useful to distinguish three different forms of document that a written constitution might take. These could be, first, a non-legal ‘Constitutional Code’, setting out the essential existing elements and principles of the constitution and workings of government; secondly, a ‘Constitutional Consolidation Act’, being a consolidation of existing laws of a constitutional nature together with a codification of essential constitutional conventions and principles into one Act of Parliament; or thirdly, a ‘Written Constitution proper’, being a document of basic law by which the country is governed and the relationship between the state and its citizens, with an amendment process and elements of reform.20 All three models would set out the framework within which the different branches of government and public administration operated, and the common purpose of all would be clarity and accessibility for everyone on what the rules and practices of the constitution are. Each would provide an organization chart for the structure of UK government and its relationship with citizens, describing the powers of the core political institutions and the conditions upon which they are exercised and controlled. The Constitution Code and Consolidation Act would not represent any substantive change in the law and working of the constitution to that at present. The former would be an authoritative guide on constitutional practice, particularly in those areas where it is useful to have unwritten conventions more clearly set out for public understanding. It could be seen as an evolutionary development of the Cabinet Manual published in 2011,21 changing its status from an internal to a public document, making its contents more comprehensive in terms of constitutional subject matter, and being submitted for formal approval by both Houses of Parliament. The Consolidation Act would be a statute re-enacting the major elements of existing statutory law on the constitution, modernizing some of the language without affecting its effect, and additionally incorporating other relevant regulation such as some fundamental parliamentary standing orders, and codifying some core conventions. The legal status and means of enforcing this document would remain as at present, depending on the nature of the regulation in question. It would no doubt acquire a special status in matters of judicial interpretation, as a constitutional statute of great importance, whose provisions could only be changed by a later Act of Parliament expressly stating that it was repealing or amending certain sections.22 As a document, it could be re-issued by the Stationary Office from time to time in its current state. By a Written Constitution proper is meant a document containing a special status in law and an amendment procedure, which is consistent with the most normal type of constitution adopted in other western democracies.23 Its range of content could be similar to a Consolidation Act but it would provide the opportunity, if so wished, for consideration of selected matters of constitutional reform, particularly where a consensus exists on the need for change but a resolution is still pending.24 The preparation of this type of document would need to answer those lawyers who lodged objections on grounds of ‘parliamentary sovereignty’, referring to the common law principle that no Parliament can bind its future Acts.25 To maintain that it is impossible to enact a written UK constitution with a superior status in law is political nonsense. What is involved here is a change in our law that introduces a new constitutional order, and one might just as well argue that in law the Bill of Rights 1689 was ineffective on the grounds that it was enacted by an unlawfully convened Parliament following the enforced abdication of King James II and the Glorious Revolution, or indeed that Magna Carta 1215—the very foundation of English constitutionalism—was unlawful under the pre-existing feudal tenets of 1215. A written constitution, if it involved imposing new legislative procedures for constitutional amendment or a special status and priority in law for some or all of its articles, would be a new political settlement endorsed by the will of Parliament and a referendum that no court is going to refuse to accept. While each of these three forms of documentary constitution are worthy of adoption in their own right, for those wishing to move towards a Written Constitution proper, there would be some utility in preparing the first two types of document beforehand as a process for informing the body who will draft the document. In other words, it would in any event be a useful exercise to establish the guiding principles of the constitution (as in the Code), and then collect together all the existing statutory, common law and conventional institutions, powers, and procedures that make up our existing constitution (as in a Consolidation Bill) at present, before embarking on the more ambitious task of preparing a written constitution for the United Kingdom. This ‘building blocks’ approach to enacting a written constitution could also help facilitate agreement across conflicting views and attitudes by separating out more clearly matters of consolidation from those of reform in the process of selection, discussion, and agreement of its individual provisions. ISSUES OF CONTENT The starting point for any process determining the content of the document would be to demarcate the boundaries of what is regarded as ‘constitutional’ or fundamental in nature to the working of the UK system of government. A useful working definition has been provided by the House of Lords Constitution Committee, who addressed this question when it first set about its deliberations on being created in 2000. It defined its scope as addressing, ‘the set of laws, rules and practices that create the basic institutions of the state, and its component and related parts, and stipulate the powers of those institutions and the relationship between the different institutions and between those institutions and the individual’.26 The core principles and values underlying the United Kingdom’s political and legal culture will need to be set out, whether in the Preamble or branding of its component parts, which would include: Popular sovereignty and the democratic nature of the state Equality and non-discrimination in citizenship Government actions in accordance with established law Judicial independence and impartiality in supervising the legality of government and securing the freedoms of its citizens Ministerial accountability to Parliament Nature of the Union between England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland Constitutional relationship between central and local government Nature and limits of UK membership of the EU Method of protecting civil liberties and human rights in the United Kingdom Delivery of core social and economic services to citizens Political impartiality of civil servants and parliamentary, regional, and local government state officials The narrative and text of the document would extend across the different branches of government, including the Crown and political executive (head of state, head of government, ministers), their relationship with Parliament in the Westminster model (rules of ministerial responsibility), the legislature together with membership, powers, and central procedures (House of Commons, House of Lords, Speakers, legislative process, Select Committees), the civil service and freedom of information, the judiciary and court systems (in England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland), the devolved systems of government, the structure of local government, issues of nationality and citizenship (including human rights and freedoms), commissions or ombudsmen of a constitutional or quasi-constitutional nature, provision for national emergencies, arrangements with the EU, the status and ratification of treaties, and procedures for amendment. It would provide for the rights and freedoms of the individual, re-enacting articles of the European Convention on Human Rights as presently incorporated into UK law by the Human Rights Act, unless this had by then been replaced by a UK Bill of Rights.27 The relative length and level of detail for a written constitution would be largely determined by the type and nature of the document adopted. Thus, a non-legal Code would concentrate on general principles and clarity of expression without descending into too many qualifications or excessive detail. Where codes relating to particular components of the constitution or government already exist, such as with human rights28, then after an explanation reference could be made to those documents instead. The content of a Consolidation Act comprising a re-enactment of pre-existing legislative material would be more lengthy and detailed. It would need to deal with a great deal of statutory material, which in the traditional UK manner is drafted in very great detail, seeking to cover every eventuality. A line would need to be drawn between essential constitutional subject matter and public law of a more organic or subordinate nature to which reference could be made, undertaken with careful editing of the overall document accompanied by an explanatory memorandum. This demarcation would similarly apply to a Written Constitution proper, where a key issue will be length. Some distinguish between a ‘people’s’ constitution, as opposed to a ‘lawyer’s’ constitution, the former a shorter document aimed at being readily intelligible for the public, the latter being longer and more precise for the purposes of settling any disputes in the courts. A shorter document might result in greater judicial creativity in interpreting and applying its provisions, as in the case of the constitution of the United States and its Supreme Court. However, a long and detailed constitution, such as that adopted by India in 1950 with 444 articles in 22 parts with 118 schedules, may give greater certainty in specific areas of public life but may also prove highly politicized, both in the parliamentary sphere (because governments will far more frequently be seeking amendments to suits their ends). Experience shows that a more detailed constitution does not necessarily prevent the judiciary from becoming embroiled in the politics of the state through its rulings.29 A middle way is therefore most likely to gain broad support. For example, on the composition of the House of Commons, the principles governing voting might be stated (constituency basis of representation, universal suffrage by secret ballot, regular intervals between elections, and method of voting30) but the details of electoral administration could be left to organic law (the Representation of the People Acts); and the offices of state notably the Speaker be provided for in the constitution, together with the requirement he or she be chosen from among their number, leaving the procedural details of election to standing orders as at present. Codifying the constitution will involve putting into writing the most fundamental, and incontrovertible, rules of political conduct that are of a non-legal and unwritten character which we call conventions.31 These would include, for example, that the Head of State will appoint a person to act as Prime Minister and Head of Government and that to be eligible for ministerial appointment a person appointed must have a seat in one of the two Houses of Parliament, which in the case of the Prime Minister and Chancellor of the Exchequer will be the Commons. Other rules of this conventional character regulate the exercise of the Crown prerogatives, and the various relationships between the Cabinet and Prime Minister, between Parliament and ministers both collectively individually, between the House of Commons and House of Lords, between ministers and the judiciary, and between the United Kingdom and other Commonwealth states. In reality there are few definitional problems in identifying and articulating the most basic conventions that would need to go into a codified constitution. A useful guiding presumption was provided by Sir Ivor Jennings, that there are three questions to ask: what are the precedents; do the actors in the precedents believe they are bound by a rule; and is there a reason for the rule.32 The task of codifying conventions is today in fact substantially easier than ever before. This is because, not only are most conventions readily described in authoritative works of legal practice such as Halsbury’s Laws of England33 or leading academic textbooks34 (and much written about in scholarly articles and books35), but as a species of regulation they are in a state of decline.36 Principally for this reason, there has been an ad hoc process codifying conventions taking place anyway, positioned in a variety of documents of different status. For example, to cite some of the codes mentioned earlier, the conventions of ministerial responsibility are now set out in the Ministerial Code37; those governing the position of civil servants have been described in the Civil Service Code issued under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010; there are parliamentary codes setting out pre-existing conventions governing the conduct of MPs and peers along with revised regulatory requirements; and the conventions for exercising the royal power of dissolution of Parliament have been superseded by the Fixed-term Parliament Act 2011. In a small number of grey areas where there is uncertainty or ambiguity over the existence or scope of a convention (such as on the need for parliamentary approval to UK entry into armed conflict abroad, or whether a Prime Minister is under an obligation to give evidence to a parliamentary committee38), clarification would need to be reached (or any rule abandoned) which would be a welcome exercise in any event. An important component for any legal document, whether a Consolidation Act or Written Constitution proper, will be to determine its status and priority as law, and whether the judiciary is to be given powers to review the validity of Acts of Parliament by reference to the articles contained in the document. The re-enactment of existing statutory provisions in a Consolidation Act would need to address the problem of its provisions being overridden by later contradictory statutes (because of the ancient common law rule that where two statutory provisions contradict one another, the later statute prevails).39 Formerly this principle applied even if the contradiction was merely incidental or implied, rather than being stated expressly.40 However, there is recent case law to the effect that statutes of major constitutional importance, which an Act consolidating our constitutional law would be, are no longer subject to this doctrine of implied repeal.41 This still means, however, that any Act of Parliament passed after the Consolidation Act that was clearly expressed as to its intended effect would prevail over any sections contained within the Consolidation Act. The position of the judiciary under a Consolidation Act, therefore, would be that the courts uphold the terms of the Consolidation Act against infringement by all later Acts of Parliament, save where an intention to override, amend, or repeal some part of the Consolidation Act is clearly expressed in the contradictory later statute. It would then be for Parliament and its scrutiny committees to ensure that any such later Act of Parliament had been carefully considered and approved as an amendment to the codified constitution. The Consolidation Act itself could be periodically re-issued in its amended form. Most written constitutions afford themselves a higher status and priority as law, thereby enabling judicial review of ordinary legislation on grounds of incompatibility with the constitution. This would be a key issue for those drafting a codified constitution of this nature, and perhaps its most controversial aspect as it engages questions of parliamentary supremacy and the balance of the relationship between executive, legislature, and judiciary. There are different levels of legal status and priority that might be considered for a Written Constitution proper, ranging from none at all (as effectively at present) to full judicial review of primary legislation. Lord Hailsham in his lecture calling for a written constitution in 1976 was firmly of the view that it should be of the ‘controlled’ variety, as he put it, meaning there should be a judicial power to invalidate Acts of Parliament that violated the constitution.42 This is the path taken by the framers of many written constitutions, including in the United States and Germany. This would not ultimately affect the supremacy of Parliament, of course, which could respond to any judicial decision of which it disapproved by enacting a constitutional amendment. A qualified judicial entrenchment would be to give the codified constitution a higher status and priority in law, reflecting its national importance, but one that could be disregarded for the purpose of constitutional review where the Act of Parliament being considered by the court included a section stating that it was to apply ‘notwithstanding’ the Constitution.43 It would then be for Parliament to ensure that future governments did not unnecessarily include such clauses in their Bills or allow parliamentary draftsmen to fall into routine use of them. A more pragmatic and very British solution would be to provide that, in cases where a court found an Act of the UK Parliament, Scottish Parliament, Assembly for Wales, or Northern Ireland Assembly to be wholly or in part incompatible with the Constitution, it shall issue a ‘declaration of unconstitutionality’ to the extent of the incompatibility, which was of no direct effect on the Constitution or the legal proceedings in which the question arose.44 If this procedure was followed, it would be wise for the Constitution also to state that the declaration shall be conditional on its confirmation by the Supreme Court, to whom the question in dispute should be directly referred. Such a declaration would not therefore affect the validity, continuing operation, or enforcement of the provision in respect of which it is given and would not be binding on the parties to the proceedings in which it is made.45 This would satisfy those politicians who were wedded to traditional notions of parliamentary supremacy and antipathetic to the idea of unelected judges having the final word on constitutional matters.46 It would serve to communicate to Parliament and the government that a question of the moral legitimacy of one of its statutes needed their consideration. To accompany whatever degree of judicial enforcement of the Written Constitution proper was adopted, a number of non-judicial bodies could be designed to supervise compliance and even provide adjudication on specified matters. If a permanent Constitutional Commission was established, as discussed later in this article, it could be entrusted with this role. Alternatively or in addition, particular parts of the apparatus of the state could supervised by special watchdogs, analogous to and following the pattern of the Committee on Standards in Public Life, the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority, the Electoral Commission, and the Commission on Equality and Human Rights. Another important component of the document will be to establish the process and procedures by which it is to be amended. If the document were a non-legal Code, it could simply be re-issued at the start of each new Parliament, updating itself on any legislative changes that took place in the previous Parliament and inserting any proposed changes in convention or practice for the discussion and formal approval of each House. A Consolidation Act that replicated pre-existing procedures on constitutional law reform would need to be re-issued at regular intervals to keep its terms up to date with new statutory developments. However, existing, or perhaps strengthened, best practice on reform procedures might be included. The key elements from the Cabinet Office’s latest Consultation Principles47 could be reproduced, along with the suggested procedure of the House of Lords Constitution Committee that when a constitutional Bill is presented to Parliament, the responsible minister should make a prescribed form of statement to the House in which it is first presented.48 Entrenched written constitutions around the world generally lay down a special procedure for their amendment, different from those governing ordinary legislation. These are usually in the nature of special majorities in one or both chambers of a bicameral legislature, enhanced powers for the second chamber, the consent of regional bodies or states within a federal structure, and/or a referendum. Special majorities are unknown to the UK Parliament, with two exceptions.49 In theory at least, most people regard the House of Lords as performing some special role as watchdog of the constitution and in the scrutiny of constitutional Bills. For this reason and purpose, it has a Select Committee on the Constitution. Under the Parliament Acts 1911–49 the Lords at present possesses a one-year power of delay over non-financial public Bills dealing with any type of subject matter introduced and passed by the House of Commons, with two exceptions where its absolute approval is required without time limit. One is any Bill to prolong the life of Parliament, in other words suspend general elections50; the other is any subordinate legislation by way of statutory instrument including Remedial Orders under the Human Rights Act 1998.51 Although in the past, the two main parties’ leaderships have opposed any extension in the powers of the House of Lords, no doubt because they fear the obstruction this might cause them in office, in the context of a Written Constitution proper there would clearly be a case for extending the second chamber’s powers with respect to constitutional amendments. A small step would be that a majority of the membership of the House, rather than a majority of those present and voting as at present, is required. However, a two-thirds majority would not be unusual, as is case in Germany and the United States. Rather than being given an absolute power of veto, the Lords could be given an extended power of delay up to the remainder of the life of the Parliament, thereby allowing for an expression of the opinion of the electorate on the matter. In the past 40 years the referendum has emerged as an established part of the United Kingdom’s political culture, though as a procedure to be used on an ad hoc basis at the convenience of the government. It has been limited to questions of constitutional change, rather than other public policy or moral issues. Referendums have so far been held as a border poll in Northern Ireland in March 1973 (on whether the province should remain part of the United Kingdom or join with the Irish Republic); on the European Economic Community (EEC), June 1975 (whether the United Kingdom should remain in the EEC); on devolution in Scotland and Wales in February 1979, and again later in September 1997; on the Greater London Authority proposals in May 1998; on the Northern Ireland Agreement in May 1998; on a regional assembly in the northeast of England in November 2004; on the powers of the National Assembly of Wales in March 2011; on the Alternative Vote method of electoral system in May 2011; and most recently on Scottish independence in September 2014. In drafting an amendment process, therefore, a referendum might be stated to be required in any three of the different models of codifying the constitution. In establishing the status quo to be consolidated, either in a non-legal Code or a Consolidation Act, there are now persuasive precedents which amount to a doctrine or convention as to when a referendum should be called.52 These include that a referendum should be called before any part of the Union is allowed to secede; there is a proposed devolution of powers from the Westminster Parliament; when a wholly novel constitutional arrangement is proposed, including when alteration in the machinery by which laws are made; before joining the Euro currency; quitting membership of the EU; altering the voting system at general elections; and (locally) in establishing directly elected mayors. In addition, there is an existing requirement for a referendum to be called before a transfer of any new power to the EU under the 2011 European Union Act. In the preparation of a Written Constitution proper, then, with a specially designed amendment process, consideration should be given to which parts, or all, of the document should require popular consent before being changed. Unlike deliberative referendums, any requirement for a referendum as part of an amendment process would most likely be in the nature of formal ratification. Finally on issues of content, the preparation of a Written Constitution proper would provide the opportunity and process for the examination and settlement of any special constitutional problem (or problems) awaiting resolution that the parties wished to refer to the commission or body preparing the draft document. Thus, at the time of writing, this could include the state of the Union and a permanent settlement on the devolved governance arrangements across England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland; it could address a permanent form of composition for the House of Lords; it could establish in law the principle that is emerging for parliamentary agreement before sending armed troops overseas53; and it could include recommendations for revising for domestic legal purposes the articles of the European Convention on Human Rights (currently incorporated into UK law by the Human Rights Act 1998) for inclusion in its Part dealing with individual rights and freedoms which might be called the ‘British Bill of Rights’. THE BODY ENTRUSTED WITH DRAFTING THE DOCUMENT Choosing and composing the type of body entrusted with preparing a draft written constitution for approval will to a large extent be determined by the nature of the document the government wishes it to produce. Since a non-legal Code or a Consolidation Bill would not represent any substantive change in the workings of government or UK constitutional law, a less rigorous process of preparation for these would be required than for a Written Constitution proper that afforded itself a higher status in law and special amendment procedure together with any other novel elements taking place at the same time. The classic method of examining some major constitutional question in the United Kingdom has been to establish a Royal Commission. This has the highest formal status in terms of a public inquiry, with members of the Commission being formally appointed by royal warrant on the advice of the Prime Minister or a Secretary of State. Constitutional matters on which a Royal Commission has been set up in modern times include Systems of Election (1908–10),54 the Civil Service (1912–15,55 1929–31,56 1953–5557), the Local Government of Greater London (1921–23,58 1957–6059), Local Government (1923–29,60 1966–6961), the Police (1960–62)62, the Constitution (in practice, dealing with devolution, 1969–73),63 and Reform of the House of Lords (1999–2000).64 In substance, there is little difference between a Royal Commission and a departmental committee of inquiry that is more simply appointed by one or more government ministers. Such inquiries on constitutional matters have included Ministers’ Powers (1929–31)65 and Administrative Tribunals and Inquiries (1955–57).66 More recently, bodies of a similar nature termed Independent Commissions have been set up to consider some particularly controversial proposal, including on the Voting System (1997–98)67 and a Bill of Rights (2011–12).68 The membership of Royal Commissions and departmental committees are chosen by the government, often taking nominees of opposition parties into consideration. Their working practices have varied considerably, and to a large extent are dictated by the government in setting the period of time in which the Commission or committee is required to report, and the human and financial resources assigned to them. A Royal Commission is more likely to hold extensive public hearings, but neither it nor a departmental committee of inquiry has the power to compel the attendance of witnesses, which bodies established under the Inquiries Act 2005 may do, such as the recent inquiry into the Culture, Practice and Ethics of the Press (2011–12),69 or (in theory) a parliamentary select committee. All these public bodies are advisory in nature, leaving it to the government to accept or reject their recommendations, or cherry-pick which of their recommendations to adopt. In terms of prestige and tradition a Royal Commission might appear the natural choice for designing or supervising the preparation of a written constitution. However, in practice there may be considerable drawbacks. The method of government appointment is opaque, often giving rise to suspicions that the membership is biased towards a particular conclusion. There has been little attempt in the past to make such a body representative of society.70 Its inquisitorial style of public hearing in the past has not been successful in terms of encouraging public participation and deliberation. The success rate of Royal Commissions, as well as those of the recent Independent Commissions, in terms of outcome has been poor.71 Preparation of a Constitutional Code If the government wished to produce a document in the nature of the Constitutional Code described above, then it would simplest for the Cabinet Office to take on the role of producing a first draft, building on its pre-existing guide to the laws, conventions, and rules on the operation of government set out in its Cabinet Manual. It would need to substantially recalibrate the content of the Manual, both in the style of drafting (more in line with articles of principles than the minutiae of Whitehall practice), and extend its scope to important areas of constitutional affairs currently missing in the Manual, such as matters of citizenship, the law of Parliament, the role of the judiciary, and machinery of justice. The background and significance of the Cabinet Manual is pertinent here. In February 2010, the then Prime Minister Gordon Brown publicly announced that he has asked the Cabinet Secretary, then Sir Gus O’Donnell, to have the Cabinet Office produce a consolidation of the existing unwritten constitutional conventions (non-legal rules) affecting government into one single written document. He stated,72 ‘I can announce today that I have asked the Cabinet Secretary to lead work to consolidate the existing unwritten, piecemeal conventions that govern much of the way central government operates under our existing constitution into a single written document’.73 The Cabinet Office then proceeded to produce the current Cabinet Manual, with support from colleagues across government, intended to be ‘a source of information on the laws, conventions and rules that affect the operation and procedures of government’. If a non-legal Code were to be the final work on producing a documentary constitution, then the Cabinet Office’s draft version, building on the Manual, could be submitted to a Joint Committee of Parliament constituted for the purpose to inquire into its accuracy, take evidence, and report to both Houses. In conducting its inquiry it would be instructive for the Committee to not only take expert evidence but conduct a public consultation exercise (including means of establishing public opinion), with terms of reference making it clear that the codification exercise was to consolidate existing principles and elements of the constitution and not in any substantive way change it. The government could then consider any changes recommended by the Joint Committee, provide a reasoned response to them, and explain why or why not they are acting upon them. The Prime Minister and Leader of the House of Lords could then submit their revised Constitutional Code to each House of Parliament, respectively, on a motion to take note and approve on a free vote. This process could be repeated within the first session of each new Parliament, providing the opportunity to amend the Constitutional Code as conventions and practice evolve. Preparation of a Consolidation Act If codifying the constitution in legal form were seen as essentially a technical exercise, re-enacting and codifying pre-existing rules—as would be most of the work involved in preparing a Consolidation Act, described above—then the Law Commissions would be well situated to take on this task. The Law Commission of England and Wales was created for the purpose of achieving greater simplification, coherence, and modernization in the structure of the law.74 It is required ‘to take and keep under review all the law including in particular the codification of such law’.75 The Commission adopts project proposals on the basis of government departmental submissions or at the suggestion of others, with the support of the department. These it considers taking into account factors such as whether it agrees the law is unsatisfactory, there are benefits of reform, the suitability of the Commission to undertake the work, and whether the Commission has the relevant expertise. Commissioners then submit their proposed programmes of work to the Lord Chancellor for his formal approval. After their work is completed, their reports (which include draft Bills and detailed legislative proposals) are submitted to the Lord Chancellor to consider, and he will present them to Parliament if and when he and the Cabinet agree to do so. Since the Commission is under a statutory duty to review ‘all of the law’, this includes the law of the constitution. It has earlier conducted reviews of particular public law subjects, including on Administrative Redress and currently on Electoral Law. It has extensive experience of both consolidation work, producing over 200 consolidation Bills that have become Acts since 1965, and codification exercises, including in the law of divorce, family, crime, landlord and tenant relations, though only a few of these were in the event completed, largely for reasons of resource and shifting priorities. In the case of one project, on codifying the criminal law, it established a dedicated group of distinguished academics known as the ‘Code Team’ under terms of reference set by the Commission to which it reported. The team’s report, including a draft bill, was published with an introduction by the Commission and presented to the Lord Chancellor as a document for discussion.76 In the opinion of the Commission and the Lord Chancellor, any proposed project for its work must be ‘suitable’, which has been described in its latest programme of law reform in the following way: ‘Whether the reform would be suitable to be put forward by a body of lawyers after legal research and consultation (this would tend to exclude subjects where the considerations are shaped primarily by “political judgements”)’.77 This means that if the government requested that the Law Commission undertake this work of codifying the constitution, it would need to come with the agreement of the main political parties and without any significant degree of political contentiousness. The advantage of using the Commission for codifying the constitution would be that its report and draft document would be conducted in a politically neutral and independent way, treated as a technical exercise, and it would follow the professional working practices of the Commission which are well suited for such a task in matters such as consultation and Commissioner peer review. However, there would need to be a broad consensus not only on the desirability of codification but also on what the outline content of the codified constitution should be. The government’s brief to the Commission on content would need to be established in advance through a prior process of public and parliamentary consultation and all-party agreement. In correspondence with the author, the Chairman of the Law Commission, Sir David Lloyd Jones, agrees that the Law Commission is suitably equipped to take on this task. In his letter of 19 June 2014, he has said, On a technical level, the task of bringing together in one statute, and modernising the language of, various provisions of existing statute law relating to constitutional matters is one for which, in principle, the Commission would be well suited. I can equally see how a similar process could be applied to constitutional conventions. I would only add two caveats. First, it would only be appropriate for the Commission to undertake such a task if there was a clear political consensus in favour of engaging in it as a technical exercise. Secondly, such a task, particularly if there were to be a requirement to conduct it speedily, would require appropriate additional resources for the Commission. The United Kingdom-wide nature of such a project would make involvement of the Scottish and Northern Irish Law Commissions desirable. The government’s initiative could set out a timetable for production of the Bill and a commitment to present it to Parliament at the earliest opportunity. The brief to the Law Commission in its drafting and editing work, which will include certain conventions though stated to be without direct legal effect, should be to produce a document that contains the fundamental elements of the constitution, reproducing no more statutory provisions in its detail than essential to its task. Operationally, the project should be conducted on a tripartite basis between the three Law Commissions in the United Kingdom, with the Commission for England and Wales playing the lead role. If thought necessary or desirable, a subcommittee on the Constitution might be established for the purpose of carrying out or assisting with this work, with a chairman and members expert on constitutional law and practice being appointed, supervised and reporting to the Public Law team manager and Chairman. In all other respects, the process of drawing up the Consolidation Bill should follow normal Law Commission practices. The draft Bill prepared by the Law Commission and submitted to the Justice Secretary would then be published for scrutiny by Parliament. A Joint Committee would most likely be established, taking evidence and preparing a report with any suggested amendments. The government would then respond to this Report and present its Constitutional Consolidation Bill to Parliament for its consent in the customary manner. The legislative process agreed for this Bill should ensure that it was possible to take expert evidence during the committee stage in the House of Commons.78 Preparation of a Written Constitution Proper The process by which a Written Constitution proper, containing any reforming elements, might be prepared and implemented would clearly be more intensive and complex than a non-legal Code or Consolidation Bill, as it would symbolically become the Constitution in the state, providing the basic law and primary source of authority in the United Kingdom. The level of political importance and legal significance of such a document would make it essential that there was an extensive programme of public engagement built into its design and implementation process. One option for its preparatory body, placing special emphasis on popular participation, would be for a Convention or Assembly, however termed, which included a proportion of members of the public. Its membership might be chosen through a process of direct election from persons nominated as candidates or else selected at random from the electoral register (then agreeing to serve). There could, for example, be 100 members, half nominated representatives of the parties (in proportion to national votes cast for them at the previous general election), and half members of the public interested in participating (selected through a process ensuring a geographical spread across the country, using quotas in relation to age with gender, ethnicity, and socio-economic status).79 The proposal for a Convention of this nature could be presented for approval in both Houses of Parliament with terms of reference to consider and make recommendations on key questions and options in drawing up the codified constitution. Considerable informal negotiations and talks in advance of the parliamentary motions setting up this body would be necessary, and it would be for the government in consultation with the other parties to agree its working details. A suitable design might be for the chairman to be chosen by the government after consulting the other parties, subject to a pre-appointment hearing by a parliamentary committee. It would be desirable for the government to give an undertaking during the debate on the resolution setting up the Convention that the government would respond to the Convention’s recommendations within a specified time frame, by way of a statement to Parliament and a paper indicating those areas where it agreed or disagreed with the Convention’s recommendations. The government could then proceed to have a draft of the documentary constitution drawn up and presented to Parliament. A second option would be for the government to bring forward a Bill to create a statutory Constitutional Commission. This might be of a temporary nature, established for the sole purpose of preparing and agreeing a draft written constitution80; or be permanent, charged with keeping the constitution under review and making recommendations on references to it by ministers, and entrusted with this work as its first task. A body of this nature could be constructed in similar fashion to the Electoral Commission, having up to 12 independent Commissioners including a Chairman formally appointed by the Queen, following an Address from the House of Commons, and a selection process supervised by a Speaker’s Panel, with four of the Commissioners being nominated by the political parties. The tenure and conditions of office for the Chair and ordinary Commissioners would be settled in the legislation establishing the Commission,81 as would its other permanent functions and resources. However, the most suitable way forward, in my view, would be for a ‘Commission for Democracy’ to be set up under ministerial prerogative authority for the purpose, following cross-party talks reaching consensus on its general aims, form of composition, and method of working. Its composition could be similar to that suggested for a statutory Constitutional Commission, or whatever form proved acceptable through negotiation and agreement across the political parties. One major advantage would be that, if a government wished to accomplish its aim of a written constitution within its own lifetime or that of a five-year Parliament, this would be a more expeditious process than a statutory body. This is because a government Bill to set up a statutory Commission for the purpose would inevitably arouse extensive debate in both Houses of Parliament and in its committees on the whole subject of a written constitution, opening up the possibility of that this preliminary process became so protracted that the work involved becomes derailed or paralyzed before the Commission has even started. This does not mean that the role of Parliament should be circumvented but that the participation, influence, and agreement of both Houses and their members are best performed during the extensive debates that would take place on the Bill for the written constitution itself.82 This Commission for Democracy would relieve the government of what would be a highly time-consuming and complex task, most likely undertaken at a time when most of the electorate perceived there to be other higher priorities relating to the economy and public services, while maintaining the government’s involvement and trust in the process and outcome. Its title would serve to emphasize that its work was part of a broader process to improve the workings of our political democracy and popular engagement in the governance of the country. The Commission would need sufficient resources for a secretariat and to establish subcommittees, for example one to provide expert advice and research on constitutional and legal questions arising and another to design and organize a process of public engagement, consultation, and opinion gathering. Members on the subcommittees could be seconded or recruited from government departments, Universities, or professional bodies, as the Commission thought best equipped and appropriate. Lawyers from the office of parliamentary counsel could support the work of a commission in the drafting of the legal document. INTER-PARTY TALKS AND CO-OPERATION A vital precondition for enacting a written constitution will be for the government to reach agreement with the opposition, and preferably all parties represented in the House of Commons, on the desirability of the initiative and the process to be adopted in drawing up a draft document. Many will say this would be a lost cause, and that British political parties disagree with one another as a matter of course because of our system of adversary politics. However, while there is no denying this would be one of the most challenging aspects of enacting a constitution, it is far from an insuperable stumbling block, and there are clear precedents for successful cross-party co-operation if the necessary political will and conducive social circumstances in the country exist. Furthermore, there is in reality a great deal of consensus around the fundamentals and basic elements of our system of politics, and the point of agreement sought would simply be the desirability of setting down in one document what the constitutional arrangements of the country are, and how such a document might be drawn up and agreed. This cross-party co-operation would be necessary not simply for the enactment of the document but also for its lasting effectiveness. Clearly, it would be counter-productive to the unifying purpose of a written constitution, and the prospect of it enduring beyond the lifetime of the party in office, for it to be unilaterally imposed on one side of the House of Commons and fiercely opposed by the other. Whether the document was in the nature of a non-legal Code or a legal instrument, if the initiative or any draft document prepared were to be actively resisted by the Opposition parties, there is ample scope in the parliamentary process to protract its passage, raising serious concerns about the expenditure of time in comparison to pressing social and economic issues; and if a referendum were held in circumstances of political division, it would be self-defeating to its wider national purpose of serving as a means of binding and unifying the country. In the past formal inter-party conferences were widely used as a method to resolve problems which could not be dealt with by the normal machinery of party politics but were rarely successful. The first such conference was on the disestablishment of the Irish church in 1869, and the second on the electoral reform and redistribution proposals of 1884. The next four conferences, on the abortive education bill of 1906, on the constitution in 1910, on Irish Home Rule in 1914, and on conscription in 1915, were unsuccessful. There have been a number of inter-party conferences on reform of the House of Lords, none of which produced a successful reform, including the Bryce Commission 1917–18, a party leaders conference in 1948, and an inter-party conference in 1967–68. Inter-party talks of a less formal nature were initiated on devolution in 1977, but no agreement could be reached and the Labour government with the support of the Liberal Party proceeded to new legislation on devolution without all-party agreement, which failed to be approved in a Scottish referendum held the following year. The use of formal bodies such as Royal Commissions, Speaker’s conferences, or select committee inquiries may be useful to clarify areas of likely agreement and disagreement along with their recommendations but are all of limited practical value for securing inter-party agreement. This is simply because the memberships of such bodies, while usually containing members drawn from across the political parties, have no power to bind their party leaders. The political precedents suggest that informal methods of negotiation and dialogue between the party leaders or their delegates are more effective than formal conferences, and success relies on a predisposition of the parties to reach agreement, facilitated by the personal skills of those leading the negotiations on each side. There have in fact, away from the public eye and glare of the media, been some successful episodes of cross-party talks in recent years on the need for reform, where a compelling desire to produce an agreed outcome existed. To take one such case, the issue of reforming parliamentary expenses arose in 2009, following daily front-page revelations in the Daily Telegraph on how MPs had been spending their allowances for private purposes. The then Speaker, Michael Martin, convened a meeting of party leaders to agree an interim regime for MPs’ expenses and how to go forward. All the party leaders at the time attended (Prime Minister Gordon Brown, David Cameron, and Nick Clegg), together with the leaders of the minor parties who had been invited. The paper considered was in the name of the Speaker and had been prepared by a parliamentary official. This led to an agreed plan of action, including the principle of establishing an external body supervise and regulate the operation of expenses in the future. The government then took the lead in preparing further cross-party talks to agree the details of the permanent new body to be set up by statute. These meetings of about 30 people in total were conducted at Leader of the House level, with Jack Straw, then Justice Secretary, attending and supported by a team of Ministry of Justice officials. Alan Duncan, then shadow leader of the House, represented the Opposition, with other important participants including Sir George Young, the chair of the Privileges Committee, and representatives of all the parties, together with the party leaders in the House of Lords. Six meetings were held in a large ministerial conference room at the House of Commons, directly beneath the Chamber. In practice, Jack Straw led in the meetings, sharing with the others successive drafts of the Bill—itself an unusual development. His personal diplomatic abilities combined with a frank and open style of handling the debate and discussion made a significant difference. Another factor promoting the success of the talks was the presence of the minor parties, who had the effect of defusing some of the tension that built up on occasion between the three main parties, especially the contributions made by Elfyn Llwd for Plaid Cymru. This was commented upon in the parliamentary debates on the Bill later on, which became the Parliamentary Standards Act 2009 setting up the statutory Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority.83 This episode might be contrasted with the attempt of Gordon Brown, then Prime Minister, to set up all-party talks on a written constitution in 2010, which in my view was doomed from the outset, given the proximity of the general election and difficult personal relations between the central characters involved. In a speech to the Royal Society of Arts,84 Mr Brown said, ‘the question of a written constitution [is] an issue on which I hope all parties can work together in a spirit of partnership and patriotism’. He went onto say that he was convening an all-party group to begin the process of working towards codifying the constitution: If we are to go ahead with a written constitution we clearly have to debate also what aspects of law and relationships between each part of the state and between the state and the citizen should be deemed “constitutional”. I can therefore also announce today that a group will be set up to identify those principles and I hereby issue an invitation to all parties to be represented on this group. And if we are to decide to have a written constitution the time for its completion should be the 800th anniversary of the signing of the Magna Carta in Runnymede in 1215. However, there is no record of any such group or inter-party talks taking place, and it seems clear that both David Cameron or Nick Clegg were unwilling to participate in any such initiative.85 Given the proximity of the forthcoming general election in less than four months’ time, it would have been surprising if David Cameron, then Leader of the Conservative Opposition, had wished to enter into any form of collaboration with a government he was intent on attacking generally. In the case of the Liberal Democrat leadership, it later became crystal clear during the five days in May when the three main party leaders were negotiating on the formation of a new government from the hung Parliament, that Nick Clegg was unwilling to co-operate with Labour while Gordon Brown remained its leader.86 Party politics and personalities played the greater part in scuppering Gordon Brown’s hopes for inter-party talks on a codified constitution in 2010. POPULAR INVOLVEMENT AND CONSULTATION Since the preparation of a non-legal Code or Consolidation Act would not be changing the political structure from what it already was, no special procedures for public engagement are likely to be considered necessary, beyond a Green Paper and normal written consultation processes. However, the preparation of a Written Constitution proper, and the level of political importance and legal significance of such a document, would make it essential there was an extensive programme of public engagement built into its design and implementation process. The British electorate would need to be convinced that this exercise was being conducted for their benefit, rather than purely for the political elite, and feel a genuine sense of ownership of the document being produced. Social surveys indicate that the public clearly support the idea of a written constitution, with the level of support shown in opinion polls varying depending on how the question is phrased. To the question ‘Should the UK have a written constitution?’, a 2010 poll carried out by the Ministry of Justice returned 44 per cent for, 39 against, and 17 don’t knows. In a YouGov poll in 2009 on whether respondents agreed or disagreed with a proposal to ‘devise a written constitution to replace the current unwritten constitution which has evolved gradually over the past 1000 years’, 59 per cent agreed, 15 were opposed, and 26 were undecided. In an ICM poll in 2010 asking for a response to the more loaded question that ‘Britain needs a written constitution providing clear legal rules within which government ministers and civil servants are forced to operate’, 73 per cent agreed, 8 per cent were opposed, and 19 per cent were undecided. However, such surveys also show that the public has a low level of knowledge and understanding of the constitution and their system of government. In a Hansard Society survey on ‘the constitutional arrangements governing Britain’ undertaken in 2007, only one in five people thought they knew ‘a fair amount’, and around one-half of respondents said they knew ‘hardly anything at all’ or had ‘never heard of it’.87 This low public salience does not mean that ordinary members of the public do not have views on how we are governed or the issues that are raised by writing down the constitution, but it is a factor to be taken into account in determining the manner in which meaningful tests to gauge public opinion on specific aspects are conducted. In particular, it means that formal consultation exercises may be of limited use because while they enable lobby groups and politically motivated individuals to have their say, they are less effective in terms of establishing what the state of public opinion is generally across the country. However, one benefit of an initiative on a written constitution would be that it would itself precipitate a national and media debate on the constitution and the ways in which we are governed, raising greater awareness and provoking popular discussion and opinion on the subject. It would help establish the extent to which people across the country are content with existing political and constitutional arrangements, and give an indication of popular preferences to guide future developments, whether or not committed into a written constitution. In other words, the occasion of writing down the constitution would itself have considerable benefits in terms of engaging and informing public opinion, which in turn would benefit and inform the political parties in shaping their future policies on constitutional affairs. If the body entrusted with preparing the written constitution were to be a Convention or Assembly with some popular membership built into its composition, then this would provide the most direct form of public engagement.88 But if, as has been advocated in this article, the preferred body were to be a Commission on Democracy, then an advisory unit could be created to assist it with the specific task of informing and engaging the public. A precedent for this type of procedure is the Constitutional Advisory Group established by the Ministry of Justice in New Zealand to inform and engage the public on a number of selected constitutional and democratic issues.89 There is a range of techniques today, assisted by modern communication technology, which will be valuable in engaging the public and learning what is the true state of public opinion is on particular questions. The results of these deliberative exercises would help guide those framing the constitutional document and could be published to further inform public opinion.90 CONCLUDING: THE FINAL STAGES OF ENACTMENT In my view, a written constitution for the United Kingdom will be enacted at some point in the future, and the only question is precisely when and how. As to when, its occasion is likely to be prompted by one or more catalysts, perhaps a crisis in the United Kingdom’s membership of the EU, political pressures over settling the state of the Union across the four nations of England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, or some unexpected domestic political crisis, or a combination of factors, creating the necessary sense of necessity and commitment, coupled with clear national support. As to how, this article has attempted to answer some of the questions that will arise. As mentioned earlier, the three different kinds of documentary constitution discussed in this article could be taken as a process of building blocks towards the end purpose of enacting a Written Constitution proper, one creating a new order with the Constitution replacing the common law theory of the Crown as the ultimate source of authority in the state. This would be a useful and practical exercise, by first compiling a Code describing the basic institutions, powers, and principles of the constitution we possess and wish to retain, and then in a consolidation document graphically showing us precisely what we have as our constitutional law at present. The eventual form of written constitution we choose for ourselves is most likely to be a Written Constitution proper, as I have termed it. Its eventual enactment will prove the occasion for a sense of national renewal and great popular interest, aiming to provide the United Kingdom with a fresh sense of confidence about itself and its future. The final stage in the enactment of such a document would be for its agreed content to be set out in a draft government Bill presented to the House of Commons, providing for its introduction as the ‘Constitution of the United Kingdom’. This could be in the form of an Act of Parliament with the text of the Constitution set out in its Schedule, in similar form to that set out below. A referendum would be necessary to bring the Constitution into effect not only to exhibit the electorate’s approval of the idea and content of the document but to confer moral legitimacy upon the new legal order. Certain related formalities would be necessary or desirable to reinforce its authority, which might include amending the form of the Oaths taken by principal office holders of state, including ministers, parliamentarians, and members of the judiciary, so that henceforth they swear to uphold the provisions of the Constitution. A BILL to Provide for a referendum on a documentary Constitution for the United Kingdom and subject thereto to provide for its entry into force. Whereas the good governance of the four nations of England, Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland, constituting a United Kingdom, has evolved over many centuries, guided by principles of civil liberty, the rule of law, and parliamentary representation; with landmarks in its constitutional history that include the Magna Carta 1215, the Petition of Rights 1628, the Habeas Corpus Acts, the Bill of Rights and Claim of Rights 1689, the Acts of Union, the Representation of the People Acts, and the 1998 legislation starting the process of devolution to Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland; the country has progressed into a democracy founded upon civic values of tolerance, equality, and mutual respect; the people of the United Kingdom now desire a new settlement that codifies the Constitution of the country, for the purpose of greater transparency and openness in government, the greater inclusion of all citizens of the United Kingdom in the political process, and greater stability in its governance and constitutional arrangements. BE IT ENACTED by the Queen’s most Excellent Majesty, by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and Commons, in this present Parliament assembled, and by the authority of the same, as follows: PART I REFERENDUM ON THE CONSTITUTION 1 . A referendum shall be held to approve the Constitution, set out the Schedule. 2. The referendum question on the ballot paper shall be—‘Are you in favour of the proposed Constitution for the United Kingdom?’ 3. The referendum shall be held on 14th day of June 2019. PART II ESTABLISHMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION 4. Subject to a majority of those voting in the referendum being in favour of the Constitution, the Constitution shall take effect and become the fundamental law of the United Kingdom in accordance its terms and provisions. PART III GENERAL 5. Subject to section 4, the date of the Constitution entering into force shall be the 14th day of September 2019. 6. In this Act, the term ‘Constitution’ means the document set out in the Schedule. 7. This Act may be cited as the Constitution of the United Kingdom Act 2019. SCHEDULE [Constitution of the United Kingdom] *** © Robert Blackburn 2015 * PhD, LLD, Professor of Constitutional Law, King’s College London. The author served as Special Counsel to the House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee for its inquiry Mapping the Path Towards Codifying - or Not Codifying - the UK Constitution, 2010–15, and this article draws on research and writing he prepared for the Committee: see A New Magna Carta?, 2014–15, HC 463. He gratefully acknowledges support from the Nuffield Foundation and Joseph Rowntree Charitable Trust. 1 For a classic study, see Sir Ivor Jennings Magna Carta and its Influence in the World Today (1965). 2 On terminology, references to a ‘codified’ or ‘written’ constitution are essentially interchangeable expressions. There has been some debate in the United Kingdom about the best shorthand expression to describe the nature of the existing UK constitution, many pointing out that to say it is ‘unwritten’ is strictly speaking misleading as many constitutional rules are to be found written down in Acts of Parliament or administrative codes: see the House of Lords Constitution Committee, Reviewing the Constitution: Terms of Reference and Method of Working, 2001–02, HL 11, paras 20–21. However, comparative constitutional studies still most commonly use the terms written and unwritten to classify and distinguish between states with and without a documentary constitution. 3 The other two countries are New Zealand and Israel. 4 See Lord Hailsham (Conservative Party Chairman 1959–60, and Lord Chancellor 1970–74 and 1979–83), Elective Dictatorship (BBC, Richard Dimbleby Lecture 1976) and The Dilemma of Democracy (1978). 5 ‘I personally favour a written constitution. I recognise that this change would represent a historic shift in our constitutional arrangements, so any such proposals will be subject to wide public debate and the drafting of such a constitution should ultimately be a matter for the widest possible consultation with the British people themselves’ Commons Hansard, 10 June 2009, col 798. 6 Cm. 7170 (2007). 7 The Labour Party Manifesto promised to establish ‘an All Party Commission to chart a course towards a Written Constitution’ 9:3. 8 The Liberal Democrat Manifesto promised to ‘address the status of England within a federal Britain, through the Constitutional Convention set up to draft a written constitution for the UK as a whole’ 92. The Liberal Democrat leader, Nick Clegg, reiterated his support for a written constitution during his tenure as Deputy Prime Minister in 2010–15: see evidence to the House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, 19 April 2012, Q.205. 9 See House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, A New Magna Carta?, 2014–15, HC 463; and its related inquiries and reports such as Constitutional Role of the Judiciary If There Were a Codified Constitution, 2013–14, HC 802. 10 In preparation for its independence the Scottish government made plans for a written constitution: see Scottish Independence Bill (2014), in the preface to which Nicola Sturgeon, Deputy First Minister, said, ‘A written constitution is the basis of everyday life, setting out and protecting the rights and aspirations of the people of Scotland. It will be the highest and strongest of laws – a statement of the fundamental principles by which a country chooses to live, regardless of the political party in power’. 11 See, e.g. former Conservative Cabinet minister J Redwood MP ‘The Time is Ripe for English Devolution’ Financial Times (17 September 2014). See the proposals of the Smith Commission for Further Devolution of Powers to the Scottish Parliament, 27 November 2014; and the government white paper, Scotland in the United Kingdom, An Enduring Settlement, January 2015, Cm. 8990. 12 See, e.g. speech by Carwyn Jones, First Minister for Wales, ‘Wales and the Changing Union’ conference, 30 March 2012, in which he said, ‘I am whole-heartedly in favour of a written constitution for the UK. The incremental piecemeal approach to our constitution is destabilising and distracting. Far better, I believe, to have a comprehensive look at what kind of state we want the UK to be and then move towards a written constitution which commits and binds’. 13 See OH Phillips Reform of the Constitution (1970); R Holme and M Elliott (eds) 1688–1988: Time for a New Constitution (1988); F Vibert Constitutional Reform in the United Kingdom (Institute of Economic Affairs 1990); Institute for Public Policy Research A Written Constitution for the United Kingdom (rev edn 1993); J Cornford ‘On Writing a Constitution’ [1991] Parliamentary Affairs 558; Lord Scarman Why Britain needs a Written Constitution (Charter 88 Lecture 1992); D Oliver ‘Written Constitutions: Principles and Problems’ [1992] Parliamentary Affairs 135; T Benn Common Sense: A New Constitution for Britain (1993); C. Bryant (ed) Towards a New Constitutional Settlement (Smith Institute 2007); V Bogdanor, T Khaitan, and S Vogenauer ‘Should Britain Have a Written Constitution?’ [2007] Political Quarterly 499; R Gordon Repairing British Politics: A Blueprint for Constitutional Change (2010); V Bogdanor, S Hockman, et al. Towards a Codified Constitution (Justice Paper 2010); R Singh The UK Constitution: Time for Fundamental Reform? (Tom Sargent Lecture 2010). 14 For an analysis of the relative ease with which a government can change UK constitutional law and practice at present, see R Blackburn ‘Constitutional Amendment in the United Kingdom’ ch. 18 in X Contiades (ed) Engineering Constitutional Change (2013). 15 Generally, see J Goldsworthy The Sovereignty of Parliament: History and Philosophy (1999). 16 Thus Lord Hailsham, said, ‘The sovereignty of Parliament has increasingly become, in practice, the sovereignty of the Commons, and the sovereignty of the Commons has increasingly become the sovereignty of the government, which, in addition to its influence in Parliament, controls the party whips, the party machine and the civil service... I think the time has come to take stock and to recognise how far this nation, supposedly dedicated to freedom under law, has moved towards a totalitarianism which can only be altered by a systematic and radical overhaul of our constitution’: Elective Dictatorship (1976) 8, 3. 17 See House of Commons Public Administration Select Committee, Taming the Prerogative: Ministerial Accountability to Parliament, 2002–13, HC 422. 18 See House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Prospects for Codifying the Relationship between Central and Local Government, 2012–13, HC 656. 19 Other common arguments against a written constitution include suggestions that it would increase politically motivated litigation in the courts, it would expand the scope of judicial review actions against government ministers and departments, it would allow political opponents of the government to challenge its legislation using the courts, and it would cause uncertainty about the legality of controversial provisions in Acts of Parliament. See also N Barber ‘Against a Written Constitution’ [2008] Public Law 11; and Sir John Baker Our Unwritten Constitution (British Academy Lecture 2009). 20 For a draft illustrative blueprint for each of these three types of document, see those prepared by the author for the House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, A New Magna Carta?, 2014–15, HC 463, 29–356. 21 (Cabinet Office, 2011) and see House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Constitutional Implications of the Cabinet Manual, 2010–12, HC 734. 22 See F Bennion Statutory Interpretation (5th edn 2007). 23 For the texts of comparative constitutions, see A Alen (ed) International Encyclopaedia of Laws: Constitutional Law (Kluwer Law International). 24 Such as House of Lords reform and a solution to the ‘West Lothian question’. 25 Ellen Street Estates Ltd v. Minister of Health [1934] 1 KB 590; Vauxhall Estates Ltd v. Liverpool Corporation [1932] 1 KB 733. 26 See House of Lords Constitution Committee, Reviewing the Constitution: Terms of Reference and Method of Working, 2001–02, HL 11, para. 20. 27 The Prime Minister David Cameron and Justice Secretary Chris Grayling announced during the Conservative Party Conference their intention to replace the Human Rights Act with a British Bill of Rights and Responsibilities: see Mr Cameron, Speech to Conference, 30 September 2014; C Grayling ‘We Must Seize Power from Euro Judges’ Daily Mail (October 2014) 3; and M Howard ‘Britain Can Reclaim its Human Rights Laws’ Daily Telegraph (October 2014) 3. 28 Human Rights Act 1998. 29 See, e.g. AG Noorani Citizens’ Rights, Judges and State Accountability (2002) and Constitutional Questions in India (2002). 30 Given its political importance it would seem appropriate for the voting system to be stated in the constitution, though this could be left to organic law (the Representation of the People Acts, as at present). In present circumstances especially following the referendum on the voting system in 2011 the default position of the status quo, the simple plurality or First Past the Post system, would almost certainly be adopted (the two main parties currently favouring the existing system and the Liberal Democrats who advocate proportional representation being in a weak negotiating position). 31 Generally, see G Marshall Constitutional Conventions (1984). In 2006 a parliamentary Joint Committee on Conventions in 2006 opposed to the idea of codifying conventions, saying they ‘by their very nature, are unenforceable ... codifying conventions is a contradiction in terms. It would raise issues of definition, reduce flexibility, and inhibit the capacity to evolve. It might create a need for adjudication...’: Conventions of the UK Parliament, 2005–06, HL 265-1, para. 279. However, that Committee had a specific task of establishing conventions in the House of Lords (notably the Addison-Salisbury convention) in a shifting and uncertain context of a large number of additional party political peers being nominated since 1999 and on-going disagreement over future reform and elections to the Chamber. 32 See Sir Ivor Jennings The Law and the Constitution (5th edn 1959) 136. 33 Constitutional and Administrative Law (5th edn 2014) vol 20. 34 Such as AW Bradley and KD Ewing Constitutional and Administrative Law (15th edn 2011). 35 On the conventions governing the monarchy for example, see R Blackburn ‘Monarchy and the Personal Prerogatives’ [2004] Public Law 546–63. 36 In the post-1997 era of rolling constitutional change they have also become markedly less robust in shaping political behaviour, a feature remarked upon in a lecture by the former Cabinet Secretary, Lord Wilson, who said, ‘Our unwritten constitutional conventions are under pressure from a variety of directions, for instance because of the power of the media, constitutional change, management change and a general ignorance of, or impatience with, the constitution’ (Lord Wilson of Dinton ‘The Robustness of Conventions in a Time of Modernisation and Change’ [2004] Public Law 407f). 37 Cabinet Office, 2010. 38 Until 2002, Downing Street maintained there was a convention that Prime Ministers do not appear before Select Committees, but since that date Prime Ministers have appeared every six months before the Liaison Committee in the House of Commons: see R Blackburn and A Kennon Parliament: Functions, Practice and Procedures (2nd edn 2003) 763–66. 39 Ellen Street Estates Ltd v. Minister of Health [1934] 1 KB 590; Vauxhall Estates Ltd v. Liverpool Corporation [1932] 1 KB 733. 40 For discussion see AW Bradley ‘The Sovereignty of Parliament – Form or Substance?’ ch. 2 in J Jowell and D Oliver (eds) The Changing Constitution (7th edn 2011). 41 Thoburn v. Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195, [2003] QB 151; R (on the application of HS2 Action Alliance Limited) v. The Secretary of State for Transport and another [2014] UKSC 3 at para. 208. 42 Elective Dictatorship (1976). 43 This procedure was adopted in Canada’s Constitution Act 1982 for the purposes of its Charter of Rights and Freedoms, section 33(1): ‘Exception where express declaration. Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 [fundamental freedoms] or sections 7 to 15 [legal and quality rights] of this Charter’. 44 For discussion of this formulation, see House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Constitutional Role of the Judiciary If There Were a Codified Constitution, 2013–14, HC 802. 45 This procedure would be similar to ‘declarations of incompatibility’ made under section 4 of the Human Rights Act 1998. 46 For a work of legal sociology arguing this point of view, see JAG Griffith The Politics of the Judiciary (5th edn 1997). 47 5 November 2013. 48 See The Process of Constitutional Change, 2010–12, HL 177, 24–25. 49 One is the requirement in Standing Orders for at least 100 members in the House of Commons to vote in favour of a successful closure motion. The other, providing a possible precedent for those framing a written constitution, is a requirement for two-thirds of the membership of the House of Commons to vote in support of an early general election under the terms of the Fixed-term Parliament Act 2011. This is a high threshold and would normally require some degree of cross-party co-operation. 50 Parliament Act 1911, section 2(1). 51 As delegated legislation was not mentioned in the Parliament Acts 1911–49 (not being the common occurrence it became later in the 20th century) the Lords’ veto remained. 52 See House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Referendums in the United Kingdom, 2009–10, HL 99. 53 See HC Deb, 29 August 2013 (the Prime Minister withdrew his intention for military action in Syria following an adverse vote on such action in the House of Commons); and House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee, Parliament’s Role in Conflict Decisions: A Way Forward, 2013–14, HC 892. 54 Cd. 5163 (1910). 55 Cd. 6210 (1912), Cd. 7338 (1914). 56 Cmd. 3909 (1931). 57 Cmd. 9613 (1955). 58 Cmd. 1798 (1923). 59 Cmd. 1164 (1960). 60 Cmd. 3436 (1929). 61 England, Cmd. 4040 (1973). 62 Cmd. 1728 (1962). 63 Cmd. 5460 (1973). 64 A House for the Future, Cm. 4534 (2000). 65 Cmd. 4060 (1931). 66 Cmd. 218 (1957). 67 Cm. 4090 (1998). 68 Commission on a Bill of Rights A UK Bill of Rights? The Choice Before Us (December 2012). 69 HC 779, 29 November 2012. 70 For example, only 5 of the 53 members of the last three Royal Commissions combined were women. 71 The recommendations of the Royal Commission on the House of Lords with respect to elections, and those of the Independent Commissions on the Voting System and on a Bill of Rights, all failed. 72 Speech ‘Towards a New Politics’ 2 February 2010. 73 This initiative formed part of Mr Brown’s broader project of working towards a written constitution, on which see further below. 74 Generally, see G Zellick The Law Commission and Law Reform (1988); M Zander The Law-Making Process (2004) ch. 9; and Lord Justice Munby Shaping the Law – The Law Commission at the Crossroad (Denning Lecture 2011). 75 There are three Law Commissions in the United Kingdom, dealing with the respective legal systems in England and Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland. The Law Commission for England and Wales could be the lead body in codifying the constitution, acting in close association with the other two Commissions. The English Commission consists of a Chairman and four Commissioners, all of who are appointed by the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice. The Chair is a person who holds office as a judge of the High Court or Court of Appeal, and the other Commissioners are qualified by the holding of judicial office or by experience as a legal practitioner or as a University professor of law. 76 Law Commission of England and Wales, No. 177, A Criminal Code for England and Wales, 1988–89, HC 299. 77 Law Commission of England and Wales, 11th Programme (2011), 330. 78 In other words, there would need to be cross-party agreement reached in the House of Commons on the allocation of which clauses at committee stage were taken by the whole House, being the conventional committee stage for bills of first class constitutional importance, and those by a public bill committee enabling the taking of oral and written evidence. 79 This is similar to the Convention on the Constitution in the Republic of Ireland in 2012–13. The Convention was set up in July 2012 by resolution of both Houses of the Oireachtas (Parliament) in the Republic of Ireland to make recommendations on a series of constitutional reform issues. The Convention consisted of 100 people, being 66 citizens who were eligible to vote selected at random and balanced in terms of gender, age, and region, and the remainder being parliamentarians nominated by their parties in proportion to their relative strengths in the Oireachtas, one representative from each of the parties in Northern Ireland, and an independent chairman appointed by the government. The Convention held a large number of public hearings throughout 2012–13 and appointed an Academic and Legal Support Group to provide expert research and reports to support the work and deliberations of the convention. Its terms of reference required it to report within 12 months of its first public hearing, with the government undertaking to respond to each of the recommendations within four months and, if accepting a recommendation, to indicate the timeframe it envisaged for the holding of any related referendum. 80 A statutory all-party Commission of this kind was promised in the Labour Party Manifesto of 2010, 9:3. 81 See the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000, Part I, for the statutory framework for the Electoral Commission. 82 Both Houses of Parliament and its committees would in any event be involved in the consultation processes undertaken by the Commission. 83 Another recent case of informal cross-party negotiations was during 2012/13 on how to settle reform of the press following the Leveson inquiry, which led to the agreed outcome of a Royal Charter dealing with enforcement of a new code of practice governing the press and the matter of exemplary damages being dealt with by way of amendments to the Crime and Courts Bill then passing through Parliament. 84 ‘Towards a New Politics’ 2 February 2010. 85 A 10 Downing Street Policy Unit seminar had been held on the subject earlier in December 2009, but one whose membership consisted of selected constitutional specialists in the subject rather than politicians. 86 See R Blackburn ‘The 2010 General Election Outcome and Formation of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition Government’ [2011] Public Law 30–55. 87 See An Audit of Political Engagement (2008) 5 and Ministry of Justice, People and Power: Shaping Democracy, Rights and Responsibilities (March 2010) with results of deliberative events held with members of the public on constitutional change including the potential for a written constitution. 88 Operating independent of government, a cross-party Constitutional Convention including representatives of civil society worked on a programme for Scottish devolution prior to the Scotland Bill being framed in 1997–98. The House of Commons Political and Constitutional Reform Committee has suggested a government-initiated Constitutional Convention with a strong element of public participation be established to review and recommend a lasting settlement for devolved government across the United Kingdom: Do We Need a Constitutional Convention for the UK?, 2012–13, HC 371. 89 The topics include the sensitive question of Māori representation. The chairman of the Group is Professor John Burrows, a former chairman of New Zealand’s Law Commission. 90 There is now a growing science in deliberative democracy principles and practices, with a wide variety of techniques to choose from in terms of engaging the public in policy decision making. It includes forms of mandatory preliminary instruction before any public vote is taken on a proposal; scaled referendums asking voters to indicate support for reform options on a sliding quantitative scale with the values, costs, and benefits associated with each option clearly listed in the ballot paper itself; and ‘preliminary values questioning’ asking voters about the values they already hold and which they believe should drive the future of constitutional development, thereby encouraging purposive reasoning. Generally see R. Levy, “Deliberative Voting: Realising Constitutional Referendum Democracy” (2013) Public Law 555; “The Law of Deliberative Voting: Seeding the Field” (2013) Election Law Journal 355. © The Author 2015. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com.
TI - Enacting a Written Constitution for the United Kingdom
JF - Statute Law Review
DO - 10.1093/slr/hmv004
DA - 2015-02-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/enacting-a-written-constitution-for-the-united-kingdom-oMV7IsGWbA
SP - 1
EP - 27
VL - 36
IS - 1
DP - DeepDyve
ER -