TY - JOUR
AU - Jorba, Marta
AB - Phenom Cogn Sci (2013) 12:883–890 DOI 10.1007/s11097-012-9284-9 Book review: Bayne, T. and Montague, M. (eds.) (2011). Cognitive phenomenology. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press Marta Jorba Published online: 28 September 2012 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2012 “Cognitive phenomenology”, the title of this volume, is an expression that is likely to sound unfamiliar, to say the least, to a number of significant philosophers who have been working in mainstream philosophy of mind since the second half of the twentieth century. In general terms, with regard to their relation to phenomenal character or what-it-is-likeness (Nagel 1974), cognitive states and sensory states have been two separate realms. While sensory experiences are widely recognized as phenomenally conscious mental states, cognitive ones do not seem to bear any direct interesting relation to phenomenal consciousness. In addition, it used to be the orthodoxy in the field to divide mental states into those that are intentional and those that are qualitative (Block 1987): Intentional mental states were paradigmatically exemplified by cognitive states and qualitative states by sensations or “raw feels”, such as pains, tickles, and moods. Since then, this orthodoxy has been challenged from many angles, for instance by philosophers who defended that qualitative states 
TI - Book review: Bayne, T. and Montague, M. (eds.) (2011). Cognitive phenomenology. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press
JO - Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
DO - 10.1007/s11097-012-9284-9
DA - 2012-09-28
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/springer-journals/book-review-bayne-t-and-montague-m-eds-2011-cognitive-phenomenology-bI71J7CLqe
SP - 883
EP - 890
VL - 12
IS - 4
DP - DeepDyve
ER -