TY - JOUR
AU1 - Harknett, Richard J.
AU2 - Yalcin, Hasan B.
AB - Abstract Structural theories have advanced our understanding of International Relations (IR). This article contends that the two leading structural realist frameworks, however, rely too heavily on an ascribed unit motivation and core dynamic that are not derived from structure. This ultimately weakens both theories' explanatory potential. This article offers a refinement called structural autonomy that explains IR through a focus on a self-reliant pursuit of autonomy and the particular distribution of capabilities found across the system. This article offers a new variant to the two leading structural realist frameworks associated most prominently with the thinking of Kenneth Waltz (1979) and John Mearsheimer (2001). This refinement of structural realism is based on the assessment that both defensive and offensive realism, while advancing structural reasoning, rely too heavily on an ascribed unit level motivation that is not derived from structure. Both Waltz and Mearsheimer were correct to orient the study of International Relations (IR) toward the importance of structural analysis, but neither has delivered fully on the explanatory promise that structuralism offers.1 Thus, unlike most critical interpretations that seek full rejection of defensive and offensive realism, this article seeks to build upon their strengths and refine their weaknesses within a new framework of structural autonomy—a structural theory that finds its conceptual roots in realist IR thought. A theory of structural autonomy promises a richer explanatory frame that can better address the distinct dynamics that flow from different power structures. The article proceeds in four main parts: First, briefly, the core hybrid nature of offensive and defensive realism is explored to reveal where they fall short in structural reasoning.2 Second, discussion of structure and units leads to the introduction of the two new core concepts of autonomy and self-reliance. Third, the fundamental logic of structural autonomy is outlined, so that in the final section the implications of structural autonomy and how it reorients thinking about international politics can be considered. On Defensive and Offensive Motivations Structuralism, in principle, provides the opportunity of understanding human identity, motivation, and behavior by tracing their roots to the environment in which they are all located. It is based on a belief in the shaping power of conditions over agency. Instead of the essentialist focus3 on “who we are” or the intentionalist emphasis4 on “what we want,” structuralism is about “what we have.”5 It is our possessions in an environment that is constituted by the distribution of our possessions that influence “who we are,”“what we want,” and “what we do.” In the two most prominent realist-based attempts to explain IR from a structural level, Kenneth Waltz and John Mearsheimer focused attention correctly on two key elements of structure in the international system—its anarchic nature and the distribution of capabilities. From a structural perspective, how capabilities are distributed across an environment lacking centralized authority should reveal why IR flows as it does. Such a focus should provide us an expectation about the key actors within the system and their behaviors. As Hans Morgenthau (1993:7) himself suggested, it is what is possible and not what is desirable that drives behavior. However, the explanatory locus of both Waltz and Mearsheimer falls short of this structural principle in that both defensive and offensive realism ascribe to states a base desire to either maximize security or maximize power that is removed from the conditioning effect of the specific distribution of power within which states must react. The unit level desire to survive pursued through consistent maximizing behavior overwhelms, from an explanatory logic, the particular conditions in which states seeking survival exist. If the distribution of power is structurally conditioning the behavior of states, should not the behavior of states vary based on the relative capabilities they possess? What is possible for the United States differs from what is possible for Kuwait, which shifts over time as well. The relative position of the United States in the world of 1796 when George Washington advised against entangling alliances differed substantively from the world in 1949 when the United States signed the North Atlantic Treaty. And yet for Waltz, we assume that both the United States and Kuwait are consistently maximizing their security, and thus, their behaviors are explained via this consistent motivation. For Mearsheimer, behavior is explained as a result of power maximization. According to both, the base motivation of all states is to survive. And herein lies the core flaw in defensive and offensive realism. The survival motivation is said to extend from the anarchical nature of international politics. Because there is no central authority, states live in a system of self-help. But help from what? Both Waltz and Mearsheimer devise a rendering of anarchy that presumes a threat from which states need assistance to the extent that ultimately questions their survival. This logic de-links the two structural variables of anarchy and the distribution of power. There are particular distributions of power that are not threatening at the level of survival to particular states depending on their relative position in the international system. If the distribution of power matters explanatory-wise, it must be allowed to structurally condition state behavior. Structural theory must allow for the prospect that if conditions do not threaten survival, behavior should not be based primarily on a survival instinct. States cannot decide a priori whether maximizing security or power is their best strategy. Despite what they might wish to achieve, states must take the distribution of power and their relative systemic position into consideration. Therefore, a structural theory of international politics should pay sufficient attention to both anarchy and the distribution of power, rather than attributing an unsustainable threat dimension to the concept of anarchy or making fixed unit-level assumptions about what states want divorced from the conditions in which they find themselves. On Realist Structure and Realist Units So, how can a realist's viewpoint better leverage structuralism? On what foundation can analysis of international politics rest if we do not a priori ascribe to states a motivation to seek maximum power or security? The answer lies in granting the explanatory weight to a structure in which anarchy and the distribution of power interact iteratively in establishing the conditions under which the primary agents of international politics act. It also requires use of the most primitive assumption that can be derived from that dynamic structure as a fundamental motivation applied systemically to all units. The Overwhelming Structure A theory of structural autonomy rests on four base assumptions about the notion of structure: First, structure is the overruling element of international politics.6 Second, it is composed of two elements: anarchy and the distribution of power.7 Third, structure is so overwhelming that as the most fundamental factor it shapes not only behaviors but also identity and orientations of the units. Fourth, structure is a conditional environment (continuously active) that creates an imperative of responsiveness among its units.8 First, structure is the overwhelming factor of international politics. This assumption is quite straightforward. It is based on a specific worldview that claims that human behavior is shaped by structural factors. It is the starting point of any structural analysis. Without a belief in the capacity of structure to shape and transform agency behavior, there would be no need to develop structural theories. So any structural theory has to start by recognizing the overruling force of structure. Since structure is composed of both an anarchical ordering principle and a shifting distribution of capabilities, it both shapes agent behavior and is iteratively modified by that behavior as the distribution of capabilities changes. What vary are the particular strategies units will pursue in relation to the specific distribution of power they find themselves in. As suggested above, the second assumption is that the structure of international politics is composed of two elements: anarchy and the distribution of power. Although this assumption is, too, quite straightforward in structural theories of IR in principle, theorists, in practice, emphasize one structural element over the other. In the case of balance of power theories, for instance, outcomes of anarchy are emphasized over the outcomes of the distribution of power, while hegemonic stability theorists tend to neglect the outcomes of anarchy on state behavior by depicting an international environment as defined by a hegemonic distribution of power (Gilpin 1981; Wohlforth 1987, 1999, 2002). In balance of power theories, the distribution of power and the relative positions of actors in this distribution play only a minor role in shaping state behavior—states are expected to balance regardless of their relative capacity to do so. For example, states are expected to balance emergent hegemons as a survival strategy even though they do not have the capability to do so as in the case of unipolarity. The inability of predicting and explaining unipolarity is directly related to the overemphasis of the survival motivation at the expense of the distribution of power variable (Waltz 2000; Krauthammer 1990/91; Huntington 1999; Layne 1993). On the other side, for hegemonic stability theorists, the distribution of power explains all state behavior without resorting to the influence of anarchy. States jump on bandwagons even in an anarchic system without considering the risks of bandwagoning for their autonomy in an anarchic environment (Wohlforth 2002). Alternatively, structural autonomy theory rests on an understanding of the interplay between the distribution of power and anarchy. Units act in accordance with both anarchy and the distribution of power. They do not a priori favor one over the other. Third, structure shapes not only behaviors but also identities and orientations of agents. In offensive and defensive realist theories, state identities and motivations are defined and assumed independently from the shaping power of structural factors. States are taken to have a specific motivation whatever the constraints and opportunities of structural conditions. Structure does not affect the survival motivation in neorealist theories of IR, which assume that even if there is no direct threat to state survival, it is a survival instinct that is driving action. In contrast, in the structural autonomy theory developed here, units rearrange not only their behaviors, but also their identities and motivations in response to the distribution of power. A structural autonomy theory holds the assumption that structure is the most fundamental source of actors' identities and motivations. Units do not decide who they are and what they want without their knowledge of the international structure, which is composed of anarchy and the distribution of power. Great Power status, for instance, is a form of identity that flows not solely from where a unit's capabilities land across the distribution of power, but through a relative successful self-reliant struggle for autonomy in response to the anarchical condition of international politics. The identity of Great Power status carries with it behavioral expectations that are not found in units whose capabilities are much lower and whose struggle for autonomy is highly constrained. The inaction of the United States in the Rwandan genocide of the 1990s mattered not only on the ground in Rwanda, but in how international and regional organizations and other states responded to the emerging killing. The inaction of Fiji did not have consequence. More importantly, the fact that the United States was a Great Power that did not act in 1994 created a precedent that impacted international calculations as the military forces of Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi neared the rebellious city of Benghazi in 2011. Its self-identity as a Great Power in a specific structural distribution set against its past inaction helped shape the United States' promotion of a multilateral NATO-led intervention even though on the face of it, a massacre in Benghazi would not have affected US survival. Assessed in the context of a desire to sustain the autonomy of a Great Power, such leadership is more understandable. Of course, the strategies the Libyan government adopted after the intervention reflected its reaction to its relative place in the distribution of power at the time, which did bring into play the threat to its autonomy at the extreme base level of survival. The final assumption about structure that underlies the logic of structural autonomy is that structure is an ever-present and continuously active environment. This assumption is strongly related to the previous one, which holds that structure shapes not only behaviors but also identities and motivations. Structure has an influence on all these sources of decision making. It is not a factor that shapes once and does nothing in other stages. Structure, as the overarching conditional environment, creates the identities and orientations of the agents in it and reshapes those orientations actively. The Realistic Reasoning and Responsive Agent What can we draw from previous realist writings in terms of assumptions to be ascribed to these units that conform to the expectations of a structural theory? Two base-interrelated assumptions are made—that these actors are reasoning and responsive. Without making an assumption about the nature of agents within a system, the application of structural theory is impossible. For any social theory, we need to identify at least with what kind of actors we are dealing. However, that assumption should be held in a minimized form. It should not exceed the boundaries of structural factors, for the locus of explanatory power rests with the structural dynamics that shape the agent's behavior and identity, not the qualities of the agents themselves. For instance, in a sociological study, the very existence of human agency and its minimal properties need to be recognized. The important thing is keeping that assumption in a comprehensive and primitive form, which will not conflict with the shaping power of structure. Otherwise, without an agent that responds to the structural conditioning, the theory cannot be applied. Therefore, a structural theory should try to and actually has to hold a minimized assumption about the agents. From this perspective, assuming the reasoning and responsive nature of actors within an international structure is justifiable, because it is an assumption that is both comprehensive and primitive.9 Essentialist theories hold a belief that human beings or human organizations act because of their essential characteristics. So an answer given about the identity of any agent is believed to explain its behaviors. Intentionalist theories hold a belief that we can assign specific intentions for human agencies, and these assumptions of human intention help us in building theories to explain human behavior. In contrast to essentialism and intentionalism, a theory of structural autonomy sets aside unit-level identities and interests for the sake of a broader explanatory power. The theory, for example, is not deriving explanation from some assumption about human nature as classic realists, such as Hans Morgenthau prescribed. It does not hold a biased belief about the desires of the units' orientation toward a future action. It is not fixed to a specific form of motivation for some specific actors derived independently from structural formation. It tries to encompass the most fundamental properties shared by all actors in the system. Lastly, it is not a consequentialist assumption as in the case of intentionalist theories, but is a conditionalist one in accordance with structural requirements.10 It is based not on outcomes, but on conditions. Within the theoretical framework of structural autonomy, reasoning and responsive actors form their identities, motivations, and actions, not from a desire that is independent from the structure but because of structural conditioning. They respond to the structural conditions with their available capabilities. We assume units are not blind calculators, but reasoning processors. Thus, the reasoning and the responsive characteristics of units should not be interpreted as a classical rational choice assumption. Even though reasoning and responsiveness can be considered as a loose rationality assumption, it is not a classical rational choice assumption because of its responsive and inconsequentialist characteristics.11 Units are assumed as focusing and responding to the conditions not only on the behavioral level, but also on the motivational level. Reason is not an instrument of already-given and unchanging motivations but can rearrange the motivations according to the circumstances. International actors do not follow their goals blindly at the expense of anything else. This is not a consequentialist assumption, which focuses on the determinism of agency; on the contrary, it is an assumption based on the sources of motivation and behavior. In this form, for example, states are assumed to be aware of the conditions of the international structure and as defining and redefining their interests not according to their individual desires but according to the requirements of the international environment. A structural theory should consider the reflectiveness and responsiveness of agency in structural conditions in which agents act because of their conditioned reasoning.12 We assume that reasoning actors rearrange their motivations and interests according to their reflections about the international environment. They hold complicated evaluations of the world in which they act and rearrange their immediate interests according to where their capabilities place them on the distribution of power, globally. They reason and respond to the structural conditions. They might have specific desires to attain but in cases where those desires do not fit into the power context in which they find themselves, we can assume they have the capacity to re-evaluate and re-describe their interests.13 This reasoning and responsiveness assumption is also consistent with the assumption of an ever-present and continuously active structure. In such a structure, actors cannot rely on fixed attitudes. In order to respond to an ever-active structure, units have to repeatedly adjust their motivations and behaviors. A consequentialist assumption of rationality would lead to fixed motivations, which would not be rearranged according to the structural conditions, and thus, this assumption marks an important refinement from traditional renderings of realist tenets that tend to emphasize the notion of rationality as a unit-level ascribed characteristic. In sum, structural autonomy theory suggests that international politics is characterized by units with organized power (the capacity for sustained action), who are reasoning and responsive to the international structure, which shapes not only behaviors, but also motivations of units in an iterative and active realm of shifting distributions of power. These particular assumptions about units allow structural autonomy to correct misunderstandings about realist theory as a theory concerning state behavior. Hans Morgenthau directed us to the recognition that international politics is conducted in a realm of power and that realms of power create distinctive dynamics. The units to which we should focus our analytical attention are those that have the material capacity for sustained consequential action internationally. At the time of Morgenthau's writing, a parsimonious reading of international reality led him to focus explanatory attention on states as the best organized units of power (Morgenthau 1993). Over 60 years later, what should drive our analytical focus is a realistic assessment of what units today possess the most effective material capacity for sustained consequential action internationally—where does organized power lie? While current analysis can suggest that the territorial state remains privileged in its capacity to act globally and in current application should be the locus of explanation, structural autonomy theory is not a theory of state action, but rather of unit action globally. A theory of IR drawing from realist traditions need not be confined to a focus on the state if through technological advancement or the emergence of new forms of territorial arrangement and action (governance or lack of governance) other units emerge that have organized material capacity that rivals or challenges the level that now is held by the territorial state. What drives this unit determination is actually one of the core structural variables—the distribution of power. In the context of distribution, what is revealed is where the capacity to act rests across the system under study. Currently, global politics is conducted by many actors, and one can conclude that the most prominent generalizable pockets of sustainable capacity to act globally remain states. The logic of structural autonomy, however, need not a priori assume that states will be the primary consequential actors that drive international politics. It is not something inherent to states that make them the focus of study, but where they land as prominent units in the global distribution of power. Thus, since 2001, significant patterns of state behavior have been driven in reaction to a nonstate actor, Al Qaeda. The logic of structural autonomy does not preclude analysis about the interaction between the United States and an organization like Al Qaeda.14 The Core Concepts: Autonomy and Self-Reliance What is the central dynamic that logically follows from the interaction of anarchy, the distribution of power, and reasoning and responsive units? In contrast to defensive and offensive realism, structural autonomy argues that states are not inherently preoccupied with power maximization or security, but rather more fundamentally with seeking autonomy. All that can be derived from a structural imperative about unit motivation is that it is not about accumulating a capacity, but rather having the wherewithal to act on that capacity in a sustained and significant manner. The wherewithal to act (autonomy) or the lack of it derives from the combined lack of a central authority and the variance of capabilities arrayed across several units (anarchy and the distribution of power). Thus, structurally derived, it can be assumed that units seek autonomy, which is defined as possession of the wherewithal for the organized capacity to act in a sustained fashion globally. Seeking autonomy should be understood not as a unit-based and generated motivation, but rather as a structurally generated necessity. Understanding autonomy as the basic motivation shifts our understanding of Waltz's and Mearsheimer's focus on security or power maximization. Those pursuits are, in reality, different strategies (among many others) for achieving the base structural necessity of being autonomous. As discussed earlier, the combination of anarchy and a distribution of power cannot a priori tell us whether states are under threat, concerned about survival and fixed on how they will go about dealing with their condition. All anarchic structure and distributed capacity can reveal is that we are dealing with a system of relatively autonomous actors. If the system persists, we can derive the assumption that at least some of the actors are successfully seeking autonomy relative to each other. Thus, structural autonomy offers a substantive modification to Morgenthau's traditional supposition. Rather than a struggle over power, international politics is best understood, more purely, as a struggle for autonomy.15 The concept of autonomy differs from the concepts of power and security as motivations and does not have a link to any defensive or offensive presuppositions. It liberates our analytical capability to assess international politics more broadly. It does not tell us that states act defensively because of their defensive intentions or offensively because of their offensive intentions. Those intentions and the actions that ultimately follow from them are responses to the particular structural conditions units face.16 To understand why the pursuit of autonomy has greater explanatory value than the conceptualizations of power or security maximization, the base concept of anarchy must be examined more closely and a refinement offered there as well. In a structural analysis of international politics, there can be no overarching unit motivation of survival or search for wealth and power independent of the distribution of power. Units who assess that the international environment presents opportunities will not feel threatened, while units who conclude that their position in the distribution of power is under threat may be compelled to take defensive measures.17 Opportunistic or threat-responsive behavior flows from the structure of international politics and cannot be pre-assigned as a dominant motivation. At its root, we must assume that units simply want to possess the capacity to act in a sustained manner that preserves and enhances their capacity to act into the future—they merely want to remain autonomous. Whether that autonomy is threatened to the point at which survival is at stake is dependent upon a number of factors, but principally where their power rests across the distribution of power. Not all units will find themselves assessing their policy choices set against a backdrop of surviving, which implies a threat to their existence. A default to a survival-first response follows only from a particularly threatening distribution of power, and not all distributions of power will threaten every state's existence to the point that it can be assumed that survival is a base motivation. If we are to offer an explanatory framework truly anchored on structure, then the distribution of power combined with anarchy must actually matter in an explanatory way; that is, we must assume that it will shape unit behavior, and units must define themselves against those particular and distinctive distributions, otherwise the distribution of power is either static (which it is not) or meaningless (which, in a structural realist theory, it cannot be). While for some, the distribution of power will create a condition of extreme threat (survival), for others it will be less severe and not immediately threatening, and perhaps for others, it will create conditions for opportunity. A structural theory must be alive to all of these structurally driven conditions and the behaviors that will flow from them. What we can observe and deduce is that there exists both a reinforcement of the imperative of autonomy due to anarchy and a restriction on pure freedom of action imposed by the conditional opportunities and threats embedded in the distribution of power. Idealized, autonomous actors would prefer pure freedom of action and thus direct control over their individual destinies, but the ever-present and shifting distribution of power to which they must react is a fundamental feature. The supposition that the dynamic of international politics is best understood as a struggle is a recognition that structural autonomy theory is not deterministic in its explanation of state behavior. The struggle is infinite and exhausting (here John Mearsheimer's notion of tragedy is instructive), but it is a struggle that has twists and turns, poor decisions that turn out okay, and optimized decisions that fail to achieve optimal ends. This follows from the responsiveness to structure—an interplay—rather than a scripted play. The search for autonomy is the most fundamental motivation about agent behavior under the conditions of anarchy that structure can derive. Units react to the conditions that have the capacity to increase or decrease their autonomy. In the search of this deep-level motivation, units rearrange their surface-level and specific goals and behaviors in accordance with their capabilities. So their standing in the international distribution of power plays a significant role in defining the strategies of autonomy they will adopt. In order to understand and identify the fundamental motivation of units in the system, it is necessary to characterize how the structure of the international system operates to shape it. In general, most theorists of IR have argued that anarchic orders are self-help systems in which all actors feel threatened, so they seek to survive beyond all other motivations. According to this common interpretation, any state behavior is a means of achieving the eventual goal of survival. By seeking power or security or wealth, states want to attain survival. If the anarchic order is a self-help system, then this reasoning would be powerful, but if it is not a self-help system at its core, then the fundamental state motivation to be derived is not survival. The argument in this study is that the anarchic order is a self-reliance, not a self-help system. Units do not try to secure their survival by adjusting their power in accordance with some a priori supposed means and ends. They try to promote their autonomy in a self-reliance system by relying on their capabilities to act by adjusting their desires and behaviors in accordance with their capabilities. No specific orientation rules unit power, but rather the distribution of unit power rules unit orientation. Waltzian linear model of theorizing, that anarchic orders are self-help systems and in self-help systems states wish to survive, is a helpful tool in establishing the present argument and making comparisons. Although realists and nonrealists repeatedly note that anarchy does not necessarily mean chaos, the common frame of self-help implies help is needed to grapple with an ever-present threat dimension that, in realist formulations, is commonly interpreted as if involving a complete threat to state existence within the system. While that possibility exists, it exists only under certain power structure conditions. States are not infants incapable of survival without the help of others (or themselves). They are units within a power system because they have the capacity, at some base level, to act. Their existence as actors within an anarchical system tells us not that they are in need of help, but simply that they must rely on themselves first and foremost. The absence of centralized authority suggests not a system of self-help, but rather, more accurately, a system of self-reliance. The translation of anarchy as a self-help system in previous realist theorizing has added an unnecessary threat dimension to the logic that has been attributed to anarchic dynamics. Systems with no central authority force the units to rely on their own capabilities to take control of their own affairs, which might include both threats and opportunities. There might be different distributions of power imposing different specific ranges of responses on units. By relying on their power, units may act offensively or defensively depending on the specific conditions they face as they struggle to sustain autonomy. In a self-reliance system, it is the specific distribution of power in which units find themselves relative to what they have to rely on that drives the unit's action. A self-reliance system follows from, but also reinforces, the anarchical nature of the system. This reinforcing dynamic of structure (which is not static) is critical to recognize. If anarchy is the organizing principle of international politics, then the most primitive state motivation should properly follow its explicit description. In the literature, there is a traditional common ground in the definition of this central concept. It is commonly defined and adopted by realists and non-realists too, as “the lack of a central authority” (Milner 1991). Considering it as the opposite of a hierarchical system metaphorically helps us to understand its prime conditions. If hierarchical systems are characterized by organized rules, which are defined and executed by one agency or group of agencies, then anarchic systems should be characterized by the lack of those specified rules and a dominating agency who can legislate, execute, and judge rules. If a hierarchic system is constructed by labor specification among unit branches, as, for instance, in the case of domestic politics, then an anarchic system should be defined as a mechanistic society in which units perform the same set of tasks.18 Because of the absence of a central authority to manage the relations among the similar units, all units in the system have the same set of problems so they must hold the same fundamental motivation. States in the anarchic system of international politics do not delegate any part of their authority to legislate, execute, and judge to any higher or equal authority because they hold some share of the distribution of power. This is the structural connection between anarchy and the distribution. If there is no central authority, then it means all units assume autonomy and try to sustain it. They reject delegating their existential unity and integrity to a higher authority. A system becomes anarchic only as the two requirements are met: the presence of units holding the wherewithal to organize the capacity to act (autonomy) and the denial of the delegation of autonomy. In this equation, a system is called anarchic when it is composed of units that deny the delegation of their autonomies to a higher authority and self-reliantly have the wherewithal to remain autonomous. If the system is recognized as anarchic, then it follows that there are some units who are capable of sustaining their denial of a central authority. That means there is a specific distribution of capabilities in the system that prevents the formation of a hierarchic system. But the distribution of capabilities would not be able to sustain anarchy if those units who rely on their own capabilities did not wish to sustain it. Therefore, it can be derived from the equation that the system would not be anarchic if the units holding these capabilities were wishing to delegate their autonomies. Defining the international system as anarchic and characterized by the distribution of power by definition requires recognizing the existence of units who are motivated by the structure to promote their autonomy rather than delegating all or some parts of it to some other authority. This is the minimum condition for a system to be anarchic. This is also the maximum limit for deriving a unit motivation from the equation provided by the definition of an international system as a combination of anarchy and a distribution of power. Any other unit motivation like seeking survival or maximizing power requires some additional properties beyond either the concept of anarchy or the units populating it. For instance, if anarchy was defined as an environment full of opportunities, then one could assume states as opportunity-seeking agents, or if it was defined as an environment with no opportunity but full of threats, then one could assume a survival motivation. But if it is defined merely as the lack of a central authority, then logically, the only available inference for unit motivation is the denial of central authority or, more precisely, the denial of a delegation of the autonomy that sustains the anarchic structure. If we assume an anarchic organizing principle, then we must assume that the units capable of relying on their own capabilities are sustaining that anarchic order so because they want it and are capable of sustaining it via their individual self-reliance (and thus even if a unit pursued transformation to hierarchy, the self-reliance of others would constrain the attempt). Therefore, logically, the only available inference that can be made from the definition of international structure as anarchic is the existence of units structurally driven to promote their autonomy by the presence of a distribution of power in which self-reliance is possible. There is a reason for the reinforcement and maintenance of anarchy, and it is the unit fundamental motivation to remain autonomous. If any unit in the system was powerful enough to turn it into hierarchy or all units were helplessly in need of survival, there would be no anarchic system. The traditional realist-ascribed motive of survival implies a logic in which helpless states would eventually require the delegation of state autonomy to a higher authority in a fearful environment populated by units wishing for survival. A conceptual focus on survival does not inherently and logically reinforce anarchy; however, in our framework, seeking autonomy does.19 The maintenance of autonomy, not its delegation, is the structurally derived rule of international politics.20 There is just one cause of anarchy and that is the presence of a distribution of power in which self-reliance is possible.21 The combination of the struggle for autonomy and the absence of enough concentration of power make the search for autonomy in its purest sense an unattainable, but structurally necessary goal.22 While absolute autonomy is an elusive goal, relative autonomy is the defining characteristic of international politics (see Table 1). 1 Structural Theories in IR Theory Ordering Principle (Structure) System Dynamic Fundamental Motivation Unit Orientation (The default behavior following from the fundamental motivation) Defensive Realism Anarchic Self-help Survival Security-maximization Offensive Realism Anarchic Self-help Survival Power-maximization Neo-liberal Institutionalism Anarchic Self-help Absolute well-being Wealth-maximization Structural Autonomy Anarchic+distributed power Self-reliance Autonomy Depends on the distribution of power (concentrated or distributed), status quo or change Theory Ordering Principle (Structure) System Dynamic Fundamental Motivation Unit Orientation (The default behavior following from the fundamental motivation) Defensive Realism Anarchic Self-help Survival Security-maximization Offensive Realism Anarchic Self-help Survival Power-maximization Neo-liberal Institutionalism Anarchic Self-help Absolute well-being Wealth-maximization Structural Autonomy Anarchic+distributed power Self-reliance Autonomy Depends on the distribution of power (concentrated or distributed), status quo or change View Large 1 Structural Theories in IR Theory Ordering Principle (Structure) System Dynamic Fundamental Motivation Unit Orientation (The default behavior following from the fundamental motivation) Defensive Realism Anarchic Self-help Survival Security-maximization Offensive Realism Anarchic Self-help Survival Power-maximization Neo-liberal Institutionalism Anarchic Self-help Absolute well-being Wealth-maximization Structural Autonomy Anarchic+distributed power Self-reliance Autonomy Depends on the distribution of power (concentrated or distributed), status quo or change Theory Ordering Principle (Structure) System Dynamic Fundamental Motivation Unit Orientation (The default behavior following from the fundamental motivation) Defensive Realism Anarchic Self-help Survival Security-maximization Offensive Realism Anarchic Self-help Survival Power-maximization Neo-liberal Institutionalism Anarchic Self-help Absolute well-being Wealth-maximization Structural Autonomy Anarchic+distributed power Self-reliance Autonomy Depends on the distribution of power (concentrated or distributed), status quo or change View Large On the Core Dynamic Assuming a self-reliant imperative driving the pursuit of autonomy, structural autonomy theory thus orients its explanatory focus around two archetypes of power structures that allow for shifts and, in combination with the fundamental motivation of seeking autonomy, produces different incentives, behaviors, and systemic outcomes. The framework identifies two base-level forms of systemic power: a diffuse power structure and a concentrated power structure. While the base motivation is to seek autonomy, how units go about doing that will depend on whether they find themselves within one of these two power structures and where individually they find themselves in the relative distribution spread across either power structure. The Diffuse Power Structure In a diffuse power structure, the relative power between several units is marginal, but important. For a diffuse power structure to exist, a small gap in power must subsist between a minimum of two units and can encompass many more. What have traditionally been called bipolar and multipolar systems have more in common than offensive and defensive realists have considered and are better explained under the single category of a diffuse power structure. Within such a diffuse power structure, there is a stronger incentive to seek change in relative power positions and in the overall structure itself. Since gaps are small, advances in material capacity will affect autonomy more directly (and potentially more immediately). Opportunities and potential threats will be scrutinized to see if positive change can be made or negative change can be avoided. One characteristic of such diffuse power structures is that this behavioral orientation toward change will tend to lean the overall system toward major war—the propensity for major war is higher in diffuse power systems. This outcome tendency holds even if states within the diffuse power system frame their behavior and intentions as being primarily defensive. Firstly, because of a more equal distribution of power, more and more actors become able to act in accordance with their individual goals and strategies. Importantly, the increased capability of each actor does not mean that they become more autonomous, if in a diffuse power system others are increasing their power as well. The increased number of actors capable to act in terms of their interests (self-reliant) decreases all actors' level of autonomy. Under such a system, units become more and more concerned with structural constraints. It becomes an undesirable environment because of the decreased level of autonomy for all. Additionally, since small changes in gaps in power may impact the position of a unit in the diffuse system, units will not favor the status quo in such a system, and if the possibility arises, their default orientation is to transform it somehow—to shift where they sit along a tight or tightening distribution of power. Hence, because of the lack of enough relative capabilities to transform the system to its advantage, given its diffuse nature, each unit has to contend with this constraining structure and actively manage their position in the system. Thus, the main strategic orientation here is to seek autonomy by changing the distribution of power in a favorable manner, but the diffuse power structure itself frustrates these efforts. The frustrated desire for change in the overall power distribution translates into unit behavior that is constantly putting to question the relative position of other units, even if those behaviors are framed as defensive in intent. The combination of a macro-level orientation to get out from under a diffuse power structure and gain more autonomy and actual change-oriented policy decision making will structurally orient the system toward the potential for major conflict. In this dynamic, even defensive balancing creates a spiral of reaction that makes the system more prone to war. While the offensive behavior of Napoleon and Hitler can propel a diffuse system toward war, so too can the defensive balancing of city-states in 421 BC or European great powers in 1914. To use the terms of offensive and defensive realists, structural autonomy explains why in both tightening multipolar and bipolar systems, offensive and defensive actions can lead to major conflagrations. The actual outbreak of war correlates with the diffuse power structure's influence on motivating states to seek their autonomy via a change in the power structure itself manifested in behavior that is sensitive to their relative tight (or tightening) position in that diffuse power structure. It is not the polarity of the system as a structural construct, nor the defensive or offensive unit proclivity (a unit level assumption) that offers us the best explanatory basis. Rather, it is the recognition that power is diffused between two or more units and that the distribution of power creates both opportunities and constraints to autonomy. The structural potential for major war exists in diffuse power structures, and we can hypothesize that the more immediate cause of when such major conflict occurs relates to the tightening of the shares of power held by units across that distributed system, whether the distribution is between 2, 3, 4, or a dozen units.23 In this regard, structural autonomy suggests that there is more in common causally between the Peloponnesian War of 421 BC and the Great War of 1914, than the traditional differentiating of them as bipolar and multipolar systems suggests. In both cases, the main states found themselves in a diffuse power structure, which they found undesirable, challenging, and full of both threat and opportunities to advance their own autonomies in a self-reliant manner. In line with the expectations of the security dilemma that exists in diffuse power structures whether framed as defensive or perceived as offensive, as focus became more intense on relative positioning, behaviors became even more change-oriented, and thus, the overall default to changing the system was played out through the interactions of change-oriented policy behaviors. The dynamic of such accumulating interactions of structurally induced change-oriented behavior culminated in direct conflict that inherently was systemic (major) in intensity and affect. Concentrated Power Structures The alternative power structure is present when there are large gaps in power between units creating a concentrated power structure around a single unit.24 Globally, this would exist when one unit achieved a power differential with all other units in the system. Historically, this power structure has emerged regionally, rather than globally, although much attention has been directed to the notion of unipolarity in the post-Cold War. In concentrated power structures, units in search of an increased level of autonomy tend to prioritize retention of the power structure (and their place in it) over change.25 This holds for both sorts of actors that exist in concentrated power structures. Intuitively, the most powerful actor who has concentrated most of the material capabilities across the system would favor retaining such a power structure and thus their place in that structure as the leading unit. However, this orientation toward retaining the system holds for secondary units as well. Such actors, because of their inability to challenge directly the status quo, have to contend themselves with maintaining their autonomy within what is possible, rather than desiring an unmanageable pursuit of systemic transformation, which could actually risk their autonomy due to the concentrated nature of the power structure. Here, it is the gap in power that prioritizes retaining the status quo over seeking change. It is also the gap in power that structurally orients the system to minor or marginal conflict when such conflicts do arise systemically. Importantly, this tendency toward minor conflict holds even if states engage in behaviors that are framed as offensive. The leading state's uses of force in a concentrated power system will, by structural definition, tend to be limited in scope and directed to specific instances in which such use is necessary (or perceived to be necessary) to retain the status quo overall. The leading state will have a limited preventive orientation or limited power-adjusting objective behind their use of force that will not tend to push the overall system toward global war. Secondary states may also act offensively or opportunistically to increase their level of autonomy. They do not defensively balance the would-be hegemon because of the possible risks of doing so, but they also do not jump on its bandwagon because that would harm their level of autonomy. Instead, a base-level structural autonomy expectation is that such units will employ clever and nuanced policies of increasing their level of autonomy without directly challenging the overall concentrated nature of the power structure. The similar behavior of those states emerging from the collapse of the Soviet empire in the early 1990s is a good case in point. The similar choices of the former Warsaw Pact nations to all seek admission into NATO and subsequently the European Union is best understood as policy choices that are structurally induced pursuits of increased autonomy. Whether these states could emerge as functioning autonomous agents was not a given in 1990. The possibility of political and economic collapse was real. Each of these states, be they the Baltic nations, Poland, or Hungary, certainly had significant domestic differences in emerging leaderships, economic challenges, and political stability. Emerging from a period of external control, one would suspect that such units would be highly sensitive to their independence and freedom of action. And yet, all pursued coordination strategies in a concentrated power structure to align their political, economic, foreign, and domestic policy with the military alliance of NATO and the economic structure of the European Union at some pain and risk. What was going on here? According to the expectations of structural autonomy, all of these states found their autonomy advanced (some might say secured and stabilized) through the opportunity to coordinate their security and economic development strategies with the institutional constructs that reflected the global and regional concentrated power structures in which they emerged in the 1990s. Counterintuitively, these states have been able to develop an improved wherewithal of organized capacity to act in a sustained fashion globally (for example, more autonomy) via the opportunity afforded in NATO membership and European Union admission. The behavior of these states was not balancing against either power or threat, nor is it best understood as defensively induced or opportunistically inspired bandwagoning. It was a clear strategy to enhance their autonomy through alignment—an opportunity afforded by the concentrated power structure that never existed when the global and regional power structure was diffuse. Two points are salient here for structural autonomy: First, all of these states acted similarly and against the intuitive expectation. This is best explained as being structurally induced behavior to advance autonomy. Second, the type of behavior reinforced the concentrated power structure, while advancing the autonomy of the secondary state. The former Warsaw Pact countries find themselves actually more autonomous in 2011 than in 1981 or, more importantly than in 1991, via actions that did not challenge, but enhanced the concentrated nature of the power structure of this period in history; that is, they reinforced a regional and emerging global distribution concentrated around American power. That concentrated power structure was not directly challenged even when the policies of the leading state did not accord with the interests or policies of many secondary states. The second Iraq crisis is a potential case in point. When the United States acted offensively to reinforce its autonomy, actors both regional and global, including most European Union members, could not balance the United States actively, but also rejected bandwagoning as well. They re-directed the issue toward the United Nations to define some parameters for American behavior that would maintain autonomy moving forward as the crisis unfolded. There was no major balancing or bandwagoning alignment among the secondary states. Thus, autonomy was preserved (except for Iraq itself) and the concentrated power structure reinforced. To better highlight the explanatory re-orientation structural autonomy offers, the following section briefly outlines some hypotheses that, if they hold, will lead us to different and or more precise explanations than those we have found through offensive or defensive realisms. Considering Some Hypotheses Diffuse Power Structures H1 As the number of actors with relatively equal capabilities increases, the level of autonomy for all units in the system decreases. H2 As the distribution becomes more and more equal, the search for change increases. H3 As the volume of the search for change increases, the possibility and the number of major wars also increases even if units are acting defensively. In a diffuse power structure, the core explanatory variable driving international dynamics is the tight or tightening gap in power across units. Diffuse power structures are by definition structures in which there are multiple actors with relatively equal capabilities. However, because of the increased number of actors with equal capabilities, units are not relatively more autonomous. In contrast, all the units in the system have their autonomies constrained by other actors with equal capabilities. So any equal distribution of power produces less relatively autonomous actors. The very existence of other actors with equal capabilities decreases the level of autonomy of all. However, this does not mean deterministically that units are less secure and must focus intensely on survival. In contrast, we can derive structurally that when power is relatively equal, units will find that their survival is more secure, since no single actor can easily become an existential threat. Nevertheless, their autonomy will be lessened because of the difficulty in converging with multiple actors on most issue areas. In diffuse power structures, states can be secure because of their power but less autonomous because of others' power. In any issue area, there will be more actors taking part with their equal capabilities complicating the ability to act autonomously. This is a less desirable power structure in which to operate and, thus, change will be the prioritized strategy. This argument offers a nuance to the polarity-balance of power-stability arguments found in offensive and defensive realisms. In what in Waltzian terms would be considered a balanced system, states will feel less threatened (or more secure), but this does not translate into behavior promoting stability. Since the primary motivation is not security (or survival) but autonomy, “balanced”26 systems will not necessarily be stable, but rather have strong structurally induced incentives to change the power structure (and the relative distributions within it) to gain autonomy. The Cold War behavior of the two superpowers became more change-oriented during periods in which their power was more “balanced” with each seeking a breakout capacity via military technology, additional allies, exploitation of minor states (the competition over the Third World), or expanded realms of competition (the Space Race). The structure, itself, induced intense change-oriented policy, not stability-seeking on the part of the superpowers. This was the case in the bipolar system of Athens and Sparta as well: as they became more equal, they became more oriented toward behaviors that challenged the diffuse power structure, even though they had a treaty requiring them to do otherwise. The change-oriented behavior of these two equal distributed systems amounted to similar competitive dynamics. The power structure induced similar state behavior. As the system moves toward a tightening of gaps in distribution, we do not get the stability of balance, as argued in previous realist frameworks, but the ripening of conditions for major war. The outcome difference between these two historical cases—why we ended in war in 421 BC and not in 1990—amounts to understanding the intervening variable of the distinct military strategic environment, namely nuclear versus conventional (this military strategic differential is discussed below). As a consequence of a distribution of power with marginal gaps, states with decreased levels of autonomy will find this structure less attractive. They will be limited by the capabilities of others in every situation. If they were able to transform it into a more favorable one, they would certainly choose that way. So in the constant search for autonomy, states in this system would want to change it. However, there is a broad difference between what units want and what they do because of the relatively equal power distribution and increased number of actors with similar capabilities. The search for systemic change and an increased level of autonomy creates a trap that actually reproduces the diffuse system and the decreased level of autonomy for all units. The main structural mechanism behind this gap between the behavior and international outcome is the well-known logic associated with the security dilemma (or in strict structural autonomy terms, the “autonomy” dilemma) (Jervis 1978; Glaser 1997). As predicted by the dilemma, increased autonomy of one side comes at the expense of others. So any change-oriented behavior triggers other change-oriented behaviors until it reaches a certain limit that becomes untenable. Even if framed as defensive, these change-oriented behaviors will spiral toward major war. Concentrated Power Structures H1 As the number of actors with equal capabilities decreases, the level of autonomy for some units in the system increases. H2 As the distribution becomes less and less equal, the search for change decreases. H3 As the volume of retention-oriented motivations increases, the propensity of major wars decreases, even if the leading unit acts offensively. Concentrated power structures by definition are the ones in which there is a significant gap between the capabilities of one side and others. So they are populated by one powerful actor and the rest. In such a structure, there is only one actor with enough capabilities to act relatively autonomous. All others in the system lack enough capabilities to challenge that strong party or the system itself. Under these conditions, actors do not intend to change the structure because of two reasons. The first one is related to the strong party's choices in its search for autonomy as an actor “liberated from the ropes” of conflicting autonomies (Joffe 2003), while the second one is related to weaker parties' obligations and their lack of enough capabilities to challenge the status quo. One sees change as unnecessary, the other as unattainable. This is a more desirable position compared to any other system for the leading state. “A hegemonic power establishes the rules and norms of international order, and acts to provide security and stability in the international system” (Layne 2004:113). This position depends on two requirements: The powerful unit is not powerful enough to turn the structure into a hierarchic one; in other words, the structure is still anarchic, and yet it is still too powerful compared to others. It cannot completely dominate the system but it has a certain level of autonomy to act relatively freer than others. If there was any hope of turning the structure into a hierarchic one, there would be no reason like the stopping power of water (Mearsheimer 2001; Levy 2004; Levy and Thompson 2005), benevolent hegemony (Kupchan 1998; Ikenberry 2001), etc., to stop it. The only reasons for voluntary/intentional support of the status quo are increased autonomy in anarchy and falling short of missing capabilities to make it hierarchic. In an anarchic environment, where power is concentrated in the hands of one actor, its relative autonomy allows the powerful actor to act preventively to sustain its position. This does not presuppose a defensive pursuit of sufficient power, or an offensive pursuit of power maximization, but rather a mix of strategies that will sustain its relative autonomy achieved via its place in the distribution of power. Under certain conditions, “when a hegemon finds its primacy threatened, the best strategy is to eliminate the source of the problem” (Gilpin 1981:191). However, reacting to a favorable set of conditions in a particular issue area, a leading unit may grant opportunities to other units in the system to encourage buy-in toward system maintenance. The goal is not sufficient or maximum power, but maximized autonomy achieved through a mix of strategies, assuming anarchy as the system's organizing element. Secondary units in the system tend to behave in ways that support the system, because change-oriented policies risk autonomy. Thus, in concentrated power structures, the current structure is more favorable than the effort to change that structure. While secondary status is not favorable in itself, it is more favorable than the risky environment of unattainable challenge. Since they lack enough capabilities to turn the structure into a more favorable one, they are afraid of an untimely and unmanageable transformation. “The weaker actor is, therefore, in a conundrum: Unwilling to accept inequitable “take-it-or-leave-it” policy solutions, yet unable to balance against the other actor militarily” (Kelley 2005:153). Systemic retention is the better option. The states that have to be content with the current order also want to find ways of gaining a more autonomous position. They may purse offensive strategies to open new opportunities of increasing their level of autonomy. Against the expectations of hegemonic stability theorists (Wohlforth 1999), secondary states do not necessarily jump on the bandwagon. Such an expectation neglects the systemwide search for autonomy that is the imperative of anarchic order. A bandwagoning strategy in both offensive and defensive terms means the delegation of some part of autonomy to another actor. Despite their lack of capabilities, secondary states try to find some clever ways of increasing their level of autonomy instead of an automatic bandwagoning strategy. “Bandwagoning makes a country's future security dependent on the continued goodwill of the dominant state” (Garnham 1991:65). Structural autonomy views bandwagoning as an autonomy strategy, but one that is highly conditional on the range of options available to secondary states. Ultimately, secondary states in the system try to produce nuanced policies that may include building relations with other secondary states as a form of coordinated behavior that does not directly challenge the powerful actor (Lieber and Gerard 2005:129) but creates opportunities of increased autonomy.27 These nuanced or “soft” policies are aimed at filling the niches of power placement, not confronting the autonomies of others. Considering the Structural Autonomy Frame In order to highlight heuristically the alternative perspective gained via structural autonomy, this section applies the framework to a familiar case study—the Cold War. From a structural autonomy view, this was not a 45-year period of bipolar stability, but rather a timeframe of shifting power structures in which both concentrated and diffuse structural dynamics shaped behavior. A structural autonomy framework suggests a view of the Cold War divided roughly into three periods: concentrated eras (1945?–1957 and 1979–1991) and an intervening diffuse power structure (1957–1979). The first and third periods were characterized by status quo–oriented motivations and minor conflicts. The second era was characterized by change-oriented motivations, major superpower confrontations, and the potential for major war was at its highest. Soviet behavior is particularly instructive in that it was similar in avoiding direct challenge during the immediate aftermath of the Second World War in which US power was significantly advanced and from 1979 onward in which the Soviets viewed the gap between the United States and itself as expanding. More direct confrontation occurred when the gap between the two states was tightening and tightened into a diffuse power structure. Considering the entire Cold War period as statically bipolar overlooks the actual shifting nature of power and the structural explanation for why the real potential for major crisis varied over time. A significant difference from previous offensive and defensive realist explanations arises from structural autonomy's perspective that, to use traditional concepts, stability lessened as the system became more balanced. During the first era of the Cold War (1945–1957), whatever the motivations of both sides were, whatever the strategies followed were, because of the concentrated power structure, all conflicts were taking place on the margins, in covert forms, and, on the Soviet side, cautiously, since “at no point was he [Stalin] willing to challenge the Americans” (Gaddis 1997:31). Most of the crises of this era were started with an aim to protect the status quo and even if foreign policy behaviors were quite offensive like in the case of the Korean War (Jervis 1980; Zhihau 2000; Stueck 2002), crises over Turkey, Greece, and Iran (Kuniholm 1980; Raine 2005), they did not transform into a major systemic confrontation. Because of the concentrated power structure in favor of the United States (Leffler 1992), when faced with US power, Stalin decided to step back and avoid a major confrontation. During the second era of the Cold War (1957–1979), because of the intersection of autonomies and the lack of a power gap in favor of one side, both superpowers aimed at transforming the uncomfortable conundrum. Despite the ongoing minor crises all around the world (Westad 2005), which were mostly an outcome of the first era, this period of Cold War was an era of bilateral, direct, and serious confrontation. The most serious two events of the Cold War (perhaps of human history) surfaced in this era (Walker 1995:158). In the Berlin and Cuban crises, the world came to the edges of a nuclear abyss. Both crises were the outcomes of change-oriented actions. Khrushchev, who wanted a change in the system (Fursenko 2006:7), viewed both Berlin and Cuba as tools for shaking the roots of the status quo (Dobrynin 1995:64–65). While Stalin viewed Berlin as a threat that could worsen the power gap, Khrushchev saw it as an opportunity (Khrushchev 1974:501) as he did Cuba as well (Allyn, Blight, and Welch 1989–1990) to bring change and challenge via ostensibly defensive actions (protecting the flight of East German elites with the wall and protecting Cuba from invasion) (Freedman 2002). The dynamics of the second Berlin Crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis were systemic major confrontations that fell short of hot war only because of the unique structural intervening variable of the mutual assured destruction distribution of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons “helped to prevent the world wars that plagued the planet in the first half of the twentieth century” (Art 2009:129). The final stage of the Cold War was also characterized by a concentrated power structure. Starting during the late Carter and accelerating during the Reagan administrations, US leaders found themselves in a comfortable position of increasing the tension, which would put more burdens on the deteriorating Soviet economy and power. “The new administration was thus optimistic on at least two counts: that the American economy could carry the increased burden that would result from a more assertive U.S. strategy; and that Soviet power was in such poor shape that it would be unable to withstand a renewed American offensive” (Cox 1990:160). Overall, the new power structure of the late 1970s and early 1980s created new orientations and actions that would bring the renewal of tension. However, it is clear that this renewed tension was on minor issue areas once again and did not produce systemic confrontation as in the cases of the Second Berlin Crisis or Cuban Missile Crisis.28 Instead, the competition was limited to areas like Afghanistan and covert operations such as the US support for Afghan mujahids and East European liberals. Full application of structural autonomy will require examinations of the Cold War along the lines suggested above and comparative case study analysis with key examinations of periods of concentrated and diffuse power structures that include not just the outbreak of war, but major instances of cooperation (for example, creation of institutions, treaty law). The desire to find powerful explanation via structural variables will also require a carving out of the logic behind the distinctive military strategic environment of nuclear assured destruction (which held during the Cold War and can sustain in other relations, such as China–Russia, China–India, and India–Pakistan, for example). From a structural autonomy perspective, it is not the unit-level possession of nuclear weapons that is important, but the distribution of that possession. The historical fact remains that when these weapons were possessed by a single state, they were used, but when possessed at a sufficient level to assure mutually the destruction of each opponent, despite the high potential for conflict, direct war did not occur. The proposition to be further established is that the distribution of nuclear possession at a mutual assured destruction level is an intervening strategic military environmental variable that reins in the extremes of change-oriented diffuse power structures and structurally funnels change behavior toward policies that remain short of systemic war. A dangerous environment, but one that is dangerous due to the characteristics of diffuse power structures, rather than due to the possession of nuclear weapons in a mutual assured destruction potential. A further nuance in application of structural autonomy theory relates to the complex interface between regional and global structural framing. A case in point is Iraq in the 1990s. Iraq existed in the diffuse regional power structure of the Persian Gulf in 1990 and the globally concentrated power structure that had begun to form around the United States. One could view Saddam Hussein's understanding of his infamous interaction with US Ambassador April Gallespie in July 1990 as signaling that the United States saw the crisis as regional in scope, and thus, the dynamics followed the expectations of change-oriented diffuse power structures as a major regional war occurred—Iraq calculated under the expectations of a tight diffuse power system and attacked Kuwait in order to redress the marginal power gaps that were shifting in the region to the disadvantage of Iraq. Ultimately, however, the United States viewed the problem globally and followed the expectations of concentrated power structures and engaged in a retention-oriented limited war to consolidate the concentrated system that was emerging around its power at the time (whether Gallespie misunderstood her instructions from Washington or was misinterpreted by Saddam remains unclear). By 2003, the United States again used preventive war to sustain its concentrated power structure, which was perceived to have been called into question via the risky behavior of Al Qaeda and continued defiance of Saddam Hussein's Iraq. The expectations of theory are met depending on how the power structure is framed (regional or concentrated). Further study may examine what drives one frame to dominate the other when they co-exist, but the Iraq case implies it depends on whether the leading state in a concentrated system views regional dynamics as related to the overall global distribution of power or not.29 In this context, we hypothesize that the global power structure will trump any regional power structure in shaping international political dynamics, except in isolated cases, where the interests of global powers are not engaged regionally. Iraq appears as one of those exceptional regional cases in that Saddam Hussein essentially checks with the global power and confirms US interests are not engaged and, thus, proceeds to act with only the regional power structure in mind. Since that is a diffuse power structure with marginal gaps in power fluctuating, the expectations of structural autonomy theory are met—a major war is initiated (the invasion and occupation of Kuwait). And yet, from a global perspective, the concentrated power structure dictates behavior that offensively at times will retain and redress the status quo. The United States acts in accord with structural autonomy theory to retain the global status quo. The fact that the Soviets align with the United States against a Soviet-armed ally is suggestive of how significant the concentrated power structure had become by 1990 before even the formal collapse of the Soviet Union. Conclusions There is a place for structural theory in the attempt to explain the complexities of international politics. IR theory has been evolving for decades and has strengthened as structural variables were given more prominence. To date, however, the field has fallen short in leveraging the strength of structuralist thinking. The evolution of realism, in particular, has provided a solid conceptual basis for the subfield's development (whether one has worked within or in contrast to realism), but it also complicates this endeavor since the literature has assumed we have achieved a structural realist explanation, when in fact we have not. This article seeks to plant the flag more firmly in the groundings of a structuralism that is realistic. In the end, international politics is a struggle for autonomy. We hope that simple, but not simplistic refinement will, in itself, cause those of us seeking to explain IR to engage in a renewed intellectual struggle to leverage parsimony in the cause of better understanding. Footnotes 1 This article suggests that both offensive and defensive realisms, because of internal inconsistency, ultimately produce partial explanations. In offering an emphasis on structure as the locus of explanation, this article heads in the opposite direction of recent structurally oriented theorizing in IR, which is inclined toward more hybridization of already existing hybrid frameworks. Neo-classical realists with their multi-causal and multi-level frameworks are increasing the number of factors across the realist paradigm. This is a degenerative process from a structuralist perspective. For some examples, see Walt (1987), Schweller (1994), Van Evera (1999). For the most recent attempt to synthesize already synthetic theories of offensive and defensive realism, see Fiammenghi (2011). 2 We classify these two theoretical frameworks as hybrid rather than structural because of three reasons on two different levels: First, they assume that states wish to survive. This is an independent assumption on the unit level about state desire rather than being a structurally determined orientation. Second, when they attempt to justify that assumption through the logic of the structure, they misinterpret the international environment as a self-help system, which implies an unnecessary threat dimension that would require a fundamental survival motivation. Third, they define the ways of survival in two different forms as offensive and defensive behaviors, which are not structurally determined. Mainly because of the existence of independent assumptions on the unit level, these theories include multiple levels and multiple causes of state behavior. 3 Constructivist theorizing is one recent example of essentialism in IR (see Ruggie 1998; Wendt 1999). Democratic Peace Theory represents a recent turn to essentialism in the liberal school (see Doyle 1983; Russett 1993, 1995; Owen 1994). 4 Neo-classical realism is an example of recent intentionalist theorizing (see, for instance, Walt 1987; Wohlforth 1987, 1999; Snyder 1991; Schweller 1994). For an example in liberal theorizing, see Moravcsik (1997). 5 Structuralism is criticized for its lack of detailed descriptive accuracy. However, unit-level focus on identities and interests that come at the expense of a focus on environmental conditioning tend to a descriptive richness that lacks a comprehensive explanation of the causes of social behavior. 6 In line with Waltzian definitions, structural autonomy assumes that systems are composed of structure and interacting units and consider structure as the set of core conditions that fundamentally shape the behavior and identity of the interacting units. It is a constraint that sets the stage for opportunity and defines limitations. Structure is the condition across which a range of interaction becomes possible. The two core conditions are a base organizing principle and a distribution of capabilities, which is measured systemically (be it a global or regional system). Concepts such as context and process should not be confused with the concept of structure. Structure is the stage-setting arrangement of units in a system, not an interaction-level process variable. For a realist example of process-level description of structure, see Snyder (1996). 7 Structural autonomy adopts the materialist base assumptions found in past realist theories concerning the composition of structure. As such, the term “distribution of power” is understood to reflect the systemic (global or regional) relative measure of unit capabilities to act. Unit capacity includes a unit's population, political organization, military potential for offensive and defensive operations, economic infrastructure (both of which leverage geographic location, technology advancement, natural resource control, and reliable access to capital and other assets necessary to support military and economic developments). Structural explanation rests on how the relative spread of those unit capabilities shapes unit behavior, not the unit capabilities themselves. 8 Structure is not an “event” to which units react, but the defined stage upon which they must play out their existence and upon which they interact with each other. 9 Both offensive and defensive realists assume states to be units wishing to survive. Survival, as a state motivation, is a consequentialist assumption that specifies a direction for state behavior and interests, but it does not in reality cover all units in the system at all times. So, it is both specific and biased. 10 This study is based on a classification of social theories as intentionalist, essentialist, and structural theories. While the former two classifications adopt a consequentialist logic that assumes agents act to attain a specific goal, the latter approach adopts a conditionalist perspective in which agency ends are shaped by means. 11 This conceptualization of reasoning and responsive actor is highly related to John Searle's philosophy of action, but it differs from Searle's formulation in some respects (see Searle 2001). For a similar loosened reasoning and responsive actor model, see Giddens (1979). 12 For an explanation between the practical and theoretical reasoning and their relation to desire and belief, respectively, see Harman (1976). 13 This assumption might provoke criticism from a domestic-level perspective. Even if states might form their own preferences because of domestic reasons, they should be ignored in a structural analysis because structuralism is based on the belief of the removal of domestic concerns due to the overruling character of structural factors. For an example of domestic preference formation, see Moravcsik (1997). 14 The information technology revolution's empowerment of individuals and small groups that can affect international dynamics is in its infancy, but its potential is growing. Nonstate actors empowered with information technology may in the near future have sustainable capacity—autonomy—and thus should be captured in theories that seek to explain international politics. 15 This is a reference to Morgenthau's famous frame about international politics as a struggle for power and its dominant role in the field. Also see Mearsheimer (2001). 16 Rather than assuming independently, we derive the dynamic of struggle for autonomy from the structure which is composed of anarchy as a self-reliance system and distribution of power. This is the only unit-level motivation that can be derived structurally and covers all units with its primitive and comprehensive nature. 17 For a similar but underdeveloped argument about the existence of both opportunities and constraints, see Mastanduno (1997). 18 Against most of the critics, Waltz was certainly right in claiming that states are functionally similar units. This is the most distinctive and only characteristic of the concept of anarchy. If state functions are differentiated, then there would be no conceptual meaning of the term “anarchy.” For the most prominent examples of these critics, see Ruggie (1986); Buzan, Jones, and Little (1993). 19 The traditional interpretation of the concept of a state of nature tends to emphasize the struggle for survival motivation and, therefore, the need for a leviathan. If states were really motivated to survive, then we would expect the emergence of a world government. However, because of the struggle of self-relying units for autonomy and because of their capabilities to act, a world government does not emerge and anarchy is sustained. 20 In the real world of international affairs, there is no Rawls (1971)“veil of ignorance.” States are aware of the limitations of their power. They roughly know their position in the distribution of power. In making their decisions, they take their relative power positions into consideration. They are individually unable to bring about a structural change, but in theory if every member of the system delegated their autonomy the system would change—this is the regional system lesson of the US former colonies moving from the articles of confederation to a “united” states of America. But as long as one unit remained self-reliant and possessive of their autonomy, by definition the system overall would lack a central authority. This change regionally did not affect the structure of the international system. The other theoretical path to hierarchy is the successful coercion of the most powerful state in overwhelming all others' capacity to remain self-reliant. 21 A similar conceptualization of hierarchy in anarchic orders might be found in David Lake's writings. But Lake uses a legalist concept of hierarchy, which de-emphasizes the significance of state autonomy at the expense of a higher authority (see Lake 2007). 22 The concept of autonomy which depends on capabilities should not be confused with sovereignty, which is a legal concept. Despite the legal claim for the sovereignty of all states since Westphalia, there can be no absolutely autonomous agent in the system. Autonomy requires the full freedom of an agent, which dominates the entire structure with its capabilities. If this was the case, then the international structure would not be an anarchic order, but it would be defined as a hierarchic one. Autonomy is essentially an elusive goal. The struggle for it reproduces the anarchic order rather than demolishing it in favor of a specific unit. 23 Here, structural autonomy departs from Waltz's Man, the State and War (1959) in that explanation remains at the structural level, rather than shifting to the unit or state level to explain the immediate causes of war. Additionally, structure matters so much that it affects the type of war that is likely to be fought. In concentrated structures, war will be limited in objective and application. 24 Concentrated power structure in this study refers to a high level of power concentration in the system. It can be viewed as hegemonic position gained by one unit over others in terms of power. But that concept of hegemony should not be confused with hierarchy. 25 Depending on specific power structures, states hold second-level motivations (orientation) for change or retention. Therefore, a state is defined as motivated for change if it wants to break down the distributed international power structure. In contrast, a state is defined as motivated for retention, if it views the status quo as a favorable international structure and pursues actions that do not challenge the overall concentrated nature of the system. 26 In our structural autonomy terms, balanced systems are diffuse power structures in which the gaps in the distribution are tight between two or more states. 27 This conceptualization of soft policies is substantially different from the concept of “soft balancing.” Supporters of the soft-balancing argument claim that any soft policies followed by secondary states target the power of the would-be hegemon. However, the concept of soft policies does not refer to the balancing behavior targeting the powerful actor. 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TI - The Struggle for Autonomy: A Realist Structural Theory of International Relations
JF - International Studies Review
DO - 10.1111/misr.12010
DA - 2012-12-16
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/the-struggle-for-autonomy-a-realist-structural-theory-of-international-gx6C6rvX1R
SP - 1
EP - 521
VL - Advance Article
IS - 4
DP - DeepDyve
ER -