TY - JOUR
AU - Wurmnest
AB -  Common Market Law Review 49: 721­736, 2012. © 2012 Kluwer Law International. Printed in the United Kingdom. , Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera Sverige AB, Judgment of the Court of Justice (First Chamber) of 17 February 2011, nyr. Introduction Courts are ill-suited "to act as central planners, identifying the proper price, quantity or other terms of dealing".1 With these striking words, the U.S. Supreme Court recently considerably limited antitrust liability under Section 2 of the Sherman Act for margin squeeze pricing policies pursued by vertically integrated firms with market power.2 By contrast, the European Court of Justice has confirmed in TeliaSonera its recent line of jurisprudence according to which such a pricing policy may be abusive under Article 102 TFEU (ex 82 EC). The ECJ thus recognizes that vertically integrated dominant undertakings have many different "pricing arrows" in their quivers to unlawfully exclude rivals in associated markets. A margin squeeze can be described as a situation in which a vertically integrated dominant firm supplies a key input not only to its own downstream entities, but also to its competitors. This input is then converted or split into a related product/service and offered on the downstream market. If the dominant firm 
TI - Case C-52/09, Konkurrensverket v. TeliaSonera SverigeAB , Judgment of the Court of Justice (First Chamber) of 17 February 2011.
JF - Common Market Law Review
DA - 2012-04-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/kluwer-law-international/case-c-52-09-konkurrensverket-v-teliasonera-sverigeab-judgment-of-the-djyN0nsyPf
SP - 721
EP - 736
VL - 49
IS - 2
DP - DeepDyve
ER -