TY - JOUR
AU - Suzumura,, Kotaro
AB - Abstract Two distinct approaches can be identified in the new welfare economics. The school of thought based on the compensation principles attempted to see what can be said about social welfare without making interpersonal comparisons of well‐being by extending the applicability of the Pareto principle through hypothetical compensatory payments between gainers and losers. The Bergson‐Samuelson school of thought introduced the social welfare function as a formal method of introducing a Pareto‐inclusive ethical belief on social welfare, whose policy implications we should theoretically explore. Synthesising these two approaches, this paper identifies a condition under which the new welfare economics is logically impeccable. This content is only available as a PDF. Author notes This paper capitalises on Suzumura (1997), and generalises the main theorem that first appeared there. The basic idea was presented at the Fourth OsnabruÈck Seminar on Individual Decisions and Social Choice held at the University of OsnabruÈck, September 14, 1996, the Research Seminar at the Institute for Social and Economic Research held at Osaka University, January 22, 1997, the Far Eastern Meeting of the Econometric Society held at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, July 24-6, 1997, and the Fourth International Meeting of the Society for Social Choice and Welfare held at the University of British Columbia, July 3-6, 1998. I am grateful to Professors Nick Baigent, David Donaldson, Wulf Gaertner, Philippe Mongin, Prasanta Pattanaik, Koichi Tadenuma, Yongsheng Xu, and Akira Yamazaki for their helpful comments and discussions at several stages of the evolution of this paper. Last but surely not least, my sincere thanks go to the editor in charge, Professor Timothy Besley, and the two referees of this JOURNAL for their helpful comments and suggestions. Needless to say, I am solely responsible for any remaining defects of this paper. © Royal Economic Society 1999
TI - Paretian Welfare Judgements and Bergsonian Social Choice
JO - The Economic Journal
DO - 10.1111/1468-0297.00428
DA - 1999-04-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/paretian-welfare-judgements-and-bergsonian-social-choice-dR6OOiKaOC
SP - 204
EP - 220
VL - 109
IS - 455
DP - DeepDyve
ER -