TY - JOUR
AU - Mason, T. David
AB - The last half of the twentieth century was marked by dramatic changes in the patterns of armed conflict in the world. First, whereas wars between sovereign nation-states had defined the contours of international politics for the previous three hundred years, civil wars—revolutions, secessionist wars, and anticolonial revolts—became the most frequent and deadly forms of armed conflict in the post-World War II era. The Correlates of War data indicate that between 1945 and 1999 there were only twenty-five interstate wars (resulting in a total of 3.3 million battle deaths), but five times as many civil wars (127) occurred, resulting in five times as many battle deaths (16.2 million) (Fearon and Laitin 2003:75). Second, whereas the major powers (including Europe, the United States, China, and Japan) had been the site of most of the world's interstate wars, the Third World—Asia, Africa, and Latin America—became the locus of almost all the armed conflict that punctuated the history of the last half-century. While Europe enjoyed what John Gaddis (1986) termed the “long peace” (the longest period in the post-Westphalia era without a major war among the major powers), conflicts in the Third World inflicted all but 176,000 of the 22 million battle deaths that occurred between 1945 and 1989 (Holsti 1992:37). If the restructuring of the international system that occurred in the aftermath of World War II could result in such a profound transformation in the global patterns of armed conflict, we might also expect a similar shift to occur with the end of the Cold War. In this article I will explore the question of what trends, if any, we might expect to see in patterns of civil war in the new century. Will the end of the Cold War bring an end to the age of civil war or simply result in the diffusion of such conflict to regions that heretofore were relatively immune to its occurrence? Investigating the prospects for another phase shift in global patterns of armed conflict requires that we relax the disciplinary boundaries between comparative politics and international relations. Changes in the structure of the international system have been implicated in the diffusion of revolutionary violence that occurred after World War II.1 The domestic conditions that most theories propose as causal antecedents of civil war—for example, extreme inequality of income and wealth, displacement of rural populations from the land, weak state capacity with repressive regimes—are, to varying degrees, outcomes of international processes, including the dismantling of colonial empires, the shift to export agriculture in many parts of the Third World, and the intervention of major powers in the domestic politics of Third World regimes in the service of Cold War geopolitical interests. Three trends in the post-Cold War international system have been identified as possibly (but not certainly) moderating the domestic conditions that fuel civil war: (1) the globalization of national economies; (2) the third wave of democratization; and (3) the expanded use of peacekeeping operations as a means to bring civil wars to a peaceful conclusion. Globalization promises to bring new investments to Third World nations, diversifying their economies, stimulating growth, and potentially alleviating the deprivation that has fueled support for revolutionary insurgencies. The spread of democracy means that Third World states faced with opposition challenges will be far less likely to respond with the level of repression that has often turned peaceful opposition into revolutionary movements. And the expanded use of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations suggests that, when civil wars do occur, the international community is more likely to intervene to bring the war to an earlier and less destructive end. In the remainder of this article, I will examine the competing arguments on how these three trends might affect the frequency, destructiveness, and geographic distribution of civil wars in the new millennium. Globalization and Revolution The end of the Cold War has accelerated the trend toward integration of national economies into a truly global economy. The dismantling of the economic wall between the market economies of the capitalist West and the state socialist economies of the Leninist East has encouraged the globalization of industrial production and finance to the Third World as well. This phenomenon is expected to alter the dynamics of national economic development in fundamental ways. The question for this article is whether these trends can create enough opportunity for enough of the population in the Third World to diminish the frequency of civil wars there. Optimists predict that globalization will result in higher rates of investment and economic growth in the Third World as those nations become full partners in a global system of production, consumption, and finance. The diffusion of industrial production to the Third World will make their economies less dependent on raw materials exports and less vulnerable to market fluctuations in the price of those exports. Expansion of the industrial and service sectors in Third World economies is expected to create occupational alternatives to agriculture that promise to absorb much of the surplus rural labor that traditionally has provided the civilian support for revolutionary insurgencies. In this manner, globalization promises to remedy the grievances that fuel popular support for revolutionary movements and thereby diminish the frequency with which civil wars occur. Critics of globalization acknowledge that the integration of the Third World into a global system of production and finance may well shift some low wage manufacturing jobs to the Third World. However, the local benefits of this trend will be limited and temporary. Benefits will be limited because the jobs will be low-skill and low-wage positions. As such, they promise little improvement in the standard of living of most workers there. Nor do they promise to alleviate the extremes of income inequality that most deprived actor models of revolution depict as the source of popular grievances. Moreover, continued high population growth rates in the Third World mean that the absolute number of people living in poverty will remain large, even if the anticipated benefits of globalization do lift some out of poverty. Eric Selbin (2001:289–290) points out that in Latin America more people live in poverty today than twenty years ago: “nearly half of the region's 460 million people are poor—an increase of 60 million in one decade.” The growing number of poor will provide fertile recruiting grounds for opposition movements that can depict the incumbent regime—even a democratic one—as more responsive to the imperatives of global capital markets than to the needs of its own impoverished citizens. Whatever benefits flow from globalization will be temporary because those are precisely the kinds of jobs that are targeted for eventual elimination through automation. The only industries that will relocate to the Third World are those that pay low wages and generate the kinds of environmental problems that publics in wealthier nations will no longer tolerate. Indeed, part of the reason that these industries relocate to the Third World is that social movements in advanced industrial democracies have succeeded in getting “green” legislation enacted to compel manufacturers to invest in environmental clean up. Firms can avoid these costs by relocating to the Third World, where environmental movements are as yet politically weak if not nonexistent. Those firms often find that the promise of job-creating investments overwhelms environmental concerns in the political calculus of elected officials in many Third World states. Thus, critics argue that globalization will have little if any effect on the economic grievances that fuel support for revolutionary movements. In short, an ample supply of impoverished individuals and communities will still provide the civilian support base to sustain revolutionary movements. To reconcile these contending views on globalization, we must inventory some of its specific effects on grievances among the rural poor, on mobilization of aggrieved populations, and on state responses to opposition social movements. Globalization and Economic Development In many ways, the arguments about globalization, both critical and optimistic, closely parallel earlier debates in the field of comparative politics over the concepts of “modernization” and “development.” Half a century ago, modernization theorists extrapolated from the experience of Western Europe and North America to predict that the commercialization of agriculture in the Third World would transform the surplus rural population of those nations into an urban labor force that would fuel an industrial revolution in those countries (Lewis 1954, cited in McMichael 2000:274; see also Rostow 1990). Comparative advantage implied that these regions' economic development was best served by specializing in the production of raw materials for export to industrial economies of the North. Dependency and world systems theorists observed that the actual outcome of modernization has been something far less than the take-off to industrial maturity that Europe and North America experienced in the nineteenth century. Quite the contrary, the commercialization of agriculture has led to high rates of landlessness, overurbanization, environmental deterioration, and the impoverishment of large portions of the urban and rural populations. The much-anticipated industrial revolution did not occur in most nations of the Third World, especially those that were integrated into the global economy as exporters of agricultural commodities. If the prescription of comparative advantage failed to replicate Europe's industrial revolution, is there any reason to believe that the postmodern prescription of globalization will be any more of a panacea for Third World poverty? If not, why should we expect economic globalization to bring about any substantial decline in the frequency with which revolutionary situations emerge in the Third World? If the modernization paradigm envisioned Third World nations replicating the developmental path that Western Europe and North America had followed in the nineteenth century, globalization represents an abandonment of that goal. Instead, nations seek niches of specialization in a global economy whose dynamics are determined more by capital markets than by states. “Nation-states no longer ‘develop’; rather, they ‘position themselves’ in the global economy” (McMichael 2000:275). Different nations or even regions within nations specialize in some phase of a globalized production process. In so doing, they hope to make themselves indispensable partners in a global production and distribution network. To the extent that they succeed, capital will flow into their economy, fueling the growth and prosperity that will allow them to become full partners in the global consumer market. To the extent that these expectations are not fulfilled, the economic grievances that fuel popular support for dissident movements will remain. Globalization and the State Both optimists and critics of globalization agree on one primary difference between the changes resulting from globalization and those predicted by modernization theorists: globalization will substantially diminish the capacity of the state to influence national economic development. Arrighi (1994) links the shift from “development” to “globalization” to the onset of the “financialization” of the global economy: a preference on the part of investors for liquid rather than fixed capital. The heightened mobility of capital has privileged financial speculation at the expense of fixed investment. It has also privileged international financial and corporate elites (including officials of international institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization) at the expense of government officials in the nations penetrated by the global trade and financial system (McMichael 2000:279). Under globalization, “boosting export production and offering attractive conditions for foreign investment became the new priorities for governments in the Third World, alongside an extraordinary roll-back of public investment” (McMichael 2000:281). To make their nation attractive to global financial elites, state leaders in the Third World are compelled to reduce taxes, devalue their currency, and cut public spending, whether it be for social welfare benefits or investment in infrastructure. It also requires the privatization of state assets, auctioning them off to these same global financial elites at prices dictated by global financial markets. Privatization increased tenfold over the course of the 1980s (McMichael 2000:281). Critics argue that structural adjustments of these sorts undermine the coherence and sovereignty of national economies. Lowering wages in order to attract foreign direct investment reduces purchasing power in the domestic economy. Privatizing public enterprises reduces the capacity of states to influence domestic economic development and to cushion their constituents against shocks emanating from the global economy. The promise of low-wage manufacturing jobs today can disappear tomorrow with shifts in global currency or capital markets, innovations in production technology, or changes in consumer demand. State elites who enact policies designed to attract foreign investments often find that global market forces are far more crucial than their own policies in determining the flow of investment into and out of their nation's economy. Compliance with the rules of the global economy results in the shrinking of state capacity. Shrinking the state has reduced its capacity to allocate and redistribute resources in response to the demands of popular sectors, including workers and peasants. States must give up some of the very policy instruments with which they could accommodate the demands of mobilized publics and defuse tensions that otherwise might fuel political violence, including civil war. Some argue that such changes will be good for the development of national economies. The fear of driving away foreign investment will make states less likely (and less able) to intervene in the economy in ways that disrupt markets. In the past, such interventions were justified on the grounds of protecting vulnerable domestic constituencies. However, such policies often produced more in the way of short-term political payoff for state officials than long-term economic protections for targeted sectors of the labor force. Brazil's failed experiments with import substitution and Argentina's populist policies under Peron are illustrative of the long-term economic consequences that can accrue to politically motivated interventions in markets. Globalization makes such interventions less likely by raising the costs to states—in terms of international investment—of intervening in the market. The globalization imperative also suggests that when popular discontent is mobilized, states will be far less likely to respond with repression for fear of scaring off international investment. The political risks that accompany state repression can deter foreign investment, especially when capital is as mobile as it has become today. Thus, the imperatives of globalization may make states in the Third World less repressive than they were during the Cold War when the prospects of large fixed capital investments could induce state elites to repress labor unions, peasant associations, and other popular social movements. The Mexican government's response to the Zapatista uprising on the day that NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement) went into effect is instructive. During the Cold War, an armed uprising of the sort that occurred on January 1, 1994, would likely have provoked a harsh military response, no doubt with the active support of the United States. Instead, the Mexican government (at the urging of the United States) restrained its military response for fear of driving off investors who were poised to pour capital into the Mexican economy once NAFTA went into effect. Popular discontent can become politicized by state impotence in the face of economic grievances just as well as by state intervention in markets to redistribute the benefits and costs of economic development. Within the state, globalization has privileged the financial and trade ministries at the expense of ministries whose constituents include factory workers, peasants, the urban poor, and other marginal social groups. State agencies that support and regulate sectors of the economy that affect the lives of the majority of the citizenry have lost budgetary resources and policy influence to agencies concerned with and connected to global economic interests (McMichael 2000:281). States are no longer in a position to enter joint ventures with private firms, nor can they use such investments to “pick winners” in the domestic economy so as to shape the nation's developmental trajectory in ways that state leaders determine are best for the long-term health of the national economy or the short-term stability of the political system. Robert Snyder (1999:13) argues that shrinking the state will make revolution less likely because the diminished role of the state in the economy will make it less relevant as a target for popular discontent. Jeff Goodwin (2001:275) adds, “state power—the traditional prize of revolutionaries—has been dramatically eroded by the growing power of multinational corporations and by the increasingly rapid and uncontrollable movements of capital, commodities, and people.” As globalization hollows out the state, it will no longer be a prize worth the costs and risks of revolutionary action. This argument is unconvincing. Control of the state in even the most impoverished nation provides, if nothing else, ample opportunity for rent-seeking on the part of those who control it, as evidenced by the ability of dictators such as Mobutu Sese-seko in Zaire, Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, and Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines to amass huge personal fortunes while presiding with indifference to their constituents' suffering from their failed development policies. Paul Collier and his colleagues at the World Bank have documented a trend among rebel organizations that do well by war. By capturing the flow of certain types of commodities (such as diamonds or illegal drugs), rebel organizations can extract enough income to prosper economically regardless of their chances of ever overthrowing the government (see Collier and Hoeffler 2001). A weakened state simply enhances these opportunities. If globalization diminishes the state's capacity to address the grievances of mobilized publics, how will the state respond to new social movements arising within the polity? Globalization and Social Movements Regardless of its effects on state capacity and economic development (and, therefore, on grievances), globalization also affects the ability of aggrieved populations to mobilize for collective action. The same global communications networks (including the Internet and wireless communications) that make possible the instantaneous movement of capital around the globe also facilitate the coordination of social movement activities across borders and the diffusion of social movement technologies to the most remote corners of the world. Globalization gives Third World social movement organizations access to supporters and resources exogenous to their own nation. Globalization also means that repertoires of contention are more easily diffused from one nation to another. And the coordination of supporters' behavior by dissident activists is facilitated by the same technologies of globalization that supposedly make revolution less likely by diminishing grievances. If, as Charles Tilly (1978), John McCarthy and Meyer Zald (1977), and others have argued, the emergence of dissident social movements is less a function of grievances and more a function of organization, the very trends that optimists point to as making revolution less likely in the Third World should make the proliferation of social movements all the more robust. The more social movements there are, the more likely it is that some of them will escalate to revolutionary violence. At the very least, any assessment of the prospects for civil war in the Third World must consider how changes in the global economy—and in the domestic political economy of those nations—affect the prospects for grassroots mobilization of peasants and the urban poor in the Third World. There is no reason to expect that globalization processes will act as a deterrent to grassroots mobilization in the Third World. Indeed, there is every reason to believe that mobilizing the poor for collective action will be facilitated by the trends toward globalization. Globalization builds links between communities, social organizations, and identity groups in the Third World and their counterparts in the North. The diffusion of social movement organizations, the emergence of transnational social movements, and the expansion of links between Third World social movements and their counterparts or sympathizers in wealthier nations in the North suggest that activists in the Third World will find the tasks of building a social movement organization and mobilizing the resources necessary to sustain the movement easier in an era of globalization than they were during the Cold War. The question then becomes how globalization will affect the willingness of non-elites to support and participate in dissident social movements. What matters to an impoverished individual are not the big issues of global integration but how these trends affect the immediate conditions of their daily existence. “Globalization tends to be understood as a process of economic integration—observed through local prisms, or ‘grounded’ in local terms, giving a local face to processes of globalization” (McMichael 2000:275). Although globalization is, first and foremost, a matter of integrating national economies into the global economy, the effects of this process are felt locally and are defined for people in local terms. For example, neoliberal reforms of the Salinas administration in Mexico had profound effects on peasant farmers in that nation. The elimination of guaranteed crop prices, reductions in state-subsidized credit, and the dismantling of trade barriers under the banner of NAFTA exposed Mexican farmers to competition from US agribusiness conglomerates, and this competition threatened their very livelihood (Harvey 1998:170). Some of Salinas' proposals on land tenure were perceived by indigenous communities in Chiapas as threatening, not just to their control of the ejidos, but to a way of life based around communal lands (Wager and Shulz 1995:5–7). These threats became real precisely because of the local incentives created by NAFTA. Communities threatened by globalization were able to turn their own community institutions into mobilizing structures to mount organized opposition to NAFTA and to the Mexican government as the champion of NAFTA. Thus the Zapatista movement was born: the Ejército Zapatsita de Liberación Nacional or EZLN. The same trend toward economic globalization could, however, make it less likely that movements such as the EZLN will escalate to revolutionary violence. When the Zapatistas surprised the Mexican government and the world with their carefully timed uprising, the Mexican government resisted the reflexive response of retaliating with massive military firepower. Within two weeks after the EZLN's opening offensive, the government had declared a cease-fire and initiated settlement talks. Within six months, the government had poured over $220 million into social development projects in the region, a 44 percent increase over what had been budgeted (Wager and Shulz 1995:29). Had the government tried to crush the movement militarily, relying on its overwhelming advantages in troops and firepower, the surviving Zapatista combatants would likely have concentrated on building their own military capabilities. Some portion of their civilian support base would have become committed to supporting guerrilla operations. Although the prospects of a Zapatista victory would still have been remote, the likelihood of protracted guerrilla conflict destabilizing an already fragile Mexican economy would have increased. The fact that Salinas did not pursue the military response as aggressively as he could have is due in part to the international imperatives of globalization. Despite the intrusion of global issues into the local political economy and despite the growth in the number of transnational social movement organizations, it appears that “most political challengers continue to operate within fairly traditional, nationally-focused political arenas” (Smith 2000:3; see also Imig and Tarrow 2000, 2001a, 2001b). Globalization of national economies has not yet resulted in truly transnational social movements (Imig and Tarrow 2001a). Third World social movement organizations may have counterparts and colleagues in the wealthier nations of Europe and North America. However, to date, the emergence of transnational social movements has not kept pace with the globalization of national economies. Imig and Tarrow (2000) point to the higher costs of transnational activism and the difficulties in mobilizing both using voluntary support and labor impersonal, long-distance communications. Their research—and most of the research on transnational social movements—is focused on the European Union. If transnational social movements have a difficult time achieving success there—with well-educated and prosperous publics, and few barriers to the flow of people, capital, or information across national boundaries—it is unrealistic to expect transnational social movements to emerge either within the Third World or between Third World movements and their counterparts in the North. Smith (2000:9) notes that only 23 percent of transnational social movement organizations are based in the South. Even these are largely associations of people who, by local standards, would be considered elites. Rarely are transnational social movements associations of the poor. Even more rarely are they likely to involve heavy participation from the impoverished rural population that traditionally provides the civilian support base for revolutionary movements. Activists in the Third World may receive moral support, publicity for their cause, and even some financial support from their counterparts in the North. However, their Northern colleagues are not likely to relocate in large numbers to the Third World to serve as foot soldiers in Third World revolutionary movements. They may stage demonstrations in Europe and North America to raise public consciousness about land and poverty issues in the Third World, but they are not likely to show up in large numbers to participate in land invasions in rural areas of Asia, Africa, or Latin America. Therefore, Third World activists can expect to receive only marginal amounts of tangible assistance from their counterparts in the North and certainly not enough to affect the success of their movements or the frequency with which they escalate to revolutionary violence. Whether local activists succeed in mobilizing a following will be determined primarily by local conditions. Whether local movements remain nonviolent or transform into revolutionary movements depends in large part on how the state responds to nonviolent opposition movements. This brings us to a consideration of how the trend toward democratization in the Third World will affect the probability of revolution in any one nation and the frequency of revolutions across nations. Democratization: The “Coffin of Revolution”? The second trend that many predict will affect the frequency and destructiveness of civil war is what Samuel Huntington (1991) has labeled the “third wave of democracy.” Over the last quarter of the twentieth century, we witnessed the transition from authoritarianism to democracy in over fifty nations, many of them in the Third World (Diamond 1997:xiii–xiv). Democratization is directly relevant to the future of revolutionary conflict because stable democracies do appear to be relatively immune to civil war (Krain and Myers 1997; Hegre et al. 2001). Jeff Goodwin states it more emphatically: “no popular revolutionary movement, it bears emphasizing, has ever overthrown a consolidated democratic regime” (Goodwin 2001:276; emphasis in the original). If, as Goodwin and Skocpol (1989:495) argue, “the ballot box … has proven to be the coffin of revolutionary movements,” then the spread of democracy throughout the Third World should make revolutions and other forms of civil war less likely in the future. This domestic corollary of the democratic peace proposition holds that democracies are less likely to experience civil war because democratic regimes defuse revolutionary violence by diverting popular discontent into institutionalized channels of electoral competition and nonviolent protest. Dissident movements do not need to resort to organized violence against the state because they can seek to redress their grievances through electoral means and other forms of nonviolent collective action. Democratic states are also less likely to repress nonviolent protest. Hence, opposition social movements are not compelled by state repression to choose between withdrawing from politics in order to escape repression or shifting to violent tactics of their own in order to combat it. Empirical support for this proposition is found in the frequently cited “inverted U-curve” relationship between repression and civil violence.2 The inverted U suggests that established democracies and harshly autocratic regimes are less susceptible to civil war than weak authoritarian regimes (Muller and Weede 1990; Hegre et al. 2001). In a democracy, the benefits of peaceful negotiations exceed the benefits of violent conflict; revolution is not necessary. Conversely, harshly autocratic regimes preempt revolutionary violence by crushing opposition movements before they develop the capacity to mount a serious challenge to the state. In this circumstance, rebellion is irrational because the costs are prohibitively high, and the likelihood of success is remote. It is weak authoritarian states that are the most susceptible to civil war. They lack both the institutional capacity to accommodate opposition grievances through electoral mechanisms and the coercive capacity to crush opposition movements preemptively. When organized opposition movements do emerge, the weak authoritarian state attempts to repress them but fails. In so doing, the state converts nonviolent opposition into revolutionary movements (Mason and Krane 1989; Mason 1990). Thus, a theoretical basis and some empirical support exist for the notion that the third wave of democracy should bring about a decline in the incidence of civil war. However, there are several reasons for caution on this proposition. First, in several cases in which the transition to democracy took place while a civil war was already underway, democratization did not bring about an end to that conflict. In the Philippines, the guerrilla insurgency of the New People's Army persists after almost two decades of democracy. Likewise, more than twenty years of democracy has not brought an end to the Shining Path insurgency in Peru. Nor has the transition to democracy in Colombia brought an end to the civil war there. Thus, the transition to democracy does not automatically mean an end to revolutionary movements whose existence predates the transition. A well-established revolutionary movement may not be willing to compromise its demands if its leaders believe they still have a chance of achieving military victory, or if they believe that the best compromise they can hope to achieve through democratic processes is less than what they can gain through a continuation of violence. The persistence of revolutionary movements can impede democratic consolidation and even jeopardize the survival of democracy. The newly democratic regime in the Philippines has been threatened numerous times by attempted military coups, in part because of the inability of that regime to resolve the land issues that fuel popular support for the New People's Army. In Peru, the threat posed by Sendero Luminoso guerrillas was one of the motivations for President Alberto Fujimori's autogolpe of April 5, 1992. He suspended the 1979 constitution, arrested several opposition leaders, dissolved the Congress and the judiciary, and assumed virtual dictatorial powers. Second, the domestic version of the democratic peace applies most clearly to well-established democracies, and most of the new democracies of the Third World have not yet achieved democratic consolidation. Where democratization is confined to competitive elections and constitutional constraints on state power are weak or nonexistent, “illiberal democracy” can bring to power “elected tyrants” who become “predatory, maintaining some order but also arresting opponents, muzzling dissent, nationalizing industries, and confiscating property” (Zakaria 1997:32). The risk of reversion to nondemocratic forms of government cannot be discounted in many new democracies in the Third World. Huntington (1968, 1991) warned that new democracies can decay, and each of the three waves of democracy he describes was followed by a period of reversal in which some newly democratic regimes reverted to nondemocratic forms of governance. Adam Przeworski and his collaborators have identified a number of conditions that increase the probability of a democracy's demise (Przeworski et al. 1997:295). Among these are economic stagnation, poverty, and high rates of inflation. Democracies in which per capita income is less than $1,000 have a life expectancy of less than nine years, and those in the $1,000–2,000 range can expect to survive only about sixteen years. They also found that certain institutional configurations are less likely to survive than others. For instance, presidential (as opposed to parliamentary systems) with highly fragmented legislative party systems are less likely to survive than parliamentary systems with less fragmented party systems. Even though the transition to democracy may make revolution in the countryside less likely, the failure of new democracies to achieve consolidation—and the subsequent reversion to authoritarian rule—should make revolution more likely. Typically, the authoritarian juntas that seize power from failed democracies announce their rule by demobilizing popular sectors through violent repression. This pattern characterized South America's rash of bureaucratic-authoritarian coups during the 1960s and 1970s (see O'Donnell 1973; Collier 1979). When that occurs, we can expect some of the targeted social movement organizations to reconstitute themselves as revolutionary insurgencies. Just as the transition to democracy makes revolution less likely, the reversion to authoritarian rule makes it more likely. Given the history of the first two waves of democracy, and given the findings that Przeworski and his colleagues reported, we should expect some proportion of the third wave democracies to fail, and in some portion of those failed democracies revolution is likely to occur. Third, when democracy is installed in ethnically divided societies, it often fails to have the intended remedial effects on civil conflict. Indeed, democratic competition can, under some circumstances, exacerbate ethnic conflict. Donald Horowitz (1985) points out that in ethnically divided democracies, parties tend to form along ethnic lines, and this makes the consolidation of democracy problematic. Any effort on the part of leaders to form coalitions across ethnic lines or to forge multiethnic parties leaves them vulnerable to challenges from within their own ethnic group. The votes they hope to gain by making appeals across ethnic lines are fewer in number than the votes they stand to lose to challengers from within their own ethnic group who outflank them by appealing to ethnic solidarity. With an ethnically based party system, elections reduce to little more than an ethnic census. Ethnic minorities come to see themselves as relegated to the status of permanent opposition parties. Even though democratic consolidation requires that losers in elections accept their defeat, it also implies that they have a reasonable expectation of winning control of the government at some point in the foreseeable future. Ethnic minority parties may conclude that the latter condition is not true. In these circumstances, minority groups have strong motives to challenge the legitimacy of democratic rules that relegate them to permanent opposition status. As a permanent opposition, they are subject to the tyranny of an ethnic majority. If they resort to extra-constitutional means to challenge the dominance of ethnic majorities, the majority may feel justified in repressing that minority. An escalating cycle of repression and violence may ensue, culminating in revolution or secessionist violence. In Sri Lanka, the Tamil minority found itself victimized by democratically enacted legislation designed to confer advantages on the Sinhalese majority at the expense of the Tamil community. Under those circumstances, the legitimacy of Sri Lanka's democracy eroded in the eyes of the Tamil minority, and Tamil youth became increasingly susceptible to the appeals of radicals calling for violent secession from Sri Lanka (see Bush 1990; Singer 1992, 1996; Tambiah and Jayawardena 1992). Not surprisingly, most of the post-Cold War civil wars that have erupted have been ethnically based conflicts, and many of them have occurred in new democracies that are deeply divided along ethnic lines (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 2000). Finally, the consolidation of democracy is, to some extent, dependent upon newly elected leaders' ability to resolve the economic problems that plague the rural and urban poor. Democracy empowers those segments of the population, at least in the sense that they are granted the right to vote. Because the poor are more numerous than their more prosperous fellow citizens, their votes can be decisive in elections. As a consequence, elected politicians in new democracies face what Barbara Geddes (1994) has termed “the politician's dilemma.” On the one hand, the imperatives of getting elected and staying in office dictate that elected leaders enact policies that distribute economic resources according to patronage criteria. In short, government budgetary priorities are dictated by the goal of maximizing electoral payoffs for incumbents. On the other hand, the long-term consolidation of democracy depends on elected leaders' ability to build a strong and stable economy. This requires fiscal responsibility and, in the era of globalization, conformity to global standards of financial rectitude. Those standards—reinforced by pressure from international financial institutions and global capital markets—often require elected leaders to impose austerity measures on their constituents. Fiscally responsible elected leaders are vulnerable to being outbid at the polls by populist rivals who promise to end austerity and reinstitute social welfare spending. This dilemma confronts all democratically elected leaders. However, in new democracies, in which democracy is not yet viewed as “the only game in town,” to borrow Linz and Stepan's (1996) phrase, the policy conflicts that arise from the politician's dilemma can embolden nondemocratic segments of the national elite to stage a coup or otherwise sacrifice democracy in the name of economic stability and austerity. This was the dynamic that gave rise to the spread of bureaucratic authoritarian regimes in Latin America in the 1960s and 1970s. We cannot discount the possibility of similar antidemocratic reversions occurring among the new democracies of Asia, Africa, Latin America, or eastern Europe. The relevant lesson from that earlier era (the second wave of democracy) is that when authoritarian recidivists forcibly dismantle democratic regimes, hardliners use the coercive power of the state to demobilize popular sectors (including labor, peasants, and the intelligentsia) by repressing dissent and crushing social movement organizations. In those circumstances, the forcible displacement of newly democratic regimes by authoritarian restorationists makes the recurrence of civil war not only possible but also likely in nations that fall victim to this pattern. Peacekeeping and Peacemaking A third trend that should affect the duration and destructiveness of civil wars (if not the frequency) is the remarkable increase in the use of international peacekeeping operations as a device for conflict resolution. Forty-two of the fifty-five peacekeeping operations established by the UN since its inception in 1945 have been created since 1988.3 Not only has the number of operations increased, but their use has expanded to include civil wars as well as interstate conflicts, and their mission has grown from the traditional role of enforcing a truce to include postconflict reconstruction and reconciliation. The use of peacekeeping operations in civil wars was all but foreclosed during the Cold War. Rival superpower blocs treated Third World conflicts as battlegrounds in the East–West geopolitical struggle. Accordingly, it was rare that the UN Security Council, divided between the Soviet Union and the United States, could achieve the consensus required to authorize UN mediation of Third World civil wars. Besides Cold War politics, it was far more problematic for the UN to provide peacekeeping or mediation services in civil wars as compared to interstate wars. The introduction of peacekeepers in any conflict requires (1) the consent of the parties involved in the conflict, (2) the consent of any major power with the capacity to veto the operation, either formally in the Security Council or practically by intervening militarily in the conflict, and (3) the consent of donor nations who are willing to contribute the forces and funding to sustain the operation (Goulding 1993). In a civil war, securing the consent of both parties in the conflict is difficult, especially for the UN. At least one of the protagonists (the rebels) is not a sovereign state and, therefore, has no legal standing in the UN. This presents the UN with a diplomatic quandary. On the one hand, the organization will have a difficult time convincing the rebels that it can be a neutral mediator between them and one of its own members. On the other hand, for the UN to approach the rebels about peace negotiations can be interpreted by the affected state as a de facto grant of diplomatic recognition to the rebels and, by implication, a challenge to the sovereignty of that state. Thus, UN intervention in civil wars was often opposed on the grounds that it represented an intrusion on the principle of national sovereignty. Practically speaking, peacekeeping operations are difficult to implement in a civil war. Peacekeepers traditionally performed their function by establishing a buffer zone between the warring parties and policing a truce while settlement talks took place. Establishing a territorial buffer is difficult if not impossible when rebels use guerrilla tactics because the guerrillas and their civilian supporters are not confined to a distinct territorial enclave. Civilians in any region of the nation can be covert participants in guerrilla war. With these constraints, it should not be surprising that UN peacekeeping was rare during the Cold War, and when such interventions were used, it was often in interstate rather than in civil wars (James 1995). The end of the Cold War dissolved some of the constraints on peacekeeping. The first step in this process involved a change in the major powers' willingness to sanction such operations or, more precisely, to refrain from vetoing them in the Security Council. In 1987 Mikhail Gorbachev reversed the long-standing Soviet position of skepticism toward UN peacekeeping when he publicly declared that UN military observers and peacekeeping forces played a valuable role in promoting international peace and security (Karns and Mingst 1998:208). His declaration forced the Reagan administration to moderate its own antagonism toward UN peacekeeping. The result was a dramatic increase in UN activism in mediating conflicts generally and civil wars specifically. Between 1989 and 1993, the UN initiated thirteen new peacekeeping operations, and almost all of them involved civil wars (Karns and Mingst 1998:210). These second-generation peacekeeping operations have assumed a wide range of functions beyond mere truce supervision. In some cases they have assumed the role of “peacemaking” in the form of armed intervention to force combatants to accept a cease-fire (Bertram 1995:389). NATO intervention in Bosnia (with UN authorization) represents the most visible example of this more muscular dimension of second-generation peacekeeping. Such missions effectively ignore the principle of host nation consent, but this is often justified on the grounds of preventing genocide or other humanitarian disasters. Ethnic cleansing in Bosnia and famine in Somalia were deemed sufficient cause to ignore or deny the need for consent from the host government, and in both cases the identity of the host state was sufficiently ambiguous to allow this requirement to be bypassed. Second-generation peacekeeping has also expanded to include postconflict reconstruction activities aimed at achieving a transition to democracy through the reform (or establishment from scratch) of basic state institutions (Bertram 1995:388). This has involved such specialized tasks as election supervision, police and civil administration training, as well as the traditional responsibilities of supervising the truce. In Namibia, UNTAG (UN Transition Assistance Group in Namibia) supervised the withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia and the establishment of a civilian police force, secured the repeal of discriminatory legislation, and oversaw the conduct of that nation's first free and fair elections (James 1995:248; Karns and Mingst 1998:209). In October 1991, peace agreements ending the civil war in Cambodia endowed the UN with the authority to demobilize combatant forces, repatriate refugees, train and monitor local police forces, and organize that nation's first elections under the new democratic regime (James 1995:248). This represented the first instance ever of the international community charging the United Nations with the political and economic restructuring of a member state (Karns and Mingst 1998:212). In Central America, ONUCA (UN Observer Group in Central America) oversaw the disarming and demobilization of combatants on both sides of the civil wars in El Salvador and Nicaragua. The ONUSAL (the United Nations Observers in El Salvador) took on the unprecedented task of documenting human rights violations that had occurred in El Salvador during more than a decade of civil war. In all, twelve of the twenty-five missions undertaken between 1988 and 1995 involved some measure of postconflict reconstruction and reconciliation (Bertram 1995:389). The willingness of the international community to intervene in conflicts for the purpose of bringing them to an end bodes well for the prospects of conflict management and prevention in the post-Cold War world. Besides the dramatic increase in the number of peacekeeping operations, the willingness of the Security Council to use peacekeepers in civil wars is especially noteworthy given that wars within nations have been (and presumably will continue to be) the dominant conflict modality in the international system. Clearly, this phase shift in UN operations represents a blurring of the lines between international and domestic politics. The expansion of peacekeeping mandates beyond truce supervision to include postwar reconstruction and reconciliation as well as state-building and nation-building functions should make it easier to sustain the peace in nations previously torn by civil war or interstate conflicts. Finally, the dramatic increase in the number of peacekeeping operations over the last decade of the twentieth century has, if nothing else, given the militaries of a number of nations considerable experience in the mechanics of peacekeeping, as opposed to war fighting. The success of most of these operations has made the UN as an institution, the major powers with veto rights on the Security Council, as well as nations that donate troops and equipment to such operations more confident in the likelihood of their success and, therefore, more willing to contribute to them. On the other hand, the expansion of peacekeeping missions to nation-building tasks creates new risks for the UN and for the nations that participate in these efforts. Supervising a truce between combatant forces is a difficult and risky proposition, but building the institutions of a new state and integrating former enemies into a single regime is a far more complex and risky endeavor to say the least. Supervising a truce is essentially a tactical military question with fairly explicit criteria for success and failure. At issue are relatively straightforward questions of troop strength, deployment patterns, and rules of engagement. Securing consensus on these requirements and implementing them, although by no means easy, is certainly easier than building consensus on an institutional formula for postwar state building. The latter requires not only the authorization of the UN Security Council but also the consent of the parties involved in the conflict. In addition, UN member nations will have to be persuaded to contribute funds, personnel, and logistical support to the operation. And whatever formula is adopted will ultimately have to win the support of the civilian population of the nation. One danger inherent in this expanded role, then, is that the enlarged array of UN responsibilities creates a greater array of opportunities for failure. And failed peacekeeping missions can create a hangover effect that makes major powers (such as the United States) less willing to intervene in the next crisis. The US experience in Somalia made President Clinton less willing to act early in the Rwanda crisis, resulting in a near genocide before the international community could bring itself to take any action. Inherent in the decision to authorize peacekeeping operations is a collective action problem: under what conditions is it in the interest of the international community to intervene in a civil war in one of its member states? Bobrow and Boyer (1997) have assessed the incentives for different classes of nations to support and contribute to UN peacekeeping. Most nations will suffer no direct costs from civil wars in other nations. The private benefits for nations that are reimbursed for contributing personnel to such missions are fairly obvious. And the benefits to nations in the region that are at risk of suffering economic costs and possible destabilization of their own regime from diffusion effects should be fairly obvious. However, authorization ultimately requires the consent—indeed the active support—of major powers. Bobrow and Boyer (1997:727) argue that major powers—including UN Security Council members—may benefit from “the maintenance of international and regional peace and stability,…the creation of environments more conducive to favored free and democratic elections,… stability for commercial and economic development interests in a region, and… a number of humanitarian goals ranging from food distribution to the management of refugee problems.” All too often, however, intervening in civil wars in Third World states offers no significant private benefits to major powers that would justify the costs and the risks (both to troops and to the electoral fortunes of leaders who commit their nation to the intervention). Given that major powers assume a substantial share of the costs of peacekeeping operations, and given that the expanded mandate of second-generation peacekeeping involves a greater commitment of resources for a longer period of time, elected leaders of major powers have strong private incentives to withhold support for such missions. Thus, civil wars continue in Sierra Leone, Ivory Coast, Sudan, Somalia, Sri Lanka, Burma, and elsewhere, arguably because major powers have no private economic or security interests at stake in these wars. Humanitarian disasters such as genocides in Rwanda, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, or famine in Somalia evoke responses from major powers only when public pressure within their own polities compels elected leaders to act. Public pressure is not likely to reach the proportions necessary to induce action until the event requiring intervention has already escalated to the point of being a humanitarian disaster. Conclusions One general conclusion that emerges from the foregoing analysis is that the patterns of revolution and civil war in the future are likely to be different from what they were during the Cold War era. First, it is probably safe to conclude that democratization and globalization will have a moderating effect on the occurrence of revolution, at least in one sense. Nations will experience domestic political and economic crises that, with some nonzero probability, would have escalated to civil war during the Cold War. But because those nations have made the transition to democratic governance and are actively pursuing integration in the global economy, these crises are substantially less likely to escalate to civil war today. Mexico's response to the Zapatista uprising is illustrative of this dynamic. To the extent that democratically elected governments do refrain from repressing opposition movements, and to the extent that global economic forces exert pressure on those regimes to practice restraint in order to remain attractive to foreign investors, then civil wars will be less likely to occur than they would have been during the Cold War when international pressures were, in many cases, supportive of the sort of repression that transformed nonviolent movements into revolutions. On the other hand, we should not forget that it was globalization that provided movements like the Zapatistas with the motive for their uprising in the first place. The Zapatistas framed the issues confronting peasants in Chiapas in terms of the intrusion of global market forces disrupting their communities, their lives, and their survival strategies. Democratic reforms open the political space in which opposition movements can arise precisely because they are relatively free from state repression. Therefore, the same forces that might make civil war less likely also make the mobilization of opposition social movements easier. This expansion of social movements may strain the institutional capacity of newly established democratic regimes and embolden antidemocratic forces to attempt antidemocratic coups on the grounds that preserving domestic stability by repressing domestic opposition is essential to attracting foreign investment. That repression can transform democratic opposition movements into revolutionary insurgencies. Despite the potential for economic development that globalization promises, we must keep in mind the overwhelming demographic pressures that face most Third World regimes. In most nations that would otherwise be prime candidates for the sorts of revolutionary movements that punctuated politics during the last half-century, it is unlikely that globalization will lift enough of the population out of the grips of poverty to render these nations immune to political turmoil. There will continue to be an ample supply of impoverished people available for activists to mobilize in social movements that challenge the state. Indeed, as I mentioned above, globalization and democratization should actually facilitate the mobilization of political discontent in the Third World. Given this likelihood, the critical question becomes whether states respond with the sort of repression that converts nonviolent social movements into revolutionary movements. More precisely, the question is whether newly democratic regimes, when confronted with these movements, will be able to resist the antidemocratic forces in and around the state that view these movements as threats to the nation and view the democratic regime as incapable of adequately addressing the threat. If the institutions of democracy—including democratic political culture—are not fully consolidated when these social movements arise, then those newly democratic regimes will be vulnerable to overthrow by antidemocratic forces that view repression as the only remedy to mobilized political opposition. Under those circumstances, civil wars remain likely. Finally, even if revolutions continue to recur, we can take hope in the willingness and ability of the international community to intervene in civil wars for the purpose of bringing them to a peaceful conclusion. Civil war is costly, not just to the nation in which it occurs but also to the international community. When those costs threaten the territory or other vital interests of major powers, it is more likely now than during the Cold War that the international community will take action to resolve the conflict. However, when no such interests are jeopardized, we should not expect international action to resolve civil wars in the Third World. Revolutions and other forms of civil war have dominated the patterns of conflict during the Cold War era. But by no means does this mean that these forms of conflict will disappear with the end of the Cold War. Civil war is not some historically anomalous phenomenon, confined to some limited set of regime types that have been rendered obsolete by the end of the Cold War. Nor are they the product of some unique historical circumstance whose passing will render civil war no longer in vogue, to borrow Forrest Colburn's (1994) phrase. The end of the Cold War, the emergence of a more thoroughly global economy, and the spread of democracy to nations previously subject to various forms of authoritarian rule may render civil war less likely to occur in nations that previously were ripe for revolt. We should recall, however, that revolutions have always been a rare phenomenon; even if they become rarer still, they are not likely to become extinct. Moreover, revolutions are made by small minorities. Nothing in the current global scene suggests that poverty and repression will cease to exist, or that communities that are victims of these circumstances will forever cease to mobilize to remedy those conditions. There will still be a small minority of nations in which a small minority of the population manages to organize a challenge to the state, and in a small minority of those cases the state's response will compel the opposition to resort to revolutionary violence or perish at the hands of the state. 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TI - Globalization, Democratization, and the Prospects for Civil War in the New Millennium
JF - International Studies Review
DO - 10.1111/j.1079-1760.2003.00504004.x
DA - 2003-12-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/globalization-democratization-and-the-prospects-for-civil-war-in-the-nolRqQws9K
SP - 1
EP - 35
VL - Advance Article
IS - 4
DP - DeepDyve
ER -