TY - JOUR
AU1 - Grayson, George W.
AB - Editor's Note: Mexico is one of the most—if not “the most”—important country in terms of its daily impact on the lives of US citizens. Trade, investment, energy, narcotics, security, pollution, tourism, academic exchanges, crime, legal and illegal migration, family ties, cuisine, media attention, and political campaigns (in both countries) are among the factors that enhance the salience of our “southern neighbor” to the well-being of America and Americans. Not only does the 2,000-mile long US-Mexican border constitute the world's longest frontier between a developed and a developing nation, but Mexico's highly porous, violence-ridden, corruption-infested 755-mile interface with Guatemala and Belize constitutes a virtual “Third US Border” through which hundreds of thousands of people pass annually en route to the United States (Grayson 2006). Twenty years ago it was said that “democracy exists 364days a year in Mexico—it's only absent on Election Day.” Giving credence to Mexico's status as “the perfect dictatorship”1was the government's blatant manipulation of the 1988 presidential contest on behalf of Carlos Salinas de Gortari, candidate of the Tammany-Hall-like Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) over Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, PRI apostate and nominee of the center-leftist front that evolved into the Democratic Revolutionary Party (PRD). The standard-bearer of the center-right National Action Party (PAN) finished third. Mexico's significance to the US accounts, in part at least, for the jubilation expressed by pundits, politicians, and political scientists to the mid-2000 victory of the PAN's Vicente Fox Quesada over PRI and PRD competitors, an apparent affirmation that the ancient Aztec nation was surfing on the “third wave of democracy” (Huntington 1991). Known as the “Marlboro Man” because of his 6-foot-5-inch height and craggy good looks, the PAN competitor trumpeted the imperative of change during his campaign, castigating the hapless PRI candidate for the nation's real and imagined ills. Fox confidently pledged to loft economic growth to 7%, slash inflation, create 1 million new jobs annually, promote small businesses, combat corruption, diminish pollution, improve education, enhance health care, boost oil output, curb poverty, fight drug cartels, and work with Washington to revamp US immigration statutes. The last item, referred to as the “whole enchilada” by political scientist-turned foreign secretary, Jorge Castañeda, would expand the existing guest-worker program, obtain more visas for Mexicans, and “regularize” (a euphemism for amnesty) the 12 million of his countrymen who lived unlawfully north of the Rio Grande. In fact, Castañeda called for transforming the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) into a continent-wide community modeled on the European Union, complete with the free flow of labor across national boundaries, development assistance from the wealthiest partners (the United States and Canada) to the poorest (Mexico), and, eventually, a common currency. No wonder journalist LarryKudlow (2000,) lauded Fox's success as opening “the door to a period of sustained economic prosperity that could carry Mexico into the front-ranks of the information-age global economy.” President Bill Clinton congratulated Fox on a “triumph for democracy.”“Mexico's national elections,” he affirmed, “were the freest and fairest in the nation's history and stand as vivid testimony to the depth of the democratic commitment of the Mexican people.” Clinton also saluted Mexico's progress to “strengthen and consolidate democratic institutions and set Mexico on a course of economic growth and prosperity” (Houston Chronicle 2000,). Academics also indulged in hyperbole. The Hoover Institute'sLarry Diamond (2000),heralded the event as “a hugely significant victory for democracy,” adding that “it puts a long-overdue end to seven decades of rotten, cynical control by a single party over a swollen and abused state.” A reviewer for theWorld Policy Journal (2003–2004),gushed that “Mexico ended 71 years of one-party, authoritarian rule and has since surprised many at home and abroad by evolving into a stable and lively two-party democracy.” While emphatically upbeat, MIT's ChappellLawson (2000)sounded a prescient note of caution. “Mexico's old one-party regime has finally broken down, and democratic institutions have definitely taken its place,” he wrote. “But democratization has not proceeded at the same pace across all regions or spheres of government. As a result, Mexico's new political order comprises a series of authoritarian enclaves in which the old rules of the game still operate.” The euphoria expressed after his inauguration abated long before Fox completed his 6-year term in December 2006. In his contribution to this Forum, Steven Wuhs points out that “division, conflict, and paralysis” beset the Marlboro Man's administration. In comparison with his “pie in the sky” stump promises, Fox accomplished little. Lawson's “authoritarian enclaves” persisted and levels of poverty, pollution, corruption, unemployment, crime, and drug-trafficking remain perilously high. To his dismay, Fox left office with neither an immigration reform nor productive relations with his erstwhile “amigo” President George W. Bush. Even worse in terms of advancing Mexico's quest for democracy, Fox failed to achieve a consensus among opposition parties and other power brokers on the economic rules of the game. In the mid-1990s, the major parties committed themselves to a new electoral code that turned over voter registration, the conduct of balloting, and preliminary results to a citizen-run Federal Electoral Institute or IFE whose decisions could be appealed to an independent Federal Electoral Court or TEPJF (IFE 2007). While important, the transparency of contests pales in importance if elected officials do not enact measures that benefit the citizenry. A stalemate afflicted economic policy. Most leaders of Fox's PAN and progressives within the PRI resonated to a market-oriented approach, but PRI “dinosaurs” and the PRD-led Left tenaciously defended ubiquitous state intervention in the economy, the retention of a dozen peso-hemorrhaging health-care and retirement systems, preservation of two public electricity giants, an outmoded labor law, a fiscal system riddled with exemptions and loopholes, and a ban on private investment in Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex), the national oil monopoly and a vital source of foreign exchange. To the Marlboro Man's credit, however, he recognized decisions of IFE and TEPJF, promoted greater transparency in his administration, ameliorated conditions for extremely poor citizens through an “Opportunities” initiative, and reduced the inflation rate from 19% (2000) to 4% (2006), thanks in large measure to PRI technocrats who presided over the Finance Ministry and Central Bank. Fox's lackluster tenure aside, his PAN party managed to win the mid-2006 presidential showdown. Moderate former legislator and energy minister, Felipe Calderón Hinojosa, squeaked past Andrés Manuel López Obrador, the messianic ex-PRD mayor of Mexico City. The opportunistic PRI cooperated with Calderón in passing the 2007 budget and revamping the government employees’ pension system. Yet the revolutionary party was reticent to endorse broad fiscal, energy, and labor reforms that are crucial to sustained growth. Except for the party's four governors, a majority of the PRD refuses even to recognize the validity of the Calderón victory. Meanwhile, the self-anointed “legitimate president” López Obrador and his 12-member “legitimate cabinet” relentlessly barnstorm the country. They decry the chief executive's “spurious” and “fascist” regime, inveigh against its pro-market orientation, and allege horrendous human rights abuses arising from a crackdown on narco-traffickers. While appearing like a character out of Gilbert and Sullivan, the ex-mayor has become the redeemer of the impoverished who make up nearly a half of the nation's 107.5-million inhabitants. The so-called “Little Ray of Hope” contends that Calderón's indifference to the downtrodden will enable the former to accomplish a second coming in the 2012 presidential contest (Grayson 2007). What can scholars, politicians, and interested observers learn about Mexico's prospects for democracy by analyzing political transitions in Eastern and Central Europe, Asia, Senegal, and Spain? It is tempting to say “very little” in light of the unique institutional and cultural features of the ancient Aztec nation's polity during the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. First, only the Soviet Union's Communist Party or CPSU (1917–1991) exceeded Mexico's PRI (1929–2000) in terms of the longevity of its rule. Both the PRI and the CPSU fused party and government. However, Mexico's self-described “revolutionary party” limited chief executives to one 6-year term after which they were rewarded for retiring from active politics.2While a PRI president enjoyed exceptional formal and informal powers during his tenure, the “no-reelection-exit-after-six-years” principle gave rise to a “blandadura” (soft dictatorship) rather than a prolonged tyranny such as that practiced by Joseph Stalin from 1929 to 1953. The revolving door did immunize the country from extended rule by a single individual. At the same time, it forced presidential aspirants to propitiate the incumbent who handpicked his successor, militated against continuity in policies because the new jefe enjoyed broad discretion, and magnified corruption, especially by functionaries of the outgoing administration who could not count on being rehired by the next chief executive. Second, in the words ofSara Schatz (2000),, the PRI was a populist “catchall” party whose formal ideology—“Revolutionary Nationalism”—was as vacuous as it was mutable. A reform-minded president like Lázaro Cárdenas (1934–1940) employed the concept when spurring unionization and land reform, while Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988–1994), a convert to neoliberalism, used it to justify signing NAFTA and linking his nation to the global economy. Its protean doctrine combined with a sophisticated corporatist structure enabled the PRI to thwart the development of an autonomous labor movement and a cohesive leftist party (at least half a dozen factions compete for influence within today's PRD). The trumpeting of Revolutionary Nationalism also allowed the PRI to elude the accountability that could be demanded of a party with a clear ideology and coherent platform (Domínguez 2002). After losing to Fox and Calderón, the PRI is once again embarked on reinventing itself. Current party president Beatriz Paredes Rangel hopes to reshape the PRI, long identified with venality and electoral skullduggery, into a credible center-left option for Mexican voters. This project explains her assistance with both the 2007 budget and the government employees’ pension proposal, but root-and-branch changes at Pemex, the state electricity companies, and bloated pro-PRI unions appear to collide with Paredes’ vision for the party. Third, abundant oil reserves have proved a mixed blessing for Mexico. Cárdenas's nationalization of the foreign-controlled petroleum industry in 1938 and the subsequent formation of Pemex have become potent symbols of Mexico's ability to stand up to Uncle Sam. The discovery of huge off-shore reservoirs in the 1970s endowed the country with abundant quantities of oil for domestic consumption and export. March 18—the date on which the president announced the takeover of the industry 69 years ago—is known as a “day of national dignity” when politicians shrill: “El petróleo es el nuestro” (The oil belongs to us). Pemex revenues cover nearly 40% of the national budget. However, insufficient investment has spurred a fall in reserves, even as the iconic status of the oil sector finds myopic PRI and PRD politicians vehemently opposing opening the industry to private capital. Only North Korea and Mexico bar risk contracts from their oil sectors. Without an infusion of resources, Mexico will become a net oil importer in a few years, further limiting the government's ability to improve conditions for the dispossessed. Fourth, the PRI's organizational prowess and corporatist control mechanisms mean that Mexico's armed forces, in contrast with its counterparts in many single-party-led states, have remained at the margin of politics, obeying civilians rather than deliberating over intervening in policymaking. The deep-seated corruption of civilian police forces has forced Calderón to rely heavily on the military in his war on drug cartels. Fifth, the random scattering of state and local elections throughout an administration's sexenio often affects the behavior of party chiefs, legislators, and the president himself with respect to pressing national issues. In 2007 alone, voters will go to the polls in 13 states on seven different days. Thus, in deciding whether to support Calderón proposed fiscal reform, opposition leaders do not consider simply the consequences of their action on the 2009 mid-term congressional elections, but they also calculate the impact of their stance on local contests. For instance, the PRI sought to capture the Baja California statehouse from the PAN on August 5, 2007. The frequency of elections is a godsend for Elba Esther Gordillo, the rich as Croesus founder of the National Alliance Party (PANAL) and boss of the 2.5-million member teachers’ union (SNTE). The latter, for which notions like “accountability,”“merit pay,” and “competency tests” are anathema, exerts a stranglehold on the nation's public schools. Just as the redoubtable Gordillo rounded up the critical mass of votes for Calderón's defeat of López Obrador, she can affect the outcome of state and local contests. The hidebound SNTE epitomizes the corporatist institutions that impede social mobility and modernization.3 Finally, its contiguity to the United States differentiates Mexico from other nations evolving from single-party hegemony. While local textbooks still refer to the Mexican-American War as the “War of North American Aggression,” the United States has furnished a safety net for Mexico's establishment. Washington rescued the floundering Mexican economy in 1982 and again after the December 1994 “peso crisis.” Moreover, the bilateral border functions as an escape valve for Mexicans who cannot find opportunities at home. The northward exodus relieves pressure on Mexico's elite to (1) attack the SNTE and other bottlenecks that thwart advancement, (2) spend adequately on health care, education, and job training, and (3) overhaul a antiquated tax system. Indeed, Mexico tax collections equal only 10.3% of GDP—one-third of the size of levies in Brazil and roughly equal to those in Haiti. Contributors to this Forum, however, have resisted the allure of hiding behind the curtain of exceptionalism. By examining cases of other “predominant,”“hegemonic,” and “single-party states” (Sartori 1976,), we propose to illuminate reasons for the failure of Fox's administration, examine the outlook for the once-hegemonic PRI, and evaluate the prospects of Calderón's government to move beyond transparent and reliable elections to embrace the rule of law that “ensures political rights, and liberties, and mechanisms of accountability which in turn affirm the political equality of all citizens and contain potential abuses of state power” (O'Donnell 2006). Joseph Klesner argues that a few postcommunist successor parties have boasted electoral success in the aftermath of their nations’ political opening. He indicates that the “survivors”—for example, the Hungarian Socialist Party, Poland's Democratic Left Alliance, and the Bulgarian Socialist Party—have embellished their ideologies and reached out to new voters. This is exactly what Paredes is currently attempting to achieve with the PRI. At issue, however, is whether her reinterpretation of Revolutionary Nationalism and the dinosaur-progressive division in her ranks will give rise to the PRI's dabbling in reform for public relations purposes or committing itself to critical structural changes. In comparing the transitions to democracy, Grayson contrasts the enlightened leadership of Prime Minister Adolfo Suárez and King Carlos I, whose imagination and guile gave birth to a compromise between Spain's Right and Left (the Moncloa Pacts), with the obtuseness of Mexico's Vicente Fox. While the Marlboro Man was an adroit campaigner, he was a neophyte politician who exuded hostility toward politics and politicians—an outlook accentuated by three decades in the private sector where he confronted sticky-fingered bureaucrats and absurd, anti-market rules and regulations. In light of opposition from the PRI and PRD, Fox may have been destined for failure. Still, his inability to unify his own PAN party, much less attempt to build a working coalition with reformers in the PRI, precipitated 6 years of deadlock and drift. In comparing transitions in Senegal, South Korea, and Taiwan with the Mexican experience, Wuhs stresses the imperative to excise institutional vestiges of authoritarianism. Electoral rules offer one potential site for “real-world reform.” He argues that mixed electoral systems such as Mexico's—where legislators are chosen in single-member districts as well as by proportional representation—frustrate the transition to democracy. The problem he recognizes is that, rhetoric about a “reform of the state” notwithstanding, major changes in Mexico's electoral laws are unlikely as long as the PAN, PRI, and PRD have sizable blocs in both legislative chambers and the prospect of capturing the presidency in a first-past-the-post-contest. Wuhs astutely observes that the “honeymoon” associated with the third wave of democracy is over and that citizens in Mexico and other nations with openly chosen governments now take formal elections for granted. There is nothing linear about the democratic process as evidenced by the postelection assaults on the Calderón regime. If parties as organizations and parties in government fail to respond to the challenges of poverty, corruption, and inequality, their fledgling moves toward democracy may be jeopardized by populist detractors who deploy their elected members of Congress to stymie liberal reforms deemed antithetical to the dispossessed. Francisco González homes in on social cleavages, institutions, and economic performance in analyzing the decline of the PRI vis-à-vis India's Congress Party and Japan's Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). While reiterating that the depth and duration of economic crises correlate with the fall of regimes (Przeworski and Limongi 1997), he emphasizes that splits in the dominant party and/or the presence of a credible opposition precede its fall from power. A series of events—the Tlatelolco Massacre, the economic crisis of August 1982, the inept response to the September 1985 earthquakes—had besmirched the PRI's image. But only with the schism of 1987 (when Cárdenas bolted the party to seek the presidency) and the emergence of credible opponents (Fox in 2000 and Calderón and López Obrador in 2006) did voters resoundingly reject the PRI. Fox did little to diminish the cleavage between rich and poor, strengthen institutions, and propel growth. Calderón may have the last best chance to address these challenges before Mexicans reject moderation in favor of a populist, messianic scheme for solving the country's Herculean problems. Does the Collapse of Single-Party Rule in Central and Eastern Europe Reveal the Path Down Which Mexico is Headed? Joseph L. Klesner Department of Political Science, Kenyon College Perhaps the trite answer to the question in the title is “no—and yes.” Many party systems in the ex-communist states of the former Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries dominated by the USSR have fragmented in ways that should not repeat themselves in Mexico—but some have consolidated into two-party, government-versus-opposition arrangements. Although other successors to the once-ruling communists have failed to adapt successfully to competition, several have reformed and transmuted themselves well enough to share in the governance of their nations. And while some successor parties and new party systems have been unable to develop an effective democratic political culture, others have advanced the consolidation of democracy in the former Soviet bloc. Comparative analysis of the Mexican transition with the new regimes of Central and Eastern Europe can tell us much about the peculiarities of Mexican democratization and offer insights into the future of its former ruling party. Novelist Vargas Llosa (1991) once called the Mexican regime the “perfect dictatorship.” Perfect though it may have seemed to Vargas Llosa, the 71-year control by the PRI of Mexico's executive branch ended unexpectedly in July 2000. Since then, the party's fortunes have fluctuated. The former ruling party appeared strong in 2003 and 2004 as it captured the most seats in the midterm congressional elections and won several gubernatorial races. In the 2006 presidential contest, however, the nominee of the self-styled “revolutionary party,” former party president Roberto Madrazo, finished a disappointing third, running best among the most elderly and most economically marginalized citizens (Klesner 2007). The PRI has neither disappeared nor is it primed to retake power at the national level. Two parties of long standing, the PAN, a center-right organization founded in 1939, and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), a center-left coalition dating from 1989, have surged ahead of the PRI in national popularity. The perfect dictatorship has yielded to a democratic evolution, which—if not perfect—can be considered optimal. The former ruling party retains influence, governs a majority of Mexico's federal entities (17 of 31 states), and holds the balance in the Congress in the first half of President Felipe Calderón's term, which began on December 1, 2006. Still, its appeal to younger, urban voters remains limited, so it is likely that the PRI will give way to more modern political organizations that excite broader interest. Only a thorough makeover of the PRI comparable to the transformation of some of the former ruling communist parties in Central and Eastern Europe—for example, the Hungarian Socialist Party—will ensure its longevity. The Mexican transition has had three critical consequences for the party system. First, while defeated, the former ruling party has not yet imploded and retains the most national structure of the major surviving parties. Second, although there are new opposition parties, the Mexican party system has remained remarkably solid, with both national, state, and local politics revolving around three major parties. The party system has not fragmented. Third, the dynamic of competition drives the parties’ internal development to encourage them to be catch-all parties (Klesner 2005; Shirk 2005; Wuhs n.d.), which moderates their ideological zeal. That the Mexican party system has evolved as it has owes much to the nature of the Mexican transition. The emergence of competitive democracy in Mexico came via what many commentators have described as a “protracted transition.” The earliest significant reforms that set the stage for the PRI's ouster from power were made in 1977 (Middlebrook 1986). The first true challenge to the ruling party came in the 1988 presidential election, when PRI apostate and eventual PRD founder Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas may have been cheated of victory over the official PRI candidate, Carlos Salinas de Gortari. In the wake of this disputed showdown, Salinas (President, 1988–1994) advanced important reforms to gain PAN legislative support for his sweeping neoliberal economic policies. Salinas's successor, Ernesto Zedillo (1994–2000), implemented even more significant electoral changes. He leveled the electoral playing field so that adversaries could defeat the PRI in fair elections. The first such contest came when Cárdenas garnered the mayorship of Mexico City in 1997. In that year, the PAN and PRD prevented the PRI from regaining its congressional majority (Klesner 1997). In the next presidential election (in 2000), the PAN's Vicente Fox, running on a ticket of “change,” upset the PRI's nominee. This lengthy transition featured a difficult but crucial process of amalgamating different currents of the Left into the PRD under Cárdenas's leadership, effective PAN party organization at the state and local level (Wuhs n.d.), the appearance of a vast array of grass-roots organizations devoted to increasing political participation, and the emergence of an independent and critical media, particularly newspapers willing to investigate government malfeasance (Lawson 2002). In the remainder of my part of this Forum, I will compare the PRI to the heirs of the former ruling communist parties that emerged after the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe. In so doing, I will consider the PRI's prospects for playing a significant role in its country's future. I will also examine the party systems that have arisen in the new European democracies and those which have developed during the protracted Mexican transition. Before turning to those topics, let me offer preliminary comments on how to define single-party systems and important contextual factors crucial to these comparisons. Preliminaries: Definitions and Context All one-party systems were not created equal, as many scholars have carefully delineated. Following Giovanni Sartori (1976), we can distinguish among predominant-party regimes, hegemonic-party systems, and single-party states. For example, during its first four decades of independence, India had a predominant-party system in which the Congress Party held sway without effective competitors. Other viable parties existed, however, and the Congress Party did not always receive a majority of the popular vote. In such instances, it did not control all state governments and only achieved dominance in the national legislature by winning an absolute majority of parliamentary seats. As Sartori (1976:230) has observed, the Congress Party “remains submissive to the conditions that make for a responsible government,” such as yielding to the will of the electorate and going into opposition, as events over the past decade have shown. Other examples of predominant-party systems include Japan under the LDP (1955 to the present), Italy when the Christian Democratic Party prevailed (1945–1990s), and Sweden under the Social Democrats for most of the twentieth century (see Pempel 1990). Mexico, by way of contrast, epitomizes what Sartori (1976:230) has called a “hegemonic-pragmatic” party system: hegemonic because while other parties were allowed to exist, “the possibility of rotation in power [was] not even envisaged” and pragmatic because the ruling party, the PRI, lacked a coherent ideology and concentrated on maintaining its “relaxed monopoly.” India under the Congress Party or Japan under the LDP represented cases of democracy in which one party predominates, while Mexico under the PRI was a civilian authoritarian regime in which the “hegemonic party permit[ed] second class parties as long as, and to the extent that, they remain as they are” (Sartori 1976:235). In the PRI's last decade of rule, especially after 1994, the party system evolved toward a predominant-party system as the PRI was disposed to accept defeats at the state and local levels. The party systems of the former communist states as well as a handful of other societies fit into Sartori's (1976:221)“single-party” category; namely, that “one party means, literally, what it says: Only one party exists and is allowed to exist. This is so because such a party vetoes, both de jure and de facto, any kind of party pluralism.” In Eastern Europe, parties were granted the constitutional responsibility, and frequently practiced that duty, to oversee the operation of the revolutionary state. This “leading role” made communist parties totalitarian institutions. Without discussing whether communists truly dominated the state bureaucracies or whether state ministries enjoyed some degree of autonomy, suffice it to say that competition from other parties was unwelcome. Thus, it's possible to conceptualize the former communist party systems as party-state systems.4 Party-state systems fall into two categories: those that came to power through an indigenous revolution such as the Soviet and Chinese communist parties and those imposed from the outside by the imperial reach of an existing communist state. We may assume that party-states established through revolutions came to power because they had a significant organization and ideological appeal to the population. Moreover, because they have often combined a national independence struggle with the implementation of a socialist developmental strategy, such party-states excite nationalism by donning the mantle of liberators. In contrast, those communist party-states imposed by Moscow in the late 1940s often reached power without broad appeal (hence the need to impose them), and the obeisance of “national” leaders to their Soviet overlords undermined their claim to hold legitimizing nationalist credentials. Scholars of Eastern European party systems argue that parties such as the Polish United Workers’ Party, the governing party in communist Poland, and the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party found their legitimacy questioned because they were clearly imposed from outside. In contrast, the Czechoslovak Communist Party effectively cultivated the image of a home-grown movement until 1968. The ruling parties of communist Romania and Bulgaria made similar claims (Ishiyama 1995:158–159). This dichotomy clearly oversimplifies a much more complex Eastern European reality, but for analytical purposes the comparison will serve. Given that the USSR thrust communism on many people of the region, nationalism loomed large in the demise of the communist party in Central and Eastern Europe as well as in Russia itself. Those who lived in the Soviet sphere of influence sought to break away from Moscow's control. In the republics of the ex-USSR itself, nationalists sought to apply the principles of the Soviet constitution, specifically that Soviet Russia was a voluntary association, to escape the grip of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The latter was true even of the Russian Federation itself (Carrere d’Encausse 1994). At the time of the fall of the Berlin Wall, the various ruling communist parties had to take an ideological and political stance vis-à-vis this nationalist élan. Some chose to remain relatively internationalist ideologically and to reject the appeal of nationalism electorally and as guide to policy (for example, successor parties in the Czech Republic and to a lesser extent those in Hungary and Poland). However, many successor parties chose to tap nationalist emotions to survive in their new environments (notable examples include Russia and Romania; see Ishiyama and Bozóki 2001). Nationalism and ethnic issues continue to serve to define a powerful cleavage in postcommunist party systems in the new European democracies, as we will see below. In the Mexican case, nationalism played no significant role in the democratic transition. It can be argued that the new openness to international trade—especially with the United States from the late 1980s onward—pushed Mexico to begin opening the political sphere to competitors. Such a move helped promote the image of democracy and liberalism in a regime that was neither democratic nor liberal in the early 1990s. The PRI's strong advocacy of liberalization before the reforms of the 1980s and 1990s obviated appeals to national independence. Put briefly, nationalism and ethnic issues had little relevance in Mexican electoral politics. The Evolution of Former Ruling Parties Do the experiences of the former ruling communist parties of Central and Eastern Europe offer any lessons for the PRI's future? The resilience of the heirs to communism stands out as one of the most salient aspects of post-transition politics in the region. Transformed or, in some cases, un- or partially-altered structures and cadres from the former ruling communist parties have appeared in several countries of the former Soviet bloc. Table 1 offers a summary of the electoral success of postcommunist successor parties and that of the PRI since the time of their respective democratic transitions.5 1 Electoral Success of Successors to Former Ruling Parties Country Ruling Party Successor Party Vote Share in PR Portion of Lower House Election (Date) First Democratic Election ca. 2000 Most Recent Election Bulgaria Bulgarian Communist Party Bulgarian Socialist Party 47.2 (1990) 17.1 (2001) 34.2a (2005) Hungary Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party Hungarian Socialist Party 10.9 (1990) 32.2 (1998) 43.2 (2006) Poland Polish United Workers’ Party Democratic Left Alliance 12.0 (1991) 41.0 (2001) 11.3 (2004) Romania Romanian Communist Party Social Democratic Party of Romaniab 66.3 (1990) 36.6 (2000) 36.8 (2004) Russia Communist Party of the Soviet Union Communist Party of the Russian Federation 11.8 (1993) 24.3 (1999) 12.8 (2003) Ukraine Communist Party of the Soviet Union Communist Party of Ukraine 12.7 (1994) 20.0 (2002) 3.7 (2006) Mexico Institutional Revolutionary Party Institutional Revolutionary Party 39.1 (1997) 37.8 (2000) 28.2c (2006) Country Ruling Party Successor Party Vote Share in PR Portion of Lower House Election (Date) First Democratic Election ca. 2000 Most Recent Election Bulgaria Bulgarian Communist Party Bulgarian Socialist Party 47.2 (1990) 17.1 (2001) 34.2a (2005) Hungary Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party Hungarian Socialist Party 10.9 (1990) 32.2 (1998) 43.2 (2006) Poland Polish United Workers’ Party Democratic Left Alliance 12.0 (1991) 41.0 (2001) 11.3 (2004) Romania Romanian Communist Party Social Democratic Party of Romaniab 66.3 (1990) 36.6 (2000) 36.8 (2004) Russia Communist Party of the Soviet Union Communist Party of the Russian Federation 11.8 (1993) 24.3 (1999) 12.8 (2003) Ukraine Communist Party of the Soviet Union Communist Party of Ukraine 12.7 (1994) 20.0 (2002) 3.7 (2006) Mexico Institutional Revolutionary Party Institutional Revolutionary Party 39.1 (1997) 37.8 (2000) 28.2c (2006) Sources: Rose and Munro (2003); for most recent elections, Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org) entries for elections in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine; for Mexico, Instituto Federal Electoral (http://www.ife.org.mx). aAs part of the Coalition for Bulgaria (Koalicija za Bălgarija). bIn 1990, part of the National Salvation Front (Frontul Salvării Naţionale, FSN); in 2000, as part of the Social Democratic Pole; and in 2004, in alliance with the Humanist Party of Romania (Partidul Umanist din România). cIn alliance with the Ecological Green Party of Mexico (Partido Verde Ecologista de México, PVEM). View Large 1 Electoral Success of Successors to Former Ruling Parties Country Ruling Party Successor Party Vote Share in PR Portion of Lower House Election (Date) First Democratic Election ca. 2000 Most Recent Election Bulgaria Bulgarian Communist Party Bulgarian Socialist Party 47.2 (1990) 17.1 (2001) 34.2a (2005) Hungary Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party Hungarian Socialist Party 10.9 (1990) 32.2 (1998) 43.2 (2006) Poland Polish United Workers’ Party Democratic Left Alliance 12.0 (1991) 41.0 (2001) 11.3 (2004) Romania Romanian Communist Party Social Democratic Party of Romaniab 66.3 (1990) 36.6 (2000) 36.8 (2004) Russia Communist Party of the Soviet Union Communist Party of the Russian Federation 11.8 (1993) 24.3 (1999) 12.8 (2003) Ukraine Communist Party of the Soviet Union Communist Party of Ukraine 12.7 (1994) 20.0 (2002) 3.7 (2006) Mexico Institutional Revolutionary Party Institutional Revolutionary Party 39.1 (1997) 37.8 (2000) 28.2c (2006) Country Ruling Party Successor Party Vote Share in PR Portion of Lower House Election (Date) First Democratic Election ca. 2000 Most Recent Election Bulgaria Bulgarian Communist Party Bulgarian Socialist Party 47.2 (1990) 17.1 (2001) 34.2a (2005) Hungary Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party Hungarian Socialist Party 10.9 (1990) 32.2 (1998) 43.2 (2006) Poland Polish United Workers’ Party Democratic Left Alliance 12.0 (1991) 41.0 (2001) 11.3 (2004) Romania Romanian Communist Party Social Democratic Party of Romaniab 66.3 (1990) 36.6 (2000) 36.8 (2004) Russia Communist Party of the Soviet Union Communist Party of the Russian Federation 11.8 (1993) 24.3 (1999) 12.8 (2003) Ukraine Communist Party of the Soviet Union Communist Party of Ukraine 12.7 (1994) 20.0 (2002) 3.7 (2006) Mexico Institutional Revolutionary Party Institutional Revolutionary Party 39.1 (1997) 37.8 (2000) 28.2c (2006) Sources: Rose and Munro (2003); for most recent elections, Wikipedia (http://en.wikipedia.org) entries for elections in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine; for Mexico, Instituto Federal Electoral (http://www.ife.org.mx). aAs part of the Coalition for Bulgaria (Koalicija za Bălgarija). bIn 1990, part of the National Salvation Front (Frontul Salvării Naţionale, FSN); in 2000, as part of the Social Democratic Pole; and in 2004, in alliance with the Humanist Party of Romania (Partidul Umanist din România). cIn alliance with the Ecological Green Party of Mexico (Partido Verde Ecologista de México, PVEM). View Large Table 1 indicates that postcommunist successor parties have boasted electoral success in the aftermath of their nations’ democratic evolutions. While none of the successor parties has become dominant in the new democracies, several have participated in coalitions in the parliamentary regimes—for example, the Hungarian Socialist Party, Poland's Democratic Left Alliance, the Bulgarian Socialist Party, and the Social Democratic Party of Romania. In presidential regimes they have been able to play significant roles in their legislatures—for example, the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) and the Communist Party of Ukraine. Reasons for the recent decline of communist party heirs in Ukraine, Russia, and Poland vary widely with no generalizable explanation. In Ukraine, the emergence of personalistic parties initially focusing on presidential candidates Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovych, that produced the “Orange Revolution” in 2004–2005, has eclipsed the Ukrainian Communist Party (Hesli 2006). In Russia, the 2003 Duma election proved especially disappointing to the KPRF as its vote share was halved compared to 1999, to but 12.8%. The KPRF failed to rally its rural, conservative base, which suggests that the party has not attracted the “losers and malcontents” arising from the liberal economic reforms (Wegren 2004; Wegren and Konitzer 2006), indicating that its fate may be similar to its Ukranian counterpart. In Poland, a medley of factors—policy failures, scandals, and a split within the Democratic Left Alliance—led voters to punish it in the 2005 parliamentary contests (Markowski 2006). In Mexico, the PRI's setback in 2006 clearly relates to Madrazo's lack of appeal and his poor campaign (Langston 2007). That PRI congressional candidates outperformed their presidential nominee by six percentage points suggests that the party will not be as easily eliminated from the political arena as occurred with the Ukrainian Communist Party. Still, the PRI's decline partially mirrors that of the Russian communists in that both parties garnered support in rural and economically backward zones that are waning in size and salience. Those who have scrutinized their development underscore several ways of distinguishing among the postcommunist successor parties that have some heuristic value for the PRI's evolution. Scholars note that pretransition regimes, party choices, and party organizational and environmental characteristics have made a difference in the types of postcommunist successor parties that have emerged. Old-Regime Legacies Ways of characterizing pretransition regimes in Central and Eastern Europe vary widely. Kitschelt (1995:453–454) suggests three categories: Patrimonial communism, with low intra-elite competition and which “rely on hierarchical chains of personal dependence between leaders in the apparatus and their entourage, buttressed by extensive patronage and clientelistic networks.” Examples are Bulgaria, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine. Bureaucratic-authoritarian communism, where “the level of rational-bureaucratic institutionalization is high.” Because of that, the regime can not quickly respond to external challenges such as the civic uprisings of 1989. Cases include the former East Germany and Czechoslovakia. National consensus communism, which allowed for interest articulation and some competition within the political elite. Hungary and Poland are prime examples. Where national consensus communism prevailed, the communist parties could anticipate change more easily—and even spearhead it—to best position their successors after the transition than proved true in the patrimonial or bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes (the latter simply imploded). When change came to the patrimonial communist regimes, it resulted from elite transformations—pre-emptive reforms as exemplified by Mikhail Gorbachev's perestroika. The consequences for party organization during and after transition included clique-based struggles within the communist nomenklatura and weak liberal but strong nationalist opposition (Kitschelt et al. 1999). In the aftermath of the crumbling of the Berlin Wall, the surviving communist parties in these patrimonial regimes could have chosen either to continue reforms in a social-democratic direction or adopt a “leftist-retreat” strategy. Many such parties took advantage of surging nationalism to convert themselves into national-patriotic entities (Ishiyama and Bozóki 2001). This allowed some parties, such as the Russian Communist Party, to avoid reforms, while still courting the electorate by stressing its defense of the motherland during the twentieth century. This appeal, of course, is important when the party no longer has government resources to lavish on its constituents. Mexico under the PRI exhibited patrimonialism and national consensus politics. On the one hand, the PRI was a classic clientelist party. Among PRI politicians and in the party's relationship to the broader society, patron–client relationships dominated. It recruited many astute politicians and public servants through clientelist networks known as camarillas (Camp 1999:116–120). Those same politicos encouraged Mexican citizens to make demands on the state through patron–client channels that they controlled rather than through interest groups. The PRI continues to operate through both kinds of patron–client ties, with party factions coalescing around jefes, but with the patronage now distributed through PRI-run state and local governments. As a result, the PRI has become a party of governors, powerful politicians seeking to parlay their regional strength into national prominence. The unwillingness of many PRI state executives to identify with Madrazo's campaign sprang from their sense that the nominee's poor image would damage their support (Langston 2007). On the other hand, the pretransition Mexican regime emphasized national consensus, at least until the last two decades of PRI rule. The PRI articulated a nebulous ideology of “revolutionary nationalism” that rhetorically integrated all Mexicans into a development project based on economic nationalism and import-substituting industrialization (Hansen 1971). The party allowed token, loyal opponents, which it subsidized (except for the PAN), to compete for office. Contending intraparty currents emphasized either more market-oriented or more state-directed policies. Revolutionary nationalism faded by the late 1970s once the struggle to define a new development approach came to the fore in the 1980s. Nevertheless, the PRI continued to claim that it was, above all, the party of the majority of Mexicans. But, at present, the PRI must develop a postrevolutionary ideology to appeal to voters who cannot be recruited by the now limited patronage. This is particularly difficult for a party that once presented itself as all things to all people. Political Choice In countries such as Poland, Hungary, and Bulgaria, the former ruling parties had factions willing to negotiate with the democratic opposition, to sacrifice their constitutional “leading role” status, and—in Poland and Hungary—to layer Western European-style social democracy on the remnants of the communist party (Waller 1995). Table 1 suggests that these have been among the most successful communist successor parties. For their part, the Russian and Ukrainian parties resisted giving up their leading role until forced to do so by reformers who even outlawed those parties for a time. The early willingness of the former Polish and Hungarian ruling parties to foresee the need to adapt to change led them to adopt reforms that allowed the successors in these countries to serve as social-democratic pillars of new party regimes. The Russian and Ukranian parties retained large roles in their new democracies. This outcome resulted from the incapacity of those new democracies to create institutionalized parties de novo in the wake of repressive communist regimes. In their most recent elections, the Ukrainian and Russian successor parties have suffered major reverses indicating that they may soon fade from the political stage (see Table 1). Mexico's PRI leadership was divided about how much they should revamp the party during the democratic change. While PRI modernizers typically accentuated pre-emptive reforms to develop the capacity to win elections fairly, other elements in the party either resisted changes or sought to undermine reforms proposed by party chiefs. Moreover, the party split over the neoliberal project pursued by PRI presidents Carlos Salinas and Ernesto Zedillo with neither the champions of continued economic liberalization nor paladins of statism winning by the time that the PAN swept the PRI from power in 2000. During Fox's term, PRI heavyweights fought among themselves for control of the party. This intramural struggle aside, the party failed to resolve the pro-market, anti-market clash. This lack of ideologic clarity benefited the PRI when it was the “party of the majority”—the Mexican version of the “big tent”—and it was not a liability as long as it offered the most credible alternative to the now-governing PAN, as was the case in 2003. Yet when another party—the PRD—presented a viable option to the PAN in 2006, the former governing party found itself running third and failing to capture a single state. The PRI has survived thanks to its traditional constituencies and its positions in state governments from which to distribute patronage. It lacks a coherent, compelling, and, most importantly, distinctive message for the national electorate, including the millions of new voters. Organizational and Environmental Characteristics Scholars exploring the adaptation of communist party successors have focused on the extent to which successor parties have made adaptations to such “environmental” factors as changing electoral institutions, the emergence of competitors on the left, and party organizational characteristics. John Ishiyama (2001) has demonstrated that some successor parties—notably Bulgaria's and Romania's—took power primarily because of the absence of an organized, coherent leftist competitor. Their organizations, particularly the degree to which they were led by officeholders intent on creating effective electoral mechanisms, would not have vaulted them into the government (Ishiyama 2001:860). Other successor parties have relied on organizational strengths to win enough votes to gain office or, at least, to play a significant role in the legislature (as did Russia's KPRF). Meanwhile, Hungary's Socialist Party and Poland's Left Democratic Alliance had to acquire the electoral apparatus to shove aside foes that might have filled the left on the political spectrum. The Russian and Ukrainian successor parties encountered a weaker challenge on the left. How can we access the Mexican PRI's organizational characteristics? First, we should note that its two major competitors define themselves as center-right (PAN) and center-left (PRD), with the former having a much stronger organization than the latter (Wuhs n.d.). In the wake of the PRI's loss to the PAN in 2000, few PRI leaders advocated vying for the same ideological space as the PAN; indeed, many observers ascribed the party's debacle to its having moved too far to the right on economic issues. On the other side of the continuum—where the PRI's traditional pro-state, revolutionary nationalist ideology comfortably fits—the PRD posed a robust threat. The PRI boasts a better organization than the PRD, but both are strong enough that in the Federal District and a half-dozen other states the PRI would not necessarily win one-on-one against the PRD.6 Second, the PRI is organized nationwide; the PRD has an anemic presence in the North; the PAN has difficulty penetrating rural southern Mexico. In effect, its national reach will enable the PRI to continue to win elections. This means that it can serve as the alternative to either the PAN (in the north and the west) or the PRD (in the south) if state or local voters want to punish the incumbent party. This national presence will not, however, return the presidency to the PRI unless it fields more appealing standard-bearers than it did in 2000 or 2006 (Klesner 2001; Langston 2007). Third, in the absence of effective competition to the PRI until the mid-1980s, it served as an instrument to reward friends and punish foes. In other words, the PRI placed aspiring power holders—and, increasingly, technocrats—into executive offices (Smith 1978; Camp 1995). In fact, PRI candidates who were elected president of Mexico in 1970, 1976, 1982, 1988, and 1994 had never before run for elective office. In the late 1980s, however, the PRI was forced to improve its vote-winning capability, even as many PRI “dinosaurs” disparaged modern campaign techniques. The PRI, indeed, has introduced some important institutional innovations such as the use of primaries to select presidential, gubernatorial, and senatorial candidates (Klesner 1999; Langston 2006). Yet the party remains deeply riven. Before the PRI's fall from power, the Mexican chief executive's control of appointments and his influence over nominations allowed the party to paper over internal divisions because no one dared rock the boat lest he incur the president's wrath. Today, with the PAN occupying the Los Pinos presidential residence, no figure wields similar power within the party. As a result, some PRI big shots openly urged voters to turn their backs on Madrazo in the 2006 election even as they cast ballots for state and local PRI party aspirants (Langston 2007). The internal wrangling for control of the party eclipses the struggle against other parties. By comparison to the communist successor parties, the PRI has some advantages, but faces some challenges as it adapts to competitive politics. It is a genuinely indigenous party with an elaborate organization, holds power in many states and localities, and can use its governorships and mayorships to reward clients/supporters. At the same time, it lacks a distinctive and coherent message. Moreover, its internal divisions have diminished its electoral clout. Finally, it has failed to attract a new base following its presidential defeats. Its inability to replace the rural, less educated, and aging voters who have been its bulwark for years threatens to put it in the same situation as the Russian communists, whose core voters are aging and passing from the scene. The Emergence of Competitive Party Systems At first glance, the party systems of the former communist nations appear to feature an alphabet soup of new parties—a menu of bewildering choices, with options as various as the Polish Beer-Lovers’ Party, the German Minority in Silesian Opole, and the Peasant Alliance in Poland alone.7 In her survey of 19 new democracies, Sarah Birch (2003) found an average of 5.87 elective parties in contests up to 2002. However, the effective number of parliamentary parties in those regimes totaled only 4.12 (Birch 2003:111). The latter figure masks considerable diversity, too, with the effective number of parliamentary parties varying widely from country to country and over time. For example, while in 2002, Hungary had 2.21 effective parliamentary parties, Ukraine had 4.43. In its first democratic election in 1991, Poland had 10.89 competitive electoral parties, a figure that plummeted to 3.6 by 2001. Yet, in the region as a whole, the effective number of both electoral and parliamentary parties changed very little between the first and fifth elections (Birch 2003:110). Table 2 provides a set of measures of party system fragmentation in Central and Eastern Europe, with Mexico included for comparative purposes. The figures describe elections held in large countries approximately a decade after the fall of the Berlin Wall and portray the results of the third (Russia and Ukraine), fourth (Hungary, Poland, and Romania), and fifth (Bulgaria) democratic elections. The figures for Mexico reflect the third post-transition election in 2006. We see that party system fragmentation in Mexico (1) compares favorably to outcomes in Poland, Romania, Russia, and Ukraine; (2) exhibits similarity to Bulgaria; and (3) is greater than in Hungary. 2 Comparative Measures of Party Systems Country (Date of Election) Effective Number of Parties Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties Vote Shares in PR Elections Seat Shares Largest Party Largest Two Parties Largest Party Largest Two Parties Bulgaria (2001) 3.95 2.92 42.7 60.9 50.0 71.3 Hungary (2002) 2.94 2.21 42.1 83.1 48.7 94.8 Poland (2001) 4.50 3.60 41.0 53.7 47.0 61.1 Romania (2000) 5.26 3.57 36.6 56.1 44.9 69.3 Russia (1999) 6.22 4.67 24.3 47.6 25.1 41.3 Ukraine (2002) 6.72 4.43 23.5 43.5 24.7 47.3 Mexico (2006) 3.43 3.03 34.2 63.9 41.2 73.2 Country (Date of Election) Effective Number of Parties Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties Vote Shares in PR Elections Seat Shares Largest Party Largest Two Parties Largest Party Largest Two Parties Bulgaria (2001) 3.95 2.92 42.7 60.9 50.0 71.3 Hungary (2002) 2.94 2.21 42.1 83.1 48.7 94.8 Poland (2001) 4.50 3.60 41.0 53.7 47.0 61.1 Romania (2000) 5.26 3.57 36.6 56.1 44.9 69.3 Russia (1999) 6.22 4.67 24.3 47.6 25.1 41.3 Ukraine (2002) 6.72 4.43 23.5 43.5 24.7 47.3 Mexico (2006) 3.43 3.03 34.2 63.9 41.2 73.2 Sources: For formerly communist countries: Birch (2003:109–114) and Rose and Munro (2003); for Mexico: author calculations based on data provided by the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) at http://www.ife.org.mx/docs/Internet/IFE_Home/CENTRAL/Contenidos_Centrales/Informes_Especiales_gastos_CP/Integracion_Congreso_Union_2006/integracion_total.pdf. View Large 2 Comparative Measures of Party Systems Country (Date of Election) Effective Number of Parties Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties Vote Shares in PR Elections Seat Shares Largest Party Largest Two Parties Largest Party Largest Two Parties Bulgaria (2001) 3.95 2.92 42.7 60.9 50.0 71.3 Hungary (2002) 2.94 2.21 42.1 83.1 48.7 94.8 Poland (2001) 4.50 3.60 41.0 53.7 47.0 61.1 Romania (2000) 5.26 3.57 36.6 56.1 44.9 69.3 Russia (1999) 6.22 4.67 24.3 47.6 25.1 41.3 Ukraine (2002) 6.72 4.43 23.5 43.5 24.7 47.3 Mexico (2006) 3.43 3.03 34.2 63.9 41.2 73.2 Country (Date of Election) Effective Number of Parties Effective Number of Parliamentary Parties Vote Shares in PR Elections Seat Shares Largest Party Largest Two Parties Largest Party Largest Two Parties Bulgaria (2001) 3.95 2.92 42.7 60.9 50.0 71.3 Hungary (2002) 2.94 2.21 42.1 83.1 48.7 94.8 Poland (2001) 4.50 3.60 41.0 53.7 47.0 61.1 Romania (2000) 5.26 3.57 36.6 56.1 44.9 69.3 Russia (1999) 6.22 4.67 24.3 47.6 25.1 41.3 Ukraine (2002) 6.72 4.43 23.5 43.5 24.7 47.3 Mexico (2006) 3.43 3.03 34.2 63.9 41.2 73.2 Sources: For formerly communist countries: Birch (2003:109–114) and Rose and Munro (2003); for Mexico: author calculations based on data provided by the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) at http://www.ife.org.mx/docs/Internet/IFE_Home/CENTRAL/Contenidos_Centrales/Informes_Especiales_gastos_CP/Integracion_Congreso_Union_2006/integracion_total.pdf. View Large As mentioned above, three main parties have contested elections in Mexico since 1988.8 However, other small parties have existed alongside the PRI, PAN, and PRD, notably the Mexican Ecological Green Party and the Labor Party. As in 2006, these small parties often form electoral coalitions with larger parties. The figure of 3.03 for the effective number of parliamentary parties in Mexico measures coalition seats; it rises to 3.57 if the actual party identities of members of the lower house of the Congress are considered. Table 2 shows that no single party has won the majority of votes in these new democracies. In the relatively concentrated systems of Bulgaria and Hungary, single parties have at times won parliamentary majorities, thus being able to form governments. At the same time, the party regimes have not fragmented to the extent that any party fails to garner a substantial plurality; large parties take first place in these countries and, in most of them, two parties share the lion's share of the votes. But the mixed electoral systems in Russia and Ukraine gave rise to large numbers of independents elected in single-member districts. This made their legislatures more diverse than their counterparts in the region. Birch (2003:140–142) also notes that the presidential systems—complemented by power struggles between executive and legislative branches—have led the Russian and Ukrainian chief executives to encourage party proliferation. As the literature suggests, the factors shaping the emergent party systems include the number and salience of issue dimensions (or cleavages) and institutional features, principally whether the regime is presidential or parliamentary and the type of electoral system employed to select legislators. Regarding the latter, Birch (2003:137–139) concludes that proportional representation engenders a proliferation of parties in the new European democracies, a reaffirmation of the conventional wisdom on the impact of electoral systems on party system development. However, she notes the exception of the former Soviet republics, namely, that in them single-member constituencies often favor a large number of independents or regional parties. Of course, electoral law can inhibit such fragmentation by prohibiting independent candidacies, which Mexico does. To the extent that Mexico uses single-member districts for a majority of its legislative seats (60% of the Chamber of Deputies and 50% of the Senate), imposes a threshold to keep out extremely small parties (the current 2% level may be too low), and requires candidates to be nominated by registered parties, it discourages fragmentation. Similarly, Mexico's presidential system propitiates the formation of large parties—or, at least, alliances centered on large parties—to effectively contest the long and costly campaigns for office. Thus, compared to the postcommunist regimes, Mexico's institutions should discourage the multiplication of parties. Cleavages also shape party systems, of course. Economic issues have been dominant in postcommunist Central and Eastern Europe as the new democracies have struggled to shift from central planning to market-oriented regimes. As a result, political entrepreneurs have made nationalism an important wedge issue in several countries. In addition, during the early postcommunist rule, a division existed between those who preferred a more democratic regime and those more comfortable with authoritarian rule (Kitschelt 1995; Sitter 2002). When combined with electoral systems with proportional representation, these cleavages created the prospect for broad representation and multiparty systems (see Kitschelt et al. 1999 for a more extensive discussion). A pro-regime, anti-regime face-off that characterized competition in Mexico in the 1990s (Molinar Horcasitas 1991; Moreno 1998; Klesner 2005) was supplemented by differences over economic policy. In many ways the election of Fox put an end to the salience of the regime cleavage. In its place, economic questions have surfaced as the principal cleavage (Moreno 2007). Some Mexicans yearn for the PRI's hegemonic regime just as some Central and Eastern Europeans long for the certainties of authoritarian rule, but this pro-regime, anti-regime dimension of party competition will likely fade from the scene. Strife over nationalism and ethnicity has not arisen. A potential nationalist versus internationalist conflict overlaps in Mexico with the economic cleavage because economic policies relate to the Left's nostalgia for statism in contrast to continued openness to the United States and world economies. The Left has exploited anti-American nationalism, but on the most emotional issue—the treatment of Mexican nationals in the United States—all parties advocate better treatment of Mexicans north of the Rio Grande and the liberalization of US immigration statutes. A possible cleavage based on claims by indigenous Mexicans for greater rights has not been channeled effectively through the party system. For better or worse, the economic divide shapes a party system in which most other factors work to discourage proliferation. Conclusions At this point, Mexican politics has one strong cleavage, but three main parties—one more than necessary to represent that division. The competitive dynamics of Mexican politics—in races for the presidency, governorships, and single-member district legislative seats—should reduce the number of parties. The PAN and the PRD have distinct agendas; the PRI does not. Were party systems determined only by social cleavages, the PRI would confront a bleak future. The PRI does have organizational strength, however, and it can nominate presidential candidates with extensive experience in government at the national and state level. Moreover, it continues to promote clientelistic machines throughout the country. Nevertheless, if it fails to place itself within the new party system as the Hungarian and Bulgarian successor parties have done, it risks fading into irrelevance. Of the new democracies, the evolution of the Hungarian party system before and after the demise of communism closely resembles that of Mexico. However, the Hungarian Socialist Party—in contrast to the PRI—developed an effective vote-winning capability that landed it a key space in the new party system. The PRI could forfeit its electoral space to the PRD, unless bad decisions by its failed presidential candidate Andrés Manuel López Obrador and other leaders discredit it in the eyes of the electorate. If this happens, the PRI may rebound as the fortunate recipient of a gift from its major competitor on the Left. The Transition to Democracy of Spain and Mexico: The Importance of Leadership George W. Grayson Department of Government, College of William and Mary This part of the Forum compares the transition from authoritarian rule toward democracy following the fall of one-party dominant systems in Spain and Mexico. The focus in Spain is on the demise of Generalissimo Francisco Franco and the years surrounding his death on November 20, 1975. The concentration on Mexico revolves around the period after the defeat of the presidential candidate of the long-ruling PRI on July 2, 2000. I will argue that, while some factors differentiate 1970s Spain and Mexico 30 years later at the international and national levels of analysis, the most salient contrasting element is in the individual sphere, namely, the political management of Adolfo Suárez and King Juan Carlos I in Spain and that of Vicente Fox Quesada in Mexico—with leadership defined as “the ability to effectively influence the achievement of certain goals” (Inter-American Development Bank 2006). This approach both amplifies and contradicts the emphasis on “the transition type,” the “external and internal context in which the regime change takes place,” the agenda setting of the emerging party system, the new government's “efficiency,” its success in restricting “political conflict to the parliamentary arena,” the prospect of “alternation in power,” and the “viability of the peaceful resolution of conflicts” (Maravall and Santamaría 1986:71–108). An overview of relevant events in Spain and Mexico before Franco's demise and the PRI's loss precede attention to the international, national, and individual levels of analysis. Overview of Events in Spain Modern history in Spain begins with Francisco Franco. Born in 1892, he graduated from the Infantry Academy in Toledo. Following service in Spain's North African protectorates, he earned promotion to the rank of major (comandante), becoming the youngest field-grade officer in the Spanish Army. Later, he was second-in-command—and later commander—of the Legión Extranjera, his nation's rendition of the French Foreign Legion. After this assignment, Franco, then a general, served as director of the newly created Joint Military Academy, an Iberian version of West Point. Franco refused to engage in military plots, even after Republicans overthrew dictator Miguel Primo de Rivera and King Alfonso XIII, who had ruled from 1902 to 1931 and with whom Franco had good relations. However, Franco's neutrality gradually gave way to a right-wing stance, which was evident when he became commander in chief of the army in 1935. The following year, he cast his lot with other conservative officers who fomented a revolt against the left-leaning Spanish Republic—a move that sparked the Spanish Civil War. Thanks to military and economic assistance from Mussolini's Italy and Hitler's Germany, the Nationalists triumphed over the Republicans on April 1, 1939. Later in that year, Franco became Generalissimo of the army, head of state, prime minister, and leader of the Falange, the only legal political party. These various posts were personified in his self-selected title of “Caudillo” or strongman. Although Franco dispatched the Blue Division to fight alongside the Wehrmacht on the Russian front in World War II, he joined Portugal's dictator António Salazar in maintaining official “neutrality” while favoring the Axis until he broke relations with them in October 1943. Meanwhile, he built his own power structure that rested on the armed forces, the National Guard (Guardia Civil), and the Falange, which evolved into the National Movement. The Allied victors in World War II ostracized Spain after peace was declared. They continued to repeat Napoleon's dictum that “Africa begins at the Pyrenees.” To improve his image, Franco promulgated the 1947 Constitution. This document identified his nation as a monarchy with the Generalissimo enjoying the right to name his successor. He selected cabinet ministers of conservative and moderate orientations. Nevertheless, the fundamental law prohibited both political opposition and criticism of the government. Meanwhile, political prisoners wound up in concentration camps, homosexuals in insane asylums, and women worked only with the permission of their fathers or husbands. In the absence of an ideology, Franco established the corporatist Spanish Sindical Organization through which the state sought to harmonize relations between the officially recognized trade unions and employers (for an analysis of corporatism in Iberia, see Wiarda 1988). He complemented this corporatist structure with economic nationalism that safeguarded domestic industries from foreign competition. His most zealous loyalists—civilian and military—constituted the infamous “Búnker.” He relied on a paramilitary police force—the Guardia Civil—to enforce laws throughout the country. In addition, he propitiated the Roman Catholic Church, which had opposed the “atheistic communism” of the Republic. Franco agreed to an economic opening in the 1960s. During this decade, the GDP of Spain rapidly expanded, per-capita income surged at an average of 6.4% per annum, industrial activity doubled, tourism flourished, and tens of thousands of families benefited from remittances sent home by Spanish guest workers employed in France, Germany, and other Western European nations. As living standards improved, social unrest declined. Still, illegal leftist unions and radical Basque separatists continued to attack the regime. In 1973, the Basque terrorist and secessionist organization ETA assassinated Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, Franco's éminence grise, intended successor, and engineer of “operation Don Carlos.” The Caudillo owed his “Spanish Miracle” to innovations introduced by technocrats in his cabinet, many of whom belonged to Opus Dei, a shadowy Catholic organization that wielded enormous influence. In 1969 Franco evinced his reliance upon this group when the National Movement, whose leaders were jockeying for power with Opus Dei members, lost its official status. Amid declining health, Franco designated Prince Juan Carlos de Borbón, grandson of Alfonso XIII, as his official successor in 1969. Four years later, he relinquished his position as prime minister but continued to be head of state—with the army still looming as the most important institution in society. Various illnesses afflicted the 82-year-old dictator before his death in late 1975. Two days after Franco's demise, Juan Carlos was installed as king. Although having sworn loyalty to Franco's National Movement, he said upon donning the crown: “The Monarchy can and must be effective as a political system if it is able to maintain a just and true balance of powers, and if it is rooted in the real life of the Spanish people.” Former Interior Minister Carlos Arias Navarro became the new prime minister. Conflict between reformers and the reactionary Búnker beset his government. Although promising gradual change, Arias Navarro promulgated the conservative Law of Associations that determined the legality of political parties, ruthlessly cracked down on the ETA Basque separatist movement, and defied international pressure by executing five Basque terrorists in September 1975. This repression convinced the monarch to replace him with Adolfo Suárez, a nationalist and skilled negotiator who had studied law at Madrid's Complutense University before holding several governmental and National Movement posts under Franco. This mid-1976 appointment won praise from partisans of Franco, but ignited leftist protests. Suárez—who had once described himself as “a foot solider of politics”—soon unveiled his goals. In a nationally televised address on July 7, 1976, he said that: If Spanish society aspires to democratic normalization, we are going to try to attain it. If political reform has been undertaken as an urgent task, we are going to accelerate it with the realism that our time demands….The final goal is quite concrete: that future Governments emerge from the free choice of the majority of Spaniards, and to achieve this objective, I ask the collaboration of all social forces….Several days ago, I affirmed before the Cortes, and I repeat it now, that we must elevate the concept of normal politics to the point that it is taken for granted (El Reformismo De Adolfo Suárez 2003). With the full support of the king, Suárez invested substance in his rhetoric by taking the following steps: formed a cabinet largely free of Francoists; initiated a dialogue with a broad spectrum of political actors, including Franco's collaborators and Santiago Carrillo, secretary general of the Spanish Communist Party (PCE); began the dismantling of Francoist institutions with a Political Reform Law in December 1976, which called for a parliamentary democracy characterized by a new, bicameral legislature of 350 deputies and 207 senators chosen by universal suffrage; won 90 percent approval for this measure in a referendum (December 15, 1976); eliminated the widely despised Public Order Court, which had been created in 1093 to punish opponents of the regime; implemented a penal code that legalized all political parties (except the PCE) and dissolved the National Movement (February 1977); granted a sweeping amnesty to political prisoners (March 1977); legalized all trade unions, while eliminating the corporatist “vertical unions” (March 1977); granted legal status to the PCE (April 1977); presided over the first free elections in 40 years in which Suárez's United Democratic Center or UCD (31.1%) ran ahead of the Spanish Socialist Party or PSOE (28.6%), the PCE (9.4%), and the conservative Popular Alliance or AP (8.5%) (June 15, 1977); formed the first democratic party government (July 1977); attained parliamentary approval of a new, democratic constitution, which embraced political pluralism, union rights, religious freedom, and autonomy for the nation's regions (October 1978); and gained ratification of this constitution in a referendum (December 6, 1978). The 169-article constitution defined Spain as a parliamentary monarchy, with the king as head of state and symbol of its unity and permanence. It declared liberty, justice, equality, and political pluralism to be the country's foremost values and established a bicameral legislature, the Cortes, and an independent judicial system. Individual liberties were further strengthened by provisions recognizing the right to organize trade unions and to strike. It called for sufficient remuneration to meet individual and family needs without discrimination and guaranteed adequate pensions for the elderly, protection of the handicapped, decent housing, and access to health care and welfare. The framers sought to curb the influence of the armed forces without antagonizing them. While assigning to the army the role of safeguarding the nation, the constitution emphasized that ultimate responsibility for defense rests with its popularly elected government, not with the armed forces. This fundamental law also eliminated Catholicism as the state religion. At the same time, it guaranteed complete religious freedom and affirmed that public authorities are to take into account the religious beliefs of Spanish society and that they are to maintain cooperative relations with the Roman Catholic Church and with other religions. This cooperation may take the form of state aid to parochial schools. While affirming the “indissoluble unity of the nation,” the document granted a greater degree of autonomy to nationalities and regions, permitting them to use their own languages and flags without interference. These remarkable political achievements would have been impossible without an economic accord that Suárez hammered out between the Left and the Right. Although Spain registered impressive development in the 1960s and early 1970s, it was hard hit by the energy crisis of 1973. This emergency spawned rising unemployment, soaring prices, a gaping trade deficit, and a sharp upswing in strikes. In response to this situation, the prime minister invited representatives of the nine major political parties to take part in the negotiations that commenced on October 9, 1977. Within 2weeks, the participants had struck a bargain known as the “Moncloa Pacts,” named after the prime minister's official residence where the bargaining took place. This accord embodied an austerity plan. The government committed itself to elevating pension and unemployment benefits, replacing indirect levies with a progressive income tax, endowing parliament with greater control over the social security system, expanding free education, and introducing the teaching of regional language. In addition, Suárez agreed to undertake slum removal, construct public housing, end sharecropping, and promote an agrarian reform that would convert renters into land owners. The Left also won revision of the Law of Public Order, which redefined the concept of public order as based “on the free, peaceful, and harmonious enjoyment of civil liberties and respect for human rights.” In return for these concessions, representatives of the workers promised to forego strikes, while accepting a 22% ceiling on wage increases—the expected inflation level in 1978. The collaborative effort of multiple parties yielded a badly needed agreement. Moreover, the Moncloa sessions also had important symbolic significance. On the morning of the first meeting, ETA terrorists assassinated a civilian official and his two military escorts. Thus the gathering began not with ideological harangues, but with the negotiators offering their “unanimous public condemnation” of this “criminal act.” The conferees then promised “to continue forward on the path that had already been taken, toward the full realization of collective freedoms …and the peace that we all desire for our country” (El Pais 1977:11,). The negotiations ended with a live telecast of the proceeding. After the participants had affixed their signatures to the accords, Suárez said: “I think, gentlemen, that we should all greet one another,” which they did. “Thus, the signing of the Moncloa Pacts was publicly finalized and affirmed as an act of tolerance and reconciliation as well as pluralism and democracy” (Edles 1998:85). In advancing his daunting program, Suárez distanced himself from La Zarzuela [the royal palace] “concerned that the crown should not be damaged by the attrition of day-to-day politics” (Preston 2004:399). This strategy helped the king conserve political capital that he used to put down an attempted coup d’ètat in 1981. As one magazine noted: “Backed by the King, he [Suárez] has steered Spain, with hardly a false move, from dictatorship to what should eventually become a full-fledged parliamentary democracy” (Time 1977). Overview of Events in Mexico The killing of hundreds of innocent protesters on October 2, 1968, accelerated the PRI's decline. This act also gave rise to the “Tlatelolco complex,” named after the location of the blood-letting, whereby future presidents often cringed from employing force even against criminals, lest they be accused of repressing social activists. An oil boom in the late 1970s prolonged the governance of the self-designated “revolutionary party” that had held sway since its formation in 1929. A combination of factors—the government's weak-kneed reaction to the September 1985 earthquakes that struck Mexico City, the blatantly rigged 1988 presidential showdown, and vexing economic nightmares—convinced President Carlos Salinas de Gortari (1988–1994) of the imperative to link his country to the global economy. To this end, he joined the United States and Canada in NAFTA, which took effect on January 1, 1994. Liberalization exacted a toll on the nation's top-down, authoritarian regime. It diminished rewards to PRI clients, who made up the party's three corporatist sectors; generated cries for greater choices in the political sphere to match those in the marketplace; gave rise to opposition-party successes that witnessed the PRI's losing its majority in Congress and the leftist-nationalist PRD capturing the mayorship of Mexico City; pressured manufacturers to introduce cutting-edge technology and efficient manufacturing techniques to compete effectively in overseas’ markets; and encouraged intense scrutiny of politicians by both domestic and international media, which thrived on discovering corruption and electoral shenanigans. Following Salinas’ 6-year term, Mexicans chose two nonpolitical chief executives: after the assassination of the PRI's first nominee, Luis Donaldo Colosio, the party selected economist Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León (1994–2000); he was succeeded by the PAN's Vicente Fox (2000–2006). During these 12 years, the nation witnessed a severe recession, a democratic reform of its electoral system, a change in governing parties, a surge in street crime, and the mounting brutality of drug cartels. Zedillo, who had his hands full managing an economic recovery, lacked a strong governing team. His weakness became evident within several weeks of his taking office, when—for the first time ever—a PRI president proved incapable of ousting a sitting PRI governor. The backlash against the 1994–1995 recession manifest itself in the election of the PRD's candidate to head the Federal District as well as major opposition gains in the 1997 congressional elections. Because Zedillo had righted the economy, however, even generating growth by the end of his term, the PRI could not use the “fear factor” to retain the presidency and the voters felt free to opt for the platform of “change” presented by Fox. The former businessman and rancher blamed all of the nation's ills on the PRI. To overcome that legacy, he made dozens of promises. These included pledges to spur 7% economic growth, generate a million new jobs each year, combat poverty, clean up the environment, eliminate corruption, fight drug-trafficking, and encourage Washington to undertake a comprehensive reform of its immigration system to benefit Mexicans working legally and illegally north of the Rio Grande. At his December 1, 2000, inauguration, the new chief executive reiterated many of these objectives. Fox emphasized that: “the origin of our evils lies in the excessive concentration of power.” As a result, he stressed the imperative of “dialogue,” for “the strength of the nation will not come from one single Party,” adding that “now more than ever, understanding and agreement among political players are necessary. I call upon all political forces to build, without prejudice, a dignified relationship.” He said that “in a plural society there is no room for stubbornness. Tolerance is indispensable to consolidate plurality. There is a lot at stake here: the hopes of millions of Mexicans.” He pledged to impel a fiscal reform “to stimulate savings and investments”—with new revenues invested in “the health and education of the next generation.” In addition, quality education and employment would “form a basis for eliminating poverty.” Fox vowed that he would “never concentrate power but … work to gain moral authority. We all have a role to play in the struggle in favor of Mexico. I urge all to form an alliance to move from arbitrariness to a law-based state.”“The construction of Mexico's future requires the work of everyone.” (The quotations here are based on articles that appeared on December 1, 2000, in El Universal, Reforma, and La Jornada.) One of Fox's most surprising proposals came near the end of his address when he averred that “as president of the Republic, I am committed to establishing a new relationship with Indian communities. I will work tirelessly to accomplish this. This is a direct responsibility of the president. Brothers and sisters from Indian communities, allow me to address you especially. As president of Mexico, I pledge to work to allow for your participation in building a legal framework that guarantees autonomy and self-determination. In Mexico and in Chiapas there will be a new dawning.” This was a reference to the Zapatista National Revolutionary Army (EZLN), which had declared “war” on the country's government sixyears earlier. Fox came to office as a political outsider. Although a highly effective campaigner, it turned out that he disdained both politics and politicians. And even though his triumph stunned the PRI, that party—in contrast to Franco—was by no means dead. It boasted 208 deputies in the 500-member Chamber of Deputies, 60 seats in the 128-member Senate, and 17 of 31 state governorships. Given these figures, however, the newly elected chief executive, who basked in high approval ratings at the beginning of his term, failed to develop a coherent strategy toward the PRI. Indeed, he believed that winning a fair election meant that the opposition would throw its support to him. He could have extended an olive branch in hopes that several dozen progressive PRI legislators would back his vitally needed energy, fiscal, labor, and judicial reforms, or, he could have lunged for the throat of his nemesis by exposing the corruption that suffused the once-hegemonic party. After all, the PAN, with only 205 deputies and 46 senators, needed allies to push important measures through Congress. Instead, the politically naïve, former Coca-Cola executive attempted both tactics. He lambasted the PRI for channeling millions of dollars from the state oil monopoly to its presidential nominee in the scandalous “Pemexgate” saga. Then he reversed field and implored the party to back a broadening of the unpopular value-added tax. When its lawmakers rejected this overture, the chief executive took to the air waves to excoriate opponents as “liars” for claiming that his fiscal initiative would harm poor people. Meanwhile, his courtship of the Zapatista National Liberation Army (EZLN) drove a wedge between him and a major faction of the PAN. His PAN detractors observed that the rebels had never run for office and that to propitiate them would encourage other firebrands to engage in insurgencies. Fox's welcoming the Zapatistas to Mexico City conveyed a disturbing message to dissidents: “If you want to get the government's attention, arm a few hundred people, declare war against the state, and stage a march on the capital.” In effect, Fox's ineptness gave the PRI an opportunity to regroup in 2002, when it elected a cunning “dinosaur,” Roberto Madrazo, as party president. On his watch, the PRI joined with the PRD in April 2002 to prevent the peripatetic president from receiving permission to travel to the United States and Canada. This unprecedented denial sprang from the refusal of Fox's arrogant foreign secretary to submit for Senate confirmation the name of an Undersecretary of Human Rights on the grounds that she was not assuming a geographic post. Five months later, two members of his “Montessori Cabinet”—so called because of their preference for self-expression over teamwork—botched the siting of a new Mexico City airport that was to be the centerpiece of Fox's public works ventures. The secretaries of Government and Transport and Communication had not negotiated with local residents over the acquisition of the land on which the airport would be built before the project was announced. As a result, machete-waving peasants—joined by pro-Zapatistas, debtor organizations, radical students, and supporters of Mexico City's messianic mayor, Andrés Manuel López Obrador—occupied the site until the president gave up the project. No one lost his job over this fiasco. Fox never succeeded in uniting his own PAN behind his initiatives and, much to the chagrin of party notables, the president's hyper-ambitious wife—Marta Sahagún—began to dabble openly in policy and stage-whispered her desire to seek public office, possibly the presidency. Questions about the source of funding for Sahagún's Vamos México foundation and lucrative business ventures by her sons also excited charges of influence peddling by the first family. The upshot was that the PAN suffered severe setbacks in the 2003 midterm congressional elections and Fox prematurely became a lame duck as politicians from across the spectrum positioned themselves to succeed him threeyears before his term ended. Only sound macroeconomic policy prevented Fox's administration from winding up as an unmitigated disaster. Finance Secretary Francisco Gil Díaz and Central Bank Governor Guillermo Ortiz adroitly balanced income with expenditures, with the result that inflation fell from 16.6% in 1999 to 4.29% in 2006 and foreign reserves reached an all-time high. While income distribution remained brutally skewed, the living standards of the poorest Mexicans improved marginally thanks to anti-poverty programs like Opportunities and Popular Security. GDP grew 4.6% during the final months of Fox's 6-year term. To its credit, the government also respected decisions made by the citizen-run IFE, which registers voters, organizes elections, and counts the ballots, and the Federal Electoral Tribunal, which adjudicates electoral conflicts. Nevertheless, the country's traditional control mechanisms that the PRI once commanded—trade unions, peasant leagues, law-enforcement agencies, state governments, the presidency, and Congress—continued to lose influence and legitimacy. This erosion of key institutions contributed to widespread urban violence, police corruption, political crises in states like Oaxaca, and ubiquitous drug-trafficking. Narco-criminals showed their growing brutality when, before dawn in early September 2006, they burst into the Sol y Sombra dance hall in central Mexico, brandished high-powered machine guns, and rolled the heads of five victims onto the dance floor. Although Fox claimed to have imprisoned 16 drug lords and 75,000 lower-ranking cartel members, criminal organizations murdered some 2,000 people in 2006—up from 1,304 in 2004 and 1,080 in 2001. While lamenting the ubiquitous violence in the country, the president seemed paralyzed by the Tlatelolco complex and, as he vacillated, the narco-barons became more and more audacious. The following events highlight Fox's 6-year term. He failed to consult PAN notables when appointing a cabinet composed largely of allies from his native Guanajuato state and individuals selected by “head-hunting” firms (November 2000); announced his intention to remove the army from Chiapas and committed himself to solving the Chiapas conflict (December 2000); urged Congress to give the Zapatista guerrillas a forum to present their claims (March 2001); clashed with the Senate over the confirmation of Mariclare Acosta as Undersecretary for Human Rights (April 2001); observed Congress pass a cosmetic indigenous reform bill that EZLN leaders decried as “illegitimate, reactionary, anti-democratic” (August 2001); vacillated on response to the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon (September 2001); failed to convince Congress to accomplish a fiscal reform (January 2002); incurred Fidel Castro's wrath by urging him to leave prematurely a UN Conference on Global Development held in Monterrey (April 2002); denied permission by the Senate to travel to Canada and the United States for 3days (April 2002); retreated on the project to construct a new Mexico City area airport in Atenco after machete-waving peasants protested (August 2002); witnessed his party's setback in the congressional elections in which the PAN's number of seats in the Chamber of Deputies plummeted from 202 to 158 (July 2003); supported removing the political immunity of Mexico City Mayor Andrés Manuel López Obrador so he could be tried for defying a judge's order (May 2004); accepted the resignation of Energy Secretary Felipe Calderón Hinojosa after criticizing the cabinet member for prematurely launching his presidential campaign (May 2004); backed down on the effort to deprive López Obrador of his immunity (April 2005); failed to attain the PAN presidential nomination for his dauphin, Santiago Creel (October 2005); involved himself blatantly in the campaign in favor of PAN nominee Felipe Calderón and against López Obrador; denied permission by the Chamber of Deputies to visit Australia and Vietnam (November 2006); and left office having presided over a 2.2 annual average growth rate, with the creation of less than half the 1.2 million jobs needed each year. The PAN managed to retain Los Pinos in the mid-2006 presidential election. The new chief executive, Felipe Calderón, managed to eke out a victory over López Obrador by distancing himself from Fox, who had wanted former Government Secretary Santiago Creel to succeed him. International Level of Analysis Several similarities exist between post-Franco Spain and post-2000 Mexico in international affairs. The United States and Western Europe played a vital role in Spain's transition to democracy. Thanks to the onset of the Cold War, the United States came to consider Spain a valuable ally against the Soviet Union. In 1953, Washington gave Franco $226 million in financial and military aid in return for the establishment of four US bases in his country. Also in 1953, the Vatican signed a concordat with Spain that enhanced its diplomatic respectability. The United States supported Spain's admission to the United Nations in 1955. Western European policymakers remembered the civil war and Spain's pro-fascist posture during World War II and were reluctant to bring the country into their burgeoning European Economic Community (EEC). As long as Franco lived, the Iberian nation was not deemed “clubbable” (Wiarda 1988:192). In 1964 the community opened “exploratory” talks with the Madrid government, but only on commercial affairs. Above all, neighboring countries sought to encourage fair elections, respect for human rights, the creation of an impartial judiciary, and economic reforms in the “soft underbelly of Europe” (EEC senior official Fernand Spaak quoted in Wiarda 1988:193). One of the first moves of the post-Franco government was to press its case for admission to the EEC. A broad spectrum of Spanish opinion, from the right to the center-left, firmly supported community membership as a goal. To this end, Suárez applied for membership in July 1977 and years of negotiations began 7months later. French and Italian concerns about competition in agriculture and wines delayed the process to the point that the liberal weekly Cambio wrote: ‘‘Imagine how radiant Spanish history might have been if France were situated where Australia is. No Louis XIV, no Napoleon, no sons of Saint Louis, no Giscard, no stupid cucumber war” (The Economist 1980). Only in mid-1985, after having proved a worthy member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, did Spain gain admission to the EEC. For decades, official Washington turned a blind eye to the PRI's authoritarian rule. The dominant single party had brought stability to the country, marginalized the armed forces, and impelled an “economic miracle” in the 1950s and 1960s. Although the government sometimes practiced repression, it was deemed a “dictablanda” (soft dictatorship) rather than a “dictadura” (hard dictatorship). By the mid-1970s, however, serious crises accompanied the change of presidents every 6 years. Consequently in 2000, the United States—already a partner in NAFTA—and other countries welcomed Fox's victory and encouraged him to combat criminal activity, stifle the northward flow of drugs, curb corruption, and undertake critical tax, energy, judicial, and labor reforms. Fox proved unable to achieve most of his goals. This failure combined with Mexico's strident criticism of the US invasion of Iraq chilled bilateral relations. National Level of Analysis Many commonalities exist between Spain and Mexico in the period analyzed in this essay. True, the latter escaped a civil war, significant involvement in World War II, and a politically active military. Nevertheless, a single party dominated Mexico's political system just as the National Movement was the only recognized party in Franco's Spain. The National Movement resembled the PRI inasmuch as it had a vague ideology whose content was determined by the ruler. Mexico—like Spain—also suffered authoritarianism. Corporatism prevailed in the two nations in the form of state regulation of business and labor unions as well as a significant period of protectionism. In both countries, technocrats—Ivy League-educated economists in Mexico, Opus Dei economists in Spain—dismantled the wall of quotas, tariffs, and import permits to accomplish modernization and link their respective nations with the global economy. This transition drew scorn from old-guard traditionalists—“dinosaurs” in Mexico, the “Búnker” in Spain. While not monolithic, the Roman Catholic Church supported a political opening in the two nations. Individual Level of Analysis: Spain It is at the level of individual political figures—managers of the transition—where the Spanish experience departs sharply from that of Mexico. By preparing Juan Carlos to become king, Franco provided Spaniards with a symbol that appeared legitimate to many sectors of society. It is worth noting that the European nations—Scandinavia, the Low Countries, and the United Kingdom—that peacefully evolved from conservative elite rule in the nineteenth century to democratic middle class governance in the twentieth century retained the monarchy. Of course, all monarchs are not created equal. The unsteady leadership of King Constantine II spurred the abolition of the Greek monarchy in a December 1974 referendum. Unlike Constantine II, whose sister he married, Juan Carlos demonstrated political acumen. In a critical move, he appointed Suárez as prime minister in mid-1976. A product of Franco's bureaucracy, Suárez faced daunting challenges. The low-key Suárez named a cabinet drawn mainly from the Christian Democratic Center that some considered “faceless.”The Economist (1976:42) magazine described his team as “relative unknowns…[who] have few friends, but they raise few hackles: they are pragmatists and administrators, not polemicists or prima donnas, and that, in a transitional cabinet, is almost certainly an asset.” To make matters even worse, Suárez inherited an economy afflicted by slow growth, high unemployment, and spiraling price levels as well as a burdensome external debt. Moreover, Western European nations refused to recognize the Madrid government because of its economic and political backwardness. Divisions within his party, mounting personal attacks, and differences with the king drove Suárez to tender his irrevocable resignation in February 1981. “I have reached the conclusion that Spain benefits more by my departure than by my remaining at the post,” he said (Newsweek 1981:56). This action ended the political career of a man who had steered Spain to democracy—a veritable “Miracle Worker” in the words of one international publication. Right-wingers in the paramilitary Guardia Civil took advantage of the uncertainty that attended the change of leadership to attempt a coup d’ètat. On February 23, 1981, 200 guardsmen, led by gun-wielding Lt.-Colonel Antonio Tejero, stormed into the Cortés while its 350 deputies were debating the investiture of Suárez's successor. They hoped to excite rebellions in other parts of the country with a view to creating a military government. While Suárez and other cabinet members were also held hostage, Juan Carlos went on national television. Dressed in the uniform of a captain general, he stressed that “the Crown cannot tolerate in any form any act which tries to interfere with the constitution which has been approved by the Spanish people” (Cemlyn-Jones 1981). The army obeyed his order to take all necessary measures to crush the revolt. The legislators selected a successor to Suárez and Spain continued its democratic march. In 1982, the electorate voted the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party, headed by Felipe González, into power. Three years later, Juan Carlos visited France where he and President François Mitterrand signed a bilateral agreement for economic, political, and military cooperation. This accord opened the door for Spain's entry into the EEC. Three months later, Spanish voters decided in a referendum that their country would remain a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Thus, Spain owes its re-entry into the European community and its return to democracy in large part to the guidance and skill of King Juan Carlos I and Prime Minister Suárez. As one publication noted: He [Suárez] had received a political system regulated by laws from the previous regime…but when he stepped down, Spain boasted a modern Constitution, a pact of mutual respect, a parliamentary democracy based on constitutional legality and dynastic legitimacy…voting has been converted into a simply normal act; the party system has been consolidated, labor freedom is total, local finances have been put in order; Spaniards have practically buried the ghosts of the old civil war, with only the yellow axe of terror uncoiled by a snake; no political prisoners exist in Spanish prisons; the road to the European Community is open; and [regional] autonomy … is underway (Lamo De Espinosa 2006). Individual Level of Analysis: Mexico A major factor differentiates the situation in Spain from that in Mexico. With all of his shortcomings, Franco had provided for a royal successor: Juan Carlos, who proved a crucial element in the transition. This having been said, his prime minister, Adolfo Suárez, also faced Herculean challenges: an economy wracked by inflation and unemployment, a Left that regarded him as an agent of Francoism, a Búnker that yearned to turn the clock back, separatists who employed violence, and an outside world that regarded Spain as a pariah. For his part, Fox inherited a presidency that had been weakened by Zedillo's inability to dominate the political system and by the increased power of Congress, which spared no effort to undermine the program of the first PAN chief executive. Nevertheless, the first PAN chief executive inherited a growing economy and a free-trade agreement with the most dynamic market in the world. Why, then, did Suárez succeed in moving his country toward democracy while Fox lost ground with respect to the legitimacy of political institutions? First, although not well know to his countrymen, Suárez had acquired copious knowledge of the intricacies of Spain's political system through his leadership role in the Falange. In contrast, Fox was a newcomer to politics. He had served one term in the Chamber of Deputies and spent only a year or so as governor of Guanajuato before commencing his bid for the presidency. Second, Suárez was a skilled negotiator. He lacked a real political party—the UDC was a grouping of disparate groups—and so he could not impose his will on politicians who had fought each other during a bloody civil war. Thus, he propitiated the Right by promising to preserve both capitalism and the favored status of the military. At the same time, he held quiet conversations with communist and socialist chiefs. This low-key diplomacy yielded fruit in the 1977 Moncloa Pacts and the 1978 Constitution. For his part, Fox spurned the heavy lifting of bargaining with opposition parties. Although an adept campaigner, he had a jaundiced view of politicians—in large measure because of the corruption, avarice, and inane regulations that he had encountered as a businessman and rancher. Third, Suárez moved rapidly and in a coherent sequence to promote reforms. In a year-and-a-half, he dismantled the Francoist political apparatus, won support for reform in a referendum, hammered out an accord on the nation's economic development model, spearheaded the framing of a new fundamental law, established a democratically elected government under that constitution, and launched talks for admission to the EEC. Although Fox enjoyed international adulation upon defeating the PRI, he indulged in the illusion that winning an open election would yield a “democratic bonus”—in the form of a loyal opposition, a compliant Congress, and a US government eager to overhaul immigration statutes. For reasons that only he knows, Fox spent the first several months of his administration trying to appease the Zapatista guerrillas. While Chiapas constituted a nuisance for Mexicans, they were much more concerned with his honoring his promises to encourage growth, expand employment, attack street crime, and improve the nation's educational and health-care systems. In the final analysis, the self-serving PRI, which regarded occupying Los Pinos as a birthright, might have blocked his ability to forge an agreement over vital reforms and the proper economic strategy. The problem is that Fox never tried. Finally, while Suárez kept military ministers in place, he formed a cabinet of able individuals whom he trusted and who could work together. His 44months in office, the longest tenure to date of a Spanish prime minister in the twentieth century, were remarkably free from leaks and divisions in his entourage. There was not unanimous agreement on many measures, but cabinet members typically aired their differences behind closed doors. Fox had an entirely different style of managing his Montessori cabinet. He allowed cabinet officials to pursue their own agendas. When they made egregious errors, he apologized for them rather than removing them from positions of trust. He should have fired his foreign secretary for the high-handedness with which he treated Congress. Heads should have rolled over the airport siting debacle. Few men and women from his original cabinet completed sixyears in office. However, most of those who left office did so at their own initiative. Conclusions It goes without saying that no two countries are alike. Each nation has its own history, a distinct culture, a different economy, and unique political institutions. Still, as discussed above, similarities abound between Spain after Franco's death and Mexico following Fox's victory. Both exhibited a Hispanic heritage, authoritarianism, a single party tradition, protectionism, a corporatist structure, and widespread poverty. In the final analysis, the major factor that has propelled Spain's economic and political development is the leadership provided by King Juan Carlos I and Prime Minister Suárez. Felipe Calderón can benefit from their experience as he endeavors to overcome the 6 years of deadlock and drift under Vicente Fox. The Legacies of Transition from One-Party Rule: Mexico in Comparative Perspective Steven T. Wuhs Department of Government and International Relations, University of Redlands Mexico underwent an historic transformation on July 2, 2000. On that day, Vicente Fox, the candidate of the PAN, defeated the candidate of the long-ruling PRI in the Mexican presidential contest. The election of the dynamic Fox marked the culmination of a gradual process of political opening begun in the 1970s and unleashed tremendous enthusiasm in Mexico City, in the country as a whole, and throughout the world. Fox's victory raised high expectations for his term and for Mexico's fledgling democracy. Indeed, the past campaign efforts of Mexico's two historic opposition parties, the PAN and the center-left Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), had placed democracy and democratic change first among the issues that drove voters’ choices in the 1990s and in 2000. Despite the apparent consensus that democracy mattered and the groundswell of political support that the new president initially encountered, Fox's sexenio was a trying one, beset by division, conflict, and paralysis. Seen in comparative light, these problems were unfortunately quite predictable. In this part of the Forum, I will compare Mexico to a handful of countries that underwent similar transitions from one-party rule in the 1990s and 2000 and highlight the common constraints that new democratic governments face in such systems.9 Drawing from a sample of countries from East Asia and sub-Saharan Africa,10 I argue that these new governments are often destined to fail because of institutional legacies from the previous regime. Moreover, the party systems that take root in this type of postauthoritarian setting undermine the development of programmatic politics and often gravitate toward populism. Overview of the Cases Mexico From its formation in 1929 through the late 1980s, a single party—the PRI—monopolized power. The party was hegemonic in its golden age, drawing in competing sets of regional chiefs, deploying a vast corporatist network to infiltrate and ultimately control many sectors of society, and maintaining discipline through extensive patronage supported by the country's import-substitution initiative after World War II. While opposition parties, most notably the now-governing PAN, regularly ran candidates, corruption and fraud abounded in elections. From the 1970s, economic and political crises undercut the PRI's capacity to preserve the cohesion of partisan elites and sustain the impressive array of constituencies upon which it depended. Facing increased mobilization by the PAN on the right and a new party, the PRD, on the left, the PRI begrudgingly backed a number of moderate reforms until it fell from power in 2000. Senegal A single party, the Socialist Party (PS),11 dominated Senegalese politics from independence in 1960 until 2000. Under founder Leopold Senghor, the party controlled an elaborate array of clients channeled through the country's Muslim leaders and brotherhoods that facilitated, by the mid-1960s, the hegemonic party regime. By working with multiple ethnic groups, the government avoided potentially divisive social cleavages. Under pressure from the opposition Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), led by Abdoulaye Wade, the PS regime frequently restructured electoral rules to include more voices in government, while actively dividing its foes. The PS finally lost power in the presidential election of 2000, when Wade emerged victorious over Senghor's chosen successor Abdou Diouf, an incumbent since 1981. South Korea From 1961 through 1987, an authoritarian structure anchored in political parties and the military governed the Republic of Korea. General Park Chung Hee came to power via a coup, established a strong presidential system, and built the Democratic-Republican Party. While no model democracy, the system did allow some basic freedoms until Park's successor, General Chun Doo Wan, imposed martial law in 1980. The first direct election took place 8 years later, when ruling-party candidate Roh Tae Woo rose to power over the opposition “Kims” (Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung). Kim Young Sam subsequently moved to Roh's party and, in 1992, defeated the Democratic Party's Kim Dae Jung. In 1997, South Koreans elected Kim Dae Jung, then running on the National Congress for New Politics (NCNP) ticket, ousting the incumbent party from the presidency for the first time. Taiwan For much of the postrevolutionary era, Taiwan (the Republic of China) was under martial law. From 1949 through the early 1970s the Temporary Provisions severely constrained foes of the Kuomintang (KMT) by curbing mobilization and controlled the media. In addition to the “sticks” associated with the Temporary Provisions, the KMT regime incorporated unions, farmers, and civic groups as well as functional associations for social and occupational groups. The KMT's deep pockets enabled the party-regime to reinforce its dominance while the country's single nontransferable voting (SNTV) system fragmented challengers.12 Only in 1986 did an opposition group called the Dangwai (literally “outside the party”) form a political party, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). DPP presidential candidate Chen Shui-bian benefited from a split within the KMT and defeated KMT candidate Lien Chan in 2000. A summary of this discussion across all these countries is found in Table 3. 3 Transitional Elections by Countrya Country Transitional Elections (Data) Mexico 2000 Election of Vicente Fox over Francisco Labastida (PAN 42.52%, PRI 36.11%, PRD 16.64%) Senegal 2000 Election of Abdoulaye Wade over Abdou Diouf Round 2 (PDS 58.70%, PS 41.30%) South Korea 1997 Election of Kim Dae Jung over Lee Hoi Chang (NCNP 39.7%, GNP 38.2%) Taiwan 2000 Election of Chen Shui-bian over Lien Chan (DPP 39.3%, Indep 36.8%, KMT 23.1%) Country Transitional Elections (Data) Mexico 2000 Election of Vicente Fox over Francisco Labastida (PAN 42.52%, PRI 36.11%, PRD 16.64%) Senegal 2000 Election of Abdoulaye Wade over Abdou Diouf Round 2 (PDS 58.70%, PS 41.30%) South Korea 1997 Election of Kim Dae Jung over Lee Hoi Chang (NCNP 39.7%, GNP 38.2%) Taiwan 2000 Election of Chen Shui-bian over Lien Chan (DPP 39.3%, Indep 36.8%, KMT 23.1%) Note: The transitional election column includes major candidates only. These data reflect presidential vote shares, not legislative returns, the appropriate indicator given the strong presidentialism associated with each of these regimes. In 2000, Mexico's PAN and PRD completed in coalitions. Wade triumphed in the second round of the 2000 Senegal election despite being bested by Diouf in the first round. Once the field was reduced to those two candidates, a broad range of opposition cast their lot with Wade. View Large 3 Transitional Elections by Countrya Country Transitional Elections (Data) Mexico 2000 Election of Vicente Fox over Francisco Labastida (PAN 42.52%, PRI 36.11%, PRD 16.64%) Senegal 2000 Election of Abdoulaye Wade over Abdou Diouf Round 2 (PDS 58.70%, PS 41.30%) South Korea 1997 Election of Kim Dae Jung over Lee Hoi Chang (NCNP 39.7%, GNP 38.2%) Taiwan 2000 Election of Chen Shui-bian over Lien Chan (DPP 39.3%, Indep 36.8%, KMT 23.1%) Country Transitional Elections (Data) Mexico 2000 Election of Vicente Fox over Francisco Labastida (PAN 42.52%, PRI 36.11%, PRD 16.64%) Senegal 2000 Election of Abdoulaye Wade over Abdou Diouf Round 2 (PDS 58.70%, PS 41.30%) South Korea 1997 Election of Kim Dae Jung over Lee Hoi Chang (NCNP 39.7%, GNP 38.2%) Taiwan 2000 Election of Chen Shui-bian over Lien Chan (DPP 39.3%, Indep 36.8%, KMT 23.1%) Note: The transitional election column includes major candidates only. These data reflect presidential vote shares, not legislative returns, the appropriate indicator given the strong presidentialism associated with each of these regimes. In 2000, Mexico's PAN and PRD completed in coalitions. Wade triumphed in the second round of the 2000 Senegal election despite being bested by Diouf in the first round. Once the field was reduced to those two candidates, a broad range of opposition cast their lot with Wade. View Large Institutional Legacies of Authoritarian Rule Mexico, South Korea, Senegal, and Taiwan shared authoritarian regimes with dominant or hegemonic parties. These systems combined an intricate set of institutional incentives and disincentives to dampen mobilization of the opposition and, when it surfaced, to transform it into forms acceptable to the regime. The extensive use of clientelism and state corporatism also figured prominently in most of the cases examined here by strengthening the carrots and sticks brandished by the party-regimes. Positive and negative incentives were paired with institutions central to the maintenance of political control: strong leaders and divisive electoral rules. These configurations reflected deliberate efforts of succeeding incumbents to keep their party's grip on power, yet most remained intact during transitions to democracy, leaving leaders to struggle through institutions designed to stymie democracy, not build it. Leadership These countries maintained presidentialism even during protracted autocratic and military rule. It was not, however, democratic presidentialism. The men occupying the offices attained power through coups (as in South Korea), through installation by sitting presidents (as in Mexico and Senegal), or by navigating the complex politics of an autocratic party (as in Taiwan). Rarely were these cases of constitutional presidentialism, either. That is, the authority of chief executives dominating one-party states far surpassed the limits specified by constitutions. Control of the party-state invested presidents with tremendous influence as their regimes incorporated diverse sets of competing elites, penetrated organized sectors of society, included state employers and employees in the often-vast parastatal sector, and monopolized the process of recruitment to positions of power. In Mexico, the president wielded an additional set of “meta-constitutional” powers: he was the de-facto leader of the PRI, designated his successor, appointed and replaced governors and other officials, and shaped the membership of the Congress and the judiciary (Weldon 1997). Mexico's leader was distinct from some of his counterparts in two important ways: (1) from 1940 on he was a civilian with authority over the military rather than vice-versa and (2) he assumed power for a fixed, 6-year term with no possibility of re-election. The architecture of leadership under Taiwan's KMT rule bore striking resemblances to that of Mexico's PRI, with the crucial exception of the threat of military attack from mainland China and the resulting imposition of martial law. Security questions aside, the KMT chief executive was empowered by a PRI-like party-state featuring corporatism and a robust state sector of the economy. Executive leadership in both countries was embedded in networks of institutions, not particular individuals. Senegal's two PS presidents—Senghor and Diouf—led through more fluid and personalistic structures. The founding leader of the PS, Senghor, exuded charismatic and traditional authority. A prominent intellectual and literary figure, he was revered as the father of the nation and the population applauded his championing of peasants and African socialism (Coulon 1990:420–421). Diouf did not boast the same grassroots base; instead, he derived his authority from anointment by Senghor, on the one hand, and from his international leadership and political record, on the other (Galvan 2001:53). South Korean leaders occupied a middle ground. They neither rotated regularly as in Mexico and Taiwan, nor commanded the deep-seated allegiances that Senghor enjoyed. Before the democratic transition, two generals held sway over South Korean politics: Park institutionalized the power of the presidency (Han 1990), while Chun practiced harsher authoritarianism. Each was tied to a highly personalistic political party, but neither boasted substantive programs nor issues. Whether predicated on institutional or charismatic authority, strong executive leadership contributed to the endurance of these authoritarian regimes. The presidents of Mexico, South Korea, Taiwan, and Senegal made policy relatively free of checks from other bodies, acted decisively against their opponents, and took credit for their successes, especially with regard to economic development. At the moment of transition, though, presidentialism complicated life for the new democratic leaders, principally through disparities between expectations and outcomes. Reduced to their constitutional prerogatives and robbed of the patronage available to their predecessors, these chief executives were significantly weaker, unable to act unilaterally, and compelled to negotiate with acutely fragmented legislatures (see below). Bound to the rule of law, such leaders seemed anemic and citizens and voters grew increasingly frustrated with their inability to avoid political gridlock. For example, while President Fox listed a reasonable set of accomplishments, he drew criticism for failing to advance his labor, energy, and tax reforms as well as other measures that required congressional coalitions for passage. Electoral Rules In many one-party dominant regimes, electoral systems simultaneously brought opposition forces into formal politics and constrained their influence over political outcomes by fragmenting those forces and systematically under-representing them in office. Mexico offers an illustrative case. The PRI regime expertly manipulated the country's electoral rules to ensure its continued dominance. At the time of the PRI's founding, the two chambers of the Mexican legislature (the Chamber of Deputies and the Senate) consisted only of first-past-the-post (FPTP) seats. For the PRI's opposition, it was nearly impossible to win a single seat in such a majoritarian system. As frustrations periodically surfaced with the party's monopoly on power, though, the regime promulgated reforms to incorporate the dissatisfied into the legislature. In 1963, the first such initiative created a handful of seats for opposition parties, but it was after the uncontested 1976 presidential election that the PRI launched serious legislative changes. Successive reforms created 100 proportional representation (PR) seats in the Chamber,13 then another 100 such seats, which brought the Chamber to 500 members. Separate changes doubled the size of the Senate through a two-member formula for the FPTP seats and the creation of 32 seats elected by PR from national lists.14 Senegal's party-regime responded similarly to Mexico's when the opposition PDS party emerged in the 1970s: it unleashed a series of electoral laws and formulas. The first prescribed a three-party system, tested in 1978, in which two opposition parties were assigned to predetermined ideological positions and allowed to compete with the leftist PS. Diouf replaced that system in the early 1980s with a host of new electoral rules including bans on coalitions that undermined the formation of a broad opposition front and a mixed electoral system with national PR lists (for 55 seats) and departmental FPTP seats (65 seats from 31 districts).15 Based on Wade's agreement to participate in a unity government after widespread protests in 1990–1991, the opposition extracted further reforms from the PS and Diouf, including the introduction of the secret ballot, lowering of the voting age, and improved opposition party representation at voting booths (Villalon 1993). The ruling parties of Taiwan and South Korea also employed electoral and party registration rules against their opposition. During their authoritarian eras, both used the SNTV system.16 The KMT regime adopted the SNTV procedure in the 1950s. Its deployment served the party well after the Temporary Provisions were lifted by fostering competition within opposition forces and rewarding the KMT with seats disproportionate to its vote share. In addition to these effects, SNTV encouraged parties and leaders to cultivate personal followings, leading some to charge that its maintenance gave rise to money politics (Hu and Chu 1996).17 South Korea's Yushin Constitution (1972) established the indirect election of the president as well as the chief executive's right to appoint one-third of the National Assembly, with the balance filled by elections using SNTV in the country's 73 two-member districts. As in Senegal, Chun's party-regime also attempted to manufacture a system to facilitate limited but ultimately nonthreatening competition—featuring one dominant party and several minor parties—which persisted into the 1990s. The regime also tinkered with electoral rules. In the 1980s, South Korea adopted a mixed formula with one-third filled through PR with national lists and 276 seats elected from 92 two-member districts (Park 2001:127). As liberalization progressed in the 1990s, South Korean authorities moved to single-member districts for the plurality seats and repeatedly shifted the FPTP/PR ratio by reducing the share of seats elected from party lists. The one-party regimes that governed these countries grew incrementally more inclusive as authoritarian incumbents sought to maintain their power by appeasing organized opponents through electoral and other reforms. During the transition, these political spaces gave pro-democratic actors increased leverage against the regimes and even now offer minorities a voice in the political process. But as Table 4 demonstrates, transplanted to a democratic setting, the same rules produce deeply divided electorates and complicated multiparty legislatures. In South Korea, Senegal, and Taiwan, parties govern effectively only as a result of the disparities between vote shares and seat counts. Mexico has faced the same challenge since 2000: party leaders must assemble legislative coalitions to pass every single bill in the Congress. But cohesion within party delegations cannot be taken for granted. What Table 4does not show is the fragmentation within party delegations, elected according to different formulas and thus logics of accountability. 4 Recent Elections by Country Country Most Recent Legislative Election [Data] Mexico 2006 Chamber of Deputies [PAN 33.41% (137, 69); PRD 28.99% (100, 60); PRI 28.18% (63, 58), Total=500] Senegal 2001 National Assembly [PDS 49.6% (89); Alliance of Progress Forces 16.1% (11); PS 17.4% (10), Total=120] South Korea 2004 National Assembly [Uri Party 38.3% (152); GNP 35.8% (121); DLP 13% (10), Total=299] Taiwan 2004 Legislative Yuan [DPP 37.98% (89+12 coalition); KMT 34.9% (79+35 coalition); NPSU 3.86% (6), Total=225] Country Most Recent Legislative Election [Data] Mexico 2006 Chamber of Deputies [PAN 33.41% (137, 69); PRD 28.99% (100, 60); PRI 28.18% (63, 58), Total=500] Senegal 2001 National Assembly [PDS 49.6% (89); Alliance of Progress Forces 16.1% (11); PS 17.4% (10), Total=120] South Korea 2004 National Assembly [Uri Party 38.3% (152); GNP 35.8% (121); DLP 13% (10), Total=299] Taiwan 2004 Legislative Yuan [DPP 37.98% (89+12 coalition); KMT 34.9% (79+35 coalition); NPSU 3.86% (6), Total=225] Both vote shares and seats are noted parenthetically. This is important given the disproportionalities in these countries’ electoral systems. Also included are the total number of seats in the chamber. In 2006, Mexico's PRD and PRI competed in coalitions, as did Taiwan's DPP and KMT in 2004. South Korea's DLP is the Democratic Labor Party and Taiwan's NPSU is the Non-Partisan Solidarity Union. The Mexican data separate the FPTP and PR seat totals. View Large 4 Recent Elections by Country Country Most Recent Legislative Election [Data] Mexico 2006 Chamber of Deputies [PAN 33.41% (137, 69); PRD 28.99% (100, 60); PRI 28.18% (63, 58), Total=500] Senegal 2001 National Assembly [PDS 49.6% (89); Alliance of Progress Forces 16.1% (11); PS 17.4% (10), Total=120] South Korea 2004 National Assembly [Uri Party 38.3% (152); GNP 35.8% (121); DLP 13% (10), Total=299] Taiwan 2004 Legislative Yuan [DPP 37.98% (89+12 coalition); KMT 34.9% (79+35 coalition); NPSU 3.86% (6), Total=225] Country Most Recent Legislative Election [Data] Mexico 2006 Chamber of Deputies [PAN 33.41% (137, 69); PRD 28.99% (100, 60); PRI 28.18% (63, 58), Total=500] Senegal 2001 National Assembly [PDS 49.6% (89); Alliance of Progress Forces 16.1% (11); PS 17.4% (10), Total=120] South Korea 2004 National Assembly [Uri Party 38.3% (152); GNP 35.8% (121); DLP 13% (10), Total=299] Taiwan 2004 Legislative Yuan [DPP 37.98% (89+12 coalition); KMT 34.9% (79+35 coalition); NPSU 3.86% (6), Total=225] Both vote shares and seats are noted parenthetically. This is important given the disproportionalities in these countries’ electoral systems. Also included are the total number of seats in the chamber. In 2006, Mexico's PRD and PRI competed in coalitions, as did Taiwan's DPP and KMT in 2004. South Korea's DLP is the Democratic Labor Party and Taiwan's NPSU is the Non-Partisan Solidarity Union. The Mexican data separate the FPTP and PR seat totals. View Large Issues and Cleavages While the character of national party systems is inextricably tied to electoral rules, it is also significantly influenced by social cleavages and the issue positions of parties. In Mexico, Senegal, South Korea, and Taiwan, the dominant issues at democratizing moments failed to structure party competition beyond the transition. The similar electoral mode of transition that these countries share helps explain why “change”—whether in Spanish (cambio) or Wolof (sopi)—provided a common rallying cry for democratizing campaigns. As observed earlier, the idea of democracy is what brought Mexican voters to the ballot box in the 1990s and in 2000. Indeed, such ideas were central to the origin of Mexico's pro-democratic opposition parties and weighed heavily in their internal processes of institutional development (Wuhs n.d.). Democracy also loomed large in the minds of South Korean voters from 1992 to 1997 (Park 2001:133) and even during previous periods of competitive authoritarianism (Han 1990:342). During those periods, there was little room for ideological diversity in semi-competitive politics, leading to the pro- and anti-regime voting that also characterized pretransition Senegal (Galvan 2001). When parties compete about “democracy,” it bifurcates the electorate into authoritarian and democratic camps that can pose challenges for regime consolidation (Deegan-Krause 2000). Furthermore, after transitional elections, the parties’ core issue disappears, leaving voters without a clear criterion on which to evaluate rival parties. South Korea escaped this issueless system, but only because the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s brought the government's economic management to the forefront of voters’ minds. While Mexico's 2006 campaign had more to do with economics than democracy, the postelectoral upheaval revived political conflict about democracy as López Obrador's protests centered on allegations that the country's electoral institutions were rotten to the core. The 2000 Taiwanese election also revolved around democracy, but Taiwanese electoral politics have always been marked by important nationalist questions as well: the status of Taiwan vis-à-vis mainland China and the role of local ethnics in politics. Indeed, the number of possible positions on the issue is one explanation for the fragmented nature of competition within and between parties. When the DPP first formed from the Dangwai in 1986, it was aggressively separatist in its rhetoric, a tone it maintained throughout most of the 1990s. Chen's election in 2000 followed moderation of his position on the national issue. His lack of decisive action on the question reflects many constraints and challenges, but they likely include the recognition that the DPP's previous stance was easier to hold in opposition than in government. Democracy, “change,” and even nationalism cut across socio-economic and other cleavages that in the advanced industrialized countries have structured party competition for most of the post-World War II era (Lipset and Rokkan 1967; Deegan-Krause 2003:77). Consequently, these issues stunt the development of enduring patterns of political competition and open political systems leading to short-term visions and fly-by-night campaigns. While parties are responsible for creating such patterns, they are also trapped by them, leading to weak partisan efforts to develop bases in the electorate and fostering passing citizen allegiances to particular parties (Wuhs n.d.). Personalities and Institutions When parties exhibit vapid programs and feeble ties to the electorate, populism often rears its head. Across the cases examined here, populist movements have sprung up either to challenge the legitimacy of elected officials or to vault their chiefs to power. Mexico offers the most striking example. After a campaign in which López Obrador moderated many of his views, a tight election, and disputed vote count, he impugned as “fascist” President-elect Felipe Calderón while naming his own shadow cabinet, advancing his own budget, and directing his party's legislators to prevent Calderón from swearing the oath of office. While López Obrador may see himself as the champion of democracy for Mexico's poor, his actions may delay democratic consolidation in Mexico. South Korea, Senegal, and Taiwan also exhibit present or rising populism. Personalism has suffused South Korean politics since before the 1997 transition: executive and legislative competition is candidate-centered, party affiliations and parties themselves are strikingly fluid, and the candidates and their parties lack developed platforms. In South Korea, populism represents continuity, not change. When Wade bested Diouf in Senegal, he “changed Senegal forever. Or perhaps not” (Galvan 2001:55). Wade's election promised more institutionalized governance, but early in his term he appeared “more open, populist…[and] has also proven himself a master of the rhetoric of democratic reform and popular inclusion” (Galvan 2001:55). And despite the party-centered nature of authoritarian rule in Taiwan, even before the DPP victory in 2000 populism was on the rise (Hu and Chu 1996). Populism's (and populists’) emphasis on governing through manipulating the popular will has a tenuous relationship with liberal democratic rule; indeed, one recent analysis referred to populism as democracy's “shadow” (March 2007). Taken to the extreme, it facilitates cycles of mobilization and demobilization that undermine the legitimacy of democratic rule. Given the fractured nature of formal politics and the weak presence of programmatic politics in these four countries, they may be particularly susceptible to populist turns. Conclusions The construction of effective, institutionalized parties constitutes one of the major impediments to the deepening of new democratic rule.18 For that reason, Mexico and the other countries examined here were often assessed favorably before their transitions. It was presumed that once the PRI and the other authoritarian parties were ousted, their opponents would step in to govern while the losers adjusted to life in the opposition and the world of competitive politics. No one assumed that the transition period would be easy, but at the very least political elites did not need to build party structures and configure party programs. And, indeed, when the incumbent parties lost in key elections, transfers of power were relatively smooth.19 But smooth transitions are no guarantee of smooth processes of democratic consolidation. Despite the presence of organized, pro-democratic parties, these polities confronted common challenges. Committed as they were to the rule of law and constitutional prerogatives, the new leaders appeared weak. Their electoral regulations engendered fragmented party systems and internally factionalized parties. Their party systems centered, programmatically speaking, on moot or untouchable political issues. And as a result of party politics, these regimes were vulnerable to populism, either from newly elected democratic officials or their foes. To fortify their evolving democratic regimes, leaders need to strengthen their party systems, a task much more easily said than done in environments in which politicians increasingly engage in candidate-centered campaigns to achieve their electoral goals (as was the case for both Fox in 2000 and López Obrador in 2006). With more institutionalized party systems, minority presidents could develop stable bases of support in the legislature. Less fragmented party systems could also facilitate lasting congressional coalitions. And with deeply rooted party systems, populist challenges would be less threatening. Yet, while democracy stands to gain from the construction of well-organized parties with clear programs, individual candidates and their parties may not. Even as the international community and its constituent organizations devote their efforts to building effective parties, it is a tough sell in the real world of politics.20 One crucial avenue that can lead to reconstructed party systems involves the removal of the institutional vestiges of authoritarianism. Electoral rules offer one potential site for real-world reform. Moving from the mixed electoral systems that most of these cases use to pure proportional representation systems, for example, might fortify a common party identity and encourage parties to distinguish themselves from one another on programmatic grounds, although it would (more than likely) also empower elite party leaders and powerful interest groups to form party lists. Moving to pure FPTP, in contrast, would bring parties closer to the electorate and possibly fortify grassroots linkages, but might also weaken parties’ programmatic identities. Neither path to reform is perfect, but maintaining mixed systems prevents parties from achieving either set of positive outcomes. Unfortunately, political leaders in these countries may not have much time to act. The honeymoon associated with the transition itself has by and large passed. Voters and citizens are demanding results from democratically elected governments. Poverty and inequality demand attention in Mexico and Senegal, and corruption charges threaten Chen's second term in Taiwan. In Mexico, the challenges of democratic governance are now compounded by broad-based, postelectoral assaults on the very legitimacy of the institutions of government. If parties as organizations and parties in government fail to respond to these challenges, they may be placing these new democratic regimes in jeopardy. The Demise of Mexico's One-Party Dominance in Comparative Perspective21 Francisco E. González School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University The continued exercise of political power by the same individual, group, or party cannot be taken for granted. Power is naturally contested and countries dominated by one-party systems (albeit in nontotalitarian regimes) in Mexico under the PRI, India under the Indian National Congress (INC), and Japan under the LDP are not exceptions. The recent political history of these nations indicates two main challenges to one-party hegemony: a major split in the dominant party and the rise of an opposition capable of gaining widespread credibility regarding the fact that it could govern. I argue in this part of the Forum that the likelihood of either or both of these challenges materializing is a function of each country's social cleavages, institutional structure, and economic performance. These factors create the main constraints and opportunities for the dominant party to remain on top or for its foes to struggle effectively and replace it. Multiple social cleavages give rise to potential political divisions and impede forging and maintaining a broad voting bloc. India contains one of the largest numbers of cross-cutting cleavages of any country. These cleavages spring from caste, region, language, religion, and class. Postrevolutionary Mexico is an intermediate case whose salient cleavages have been center/periphery, state/Church, and capitalists/workers. Lastly, Japan's foremost cleavage since 1946 has been between urban and rural areas, but in all other social aspects the country remains extremely homogenous. In turn, institutional structure provides the rules of the game that both incumbents and opposition have to follow to contest and exercise power. Mexico's institutional structure includes presidentialism, federalism, and a FPTP electoral regime that was transformed into a mixed system in 1977. This system allocates legislative seats at both the federal and state levels on a combination of 300 FPTP seats in single-member districts and 200 PR seats from party lists. The crucial rule in Mexico is no-reelection to public office—absolute for the presidency and governorships and nonconsecutive for federal and state legislatures. India's institutional arrangements include a parliament, federalism, and FPTP with single-member districts. For its part, Japan embraces a parliamentary regime, a unitary polity, and an electoral system that operates under the SNTV in multimember districts. This arrangement prevailed between 1946 and 1994, when it was converted into a mixed system for the House of Representatives, which combines 300 FPTP seats in single-member districts with 180 PR seats distributed in eleven national districts. (For a discussion of the varieties of mixed electoral systems, see Shugart and Wattenberg 2001:20–21.) Another crucial institutional difference is that Mexico's dominant party was hegemonic, while those of India and Japan were predominant. This distinction follows Sartori's (1976) classic analysis of subtypes of one-party dominance described earlier in this Forum, namely, single-party systems, hegemonic-party systems, and predominant-party systems. In hegemonic-party systems, like Mexico's under the PRI, the existence of more than one party is allowed, although competition for power on an equal footing that permits alternation is not. In predominant-party systems, like India under the INC and Japan under the LDP, parties different from the dominant one not only exist legally, but also are real competitors for power; alternation is a possibility and, therefore, these are democratic regimes. Economic factors contribute to the likelihood that a party or coalition will either continue in power or be replaced. Both democratic and nondemocratic governments derive part of their legitimacy from their economic performance (Linz and Stepan 1996:76–81). In particular, the depth and duration of economic crises correlate with the fall of both democratic and nondemocratic regimes (Przeworski and Limongi 1997:167–169). Before 1980, the economies of Japan and Mexico expanded at a higher rate than India. The tables then turned and, since 1992, India has registered high, sustained growth; Japan's economy has endured low growth since its asset bubble burst in 1990; and Mexico's economy suffered dramatic setbacks in 1982 and in 1994–1995. It would be incorrect to infer from such broad economic trends the early demise of one-party dominance in India (the Congress party lost elections at the state level for the first time in Kerala in 1956) vis-à-vis Mexico (the PRI acknowledged its first governorship defeat in 1989) and Japan (the first cabinet position was offered to a member of the opposition in the Diet in 1983). Still, taking into account the economic conditions that preceded these changes makes it easier to understand the political events that precipitated splits in the dominant parties and/or allowed the rise of credible opponents, which eventually yielded to alternation in power. In India, the Congress party's rupture in 1969 and Indira Gandhi's authoritarian rule during her declared state of emergency (1975–1977) culminated with Congress losing power for the first time in the 1977 elections to a coalition of right- and left-wing parties. This defeat came on the heels of a period of worsening distributional conflict after Nehru's model of state-led ISI fizzled (Brass 1990:276). However, neither bad economic performance nor the Congress party's division in 1969 explains the party's fall from grace. Potent anti-incumbency was at play when traditional Congress supporters cast a vote of no confidence in Mrs. Gandhi's authoritarian politics in 1977. Once democracy was restored, Mrs. Gandhi and a strengthened Congress returned to power, this time riding high on a wave of national discontent following the 1979 economic bust which occurred during the short-lived rule of the ideologically diverse, first non-Congress coalition (1977–1979). In turn, the division in the Congress party in 1969 resulted from Mrs. Gandhi's fight with the party bosses—the so-called “syndicate”—over the nomination of a candidate for the country's presidency, but the outcome did not transform the party landscape as occurred when the PRI and the LDP ruptured in Mexico and Japan, respectively. The proximate causes of why one-party dominance in India came to an end were the country's multiple and profound social cleavages and the country's political institutions. The ethnic cleavage, in particular Hindu nationalists’ political violence against India's Muslim minority (around 12% of the 2007 total population), provided the ideological impetus for a new national party to become a plausible opponent, namely, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). This party was born with its current name in 1980, although its roots lie in the paramilitary Hindu nationalist group Rastriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). Begun in 1925, the RSS was very active socially and politically in the aftermath of India's traumatic 1947 partition. The government outlawed the RSS party after one of its former militants assassinated Mahatma Gandhi in January 1948, and it faced a renewed ban during Indira Gandhi's state of emergency. Before 1989 the BJP and its predecessor, the BJS, had captured <10% of the vote in national elections. Since then, its vote has not slipped below 20%. To accomplish this increase, the party exploited Hindu nationalism, known as Hindutva, by engaging in spectacular symbolic politics such as destroying the Babri Mosque in Ayodhya to construct a Ram temple in December 1992. The BJP's rise to national prominence in fewer than two decades in such a divided society was no mean feat (see Malik and Singh 1994). However, even though the politics of spectacle and ethnic conflict brought attention and political gains throughout the country, India's institutional structure limited the effectiveness of this strategy, which might otherwise have allowed the BJP to become the country's new dominant party. The rules of the political game in India have married a Westminster-style parliament (although not really a parliamentary system, because the Westminster system generally does not have federalism, a written constitution, and judicial review22) with a type of federalism that draws state boundaries along lines paralleling linguistic groups. Single member districts elected by FPTP allowed the “manufacturing of majorities,” while the parliamentary regime ensured the flexibility to assemble coalition governments, to dissolve such alliances, and to call new elections when deadlock arose. Yet by concentrating minorities, linguistic federalism worked against the creation of a traditional British-style two-party system. This arrangement strengthened state-based parties by helping them elect state and local governments. Although state-based parties could never aspire to a national triumph, they became instrumental in granting or denying victory, first, to the Congress party and, since the 1990s, to the BJP. These conditions have fostered multiple parties at the national level and party configurations at the state level, most of which are two-party or, at least, two-alliance systems (although the state of West Bengal has been ruled uninterruptedly by the communist-led Left Front since 1977) in which regional parties and their allies compete against national parties: first and foremost the Congress party and, more recently, the BJP and its allies. In this scheme of “‘multiple bipolarities’ … electoral victories nationally depend on state-level swings” (Sridharan and Varshney 2001:212). Thus, the politics of subnational coalition making determines electoral victory at the national level, and coalition government usually forces the moderation of partners’ more ideologic policy positions. In contrast, the challenges to one-party dominance in Japan were intertwined with the country's economic fortunes and access to money in politics rather than to the political exploitation of social cleavages to mobilize the opposition against the dominant party as in India. Japan's years of high growth came to an end after the 1973–1974 oil shocks. Before those events, the LDP had never lost its majority in the lower house. Thereafter it did in 1976, 1979, and 1983, but by slim margins. The LDP remained in power because it was by far the largest party in Japan, and it forged coalition governments with smaller conservative parties. The most important contrast with India and Mexico was the absence of a credible opposition capable of challenging the LDP's broad power base. Rather, when the LDP was defeated for the first time in 1993, it was due to internecine divisions. The absence of a credible opposition was related to the LDP's use of ideological and material resources. The LDP highlighted the contrast between its commitment to capitalism, social harmony, and national traditions—and the economic success these produced between the 1950s and the 1970s—with its “radical and anti-American” competitor, the Japan Socialist Party (JSP). Until the late 1980s, the JSP opposed ties to the United States, refused to accord legitimacy to the Self-Defense Forces, and called itself “a revolutionary party which espoused a dictatorship of the proletariat” (Pempel 1990:28). The LDP used its monopoly on state resources to blunt any programmatic challenges. A cycle of “crisis and compensation” developed whereby successive Japanese governments under the LDP threw money at problems, particularly those that its opponents emphasized. “Thus, the opposition often determined the policymaking agenda of the LDP and the way in which the conservative circle of compensation would expand…. Domestic and international crises produced the policy initiatives giving Japanese conservative policies their unusual distributive cast, despite a technocratic political structure” (Calder 1988:26). Compensation for affected interests was the main tool to retain one-party dominance because elections remained competitive between the LDP and the opposition and, crucially, within the LDP itself. The LDP's factionalism has traditionally been identified as the distinctive feature of Japan's type of one-party dominance (Scalapino and Masumi 1962; Fukui 1970). Such conflict was partly a function of Japan's institutional structure under its SNTV system in multiple-member districts until 1994. This process produced “candidate-centered elections, immense campaign spending, and particularistic politics” (Sakamoto 1999:422). In this system the candidates of the big parties, particularly the LDP, ran not only against competitors from other parties but also against their own parties’ nominees. Given these rules of the game, the LDP employed patronage and clientelism to retain its dominance. Patronage gave big business privileged access to the policy process in return for generous campaign contributions to the LDP. Clientelism helped to sustain LDP representatives in power by creating “personal vote-mobilization machines” (Sakamoto 1999:422), according to which resources flowed from the heads of the various LDP currents to their candidates and from these candidates to their constituents. From its inception, corruption constituted the Achilles heel of this system. Before 1993, scandals involving the bribery of officials had rocked Japanese governments in 1948 (Showa Denko), 1954 (shipbuilding companies), 1976 (Lockheed), 1989 (Recruit), and 1992 (Sagawa Kyubin). Even though Japanese society became cynical about the chances of tackling this problem—it was like “cutting a lizard's tail” (Hayes 2001:115)—by the early 1990s public opinion identified this peculiar electoral system as the root cause of the “money politics” dominating elections. Calls for reform mushroomed following the collapse of the country's real estate boom in 1990. The demand for change included not only a revision of the electoral system and the laws regulating campaign funds, but also the need to attack malapportionment. Specifically, rural LDP bailiwicks were over-represented vis-à-vis urban districts, where the opposition had been traditionally stronger (Jain 1993:1073). And the opposition and some LDP defectors who formed two small parties (the Shinsey and Sakigake) enacted political reform in 1993–1994. The main outcomes were the ousting of the LDP from power for the first time in 38 years and, crucially, the introduction of the mixed electoral system that transformed party competition. In Mexico, the main challenge to one-party dominance traditionally came from fissures within the PRI rather than from adversaries. The first three splits in the hegemonic party (1939–1940, 1945–1946, 1951–1952) did not relate to the country's economic performance. Instead, they took place in the run-up to presidential elections and sprang from competition for the nomination by party leaders and their support groups (Molinar Horcasitas 1991:18–19). Economic considerations only moved to center stage in the run-up to the PRI's last major split in 1987–1988. As before, the presidential succession triggered the rupture but unlike on previous occasions, the worst economic conditions since the Great Depression afflicted the country. The 1982 economic crisis marked the end of the state-led development model that Mexico had followed since World War II. After 1982, opposition from the private sector in the North and the urban middle classes nationwide started working through the center-right PAN (Partido Acción Nacional) to challenge the PRI's monopoly on power, which was blamed for the economic bungling that marred the presidencies of Luis Echeverría (1970–1976) and José López Portillo (1976–1982). President Miguel de la Madrid (1982–1988) inherited a nearly bankrupt economy and assigned a priority to repaying the country's external debt. To raise capital, his government initiated economic liberalization, which included privatizing state enterprises. To control inflation, markets were opened to external competition. The PRI's traditional constituencies—workers, peasants, public sector employees—bore the costs of the adjustment. The 1988 presidential succession pitted de la Madrid's anointed successor Carlos Salinas, a vigorous supporter of liberalization, against Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas and other nationalist foes of market-oriented reforms. Cárdenas and his followers broke with the PRI, united most of the Left under the umbrella of the National Democratic Front (PAN), and challenged Salinas for the presidency. Cárdenas might have won the contest had the Government Ministry not stopped the vote count because of “computer malfunctions.” The following year major participants in the FDN formed the PRD (Partido de la Revolución Democrática). This Cárdenas-dominated organization drew support from central and southern Mexico and included such diverse groups as PRI defectors, traditional socialists and communists, urban and rural popular movements, independent trade unions, public university students, and intellectuals. Upon being named president-elect, Salinas (1988–1994) formally declared the end of the hegemonic-party system. Even as it repressed the PRD, his government reached out to the PAN to implement a far-reaching liberalization agenda. However, the result was that Mexico's social cleavages and the country's institutional structure catalyzed the emergence of a multiparty system. Social cleavages attracted voters to opposition parties on the left and right. Rather than having to fight for a predominantly floating electorate, the PAN and the PRD gradually drew strength from relatively secure geographic, socio-economic, and ideological bases. The PAN grew strong in western and northern Mexico, which are more middle-class and socially conservative regions than the poorer, rural, and more radical southern region where the PRD established strong bases. (This nationalist-leftist party also boasted growing strength in Mexico City.) The mixed electoral system ensured that medium-sized parties, like the PAN and the PRD in the early 1990s, garnered enough seats in the federal Congress to force the PRI into negotiating further political liberalization in exchange for legislative cooperation. In turn, federalism meant that the PAN and the PRD could win governorships and state legislature seats, both of which yielded patronage and resources to fortify and broaden their followings. Still, the demise of the hegemonic system could not have happened as long as federal and state executives controlled elections. It took another economic collapse during the first months of the administration of President Ernesto Zedillo (1994–2000) to force a major reform that established citizen-run electoral authorities in 1996: until that time the IFE and its state counterparts, which had existed since 1990, had not been independent from the government. As soon as this happened, the PRI started losing elections not only to the PAN, but also to the PRD (crucially, the government of Mexico City); it lost control of the Chamber of Deputies in 1997; and, finally, after 71 years of uninterrupted rule, it lost the presidency to the PAN's Vicente Fox in 2000. Challenges to one-party dominance in the three countries ended with the hegemonic/predominant party being ousted from power. Did this also mean the end of one-party dominance in each of the three countries? Only the LDP in Japan has retained, by and large, one-party dominance. A recent work (Scheiner 2006) explains the persistence of one-party dominance in Japan, despite its change of electoral system, by highlighting reasons why the opposition has remained ineffective. Accordingly, Japan is a unitary country with only two levels of government and a fiscally centralized system and this system remains run by the political logic of clientelism. These arrangements force: local organizations, politicians, and voters [to] have strong incentives to affiliate with the national ruling party, and parties that are not strong at the national level have a much harder time gaining local office…. In Japan, where controlling organized blocs of votes is central to electoral success, it is important for national politicians that local politicians and organizations campaign on their behalf. The lack of local groups that are affiliated with the opposition greatly hinders national opposition candidates’ chances of success (Scheiner 2006:4). Another institutional feature, parliamentarianism, with its incentives to form multiparty coalitions also allowed the LDP to bounce back after its 1993 defeat. It did so by convincing its historical enemies, the JSP—re-baptized as the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ) and espousing a pragmatic stance since the end of the Cold War—to leave the non-LDP coalition and form a new government with it. The 11-month non-LDP government was then replaced in 1994. For the socialists, the second strongest party in Japanese politics between 1946–1947 and 1993–1994, this was the kiss of death; supporters deserted in droves. Defectors from the 1993 split from the LDP carried on, first with a short lived New Frontier Party (NFP), some of whose members went on to form the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), today's second electoral force. Given the low salience of social cleavages, the persistence of clientelism under fiscal centralization, and multiparty coalitions induced by a parliamentary form of government, the result has been the persistence of LDP dominance and a new second force, the DPJ, which is also center-right. In the process, left-wing parties have been marginalized. The opposite outcome, the end of one-party dominance, has characterized India and Mexico. On top of its multiple, cross-cutting social cleavages, India is a federal country in which the states and local governments command enough resources to enable governing parties to establish and retain substantial voting blocs. Given the proliferation of regional parties under the framework of Indian federalism, what counteracts the possibility of the country's party system evolving into a form of extreme pluralism with a dozen or more effective parties is the FPTP electoral system. Were India to adopt a mixed electoral system, like Mexico's or Japan's, the number of parties represented in its national parliament would increase substantially, and governance would become more difficult. At least India, like Japan, has a parliamentary system, and this feature has allowed the Congress party to regain power by forming coalitions. Similar to the Indian case, Mexico's federal structure, with the patronage and clientelism it fosters in states and localities, has helped the three largest parties establish permanent support bases. For instance, the PRI's main strength derives from the 17 of 31 governorships it controls. Governors and mayors of the richest municipalities have become central players in the country's democracy. Mexico's mixed electoral system has permitted the three-party system to become relatively entrenched. Yet, the PR component of the mixed system has also allowed small parties to gain representation and establish their own clienteles. These parties now play a pivotal role as their votes become crucial in supporting or thwarting the passage of legislation in Congress. How much have the traditionally dominant parties in the three countries learned from having had to become the opposition? How effectively have they adapted their political strategies to try to regain dominance or at least not to keep losing electoral ground? In Japan, the LDP has retained its dominance but the economic costs associated with what is essentially a defensive political strategy for the preservation of one-party dominance keep mounting. For Japan, sustained economic growth since 2005 has been essential, but cannot continue. The protectionist and subsidy-driven policies that prevail in the domestic economy have attracted the LDP's robust, client-oriented electoral constituency. However, this system cannot survive much longer “for the simple reason that the money has run out…. The days of ‘vote for me and I will build you a bullet train’ have gone” (Pilling 2007:11). While the government of Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi (2001–2006) confronted head-on some of Japan's structural problems such as the entrenched power of the bureaucracy and the privatization of the post office, his successor, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, seems reluctant to continue the break with the past. If anything, his strategy seems to be to retain the centrality of the conservative Mori faction, the most powerful group within the LDP, to which he and Mr. Koizumi belong, and whose main traits have been strong nationalism, patriotic education, and a reform of the country's constitution that allows Japan to flex its military muscle. The economic cost of the preservation of LDP dominance remains a client-focused, low productivity political economy. The political cost, given the exploitation of nationalist themes such as prime ministerial visits to the Yasukuni shrine, has been the rise of opposition and distrust in China and other East Asian countries which suffered Japanese military occupation and colonialism (see Calder 2006). One-party dominance in Japan is increasingly costly economically and internationally, particularly when one thinks about the tough long-term choices that the country's leaders have to make given an aging society, natural resource shortages, and energy dependence. In contrast, India's one-party supremacy is a thing of the past. However much the BJP has tried to inherit the Congress party's mantle of dominance, several elements—numerous social cleavages, electoral victories which depend on state-level swings, and mounting inequality amid the breathless pace of economic growth since the early 1990s—have conspired against it. These factors have equally operated to impede the Congress party from regaining its past dominance. The upshot of political change in India since the early 1990s has been two parties with national presence (Congress and BJP), but dependent on tactical alliances with state-based parties to secure national electoral victories. Multiparty coalition governments have forced a “muddle-through” policy process. This approach, which may mirror the nation's social diversity, has slowed the pace of the reforms needed to spread the benefits of more than a decade of high growth. Both parties with national presence have ended up paying the costs of rising inequality through falling political support at the ballot box. For the BJP, the case in point was the 2004 general election. The BJP government bet that it could strengthen its majority by calling an early election and highlighting its strong macroeconomic record under the campaign slogan “India Shining.” However, the electorate thought otherwise. Sure, for a small minority of urban-based, educated constituencies the recent past and present have been bright, but for the vast majority of the country's one plus billion inhabitants, times continue to look dark. In particular, rural India voted against the BJP, and the Congress found itself in power again thanks to an alliance with the Left. But the Congress-led government under Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has found itself in a similarly difficult and paradoxical situation to its BJP predecessor: a deeply unpopular government in the midst of stellar economic results (Roche 2007). The greatest danger for India is the steady rise of anti-system forces whose rallying cry has been for social justice and who shun electoral politics because of their perceived inability to alter decisively the status quo. The continuing growth of the urban/rural divide “has already sparked violence, with a Maoist rebellion infecting 15 of India's 29 states and frequent street clashes along caste lines over access to elite education, government jobs, and services such as hospitals” (Roche 2007). In the electoral realm, the most important development has been the potential rise of a third national force capable of capitalizing politically by exposing both BJP and Congress support for economic liberalization and globalization while at the same time offering a populist platform to protect the myriad poor against such forces. Glimpses of such a third force have come to the forefront since the May 2007 electoral victory of a rainbow coalition of parties and movements of the dispossessed, under the leadership of Ms. Mayawati, in India's largest state, Uttar Pradesh. Of course, any third national force will face the same hurdles—myriad social cleavages, subnational party systems, and eschewed economic growth—that the BJP and Congress have faced. It is hard not to conclude that the governance of India, no matter what coalition of parties is in power, will remain a vexing and complex issue which even the Congress party during its golden years of one-party dominance could do little to change in the short term. The case of Mexico falls between Japan and India. Unlike Japan, one-party dominance in Mexico is a thing of the past. Unlike India, the end of one-party dominance has not translated into the proliferation of representative parties in the state and national legislatures. The PRI's early strategy to regain its dominance after the party's 2000 presidential defeat was to obstruct and sabotage any initiative by the PAN government under President Vicente Fox. This strategy failed on two counts. First, it split the PRI given that some sectors of the party wanted to cooperate with the Fox government while others remained adamantly opposed. Second, it hurt the party's electoral fortunes once a majority of public opinion started identifying policy inertia and lack of economic improvement with PRI obstructionism in Congress. As a consequence, the 2006 elections were a reality check for the PRI. Repudiated by the electorate, the party finished third in the presidential contest and its candidate, Roberto Madrazo, failed to win in any of the country's thirty-one states or the capital city. Since then, the new PRI leadership has steered a course to implement a strategy of engagement with the PAN government of President Felipe Calderón. After all, despite its precipitous electoral decline between 1997 and 2006, the PRI remains the linchpin of Mexico's political system thanks to its control of the largest number of governorships and its veto capacity in Congress. The PRI's current leadership seems to be committed to using these reserves of power in an enabling rather than an obstructionist manner in the hope that the party can be associated with economic and social improvements. Thinking thus, the party's leaders have implicitly thrown their lot in support of President Calderón's government. This is a positive development in an otherwise young and divided democracy. Multiparty democracy without a dominant party is Mexico's new political normalcy. The three main national parties have amassed enough territorial loyalties, control of public resources, and long-term constituencies to make most electoral contests in Mexico two- or three-way races. It is of the utmost importance for future economic and political outcomes that such a system has a strong center. That center is the PRI. Judging by PRI strategy during the early days of Calderón's government, the center might have finally stopped caving in. For Mexico's sake, maybe it is possible for an old dog to learn new tricks. Footnotes 1 During a 1990 debate with Nobel laureate Octavio Paz, Peruvian novelist Mario Vargas Llosa described Mexico's political system as “the perfect dictatorship.” He was referring to the PRI's control over almost every aspect of the country's life for more than six decades. 2 There were exceptions, however, such as when the regime of Gustavo Díaz Ordaz (1964–1970) violently repressed protesters in the infamous “Tlatelolco Massacre” that took place on October 2, 1968. 3 In addition to the SNTE, Pemex, and the state electricity companies, major bottlenecks to modernization include Leviathans in telecommunications (Telmex), cement (Cemex), the mass media (Televisa and TV Azteca), and processed foods (Grupo Bimbo, Maseca, and Cargill). 4 Indeed, Sartori (1976:44) writes that “parties only make for a ‘system,’…when they are parts (in the plural).” 5 I use 1997 as the transition election for Mexico—although the presidency did not change parties (because it was a midterm election), the PRI lost control of the lower house of congress and thereby could no longer unilaterally implement public policy. I focus on six of the larger Central and Eastern European countries—Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Russia, Romania, and Ukraine—for comparability because their population size is of similar scale to that of Mexico, unlike the Baltic states. I exclude the Czech Republic and Slovakia because of the complications in assessing change after the breakup of Czechoslovakia and, similarly, I do not include the former Yugoslav republics. 6 Many PRD local organizations are former PRI organizations that joined the PRD when local PRI leaders defected. 7 For a compilation of the parties contesting elections in post-transition Eastern Europe, see Richard Rose and Neil Munro (2003). 8 Cárdenas contested the 1988 election as the head of the National Democratic Front, a coalition of left-leaning PRI defectors, social movements, and small parties of the Left. The PRD was founded in 1989, using the registry of the Mexican Socialist Party, which merged with the PRI defectors and some social movement actors. 9 In this piece, I refer to transitions not just as the construction of democratic frameworks for gaining power, but also alternation in government. Arguably, Mexico's presidential election was conducted democratically in 1994, but the authoritarian PRI remained in power as a result of it. Similarly, in South Korea, alternation in power did not occur until 1997 despite competitive elections in the early 1990s. 10 In addition to the other pieces in this Forum, Glover and Wuhs (1998), Galvan (2001), and Solinger (2001) have demonstrated the fruitful nature of these cross-regional comparisons. 11 The organizational forerunners to the PS were the Senegalese Democratic Bloc (BDS) and the Senegalese Progressive Union (UPS). 12 The effects of this electoral system are elaborated on later. 13 These seats were initially reserved for the opposition parties, a restriction that was subsequently lifted. 14 At the outset of the transition period, the PRI also controlled party registration, the administration of elections, and the counting of votes. It also benefited from blatantly unequal financing and media coverage, privileges it lost during the 1990s. 15 The mixed electoral system was created in a 1983 reform. 16 Under SNTV, voters cast their vote for a single candidate in a multimember district. The excess votes for high-performing candidates (that is, those that exceed the threshold for victory) cannot be transferred to other same-party candidates in the district. As a result of this nontransferability, the SNTV system produces marked disproportionalities in vote and seat shares and privileges parties that are able to reliably allocate voters to candidates (normally, the authoritarian incumbents’ parties). 17 The improving performance of the DPP during the 1990s and since the transition suggests that it, too, had developed the administrative capacity to effectively distribute its support. 18 See Mainwaring and Scully (1995) and Linz and Stepan (1996) for important contributions on this topic. 19 Solinger (2001) explains the transitions in South Korea, Taiwan, and Mexico by referring to six structural factors across the cases: a history of elections, the presence of opposition parties or factions, electoral reforms, corruption, splits in the ruling parties, and charismatic opposition leaders. 20 See Carothers (2006) for a recent discussion of the centrality of developing political parties and party systems. 21 The author thanks Katherine Fennell, Sarah Johnston-Gardner, and Alejandro Carrión-Menéndez for invaluable research assistance. Kent Calder and Philip Oldenburg kindly shared their knowledge about Japanese and Indian politics, respectively, during the early stages of the investigation and Francis Fukuyama and Jaspal Singh offered valuable comments on an earlier draft. 22 I am grateful to Francis Fukuyama for reminding me about these differences. 23 The transitional election column includes major candidates only. These data reflect presidential vote shares, not legislative returns, the appropriate indicator given the strong presidentialism associated with each of these regimes. In 2000, Mexico's PAN and PRD competed in coalitions. Wade triumphed in the second round of the 2000 Senegal election despite being bested by Diouf in the first round. Once the field was reduced to those two candidates, a broad range of opposition cast their lot with Wade. References Birch Sarah . ( 2003 ) Electoral Systems and Political Transformation in Post-Communist Europe . Basingstoke : Palgrave Macmillan . Brass Paul . 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TI - Evolution of Mexico and Other Single-Party States
JF - International Studies Review
DO - 10.1111/j.1468-2486.2007.00694.x
DA - 2007-11-13
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/evolution-of-mexico-and-other-single-party-states-ko0SgWT0qc
SP - 1
EP - 367
VL - Advance Article
IS - 2
DP - DeepDyve
ER -