TY - JOUR
AU - Sovacool, Benjamin K
AB - Abstract The belief that modern alternative vehicles and modes of transport continue to fail primarily for technical reasons glosses over the importance of the economic, political, social and cultural dimensions of gasoline powered automobiles. This article investigates the changes that caused manufacturers and customers to abandon bicycles, horses, electric vehicles, cable cars, trolleys, and trains and to overwhelmingly prefer gasoline-powered vehicles from 1890 to 1940 in the United States. It then focuses on the lessons that the historical transition to gasoline vehicles offers modern policymakers. The American has sacrificed his life as a whole to the motor car, like someone who, demented with passion, wrecks his home in order to lavish his income on a capricious mistress who promises delights he can only occasionally enjoy. (Lewis Mumford, 1980) 1 Introduction The allure of the gasoline automobile is somewhat perplexing. Its widespread use has worsened dependence on foreign supplies of oil for many countries, inducing price spikes and fuel shocks and transferring wealth to petroleum producers. Increased reliance on the car has threatened the vitality of urban centers, required the construction of massive roads, highways, and parking structures, degraded communities, and socially excluded individuals that do not own vehicles. Automobile accidents cause more than 1.2 million deaths per year and injure 25–50 million more, making them the third largest contributor to death and injury in the world. Interstate highways, avenues, streets, and boulevards are noisy and often congested, and gasoline vehicles spew a variety of unhealthy pollutants and particles into the air, contributing to acid rain, ozone depletion, and climate change (Hard & Knie, 2001; Replogle, 1997; Rosen, 2001; Wyatt, 2006). Indeed, if we account for all of the costs needed to own and operate a conventional automobile – that is, the time needed at work to pay for it, driving it, getting it repaired, cleaning it, etc. – a car owner spends 1600 hours a year supporting their vehicle. If one averages all car mileage in a given year by the time spent giving such support, we attain an average speed of five miles per hour. Basically, as environmentalist Paul Hawken (1993) has noted, automobile owners have devastated our cities, polluted the air, damaged our lungs, and threatened our lives to attain the speed of a tricycle. Nonetheless, the automobile continues to be a prized possession and is almost constantly praised for the convenience, mobility, comfort, and luxury it offers, something as natural to purchase and own as food, clothing, and shelter regardless of the traffic, pollution, and urban decay it may cause. Despite its peculiar status in modern society, however, the rise of the gasoline automobile was by no means inevitable. An almost limitless number of transit options existed for Americans at the beginning of the 20th century. A resident of New York City could leave her apartment in 1899 and take an electric taxi to the subway, where she could catch an underground light train to the Grand Central Terminal, ride a comfortable locomotive to San Francisco, disembark and transit on a cable car or trolley, and then hail a taxi, take a horse, or walk to her final destination (Shields, 2007: 76). Yet Americans clearly preferred some forms of transportation over others. From 1895 to 1910, electric automobiles were more common in most areas of the United States and Europe than gasoline internal combustion vehicles. In the year 1900, manufacturers produced about 1575 electric vehicles compared to only 936 gasoline cars (D’Agostino, 1993). The Pope Manufacturing Company, one of the largest and most influential automobile manufacturing companies at that time, produced primarily electric vehicles. Electric vehicles appeared in Chicago, London, New York, and Paris as passenger automobiles and carriages, taxicabs, delivery vans, and even fire engines. By 1909, however, the number of electric vehicles had shrunk to about 4.4% of the number of gasoline automobiles being produced in the United States, and the Cyclopedia of Automobile Engineering declared that three propulsion systems – electricity, steam, and internal combustion – were “suitable” methods for powering a vehicle (Shields, 2007: 105). Ransom Eli Olds started mass producing internal combustion vehicles in 1901, the Ford Motor Company opened their Highland Park Plant in 1910, automakers implemented the moving assembly line in 1913, and by the 1930s the popularity of the electric vehicle had completely subsided. By the beginning of the 1940s, the gasoline automobile industry surpassed all others to become the largest in the country and one of the most significant in the world. During this period, the gasoline powered vehicle evolved from a fragile, cantankerous, and faulty contraption to a streamlined, reliable, fast, and luxurious product (Shields, 2007: 179). Many engineers and technical experts, including executives from automobile manufacturers and trade associations, explain the demise of the electric vehicle and the rise of the gasoline automobile as solely a technical matter. They note that electric vehicles (EVs) suffered from a series of “insurmountable” technical handicaps, among these expensive batteries with limited cycle lives and long recharging times, poor acceleration, a limited range between 50 and 80 miles (depending on road conditions), and solid tires needed to support the vehicles’ great weight (Fontaine, 2008: 22–23; Reich, 2001). Nonetheless, the belief that early electric vehicles failed primarily for technical reasons glosses over the importance of the social and cultural dimensions of gasoline automobiles. Technical explanations do not adequately explain why thousands of consumers purchased electric vehicles at the turn of the century. Nor do they not account for why many successful, progressive, and profitable companies continued to purchase EVs for commercial fleets through the 1920s. This article investigates the changes that occurred between 1890 and 1940 in the United States that caused manufacturers and customers to overwhelmingly prefer gasoline-powered vehicles. It then focuses on the lessons that the historical transition to gasoline automobiles offers modern policymakers. The benefits of exploring the history of early modes of transport in the United States are threefold. First and most specifically, a deeper understanding of the impediments facing early vehicles has much relevance to current debates about alternative modes of transport. In this past decade, engineers and regulators have proposed natural gas powered cars, hybrid-electric vehicles, vehicle-to-grid systems, flex-fuel automobiles, hydrogen fuel cells, ethanol, second generation biofuels, coal to liquids, tar sands, oil shale, and a host of other alternative fuels and modes as necessary to move away from dependence on gasoline and oil in the transport sector. One recent study, for example, indicated no less than eighteen different options policymakers could use to ease American dependence on foreign supplies of petroleum (Sovacool, 2007). Understanding the history of motorized transport, the impediments and challenges faced by vehicles at the turn of the century, helps reveal how consumers accept particular modes of transport but reject others. Second, an exploration of the early history of automobility renders visible the often hidden negative externalities associated with conventional forms of transport. Gasoline vehicles have a Janus face. Drivers often associate them with freedom and power but also frustration and danger. We even use the term “accidents” to imply that the injury and death caused by automobiles is a natural hazard rather than a manufactured risk. Millions of individuals take the existing transportation sector for granted and tend to uncritically believe that its risks are acceptable. An exploration of the rise and fall of early motor vehicles reminds us, however, that technological development is not predictable, orderly, and progressive, and is instead episodic, contingent, and negotiated. This article, in other words, reveals that the modern system of transport need not have occurred, and thus need not always exist. Third, and most generally, investigating the early history of motorization in the United States emphasizes the role of social, cultural, political, and economic factors in technological transitions. For modes of transportation, especially automobiles, are more than just functional technologies. They are also means of identification; items of conspicuous consumption; possible abodes of privacy, solitude, and ritual; instruments of aggression and skill; ceremonial initiations into adulthood; and potential hobbies (Fagen, 1983). The development of particular modes of transport are thus deeply altered and affected by social and cultural patterns of courtship, residence, socialization, work habits, education, leisure, and suburbanization (Flink, 1980). Highlighting these factors in the early history of the automobile has wider importance for those wishing to understand how large-scale technological systems succeed and fail. 2 America adopts the electric vehicle, 1890–1905 At the start of the nineteenth century, no network of roads and highways existed in the United States. Only in New England and between a few select cities such as New York and Washington, DC, did a genuine highway system encourage regular stagecoach traffic, and most transportation was undertaken on steamboats and ferries through waterways and canals. The first American railroad, the Baltimore & Ohio, was planned only in 1827, and it was not until the 1840s that railroads became a dominant form of transportation (Schivelbusch, 1977). By the end of the nineteenth century, however, a person seeking transport in the United States (and many other corners of the world) had to contend with a bewildering array of different options. The early market was divided into at least six distinct segments including those rooted in the world of the horse, those wanting to rely on bicycles, those in favor of trains and subways, those displaying enthusiasm for new steam-powered “horseless” carriages, those desiring gasoline automobiles, and those preferring electric-powered vehicles. The 1890s saw early carriage, bicycle, steam engine, and automobile manufacturers in the United States grapple with an infusion of new designs from overseas, steady competition from other manufacturers, terrible road conditions, and social disagreement about what motor vehicles ought to be. For a variety of technical and social reasons, however, electric vehicles prevailed to become a highly preferred mode of transport by 1902. 2.1 Horse Because they were abundant and relatively easy to ride, an astronomical number of horses and horse-drawn carriages were still in use at the end of the nineteenth century. Many horse-minded individuals preferred to depend on horses for short distances and trains for longer journeys. They denounced motor vehicles of all types for being too expensive, fast, dirty, and dangerous, and a significant number also had financial stakes in the position of horses in American society. These opponents of motorized transport attacked new gas- and electric-powered machines as “devil wagons” and condemned them for their breakneck speeds and for failing to promote basic standards of decency. Many of these individuals saw mechanized transport as making roads impossible for anything but automobiles, rendering homes uninhabitable because of dust and noise, and placing incredible burdens on taxpayers and workers who had to finance and build roadways (Wells, 2007). Notwithstanding these advantages, many automobile-minded individuals responded that while horses were comparatively inexpensive, they were slow-paced, limited in range, noisy, and filthy, often dropping excrement into the middle of the road and creating a “headache” for government planners. Horse owner abuse resulted in dozens of horse carcasses rotting in the street every day in large cities, and manure collection presented a substantial burden on municipal budgets. Children wandering the streets to and from school frequently suffered the environmental effects of dung and the sight of dead carcasses (Shields, 2007). Furthermore, horse-drawn transportation required constant attention and care, so much that wealthy Americans seldom managed horses themselves and often hired coachmen and grooms as intermediaries (Borg, 1999). The unsightliness and stench of the stable lead most horse owners to keep their horses a respectable distance from their residences. Over the course of a day's work, a horse team might cover 18–20 miles but at an average pace of three to five miles per hour. An experienced horse driver would thus have to avoid pushing a team to exhaustion by providing frequent stops for water and rest (Mom & Kirsch, 2001). These drawbacks significantly curtailed the use of horses as primary means of transport during the beginning of the 20th century. 2.2 Train Local and transcontinental rail lines offered quick, safe, and comfortable transportation from coast to coast, and in combination with a personal horse or bicycle could typically fulfill a person's entire transport needs. Light and heavy trains could battle inclement weather such as rain or snow and even penetrate mountains through enormous tunnels. Trains did not require self operation and enabled passengers to relax, socialize, and sleep during their journey. Trains were also the primary means of transportation for mammoth quantities of freight that had to be moved long distances, and they were fueled by coal, a cheap, domestically available, and plentiful fuel. Trains and subways also avoided congestion, which grew significantly from the 1890s to the 1920s, as streets constructed initially for horse-drawn carriages and pedestrians had to accommodate a mishmash of trolleys, automobiles, bicycles, streetcars, and buses. Urban commuters could effortlessly board a train and sit back as it traveled its own right of way and gathered speed the moment it departed (Shields, 2007: 72–75). Railroads, however, were unable to retail their mass appeal. Their strict adherence to schedules and timetables chaffed many passengers. While they avoided much city congestion they were also bound to their tracks, and could only carry people to and from specific points. Furthermore, trains came to be associated with corruption, pollution, and urban decay, and railroad accidents and highly publicized boiler explosions stigmatized the train as being loud and unacceptably dangerous (Schivelbusch, 1977). 2.3 Bicycle Another serious contender was the bicycle, which gained popularity during the 1880s as people became disgusted with horses and frustrated with railroads. Bicycles did not only create political pressure for roads on which to ride (ironically facilitating the advance of steam, gasoline, and electric automobiles), they also promoted a social and cultural norm of mobility. While rail and ship transportation occurred only in accordance with rigid schedules, bicycles promoted a culture of individuality (Shields, 2007: 80; Volti, 2004: 2). The bicycle, unlike horses and carriages, was also a machine. Riders could travel all day on a bicycle without having to stop other than to rest or eat, and bicycles could easily be “stored” or “parked” by leaning them again poles or taking them inside. Horses, by contrast, had to be saddled, watered, fed, rested, unsaddled, fed again, and placed in a barn or stable at night (Shields, 2007). Relatively inexpensive, bicycles were more egalitarian than horses (which could cost hundreds of dollars) and automobiles (which could cost thousands of dollars) (Trescott, 1976; Volti, 2004). Contrary to these benefits, bicycles could not travel at exceptionally high speeds; they required immense physical exertion up and down hills; they did not operate well in inclement weather or at night; and transporting luggage and freight via bicycle was difficult at best and disastrous at worst. The lack of well-paved and smooth roads also made bicycles challenging to ride, and the rapid addition of automobiles and horses to ordinary roads complicated navigation and resulted in bicycle accidents and fatalities. 2.4 Steam powered carriages Because of the disadvantages to horses, trains, and bicycles, many riders, passengers, and cyclists started quickly preferring motorized vehicles. The earliest and most widely accepted option in the late 1890s was steam-powered horseless carriages. While locomotive engines were bulky and large, stationary steam engines existed in many smaller sizes and were plentiful, already in use at fire pumps, irrigation systems, and factories. Steam powered carriages could reach much higher speeds than horses, bicycles, or locomotives, and even outdid gasoline- and electric-powered vehicles for the first few decades. An 1897 Stanley Steamer could surpass speeds of 120 miles per hour, and was relatively simple to operate with no gears to shift and merely a steam valve to open and close (Shields, 2007). Those in favor of motorized steam transport were able to foretell of a future where existing transportation methods would become obsolete, where every family would own a steamer that could speed them safely and securely over smooth roads to any destination. Steam carriage advocates promised a new “horseless age” that would free Americans from the tyranny of railroad timetables and crowded seats of trolley cars, a vision of “autopia” (Wells, 2007). The vision was so widely supported that by 1899 more than two dozen American manufacturers produced hundreds of steam-powered vehicles, with the largest segment of the market dominated by horseless steam-powered carriages such as the “Locomobile” (see Fig. 1). A transition to smaller, four-wheeled, tiller-driven, privately owned, and distinctly urban centered mode of transport had begun. Fig. 1 Open in new tabDownload slide The best selling 1901 locomobile, a steam powered “Horseless Carriage”. Source: Wells (2007). Fig. 1 Open in new tabDownload slide The best selling 1901 locomobile, a steam powered “Horseless Carriage”. Source: Wells (2007). Although steam powered carriages did start momentum towards motorized forms of personal transport, they possessed severe disadvantages compared to gasoline and electric vehicles. The earliest vehicles took a good deal of time to “get up to steam,” and a major problem consisted of water supply. Carrying enough water for a 20 or 30 mile excursion was almost impossible, and public concern with boiler explosions (heightened from the earlier era of steam locomotives) created serious public opposition (Shields, 2007). 2.5 Gasoline powered vehicle Gasoline automobiles also existed during this time, although they did not resemble anything close to their current form and also failed to gain widespread acceptance among consumers. The internal combustion engine, which could be fueled by diesel or gasoline, was invented and then perfected by Nikolaus Otto, Gottlieb Daimler, Karl Benz, Wilhelm Maybach, and Rudolf Diesel in the 1860s and 1870s (Lyle, 1976; Shields, 2007: 86). Most early models had a range between 20 and 100 miles, and in the mid-1880s a good deal of independent invention was occurring on designs but only a very small number of internal combustion engines were being manufactured. While the internal combustion engine became popular in Europe, particularly Germany, most Americans lacked experience with it. Little was known in the United States about such portable engines, and early models operated at very low horsepower. Awkward and poorly understood ignition systems malfunctioned frequently, and gasoline vehicles were commonly held to be noisy, shaky, and difficult to start. Their primary advantage, the inherent energy density of gasoline compared to steam or electricity (or human and animal power), was largely offset by low powered models, poor reliability, high manufacturing costs, and a scarcity of high octane gasoline. These problems were further worsened by a failure of standardized machinery and manufacturing processes, lack of uniform spare parts, and consistent roadside breakdowns due to routine axle fractures, bearing seizures, and steering and suspension malfunctions (Shields, 2007: 109). A 1890s gasoline automobile was a luxury item made slowly by hand to meet unique customer specifications by a collection of individual craftspeople. No standard system of measuring and gauging parts, cutting steel, assembly, hardening, painting, and filing existed, and no two gasoline automobiles were alike (McDonough & Braungart, 2002: 21). Even a few hundred miles of uninterrupted performance was considered fortunate. In essence, knowledge about internal combustion was scattered and isolated, and many considered early gasoline vehicles a passing fad. 2.6 Electric vehicles Electric vehicles (EVs), in contrast to horses, bicycles, trains, steamers, and gasoline vehicles, held many benefits, and became vehicles of choice from 1900 to 1905. Electrified street cars already ran on electric motors, and significant advances in battery technology made electric vehicles popular. Indeed, early EVs had developed far more extensively than other available modes of transport by the turn of the century. Henry G. Morris and Pedro G. Salom founded the Electric Carriage and Wagon Company in 1896, and it began operating electrically driven taxis in New York City in 1897 (Rae, 1955). The first ever stock model automobile was also offered that year, and it was an EV manufactured by the Pope Manufacturing Company and sold as the cleanest, quietist, and simplest vehicle to operate on the market. Drivers considered passenger and commercial EVs to be neater, and they were especially cleaner than gasoline and steam powered automobiles since they produced no steam or odor. An 1899 Scientific American article praised electricity as “an ideal power for vehicles, for it eliminates all the complicated machinery of either gas, steam, or compressed air motors, with their attendant noise, heat, and vibration” (D’Agostino, 1993). Their quieter operation enabled them to run in noise-restricted areas and more affluent neighborhoods. Many women also preferred push button electrics as they did not require the shifting of gears or turning of hand cranks to start (Hard & Knie, 1994; Schiffer, 1994; Volti, 1990). Commercial operators saw many benefits to EVs as well. Commodity suppliers of coal, ice, and beer (among other goods) relied predominately on EVs to distribute their products to customers. Managers found that EVs fit well into the pace of transport: the electric truck traveled faster than the horse wagon, but not so fast as to encourage joyriding or speeding (about the only practical use for a steamer). A battery could do with a rest every now and then, enabling drivers to visit bars and other local patrons for “refreshment.” The operating range of the electric truck was greater than a horse wagon but less than a gas-powered automobile, so shop owners could increase delivery range while maintaining the same distribution system but not have to radically reorganize their entire service and delivery routes. For the risk-averse managers of typical delivery departments, it was easier to change only one variable at a time by relying on EVs instead of overhauling the entire system for gasoline trucks (Mom & Kirsch, 2001). EV technology was not only embraced by early drivers, it also improved drastically. Thomas Edison “perfected” his nickel-iron storage battery in 1909, and the storage capacity of batteries increased 35% from 1910 to 1925 with a corresponding increase in range of 230%. Rechargeable lead–acid batteries could provide modest output over long periods or large output in short bursts. The life of batteries also improved more than 300% while maintenance costs dropped by 63% in the formative years of the EV industry (D’Agostino, 1993; Williams & Kurani, 2007: 552). As mentioned earlier, steam-powered alternatives could drive further than electrics but needed to refuel with pure water every 20 to 30 miles. They required training and in some cases special licenses to operate and were slow to build up a full head of steam at the beginning of a drive. Gasoline powered carriages were also seen as less attractive: drivers complained that they were noisy, smelly, prone to fierce vibration, difficult to start, easy to stall, and demanded frequent adjustment and repair (Wells, 2007; Mom, 2004). For these reasons, Henry Jackson Howard also wrote in a 1900 issue of Metropolitan Magazine that “from this initial club run we must infer that up to the present electricity is the most popular motive power … With the city automobilist, electricity will continue in favor” (Shields, 2007: 90). Oddly, the rapid success of EVs was partly responsible for their downfall. Developers and proponents of passenger and commercial EVs believed that the use of electricity as a fuel was associated with modernity and progress itself. While they were also able to cultivate an appealing vision of a horseless age, many electric vehicles proponents thus ignored some of the real advantages of gasoline and the stated preferences of customers. These advocates were so focused on an “ecstatic belief” in the future of EVs that they became blinded by the practical challenges that emerged (Mom, 2004: 236). Many were also convinced, from previous improvements in battery size and range, that a “miracle battery” would eventually be developed. In short, EV proponents believed in technological optimism and placed faith in human ingenuity to overcome lingering technical problems. Despite these high hopes, the use of EVs peaked in 1901 and 1902, when about 62% of motorized vehicles in the country were electric-powered. Their use after 1902 slowly declined and then sharply dropped off, so much that by 1920 they constituted less than 2% of the overall market. Even the commercial sector slowly abandoned them: in 1913, 10% all commercial vehicles were electric powered but by 1925 the number had dropped to less than 3% (D’Agostino, 1993). In Robert Staughton Lynd and Helen Merrell Lynd's classic 1929 study of a typical American community entitled Middletown: A Study in Modern American Culture, an anonymous resident of “Middletown” went so far as to chide the authors that “Why on earth do you need to study what's changing in this country? I can tell you what's happening in just four letters: A-U-T-O!,” and the AUTO they meant was the quintessential gasoline powered vehicle (Flink, 1980: 136). 3 The rise of the gasoline powered vehicle, 1905–1940 Why, then, did gasoline-powered internal combustion vehicles prevail over EVs and other modes of transport? This section divides the discussion into four interrelated categories: technical, economic, political, and socio-cultural. Demarcations between each of the impediments do not really exist in distinct and separate classes. For instance, the outbreak of World War I created a mass market for gasoline-powered trucks and flooded American shops with them after the end of the war, drastically lowering prices. Whether this is an example of a political or economic impediment is unclear. The Woodrow Wilson Administration's plans to develop roads and highways also increased the incentives for freight operators to purchase conventional vehicles as an alternative to rail transport. Was this factor economic or political? The gasoline automobile was one of the only transportation options available to rural families and farmers, creating a strong constituency in favor of the Model T and creating more political support for the construction of highways. Is this a social or political factor? Dividing the “social” from the “technical,” or even the “economic” from the “political” is counterproductive, since it misses the point that such impediments exist in an integrated nexus, and it is done here only to make such obstacles easier to identify. 3.1 Technical factors That said, significant technical challenges did confront EVs, and they played an important role in their demise. EVs required special time-consuming recharging stations, as most could travel only 25 miles or so between charges, and their top speeds were usually less than 15 miles per hour. While these lower speeds made them safer than steamers and gasoline cars, EVs performed poorly in hilly areas or on rough roads, and were not well suited for mountains and heavy freight. One critic writing a 1901 article for Life magazine was apparently stranded after test driving an EV up a series of hills. The author wryly noted that “those who have gout should avoid the electric machine, as a steady walk back home of thirty miles is not good for gout” (Shields, 2007: 86). EVs were thus practical for only short, urban trips that could be completed near charging stations and cities. The gasoline vehicle, in contrast, offered a 70-mile range in 1905 and boasted top speeds above 40 miles per hour. EVs faced problems relating to standardization and manufacturing at precisely the same time improvements in constructing gasoline automobiles occurred. A series of long-distance automobile races from 1900 to 1905 featured vehicles using internal combustion engines, and these races quickly revealed engineering problems that, when corrected, greatly improved internal ignition, internal lubrication, and carburetion systems. The noisy and unreliable three horsepower gasoline motor of 1900 was transformed into a thirty horsepower smooth and efficient motor of 1905. By the end of the highly publicized races in 1905, the New York Auto Show featured nine steam vehicles and 20 electric vehicles on display, but showcased 219 gasoline automobiles (Shields, 2007: 88). By 1910, a new set of metals and metalworking techniques enabled the refined production of tough and reliable automobile frames, and in 1911 Charles Kettering invented the battery-powered electric starter, eliminating the need to start gasoline cars by crank and partially attaining some of the advantages of EVs. In November of that same year Cadillac ordered 12,000 starting, ignition, and lighting systems based on the new design, and in 1912 engineers invented the muffler (then called a “silencer”) to mitigate the noisiness of internal combustion. The same year the muffler was invented, the number of electric automobiles on the road reached a plateau at 30,000, but they had to share the road with more than 900,000 internal combustion vehicles. During the first decade of the 20th century, gasoline automobile designers and manufacturers borrowed many innovations from previous modes of transport. Engineers applied techniques for building steel chasses from horse carriages and enticed thousands of former carriage makers into the industry. They also borrowed methods from bicycle manufacturing to construct close-tolerance components such as roller bearings and gears, pneumatic tires, steel-tube framing, chain drives, differential gearing, and tougher steels (Shields, 2007: 79; Trescott, 1976). Locomotives provided knowledge about engine dynamics, braking, and propulsion, as well as experience relating to the performance of metals and alloys under extreme pressure over long distances. The gasoline automobile industry even borrowed many components from EVs, including the electric starter along with direct current batteries and motors for early cars and the requisite knowledge needed for electrical engineering, lighting, and wiring (Shields, 2007). Widely available raw materials further supplemented the growth of the industry. The rapid expansion of the gasoline vehicle required a country abundant not only in skilled labor but also natural resources such as iron, steel, wood, copper, and brass. These materials existed in vast quantities and at low prices, and could be cheaply and reliably transported by the rail system along with finished vehicles on their way to dealerships and salesrooms. Railroads created a large demand for high quality steel and provided the capacity to move freight to Michigan and New York for automobile construction, and foundries actively formed alliances with automobile manufacturers when locomotive sales began to plummet. 3.2 Economic factors Yet the technical factors tell us only a very small part of the story. While engineers and mechanics were improving the internal combustion engine, the battery market for EVs became fragmented and many EV companies went bankrupt due to mismanagement. Early gasoline automobiles cost $1,000 to $2,000 whereas electric cars cost $1,250 to $3,500. The high initial price of EVs convinced manufacturers to focus only on the luxury market, while those making gasoline powered vehicles designed them for a greater range of consumers. Drivers found it difficult and expensive to have EVs recharged at gasoline stations and hotels, which differed in their rates for charging, while petrol stations listed prices clearly. The January 10, 1901 discovery of the gusher “Spindletop” in Texas also saw the price of crude oil drop below 5 cents per barrel, further incentivizing drivers to switch to petroleum and gasoline. The mass production of gasoline vehicles improved their performance and lowered costs. Ransom Olds initiated the first mass production of automobiles in 1901, when his factory in Michigan churned out 600 such cars and ramped up annual production to 5000 vehicles in 1905 (Shields, 2007: 118). The Packard Motor Car Company of Detroit and a collection of other manufacturers quickly followed, and they erected facilities that spawned tens of thousands of cars per year, topping 25,000 automobiles in 1905, more than a 10-fold increase in national production from 1899. Henry Ford actively devoted his resources to creating a lightweight automobile for mass consumption that could be produced in high volume. Ford, an engineer for Thomas Edison's electric power company, might have begun work on EVs instead of internal combustion engines, but decided that internal combustion engines presented a greater challenge. Ford already knew a great deal about electricity, electric motors, wiring, and batteries, and where EVs did not appear to require much ingenuity, the production of gasoline powered vehicles demanded immense engineering creativity. Once Ford chose the gasoline engine, he showed no apparent interest in altering his decision, and the success of his business model greatly contributed to the adoption of the gasoline automobile (Shields, 2007: 102–104). Ford believed that rather than selling a small number of boutique and expensive automobiles to relatively wealthy drivers, production at a larger scale could reduce costs and also increase profitability. Ford's Model N, a premium two-passenger runabout with front-mounted engine, debuted in 1906 for $500, making it the cheapest car on the market. After introducing his Model R and Model S (essentially Model Ns with a few cosmetic upgrades), Ford became one of the country's leading manufacturers, generating sales of 8243 vehicles between October 1906 and September 1907 (Wells, 2007: 517). Ford scaled up his mass production techniques with the Model T, which sat above the road like a high-wheeler but had more power than previous models, doubling factory output each year in some cases (Ford manufactured 63,000 Model Ts in 1908 but made 127,000 in 1909). As a consequence, the price of the Model T dropped from $850 in 1908 to $360 in 1916 and $298 in 1923. The Model T, in other words, offered low-cost drivers their first high style adventure machine, and after it finally defeated a collection of heavier and pricier touring automobiles in a 4100 mile race from New York to Seattle in 1910, tens of thousands of people wanted one (See Fig. 2). Fig. 2 Open in new tabDownload slide The Ford Model T (Circa 1908). Source: Wells (2007). Fig. 2 Open in new tabDownload slide The Ford Model T (Circa 1908). Source: Wells (2007). Business strategy played another role. Ford followed a policy at his company that dictated against taking large dividends, or paying executives large salaries, and instead funneled all profits back into research, development, and production. This enabled Ford to experiment with a variety of manufacturing processes and a surprising rate of scrapping and alteration, eventually producing a very effective assembly line (Hounshell, 1984: 219–221). Ford also, progressively, paid his workers very well. In the 1910s, when the prevailing salary for factory workers was about $2 a day, Ford hiked it to $5 and reduced the hours of the workday from nine to eight, raising the bar for the entire automobile industry (McDonough & Braungart, 2002: 23). All the while Ford was refining his marketing and production approaches, EV manufacturers made a series of bungling business errors and poor strategic decisions that saw their production costs soar, their market shrink, and many face bankruptcy (Epperson, 2000; Rae, 1955). Battery exchange never achieved popularity in the United States, with battery and vehicle manufacturers relying on central stations as the natural foci for battery service. Battery exchange plans were aimed at commercial markets rather than passenger or niche markets, and consequently a standardized battery market never emerged (Mom & Kirsch, 2001). While sales of EVs and the companies that made them were languishing, gasoline automobile manufacturers formed alliances with media agencies, banks, and financing firms to promote insurance, advertising, and financing. The development of automobile insurance arose in 1910 as a mechanism to offer greater security and reduced risk to automobile owners. Dealerships offered consumers an average insurance package consisting of protection against fire, theft, and vandalism, and liability in the case of an automobile accident. Next came innovative forms of advertising, which helped spur demand for gasoline automobiles. The earliest technique was the annual auto show, where a variety of cars could be viewed and ordered from the factory. The size of these shows grew to mammoth proportions, with some events drawing more than 40,000 daily attendants and housing more than 500 gasoline automobiles. Gasoline automobile companies paid particular attention to the importance of dealerships, which were meticulously crafted to be pleasing and comfortable. Dealerships tended to be carpeted, polished, sleek, and composed mostly of glass, and many dealers distributed flowers or scattered bright balloons among their automobiles. These dealerships also offered potential buyers test drives, so eager men (and later women) could drive a particular car before they purchased it. Test drives were expected and prolonged, something most EV and steam-powered carriage dealers avoided given the limited range of their vehicles. The test drive endowed the salesperson with sufficient time to demonstrate new features, explore the prospect of price, and build a personal rapport with customers. Some of the wealthier dealers even permitted families to drive the car home and bring it back the next day. Once a sale had been made, these dealers learned to cement a close and lasting relationship with purchasers, especially since early gasoline cars required constant care and maintenance (particularly when they were driven in rural areas or at high speeds). Dealers pledged and delivered prompt and courteous service, and it became typical for customers to service their vehicles as often as once a week (Shields, 2007: 160–161). Auto shows and test drives were complimented with a sustained and comparatively aggressive campaign of radio, magazine, and newspaper advertisements. These advertising campaigns quickly expanded to include both men and women as their target audiences. One series of advertisements for the Model T, for instance, strongly suggested that families own two cars and highlighted the advantage of having “one for Dad” and “one for Mom” (Shields, 2007: 149). A large number of vendors emphasized the aesthetically pleasing, comfortable, and safer aspects of new vehicles, and lured women to attend auto shows with their husbands, making it an occasion “for the entire family.” By the end of the 1920s, the auto show was an important cultural locus where families would come together and decide which automobile to purchase. More effective advertising and improvements in design and comfort cumulatively erased many of the previous objections women had towards internal combustion engines. Wealthy female socialites liked gasoline automobiles for their ability to display wealth and status; farm women (discussed more below) for mobility and social cohesion; flappers (discussed more below) for self identity and mobility; mothers for convenience in shopping and chauffeuring. Finally, advancements in financing expanded the class of eligible purchasers and made gasoline vehicles much more affordable. The purchase of gasoline automobiles required significant upfront capital. Payment was generally in cash only, and the potential buyer was frequently forced to save for months in order to raise enough money for the purchase. General Motors, who manufactured only gasoline automobiles, created the General Motors Acceptance Corporation in 1919, and was the first to offer “installment financing” where drivers could purchase a vehicle immediately but pay for it in monthly installments later. By the late 1920s, most new gasoline automobiles (along with some used ones) could be purchased on installment plans from a variety of dealerships, and the success of the plans not only stimulated the interest of banks and financing corporations, it also increased the sale of insurance, which was required to finance vehicles. 3.3 Political factors Equally significant to the rise of the gasoline vehicle were political factors. Electric utilities lacked the momentum of oil companies and gasoline automakers, and were focused mostly on large-scale rural electrification projects and building alliances with electric appliance manufacturers. Even though electric lights illuminated the Philadelphia Centennial Exposition in 1876 and the Edison Electric Light Company was formed in 1878, only 8% of American houses were electrified by 1907, and the electrical network was unevenly spread across the country. By 1917, just seven million American homes – roughly one-third – were connected to an electrical grid, most of these were in large cities, and fewer than one percent were wired for “complete” electric service (that is, wired to harness electricity for heat, lighting, and power) (Mom & Kirsch, 2001: 508). By 1925 little more than half (53%) of the country was electrified, and while a handful of electric utilities, such as Consolidated Edison, were quick to identify the market for the electrification of transport, they never showed interest in providing garages and saw the vehicle market as a risk they did not wish to take (D’Agostino, 1993; Mom & Kirsch, 2001; Newman & Day, 1975). Many utility managers believed that enough money could be made supplying electricity to automobile factories, which needed copious amounts of power and represented attractive industrial customers. Gasoline vehicles still required batteries, electric motors, light bulbs, and dozens of other electrical subcomponents, and the large demand the automobile industry created for these products placated many companies and stakeholders in the electricity and lighting industries. While electric utilities, light and power companies, battery makers, and EV manufacturers were disagreeing about how best to position the EV market to grow (and quite happy selling electricity and electrical components to gasoline automakers), oil and petroleum companies organized themselves and ran an aggressive campaign for the establishment of gasoline filling stations (Hard & Knie, 1994; Kirsch, 2000; Schiffer, 1994; Volti, 1990). Seeking to show his support for gasoline automobiles, President Wilson signed the Federal Aid to Roads Act in 1916 that helped construct 700,000 miles of highways, dotted with service stations and motels, by 1930 (Newman & Day, 1975: 3–4). General Motors, Firestone, and Standard Oil of California further promoted gasoline vehicles by purchasing controlling shares of electric railways and trams and converting routes to diesel bus operation or purchasing electric vehicles and trolleys only to retire them so that Americans could purchase gas-fueled automobiles (O’Hanlon, 1984; Schrag, 2000; Snell, 1974; St. Clair, 1986; for a critique of this argument, see Dunn, 1998; Paterson, 2007: 73–75). Furthermore, farmers and rural citizens discovered the utility of motorized vehicles, and these emerging and important purchasers had no use for urban-operated EVs (creating significant political support for both gasoline automobiles and country roads). Rural citizens were not serviced by many rail lines and buses, and were difficult or impossible to reach by street car, trolley, and EV. The internal combustion automobile offered one of very few ways to end their isolation. The Model T especially sold well among rural families that depended on it to transport them to town, visit the doctor, participate in church, and generally share in community life (Shields, 2007). The outbreak of World War I in 1914 cemented support in favor of gasoline vehicles. The federal government did not see electric vehicles as well suited for military applications, especially as trucks. Wartime military subsidies were thus aimed at making peacetime gasoline trucks into a “de facto military technology.” Military standards were set for speed, range, and improved performance that were much higher than what even the best EVs could provide. Since the early war needs exceeded the available supply of military vehicles, the Allies in Europe turned to the American truck industry, dramatically expanding export opportunities from 1914 to 1917 (Laux, 1985; Mom & Kirsch, 2001). The dominant effect of World War I was to increase the scale of gasoline truck production and lower the prices of gasoline-engine vehicles. Wartime pressure on national railroad infrastructure precipitated crippling shortages of coal in the winter of 1918, and these shortages highlighted the need for alternative modes of freight transport. Since EVs were limited in their range, alternative long-haul transport needs were met almost exclusively by gasoline powered vehicles, and the creation of a road network was deemed necessary to facilitate “efficient haulage” (Mom & Kirsch, 2001: 511). Following the war, thousands of surplus trucks were distributed back into the American market, furthering the demand for (and construction of) good roads and highways. When the war ended, excess wartime manufacturing capacity was also reconfigured to spawn thousands of cheap gasoline vehicles. In 1911, annual American truck production amounted to about 11,000 vehicles, but soared to almost one million vehicles by 1919. World War I not only left America with factory infrastructure attuned and standardized to gas powered vehicles, it also created hundreds of thousands of people trained to drive them (Mom, 2004). The Great Depression finally accelerated the acceptance of the gasoline automobile by bankrupting the remaining manufacturers of commercial EVs and concentrating and consolidating the automobile industry. The financial crisis of 1929–1937 led many smaller automobile manufacturers into bankruptcy and enabled General Motors, Ford, and Daimler Chrysler to control most of the industry. These three companies, sometimes called the “Big Three,” had substantial cash reserves and were able to continue production during the Depression. Moreover, the Big Three could afford to offer financing during the economic downturn, further narrowing selection to their vehicles and enabling consistent sales throughout the 1930s (Shields, 2007: 147). 3.4 Socio-cultural factors A web of socio-cultural factors played a final part. EVs came to be associated with conservatism and femininity; trolleys and trains with corruption and the dehumanizing aspects of technology; gasoline-powered vehicles with mobility, individualism, and progress. Most EVs resembled carriages of horse-and-buggy days, and male drivers often described them as “horsey.” Because they were easier to operate, lady drivers especially liked the cleanliness and simplicity of EVs and purchased hundreds of models. EVs thus came to be associated with lack of power and femininity, so much that many women drivers were laughed and hooted at by men operating gasoline vehicles (McShane, 1995; Scharff, 1992). In contrast to EVs and trains, historian Warren Belasco notes that “the first motorized generation tended to see the [gasoline] automobile as a panacea for the modern social and cultural problems that had disturbed the generation of the 1890s” (Belasco, 1982: 44). Gasoline powered vehicles came to be associated with the liberal values of individualism and privacy over the more democratic values of cooperation, community, and commitment to the public good (Brown, 2001: 66–67). Wealthy sportsmen and businessmen preferred the power and range of gasoline-powered vehicles, as they came to associate danger, masculinity, and speed with them, in essence transforming the gasoline carriage into an “adventure machine” (Mom, 2004). The magazine Motor World explained the phenomena in 1901: To take control of this materialized energy, to draw the reins over this monster with its steel muscles and fiery heart—there is something in the idea which appeals to almost every universal sense, the love of power. Add the element of danger, and the fascination in motovehicalism as a sport is not difficult to understand. Gasoline vehicles were also seen as useful alternatives to trolley cars and railroads. In Progressive Era Los Angeles, gasoline automobiles provided a democratic substitute to the poor service and corrupt practices of centralized trolley companies (Bottles, 1987). The extended range of gasoline vehicles enabled them to compete against the railroads, and here they promised individuality and privacy. At a time when railroads had become huge, clumsy affairs frequently attacked for failing to meet the needs and moods of the average human being, the gasoline powered automobile promised a nostalgic return to a simpler age of benign individualism and family solidarity (Belasco, 1982). The masculine, dangerous, and individualistic aspects of gasoline vehicles fused together to create a conception that such cars were progressive but not disruptive. Gasoline cars were not framed as revolutionary but instead seen as refreshingly regressive. In the 1920s, when mass production put almost half of the population on the road, an abundance of literature continued to describe car travel as a revival of pre-modern experiences. The 1890s and 1900s saw the nation through one of its worst economic depressions, and central to the panic was the speculative nature of railroad capitalization. The economic collapse of 1890s was hammered home with a most unwelcome message: with its complex industrial capitalist economy and increasingly disgruntled farmers and workers, the United States was becoming all too European. Even though there was still a good deal of land physically available, most Americans lamented the “end of the frontier.” By constantly engaging in wilderness, the commonly accepted view was that Americans had developed their inventiveness, dominant individualism, buoyancy and exuberance (Belasco, 1982). The limited range of EVs and fixed routes of trains mitigated their ability to transport Americans into wilderness. Gas-powered automobiles, because of their greater range and independence from urban charging stations, helped fulfill the desire for a lost frontier. After 1910, gasoline automobiles began to enjoy mass appeal as an instrument of nostalgic recreation, emancipating travelers from dictatorial time tables. Where the railway fostered and symbolized standardization, group discipline, and centralization, the gasoline automobile symbolized responsiveness to individual needs and restored local initiative. Motorists could start at their own convenience and travel virtually anywhere, instead of relying on some dark, distant, and possibly dangerous train station. The driver was his or her own station master, engineer, and porter, and the car was believed to follow a more natural schedule, as driving stopped at mealtimes and often at night (Belasco, 1982). Railroads tended to dictate exactly where you went on a fixed rack, whereas car removed this claustrophobic limitation. Trains were bound to about 30,000 miles of track in 1920, but motorists had almost three million miles of dirt but nonetheless passable road to choose from. By determining their own routes, motorists gained private access and the pioneer's view. Gasoline powered automobiles, perhaps ironically given the environmental degradation that surrounds them today, were thus advanced as possible saviors for society. EVs were seen as slow, limited, and anachronistic and the train was viewed as massive, alien, and noisy, with its smoke-belching engine and the distant corporations that owned and operated it. Train travelers and urban EV drivers often saw firsthand the economic and environmental dislocation created by modernization and industrialization: factories, pollution, warehouses, and slums. Even in smaller towns, the trains invariably passed the poorest areas, and in rural areas passengers often witnessed the discarded equipment and trash that farmers abandoned near the tracks. Rail passengers sat passively while all the work was done for them, like “overpampered Victorian dandies” (Belasco, 1982: 48). Gasoline cars, instead, were small and vulnerable. People tended to give them names after pets and other people, and, more reliable than a horse, faster and cheaper than an EV, and more personal and approachable than a train, gasoline automobiles seemed to restore human scale. Persons could enter cities by the best streets or could avoid cities all together. Traveling along quiet picturesque lanes, the gasoline car promised an era of seemingly timeless and nostalgic pastoral calm at the proper scale. Building on the connection between wilderness and re-humanization, manufacturers and advertisers were able to frame the gasoline automobile as a mechanism to rebuild the family unit. Gasoline cars enabled the opportunity to go camping, an image popularized by Henry Ford and his famous nature outings with Thomas Edison and Harvey Firestone. Gasoline motoring restored old fashioned family solidarity. Train travel, by contrast, did not promote family values, as it was expensive and unsafe for children, and many rail hotels favored businessmen and discriminated against women. Instead, families could spend 6 or 8h together in the cramped but intimate space offered by the gasoline automobile (Belasco, 1982). Lastly, gasoline automobiles were associated with meritocracy, freedom, and universality. During the era of prosperity in the 1920s, the gasoline powered vehicle symbolized independence and fun, especially among a group of women known as flappers. Slender, young, carefree, and sexually promiscuous, flappers smoke and drank openly (and often in public). The gasoline powered automobile, because it provided freedom and mobility unknown to women a decade before, became central to their identity, and while the social group did not survive the Great Depression, it further molded cultural attitudes towards accepting the automobile. The archetype of the young carefree flapper behind the wheel of a Model T, cigarette in hand, became idolized in popular culture (Shields, 2007: 176–179). Gasoline vehicles also seemed more liberating than their electric or railway counterparts. Train travel forced passengers to compete for the more comfortable seats and to fight over whether windows should be raised or lowered. Lower-class travelers resented the obvious disdain from haughty conductors, porters were always hungry for tips, and etiquette manuals advised female travelers against unguarded acquaintances. EVs, similarly, were often owned and operated by the affluent and associated with the upper class. In contrast, gasoline automobiles promoted a sense of camaraderie, democracy, and meritocracy. Broken down motorists helped each other out in the mud, exchanged information, and experienced America together (Kirsch, 2000). Households and businesses could rely on them to meet a range of driving needs and interests such as recreation, commuting, storage, and sport (Turrentine, Lee-Gosselin, Kurani & Sperling, 1992). Gasoline engine automobiles and trucks succeeded not because they were better at replacing horses, streetcars, and EVs in urban areas and trains in rural ones, but because they offered the possibility of universal service, creating an entirely new market to serve the transport needs of a wide variety of different clients (Mom & Kirsch, 2001). 4 Implications for policy The transition from horses, bicycles, and steamers to EVs and then to gasoline powered vehicles offers many lessons about the acceptance of different modes of transport. The most important is that only an alignment of technical, economic, political and social conditions resulted in the acceptance of the gasoline car. This implies that efforts to alter modern modes of transportation must not only respond to technical challenges, but also create proper economic incentives, engender political support, and shape social and cultural attitudes. History implies that policies attempting to overcome technical or social barriers isolation – such as merely developing a better engine or educating automobile drivers about other options – will not work alone. The saga of early vehicles suggests that policymakers can do four things to promote alternative forms of transport: (1) alter R&D approaches and practices; (2) remove subsidies for gasoline vehicles; (3) internalize the negative externalities associated with vehicle use; and (4) improve the information given to drivers and the public. First, R&D practices for transportation technologies need to change if consumers are to accept alternatives. The history of early vehicles reminds us that the modes of transport consumers decide to adopt are not determined solely by technical factors. Historians and sociologists have called this the “social shaping” or “social construction” of technological systems: to be successful, technologies must not only get built, but get built into society. Viewing technologies as socially constructed emphasizes that knowledge, technical devices, and people must be aligned, molded, and disciplined to accept certain types of technology. The view implies that once a technology has been stabilized or successful, the bulk of this complex and highly contingent world fades from view (Bijker & Law, 1992; Hughes, 1987; Paterson, 2007). Correspondingly, an amalgam of interconnected technical, economic, political, and socio-cultural elements were responsible for the relative success of the gasoline vehicle. Technical dimensions such as the vehicle's range and performance played a part, but product styling, consumer attitudes, and deeper values relating to individualism, mobility, comfort, and identity were also important. If one accepts that automobiles are chosen for reasons extending beyond the “rational” or “technical,” then transportation R&D pathways aimed at promoting new modes of transport must drastically change. The cultural dimension of vehicles implies that purely technical approaches will remain insufficient to facilitate consumer acceptance, and that policymakers continue to promote alternative technologies in the wrong way. Modern programs at the U.S. Department of Energy and research expenditures from automobile companies remain heavily centered on overcoming technical barriers in their promotion of newer alternative vehicles (Sovacool & Hirsh, 2009). A quick survey of the academic literature published on alternative fueled vehicles from 1998 to 2008, for example, found 2641 articles dealing with alternatives such as plug-in electric hybrids and those running on ethanol or biodiesel. Only 102, however, peripherally addressed non-technical concerns such as consumer values and attitudes, and only 12 dealt with them directly and comprehensively—less than half of a percent. Despite the billions of dollars in research and development, procurement, tax incentives, tax credits, subsidies, standards, and financial assistance, the impediments to more sustainable forms of transport remain at least partly social and cultural. Until these remaining cultural barriers are targeted in the same way that engineers and scientists tackle technical impediments, the promise of new transport systems will remain unfulfilled. Consumer attitudes, values, and expectations are just as important as improved tires, better fuel economy, longer lasting batteries, and tougher and lighter materials in why people embrace some modes of transport. Second, subsidies play a huge role in developing transportation systems, and they must be reduced or eliminated for gasoline vehicles if other modes of transport are to succeed. The history of early vehicles demonstrates that government support is essential to the development of all new technologies. In the case of gasoline vehicles, political support has included strong subsidies for oil exploration and production which lowered the price of petroleum; the construction of roads and highways; wartime efforts during World War I that helped promote the mass production of gasoline powered vehicles; and political backing for a shift in freight transport from congested trains to gasoline powered trucks. Such political support, however, makes it difficult for alternative modes of transport to compete with conventional vehicles. Because they spread government benefits unevenly, immediate repeal of existing subsidies for conventional vehicles and fuels would bring about drastic and important changes. Removal of subsidies would send market signals to consumers and encourage more rational use and valuation of transportation options. Subsidies actively discourage consumers from seeking other modes of transport, encourage the overconsumption of gasoline and oil, and lead to petroleum capacity developments and consumer patterns in excess of true needs. One group of economists calculated that by merely cutting fuel subsidies for gasoline by 80%, global demand for oil would immediately drop by 5%—the equivalent of removing 2.5 million barrels of oil a day from the market (Regan, 2008). Elimination of subsidies would thus improve competition in the transportation sector, reducing the unfair advantage given to gasoline vehicles and petroleum-based modes of transport. Third, it is important for energy and transport systems to internalize, to the extent possible, all of their externalities, or costs and benefits. One reason gasoline vehicles have achieved their popularity is because they are able to externalize many of the costs of driving to society. If even just a small fraction of the damages associated with gasoline automobile use—dependence on oil, fuel shocks and disruptions, traffic congestion, road construction, environmental pollution, and climate change—were included in the price of driving those vehicles, prices would rise at least 2–30 cents for every passenger kilometer traveled. This amount is three to four times the revenue paid by consumers in fuel taxes, meaning that many of the costs of the current transport system are not borne by drivers, but by all taxpayers, whether they use gas-powered vehicles or not (Bickel & Friedrich, 1997; Delucchi, 1997; Maddison, 1997). Furthermore, many of the costs of conventional automobiles are bundled into the price of non-transportation goods and services. “Free” parking at a shopping mall is un-priced, but its cost is included in the price of goods and services sold at the mall. Few drivers, similarly, are aware of how expensive it is to build and operate automobile parking for employees, since its cost is meshed together with other things. Maintaining government bureaus and departments of motor vehicles that issue drivers licenses, along with the maintenance of an active force of police officers, fire fighters, doctors, lawyers, and judges to deal with traffic accidents, is also deemed a public good, but it is paid for by all taxpayers rather than just drivers (Delucchi, 1997). The consequence of failing to match the price of driving gasoline vehicles with its cost is twofold. It masks the true costs of driving and is inherently inequitable, since it forces non-drivers to assume some of the social costs of a transportation system they do not use. It also contributes to low public awareness. Most Americans believe that gasoline taxes pay for all roads, when 40% of the costs of road construction and maintenance come from other sources, such as property taxes (Replogle, 1997). Internalizing many of these externalities would send consumers proper price signals so that they could utilize modes of transport and transportation fuels more efficiently and judiciously. Which leads us to a fourth important point: if one accepts that social and cultural forces play an important role in transportation decisions, then the public needs better information about the consequences of their driving. This information can take two forms: improved vehicle instrumentation and increased public awareness. Rather than merely listing current fuel economy for vehicles in miles or kilometers per gallon, for example, instruments in vehicles could display how fuel economy is affected by driving patterns and suggest ways of improvement. Such real-time feedback could enhance driving performance, especially if it also includes retrospective information after a trip is completed (Donmez, Linda, & John, 2007; Donmez, Linda, & John, 2008). Improved public awareness goes hand in hand with better instrumentation. A national driving and transportation education campaign could include grade-school classes on energy and the environment; public demonstrations and tours of alternative modes of transport; improved labeling, rating and certification programs for automobiles; and a federal information “clearing house” consisting of websites, free books, indexing services, and libraries to help consumers gather and process information in order to make more informed decisions about their choice of transport. Such information programs, however, must be carefully tailored. Information is less likely to be used if it requires effort, or arrives when drivers and car owners are busy with other things. Some vehicles use different fuels, such as gasoline, diesel, or ethanol, and drivers vary in their income, tenure, and individual needs. To avoid creating information that is merely a distraction, “general” or “generic” distribution strategies must be avoided. Unfortunately, pursuing a different approach to R&D, removing subsidies, internalizing externalities, and improving information will not work in isolation. Changing R&D practices without removing subsidies for gasoline vehicles, for instance, would still incentivize conventional modes of transport. Removing subsidies without promoting public information and education will ensure that consumers remain uninformed about other options and the inefficiency of their driving practices. Some energy services fulfill social functions independent of cost, so that people will ignore price changes for as long as possible until it becomes completely prohibitive and a threshold is passed. Schneider (1975) found that a 17% change in the price of gasoline in 1974 produced no change in sales among a survey of consumers, and that a price increase of at least 170% would be needed to reduce gasoline consumption by 20%. Pitts, John, and Daniel (1981) examined driving behavior from 1973 to 1979, when global gas prices were both volatile and escalating (some periods saw price increases of more than 50%). The researchers found that adjustments in terms of miles driven and fuel efficiency of owned vehicles remained temporary and then stagnated. Driving decreased during some rapid price escalations but quickly returned to normal. The study suggests that consumers want to preserve their lifestyles and will do so until costs become prohibitive, but will return as urgently as possible to previous levels of consumption once prices have stabilized. In order to be effective, regulators must design policy mechanisms that match the technical-economic-political-socio-cultural dimensions of automobiles and transportation systems. Once recognized, they must consistently pursue a variety of policy mechanisms that simultaneously alter R&D practices, fine tune subsidies, price externalities, and better inform the public if they are to affect consumer demand and promote more sustainable modes of transport. 5 Conclusions It is often mistakenly assumed that technological evolution occurs in a Darwinian world in which all technological possibilities begin on equal footing and advance or stagnate according to relative efficiency or social merit. Such an idyllic notion obscures the fact that all modes of transport require government support. The diffusion of early vehicles in the United States, such as EVs, steamers, gasoline automobiles, streetcars, and railways, has historically been a conflicted process, occurring in fits and starts, associated with different visions and values, success never guaranteed for any option, with eventual dominance achieved by gasoline vehicles slowly over time. Transportation policy and technology thus emerge as the outcome of contingent and uneven development that reflect not so much the planned needs expressed by completely rational manufacturers and drivers, but encompass a web of overlapping technical, economic, political, and socio-cultural elements and priorities. Within such an environment, the relative success of the gasoline vehicle was connected to more than mere technology. Even though EVs initially had many advantages over gasoline- and steam-powered transport, including quieter operation, cleaner performance, and the seemingly attractive vision of a “horseless America,” they ultimately faced rejection by consumers and industrialists. EV technology, aimed at a luxury market, did not improve rapidly enough compared to gasoline vehicle technology, which was mass produced for many different types of drivers. EVs were more expensive than gasoline vehicles, had slower top speeds, were difficult to charge, and were mostly confined to urban areas. As important, EVs came to be seen as old fashioned and feminine; streetcars and trolleys as tools of corruption; trains as dehumanizing. Gasoline automobiles, instead, were associated with individualism, social renewal, family solidarity, meritocracy, and universality. Manufacturers shrewdly designed dealerships and offered test drives, provided low-cost financing and insurance, and implemented aggressive advertising campaigns aimed at men, women, and families. Significant advances in design, many borrowed from carriages, bicycles, trains, and EVs, increased the performance of gasoline vehicles and reduced their cost. The social influence of rural populations, well publicized long-distance races and tours, a series of automobile shows, and linkages between the automobile industry and other sectors of the economy convinced steel manufacturers, road construction firms, advertising agencies, banks, financers, insurance companies, and politicians to support the gasoline vehicle. Gasoline automobiles were zealously endorsed during World War I as a military necessity, benefitted from many technological developments that improved their efficiency and range while lowering their cost, were blessed with the construction of highways and roads funded by taxpayers, and were supported by an effectively organized consortium of automobile manufacturers and oil companies. Electric utilities, the primary fuel suppliers for mass transit systems and EVs, and other stakeholders could not agree about how best to position electricity as a fuel for the transportation sector, remained fragmented, and focused on other markets. The history of motorized transport in the United States reminds us that the success of the gasoline automobile was seamlessly and intimately connected to business strategies, consumer acceptance and values, political support, and economic performance. The relative failure of EVs, streetcars, railroads, and other early modes of transport, and the rise of the gasoline automobile, serve as an important reminder that the decisions we all make about transportation are seldom about technology alone. References W.J. Belasco . Cars versus trains: 1980 and 1910. H.D. George, H.R. Mark. Energy and transport: Historical perspectives on policy issues . 1982 ; Sage : London 39 – 53 . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC P. Bickel , R. Friedrich. External costs of transport in Germany. H. Olav, L.O. Richard, R. Klaus. Social costs and sustainability: Valuation and implementation in the energy and transport sector . 1997 ; Springer : New York 341 – 355 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS Google Preview WorldCat COPAC W. Bijker , J. Law. General introduction. W. Bijker, J. Law. Shaping technology/building society: Studies in sociotechnical change . 1992 ; MIT Press : Cambridge, MA Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC K. Borg . The ‘Chauffeur Problem’ in the early auto era: Structuration theory and the users of technology . Technology & Culture . 40 ( 4 ): 1999 ; 797 – 832 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat S.L. Bottles . Los Angeles and the automobile: The making of a modern city. 1987 ; University of California Press : Berkeley M.B. Brown . The civic shaping of technology: California's electric vehicle program . Science, Technology & Human Values . 26 ( 1 ): 2001 ; 56 – 81 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat S. D’Agostino . The electric car: A historical survey on the motives driving its existence . Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers Potentials . 1993 ; 28 – 32 . (February). Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat M.A. Delucchi . The annualized social cost of motor vehicle use in the U.S. H. Olav, L.O. Richard, R. Klaus. Social costs and sustainability: Valuation and implementation in the energy and transport sector . 1997 ; Springer : New York 382 – 417 . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC B. Donmez , B. Linda, L. John. Safety implications of providing real-time feedback to distracted drivers . Accident Analysis and Prevention . 39 2007 ; 581 – 590 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS PubMed WorldCat B. Donmez , B. Linda, L. John. Mitigating driver distraction with retrospective and concurrent feedback . Accident Analysis and Prevention . 40 2008 ; 776 – 786 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS PubMed WorldCat J.A. Dunn . Driving forces: The automobile, its enemies and the politics of mobility. 1998 ; Brookings Institution Press : Washington, DC B. Epperson . Failed colossus: Strategic error at the pope manufacturing company 1878 to 1900 . Technology & Culture . 41 2000 ; 300 – 320 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat E.A. Fagen . Wheels reasonable and unreasonable: A scientist looks at the automobile. B. John, H.C. Mary, R. Daniel. Technology and energy choice . 1983 ; University of Delaware : Delaware 12 – 29 . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC J.J. Flink . America adopts the automobile. K. Melvin, A.H. Timothy, L.S. Jane. Energy and the way we live . 1980 ; Boyd & Fraser Publishing : San Francisco 136 – 141 . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC P.J. Fontaine . Shortening the path to energy independence: A policy agenda to commercialize battery-electric vehicles . Electricity Journal . 21 ( (July) 6 ): 2008 ; 22 – 42 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat M. Hard , A. Knie. The ruler of the game: The defining power of the standard automobile. S. Knut. The car and its environments: The past, present and future of the motorcar in Europe . 1994 ; European Commission : Brussels 137 – 158 . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC M. Hard , A. Knie. The cultural dimensions of technology management: Lessons from the history of the automobile . Technology Analysis & Strategic Management . 13 ( 1 ): 2001 ; 91 – 102 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat P. Hawken . The ecology of commerce: A declaration of sustainability. 1993 ; Harper Collins : New York D.A. Hounshell . From the American system to mass production 1800–1932. 1984 ; Johns Hopkins University Press : Baltimore T.P. Hughes . The evolution of large technological systems. E.B. Wiebe, T.P. Hughes, J.P. Trevor. The social construction of technological systems: New directions in the sociology and history of technology . 1987 ; MIT Press : Cambridge, MA 52 . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC D.A Kirsch . The electric vehicle and the burden of history. 2000 ; Rutgers University Press : London J.M. Laux . Trucks in the West during the First World War . Journal of Transport History . 6 1985 ; 64 – 70 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat C. Lyle . Internal fire: The internal combustion engine. 1976 ; Carnot Press : Lake Oswego pp. 1673–1900. D. Maddison . The true cost of road transport in the United Kingdom. H. Olav, L.O. Richard, R. Klaus. Social costs and sustainability: Valuation and implementation in the energy and transport sector . 1997 ; Springer : New York 357 – 379 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS Google Preview WorldCat COPAC W. McDonough , M. Braungart. Cradle to cradle: Remaking the way we make things. 2002 ; Farrar, Straus, and Giroux : New York C. McShane . Down the asphalt path: The automobile and the American City. 1995 ; Columbia University Press : New York G.P.A. Mom , A.D. Kirsch. Technologies in tension: Horses, electric trucks, and the motorization of American Cities, 1900 to 1925 . Technology & Culture . 42 ( July ): 2001 ; 489 – 518 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat G.P.A. Mom . The electric vehicle: Technology and expectations in the automobile age. 2004 ; Johns Hopkins University Press : Baltimore L. Mumford . Our motorized mistress. K. Melvin, A.H. Timothy, L.S. Jane. Energy and the way we live . 1980 ; Boyd & Fraser Publishing : San Francisco 168 – 170 . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC D.K. Newman , D. Don. The American energy consumer. 1975 ; Ballinger Publishing Company : Cambridge, MA T.P. O’Hanlon . General motors, nazis, and the demise of urban rail transit . Government Publications Review . 11 1984 ; 211 – 232 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat M. Paterson . Automobile politics: Ecology and cultural political economy. 2007 ; Cambridge University Press : Cambridge R.E. Pitts , F.W. John, L.S. Daniel. Consumer adaptation to gasoline price increases . Journal of Consumer Research . 8 1981 ; 322 – 330 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat John B. Rae . The electric vehicle company: A monopoly that missed . The Business History Review . 29 ( (December) 4 ): 1955 ; 298 – 311 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Regan , T. ( 2008 ). Relations Between Producers and Consumers of Energy. Seminar on Sustainable Development and Energy Security , vol. 1, Singapore : Institute of Southeast Asian Studies , April 22 and 23. Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC L.S. Reich . Betrayed by batteries? . Science . 291 ( (February) 23 ): 2001 ; 1495 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat M. Replogle . Overcoming barriers to transportation cost internalization. H. Olav, L.O. Richard, R. Klaus. Social costs and sustainability: Valuation and implementation in the energy and transport sector . 1997 ; Springer : New York 433 – 447 . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC P. Rosen . Towards sustainable and democratic urban transport: Constructivism, planning, and policy . Technology Analysis & Strategic Management . 13 ( 1 ): 2001 ; 117 – 135 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat V. Scharff . Taking the wheel: Women and the coming of the motor age. 1992 ; University of New Mexico Press : Albuquerque Shields , W. M. ( 2007 ). The automobile as an open to closed technological system. Theory and practice in the study of technological systems . Ph.D. Dissertation, Blacksburg : Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University , October 2. Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC M.B. Schiffer . Taking charge: The electric automobile in America. 1994 ; Smithsonian Institution : Washington, DC W. Schivelbusch . The railway journey: The industrialization of time and space in the 19th century. 1977 ; University of California Press : Los Angeles A.M. Schneider . Elasticity of demand for gasoline . Energy Systems and Policy . 1 ( 3 ): 1975 ; 277 – 284 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Z. Schrag . The bus is young and honest: Transportation politics, technical choice, and the motorization of Manhattan surface transit . Technology & Culture . 41 2000 ; 51 – 79 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat B.K. Sovacool . Solving the oil independence problem: Is it possible? . Energy Policy . 35 ( (November) 11 ): 2007 ; 5505 – 5514 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Sovacool , B. K. , & Hirsh , R. F. ( 2009 ). Beyond batteries: The benefits and barriers to a plug-in hybrid electric and vehicle-to-grid transition . Energy Policy , 37 , forthcoming. Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat B. Snell . American ground transport. 1974 ; Senate Committee on the Judiciary : Washington, DC D. St. Clair . The motorization of American cities. 1986 ; Praegar : New York M.M. Trescott . The bicycle, a technical precursor to the automobile . Business and Economic History . 2 ( 5 ): 1976 ; 51 – 75 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Turrentine , T. , Lee-Gosselin , M., Kurani , K., & Sperling , D. ( 1992 ). A study of adaptive and optimizing behavior for electric vehicles based on interactive simulation games and revealed behavior of electric vehicle owners . Working Paper No. 130, University of California Transportation Center. R. Volti . Why internal combustion? . Invention and Technology . 6 ( 2 ): 1990 ; 42 – 47 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat R. Volti . Cars and culture: The life story of a technology. 2004 ; Greenwood : Westport C.W. Wells . The road to the model T: Culture, road conditions, and innovation at the dawn of the American motor age . Technology & Culture . 48 ( July ): 2007 ; 497 – 523 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat B.D. Williams , K.S. Kurani. Commercializing light-duty plug-in/plug-out hydrogen-fuel-cell vehicles: Mobile Electricity technologies and opportunities . Journal of Power Sources . 166 2007 ; 549 – 566 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat S. Wyatt . Automobilities . Science, Technology & Human Values . 31 ( 5 ): 2006 ; 631 – 635 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Dr. Benjamin K. Sovacool is a Research Fellow in the Energy Governance Program at the Centre on Asia and Globalization, part of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy at the National University of Singapore. He is also an Adjunct Assistant Professor at the Virginia Polytechnic Institute & State University. He has worked in advisory and research capacities at the U.S. National Science Foundation's Electric Power Networks Efficiency and Security Program, Virginia Tech Consortium on Energy Restructuring, Virginia Center for Coal and Energy Research, New York State Energy Research and Development Authority, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, and U.S. Department of Energy's Climate Change Technology Program. He is the co-editor with Marilyn A. Brown of Energy and American Society: Thirteen Myths (2007) and the author of The Dirty Energy Dilemma: What's Blocking Clean Power in the United States (2008). He is also a frequent contributor to such journals as Electricity Journal, Energy & Environment, and Energy Policy. © 2009 Policy and Society Associates (APSS) This article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (https://academic.oup.com/journals/pages/open_access/funder_policies/chorus/standard_publication_model)
TI - Early modes of transport in the United States: Lessons for modern energy policymakers
JF - Policy & Society
DO - 10.1016/j.polsoc.2009.01.006
DA - 2009-03-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/early-modes-of-transport-in-the-united-states-lessons-for-modern-huIP4Kpz0R
SP - 411
EP - 427
VL - 27
IS - 4
DP - DeepDyve
ER -