TY - JOUR
AU - Tomalin,, Emma
AB - Abstract In this article, drawing on the work of the development sociologist Norman Long, I make the case for an actor-oriented approach to understanding the ‘turn to religion’ by global aid actors over the past couple of decades. I ask, is the ‘turn to religion’ evidence of the emergence of post-secular partnerships or are faith actors being instrumentalized to serve neo-liberal development goals? I argue that neither option captures the whole story and advocate that the study of religion and development needs to move beyond a binary between the ‘turn to religion’ as either evidence of post-secular partnerships or of the ‘instrumentalization’ of religion by the secular global aid business, and instead to think about how faith actors themselves encounter and shape development discourses and frameworks, translate them into relevant formats and strategically employ them. Alongside the adoption of an actor-orientated approach, I build on the work of Lewis and Mosse, Olivier de Sardan and Bierschenk to view international faith-based organizations (IFBOs) as development brokers and translators. This approach allows me to articulate the distinctive role that many members of IFBOs report they play as intermediaries who shift register between the secular development language and the faith-inspired language of their local faith partners. I take the engagement of faith actors with the new Sustainable Development Goals framework as a case-study to explore this. In the past 20 years, national and international funders have developed an interest in better understanding and cooperating with FBOs [faith-based organizations]. The World Bank, and a number of EU Member States have developed programmes and expertise in this field. Part of the reason for the growing interest in the work of FBOs is the recognition that religious affiliation often plays a major role in the beneficiary societies, and that working with religious leaders in those communities is often the most effective way of reaching local people.1 This quotation, from a European Parliamentary Research Service briefing, sums up a major shift that has taken place over the past two decades. FBOs today receive larger portions of global aid budgets for their work than they did in the past, and are seen as legitimate and valued global development and humanitarian actors.2 For instance, during the presidency of George W. Bush the United States almost doubled funding to faith-based groups, from 10.5 per cent of aid in 2001 to 19.9 per cent in 2005.3 In the United Kingdom, the white paper published in 2009 by the Department for International Development (DfID) promised to double funding to FBOs, reflecting recognition of the ‘unique contribution that they can make in both delivering development on the ground, and connecting with communities here and abroad’.4 In 2013 Christian Aid was the sixth largest recipient of funding from DfID,5 and in 2011 the evangelical Christian FBO Tearfund reported that it had received £6 million (approximately 11 per cent of its total income) in government donor funding in 2005, and that this rose to £21 million (approximately 35 per cent of total income) in 2010.6 While FBOs did receive donor funding before this ‘turn to religion’, this path of action was either not much remarked on or viewed with reservation, and even at times deliberately avoided by some donors, out of anxiety about the ethics of entangling aid with religion.7 However, as Swart and Nell write, not only have ‘national and international funders … developed an interest in better understanding and cooperating with FBOs’, but development studies has also sharpened its focus on this area, with an exponential rise in studies from around 2003.8 More recently, the study of humanitarianism is also demonstrating a growing engagement with religious topics.9 Various explanations for this have been posited. First, scholars have come to realize the limitations of the secularization thesis and that modernization and secularization do not necessarily go together. Second, the rise of political Islam has awakened academics and policy-makers to the continuing significance of religious identities more broadly. Finally, the increasing proliferation of NGOs in the aid business, as well as critiques of development for focusing on economic development at the expense of more people-centred development, has led to an opening up of the development and humanitarian space that has been conducive to faith actors who have shaped themselves into NGOs.10 My aim in this article is to draw upon, critique and develop existing analytical and theoretical tools within sociology and anthropology to formulate a new framework for interpreting faith actors' experience of the ‘turn to religion’ by the global aid business. I argue that the analysis offered by both academics and practitioners has become bifurcated, with many viewing the ‘turn to religion’ as proof of the emergence of post-secular partnerships,11 while others take it as testament that the international aid business instrumentalizes faith actors to achieve its own goals.12 For instance, writing about the increased engagement between international actors and faith actors, Haynes calls today's international environment ‘post-secular’; Ager and Ager say that we are living in a ‘post-secular age’; and Cloke and Beaumont use the term ‘post-secular partnerships’ specifically to denote instances where ‘FBOs deliberately enter into partnership with others’ who do not share their faith tradition.13 Alongside this ample discourse about the post-secular runs that about instrumentalization, where, as Karam writes, some have ‘voiced their unease that this interest in religion may be another passing fad that seeks to capitalize on their strengths and even attempt to change their way of doing things, almost as if a covert attempt were at hand to secularize the religious’.14 I argue that neither analysis adequately captures faith actors' experience of the religion–development–humanitarianism nexus. ‘Post-secular’, however we define it, is a misleading term that obscures the way in which faith actors who engage with the international system have to modify their language and mission, and reshape themselves as ostensibly secular organizations in these interactions.15 This is not just a matter of semantics; it is problematic because, although global development and humanitarian institutions are now taking religion more seriously, they predominantly and selectively partner with faith actors that are already visible and functional at the international level. As anthropologist of development Olivier de Sardan argues, these actors have ‘mastery of the development language’ which ‘is their ticket for entry into an international network, access to the developmentalist configuration and therefore to the promise of funds and projects’.16 This leads to an assumption by many global development and humanitarian actors that they have ticked the ‘religion box’ through their work with international FBOs (IFBOs)—i.e. those that work in multiple countries and are connected to the global aid system—while the great diversity of so-called ‘local faith actors’ (LFAs), who are closest to communities in need but ‘have not yet acquired the language spoken in the world of development’,17 are for the most part marginalized and excluded from mainstream development and humanitarian partnerships.18 The localization of aid is particularly important and topical at the present time, given the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit's ‘Grand Bargain’, which ‘commits donors and aid organizations to providing 25 per cent of global humanitarian funding to local and national responders by 2020’.19 As figure 1 demonstrates, the category of ‘faith actor’ covers a diverse range of organizations, projects and individuals. While international FBOs such as Tearfund and Islamic Relief, as well as many national FBOs in different settings, self-identify as development and humanitarian actors and are familiar with the language of the global aid business, there are also countless local faith leaders, places of worship and small faith-based civil society organizations (CSOs), many of which emerge in response to immediate need, but which are not part of the global aid machinery. Figure 1: Open in new tabDownload slide What do we mean by ‘faith actors’? Figure 1: Open in new tabDownload slide What do we mean by ‘faith actors’? There is also no evidence to suggest that faith actors are simply passive targets for global development discourses and policies.20 In order to make sense of this picture, I propose to apply the actor-orientated approach of the development sociologist Norman Long,21 which he began to work on in the 1980s. I argue that the study of the religion–development–humanitarianism nexus needs to move beyond a binary opposition between the ‘turn to religion’ as evidence either of post-secular partnerships or of the instrumentalization of religion by the secular global aid business, and instead to think about how faith actors themselves encounter and shape development discourses and frameworks, translate them into relevant formats and employ them strategically.22 Here we encounter the structure–agency dilemma that has been played out across the social and political sciences. An actor-orientated approach draws our attention away from the structures that enable, facilitate or compel certain types of development discourse and practice, as the only or most significant factor in our analysis, and focuses attention instead on the way in which, as Anderson and Patterson argue, ‘development discourse's “elasticity” enables dominated people to contest, use, manipulate and redefine it’.23 Rather than relying upon a structural approach to consider the impact of development discourses and frameworks, Long views ‘development arenas’ as ‘social locations or situations in which contests over issues, resources, values, and representations take place’.24 He proposes an ‘actor-oriented interface analysis for understanding cultural diversity, social difference and conflict inherent in processes of development intervention’.25 The specific development arena I focus on here is that surrounding the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which replaced the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2015. Within this arena I will apply an actor-orientated interface analysis in seeking to understand the role played by IFBOs in this domain from their perspective. I take a number of steps to avoid the criticism of some scholars, including Rossi, that the compartmentalization of ‘aid givers’ and ‘aid recipients’ in Long's interface analysis, ‘as if they were social groups governed by different, or even incompatible logics’,26 is reductionist and polarizing. First, alongside the adoption of an actor-orientated interface analysis, I build on the work of Kraft and Smith, who draw attention to the crucial role that ‘faith-based organisations (FBOs) play in acting as intermediaries between international donors and local faith communities (LFCs)’.27 I extend their analysis by locating it within the literature on development brokers and translators, advanced by anthropologists of development in the early 2000s, including Lewis and Mosse, Olivier de Sardan and Bierschenk.28 Despite the relevance of this body of literature to understanding the role that FBOs play as intermediaries and brokers, it has not yet been widely adopted to establish an analytical framework for interpreting the ‘turn to religion’.29 This approach will allow me to articulate the distinctive role that many members of FBOs report they play as intermediaries who shift register between the secular development language and the faith-inspired language of their local faith partners. The SDGs are a particularly good vehicle for exploring the localization of a global framework and the role that development intermediaries and brokers play in this. I also acknowledge the influence of Pierre Bourdieu upon Long's actor-orientated interface analysis and suggest that bringing Bourdieu more strongly into the discourse is useful, for two main reasons. First, it weakens critiques that an actor-orientated interface analysis neglects ‘broader issues of power and structure’.30 For Bourdieu, human agency is influenced not only by objective structures in societies, but also by internalized subjective structures; and he proposed ‘a science of dialectical relations between objective structures … and the subjective dispositions within which these structures are actualized and which tend to reproduce them’.31 He used the term ‘habitus’ to refer to this learned set of dispositions that individuals use to navigate their way in society, comprising a ‘structured and structuring structure’.32 I will argue that Bourdieu's ‘thinking’ tools, in particular the concepts of habitus, field and capital,33 offer a way of theorizing the ‘turn to religion’ by the global aid business that avoids the trap of essentializing it as evidence of either post-secular partnerships or the instrumentalization of religion. Second, Bourdieu's theory of fields offers a way of thinking about Long's interfaces as locations where mediation, translation and brokerage take place, directing attention to overlapping interests and shared languages between different actors in development–humanitarian domains, rather than rigid divides and opposing agendas. In the first section below I argue that the ‘turn to religion’ by global development and humanitarian actors has been selective and normative. With respect to the UN, for instance, Haynes tells us that if faith actors want ‘to gain entry into debates and discussions at the UN … [they] … must accord with the UN's secular, liberal and irreligious values’.34 Not all faith actors can or want to do this, or even know that it is possible, and those who do not are therefore unable to directly engage in a meaningful way on the global level that has such significant impacts on many of their options. Since the early 2000s a cadre of IFBOs has emerged which secularize their mission and language in their interactions with global development and humanitarian actors. In the second section I briefly discuss two excellent recent ethnographies of IFBOs, using these studies to examine how these organizations navigate their positions within the secular global development and humanitarian sphere as faith actors.35 I will demonstrate that the ‘language spoken in the world of development’36 is experienced by faith actors as a ‘secular lexicon’ that can threaten what they consider to be distinctive about their faith identity and approach. At the same time, however, they shift register between secular development language and faith language, enabling them to connect not only with their volunteers and supporters who are receptive to a faith register, but also with the LFAs with whom they act in partnership, most of whom are marginalized in the global aid project. In the final section, I draw on recent fieldwork which has examined faith actors' engagement in the consultation, negotiation and implementation of the SDG framework, to demonstrate that IFBOs play an important, but not much recognized, role as development and humanitarian agents who, to extend the work of Lewis and Mosse, act as ‘brokers operating at the “interfaces” of different world-views and knowledge systems … negotiating roles, relationships, and representations’.37 Religion, development and humanitarianism: a selective and normative engagement The fact that faith actors are now seen as legitimate partners for global development and humanitarianism has been celebrated by both academics and practitioners.38 While some have argued that this increasing presence of faith actors in the global public sphere is evidence of post-secular partnerships, I doubt this, for two main reasons. First, at the level of global development and humanitarianism, this ‘turn to religion’ is selective as it typically misses out much local faith-based activity, for instance in places of worship and the congregations of charismatic religious leaders. As figure 1 shows, faith actors relevant to the global aid business extend beyond the IFBOs and internationally orientated faith leaders on which the global aid community has tended to focus its attention. Second, there is evidence that the way in which global institutions engage with faith actors tends to be normative and instrumental, and that there are certain modes of religious communication that are not facilitated in this interaction.39 Those working for faith-based organizations often claim that they ‘leave their faith at the door’ when they communicate with secular development actors.40 As Freeman notes, this amounts to rules of engagement that have posed a number of challenges for many Christian FBDOs [faith-based development organizations], often leading to them setting up special ‘secular’ work streams which can receive government funding, while more ‘faith-based’ work which includes evangelism is funded from individual donations. It has also led to what Ingie Hovland[41] has called a kind of ‘schizophrenia’ as FBOs use different language and discourse to speak to different audiences.42 To illustrate this, it is helpful to briefly examine the best-known version of post-secular theory, advocated by the political philosopher Jürgen Habermas. Habermas argues that society is becoming increasingly post-secular, and that secular and faith actors need to participate in a ‘complementary learning process’, so that ‘both sides can … then take seriously each other's contributions to controversial themes in the public sphere’.43 While this process of ‘communicative action’ might seem to suggest that individuals are able to share their perspectives in their own voices, and that different forms of knowledge are respected, he has been widely criticized for promoting a secularist position. He writes, for instance, that ‘in a constitutional state, all norms that can be legally implemented must be formulated and publicly justified in a language that all the citizens understand’.44 As Dillon argues, however, this requires ‘religious citizens’ to translate ‘their religious norms into a secular idiom’;45 indeed, it appears, he continues, that religious–secular dialogue is ‘not possible without putting one's faith in parenthesis’.46 This analysis, I argue, helps to make sense of the type of interaction that is going on in the ‘turn to religion’ by the global aid business. It engages selectively with faith actors who can take part in the right kind of ‘communicative action’. Habermas's version is not the only theory of the post-secular, although it has been the most influential; sociologist of religion James Beckford argues that when the term became popular in the late 1990s there were some ‘common concerns’ but that the ‘concept quickly acquired diverse and divergent meanings’.47 While the range of interpretations of what ‘post-secular’ means is certainly a product of the varied contexts and engagements in relation to which the term is employed, I argue that, however we define it, it is not well suited to describing the engagement between faith and global actors as evidenced by the ‘turn to religion’. The term is also open to criticism for reflecting a bias towards an interpretation of social change in the global North and taking this as the norm, when in much of the global South religion has remained influential in both the public and the private spheres. However, this is not my main concern here. While a space has opened up for faith actors to enter secular spheres that have previously eschewed religious contributions, I argue that to use the term ‘post-secular’ is disingenuous as it masks the fact that when faith actors engage with the international system they modify their language and mission, reshaping themselves as ostensibly secular actors in these interactions. As an article in The Economist points out, ‘the UN has retained a secularist jargon and ethos, so that even religious bodies have to use secularist language when they make arguments on the East River’.48 Fear about the potential secularization of their work has been a very real concern of IFBOs as they become mainstreamed into the global development and humanitarian system and receive larger amounts of funding from secular donors. I will explore this theme briefly through examples presented in two recent studies of international development/humanitarian organizations. Negotiating a faith identity in a secular space In order to give some evidence to support this discussion, I will draw here on Freeman's Tearfund and the quest for faith-based development and King's God's internationalists: world vision and the age of evangelical humanitarianism. Each provides a rich account of the organization's history, drawing on published sources, archival research and interviews. Each also covers many themes; but both clearly articulate the internal tensions that arise in negotiating a faith identity in a secular space. As Freeman writes, many in Tearfund perceived a tension between the organisation's faith-based nature and receiving funds from secular sources and were concerned whether accepting money from secular funders would influence the nature of its work and cause it to ‘secularise’ [and] that receiving this type of funding would limit their ability to act freely in a Christian manner.49 She goes on to point out that, as ‘Tearfund emerged into the broader humanitarian field, seeking institutional funding, signing up to international codes of conduct and taking part in broader coalitions, it was indeed faced with “secularising” demands as many had feared’.50 This included the requirement that in signing up to international standards and codes it accepted provisions constraining ‘in what ways and in what situations, it was possible and appropriate to evangelise. This, after all, was of fundamental importance to Tearfund as an evangelical organisation, and yet it appeared to have just signed up to standards that ruled out evangelism.’51 Tearfund's partners also faced the same questions, but ‘as a result several of them had to make changes in the way that they worked, such as stopping distributing Bibles during development work or preaching at disaster sites. In this way these local, Southern religious organisations became subjectivised to global norms.’52 King's history of World Vision illustrates many of the same themes: here, as the organization ‘professionalized, leadership carefully insisted how efficiency and accountability did not undercut the organization's Christian identity’.53 Nevertheless King emphasizes that, with increasing its professionalization, although ‘World Vision never hid its Christian identity … explicit language about mission now fell into the background’ and it dropped ‘the “evangelical code words” on which World Vision had often relied’.54 However, he argues that seeing this ‘evolution through a narrative of secularization’ is too simplistic, and instead that World Vision ‘strategically spoke in multiple registers as it sought influence among its various audiences’.55 The reality, however, is that an organization functions within not only one field but rather multiple fields—often simultaneously. For example, World Vision has operated within an American evangelical subculture, a collection of missionary agencies, a global evangelicalism, large-scale fund-raising nonprofit organizations, and a secular development INGO network. Understanding World Vision fully requires investigating the multiple contexts and networks in which it operates and the various audiences to which it articulates its identity.56 Acknowledging that secularization and instrumentalization arouse real fears within many IFBOs as they professionalize, I propose that an actor-orientated interface analysis can assist in understanding the various interactions that IFBOs have with their multiple audiences from their own perspective. As Long writes: The analysis of power processes should not therefore be restricted to an understanding of how social constraints and access to resources shape social action. Nor should it lead to the description of rigid hierarchical categories and hegemonic ideologies that ‘oppress passive victims’. Standing back from the tendency to empathise ideologically with these hapless victims, one should, instead, explore the extent to which specific actors perceive themselves capable of manoeuvring within given contexts or networks and develop strategies for doing so. This is not to fail to recognise the often much restricted space for individual initiative but rather to examine, within the constraints encountered, how actors identify and create space for their own interests and for change.57 Rossi's critique that Long's interface analysis reduces our view of the development–humanitarian domain to a conflict between different life worlds that have no common ground is misleading, since ‘roles are more flexible … and are continuously renegotiated depending on context and intersubjectivity’58 needs to be considered and is relevant for my analysis of how faith actors negotiate their faith identity in secular spaces. In fact, it is misleading and reductionist to view any space as distinctly and rigidly secular or faith-based; rather, actors encounter both secular and faith-based dynamics and languages across all development and humanitarian spaces. For instance, as I discuss below, faith spaces are increasingly opening up within the global development–humanitarian domain, one example being the UN's Strategic Learning Exchange around faith and the SDGs. Moreover, faith actors do not always talk to other faith actors using a faith lexicon: much of the work that IFBOs do with local communities, even where they share a faith tradition, is not religious in any way. However, there is evidence to suggest that certain ways of communicating dominate in different spaces and that people adapt their register accordingly. As King notes in respect of World Vision, this shifting register is not just about ‘hedging its bets’, but instead reflects a firm belief in the organization's ability to navigate between faith and secular spaces, having ‘a unique role to play in all these spheres’.59 Extending the work of Bierschenk and colleagues to the religion–development–humanitarian domain, I argue that IFBOs are ‘brokers of development’ in the sense of ‘intermediaries who take advantage of the position at the interface between two social and cultural configurations’.60 Interfaces within the religion–development–humanitarian domain are not fixed and oppositional boundaries, but locations or, bringing Bourdieu into the discussion, ‘fields’, where actors come into contact around development and humanitarian policies and programmes, and brokers have a key role to play. Development brokers, according to Olivier de Sardan, ‘speak the local language (since they claim to “belong to the grassroots”, to be aware of its “needs” and to share its aspirations), but they must also master the development language (which is a prerequisite for their communication with donors)’.61 In the next section I take an example from my own recent fieldwork on the role that FBOs have played in the consultation, negotiation and implementation of the SDGs and view this as an ‘interface situation’ which, according to Long, provides ‘the means by which individuals or groups come to define their own cultural or ideological positions vis-à-vis those espousing or typifying opposing views’,62 as well as being the social and conceptual location where translation occurs. Religions and the SDGs: consultation, negotiation and implementation Background and research methods The data that will be analysed and interpreted here using an actor-orientated interface approach come from a research project I co-led between 2016 and 2019, funded by the Arts and Humanities Research Council in the UK, called ‘Keeping faith in 2030: religions and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)’. This research did not cover every interface within the religions and SDG domain; its primary focus was on the interface between the global aid system and FBOs, mainly international but also national, that have ‘mastery of the development language’.63 The SDGs came about following several years of discussion and negotiation. This began in 2012 as the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) approached their 2015 cut-off date. An intergovernmental open working group (OWG) was set up and, alongside this, the UN Secretary-General launched a High-level Panel of Eminent Persons to guide the discussions on the post-2015 agenda. The process included civil society actors, both through their involvement in the OWG consultations and through thematic and regional consultations that fed into the negotiations. These consultations aimed to reach a wide range of stakeholders, including governments, NGOs, the private sector, media, universities, think-tanks and the general public. It was also documented that over 7 million people took part in a survey up to the end of 2014 on the www.worldwewant2015.org website, which was also fed into the UN consultations.64 The ‘Keeping faith in 2030’ project involved three workshops,65 held in the UK, India and Ethiopia, with representatives from national and international FBOs already working in development and humanitarianism rather than LFAs, to discuss how they were involved in the consultation and negotiation process to set the SDGs, and how they were interpreting, adopting and implementing them in their work with local communities.66 All three workshops followed the same format so that comparisons could be made; they were composed of small group sessions that addressed the same series of questions in each setting. The sessions were recorded, and detailed notes were taken. We also carried out ten key informant interviews, one in the UK, four in Ethiopia, two in India and two in New York, from where the SDG process was coordinated. Ethical permission for this research was granted by the University of Leeds Research Ethics Committee. Interviews were recorded, transcribed and coded using the software NVivo. Participants in both the workshops and the interviews were promised anonymity. The two main research questions from this project that are relevant for the discussion in this article are: Given ‘the turn to religion’ by global development policy and practice, what role did faith actors play in the formulation of the SDGs as well as how they are now being implemented? Are they being instrumentalized or are we seeing post-secular partnerships? Findings and discussion In all three workshops but particularly in Ethiopia, participants indicated that their awareness of and participation in the SDG consultation process was very low; this pertained to both global and country-level consultations. Most had not even been aware that consultations were happening. Where they had participated, this was rather incidental and based on personal connections or professional networks. They had not been invited to participate as faith actors or to present a faith perspective, but attended in the same capacity as other CSOs. One interviewee at the UN in New York told me: ‘If you ask me frankly, there was no coordinated process in which inputs have been taken, in context of faith communities, that is the truth.’67 On the whole, the formal negotiation processes at the UN in New York, which took place in two phases between March 2013 and February 2014 (to agree the basic text) and between March and July 2014 (to firm up and agree the text),68 treated faith actors as civil society actors, their religious identity making little noticeable difference. An interviewee who was involved in the final negotiations reflected: Within the NGOs, how visible were faith groups? I'm asking myself. I honestly couldn't say that they were that visible, that's not to say that they weren't there, but I have a clearer sense of the faith community as it were from a couple of side events, which I addressed around that time.69 Despite the strong NGO presence, this interviewee reported: ‘I'm pretty certain that there wasn't a specific contribution made by anybody from a faith background.’70 This does not mean to say that FBOs were not in the room; indeed, I heard from several sources that World Vision had been prominent. Another interviewee at the UN told me: World Vision in particular did two things, they basically started their own consultations internally within their own World Vision networks, about the post 2015 and what kind of development, what were the issues they wanted to make sure were on the table. So they kind of raised awareness within their own networks and communities, which I thought was really smart and I think they were the only ones who did that, to be honest, from the faith-based NGOs. And then the second thing they did was they deliberately targeted the UN headquarters in Geneva, in New York and targeted individuals, heads of agencies on the issues they work on, so they work a lot on maternal mortality, on HIV/AIDS and children, so they targeted these particular UN entities, which work with them already on these issues … wanting to meet with them and consult with them and put their own issues onto the table … they started getting very actively involved in everything civil society-related in the UN, so any initiative that involved civil society, general society, World Vision was there and sometimes they were the only faith-based actor at that civil society event.71 This confirms King's observation, in his history of World Vision, that this organization has become adept at managing its faith identity in a secular space. An interviewee from World Vision also confirmed this, explaining that the fact that we have a faith identity in no way excluded or created any obstacle for us being involved there, but I guess we were involved and around the table because we're a large international development NGO, not explicitly as a faith voice. So our faith identity shapes a lot of what we can bring to the table but that's not the reason why we're invited into the room.72 Although World Vision did engage in some spaces where there was ‘an explicit identification of the faith basis for engaging … that was quite a small percentage of our overall engagement’.73 The main place where faith engagement around the SDGs has been formally nurtured within the UN system is in the UN Interagency Task Force on Engaging Religion for Sustainable Development (UNIATF), which is part of the UN Development Group. An interviewee explained that the task force existed since 2010 officially [but] the series of engagements across the UN system, to make the case for why religion matters in the first place, conceptually, practically etc., technically started in 2007, then it became formal as a process of (a) explaining what religion is, (b) explaining why and how it matters, (c) helping the different UN entities, of which there are over 60, get their own wisdom about how to engage better and even how to track their own engagement because many of them are engaged but the headquarter office wouldn't know, in London, Geneva, whatever, they wouldn't know.74 This interviewee emphasized that since 2007 we've actually allowed the faith-based organizations themselves to own their faith identity a lot more than they had themselves owned up to it. They had been so much ensconced in being an NGO and being accepted and acknowledged and doing the work and being part of the NGO world.75 Thus, spaces were opening up in the UN for faith actors to be faith actors, and this was requiring some readjustment and introducing some uncertainty about when to bring the faith dimension in and when to hold back. The same interviewee remarked: ‘It's a really important dilemma that wasn't there on the map just a few years ago, before we normalized the engagement.’76 In 2010 an initiative emerged from the UNIATF called the Strategic Learning Exchange, which was to provide opportunities for UN and FBO staff to learn from each other and to take stock of both successful and problematic partnerships. It was also an opportunity for FBOs to connect with each other: ‘the learning wasn't just for the UN, the learning eventually … started a process of internal reflection in their own organisations’.77 The timing of this initiative was propitious in coinciding with the emerging consultations on post-2015 plans, and in 2012, as Karam writes, a request was made by the UN Development Group ‘to convene a consultation that would help identify the particularities of religious development organizations in relation to the UN's post-2015 development agenda processes’.78 As an interviewee explained, it was really deliberately about convening the multitude of faith-based partners in different countries including here, but our offices in the Arab region, offices in African region, offices in Latin America region started doing that as well in 2012, systematic consultations with faith-based partners. ‘We're looking at beyond the MDGs, what do you want to tell us? What are the lessons you want to bring to the table? What are the issues you think need to be brought onto the table?’79 In May 2014, in the closing months of the SDG consultation process (which ended in July 2014), an informal two-day meeting entitled ‘Religion and development post-2015: challenges, opportunities and policy guidance’ was held in New York. The timing of this event suggests a focus on collaborations and partnerships that could be formed as the SDGs were rolled out and implemented, rather than on shaping the goals themselves. Nonetheless, while it did involve some limited consultation of faith actors as faith actors, rather than their all being bundled into broader civil society consultations, an interviewee at the UN in New York lamented that we deal with civil society and we deal with faith-based groups, as if they're not the same and the convenings, the consultations, the capacity building, the knowledge management that takes place, the policy advocacy takes place separately, which I think is remarkably stupid but there you are, that is where we're at now.80 Thus, there are spaces for faith actors to own their faith identity within the UN and these were operationalized during the SDG consultation and negotiation process; but these are kept separate from the mainstream processes, which remain secular and are where faith actors switch from a faith register to a secular register. However, as Karam writes, this separation is in part a response to calls for a ‘safe space’ (as opposed to an ‘ordinary consultation’) based on the ‘realization that no conversation about any aspect of religion, especially when based on contemporary real-life situations in diverse contexts, could avoid political sensitivities’.81 It is important, however, not to give the impression that faith values cannot be felt in secular UN processes and are always neatly partitioned off in a separate location. In reality, boundaries are more porous, and there is evidence that faith actors can have an impact on secular processes from a faith perspective without explicitly invoking religious language, for instance speaking of ‘“family values”—not of serving God’.82 It is particularly within the domain of reproductive health and sexual rights that alliances of some faith actors have coalesced and sought to influence the UN and donor initiatives, increasingly using scientific rather than religious arguments to make their case.83 And of course the fact that donors actually need FBOs to implement their policies on the ground arguably gives these organizations some agency in the ways in which they engage with donor policies. This is confirmed by one of my interviewees, who explained: The faith-based organizations themselves are now like, ‘Hey, we've got a place at the table! We're wanted! We're liked! More, we want more and we want to tell you what we want now, so it's nice that you finally see us but hey, we've got a list of things we want, it's not just that you want us to rubber stamp your stuff and don't you dare think you can instrumentalize us that way’, so ‘we've got a few things that we want you to make sure that you do as well’ … they're not just going to come and be silent and look good for the photo, but they have things, they have issues, they have ways of doing things, they have concerns about the way that the UN is doing or not doing certain things.84 In the remainder of this section I return to an actor-orientated interface analysis of the religion–SDG development domain to consider how the representatives of the FBOs (mostly international, but including some national organizations) who attended the three project workshops negotiated their engagement with the SDG framework in their work at both the global and the local level. In general, the workshop participants did not see the secular articulation of the SDGs at the global level and their involvement as ostensibly secular actors as evidence of instrumentalization and their alienation from the process. Indeed, there was a strong articulation from our Indian participants that the SDGs should be ‘secular’, particularly where religious conflict and the marginalization of some faith groups was a growing concern. In such settings the commitment to secularism is an important public value, where ‘one of the purposes of secularism is to provide a language in which people of very different metaphysical views can communicate’.85 Participants at the workshops (who were representatives of national and international organizations) were beginning to work with local faith communities to sensitize them to the SDGs. It was at this particular interface (working with communities not familiar with global development discourse) that the translation of the SDGs into faith-relevant language was salient, particularly on issues where attitudes rooted in interpretations of religious traditions might get in the way of promoting greater gender equality or interfaith dialogue. A Muslim IFBO interviewee in India, who was also present at the workshop in Delhi, reflected on SDG 5 (gender equality) and how he tackles social norms around domestic violence using Islam as a resource: ‘How it is justified to beat your wife? … Prophet's life is the best life, you know,’ I said. ‘Can you give a single example where Prophet has beaten any women or his wife or daughter? Any example?’ I ask them. They say ‘no’. ‘Then why you beat your wife?’ As a Muslim organization, he argued, the IFBO he represented had a special role to play in sensitizing communities to the SDGs, as we will have a better acceptability … compared to the other organizations … certain credential also, so that gives an advantage when you are with a Muslim community, they accept us, they … accept that we are not talking something rubbish.86 He considered that they play a role ‘in terms of bridging the gap between the local faith communities and the state and the international actors’.87 A Christian IFBO interviewee in India also talked about the role of the organization in bringing the SDG conversation to churches and Christian communities in India, but remarked that no church is talking about SDG, church only talks about the Bible and religious group talks about the spiritual life but the SDG is totally missing, while the humanitarian organizations are talking about the SDGs … if you take random interview with the faith leaders, they may not be able to say what is SDG, whereas the biggest responsibility lies on the faith leaders … That is totally new topic to them, so they are really eager to learn more about, so we help them our best to sensitize about what is SDG, how you can contribute, the churches and people they are a little bit contributing but how they will meaningfully engage, that has to be translated, that needs to be translated.88 FBOs that speak the development language shift register in their interactions with different actors in the SDG domain: figure 2 depicts two of the possible interfaces or, to use Bourdieu's terminology, ‘fields’, that FBOs encounter or participate in within this domain. While the use of diagrams to depict complex social systems is arguably reductive, such visualizations are also helpful for analytical purposes, so long as their limitations are recognized. These FBOs engage with the SDGs as a secular script in their interface with donors and INGOs (interface 1), but also as a potentially sacred script in their interface with other faith actors, including LFAs in the global South, where the SDG framework is being reformulated in a faith language (interface 2). The framing of the diagram as a movement between sacred and secular scripts should not be taken to imply a dichotomous relationship between the two, but rather a shifting scale on which either secular or religious language may dominate and where both are publicly acceptable. Thus interface 2, between FBOs and LFAs, does not only involve religious modes of communication but is a field of social action where actors can more freely use faith language alongside other types of communication to achieve shared aims. There are examples of the global aid business interacting directly with LFAs, and therefore it would be misleading to suggest that these relationships are facilitated only by the mediation of FBOs. However, there is evidence that FBOs have a distinct advantage in their engagement with local communities, which can include a faith dimension that is difficult for secular actors to realize. First, a shared faith perspective can create trust between different parties where there might otherwise be doubt about the relevance of global frameworks at the local level. Even where parties might not share the same faith tradition, faith language in general can elevate FBOs' legitimacy. Second, the capacity to translate global frameworks into local religious/cultural languages, particularly in settings where a faith perspective provides a rationale for working towards (as well as sometimes being an impediment to) social change, improves the SDGs' chances of success. Figure 2: Open in new tabDownload slide Faith actors and the SDG domain Figure 2: Open in new tabDownload slide Faith actors and the SDG domain From the perspective of the macro level of the global aid business, the interface with FBOs around the SDGs is dominated by a secular rationality. As we have seen, this interface is sometimes depicted as post-secular—erroneously, as faith actors are increasingly part of the picture. However, I argue that binary theories of the secular and the post-secular are unable to adequately capture the reality of shifting register within the religion–SDG domain, and that an actor-orientated approach requires the development of a new framework for interpreting this reality from the point of view of FBOs. Since a faith logic is part of their world-view, the depiction of this interface as either secular or post-secular makes little sense. Instead, as I have argued elsewhere, Bourdieu's theory of habitus, fields and capital offers a distinct advantage for understanding contemporary religious dynamics in the public sphere, in enabling us to view society as a whole as neither religious nor secular, but as a social world of intersecting fields within which a religious or secular habitus may or may not dominate.89 Through his observation of the social world, Bourdieu developed ‘a unique individual set of conceptual terms to be employed in the course of analysis and discussion of findings … which he called his “thinking tools”’, in particular the concepts of habitus, field and capital.90 These ‘thinking tools’ offer a way of viewing the social world as a series of intersecting fields where individuals are able to perform with varying degrees of ‘success’—in terms of strategizing to achieve desired ends—according to their individually acquired habitus and the deployment of their varying forms of ‘capital’ (symbolic and economic, social and cultural).91 I argue that this theoretical framework helps in interpreting the experience of FBOs in the SDG domain. As depicted in figure 2, FBOs move between the interfaces or ‘fields’ of secular global development policy and practice and of LFAs; in the latter, they use religious modes of communication, which are among the factors that marginalize those LFAs from direct participation in global development discourses and practices. Moreover, those LFAs have not acquired the ‘capital’ of the secular development language. Thus, LFAs find that their combination of habitus—learned set of dispositions—and capital makes it difficult for them to participate in global development discourses. However, compared to LFAs, the habitus and capital combination of FBOs enables them to engage more successfully in the field of secular global development, and to play a role as development brokers and translators. Conclusion The process of professionalization in which many FBOs engage as they become larger and better known, which includes the downplaying of the faith dimension in some public interactions, can result in its not being widely known that some are indeed ‘faith based’, if that is not obvious from their names. One of my interviewees at the UN in New York told me that a senior colleague had said to her: ‘I didn't realise that World Vision was a religious organization’—to which she replied: ‘Hello? We've been working with them for years!’92 My main aim in this article has been to make the case for an actor-orientated approach to understanding faith actors' experience of the ‘turn to religion’ by global aid actors over the past couple of decades. Many commentators imply that the ‘turn to religion’ is evidence of the emergence of post-secular partnerships, or that faith actors are being instrumentalized to serve neo-liberal development goals. Haynes, for instance, combines both judgements in his analysis, calling today's international environment ‘post-secular’,93 but also asking: To what extent are FBOs willing to ‘sign up’ to the UN's official ‘liberal’ and ‘secular’ values, in order to gain entry into debates and discussions at the UN? The point is that FBOs must accord with the UN's secular, liberal and irreligious values, and this is obviously a problem for entities whose very raison d'être has its foundation in religious values.94 Using an actor-orientated approach, I have argued that neither perspective captures the whole story and I have advocated that the study of religion, development and humanitarianism needs to consider how faith actors themselves encounter and shape development discourses and frameworks, translate them into relevant formats and strategically employ them. An examination of the engagement of FBOs with the consultation, negotiation and implementation of the SDG framework confirms the findings of other studies that these organizations shift register from secular to faith language depending on the nature of the particular interface or field. These social and conceptual spaces where different groups intersect have been recognized by anthropologists of development both as sites of ‘common interest’ and as having the ‘propensity to generate conflict due to contradictory interests and objectives or unequal power relations’.95 However, I also want to draw attention to the ways in which these interfaces or fields also serve as locations where development agents come into play, taking on certain forms and roles according to their experiences within these encounters. This includes the cadre of IFBOs that have emerged since the late 1990s and early 2000s, on which this article has focused, and which have learned to negotiate their role as faith actors in a secular space and to shift register when communicating with different audiences. However, there are other relevant agents within the religion–development–humanitarian domain that experience and are shaped by the ‘turn to religion’ in different ways. Further ethnographic research is needed to provide secular global development and humanitarian actors with ‘reflective insights’96 into how their policy interventions are interpreted and incorporated by faith actors in the global South, including national and local FBOs and faith actors (see figure 1). We also need to understand better how and why non-religious actors engage with faith actors, and what impact FBOs and religious discourses have on the agendas of secular development actors. Such evidence could add support to the argument that there is a complex or incomplete secular habitus. Footnotes 1 Philippe Perchoc, The EU and faith-based organisations in development and humanitarian aid, European Parliamentary Research Service briefing (Brussels, Luxembourg and Strasbourg, 2017), p. 1, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/at-your-service/files/be-heard/religious-and-non-confessional-dialogue/events/en-20171206-faith-organisations-and-development.pdf. (Unless otherwise noted at point of citation, all URLs cited in this article were accessible on 11 Jan. 2020.) 2 Jannie Le Moigne and Marie Juul Peterson, Donor engagement with religion and faith-based organisations in development cooperation (Frederiksberg: Danish Network on Religion and Development, 2016), https://www.dmru.org/fileadmin/Filer/Dokumenter/Religion_og_udvikling/DONOR_ENGAGEMENT_WITH_RELIGION.pdf. 3 Rick James, ‘What is distinctive about FBOs? How European FBOs define and operationalise their faith’, Praxis Paper 22 (Oxford: Intrac, 2009), https://www.intrac.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/2009/02/Praxis-Paper-22-What-is-Distinctive-About-FBOs.pdf. 4 DfID, Eliminating world poverty: building our common future (London, 2009), p. 134, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/229029/7656.pdf. 5 Sharmila Parmanand, ‘Top DfID NGO partners: a primer’, Devex News, 8 July 2013, https://www.devex.com/news/top-dfid-ngo-partners-a-primer-81391. 6 Alan Robinson, Faith-based organizations and government funding: a research note (Oxford: Tearfund/Oxford Centre for Mission Studies, 2011), http://faithindevelopment.org/doc/FBOs_and_government_funding_-_final.pdf. 7 Gerard Clarke, ‘Agents of transformation? Donors, faith-based organizations and international development’, Third World Quarterly 28: 1, 2007, pp. 77–96 at p. 84. 8 Ignatius Swart and Elsabé Nell, ‘Religion and development: the rise of a bibliography’, HTS Teologiese Studies/Theological Studies 72: 4, 2016, pp. 1–27, https://hts.org.za/index.php/hts/article/view/3862/8914; Barbara Bompani, ‘Religion and development: tracing the trajectories of an evolving sub-discipline’, Progress in Development Studies 19: 3, 2019, pp. 171–85. 9 Heather Curtis, Holy humanitarians: American evangelicals and global aid (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2018); Michael Barnett and Janice Gross Stein, Sacred aid: faith and humanitarianism (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2012). 10 Swart and Nell, ‘Religion and development’, p. 2; Emma Tomalin, Religions and development (London and New York: Routledge, 2013). 11 Paul Cloke and Justin Beaumont, ‘Geographies of postsecular rapprochement in the city’, Progress in Human Geography 37: 1, 2012, pp. 27–51. 12 Severine Deneulin and Masooda Bano, Religion in development; rewriting the secular script (London and New York: Zed, 2009); Marie Juul Petersen and Ben Jones, ‘Instrumental, narrow, normative? Reviewing recent work on religion and development’, Third World Quarterly 32: 7, 2011, pp. 1291–306. 13 Jeffrey Haynes, ‘What do faith-based organisations seek at the United Nations?’, E-International Relations, 15 Nov. 2013, https://www.e-ir.info/2013/11/15/what-do-faith-based-organisations-seek-at-the-united-nations/; Alastair Ager and Joey Ager, ‘Sustainable development and religion: accommodating diversity in a post-secular age’, Review of Faith and International Affairs 14: 3, 2016, pp. 101–105; Cloke and Beaumont, ‘Geographies of postsecular rapprochement’, p. 31. 14 Azza Karam, ed., Religion, development and the United Nations (New York: Social Science Research Council, 2011), https://s3.amazonaws.com/ssrc-cdn1/crmuploads/new_publication_3/religion-development-and-the-united-nations.pdf. 15 Ingie Hovland, ‘Who's afraid of religion? Tensions between “mission” and “development” in the Norwegian Mission Society’, in Gerard Clarke and Michael Jennings, eds, Development, civil society and faith-based organizations: bridging the sacred and the secular (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), pp. 171–86. 16 Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan, Anthropology and development: understanding contemporary social change (London and New York: Zed, 2005) p. 183. 17 Olivier de Sardan, Anthropology and development, p. 177. 18 Susanna Trotta and Olivia J. Wilkinson, Partnering with local faith actors to support peaceful and inclusive societies (Washington DC and Bonn: Joint Learning Initiative on Faith and Local Communities and International Partnership on Religion and Development, 2019). 19 Agenda for Humanity, Initiative Grand Bargain (New York and Geneva: UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2016), https://www.agendaforhumanity.org/initiatives/3861. 20 Emma Tomalin, ‘Religions, poverty reduction and global development institutions’, Palgrave Communications 4: 132, 2018, pp. 1–12, https://www.nature.com/articles/s41599-018-0167-8. 21 Norman Long, Encounters at the interface: a perspective on social discontinuities in rural development (Wageningen: Wageningen Agricultural University, 1989). 22 Norman Long, Development sociology: actor perspectives (London: Routledge, 2001). 23 Emma-Louise Anderson and Amy S. Patterson, ‘Instrumentalizing AIDS empowerment discourses in Malawi and Zambia: an actor-orientated view of donor politics’, International Affairs 93: 5, 2017, pp. 1185–204 at p. 189. 24 Long, Development sociology, p. 59. 25 Norman Long, The multiple optic of interface analysis, background paper on interface analysis (Paris: UNESCO, 1991), p. 1. 26 Benedetta Rossi, ‘Aid policies and recipient strategies in Niger’, in David Lewis and David Mosse, eds, Development brokers and translators: the ethnography of aid and agencies (Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian, 2006), pp. 27–50 at p. 27; Olivier de Sardan, Anthropology and development, pp. 12–13; Lewis and Mosse, ‘Introduction’, in Development brokers and translators, pp. 10–11. 27 Kathryn Kraft and Jonathan Smith, ‘Between international donors and local faith communities: intermediaries in humanitarian assistance to Syrian refugees in Jordan and Lebanon’, Disasters 43: 1, 2019, pp. 24–45 at p. 24. 28 Lewis and Mosse, eds, Development brokers and translators; Olivier de Sardan, Anthropology and development; Thomas Bierschenk, Jean-Pierre Chauveau and Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan, Local development brokers in Africa: the rise of a new social category, working paper no. 13 (Mainz: Institut für Ethnologie und Afrikastudien, Johannes Gutenberg-Universität, 2002). 29 Tomalin, ‘Religions, poverty reduction’; Giuseppe Bolotta, Catherine Scheer and R. Michael Feener, ‘Translating religion and development: emerging perspectives from critical ethnographies of faith-based organizations’, Progress in Development Studies 19: 4, 2019, pp. 243–63. 30 Lewis and Mosse, eds, Development brokers and translators, p. 10. 31 Pierre Bourdieu, Outline of a theory of practice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977; first publ. 1972), p. 3. 32 Pierre Bourdieu, In other words: essays towards a reflexive sociology, trans. and ed. M. Adamson (Cambridge: Polity, 1994; first publ. 1987), p. 170. 33 Michael Grenfell, ed., Pierre Bourdieu: key concepts (New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 1; Bourdieu, In other words. 34 Jeffrey Haynes, Faith-based organisations at the United Nations, working paper (San Domenico di Fiesole: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, 2013), p. 6, https://cadmus.eui.eu/bitstream/handle/1814/28119/RSCAS_2013_70.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y. 35 Dena Freeman, Tearfund and the quest for faith-based development (London and New York: Routledge, 2019); David King, God's internationalists: World Vision and the age of evangelical humanitarianism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2019). 36 Olivier de Sardan, Anthropology and development, p. 177. 37 Lewis and Mosse, ‘Introduction’, p. 10; Long, Development sociology; Bierschenk et al., Local development brokers; Tomalin, ‘Religions, poverty reduction’. 38 G. Clarke and M. Jennings, Development, civil society and faith-based organizations: bridging the sacred and the secular (New York and Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); Tomalin, Religions and development. 39 Deneulin and Bano, Religion in development; Petersen and Jones, ‘Instrumental, narrow, normative?’. 40 Clarke, ‘Agents of transformation?’, p. 84. 41 Hovland, ‘Who's afraid of religion?’. 42 Freeman, Tearfund and the quest, p. 7. 43 Jürgen Habermas, ‘On the relations between the secular liberal state and religion’, in Hent de Vries and Lawrence Eugene Sullivan, eds, Political theologies: public religions in a post-secular world (New York: Fordham University Press, 2006), pp. 251–60 at p. 258. 44 Jürgen Habermas, ‘Notes on post-secular society’, New Perspectives Quarterly 25: 4, 2008, pp. 17–29 at p. 28 (emphasis in original). 45 Michael Dillon, ‘Jürgen Habermas and the post-secular appropriation of religion: a sociological critique’, in Philip Gorski, ed., The post-secular in question: religion in contemporary society (New York: New York University Press, 2012), pp. 249–78 at p. 258. 46 Dillon, ‘Jürgen Habermas’, p. 264. 47 James A. 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Visions of a new world: faith has surfaced in the global organisation but it hasn't brought peace’, The Economist, 8 Oct. 2013, https://www.economist.com/erasmus/2013/10/08/visions-of-a-new-world. 49 Freeman, Tearfund and the quest, p. 73. 50 Freeman, Tearfund and the quest, p. 77. 51 Freeman, Tearfund and the quest, pp. 75–6. 52 Freeman, Tearfund and the quest, p. 77. 53 King, God's internationalists, p. 104. 54 King, God's internationalists, p. 153. 55 King, God's internationalists, p. 155. 56 King, God's internationalists, p. 14. 57 Long, Development sociology, p. 184. 58 Rossi, ‘Aid policies’, p. 46. 59 King, God's internationalists, p. 155. 60 Bierschenk et al., Local development brokers. 61 Olivier de Sardan, Anthropology and development, p. 182. 62 Long, Development sociology, p. 70. 63 Olivier de Sardan, Anthropology and development, p. 182. 64 Felix Dodds, Ambassador David Donoghue and Jimena Leiva Roesch, Negotiating the Sustainable Development Goals (London and New York: Routledge, 2017). 65 Reports from the three workshops can be downloaded here: https://religions-and-development.leeds.ac.uk/research-network/. 66 Emma Tomalin, Jörg Haustein and Shabaana Kidy, ‘Religions and the Sustainable Development Goals’, Review of Faith and International Affairs 17: 2, 2019, pp. 102–18. 67 Interview 1, New York, 20 April 2017. 68 Dodds et al., Negotiating the Sustainable Development Goals, p. 33. 69 Interview 2, New York, 21 April 2017. 70 Interview 2. 71 Interview 1. 72 Interview 3, London, 19 May 2017. 73 Interview 3. 74 Interview 1. 75 Interview 1. 76 Interview 1. 77 Interview 1. 78 Azza Karam, Religion and development post-2015, report of a consultation among donor organizations, United Nations development agencies and faith-based organizations, New York, 12–13 May 2014 (New York: UNFPA, 2014), https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/DONOR-UN-FBO%20May%202014.pdf, p. xiv. 79 Interview 1. 80 Interview 1. 81 Karam, Religion and development post-2015, p. xv. 82 Erasmus, ‘Religion and the UN. Visions of a new world’. 83 Jane H. Bayes and Nayereh Tohidi, eds, Globalization, gender, and religion: the politics of women's rights in Catholic and Muslim contexts (Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001); Juan Marco Vaggione, ‘The Catholic Church, contemporary sexual politics and development in Latin America’, in Emma Tomalin, ed., The Routledge handbook of religions and global development (London: Routledge, 2015), pp. 167–80. 84 Interview 1. 85 Erasmus, ‘Religion and the UN. Visions of a new world’. 86 Interview 5, New Delhi, 5 Dec. 2017. 87 Interview 5. 88 Interview 4, New Delhi, 4 Dec. 2017. 89 Tomalin, ‘Religions, poverty reduction’. 90 Grenfell, ed., Pierre Bourdieu, p. 1; Bourdieu, Outline of a theory of practice. 91 Pierre Bourdieu, ‘The forms of capital’, in John G. Richardson, ed., Handbook of theory and research for the sociology of education (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1986), pp. 241–5; Grenfell, ed., Pierre Bourdieu; Long, Development sociology. 92 Interview 1. 93 Haynes, ‘What do faith-based organisations seek?’. 94 Haynes, Faith-based organisations at the United Nations, p. 6. 95 Long, Development sociology, p. 69. 96 Lewis and Mosse, ‘Introduction’, p. 1. Author notes This article is part of a special section of the March 2020 issue of International Affairs on ‘Engaging religions and religious studies in international affairs’, guest-edited by Katherine E. Brown. © The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal Institute of International Affairs. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com. 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TI - Global aid and faith actors: the case for an actor-orientated approach to the ‘turn to religion’
JO - International Affairs
DO - 10.1093/ia/iiaa006
DA - 2020-03-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/global-aid-and-faith-actors-the-case-for-an-actor-orientated-approach-hAT0tgI3VB
SP - 323
VL - 96
IS - 2
DP - DeepDyve
ER -