TY - JOUR
AU - 
AB - Public Choice (2017) 172:399–419 DOI 10.1007/s11127-017-0452-x Condemning corruption while condoning inefficiency: an experimental investigation into voting behavior 1 2 Paulo Arvate Sergio Mittlaender Received: 14 December 2016 / Accepted: 26 April 2017 / Published online: 17 May 2017 The Author(s) 2017. This article is an open access publication Abstract This article reports results from an economic experiment that investigates the extent to which voters punish corruption and waste in elections. While both are responsible for reductions in voters’ welfare, they are not necessarily perceived as equally immoral. The empirical literature in political agency has not yet dealt with these two dimensions of voters’ choice calculus. Our results suggest that morality and norms are indeed crucial for a superior voting equilibrium in systems with heterogeneous politicians: while corruption always is punished, self-interest alone—in the absence of norms—leads to the acceptance and perpetuation of waste and social losses. Keywords Corruption  Waste  Elections  Experiment JEL Classification C91  D72  H23  H72 1 Introduction Elections serve two main functions in representative democracies: they allow voters to select the politicians that best represent their preferences and to punish incumbents that misbehave. Theory (Barro 1973; Ferejohn 1986; Persson and Tabellini 
TI - Condemning corruption while condoning inefficiency: an experimental investigation into voting behavior
JO - Public Choice
DO - 10.1007/s11127-017-0452-x
DA - 2017-05-17
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/unpaywall/condemning-corruption-while-condoning-inefficiency-an-experimental-hD9cgPOYeh
DP - DeepDyve
ER -