TY - JOUR
AU - Banks, David E
AB - Abstract The practice turn in IR offers new ways to understand how diplomats can creatively engage with their environment and one another. Yet, sometimes their diplomatic practices limit their ability to achieve agreements. This article focuses on how and why domestic practices conflict with international practices, and why states sometimes might feel constrained into engaging in practices that harm their international position. Drawing on field theory, I introduce a causal mechanism I call symbolic binding that explains why regimes may become so bound by their domestic practices of legitimation that they incur considerable international cost. Symbolic binding occurs when the symbolic practices needed to generate domestic legitimacy intersect and conflict with practices from the diplomatic field, when domestic audiences are observing the diplomatic interaction, and when regimes have limited access to alternative forms of political capital. I demonstrate the logic of this mechanism by analyzing the antagonistic diplomacy that occurred between Britain and China from the late eighteenth until the late nineteenth century. I show that the root of this diplomatic conflict can be linked to the incompatibility of both states’ diplomatic practices and show how the Qing regime's need to maintain domestic legitimacy constrained it into steadfastly adhering to diplomatic practices that were incompatible with that of encroaching European powers. Introduction In 1793 the first official British ambassador to the Qing empire, George Macartney, arrived at the Chinese coast. Whereas Macartney was tasked with opening a formal mission in China to facilitate and improve trade, the Qing considered his arrival as an opportunity to glorify the emperor by characterizing the mission as a distant vassal coming to bear tribute. Yet, when Macartney made it clear he would not engage in the symbolic practices associated with this representation—most notably the ritual koutou—the Qing government expelled him. When subsequent British diplomats also refused to engage in Qing diplomatic practice, the Qing banned all further European embassies. This began a seven-decade dispute over European and Qing diplomatic practices—a dispute that led the Qing regime to increasingly isolate itself from European contact precisely at the time when it had clear incentives to engage with an increasingly belligerent and powerful Europe. How do we explain diplomatic conflicts of this kind? Why do states sometimes find it difficult to resolve seemingly innocuous disputes over diplomatic practices by making material or symbolic concessions? How do “merely symbolic” acts of diplomatic practice become the subject of political dispute? And why would a state choose to defend these practices even when the costs of doing so are high? I argue that these conflicts over diplomatic practices occurred because Qing diplomatic practices had domestic as well as international symbolic significance and that when these linkages intersected a set of political trade-offs interposed themselves into the diplomatic dynamic.1 In explaining this process I use field theory to identify a mechanism I call symbolic binding. This mechanism triggered because of the following: the Qing symbolic practices that generated domestic legitimacy intersected and conflicted with practices from the diplomatic field; domestic audiences in Qing China (notably, Han elites) observed the diplomatic interaction; and the Qing regime had limited access to alternative forms of political capital. Because of these factors, the Qing regime was “bound” by its domestic practices of legitimation such that it could not abandon them, even at considerable international cost. I identify and evaluate this mechanism by analyzing the antagonistic diplomacy that occurred between the Qing empire and Britain from the late eighteenth until the late nineteenth century. When the Qing first encountered European international society at an official level, it struggled to accommodate European diplomatic practices before finally refusing to engage in them outright—a decision that cost it severely. In explaining this behavior, I focus on the Qing response to three official embassies sent by Britain between 1793 and 1860. As I show, Qing domestic and international practices of legitimation intersected in specific ways that made the “barbarian” Manchu Qing dynasty especially sensitive to the opinion of ethnic Han elites, on whom the Qing relied for maintaining their regime's stability. This incentivized the Qing to dispute European diplomatic practices in a way that very quickly came to define and shape Sino-British relations for more than seventy years. This argument makes a number of contributions. Most prominently, it speaks to the practice literature. However, whereas scholars of practice usually study the effect of practices inside the negotiation process, I situate practices in the broader fields from which they are drawn. I show how different fields may intersect with one another and how the possibility for creative action on the part of actors can be changed as a consequence of such intersections. This finding acts as a corrective on the agent-focused tendency of much of the practice literature (Hopf 2011, 540). By integrating the effect of fields, and by offering conditions under which they are likely to be constraining, we can gain a better grasp of when the limits of agents’ creativity might be reached. This argument also speaks directly to the burgeoning literature on hierarchy, especially with regards to the concept of legitimacy. Hierarchy scholars often explain the stability of superordinate and subordinate state relationships as a function of whether “both sides recognize as legitimate the social logic of this unequal situation” (Hobson and Sharman 2005, 69). Some argue that states willingly accept the leadership of a larger state if they feel confident that such a deal will bind and limit naked power (Ikenberry 2001, 31; Lake 2014, 71). For instance, Lee (2013, 314) argues that the diplomatic rituals of the Qing empire acted as a signaling mechanism that allowed Korea and the Qing to reduce tensions. A similar account of legitimacy argues that legitimacy not only derives from meeting actors’ interests but also from engaging in social processes seen as legitimate (Lee 2016, 330). For instance, Musgrave and Nexon (2018, 24–29) use field theory to explain how the Ming emperor dispatched dramatic “treasure fleets” in order to legitimate his political rule. My argument builds from this line of reasoning and argues that one source of such symbolic capital can come from engaging in diplomatic practice. To fully explain this dynamic the article proceeds as follows. First, I review how practice approaches explain diplomatic outcomes, while also drawing attention to how they do not adequately account for constraints on actor-creativity. Second, I present a corrective to the practice-approach in the form of field theory. I take particular care in elaborating how the concept of symbolic capital can be used to explain how regimes can create political legitimacy. Third, I introduce the mechanism of symbolic binding to explain how legitimacy concerns can constrain regimes into contesting diplomatic practice. Fourth, I evaluate this mechanism and alternatives by analyzing how and why the Qing regime refused to abandon its regional diplomatic practices when Britain attempted to force it do so. Finally, I conclude by discussing what symbolic binding implies for historical and contemporary politics. Diplomacy and Practice Diplomacy is often a subtle and sophisticated medium of interstate interaction in which background knowledge, tacit understandings, and actor ability can be instrumental in achieving results. The practice-approach focuses on such microfoundations of diplomatic interaction by drawing special attention to how diplomats navigate their way to success by drawing on their creative ability and their background knowledge (Pouliot 2008, 283). Adler-Nissen and Pouliot (2014, 894) have shown how “mastery of the game” was instrumental for British and French diplomats’ success in getting United Nations (UN) support for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Libya mission in 2011. Others have found that diplomats’ knowledge and creativity helped them prevail in encouraging closer European ties (Zaiotti 2011, 537–40) or succeeding in trade negotiations (Albin and Druckman 2014, 1014). While the foregrounding the role of agency is analytically useful, it leads to two specific problems. First, practice accounts offer insufficient conditions for understanding the boundaries of practical action and creativity. From a practice perspective “structure” is not treated as an external constraint. Rather, actors engage in practices in order to demonstrate their belief in a particular social system (Adler and Pouliot 2011, 15). Yet, practice theorists do not always offer ways to map out the boundaries of such social contexts. Second, practice accounts do not make clear where or how different structural factors might overlap or intersect. For instance, operating behind the scenes in the UN might allow diplomats to draw extensively on the background knowledge of agenda-setting, diplomatic procedure, etc. However, if a negotiation moves to a public domain, then new contextual dynamics regarding public opinion, media management, etc. would come into play. Notably, these might not simply supplant the previous dynamics; they would likely intersect with them. Understanding and specifying how such intersections might operate would help to draw clearer limits around actor's behavior as well as help explain when and why they shift strategies. Field Theory and Diplomatic Practice Pierre Bourdieu's field theory offers a way to draw such boundaries. Field theory accepts the important role that actor creativity plays in generating outcomes in any dispute, but also investigates how actors’ ability to be creative is determined and constrained by the field in which they operate (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, 98) Three concepts of field theory are especially applicable to an analysis of diplomacy: field, habitus, and capital.2 A field is “an arena of struggle in which actors compete for a variety of valued resources, that is different species of ‘capital’” (Go 2008, 206). These resources—or “stakes”—are at the center of an individual field and is what maintains it as an autonomous space. For example, in the field of academic political science, the stakes are the ability to create well-respected and highly cited publications. Activity in a field is informed by an actor's habitus: a mutually reinforcing combination of social and material conditions. Actors possessed of field-specific habitus have a better “feel” for the game and are thus more capable of successful behavior (Maher, Harker, and Wilkes 1990, 7–8). For instance, Adler-Nissen (2008, 671) shows how British and Danish diplomats’ habitus in the “diplomatic field” allows them to craft strategies when interacting with their European Union (EU) colleagues. Actors use their habitus to deploy field-specific capital. This capital can be used by actors in order to generate more capital and thus improve their current field position or to convert it from one form of capital into another (Savage, Warde, and Devine 2005, 39). This conversion dynamic draws attention to a specific form of capital that Bourdieu discusses: symbolic capital. This is the “form that the various species of capital assume when they are perceived as legitimate” (Bourdieu, quoted in Senn and Elhardt 2014, 320). Operating much like “productive power” (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 20–21), symbolic capital gives the possessor the mantle of legitimate authority and thus provides the “power to construct reality” (Bourdieu 1979, 79). Unsurprisingly, symbolic capital is a valuable political resource. As fields are a multidimensional space where positions are contested along a number of vectors, not all of which are material; the possession of symbolic capital can help protect and strengthen actors’ other forms of capital. For instance, those with economic capital may also seek symbolic capital to bolster and legitimate their economic monopoly (Go 2008, 208). Legitimacy, Practice, and Symbolic Capital While hard power matters, it is rarely the case that political domination—“the probability that certain specific commands (or all commands) will be obeyed by a given group of persons”—is reducible to naked displays of such coercive or economic power (Weber 1978, 212). Just as important for authorities’ ability to rule are their claims to political legitimacy. If people accept something as legitimate then they believe “that a rule or institution ought to be obeyed” (Hurd 2008, 30). One source of legitimacy comes from a society's narratives. In a general sense, narratives help to account for the particular social order that individuals inhabit by using the past to legitimate certain values or social relationships. Regimes can use such “controlling political idea[s]” to uphold their rule with more than coercive power (Geertz 1973, 332; Cohen 1974, xi). To put this in field theoretic terms: society's narratives provide cultural capital that, when exploited by political leaders, can help convert the leaders’ political capital into symbolic capital. Practices can play a significant role in this conversion process, as they are the “central mechanism for the reproduction of political, social, and economic structures in society” (Jackson 2008, 165). In order for regimes to convert political capital into symbolic capital, they must engage in practices that demonstrate commitment to their society's narratives. This is most directly done by implementing policies. But even simply engaging in symbolic practices that project messages about the present and the future can be politically important, as it is often “in the process (rather than in content of statutes, court decisions, and administrative rules) [that] leaders gain or lose followings” (Murray Edelman 1971, 4, italics added). As Geertz (1980, 213) puts it, “by the mere act of providing a model, a paragon, a faultless image of civilized existence, the court shapes the world around it.” This relationship between practice and culture creates incentives for regimes to engage in those practices that maintain and increase the symbolic capital that supports their power. One potential source of symbolic capital can come from the way a regime presents itself on the world stage. IR scholars are long aware of how international diplomacy can overlap with domestic politics. Interstate diplomacy often takes place at “two levels,” and bargains are often struck when the interests of actors at the domestic level overlap with the interests of those who operate at the international level (Putnam 1988, 437). The audience-cost literature also focuses on this intersection, showing how leaders can draw domestic audiences’ attention to international crises to influence opposing states (Fearon 1994). Many of these international-domestic overlaps can coalesce around symbolic issues. Symbolic actions such as the Ems telegram (O'Neill 1999, 143), states acknowledging past crimes (Lind 2009, 517) or associating with salient international symbols (Barnett 1998, 8) can draw domestic attention to international politics in ways that can strengthen leaders or force them into particular policies. Shared in such accounts is an understanding that the practices that leaders engage in at one level might be observed by, and potentially acted on, by audiences that operate in the other level. Symbolic Binding The above discussion outlines the importance that symbolic capital—sometimes in the form of diplomatic practices—has for regimes. Yet, while regimes have incentives to be shown to be operating according to the expectations of certain domestic audiences, they might still choose to satisfy the practice expectations of a foreign audience rather than a domestic one. How can we more precisely explain this behavior? How can regimes avoid a conflict between diplomatic practice and those engaged in maintaining domestic symbolic capital? And why might they sometimes choose to forgo diplomatic practice—with the attendant costs of doing so—and choose domestic practices? In short, when do they become “bound” by their domestic practices? In this section, I propose that states are subject to symbolic binding when three conditions are met: when competing intersecting fields create pressures for regimes to choose one practice over another; when regimes are being observed by important domestic audiences; and when regimes have limited access of other forms of political capital. Competing Intersecting Fields Individual fields are located in larger social spaces composed of many fields that occasionally overlap or touch. Consider the following example: the field of diplomatic interaction is located in the larger social space of the international system while it also intersects with domestic fields. Moves in one field may influence the activity in others (Pouponneau and Merand 2017, 125). Such intersecting fields are competing; however, engaging in practices that are used to generate or maintain capital in one field may also reduce or harm the production of capital in another field. When this occurs, it can have a constraining effect on actors, forcing them to choose to progress in one field at the cost of losing out in another. Whether practices used to create symbolic capital might compete with other field-specific capital is a function of the cultural content of a regime's symbolic capital. Cultural content here refers to the symbols and “rhetorical commonplaces” (Jackson 2006, 27–32) drawn from a society's narrative. This content acts as the “grammar” in any cultural-political narrative and includes elements such as sacred venues, revered figures of the past, mythical enemies, and so forth. Content helps audiences understand who the “characters” of a political universe are, the behavior that is expected of them, and what is appropriate or inappropriate. It may also “mandate” practices for political leaders in specific circumstances. Such seemingly intractable clashes of field-specific practices can be overcome. As practice scholars demonstrate, individuals are capable of creatively discarding, transforming, or reimagining cultural content in a way that still “makes sense” to participants and other observers. Yet, there are a number of reasons that the creativity of diplomats may be unable to overcome the tension between competing intersecting fields. Individual diplomats may be deeply unsympathetic to the pressures of the other side and may be unwilling to make any deviations from their own accepted practices. Even if diplomats are genuinely sympathetic to one another, they may simply find it beyond their ability to reconcile their practices. Diplomats vary in their ability to establish “competence” over the diplomatic process and may make mistakes or miscues without intending to (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014, 895). This type of problem would likely be exacerbated if those diplomats came from different cultures or material circumstances. Under these conditions, diplomats would likely “naturally” seek to steer practices toward those that obeyed the social logic that they were most familiar with (Bourdieu 1984, 33) or be unable to manage the “heterodoxy” of intersecting fields (Grenfell 2014, 123). Audience Observation Competing intersecting fields help us understand why regimes may sometimes be pressured to choose to engage in one set practices over another. However, it does not explain why they might choose domestic practices over foreign practices, or vice versa. In order to at least partially explain this, we must consider the degree to which important domestic audiences can observe these practices. If a regime is being observed by domestic audiences, then this generates pressures to select the practices that produce domestic symbolic capital. Beyond establishing that the regime shares values with domestic audiences, symbolic practices can have important coordinative and deterrent effects on potential challengers. By engaging in symbolic practices, regimes can generate “common knowledge” about the state of the world. Common knowledge exists “among a group of people if everyone knows [something and] that everyone knows that everyone knows it, etc.” (Chwe 2001, 9). If one observes an act and is certain than others have observed it and understood it similarly, then she can readily choose her best strategy for success. Exploiting this coordinative dynamic can be politically useful for regimes. This is especially true in autocratic systems where regimes have an incentive to generate common knowledge of their scope and supremacy (Wedeen 1999, 14). If potential challengers are uncertain about the actual state of the political environment, then this reduces their potential political power. Wagner (2007, 122) puts it succinctly: “[t]he mere availability of the idea of a radically different type of contract, if it becomes common knowledge, can change the relative bargaining power of the ruled.” Engaging in symbolic practices can also have more fundamental constitutive effects on society. By possessing sufficient symbolic capital, a regime can prevent the shift in perception that could allow individuals or elites to reconstitute themselves into new actors or coalitions. By contrast, if the relevant symbolic practices are not engaged, then this can lead rivals to engage in legitimation strategies that could lead to the constitution of new and potentially hostile challengers (Goddard 2006, 44–45). Thus, symbolic practices have both “pedagogical and constitutive functions” (Ringmar 2012, 2). In short, by successfully engaging in symbolic practices, regimes can try to limit the perception of their weakness and/or illegitimacy by elites or the masses. For threatened regimes this can be crucial as “no opportunity, however objectively open, will invite mobilization unless it is (a) visible to potential challengers and (b) perceived as an opportunity” (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001, 43). There is a flip side to this logic, however. While there are benefits to engaging in symbolic practices, there are also costs for failing to engage in them. If public symbolic practices create common knowledge, then they will create it whether regimes want them to or not. This means that if a regime cannot hide its practices from domestic audiences—for either practical or cultural reasons—then it will be pressured to faithfully engage in these practices or suffer negative side effects. Access to Alternative Forms of Political Capital While audience observation can explain why regimes might feel pressure to adhere to domestic symbolic practices, it does not explain when we should expect them to choose these over other field-specific practices. In order to completely explain when domestic symbolic practices bind a regime, we must consider how sensitive a regime is to domestic opinion. This sensitivity is a function of regime's access to alternative forms of political capital. Political capital here refers to the traditional tools of regime power, such as institutions and independent security services. Regimes are at the most durable when they have strong institutions that allow them to establish control over state capacity (Tilly 1975, 42), military cohesion, political parties (Greene 2007, 6), and factionalism (North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009, 805–6). Institutional control allows regimes to engage in policies or practices that do not necessarily have the consent of most of the ruled, including elites. A regime in full control of a state's institutions is in possession of the “ultimate institutional weapon” needed to consolidate its rule (Slater and Fenner 2011, 17). Regimes that do not have such control are much more dependent on the preferences of elites for their survival. If a majority of elites are satisfied that the status quo is better than the alternative then they will continue to support the regime (Slater 2010, Ch. 2). However, if a majority of elites do not share this sentiment than they pose a threat to a regime's survival. In these circumstances symbolic capital can act as important stop-gap against potential elite revolt. As discussed above, by controlling the public square, regimes can create the impression that they are powerful and legitimate. Thus, when a regime has little access to alternatives forms of political capital, it has incentives to fastidiously engage in symbolic practices, as they may be the only bulwark the regime has against elites and/or masses mobilizing against it. Failure to do so might be perceived by challengers as evidence of an “opportunity” to collectively act against it. Taken together, these three conditions can explain why a state might be subject to symbolic binding such that they will contest seemingly innocuous diplomatic practices. First, if the symbolic practices needed to generate domestic symbolic capital compete with practices from an intersecting diplomatic field, this forces the regime to decide in favor of one set of practices over another. Second, if a regime cannot hide the engagement of these practices from observing domestic audiences, then this creates an incentive to select the domestic symbolic practices over the international ones. Third, this incentive is reinforced if the regime is unable to access other forms of political capital used for maintaining control. If these three conditions are fulfilled, states will be subject to symbolic binding and be forced to choose domestic symbolic practices at the potential expense of diplomatic ones. Alternative Explanations The IR literature on strategic signaling and bargaining offers an alternative logic for why states would contest diplomatic practices. In the bargaining model, actors attempt to communicate their interests to one another to shift the size and shape of the “bargaining space” between them. Their chance of finding an agreeable outcome is dependent on each actor establishing the other's “type”—that is, the true preferences of the other (Fearon 1995, 390–91; Lake and Powell 1999, 9). From this perspective diplomatic practices could be understood as the collection of actions in which states engage in order to send signals to opponents, the purpose of which is to improve the senders’ potential bargaining outcomes. Because European diplomatic practice acts a “focal point” for members of international society, choosing to engage in these practices could be a reliable way to catch other states’ attention.3 Contestation of diplomatic practices could therefore be strategically useful for bargaining. Contesting “merely” symbolic issues could signal that the sender is a hardliner who has less stake in the outcome of the bargain and should thus be accommodated. Similarly, if an opponent is seen to quickly back down over a seemingly trivial issue, then this informs their interlocutor that they might also back down on other issues of dispute. An alternative strategic reason that states might reject diplomatic practices focuses on the security environment in which states exist, rather than their immediate bargaining goals. In an insecure and anarchical environment disputes over symbolic acts or practices might have considerable importance as they could act as focal points for the broader community's attention (Gambetta 2009, 100). A desire to protect its reputation might cause a state to choose to contest diplomatic practice simply because another state demanded that they accept it. The contesting state might be concerned that if they back down on such a “trivial” issue that this behavior could be interpreted as general weakness by other states. In short, strategic explanations suggest that disputes such as these are a low-cost mechanism for signaling resolve, gathering information, or for protecting reputation. Because diplomatic practice is so clearly routinized, states can send clear signals to other states by rejecting it. However, in each of these accounts, diplomatic practice has no independent value in and of itself—it is just a convenient focal point for influencing disputes. In contrast to strategic explanations, constructivists seriously consider that practices might have value for actors as practices can be instrumental in creating and maintaining an actor's identity. For an actor's identity to become “real” it requires that its putative possessor and other members of society engage in the practices that instantiate it. In other words, for an actor to claim to have an identity he or she must have this identity socially recognized by others. Sometimes a society will recognize an actor's preferred subjective identity; at other times it may not. This makes them worth fighting for. Such struggles for recognition can lead to conflict because, in attempting to establish one kind of identity, an actor may have to contest the identity of another (Honneth 1995, part III). Engaging in practices are crucial for this recognition dynamic. First, an actor must be able to lay claim to the particular symbols and to engage in the specific actions that are necessary components of any such particular identity (Collins and Arnett 2009, 118). Second, an actor needs others to engage in practices that reinforce this identity. If others are unwilling or unable to engage in practices that reinforce an actor's subjective identity, then this can lead to a state of ontological insecurity for the actor (Mitzen 2006, 360). Ontological insecurity occurs when an actor feels that her identity is being eroded or is disappearing in some way. In response to this threat to her intersubjective identity, an actor will often fight even if it incurs significant material costs (Ringmar 2010, 17). Understanding the relationship between practice and identity offers an alternative account for why a state would contest diplomatic practice. A state will have an incentive to engage in practices and convince other states to engage in practices that reinforce a particular identity. Therefore, we should expect that states would contest those diplomatic practices that conflicted with the practices required for a state to maintain its identity. A summary of the logics and the expectations of each explanation can be seen in Table 1. Table 1. Summary of explanations Explanation . Which practices? . Why dispute? . Payoff for dispute . Strategic 1 Any Demonstrate resolve/gather information Improve bargaining position Strategic 2 Internationally understood Protect reputation Increase security Constructivist Practices necessary for identity maintenance Ontological security Maintain/obtain identity Symbolic binding Practices that conflict with practices used to generate symbolic capital Regime is constrained Maintain/increase symbolic capital Explanation . Which practices? . Why dispute? . Payoff for dispute . Strategic 1 Any Demonstrate resolve/gather information Improve bargaining position Strategic 2 Internationally understood Protect reputation Increase security Constructivist Practices necessary for identity maintenance Ontological security Maintain/obtain identity Symbolic binding Practices that conflict with practices used to generate symbolic capital Regime is constrained Maintain/increase symbolic capital Open in new tab Table 1. Summary of explanations Explanation . Which practices? . Why dispute? . Payoff for dispute . Strategic 1 Any Demonstrate resolve/gather information Improve bargaining position Strategic 2 Internationally understood Protect reputation Increase security Constructivist Practices necessary for identity maintenance Ontological security Maintain/obtain identity Symbolic binding Practices that conflict with practices used to generate symbolic capital Regime is constrained Maintain/increase symbolic capital Explanation . Which practices? . Why dispute? . Payoff for dispute . Strategic 1 Any Demonstrate resolve/gather information Improve bargaining position Strategic 2 Internationally understood Protect reputation Increase security Constructivist Practices necessary for identity maintenance Ontological security Maintain/obtain identity Symbolic binding Practices that conflict with practices used to generate symbolic capital Regime is constrained Maintain/increase symbolic capital Open in new tab Evaluating the Mechanism: The Case of Qing China's Diplomatic Practice I evaluate these arguments by looking at the diplomatic practice of Qing China in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. When the Qing regime first officially encountered European international society, it struggled to accommodate European diplomatic practices. Eventually it refused to engage in them outright—a decision that cost it severely. In analyzing this behavior I focus on Qing responses to three official embassies sent by Britain between 1793 and 1860. These instances are selected for a number of reasons. From a historical perspective this is a significant case. Britain was the first European state to try to formally incorporate China into European international society.4 Further, it was as a consequence of Britain's embassy mission in 1816 that the Qing banned all Western states from sending missions to Beijing. Considering that Britain was the most powerful Western state active in the region during this period, China's hostility toward it is thus especially puzzling. There are also strong methodological reasons to select this case. While Britain negotiated with China on a variety of issues during this period, these three instances are examples of contests over diplomatic practice qua diplomatic practice, which is unusual in diplomacy. In this sense these instances can be seen as “extreme cases” of disputes over practice. An extreme case is one where the value of the X or Y “lies far away from the mean of a given distribution; that is to say it is unusual ” (Seawright and Gerring 2008, 308). While such cases are not representative of a broader population, they are perfectly suited for an exploratory method in which one wants to map out possible causes or the effects of an individual cause (George and Bennett 2005, 75–78). This selection strategy allows the political significance of symbolic practices to come to the fore without necessarily privileging any outcome. By contrast, selecting a case “close to the regression line” (i.e., where diplomatic practice did not influence outcomes) would not be useful because such a case-selection strategy might not help me to meaningfully uncover the independent causal role of symbolic practices (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007, 28). In demonstrating the political force and limits of practice, I engage in “practice-tracing” (Pouliot 2015, 237). This requires two commitments. First, because practices derive their causal power from how they are embedded in a social context, it is necessary to delineate this context. Doing so allows the researcher to determine “what the practice counts as in the situation at hand” (Pouliot 2015, 243). This makes it possible to determine why actors engage in them or contest them. Second, in order to accurately trace and reconstruct the effect of symbolic practices it is necessary to try to, as much as possible, understand the situation from the practitioners’ perspectives. To meet these commitments, I draw on the diaries, letters, and personal accounts of the actual participants in the events themselves. When this was not possible, I made sure to adhere to what is considered the historical consensus regarding these issues. This evidence is then carefully assessed to determine the causal impact of my theory as well as those of the alternatives.5 The remainder of the article proceeds as follows. First, in order to delineate the context of the dispute, I describe European and East Asian diplomatic practices in this period. I then give an overview of the diplomatic interactions between the UK and China and show how the diplomatic practices of both states came into conflict. To explain this conflict, I show how China became subject to symbolic binding. Finally, I evaluate the explanatory power of alternatives and show why they cannot account for the behavior we see. European Diplomatic Practice By the late eighteenth century European diplomatic practice had a number of recurring elements. First was the right of states to post permanent representatives abroad, usually in the capital of hosting states. From 1815 diplomatic missions typically took the form of either full embassies that housed ambassadors or legations that housed lower-ranked diplomats. Second, embassies (and their representatives) were entitled to the rights of immunity and inviolability. Over time immunity was expanded to apply not only to representatives but also to the diplomatic pouch (Hamilton and Langhorne 2011, 48–54). Third, diplomatic representatives and hosts were obliged to engage in and receive ceremonial rights, governed by specific protocols. These included ceremonial displays such as security escorts, red carpets, flag displays, and so forth. These ceremonies were (and are) dictated by protocol: specific rules that codified and determined which ceremony a representative was entitled to at any particular time, how it was to be staged, and how participants were to behave (Woods and Serres 1970; McCaffree and Innis 1989). Engaging in diplomatic practice was more than a functional medium for interstate interaction; it also constituted a particular European international society. For instance, while the expansion of the resident system of embassies originally had a practical purpose, over time a state's ability to send and receive embassies was seen as a mark of its power and prestige. Being able to send an embassy (or refusing to send one) sent a signal about a state's position in international society and its opinion of other members. The eighteenth-century diplomat Abraham de Wicquefort (1716, 6) claimed that “there is not a more illustrious Mark of Sovereignty than the Right of sending and receiving Ambassadors.” Thus, diplomatic practice facilitated interstate communication but also helped to recreate an international society of ostensibly independent and estranged sovereigns (Der Derian 1987, 6). In other words, diplomatic practice “anchored” one of the primary understandings of European international society: that there existed a thing called international society and that this was populated by juridically equal states (Constantinou 1996, 25).6 The Sinocentric System Qing diplomatic practice was markedly different from that of Europe. Nearly two thousand years old, this practice drew on the cultural-political narrative of the “Mandate of Heaven” (tianming). At the center of this narrative was the person of the emperor, whose rule over the entire region was understood to be divinely sanctioned. Since the Zhou dynasty (c. 1046 BCE) the Chinese state had maintained that the emperor was the essential figure in regulating the political and social world (Glanville 2010, 329). This sacred personage was both a secular and a religious ruler, the link between the cosmos and the material plane, heir to millennia of tradition and custom, responsible for all events in his realm, and the center of political, social, cosmic, and moral order (Kang 2012, 55–57). Although modified over the years, this narrative nonetheless “remained a near constant throughout all imperial Chinese dynasties” (Feng 2009, 570). The emperor was not possessed of unlimited power. On the contrary, he “was obliged to respect the norms and forms imposed on him” (Gernet 1987, xxii). As the “Son of Heaven,” it was the emperor's duty to maintain harmony between earth and the celestial realm. The primary method of doing this was through the correct application of a coterie of symbolic practices and rituals. All behavior, such as the emperor's edicts, residences, calligraphy, seals, and ritual behavior were carefully regulated. Failure to do adhere to appropriate practices indicated that the emperor was unfit to lead.7 The most significant symbolic practice associated with Qing imperial power was the ritual koutou at Beijing. Taking place in full view of all envoys, the koutou ceremony involved kneeling three times and knocking one's head on the floor. Often envoys did not meet the emperor after performing this ceremony and were expected to simply be thankful for the “extension of imperial grace” (Hevia 1989, 84). Throughout the ceremony, the superiority of the emperor was maintained. Envoys were always to be seen as representing the orbit of all things around his person. The practice of the koutou also informed the Qing regime's relations with foreign powers. China was the center of an East Asian “tributary system.” All states participating in this Sinocentric system understood and accepted the superior social position of the Chinese emperor over all other monarchs and states. Although states were free to pursue their own particular interests, their behavior was understood to take place inside an international society in which all actors ostensibly recognized the social (though not necessarily political) superiority of the Imperial throne (Fangyin 2011, 151). Sino-British Diplomacy, 1793–1860 The fault lines of potential conflict between these diplomatic practices are apparent. Unlike European international society, the Qing tributary system did not recognize the existence of equal sovereign entities. Yet, according to European diplomatic practice—built on the narrative of sovereign equality—a public act of subordination could only mean weakness and would unacceptably diminish a state's prestige. Furthermore, the entire system of Qing diplomacy—focused as it was on ceremony and short audiences—was an anathema to a European diplomatic practice that considered the stationing of a resident diplomat abroad as both a necessity and the entitlement of any powerful state. Therefore, although the tributary system and European international society differed in many ways, these conflicts only became apparent when certain practices associated with these systems intersected and conflicted.8 When Macartney arrived on the Chinese coast in 1793, the incompatibility between Qing and European diplomatic practice slowly became clear. Despite the lavish treatment the British mission received on its journey to Beijing, Qing officials refused to discuss anything substantive with Macartney. When the retinue came closer to Beijing, Qing representatives, “with the appearance of more formality than usual,” first brought up the koutou to show Macartney how to practice it (Macartney 1963, 84). Over the next six days, the koutou was repeatedly brought up to the exclusion of all other issues. When Macartney finally arrived at the capital, he proposed modifications to the ceremony that might satisfy both parties. Yet, when the time came, Macartney placed his credentials directly into the hands of the emperor—a clear violation of Qing diplomatic practice (Macartney 1963, 123). Qing officials were not happy with this. Shortly after a brief audience with the emperor, Macartney was sent away with some gifts, an edict that offered no concessions, and “a broad hint to leave as soon as possible” (Rockhill 1897, 633). Macartney was puzzled by the way the koutou dispute had come to dominate all of his interactions with Qing representatives. What had begun as a minor issue quickly expanded to become the only issue about which the Qing talked to him. Qing commitment to defending their diplomatic practices was even more pronounced when Lord William Amherst arrived in 1816. Unlike Macartney—who had been taken by surprise by ceremonial issues—Amherst fully expected that “the Tartar Court Ceremony [was] likely to form part of [his] earliest disruptions with the Chinese government.”9 He was right. At Tianjin, Amherst met Qing officials who immediately asked him whether he would be willing to practice the koutou. Amherst vaguely responded that he “should be prepared to meet with the Emperor in the most respectful manner.”10 Yet, any attempts by Amherst to change the topic of discussion until reaching Beijing failed. Qing representatives returned to the koutou issue repeatedly. Upon arrival at Beijing, Amherst was treated with little of the courtesy Macartney had received. Rather than entering the main gate, the entourage was brought through a dangerous side entrance at night. Instead of the plush apartments offered to Macartney, Amherst was brought to a “mean and dirty dwelling.”11 Amherst found this treatment humiliating and intimidating. He was outraged to have been subject to “transactions of an extraordinary nature, so little to be accounted for by the usages of European Courts”12 Most significantly, upon arrival in the early hours of the morning, Amherst was ordered to meet with the emperor. When he asked for time to prepare, Amherst was summarily dismissed and told to immediately leave Beijing. On returning to his ship, Amherst found a note waiting for him from the emperor ordering the British to send no more embassies.13 Even more than it had in 1793, the koutou issue had plagued Amherst's embassy. Indeed, his refusal to koutou had worsened diplomatic relations between the two states. Due to disputes over diplomatic practice, China had effectively isolated itself from European international society. It was nearly five decades before an official British embassy would reach Beijing again. In the time in between, British and Chinese relations deteriorated severely. In the absence of official diplomatic interaction, the central conflict of interest between Britain and China—trade (which now expanded to included British smuggling of opium into China)—was no closer to being resolved. Britain finally gave up on diplomacy when it declared war on China in 1839. At the end of the First Opium War in 1842, China was forced to open ports to trade, cede Hong Kong, pay indemnities, and grant consular jurisdiction for Britons in China. Yet, while the Treaty of Nanjing allowed Britain (and other European states) to post representatives, they were permitted to operate only at the Qing empire's periphery, meaning the relationship between the Qing and Europe was mediated by local regional governors. This inadequate arrangement finally fell apart in October 1856 when disputes over the Arrow, a ship sailing under a British flag, triggered a sequence of events that escalated into the Second Opium War. After destroying the bulk of the Chinese navy, Britain sent James Bruce, Earl of Elgin, to find a settlement. In face of Elgin's forces moving on Beijing, the Qing signed the Treaty of Tianjin in June 1858, in which they conceded to the posting of a British resident ambassador at Shanghai. However, the incoming ambassador, Elgin's brother Frederick Bruce, demanded that he be allowed to travel to hand over his credentials at Beijing, in accordance with European diplomatic practice. Qing officials conceded but requested that this mission make its way to Beijing through an obscure side gate and that it enter without banners or any escort, which might “illustrate the power and prestige of Western arms” (Graham 1978, 367). Bruce refused the request. Upon reaching the Hai river, he found its mouth blocked and its forts occupied. His forces’ attempt to storm the position was unsuccessful and the British suffered more than nine hundred casualties. When news of the battle reached Britain, there was universal outrage and demands for retribution. Yet, even with British forces approaching the gates of Beijing, the Qing defended their ritual system. When Lord Elgin demanded that he be allowed to hand the Queen's terms directly to the emperor and warned that a Qing refusal would be treated severely by Britain, the negotiations broke down once more and British representatives were kidnapped and murdered by Qing forces (Wang 1971, 618). In retaliation, a combined Anglo-French force stormed Beijing and destroyed the famous summer palaces located there (James 2004). The Qing emperor fled north to Chengde where he died shortly after. In command of the capital city, Britain and other European states now claimed full European diplomatic rights. Resident embassies were established in Beijing where European diplomats refused to engage in any ritual practices that suggested anything other than sovereign equality. Qing behavior surrounding seemingly trivial issues of diplomatic practice had directly contributed to its own diplomatic isolation, the escalation of the Second Opium War, and occupation of Beijing. Symbolic Binding and the Qing Defense of Diplomatic Practice The Qing regime defended their diplomatic practice at considerable cost. Certainly, in the early stages of their relationship with Britain, the Qing might have underestimated the consequences of refusing to incorporate at least some European diplomatic practices into their repertoire. However, by 1859 it was clear that this policy was strategically dangerous. So why did it persist? In this section I show how the Qing became symbolically bound by practices associated with domestic legitimacy. First, it should be noted that for most of this time period discussed there were active attempts by both the British and the Chinese to be creative with their symbolic practices as much as possible.14 Of the three British ambassadors discussed, only Bruce had been intransigent regarding diplomatic practice. Part of the inability of both sides to reconcile this issue may have due to their diverging worldviews. Macartney's diaries make it clear that it took time before either side recognized how consequential the koutou was going to become. However, the dispute can more readily understood when we recognize the role the koutou played in generating symbolic capital for the Qing regime. Indeed, it should be noted that foreign embassies were not the only “subjects” obliged to engage in this practice; it was also expected from all vassals of the Qing empire, as well as all domestic (that is Chinese) subjects. Thus, the practice of the koutou ceremony was critical for constituting the Qing regime's dominion not just abroad but also at home. It was the symbolic expression of a Qing universal ideology that did not recognize the distinction between the international or domestic spheres (Crossley 1999, 18). When it was practiced all the most powerful people in the empire and beyond were seen to subordinate themselves to the emperor. This allowed the regime to give the appearance of total rule. Astonished by this practice, Laurence Oliphaunt (1970, 276), who accompanied Lord Elgin to China in 1859, observed the following: [N]ot by a physical force, but by a moral prestige unrivaled in power and extent, the Emperor of China can say with no less truth than Napoleon, “L'Empire c'est moi” … Backed by no standing army … he exercises a rule more absolute than any European despot. This intersection between two competing political fields—the domestic and diplomatic (a distinction the Qing would likely not recognize)—meant that the Qing regime could not engage in diplomatic practices that did not reinforce the superiority of the Qing emperor without simultaneously jeopardizing their symbolic capital at home. This observation can explain why this issue was so strongly contested.15 Second, because the legitimacy of the Qing regime was predicated on this highly public practice, there was no meaningful way to prevent domestic audiences from observing any deviations from it. This presented a dilemma for a Qing regime that was concerned about the loyalty of its Chinese subjects. Manchu in origin, the Qing had invaded China in 1644, replacing the Ming dynasty. Even after migrating into China in the hundreds of thousands, the new Manchu ruling class was outnumbered by ethnic Han Chinese by approximately 350 to one. Thus, since its founding one of the most basic concerns for the Qing dynasty was the “minority-rule question” (Elliot 2001, 3). Governance for this “conquest dynasty” (Crossley 1999, 29) required the cooperation of Han elites, especially the administrative Confucian scholar-class. By the time of Macartney's mission, Qing reliance on Han elites had expanded into administering every corner of China. In the provinces (zhou) and counties (xian) the imperial administration existed next to and was shared with networks of Han officials and local power-holders (Gernet 1987, xxiii). These elites often had influence in the powerful Green Standard Army, which was drawn from the ethnic Han populace and was about three times the size of the Manchu Eight Banner armies (see below). The Qing were always wary of their relationship with the Han population and were conscious of the collective danger it represented (Wakeman 1998, 173–75). As Phillips (2017, 3) puts it, “fearful conformity and private resentment—rather than cultural consensus and genuine mutual identification” held things in check.16 In light of these dynamics, the symbolic importance of the koutou makes sense, as it took place in full view of the most important Chinese elites. Qing bureaucrats, Manchu noble bannermen, regional viceroys, tributary envoys, and hundreds of officials from the empire publicly and in view of each other demonstrated their symbolic subordination to the emperor (Hevia 1989, 81–82). To deviate from ritual practices located in the heart of the empire would be observed by the most powerful potential challengers to Qing rule. Consequently, this created incentives to privilege the domestic practices over the international ones. Furthermore, whenever these practices were violated by the visiting British ambassadors, the regime made sure to disguise this from domestic audiences as much as possible (Shunhong 1993, 38–39), before finally banning any European embassies from traveling to Beijing. These incentives explain why the Qing regime was flexible on political issues that would take effect far from the imperial center—such as the ceding of treaty ports—but was protective of highly public symbolic issues such as the koutou ceremony. This political dynamic can also explain the Qing regime's unwillingness to allow European ambassadors access to or residency in Beijing. Beijing was the ritual heart of China, where dignitaries came to seek an imperial audience. These embassies were only housed temporarily and in public, meaning that—like the koutou—any changes to this practice would also diminish Qing symbolic capital. For the Qing to allow permanent embassies in Beijing would be an unprecedented (and illegitimate) change in diplomatic practice. The importance of Beijing for the maintenance and production of Qing symbolic capital can also explain why the Amherst mission was treated with less respect than the Macartney mission. As Amherst documented, the manner in which his mission was treated was observed by other Qing subjects. He had not been even allowed to enter through the main gate but was brought in through a side gate—an act that indicated his embassy's inferiority. Bruce's refusal to acquiesce to a Qing request to enter a similar side gate was what led the Chinese to fire on British forces at the mouth of the Hai River.17 Indeed, rather than allow Bruce to publicly enter through Beijing's main gate, the Qing regime decided to reinitiate war with a foreign power that had already defeated it twice. Symbolic binding can help us to understand this otherwise seemingly self-destructive behavior. Third, the Qing regime had no access to alternative forms of political capital. In the early stages of Qing rule, the regime maintained its power through more than symbolic practices. The Qing placed garrisons of Manchu military bannermen (nobles) throughout China. Most garrisons took the form of miniature “Manchu cities” (mancheng) inside cities, of which the Forbidden City is an archetypal example. By the time of Macartney's mission, there were approximately one hundred mancheng, nineteen of which were located in China proper.18 Initially, the largest of these garrisons had housed as many as ten thousand banner soldiers; the smallest: as few as fifty. However, as time went on the military effectiveness of the garrison system deteriorated due to a weakening of Manchu/Han apartheid system, the shirking of martial training by bannermen, and the impoverishment of the martial class. By the late-1700s the banners had been effectively disbanded. By the late eighteenth century real power in the regions had shifted to the office of local governors-general (Elliot 2001, 139). As their control of state institutions weakened, the Qing increasingly relied on symbolic capital to maintain legitimacy. This was not an easy task. At exactly the time that European states were taking a formal interest in China, the cracks in Qing rule were beginning to show. From the second half of the eighteenth century onward, rebellions and uprisings became more common. These rebellions took a number of forms and included secret societies, peasant revolts, urban workers’ riots, garrison mutinies, and full-scale uprisings. Most were led by Han Chinese literati such as disaffected bureaucrats. By 1852 the Qing regime was wracked by the most severe rebellion of its history: the Taiping Rebellion. It was against this background that Qing disputes with Britain over diplomatic practice took place. With their grip on power weakening, and short of other forms of political capital that did not rely on Han elites, the Qing had clear incentives not to engage in any practices that risked their claims to legitimate rule. Evaluating Alternatives Strategic explanations would expect that the Qing regime contested diplomatic practice to somehow improve its strategic situation. The Qing regime might have thought that contesting diplomatic practice would somehow improve their negotiating position versus Britain (or at least not harm it). Alternatively, it might have contested European diplomatic practice to protect its international reputation and thus improve its international security. There is some evidence that suggest that, at least initially, the Qing regime saw no strategic downside risk in contesting European diplomatic practice. At the time of Macartney, the Qing had neither little interest in international trade nor an understanding of the conception of a diplomatic mission in the same way that Europeans did (Shunhong 1993). While Macartney thought that meeting the emperor would be a precursor to negotiations, the Chinese mandarins leading Macartney to Beijing treated him as they would any other foreign envoy and thus focused on the ceremonial obligations Macartney would be expected to fulfill. In this sense, the Qing regime was not “bargaining” with the British as it saw nothing to bargain over. Further, although the arrival of “sea barbarians” worried the Qing court somewhat, it is also clear that China was not fully aware of the world beyond its immediate neighbors. Western European countries were frequently confused with one another by China, and the politics of Europe was often assumed to have remained static since the first Portuguese embassies reached China in the 1600s (Fairbank 1942, 147). Bargaining explanations thus do not get us very far in understanding early Qing behavior. Qing officials were neither negotiating with British officials nor trying to send signals to a wider world that they knew very little about. Indeed, strategic explanations completely fail to explain the persistent defense of Sinocentric diplomatic practices by the Qing, especially following the Opium War. While the Qing was uncertain about European intentions in the 1790s, by the late 1820s it would have been clear to the Qing leadership that refusal to formally engage with European powers would not make the problems it was having with these states go away. Yet, despite these pressures, and even after suffering huge military defeats, the Qing regime refused to budge on issues regarding diplomatic practice. In fact, they were willing to trade-off materially valuable resources—such as territory or trading rights—in order to protect and defend their diplomatic practices. In short, the Qing's continued defense of local diplomatic practice is not reconcilable with traditional strategic explanations. Constructivist explanations should expect that the Qing contested any practices that conflicted with those needed to create and maintain the Qing identity. There is some evidence to support this line of argument. Inside, China the Qing dynasty acted in a way consistent with the Middle Kingdom Chinese identity. Although ethnically Manchu, once the Qing took power in the seventeenth century, they quickly adopted the traditional Han identity of the supplanted Ming dynasty. While this identity was modified to incorporate distinctly Manchu elements, such as the topknot haircut, the Qing Middle Kingdom was recognizably Han Chinese in many of its practices. Furthermore, the Qing regime made sure to fastidiously adhere to the rituals and practices associated with this identity, of which the koutou was an instance. Qing disputes over issues of diplomatic practice thus appear, at first glance, to be consistent with the expectations of this explanation. However, this stubborn defense of identity was more conditional than it appears. First, although the Manchu Qing did adopt traditional Chinese imperial practices, they also upheld Manchu traditions and tried hard to protect the “Manchu Way”: the particular martial and cultural values and practices distinct to the Manchu. Thus, the degree to which the Manchus became truly “sinicized” is a debate that has not been fully settled by historians.19 Of course, this evidence does not mean that Qing representatives who contested diplomatic practice were not defending this particularly Manchu version of Chinese identity. Much stronger evidence against this explanation comes from the behavior of the Qing outside of their Chinese dominions, where they had a far more pragmatic and fluid relationship with identity practices. In non-Chinese territories, the Qing did not engage in the same identity practices that they did inside China. To the Chinese they sought to portray themselves as Confucian sages and direct heirs to previous dynasties and famous emperors. However, to the Mongols, the Qing emperors appeared as great khans; to the Tibetans as “turners of the wheel of time” (Waley-Cohen 2006, 2). If nothing else, this evidence shows us that the Qing regime saw the political utility of identity practices and engaged in at least some of them in a calculated way. This “pragmatic” relationship to identity extended to diplomatic practice. For instance, to placate the interests of their powerful neighbor, the Qing allowed Russia to house a permanent embassy in the capital. However, it was officially recognized as a religious building, and its minister was obliged to participate in the koutou ritual.20 This evidence suggests two things. First, it suggests the Qing were willing to accept some of the functional elements of European diplomatic practice (such as resident missions) provided these elements were repackaged so as not to appear as official embassies. Second, although the Qing regime was immovable on issues of diplomatic practice inside its borders, it could be very flexible on such issues when abroad. In short, the Qing were happy to practice “imperial simultaneity” and rely on different legitimation practices in different parts of their empire (Crossley 1999, 12). This suggests that Qing commitment to these practices was at least somewhat motivated by political calculation as much as identity. Considering all of these factors, the diplomatic behavior of the Qing regime can be best explained by the mechanism of symbolic binding. First, the intersecting diplomatic and domestic political fields of activity meant that the symbolic practices of Qing diplomacy could not be readily abandoned. Second, the highly public nature of these practices and the difficulty the Qing faced in hiding or disguising these practices from observant audiences made the regime unwilling to jettison them in favor of those being demanded by Britain. Third, this decision was reinforced by the lack of access to alternatives form of political capital on the part of the Qing. Possessed of a diminished military capability, dependent on Han elites for their support, and suffering increasing domestic discontent, the Qing had incentives to faithfully engage in practices that demonstrated their legitimate right to rule. Final accommodation to European demands, when it came, only occurred when the capital was occupied and the emperor deposed.21 Conclusion In Beijing on February 24, 1873, the issue of Qing and European diplomatic practice was finally resolved. That day, the ambassadors of England, France, the United States, Russia, and Germany were received by the new Qing emperor in the throne room. There, in accordance with European diplomatic practice, the ministers placed their credentials directly into the emperor's hands and lightly bowed. The entire audience ceremony lasted less than five minutes (Wang 1971, 624). This was a long time to dispute such a seemingly-trivial issue. Yet, this article can account for this behavior by drawing attention to how practices do not always provide opportunities for diplomats but rather—due to their position inside fields—sometimes act as constraints. Qing diplomatic practice intersected and competed with the practices required for symbolic capital. This—combined with the existence on a highly public system of legitimation and limited access to alternative forms of political capital—symbolically bound the Qing regime. This directly led to its decision to diplomatically isolate itself from Europe, with all the consequences this entailed. This argument has important implications for our understanding of international politics in both the past and the present. Regarding history, the detailed case study of Qing China's defense of its diplomatic practices is relevant to the “Global IR” program's mission: to study non-Western regions and eras as a way to reevaluate existing theories and discover new ones (Acharaya 2014, 649–52). Many previous studies in IR about East Asia during the “expansion of international society” focus on how states like China and Japan were socialized into this society, rather than considering the motives non-Europeans polities may have had for preserving their own social orders (Gong 1984; Suzuki 2005). Even when scholars do focus on the Sinocentric system, the emphasis is usually on its general dynamics (Kang 2012) or how Qing vassals and subordinates responded to the Qing empire (Lee 2016). This account differs in that it focuses on why a non-European polity defended its symbolic practices from European encroachment. In doing so it offers an explanation that goes further than traditional identity or material explanations. By drawing on field and practice theories, this article draws attention to how the physical and symbolic enaction of alien practices could have disorienting and destabilizing effects on regime power, as well as offering an explanation for when these pressures might become acute enough to have international strategic implications. Regarding contemporary politics, this argument also offers another way for scholars to understand the specific ways that international practices are connected to, and can conflict with, domestic practices of legitimation such that they influence international outcomes. In particular, it brings into focus the potential for merely symbolic issues to be sources of significant political contest. There is a tendency to assume that disputes over trivial things like seating arrangements are just stalling or blocking tactics, rather than meaningful sources of dispute in their own right. However, there is an increasing recognition by IR scholars that seemingly small symbolic disputes might be far more intractable than they first appear (Lind 2009, 548–50). The mechanism of symbolic binding offers another reason to understand why this might be the case. In doing so, this mechanism provides us with a way to adjudicate between symbolic disputes that are being contested for substantive reasons (i.e., the disputants feel bound to contest them) and that are being contested for frivolous or obstructionist ones. It also offers guidance for understanding when engaging in symbolic practices might increase the likelihood of deals being struck. If specific symbolic practices are important for the domestic legitimacy of regimes, then it may be possible to “exchange” them for something else, especially if a regime is highly dependent on them. Thus, under certain circumstances, deals might be designed around the granting of symbolic concessions (Atran and Axelrod 2008, 221) or by one party exchanging symbolic practices for something more substantive. By appreciating the role that practices can have for generating symbolic capital for regimes, we can get a better sense on when and how such deals might work. In the media-saturated environment of the twenty-first century, this suggests that diplomatic practice needs to be taken more seriously than before. Author Biographical David E. Banks is a professorial lecturer at American University. He studies diplomatic practice, international order, great power politics, and wargaming. Notes Author's Note: For their very useful comments and criticisms I thank Robert Adcock, Henry Farrell, Martha Finnemore, James Goldgeier, Joseph O'Mahoney, and Susan Sell. I also thank the participants in a panel at the 2015 International Studies Association meeting in New Orleans, and the 2014 International Studies Association North East meeting Baltimore. Finally, I thank the editors of this article and three anonymous reviewers. Any remaining errors are my own. Footnotes 1 I thank an anonymous reviewer for this summation of the argument. 2 For a holistic but succinct account of the logic of field theory, see Soro (2018). 3 On focal points, see Mehta, Starmer, and Sugden (1994, 164–67). 4 Though it had interacted with China before this, Russia did not attempt to integrate China into broader European affairs (Hsü 1964). 5 See appendix for more on methodology. 6 It should be noted that a belief in an “equal” international society was a contested principle that did not become more generally accepted—at least rhetorically—until the nineteenth and twentieth century (Osiander 2001, 251). Further, even when this became generally accepted in Europe, this understanding was not extended to the rest of the globe (Keal 2003, chap. 4). 7 Indeed, the Qing legitimated their deposing of the Ming on the grounds that Ming leadership had created an imbalance in the natural order (Spence 1990, 58–64). 8 This point should not be read to imply that, had Britain merely received recognition of sovereign equality, it would have acted in a benign manner toward the Qing. By this point European international society had already drawn a distinction between insiders and (non-European) outsiders in the way they approached politics. For insiders, toleration was the norm; for outsiders, “civilizing” (and the attendant violence and intervention it implied) was the norm (Keene 2002, 5–6). Nonetheless, this does not negate the point that by this period British diplomats expected—at a minimum—to be treated according to European diplomatic standards (Phillips and Sharman 2015, chap. 5) 9 Letter from Amherst to Foreign Office, 8 August 1816, FO/17/3/44-51. Foreign and Commonwealth Office Correspondence and Records from 1782, National Archives, Kew, UK. 10 Ibid. 11 Letter from Amherst to George Canning, President of the Board of Commissioners for India, 7 March 1817, FO/17/3/89-98. Foreign and Commonwealth Office Correspondence and Records from 1782, National Archives, Kew, UK. 12 Ibid. 13 Letter from Amherst to British Prince Regent, 7 January 1817, FO/17/3/116. Foreign and Commonwealth Office Correspondence and Records from 1782, National Archives, Kew, UK. 14 See appendix. 15 For a detailed account of the conflict, see Hevia (1995, chap. 9). 16 This interpretation is consistent with the “New Qing History” historiography of Qing politics. See also Rawski (2004); Waley-(Cohen) 2004; Perdue (2015), and the appendix. 17 Behavior such as this shows that British diplomats were just as sensitive as their Qing interlocutors to deviating from diplomatic practices. However, their considerable material strength vis the Qing meant they did not have to choose between satisfying opinion at home and meeting their diplomatic goals. 18 The others were located in the non-Chinese imperial territories. 19 For a discussion of the literature. see Elliot (2001, 26–32); also, Waley-Cohen (2004). 20 See appendix. 21 This result indicates that the Qing “acceptance” of European demands was not due to accurately interpreting the “actual” power of their opponents and then accepting a bargain. On the contrary, this dispute only ended when the Qing court was reordered and replaced with new elites more willing to accept European demands (Wang 1971, 620). References Acharya Amitav . 2014 . “ Global International Relations (IR) and Regional Worlds: A New Agenda for International Studies .” International Studies Quarterly 58 ( 4 ): 647 – 59 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Adler Emanuel , Pouliot Vincent. 2011 . “ International Practices .” International Theory 3 ( 1 ): 1 – 36 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Adler-Nissen Rebecca . 2008 . “ The Diplomacy of Opting Out: A Bourdieudian Approach to National Integration Strategies .” Journal of Common Market Studies 46 ( 3 ): 663 – 84 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Adler-Nissen Rebecca , Pouliot Vincent. 2014 . “ Power in Practice: Negotiating the International Intervention in Libya .” European Journal of International Relations 20 ( 4 ): 889 – 911 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Albin Cecilia , Druckman Daniel. 2014 . “ Procedures Matter: Justice and Effectiveness in International Trade Negotiations .” European Journal of International Relations 20 ( 4 ): 1014 – 42 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Atran Scott , Axelrod Robert. 2008 . “ Reframing Sacred Values .” Negotiation Journal 24 ( 3 ): 221 – 46 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Barnett Michael , Duvall Raymond. 2005 . “ Power in Global Governance .” In Power in Global Governance , edited by Barnett Michael, Duvall Raymond. New York : Cambridge University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Barnett Michael . 1998 . Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order . New York : Columbia University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Bourdieu Pierre . 1979 . “ Symbolic Power .” Critique of Anthropology 77 ( 4 ): 77 – 85 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Bourdieu Pierre . 1984 . Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgment of Taste. Translated by Richard Nice . Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Bourdieu Pierre , Wacquant Loïc J. D.. 1992 . An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology . Chicago : University of Chicago Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Cohen Abner . 1974 . Two-Dimensional Man . London : Routledge & Kegan Paul . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Collins Randall , Arnett Joan. 2009 . “ A Short History of Deference and Demeanor .” In Conflict Sociology: A Sociological Classic Updated , edited by Collins Randall. Boulder, CO : Paradigm Publishers . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Chwe Michael Suk-Young . 2001 . Rational Ritual: Culture, Coordination, and Common Knowledge . Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Constantinou Costas . 1996 . On the Way to Diplomacy . London : University of Minnesota Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Crossley Pamela Kyle . 1999 . A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology . Berkeley; Los Angeles : University of California Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Der Derian James . 1987 . On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement . New York : Basil Blackwell . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC De Wicquefort Abraham . 1716 . The Embassador and his Functions . Translated by John Digby . London, UK : Bernard Lintott . https://play.google.com/books/reader?id=VGlUAAAAYAAJ&printsec=frontcover&output=reader&authuser=0&hl=en&pg=GBS.PP13 . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Edelman Murray . 1971 . Politics as Symbolic Action: Mass Arousal and Quiescence . New York : Academic Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Eisenhardt Kathleen M. , Graebner Melissa E.. 2007 . “ Theory Building from Cases: Opportunities and Challenges .” Academy of Management Journal 50 ( 1 ): 25 – 32 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Elliot Mark C. 2001 . The Manchu Way: The Eight Banners and Ethnic Identity in Late Imperial China . Stanford, CA : Stanford University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Fairbank J. K. 1942 . “ Tributary Trade and China's Relations with the West .” Far Eastern Quarterly 1 ( 2 ): 129 – 49 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Fangyin Zhou . 2011 . “ Equilibrium Analysis of the Tributary System .” Chinese Journal of International Politics 4 ( 2 ): 147 – 78 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Fearon James 1994 . “ Domestic Political Audiences and the Escalation of International Disputes .” American Political Science Review 88 ( 3 ): 577 – 92 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Fearon James . 1995 . “ Rationalist Explanations for War .” International Organization 49 ( 3 ): 379 – 414 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Feng Zhang . 2009 . “ Rethinking the ‘Tribute System’: Broadening the Conceptual Horizon of Historical East Asian Politics .” Chinese Journal of International Politics 2 ( 4 ): 545 – 74 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Foreign and Commonwealth Office . “Letter from Amherst to Foreign Office, August 8, 1816, FO /17/3/44-51.” Correspondence and Records from 1782, National Archives, Kew . Foreign and Commonwealth Office . “Letter from Amherst to George Canning, President of the Board of Commissioners for India,” March 7, 1817, FO /17/3/89-98. Correspondence and Records from 1782, National Archives, Kew . Foreign and Commonwealth Office . “Letter from Amherst to British Prince Regent,” January 7, 1817, FO /17/3/116. Correspondence and Records from 1782, National Archives, Kew . Gambetta Diego . 2009 . Codes of the Underworld: How Criminals Communicate . Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Geertz Clifford . 1973 . The Interpretation of Cultures . New York : Basic Books . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Geertz Clifford . 1980 . Negara: The Theatre State in Nineteenth-Century Bali . Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC George Alexander L. , Bennett Andrew. 2005 . Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences . Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Gernet Jacques . 1987 . “ Introduction .” In Foundations and Limits of State Power in China , edited by Schram S.R., xv – xvii . London : School of Oriental and African Studies . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Glanville Luke . 2010 . “ Retaining the Mandate of Heaven: Sovereign Accountability in Ancient China .” Millennium 39 ( 2 ): 323 – 43 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Goddard Stacie E. 2006 . “ Uncommon Ground: Indivisible Territory and the Politics of Legitimacy .” International Organization 60 ( 1 ): 35 – 68 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Go Julian . 2008 . “ Global Fields and Imperial Forms: Field Theory and the British and American Empires .” Sociological Theory 26 ( 3 ): 201 – 29 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Gong Gerrit W. 1984 . The Standard of ‘Civilisation’ in International Society . Oxford : Clarendon Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Graham Gerald S. 1978 . The China Station: War and Diplomacy 1830–1860 . Oxford : Clarendon Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Greene Kenneth F. 2007 . Why Dominant Parties Lose . New York : Cambridge University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Grenfell Michael . 2014 . Pierre Bourdieu: Key Concepts . New York : Routledge . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Hamilton Keith , Langhorne Richard. 2011 . The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory, and Administration . New York : Routledge . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Hevia James L. 1989 . “ A Multitude of Lords: Qing Court Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793 .” Late Imperial China 10 ( 2 ): 72 – 105 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Hevia James L. . 1995 . Cherishing Men from Afar: Qing Guest Ritual and the Macartney Embassy of 1793 . Durham, NC : Duke University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Hobson John M. Hobson , Sharman J. C.. 2005 . “ The Enduring Place of Hierarchy in World Politics: Tracing the Social Logics of Hierarchy and Political Change .” European Journal of International Relations 11 ( 1 ): 63 – 98 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Honneth Axel . 1995 . The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts . Cambridge : Polity Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Hopf Ted . 2011 . “ The Logic of Habit in International Relations .” European Journal of International Relations 16 ( 4 ): 539 – 61 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Hsü Immanuel C.Y. 1964 . “ Russia's Special Position in China During the Early Ch'ing Period .” Slavic Review 23 ( 4 ): 688 – 700 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Hurd Ian . 2008 . After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the UN Security Council . Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Ikenberry G. John . 2001 . After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars . Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Jackson Patrick Thaddeus . 2006 . Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West . Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Jackson Peter . 2008 . “ Pierre Bourdieu, the ‘Cultural Turn,’ and the Practice of International History .” Review of International Studies 34 ( 1 ): 155 – 81 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat James, Eight Earl of Elgin . 2004 . Letters and Journals of James, Eight Earl of Elgin: Governor of Jamaica, Governor-General of Canada, Envoy to China, Viceroy to India . Edited by Theodore Walrond C. B.. http://www.gutenberg.org/cache/epub/10610/pg10610.html . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Kang David . 2012 . East Asia Before the West: Five Centuries of Trade & Tribute . New York : Columbia University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Keal Paul . 2003 . European Conquest and the Rights of Indigenous Peoples: The Moral Backwardness of International Society . Cambridge, MA : Cambridge University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Keene Edward . 2002 . Beyond the Anarchical Society: Grotius, Colonialism and Order in World Politics . Cambridge, MA : Cambridge University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Lake David A. 2014 . “ Dominance and Subordination in World Politics: Authority, Liberalism, and Stability in the Modern International Order .” In Power, Order, and Change in World Politics , edited by Ikenberry G. John, 61 – 82 . Cambridge : Cambridge University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Lake David , Powell Robert. 1999 . Strategic Choice in International Relations . Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Lee Ji-Young . 2013 . “ Diplomatic Ritual As Power Resource: The Politics of Asymmetry in Early Modern Chinese-Korean Relations .” Journal of East Asian Studies 13 ( 2 ): 309 – 36 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Lee Ji-Young . 2016 . “ Hegemonic Authority and Domestic Legitimation: Japan and Korea Under Chinese Hegemonic Order in Early Modern Asia .” Security Studies 25 ( 2 ): 350 – 52 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Lind Jennifer . 2009 . “ Apologies in International Politics .” Security Studies 18 ( 3 ): 517 – 56 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Macartney George . 1963 . An Embassy to China: Being the Journal kept by Lord Macartney during his embassy to the Emperor Ch'ien-lung 1793–1794 . Edited by Cranmer-Byng J. L.. Hamden, CT : Archon Books . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Mahar Cheleen , Harker Richard, Wilkes Chris. 1990 . “ The Basic Theoretical Position .” In An Introduction to the Work of Pierre Bourdieu: The Practice of Theory , edited by Harker Richard, Mahar Cheleen, Wilkes Chris, 1 – 25 . New York : St. Martin's Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC McAdam Doug , Tarrow Sidney, Tilly Charles. 2001 . Dynamics of Contention . New York : Cambridge University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC McCaffree M. J. , Innis Pauline. 1989 . Protocol: The Complete Handbook of Diplomatic, Official, and Social Usage . Washington, DC : Devon Publishing . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Mehta Judith , Starmer Chris, Sugden Robert. 1994 . “ Focal Points in Pure Coordination Games: An Experimental Investigation .” Theory and Decision 36 ( 2 ): 163 – 85 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Mitzen Jennifer . 2006 . “ Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma .” European Journal of International Relations 12 ( 3 ): 341 – 70 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Musgrave Paul , Nexon Daniel H.. 2018 . “ Defending Hierarchy from the Moon to the Indian Ocean: Symbolic Capital and Political Dominance in Early Modern China and the Cold War .” International Organization 72 ( 3 ): 591 – 626 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat North Douglass C. , Wallis John Joseph, Weingast Barry. 2009 . Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History . New York : Cambridge University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Oliphaunt Laurence , esq . 1970 . Narrative of the Earl of Elgin's Mission to China and Japan in the Years 1857,’58,’59 . New York : Praeger Publishers . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC O'Neill Barry . 1999 . Honor, Symbols, and War . Ann Arbor : University of Michigan Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Osiander Andreas . 2001 . “ Sovereignty, International Relations, and the Westphalian Myth .” International Organization 55 ( 2 ): 251 – 87 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Perdue Peter C. 2015 . “ The Tenacious Tributary System .” Journal of Contemporary China 24 ( 96 ): 1002 – 14 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Phillips Andrew . 2017 . “ Contesting the Confucian Peace: Civilization, Barbarism, and International Hierarchy in East Asia .” European Journal of International Relations 23 ( 1 ): 1 – 25 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Phillips Andrew , Sharman J.C.. 2015 . International Order in Diversity: War, Trade, and Rule in the Indian Ocean . New York : Cambridge University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Pouliot Vincent . 2008 . “ The Logic of Practicality: A Theory of Practice of Security Communities .” International Organization 62 ( 2 ), 257 – 88 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Pouliot Vincent . 2015 . “ Practice Tracing .” In Process Tracing: From Metaphor to Analytic Tool , edited by Bennett Andrew, Checkel Jeffrey T., 237 – 259 . New York : Cambridge University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Pouponneau Florent , Merand Frederic. 2017 . “ Diplomatic Practices, Domestic Fields, and the International System: Explaining France's Shift on Nuclear Nonproliferation .” International Studies Quarterly 61 ( 1 ): 123 – 35 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Putnam Robert D. 1988 . “ Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games .” International Organization 42 ( 3 ): 427 – 60 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Rawski Evelyn . 2004 . “ The Qing Empire During Qianlong Reign .” In New Qing Imperial History: The Making of Inner Asian Empire at Qing Chengde , edited by Dunnell Ruth W., Elliot Mark C., Foret Phillipe, 15 – 21 . Richmond, VA : Routledge . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Ringmar Erik. 2010 . “ The International Politics of Recognition .” In The International Politics of Recognition , edited by Lindemann Thomas, Ringmar Erik, 3 – 24 . Boulder, CO : Paradigm Publishers . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Ringmar Erik. . 2012 . “ Performing International Systems: Two East-Asian Alternatives to the Westphalian Order .” International Organization 66 ( 1 ): 1 – 25 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Rockhill William Woodville . 1897 . “ Diplomatic Missions to the Court of China: The Kotow Question II .” American Historical Review 2 ( 4 ): 627 – 43 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Savage Mike , Warde Alan, Devine Fiona. 2005 . “ Capitals, Assets, and Resources: Some Critical Issues .” British Journal of Sociology 56 ( 1 ): 31 – 47 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Seawright Jason , Gerring John. 2008 . “ Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative Options .” Political Research Quarterly 61 ( 2 ): 294 – 308 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Senn Martin , Elhardt Christoph. 2014 . “ Bourdieu and the Bomb: Power, Language, and the Doxic Battle Over the Value of Nuclear Weapons .” European Journal of International Relations 20 ( 2 ): 316 – 40 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Shunhong Zhang . 1993 . “ Historical Anachronism: The Qing Perception of Reaction to the Macartney Embassy .” In Ritual and Diplomacy: The Macartney Mission to China 1792–1794. Papers presented at the 1992 Conference of British Association for Chinese Studies Marking the Bicentenary of the Macartney Mission to China , edited by Bickers Robert A., 31 – 42 . London : British Association for Chinese Studies and Wellsweep Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Slater Dan . 2010 . Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia . New York : Cambridge University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Slater Dan , Fenner Sofia. 2011 . “ State Power and Staying Power: Infrastructural Mechanisms and Authoritarian Durability .” Journal of International Affairs 65 ( 1 ): 15 – 29 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Soro Tommie . 2018 . “ Pierre Bourdieu's Field Theory .” Last modified June 17, 2018. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dLfsCXVIvj0&feature=youtu.be . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Spence Jonathan D. 1990 . The Search for Modern China . New York : W.W. Norton & Co . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Suzuki Shogo . 2005 . “ Japan's Socialization Into Janus-Faced European International Society .” European Journal of International Relations 11 ( 1 ): 137 – 64 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Tilly Charles . 1975 . “ Reflections on the History of European State-Making .” In The Formation of National States in Western Europe , edited by Tilly Charles, 3 – 83 . Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Wagner R. Harrison . 2007 . War and the State: The Theory of International Politics . Ann Arbor : Michigan University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Wakeman Frederic Jr 1998 . “ Boundaries of the Public Sphere in Ming and Qing China .” Daedalus 127 ( 3 ): 167 – 89 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Waley-Cohen Joanna . 2004 . “ The New Qing History .” Radical History Review 88 ( 1 ): 193 – 206 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Waley-Cohen Joanna . 2006 . The Culture of War in China: Empire and the Military under the Qing Dynasty . New York, NY : Palgrave Macmillan . Wang Tseng-Tsai . 1971 . “ The Audience Question: Foreign Representatives and the Emperor of China, 1858–1873 .” Historical Journal 14 ( 3 ): 617 – 26 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Weber Max . 1978 . Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology . Edited by Roth Guenther, Wittich Claus. Berkeley : University of California Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Wedeen Lisa . 1999 . Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria . Chicago : University of Chicago Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Wood John , Serres Jean. 1970 . Diplomatic Ceremonial and Protocol: Principles, Procedures & Practices . New York : Columbia University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Zaiotti Ruben . 2011 . “ Performing Schengen: Myths, Rituals, and the Making of European Territoriality Beyond Europe .” Review of International Studies 37 ( 2 ): 537 – 56 . Google Scholar OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat © The Author(s) (2019). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Studies Association. This article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (https://academic.oup.com/journals/pages/open_access/funder_policies/chorus/standard_publication_model) © The Author(s) (2019). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Studies Association.
TI - Fields of Practice: Symbolic Binding and the Qing Defense of Sinocentric Diplomacy
JF - International Studies Quarterly
DO - 10.1093/isq/sqz054
DA - 2019-09-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/fields-of-practice-symbolic-binding-and-the-qing-defense-of-cLrsDKOWEA
SP - 546
EP - 557
VL - 63
IS - 3
DP - DeepDyve
ER -