TY - JOUR
AU - Stewart, Gordon, T.
AB - America's relations with Canada seem a deservedly neglected field in U.S. diplomatic history. Canada never has been the cause of basic definitions or basic shifts of U.S. foreign policy goals. America's relations with Canada retained a low priority, even when Canada became its most important market, its biggest field of foreign investment, and its closest military ally. Relations between the two countries always have seemed to be in a special category, uniquely determined by nature and geography. At times the relations were locally interesting; sometimes they were stirred by controversy, from the perennial fisheries dispute of the nineteenth century to the recent disagreements over energy policy. But the American-Canadian bilateral relationship usually is regarded as having little general or theoretical significance. This relegation from the normally competitive system of international relations had a great deal to do with the publication in the 1930s and 1940s of the seventeen-volume Carnegie series on Canadian-American relations, which emphasized the theme of good neighbors willing to settle disputes through arbitration. The general editor of the series, Canadian-born James T. Shotwell, was a leading internationalist who hoped that Canadian-American diplomacy would set a salutary example to the international community of how to eliminate selfish national interest and bellicosity between nations.1 The bilateral relationship thus was regarded as exceptional and exemplary rather than normative. This benign view was never accepted by many Canadian scholars who, by the 1960s, argued in various forms from studious monographs to popular diatribes that American economic and cultural expansion, along with the military defense integration of the two nations in the 1940s and 1950s, constituted American imperialism toward Canada.2 Indeed, within the Carnegie series itself, Canadian authors had demonstrated their misgivings about the internationalist approach of Shotwell. Above all, Donald G. Creighton's The Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence proposed a quite different conceptual framework, emphasizing competition between the two countries over North American resources and transportation routes.3 While this more critical, dynamic view gained ground in Canada, the old good-neighbor approach was never challenged in the United States by a major book, certainly not by a weighty multivolume series equivalent to the Carnegie effort. This situation was not so much due to the fact that American scholars stood by the good-neighbor/arbitration approach but because the whole subject, so vital to Canadians, was only of marginal interest to American diplomatic historians and experts. Thoughtful American textbooks in diplomatic history backed off from the Panglossian optimism of Shotwell's model and added details of tensions between the two countries.4 The conjunction of Richard Van Alstyne's view of the expanding American continental empire with William Appleman Williams's emphasis on the expansionist drives of the American industrial economy could be pieced together as a revisionist interpretation of America's Canadian policies.5 But no textbook or monograph offered a systematic reappraisal of American-Canadian relations. The subject finally received a conceptual jolt with the publication in 1980 of Robert Hannigan's analysis of the Taft reciprocity policy of 1911.6 In this seminal article, Hannigan proposed that America's view of Canada was not sealed off from the rest of the world but could be placed illuminatingly in the context of general U.S. foreign policy goals. He argued that William Howard Taft and his advisers planned, in the short run, to gain an “open door” to Canada's market and raw materials and, in the long run, to prevent Canada from developing into a successful core state with a competitive industrial economy. By 1911 American policymakers understood that urban and industrial America would require readier access to foreign markets and that the ability of the United States to remain self-sufficient in food production was questionable. Taft and Secretary of State Philander C. Knox therefore viewed reciprocity in terms of capturing the Canadian market and gaining access to Canadian grain production.7 Hannigan placed Canada squarely in the midst of American open-door diplomacy of the early twentieth century. He brought American-Canadian relations in from the cold. A problem arises, however, in treating the Canadian relationship in the same conceptual terms as America's relationship with China or the Latin American states. The stubborn fact remains that Canada's geographical contiguity to and similarity with the United States in economic organization and expectations have given it a special place in U.S. policy formulation. At the time that Taft's advisers were writing about an open door, for example, the United States already controlled about 60 percent of the Canadian market On the one hand, the Carnegie series went too far in eliminating the possibility of a dynamic, competitive or exploitative relationship with the United States and Canada; on the other, it may be that Hannigan has gone too far in arguing that Canadian policy was simply another example of general open-door policy goals. In short, American-Canadian relations need to be assessed anew to bring into focus the basic structure ofthat relationship. Analysis of U.S. congressional debates and committee hearings and of State Department correspondence reveals the existence of three basic American attitudes that remained consistent and formed the American view of Canada down to the early 1900s. The first was that Canada possessed a population similar to that of the United States, that it was operating in equivalent geographical conditions, and that Canada, of all the countries in the world, would be the first to follow the American pattern of economic and political development. Speaking before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1888, H. V. Poor argued that “nothing is to stand in the way … of the 'Americanization' of the whole continent"8 In 1890 the Senate Select Committee on Canada listened to a comprehensive account by Francis Glenn of how Canada “has been coming to us, and is coming to us steadily, more rapidly than ever before.”9 Another example occurred even earlier. As he sought to convince Congress to enter into new trade negotiations with Canada in 1876, J. W. Ward rested his case on the grounds that “Canada, from her geographical position and similarity of her people to our own, is the first with which we should seek an extension of our commerce.”10 This standard view of Canadian-American similarity was given official sanction in 1892, when Secretary of State John W. Foster described Canadians as “our Northern neighbors, bound to us by so many ties of race and community of interest.”11 The second American attitude, embracing a counterinterpretation of Canada's destiny, viewed the Canadian confederation, established in 1867, as part of England's policy of strengthening its empire to make permanent its influence and institutions in North America.12 This view that Canada was still an integral and important factor in British imperial machinations took on substance as Americans perceived direct economic threats from Canada's transportation policies. In a report to Secretary of the Treasury Howell Cobb in 1860, Israel T. Hatch described the Grand Trunk Railroad as a systematic means of tapping the resources of the American heartland and opening it up to manufactured exports from Great Britain. The scale and the cost of the railroad, backed by British capital with its headquarters in London, proved that it was “less the struggle for temporary trade than for permanent empire.”13 Once the Canadian Pacific Railroad was completed in 1886, the American critique expanded to charge Canada with the attempt to divert American trade with China and Japan. The building of the Canadian Pacific, together with British admiralty subsidies to associated shipping lines on the Atlantic and the Pacific coasts, was regarded as a concerted effort to secure “the supremacy of the British flag upon the seas … and a scheme of British imperial supremacy overthe commerce of the western side of this continent.”14 While critics of Canada's railroad policies saw Britain as the main problem (without British capital and mercantile support, Canada posed little danger in itself), a third distinct attitude held that Canada, under the Conservative governments of John A. Macdonald, knowingly was using its position in the empire to cause problems for the United States. This attitude was expressed best by Joseph Nimmo, a spokesman for American railroads, when he told the 1890 Select Senate Committee that “Canada simply uses the British flag to play high-handed tricks upon the United States.”15 This was a long-standing complaint. In the 1860s Canada was accused of having disregarded utterly “the spirit and substance” of the 1854 reciprocity treaty, because it had raised tariffs against American manufactured goods.16 In the late 1880s, at the height of the fisheries controversy, Canadian policy, with its strict enforcement of the 1818 Anglo-American treaty provisions on the fisheries, was denounced as “inhuman” and an “outrage.”17 Furthermore, as Canada arranged its canal tolls to discriminate against American ships passing through the Weiland and St. Lawrence canals, congressional complaints increased to the point where President Grover Cleveland declared that the United States had been “imposed upon and humiliated.”18 The deep involvement of the Canadian government in British-subsidized transportation led American critics to decry Canada's “foreign policy as intensely commercial, which gives a very peculiar character to our Canadian relationship and renders it much more difficult for us to enter fair treaty arrangements with Canada than with any other nation on the globe.”19 In 1893, President Benjamin Harrison summed up this negative assessment of Canada as he insisted that in all major disputes between Britain and the United States—the Atlantic fisheries, the Bering Sea sealing question, transportation matters—Canada had “thwarted negotiations by unreasonable and unfriendly objections and protests.”20 These three attitudes—that Canada was similar to the United States and would eventually conform to an American pattern, that Canada was still burdened by European institutions and represented direct imperial economic threats, and that Canada was a deceitful and troublesome diplomatic partner—constituted the American response to Canada in the mid- or late-nineteenth century. These attitudes could not lead to any consistent policy because they were essentially contradictory. For example, Republican railroad lobbyists like Nimmo made all manner of complaints about Canadian diversion of U.S. foreign and domestic commerce and about the imperial purpose behind the Grand Trunk and Canadian Pacific railroads; but when President Cleveland, in 1888, threatened to withdraw all bonding and transit privileges in retaliation for Canadian fisheries policy, the Republicans in Congress refused to support such draconian. measures because of their negative impact on American shippers, insurers, and agents who handled the Canadian business.21 Similarly, while eastern railroad interests objected to the unfair competition of Canadian roads (unrestrained by Interstate Commerce Commission regulations), farmers and shippers in the midwest and northwest and manufacturers and consumers in New England all valued the additional capacity and cheaperrate? thus made available. Occasionally action was taken, as in 1893 when Harrison and his secretary of state, James G. Blaine, retaliated against Canadian canal policy by raising charges on American canals;22 but no comprehensive Canadian policy could be based on these conflicts among lobbyists, congressmen, and administration officials. Insofar as any policy operated, it was of the do-nothing variety, since all administrations from 1866 onward refused to alter U.S. tariff barriers to allow freer trade between the two countries. Canada in these years was a genuine puzzle for American officials and politicians. As Nimmo told the Senate Select Committee in 1890, that country was “a riddle to the American mind.”23 Canada was close, similar in population and circumstances, heading supposedly in an American direction; but the two nations were, throughout the 1870s, 1880s, and 1890s, “in a state of commercial belligerency.”24 Moreover, Canada was playing an active, aggressive role in the expansion and direction of British commercial imperialism and in all major diplomatic dealings seemed intent on playing devious tricks on the United States. In short, Canada's public policies, with their “insane idea of empire,”25 contradicted any American expectation that Canada was adjusting herself to a continent on which the United States was the preponderant power.26 As Ward put it in 1876, when he wondered about Canada's “natural” place in North America and the actual state of economic antagonism between the two nations, relations between the United States and Canada were of “an exceptional and peculiar character.”27 Beginning about 1906, however, these attitudes and actions began to be replaced by more considered policymaking. A key factor preparing the ground for a clearer assessment of American goals was the rapprochement with Britain, which reduced fears of British imperialism in North America, even though one U.S. senator as late as the 1930s objected to the proposed St. Lawrence Seaway because it would be used “as an avenue of approach for their [British] warships.”28 Another factor that altered the American view of Canada was a growing, informed awareness among U.S. officials that time and nature indeed appeared to be working on their side. In 1906 departmental special agent Charles M. Pepper reported to the secretary of commerce and labor that Canada's proximity and similarity in business methods made it less a foreign market “than an extension [of] the domestic market.”29 Using post-1898 trade statistics, he proceeded to show that, in spite of imperial tariff preferences, Canada steadily was importing more from the United States than from Britain, and he forecast that all attempts to maintain an imperial economic system would fail.30 A confirmatory assessment of these trends was made in 1908 by John B. Osborne, chief of the State Department's Bureau of Trade Relations, who argued that “nature is a most powerful ally in the development of the commercial relations between the United States and Canada.”31 Trade statistics showing that the United States had about 60 percent of the Canadian market were “pregnant with meaning,” and Osborne believed the United States would continue to displace Britain in the Canadian economy.32 Yet another significant sign of the times was identified in a 1910 report by Joseph F. Johnson to the National Monetary Commission. An analysis of the Canadian banking and credit system showed the extent in which it was tied to New York rather than to London. Quite simply, concluded Johnson, “Canada is financially part of the United States.”33 In these circumstances, created both by rapprochement and by favorable underlying economic trends, modern American policy toward Canada was formed. The American goals were to continue to detach Canada from the empire, increase the U.S. share of the Canadian market, gain readier access to Canadian natural resources, and encourage, in general, Canadian integration into a unified North American economy. It was not so much a case of obtaining an open door as of taking the door off its hinges. These goals were evident in President Taft's reciprocity policy. He explained to Congress in January 1911 how the proposed trade treaty with Canada would increase the supply of foodstuffs, enable the United States better to control the international wheat market, and further open the Canadian market for the products of urban America.34 In a phrase revealing his view of Canada, the president told the Illinois legislature two weeks later that reciprocity would strengthen “our self-supporting capacity.”35 Taft and Knox, encouraged by the arguments of Pepper and Osborne, concluded that there was a definite possibility in 1911 of shifting Canada from her previous imperial pattern of development to a more “natural” pattern that would better fit the needs of the American economy. This is why the president spoke of Canada as being “at the parting of the ways,” and why the British Tariff Commission complained that the United States was trying to “develop conditions of disintegration” between Britain and its colonies.36 The goals of weakening Canada's ties to the empire and of developing an interlocking economic system in North America were not pursued with any sense of urgency after 1911. Canada never came near the top of the State Department's priority list and, in any event, the economic trends continued to work in the American interest. By the mid-1920s the United States had replaced Britain as the largest foreign investor in Canada37. But whenever issues did arise, U. S. officials made clear the role they expected their neighbor to play. In the early 1920s, for example, when the Canadians set duties and tariffs to encourage the establishment of pulp and paper factories at home, rather than simply exporting the raw pulpwood abroad, committees in bom the House and the Senate complained that American paper mills would be forced to close “unless a reasonable supply of raw material could be kept flowing.”38 The controversy surfaced again in 1923, when Secretary of State Charles Evans Hughes, speaking to and through the U.S. chargé in Ottawa, warned that there would be American “retaliation of a far-reaching character” if Canada persisted in her attempts to limit the export of raw pulpwood.39 During the 1930s, as Canada desperately sought a new trade treaty with the United States, American officials became even more forthright in setting out their assumptions and aims with respect to that country. These were revealed in 1933 when the Conservative government of Richard B. Bennett, after fruitlessly seeking an imperial solution to Canada's trading problems, turned to the United States for tariff relief. When the Roosevelt administration moved slowly on these overtures, the Canadians became increasingly resentful, and in November 1934 the Canadian ambassador to Washington, W. H. Herridge, delivered a note that amounted to an indictment of American policy toward Canada.40 Herridge pointed out that the Canadian market for American business was significantly larger than the Japanese, Chinese, French, German, and Latin American markets; that Canada had, since 1882, carried a trade deficit with the United States; and that between 1903 and 1933 about 70 percent of Canada's imports had come from the United States. He then drew attention to American investment in Canada, with a consequent annual outflow of an estimated $125,000,000 in interest payments. He pointed out further that Canada's only credits with which to pay for its interest outflow and trade deficit were gold and revenue from American tourists. As this was a restricting and unfairly dependent position for Canada, Herridge concluded bluntly that his nation should be allowed to increase its exports to the United States.41 The American response to this critique was revealing. A comprehensive analysis of Herridge's note was made by the U.S. minister to Ottawa, Warren Robbins, and accepted by the State Department.42 Robbins had advised that it was important for the State Department to reject a basic implication of the Herridge case; namely, that Canada was unfairly on the receiving end of the American-Canadian economic connection and that it therefore deserved better access to the American market. The basic objective, argued Robbins, should be “the restoration of normal trade between the two countries and its increase without reference to, or commitment regarding, any Canadian desire to have Canadian exports to the United States exceed their normal relation to American exports to Canada.” It also was important to discredit the idea of closing the gap in American-Canadian trade, for if that principle were acknowledged by the State Department, even the Canadian Liberal party, traditionally friendly to the United States, might introduce it as a goal.43 Robbins, in his reply, clearly illustrated the American view that Canada “normally” should be in a dependent position and should not become an exporter of manufactured goods to the U.S. market. American policy was neatly summed up in June 1935 by the U.S. chargé in Ottawa, Pierre De L. Boai, who devised a more accurate, if more cumbersome, phrase than “open door.” The American aim, he wrote to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, was to fashion a “special contiguous country economic regime.”44 The post-1945 years presented encouraging circumstances for American policymakers to pursue this end. The wartime cooperation and joint discussions on defense that had been taking place since the Ogdensburg agreement of 1940, combined with Canada's serious postwar trade difficulties and exchange problems, offered a rare opportunity.45 Canada's position was critical by fall 1947, when it found itself unable to earn dollars from trade with a devastated Europe and so finance the country's traditional trade deficit with the United States. Canada faced an acute shortage of dollars. U.S. Ambassador Ray Atherton reported from Ottawa that the new Conservative opposition leader, John Bracken, was proposing a customs union with Britain to ease these trade problems. Given Prime Minister W. L. Mackenzie King's pro-American leanings and the atmosphere of cooperation between the two governments in the defense field, the Canadian economic predicament could be used as an opportunity for further economic integration and a final destruction of the imperial connection. As Atherton explained in October 1947, opinion in favor of “a closer integration of the economies of Canada and the United States … has reached probably an all-time high.” In addition, the King government seemed ready to make wholesale changes that “clearly imply Canada's secession from the Empire trading unit” and “the expansion of the Dominion's economy along lines complementary to that of the U.S.”46 During the winter of 1947–48, tariff discussions took place in Washington between Canadian and American “technicians.” On the Canadian side were Hector Mackinnon, chairman of the Dominion Tariff Board, and John Deutsch, director of economic relations in the Department of Finance; on the American side were Woodbury Willoughby, associate chief of the Division of Commercial Policy, and Willard Thorp, assistant secretary of state for economic affairs.47 A plan was drawn up to phase out, over a five-year period, all tariff barriers between the two countries. In a top secret memorandum, Thorp explained how the plan met long-standing American policy objectives. The Canadians understood the far-reaching consequences and considered “the proposal, if implemented, to be one of the most momentous decisions in their history.” Thorp urged that this golden moment be seized and advised the Truman administration to begin talking immediately to key congressional leaders in order to prepare political opinion; he emphasized to them “the vital significance of the plan from a strategic as well as an economic standpoint.”48 The phasing out of tariffs, explained Thorp, “would result in the immediate elimination of all Empire preferences granted by Canada, with important economic and political implications for the United States.” It was essential to move now on this, he added, because King was due to retire in August and “his successor may not be equally favorable to the plan.” This was, concluded Thorp, “a unique opportunity of promoting the most efficient utilization of the resources of the North American continent and knitting the two countries together—an objective of U.S. foreign policy since the founding of the republic.”49 While these assessments of American goals with respect to Canada were expressed only in secret documents in 1947–48, they emerged in public during debate on the St. Lawrence Seaway agreement Both Presidents Franklin D. Roosevelt and Harry S Truman were strong supporters of a joint American-Canadian route to the sea. Roosevelt had emphasized the energy aspect of the project, urging Congress in 1941 to view the seaway as an important additional electrical power source that would enable the United States to outstrip its enemies “in the race of production … that determines the rise and fall of nations.”50 Truman had drawn attention to the role of the Tennessee and Columbia River power projects in the development of the atomic bomb and argued that power from the St. Lawrence project would be equally significant.51 Undersecretary of State Dean G. Acheson, in his arguments, emphasized the unusual needs of the American industrial heartland: Almost unique among the highly industrialized sections of the world, our middle western manufacturing areas have grown up far away from ocean transportation.… Since the first World War, this area has progressively grown into a surplus producing area which now must ship its products not only within the United States but to foreign countries and which must procure its raw materials not only from within the United States but increasingly from abroad. For all this, a water route to the sea is needed.52 In spite of these pleas from Roosevelt, Truman, and Acheson, the opposition of affected American interests was strong enough to prevent any congressional action on the issue until the Canadians, in 1951, decided to proceed with an all-Canadian seaway.53 Administration pressure was stepped up in Congress. Already in 1950 the National Security Resources Board had argued that the United States soon would be critically short of iron ore and that it was essential to gain easier access to ore deposits in Labrador.54 In June 1953, FrankNash, assistant secretary of defense, took the seaway issue before the House Committee on Public Works, impressing upon the representatives how serious the matter was to the president, the entire cabinet, and the Joint Chiefs.55 Nash repeated the warnings about iron ore depletion and pointed out that the region north of the Gulf of the St. Lawrence seemed rich in other important raw materials. From a national security standpoint, Nash argued, it was necessary to prevent an all-Canadian route into the heart of the United States. Other proponents of the seaway added the arguments that “Canada's huge mineral resources in the vast St. Lawrence Gulf region will find an increasing market in our country,” and that a joint route to the sea was “an economic matter of primary concern to the United States.”56 Such economic benefits might follow even if the seaway were a purely Canadian project, but such autonomous Canadian control presented definite dangers to American interests. Critics, drawing on the deep historical suspicions of Canadian transportation policies, warned that Canada might well operate a discriminatory toll and regulating system. Since most incoming tonnage was expected to be in the form of raw materials for American industry, there were “compelling reasons why U.S. participation is of the utmost importance.”57 If the seaway were owned and operated by Canada alone, it would be run in Canada's own national interest, most obviously as “a revenue-producing investment, with U.S. interests continuing to pay rental for its use.”58 On the other hand, joint American-Canadian control not only would prevent any nationalist Canadian policy on the seaway but also would bring broader benefits since it would “augment integration of our economy with that of Canada.”59 The St. Lawrence seaway agreement represents a high mark in Canadian-American good neighborliness. In the communiqué announcing joint participation, both president and prime minister spoke of Canadian-American cooperation in NATO, Korea, and the Cold War in general.60 At the signing ceremony, Congressman George A. Dondero of Michigan, key figure behind the legislation, talked of the joys of working with “our good neighbor to the north.”61 These are valid characterizations of the atmosphere in which the final agreement was made, and Canada, all along, had certainly worked for American participation in sharing the cost of construction and ensuring the commercial success of the seaway.62 But public fanfare about good neighborliness should not obscure the reality that the United States had acted to gain readier access to Canadian raw materials, to prevent Canada from pursuing an autonomous, nationalist policy on seaway matters, and to confirm physically, as it were, the complementary nature of the two economies. The seaway was like a huge economic zipper knitting these countries together. It was a fitting climax to the post-1906 policy goals of economically integrating the two countries and molding the “special contiguous country economic regime.” In assessing the American response to Canada and in searching for a phrase that might best sum up that response, one approach can be quickly dismissed. It makes little sense to use the good-neighbor concept as an explanatory device. This approach, which figured so much in the Carnegie series, has been undermined by many scholars since then, but it needs to be sealed firmly in its coffin. Its weakness is that rhetoric is mistaken for reality. It is possible to find good neighbor and similar sentiments expressed throughout the period, although they multiply by the 1930s; indeed, because the sentiment was expressed so often and so variously the rhetoric has taken on a life of its own. It would even be possible to trace the origins of the notion in both countries and show its changing content and impact. It could be argued effectively, for example, that Americans were always more partial to the phrase than Canadians and used it as a kind of euphemism when they hoped Canada would act in “American” rather than “imperial” ways.63 The geographical relationship between the two countries gave the good-neighbor concept a vitality that can be analyzed in terms of its influence on public opinion and government actions. An example of this special language between the two countries occurred in April 1951 when the American ambassador to Ottawa, Stanley Woodward, asked Lester Pearson, the new minister of external affairs in the Louis St. Laurent government, to explain what Pearson had meant in speeches apparently critical of American influence in Canada. He explained himself and then was told that Woodward had been invited to a Kiwanis Club dinner in Ottawa in honor of Canadian-American Friendship Day, a dinner at which Pearson was to deliver a speech. Pearson laughed and said that he supposed he had better talk about the undefended border and 135 years of peace. He then invited the ambassador to accompany him to the opening baseball game at Lansdowne Park.64 This kind of jocular, familiar interchange is one of the hallmarks of modem Canadian-American relations and can be studied to weigh its impact on policy formation, but it does not constitute the substance of policy. The St Lawrence Seaway decision culminated in an outpouring of good neighborliness, but U.S. policy was rooted in quite different considerations. The good-neighbor rhetoric is part of the superstructure, not the foundation. When describing that foundation, there is a problem with conventional terminology. It is easy to charge that American policy was “imperialistic,” as many Canadian scholars have done and as Hannigan has argued persuasively with reference to the 1911 agreement. Placing American policy in die setting of Immanuel Wallerstein's model of world development (as Hannigan does) certainly makes more sense than accusations that the United States was embarked on a course of “capitalist imperialism” against a country as developed as Canada.65 In this more considered view of American policy, the object was to prevent Canada from growing into a core state with a complex industrial economy that might rival that of the United States. In this schema, American policy aimed at incorporating Canada into the core economy of the United States as a source of raw materials and as a market for exports.66 This did not mean that die United States would try to prevent any diversified growth in its neighbor, for growth and prosperity were required if Canada was to remain an attractive and important field of sales and investment, but it did mean that from about 1911 on U.S. policymakers tried to fashion Canadian development to fit American needs. Such is the case made by Hannigan, and it is a plausible one for 1911 and beyond, as the pulpwood affair of the 1920s clearly shows. Some awkward facts, however, have to be dealt with before that interpretation can be accepted. The biggest question is whether Canada could have become a core state irrespective of U.S. policy. From the seventeenth into the twentieth century Canada's economy always had been tied to a metropolitan market and an outside source of capital. With its small population, difficult geographical setting, and fragmented domestic market, it could well be argued that Canada never had the capability of developing into a core state.67 Indeed, if one is looking for destructive American tactics, it makes more sense to go back to 1783 when Canada was cut off from the Ohio Valley. Had Canada retained control of the entire Great Lakes basin, it might have been able to develop into a significant, competitive core economy. Insofar as any American policy thwarted Canada's core-state possibilities, it was not a policy embraced by the corporate lawyers, academic experts, and business lobbyists who advised the State Department after 1900. It was, instead, the more innocent diplomatic policy of the Founding Fathers. To make the case either way requires a more sophisticated and sustained economic analysis, but it is reasonable to suggest that this fundamental issue requires careful discussion before concluding that the United States prevented the emergence of a Canadian core state after 1911. Related to this basic consideration is the role assigned to Canadian policies throughout the period. Canadian governments from 1867 onward, sometimes deliberately, sometimes as a by-product of other goals, encouraged much of the economic integration between the two countries. Even Macdonald's national policy, with its avowed purpose to develop Canada along east-west lines and thus forestall absorption into the United States, contributed to the long-term trends by encouraging American investment across the border.68 Once the post-1921 Liberal governments of King and St. Laurent were in office, they encouraged U.S. investment down into the 1950s. Moreover, at the time it was rejecting American complaints about its pulpwood export policies in the 1920s, Canada also was encouraging U.S. investment in its papermaking business, to the point where 69 percent of the Canadian pulp and paper industry was controlled by Americans.69 After King returned to power in 1935, he immediately called on Norman Armour, U.S. ambassador to Ottawa, and told him how anxious he was to take Canada down “the American road.”70 It is clear, too, that during the 1940s Canada participated willingly in military and defense integration with the United States.71 Therefore, it is inaccurate to regard American policy as being imposed on an unwilling and unknowing country. If the United States is judged guilty of imperialism, then Canada must accept a ruling of contributory negligence. Another important complication is the extent to which American-Canadian relations were shaped by factors outside the control or purview of officials of either government. Over the years a whole host of interactions have taken place between the United States and Canada that makes their relationship unusual. The intermingling of populations is a special conditioning factor.72 Since the turn of the century, links have multiplied in a wide range of fields. The close banting ties between the two countries, established as early as 1910, had little to do with policy on either side of the border. In more recent years, ties have multiplied in the fields of business, labor, and professional organizations as well as in education, entertainment, media and communications, voluntary service agencies, and professional sports. In most cases of such bilateral relations, it can be assumed as axiomatic that those relations can be assessed best by examining the interactions of major government departments in terms of economic and strategic goals. In the case of America's relations with Canada, it might well be argued that the complex array of interactions below the national government level constitutes the real shapers of the relationship. Such an hypothesis has been proposed by John H. Redekop who has invented the useful phrase “sub-system dominance” to describe the phenomenon.73 There are some loose ends in the theory, particularly on where to draw the line between normal government interaction and the subsystem, but it is a timely reminder of the peculiarities of the American-Canadian relationship. However, even if the sub-system model is given full weight, it will not alter the arguments advanced in this paper. Indeed, the multiplying of such ties fitted neatly and easily into the State Department's view that Canada should be integrated as variously and extensively as possible into the American economy and the American view of the world. All this makes it tempting to view America's relationship to Canada as unplanned, but that leads to the kind of analysis that fails to get at the foundation of the U.S. response to Canada. It makes the relationship seem a benign growth, as though it were geographically determined and required the United States to have no need of a policy. But even amidst the sea of nineteenth-century rhetoric, the United States took some actions to push Canada in a particular direction, and from about 1906 onward, State Department and other administration officials advocated policies with specific goals in mind. These approaches rested on the old American attitude that Canada was part of the North American continent and that it ought to be “naturally” an economic extension of the United States. Because of its imperial connection, American administrations in the late nineteenth century were distrustful of Canada and refused to enter into close commercial ties for fear that Britain thereby would gain more influence in the U.S. economy. As the imperial factor was reduced, American officials concluded that Canada was beginning finally to follow the “natural” path of economic cooperation and integration. American policy after 1906 was designed to break the final links with Britain and bring Canada down this American road. In so doing the United States was pursuing conventional foreign policy goals—protecting strategic interests, promoting exports and investments. But in the peculiar circumstances of the two countries, these conventional goals directly threatened to circumscribe Canadian autonomy. American officials ignored this adverse impact on Canadian nationalist values and aspirations. Just as Canada was a riddle to nineteenth-century Americans, so it remained a puzzle in the post-1945 years. State Department officials in 1951 believed that anti-American feelings in Canada were the product of a narrow intellectual circle with a disproportionate influence in the Department of External Affairs.74 By 1958 a congressional delegation finally awoke to the fact that there were strong and pervasive anti-American values in Canada.75 From that point on, administrations and Congress have tried to be more sensitive to Canadian nationalism, but as Mark MacGuigan, present secretary of state for external affairs, has noted recently, the United States reacts quite sharply to any Canadian efforts to reduce the integration already achieved in the fields of business and energy.76 This failure to comprehend the impact of American policies on Canada justifies the use of the word “imperialism” but only if the special conditions of Canadian complicity are borne in mind. The negative American response in 1934 to the Bennett government's complaint that Canada was suffering unfairly under prevailing economic relations and the determination from 1951 to 1953 not to permit autonomous Canadian control of the seaway both confirm that U.S. policy was to keep that country in a dependent relationship. In such policy formulations lies the imperialism of the American response to Canada. The United States always has been concerned lest Canada become “a producer rather than a consumer, and sufficient unto herself.”77 It had been concerned from the 1850s to the 1890s that Canada would be used as part of Britain's imperial designs. As President Taft explained in 1911, Canada's post-1900 prosperity might crystallize into a rival economic power.78 The task was to make Canada accept the preponderant economic position of the United States on the continent and run its economy to meet the needs ofthat reality. Both advocates and opponents of reciprocal trade with Canada from 1854 to 1911 expected Canada, in the long run, to become part of the U.S.-controlled North American economy.79 Taft assumed too easily that the course finally could be set in 1911. State Department officials in the 1920s and 1930s made clear their expectation that Canada should become an economic adjunct of the United States. The Truman administration, between 1947 and 1949 and from 1951 to 1953, was expressly interested in encouraging more integration of Canada into “our military industrial pattern.”80 American imperialism in Canada was not only different from American economic expansion and its accompanying ideology in China or Latin America but also different from British imperial expansion in Africa, India, or even in Ireland because there was so much overlap in values, expectations, and general economic goals between the United States and Canada. These two circles intersected deeply. Here, then, is an exotic growth rather than an example of a common or garden variety of open-door imperialism. To repeat Ward's phrase of 1876, relations between the United States and Canada always have been of “an exceptional and peculiar character.” Footnotes 1 In his preface to Charles C. Tansill's Canadian-American Relations 1875–1911 ( New Haven , 1943 ) , Shotwell wrote that the relationship presented an example “of the way in which statesmanship and common sense have ultimately built up a technique for the settlement of disputes … which can and should furnish a model to all the world.” The final volume (and one that has stood the test of time) in the series, John B. Brebner's North Atlantic Triangle: The Interplay of Canada, the United States and Great Britain ( New York , 1945 ) , lists all the monographs in the Carnegie project. See also Harold Josephson, James T. Shotwell and the Rise of Internationalism in America ( Cranberry, NJ , 1975 ). 2 Carl C. Berger, “ Internationalism, Continental ism and the Writing of History: Comments on the Carnegie Series on the Relations of Canada and the United States ,” in Richard A. Preston , ed., The Influence of the United States on Canadian Development ( Durham, NC , 1972 ), pp. 32 – 54 . Ian Lumsden, ed., Close to the 49th Parallel ( Toronto , 1970 ) ; D. W. Carr, Recovering Canada's Nationhood ( Ottawa , 1971 ) ; Philip Sykes, Sellout: The Giveaway of Canada's Resources ( Edmonton , 1973 ) ; John W. Warnock, Partner to Behemoth: The Military Policy of Satellite Canada ( Toronto , 1970 ) ; and Abraham Rotstem and Gary Lax, eds., Getting It Bach A Program for Canadian Independence ( Toronto , 1974 ) are all examples of works on this theme. 3 Donald G. Creighton, The Commercial Empire of the St. Lawrence ( Toronto , 1937 ). An earlier study, which was not part of the Carnegie series, had drawn attention to the economically competitive dimension to the relationship. See Hugh L. Keenleyside, Canada and the United States. Some Aspects of their Historical Relationship ( New York , 1942 ). 4 For example, Thomas A. Bailey, A Diplomatic History ofthe American People , 10th ed. ( Englewood Cliffs, NJ , 1980 ), pp. 685 –86. 5 William Appleman Williams, ed., From Colony to Empire: Essays in the History of American Foreign Relations ( New York , 1972 ), pp. 39 – 202 . There are many books and articles that deal with aspects of American-Canadian relations. All books on Anglo-American diplomacy in the nineteenth century treat Canadian issues. Writings on the theme of manifest destiny invariably include discussion of U.S. expansion and its impact on Canada. See, for example, Frederick Merk, Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History ( New York , 1963 ) ; Kendnek A. Clements, “ Manifest Destiny and Canadian Reciprocity in 1911 ,” Pacific Historical Review 42 ( 1973 ): 32 – 52 ; and James G. Snell, “ The Frontier Sweeps Northwest American Perceptions ofthe British-American Prairie West at the Point of Canadian Expansion ,” Western Historical Quarterly 11 ( 1980 ): 381 – 400 . Excellent monographs such as Alvin Gluek, Minnesota and Manifest Destiny ( Toronto , 1965 ) ; and Robin Winks, Canada and the United States: The Civil War Years ( Baltimore , 1960 ) have analyzed aspects of American policy with regard to Canada. Donald F. Warner, The Idea of Continental Union: Agitation for the Annexation of Canada to the United States 1849–1893 ( Lexington, KY , 1960 ) , has provided an overview of annexationist sentiment, but there has been no systematic reappraisal of American goals. 6 Robert Hannigan, “ Reciprocity 1911: Continentalism and American Weltpolitik ,” Diplomatic History 4 (Winter 1980 ): 1 – 18 . 7 Ibid., pp. 2–3, 18. 8 U.S., Congress, Senate , Select Committee on Relations with Canada Submitted by Mr. Hoar, July 21, 1890, 51st Cong., 1st sess., 1890 , Sen. Rept. 1530, pt. 2, pp. 951 –53 (hereafter cited as Sen. Sel. Com., 1890). Poor was a lawyer and a railroad lobbyist. His 1888 testimony was reprinted in the 1890 report. 9 Ibid., pp. 774–81; Francis Glenn to George Hoar, Brooklyn, 7 June 1890, ibid., pp. 877–83. Glenn also wrote periodical articles on this theme. See American Economist 6(31 January 1890): 68–71. 10 U.S., Congress, Senate , Report of J. W. Ward , 62d Cong., 1st sess., Sen. Doc. 80, p. 1361 (hereafter cited as Ward Report, 1876). 11 John W. Foster to Michael Herbert, Washington, 24 August 1892, U.S., Department of State , Foreign Relations of the United States 1892 ( Washington , 1893 ), p. 304 (hereafter cited as FRUS). 12 U.S., Congress, Senate , W. H. Derby Report 1867 , 62d Cong., 1st sess., Sen. Doc. 80, p. 992 (hereafter cited as Derby Report, 1867); Derby Report, 1869, ibid., pp. 1230, 1238; Rice Report, 1880, ibid., p. 1385; Sen. Sel. Com., 1890, pp. 787,886,944. H. V. Poor told the 1890 committee that Britain's objective in Canada was “the erection on this continent of a new or second empire to hold in check the United States.” 13 Israel T. Hatch to Howell Cobb, Secretary of the Treasury, 28 March 1860, Sen. Doc. 80, 62d Cong., 1st sess., pp. 652–55 (hereafter cited as Hatch Report, 1860); J. M. Potter to W. H. Seward, Montreal, 1 August 1865, Despatches from U.S. Consuls , Montreal 1850–1906, vol. 7 ( Washington , 1959 ). 14 Testimony of Joseph Nimmo, Sen. Sel. Com., 1890, pp. 891–95, 903, 911–13, 1229. Nimmo, regarded as an expert on Canadian transportation policies, argued that all the public monies spent by Ottawa proved that the Canadians were aimed at “commercial supremacy on this continent.” Edward P. Crapol, America for Americans: Economic Nationalism and Anglo-phobia in the Late Nineteenth Century ( Westport, CT , 1972 ) , gives a comprehensive account of this fear of British imperial designs from Canada to India. 15 Sen. Sel. Com., 1890, p. 1234. 16 Hatch Report, 1860, pp. 655–56; Hatch Report, 1869, p. 1225; statement of Senator Justin S. Morrill, 1859, Sen. Doc. 80, 62d Cong., 1st sess., p. 1893. Chalfont Robinson, History of the Reciprocity Treaty with Canada , Sen. Doc. 17,62d Cong., 1st sess., p. 38 . This was reprinted from Robinson's 1903 study comparing the Canadian and Hawaiian reciprocity treaties. See Robinson, A History of Two Reciprocity Treaties ( New Haven , 1903 ). 17 Sen. Sel. Com., 1890, pp. 792–93; U.S., Cong., H. Rept. 3648, 49th Cong., 2d sess., p. 1742. This report of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs charged that the Canadian interpretation of the 1818 Anglo-American treaty was “preposterous in view of international laws of community and good neighborhood.” 18 Message from President Grover Cleveland with reference to intercourse between the United States and Canada, 23 August 1888, U.S., Congress, H. Doc. 434, 50th Cong., 1st sess., p. 1633. 19 Sen. Sel Com., 1890, pp. 891–93. 20 President Harrison Message to Congress, 2 February 1893, U.S., Congress, Sen. Doc. 80,62d Cong., 1st sess., p. 1688. 21 Sen. Sel. Com., 1890, p. 921. Nimmo and other transportation lobbyists were trying to obtain U.S. government subsidies and relaxation of Interstate Commerce Commission regulations. 22 On 3 February 1893 tolls were raised on American canals such as the St. Mary's at the Sault. The Canadians immediately altered their policy, and on 21 February 1893 the American increases were rescinded. In his message on this issue, President Harrison declared that Canadian policy had been in “flagrant disregard” of U. S. rights under the Treaty of Washington. See Sen. Doc. 80, 62d Cong., 1st sess., pp. 1688–89. 23 Sen. Sel. Com., 1890, p. 886. 24 Reciprocity with Canada, Pt. 2, Report of J. N. Lamed on the State of Trade with the British North American Provinces (1871), U.S., Congress, H. Rep., 62d Cong., 1st sess., p. 1293. Larned described this economic antagonism as “an unfortunate dislocation which very seriously impairs the organization and operation of the industrial energies of the American continent.” 25 Sen. Sel. Com., 1890, p. 971. 26 Ibid., p. 916. Winks, in his Canada and the United States , p. 375 , points out that by 1871 there was no doubt that the United States was the dominant power on the continent. But Americans retained doubts about British commercial scheming and resented Canada's unwillingness to adjust to that basic geopolitical fact. 27 Ward Report, 1876, p. 1362. 28 Bradford Perkins, The Great Rapprochement: England and the United States 1895–1914 ( New York , 1968 ) ; and R. G. Neale, Great Britain and United States Expansion 1898–1900 ( East Lansing, MI , 1966 ) both emphasize that Britain made concessions to improve relations with the United States. On the British naval threat in the 1930s, see John Hickerson to Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Washington, 23 March 1934, FRUS, 1934, 1–912. 29 Report on Trade Conditions in Canada by Charles M. Pepper, Special Agent of the Department of Commerce and Labor, H. Doc. 408,59th Cong., 1st sess.,pp. 1806–7, 1808–11,1826–27. 30 Ibid.,pp. 1828–29, 1831–33,1835. 31 Commercial Relations of the United States and Canada by John B. Osborne, Chief of the Bureau of Trade Relations at the State Department, Sen. Doc. 862, 61st Cong., 3d sess., pp. 47–55. 32 Ibid. 33 Report on the Canadian Banking System by Joseph F. Johnson, Sen. Doc. 583, 61st Cong., 2d sess., pp. 3, 9–10, 16. 34 Special Message of President William H. Taft to Congress, 26 January 1911, Sen. Doc. 787,61st Cong., 3d sess., pp. v–vi. Richard C. Baker, The Tariff Under Roosevelt and Taft ( Hastings, NE , 1941 ), pp. 149 –62. 35 Address of President Taft to General Assembly of Illinois, 11 February 1911, Sen. Doc. 862,61 st Cong., 3d sess., pp. 39–41. 36 Report of British Tariff Commission on Proposed Canada-U.S. Agreement, Sen. Doc. 66,62d Cong., 1st sess.,p. 4. 37 M. C. Urquart and K. A. H. Buckley, eds., Historical Statistics of Canada ( Toronto , 1965 ), pp. 169 , 182. By 1930 the United States accounted for 61 percent of foreign investment in Canada; Britain's share was 36 percent. By 1914 Canada had replaced Mexico as the largest recipient of U.S. foreign investment. 38 U.S., Congress, H. Rept. 1039,66th Cong., 2d sess., pp. 1–2; Sen. Rept 108, 67th Cong., 1st sess., pp. 1–2; Secretary of State Charles E. Hughes to U.S. Chargé in London Post Wheeler, 16 August 1921, Ambassador George Harvey to Hughes, 12 October 1921, Hughes to British Ambassador in Washington A. C. Geddes, 22 October 1921, Geddes to Hughes, 10 November 1921, FRUS, 1921, 1: 299–306. 39 Hughes to British Chargé H. G. Chilton, 5 July 1923, Hughes to U.S. Consul General in Ottawa John G. Foster, 7 July 1923, memorandum of conversation of Hughes with Chilton, 16 July 1923, FRUS, 1923, 1: 495–98. 40 W. H. Herridge to Hull, Washington, 14 November 1934, FRUS, 1934, 1: 849–57. Correspondence leading up to Herridge's critique appears in FRUS, 1933, 2:38–42; and FRUS, 1934, 1:845–48. 41 Herridge to Hull, Washington, 14 November 1934, FRUS, 1934, 1:849–57. 42 Minister in Canada Warren Robbins to Hull, Ottawa, 21 November 1934, ibid., pp. 860–70; memorandum by Undersecretary of State William Phillips, Washington, 1 December 1934, ibid., p. 871. 43 Robbins to Hull, Ottawa, 21 November 1934, ibid., pp. 860–70. 44 U.S. Charge in Ottawa Pierre De L. Boai to Hull, Ottawa, 14 June 1935, FRUS, 1935, 2:51. 45 Dean G. Acheson to Harry S Truman, Washington, 1 October 1946 and 26 October 1946, FRUS, 1946, 5:55, 57–58 concentrated on the importance of continuing cooperation in the defense field. See too R. D. Guff and J. L. Granatstein, Ties that Bind: Canadian-American Relations in War-time from the Great Warto the Cold War ( Toronto , 1977 ) ; C. P. Stacey, Arms, Men, and Governments: The War Policies of Canada 1939–1945 ( Ottawa , 1970 ) ; and S. W. Dzuiban, The Military Relations Between the United States and Canada 1939–1945 ( Washington , 1959 ). The Joint Board on Defense was the most obvious example of closer defense ties. 46 Ray Atherton to Secretary of State George C. Marshall, Ottawa, 29 October 1947, FRUS , 1947 , 3 : 123 , 127–28. 47 Memorandum by Associate Chief of the Division of Commercial Policy Woodbury Willoughby of discussions with Hector Mackinnon and John Deutsch, FRUS , 1947 , 3 : 129 . 48 Memorandum by Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Willard Thorp to Undersecretary Robert Lovett, Washington, 8 March 1948, FRUS, 1948, 9:406. 49 Ibid. 50 President Franklin D. Roosevelt to Congress, 5 June 1941, U.S., Congress, Sen. Rept. 810, 80th Cong., 2d sess., p. 43. An executive agreement with Canada on the seaway had been made in 1941. It then became necessary to seek enabling legislation in Congress, but this was not achieved until 1952–53. 51 President Truman's Message to Congress on the Seaway Project, 3 October 1946, ibid., pp. 100–1. 52 Acheson to Senate Subcommittee on Seaway Project, May-June 1947, ibid., p. 76. 53 By December 1951 the St. Lawrence Seaway Authority Act and the International Rapids Power Development Act had been approved by the Canadian Parliament. 54 Report of the National Security Resources Board, 24 April 1950, The St. Lawrence Seaway Manual: A Compilation of Documents on the Great Lakes Seaway Project, U.S., Congress, Sen. Doc. 165,83d Cong., 2d sess., pp. 47–49, 54–55. 55 Testimony of Frank Nash, assistant secretary of defense, before House Committee on Public Works, 11 June 1953, ibid., pp. 60–67. 56 Ibid., pp. 28, 77–78. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid., pp. 76–78. 59 Ibid., p. 28. President Truman, in his message to Congress, 28 January 1952, ibid., pp. 115–19, emphasized “the immediate urgency of action” to prevent the United States from being “merely a customer of Canada's for use of the seaway after it is built.” 60 Ibid.,pp. 147,166,201–3. 61 Ibid., pp. 201–3. 62 A chronological account of the origins and development of the seaway appears in an appendix to The St. Lawrence Seaway Manual See also William R. Willoughby, The St. Lawrence Waterway ( Madison, WI , 1941 ). 63 In his August 1888 message to Congress, for example, when President Cleveland proposed retaliation against Canada, he asserted that the United States always had been actuated by a “generous and neighborly spirit.” The Canadians had not reciprocated but had “imposed” upon the United States with their troublesome and ambitious imperial plans. House Ex. Doc. 434, 50th Cong., 1st sess., p. 1629. Thus, if Canada acted in a “neighborly” way, it should drop all these “overreaching” schemes and adjust itself to the North American context controlled by the United States. 64 Memorandum by Minister of Embassy in Canada Don Bliss to Ambassador in Canada Stanley Woodward, Ottawa, 17 April 1951; memorandum by Woodward, Ottawa, 18 April 1951, FRUS, 1951, 2: 883–85. 65 Hannigan, “Reciprocity 1911,” pp. 2–3, 18. Hannigan's model is from Immanuel Wallerstein, The Capitalist World Economy ( Cambridge, MA , 1979 ). 66 Ibid. 67 A starting point for analysis of this complex question is W. T. Easterbrook and M. H. Watkins, eds., Approaches to Canadian Economic History ( Toronto , 1967 ) , which presents the traditional view that Canada's economic development depended on the production and export of staples. Most monographs emphasize a standard theme, the extent to which the state took the leading role in economic development policies. R. T. Naylor, The History of Canadian Business 1867–1914 , 2 vols. ( Toronto , 1975 ) , argues that Canada never developed an industrial-capitalist base but remained a commercial-capitalist economy. 68 On this theme see John Dales, The Protective Tariff in Canadian Economic Development ( Toronto , 1966 ) ; Michael Bliss, “ Canadianizing American Business: The Roots of the Branch Plant ,” in Lumsden, ed., Close to the 49th Parallel and Stephen Scheinberg, “ Invitation to Empire: Tariffs and American Economic Expansion in Canada ,” Business History Review 47 ( 1973 ): 218 –38. 69 Geddes to Hughes, 10 November 1921, FRUS, 1921, 1:302–11. 70 Memorandum by Armour, Ottawa, 21 September 1935; Armour to Hull, 25 October 1935, FRUS, 1935, 2:27–29. 71 Cuff and Granatstein, Ties that Bind , pp. 93 – 112 . 72 Marcus L. Hansen and John B. Brebner, The Mingling of the Canadian and American Peoples ( New Haven , 1940 ). 73 John H. Redekop, “ A Re-interpretation of Canadian-American Relations ,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 9 ( 1976 ): 234 –40, 242–43. A basic problem with Redekop's thesis is the contention that there was no “conscious American governmental policy” behind the forces of integration. This view only can be held by ignoring the evidence that American diplomats and officials had worked, since 1906, to fashion an integrated, continental relationship. On the other hand, the underlying trends and consequences of the sub-system meant that American continental policy could be sporadic without being ineffective. Too much continentalism would have led to intensified anti-American reaction in Canada. 74 Assistant Secretary of State George Perkins to Secretary of State Acheson, 12 June 195l, FRUS, 1951, 2:891–92. 75 Report of the Special Study Mission of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs to Canada (1958), U.S., Congress, House Rept. 1766, 85th Cong., 2d sess. 76 Address by the Honorable Mark MacGuigan to the Center for Inter-American Relations, New York, 30 September 1981, Canada: Department of External Affairs, Statements and Speeches, No. 81/24, pp. 3–5,4–7. MacGuigan gave a friendly but forthright speech, criticizing “the litany of complaints” about the Foreign Investment Review Act of 1974 and defending Canada's new energy policy, which was seen in the United States as “shortsighted” and “nationalist.” 77 House Report Favoring New Trade Negotiations (1880), U.S., Congress, Sen. Doc. 80, 62dCong., 1st sess.,p. 1375. The committee believed freer trade would prevent Canada from becoming a “producer state.” This was Taft's view in 1911. 78 Taft Special Message to Congress, Sen. Doc. 787, 61st Cong., 3dsess., p. vi. 79 For example, Sen. Sel. Com., 1890, Glenn testimony, and Ward Report, 1876. 80 Director of Office of British Commonwealth and Northern European Affairs Henry Labouisse to Assistant Secretary for European Affairs Perkins, Washington, 8 November 1949, FRUS, 1949, 2:404–5. This was part of a memorandum on “Seven Pending Questions” in U.S.-Canadian relations. It seems incriminating as a statement of American goals; but once again a qualification must be made, for Labouisse was complaining that Congress and the Joint Chiefs were not cooperating in efforts to increase military procurement in Canada. © The Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations (SHAFR)
TI - “A Special Contiguous Country Economic Regime”: An Overview of America's Canadian Policy
JF - Diplomatic History
DO - 10.1093/dh/6.4.339
DA - 1982-10-01
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SP - 339
EP - 357
VL - 6
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DP - DeepDyve
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