TY - JOUR
AU1 - Lu, Jingfeng
AU2 - Wang, Zhewei
AU3 - Zhou, Lixue
AB - This paper demonstrates the possibility of a symmetric “binary-action mixed-strategy equilibrium” in the nested Tullock contest model (Clark and Riis in Public Choice 87:177–184, 1996; Eur J Polit Econ 14(4):605–625, 1998b) with multiple nonmonotone prizes. In this symmetric equilibrium, every player adopts the same mixed strategy: each exerts zero effort with some probability and a constant positive effort otherwise. This new type of equilibrium can coexist with the pure-strategy equilibria established in the literature; it may exist even when those pure-strategy equilibria do not. The coexisting (mixed and pure-strategy) equilibria may induce different levels of effort supply.
TI - Nested Tullock contests with nonmonotone prizes
JF - International Journal of Game Theory
DO - 10.1007/s00182-022-00820-5
DA - 2023-03-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/springer-journals/nested-tullock-contests-with-nonmonotone-prizes-jB0aW64UZ4
SP - 303
EP - 332
VL - 52
IS - 1
DP - DeepDyve
ER -