TY - JOUR
AU - Berg,, Berit
AB - Abstract This article focuses on the experiences of Iraqi and Syrian refugees in Jordan and their aspirations to migrate onwards. It is based on interviews carried out between October 2015 and January 2016—a time that coincided with unprecedented irregular movement of refugees and migrants to Europe, partly a result of secondary migrations from countries neighbouring Syria such as Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. Our data includes more than 60 in-depth interviews with refugees, some of whom have recently started moving and others who have been on their migratory journey for many years. We argue that changing circumstances and the structural constraints of life in exile forced refugees to reconsider their integration and migration strategies in host countries such as Jordan. We also demonstrate how inadequate reception is a generator of further fragmented migrations and how variations in refugee perceptions, resources and strategies propel different migratory practices and decisions. Importantly, we add a comparative perspective to current studies of Syrian refugees in the Middle East, highlighting key differences in Iraqi and Syrian refugees’ migration aspirations and movement plans. Introduction Years of war and instability have pushed millions of people to leave their homes in Syria and Iraq. Today, the conflict in Syria has produced the largest displacement crisis in the world, with around 6.5 million people displaced inside the country and a further 5 million outside, mostly to neighbouring Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan (UNHCR 2017b). Similarly, the United States-led invasion of Iraq and the ensuing violence unleashed further massive population movements from Iraq. Since 2003, millions have fled (IDMC 2015) and, as of 2016, there were more than 3 million Iraqis displaced within Iraq (IDMC 2016) and another 264,000 registered as refugees in the region (IOM 2016). Of the 1.2 million people who journeyed to Europe in 2014–15, Syrians and Iraqis accounted for two of the top three nationalities of first-time asylum seekers (Eurostat 2016). Of those, many had spent time in countries neighbouring Syria before journeying onwards (Öner and Genc 2015; Squire et al. 2017). In this article, our analysis draws on the experiences of Syrian and Iraqi refugees in Jordan. Based on qualitative research carried out between October 2015 and January 2016, this study articulates the circumstances and motivations that influence Syrian and Iraqi refugees’ further migrations and shape their onward journeys. Recent analyses offer insights into the experiences and migration aspirations of Syrian refugees (Achilli 2016a, 2016b; Christophersen 2016; DRC 2016); we add a comparative perspective, comparing contemporary Syrian and Iraqi refugee experiences in Jordan, and explore the impact that structural constraints and changing circumstances in the host country have on their integration and migration strategies. A comparative lens is particularly valuable to elucidate the complexity and dynamism of migration processes and to analyse continuities and changes in refugee experiences and strategies. We demonstrate that quality of life and reception in Jordan affect further fragmented migrations, and that disparate refugee resources, perceptions and attitudes drive their migratory decisions and practices. Our analysis proceeds as follows. First, we provide a brief overview of Syrian and Iraqi refugee movements to Jordan and of the literature on fragmented migrations. Second, we turn to push factors and the motives for secondary migration from Jordan, comparing the experiences of Syrian and Iraqi refugees. Finally, we discuss their intentions and uncertainties regarding secondary migrations in light of different socio-economic resources and structural constraints. Refugee Movements to Jordan and Fragmented Migrations Within the forced-migration literature relating to the Middle East, a significant number of studies focus on the contexts, conditions and challenges surrounding refugees’ reception (see e.g. Achilli 2015; Öner and Genc 2015; Yazgan et al. 2015; Janmyr 2016). Studies of refugees in Jordan highlight the kingdom’s historical openness to large-scale population movements as well as the ambiguity of policies, legal frameworks and discourses surrounding refugees (see e.g. Chatelard 2002; De Bel-Air 2007; Chatelard 2010; Stevens 2013; El-Abed 2014; Turner 2015). In recent years, a plethora of policy publications have focused on Syrians; however, Iraqi refugees hardly feature. Since the 1991 Gulf war, Jordan has served as a key destination and transit country for hundreds of thousands of Iraqis fleeing deteriorating economic conditions, oppression and general instability (Chatelard 2009). Insecurity following the United States-led invasion and collapse of the Baathist regime in 2003 accelerated movement to Jordan. Although ascertaining the exact number of refugees is fraught with political and practical challenges (Fafo 2007; Arouri 2008), by January 2006, when Jordan ended its open-border policy, the government claimed that 750,000 Iraqis lived within its borders (HRW 2006). From the spring of 2014, Jordan again experienced a marked increase in Iraqi refugees registering with the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) (UNHCR 2016a), many of whom belonged to Christian minorities fleeing persecution by Islamic State and affiliated groups (UNHCR 2014). At the time of our research, the Jordanian population census put the number of Iraqis living in Jordan close to 131,000 (DoS 2016: 15), although only about 53,000 were registered with UNHCR (UNHCR 2016a). Syrians escaping violence, persecution, instability and the socio-economic effects of conflict started arriving in Jordan in 2011. As the conflict escalated in 2012, a forced migration of unparalleled volume and intensity ensued. Arrivals to Jordan mirrored fluctuations in the conflict and the accessibility of border crossings. By January 2016, the government of Jordan estimated that almost 15 per cent of the country’s population was Syrian, comprising around 1.3 million (DoS 2016: 15), with about 636,000 registered as refugees with UNHCR (UNHCR 2016b). Despite having one of the largest ratios of refugees to citizens in the world, Jordan lacks a domestic asylum institution (Stevens 2013). Registering with UNHCR formally permits refugees to stay for a limited period in Jordan; however, in terms of obtaining legal status and longer-term residency, refugees, like other migrants, are received within the context of Jordan’s Law of Residence and Foreign Affairs. Although some refugees secure residency through standard immigration channels (Chatelard et al. 2009: 11) or through special ministerial decrees (Bidinger et al. 2014: 60), those not meeting such criteria are broadly considered ‘temporary guests’ or ‘irregular migrants’. Subject to a discretionary policy regime, they may live for years, in some cases decades, on the margins of society. Despite recent efforts to regularize the presence of Syrian refugees in the country (NRC and IHRC 2015), the lack of codified rights associated with a ‘refugee’ status under Jordanian law still precludes them from longer-term residency, full citizenship and stable access to public services and the formal labour market (Chatelard et al. 2009; El-Abed 2014; Hart and Kvittingen 2016). Given the ambiguous socio-legal status of refugees in Jordan and our interest in onward refugee migrations, literature that questions distinctions between transit and destination countries provides a useful framework for interpreting our data (Collyer 2007; Collyer and de Haas 2010). Increasingly, researchers have tried to identify push factors and migration obstacles that influence migration assessments, transit trajectories, ‘fragmented journeys’ (Collyer 2010) and practices of ‘secondary migration’ (Brekke and Brochmann 2015). They argue that the non-linear notion of ‘fragmented journeys’ depicts migration processes more accurately than ‘transit migration’. As their stay protracts, and lacking legal status and sufficient rights, migrants and refugees may continue their ‘fragmented journey’, utilizing varied migration channels such as family reunification, student visas or labour migration (Papadopoulou 2004; Collyer 2010; Valenta et al. 2015; Collett et al. 2016). Reflecting upon the dynamic nature of migration, Brekke and Brochmann distinguish between real transit and perceived transit, in which refugees ‘nurtured thoughts of moving on’ but ended up staying (2015: 158). Bearing this in mind, we now proceed to explore the case of Syrian and Iraqi refugees in Jordan. Methodology and Data This article is based on fieldwork amongst Syrian and Iraqi refugees in Jordan, carried out between October 2015 and January 2016. In-depth interviews were conducted with 32 Iraqis (11 women, 21 men, ages 20–70 years) and 30 Syrians (19 women, 11 men, ages 22–71 years). These were conducted in Arabic and lasted one to two and a half hours. We encouraged our interviewees to not only describe their own situation and migration strategies, but also to depict and discuss the migration strategies of friends and relatives, thereby gleaning indirect insights into the migratory practices of hundreds of refugees. As we could not check the accuracy of second-hand accounts, and acknowledge that perceptions of their friends and families’ movements may be distorted, secondary sources of data were used only to supplement the self-experienced migration trajectories of our informants. Initial contacts were made through community-based organizations in areas where displaced populations are concentrated, local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), informal contacts, friends of friends and key informants. Further interviewees were reached through snowballing. We also engaged informally with many more Syrians and Iraqis within community centres and through home visits to families. Iraqis were identified and interviewed primarily in East Amman. Around half originated from the central region around Baghdad, a third from northern Anbar and Ninewa provinces, including Mosul, and the remainder from the south, predominantly from Basra. Efforts were made to reach Iraqis of different religious backgrounds. Half of our Iraqi interviewees had arrived between 1999 and 2011, predominantly in 2005–07 in the wake of sectarian violence following the fall of the Baathist regime. The majority of this group originated from the Baghdad area. The other half, many of whom belonged to Christian minorities, had arrived in 2013–14, principally originating from and fleeing violence in the northern provinces, although several had experienced repeated internal displacement over the last decade. Socio-economic backgrounds varied considerably. Reflective of the Iraqi population in Jordan (Fafo 2007), over half of our interviewees were professionals—doctors, dentists, teachers and engineers—the rest evenly divided between those who had completed formal schooling and/or technical training and those who had never completed elementary schooling. Socio-economic profiles crossed geographic origin, religious affiliation and time of arrival in Jordan. Syrians interviewed originated predominantly from Dara’a and Damascus, reflecting the demographics of Syrians in Jordan, although interviewees also included men, women and youth from Homs, Hama and Aleppo. All had arrived in Jordan between 2011 and 2014, mostly during 2012 and 2013. Like the Iraqis, Syrian interviewees’ socio-economic profiles ranged significantly, although fewer were professionals and a greater number had no formal education or only compulsory schooling. None of our Iraqi or Syrian interviewees had secured legal residency in Jordan through standard immigration procedures—a process that is frequently lengthy and costly. Some Syrians were trying to gain residency through special, but discretionary, procedures introduced in 2015 (NRC and IHRC 2015). Such regularization, however, did not provide stable access to public services nor a right to work. As such, we limited our interviews to the hundreds of thousands of refugees who either entirely lack legal status and residency in Jordan or live with an uncertain status where rights are accorded on a discretionary basis, as this is more reflective of Iraqi and Syrian refugee experiences. Push Factors in Jordan and Motives for Secondary Migrations Deteriorating Rights and the Context of Reception Following the invasion of Iraq, Jordan benefited greatly from Iraqi capital and investments (Saif and De Bartolo 2007) and generally turned a blind eye to the majority of Iraqi ‘guests’ who failed to secure legal residency through investments (HRW 2006). However, in the wake of the hotel bombings in Amman in November 2005, carried out by Iraqi nationals, public discourse turned. The government, which until then had not requested any international support for hosting Iraqis, began emphasizing the financial and security costs of the Iraqi presence, and more stringent entry, residency and work requirements were enforced (De Bel-Air 2007). Especially for those who did not have the financial means and had overstayed tourist or medical visas, years of waiting for resettlement without legal employment have relegated them to an increasingly precarious and isolated life (Chatelard et al. 2009; CARE 2013; Hart and Kvittingen 2015). Syrians were arguably met by the Jordanian public with more hospitality and solidarity than Iraqis, which has been attributed to historic close cross-border ties with Syria, and particularly the province of Dara’a (Leenders and Heydemann 2012), from where over 40 per cent of all Syrian registered with UNHCR originate (UNHCR 2016b, 2017a). In addition to waiving entry and residency requirements, Syrians could initially access free public health care, education and employment in Jordan, provided they possessed the initially easily obtainable UNHCR registration and the Ministry of Interior’s ‘Syrian card’ (Achilli 2015; CARE et al. 2015). However, by spring 2013, half a million Syrians had entered Jordan, overwhelming response capacities and testing social tolerance, particularly in the northern governorates, where the relative number of Syrian refugees was, and remains, particularly high (DoS 2016: 14–15; UNHCR 2016b, 2017a). With popular support waning and a widespread belief, real or perceived, that Syrians’ presence negatively impacts Jordanian communities, the government began implementing incremental restrictions and progressive encampment policies (Amnesty International 2013; Turner 2015; Amnesty International 2016). However, this policy of geographical exclusion did not significantly deter irregular arrivals. Rates were only reduced with stricter border screening and closure in 2014 (Francis 2015). At the time of our research in late 2015, the situation for Syrian and Iraqi refugees without legal residency appeared similar: both communities experienced restricted access to services, work and education, as well as a sense of protracted temporariness in the country. From late 2014 and throughout 2015, the period that saw a significant rise in Syrian returns (NRC 2015b) and migration to Europe, policies curtailing access to services and mobility severely impacted the overall quality of asylum for Syrians. First, the government repealed free access to public health and education and also limited access to international humanitarian assistance by increasing the evidentiary basis for eligibility (Achilli 2015; CARE et al. 2015; NRC and IHRC 2015). Second, in a significant step producing illegality (De Genova 2013), the urban verification exercise, which coincided with a suspension of bail-out procedures from all camps, further required all non-camp Syrians to obtain a new biometric Ministry of Interior Service Card. The new card served as proof that the holder was regularized and could reside outside camps, as well as access government-run education and subsidized health services (CARE et al. 2015; NRC and IHRC 2015). Without this ID, Syrians were liable to fines, forcible relocation to the camps or even deportation (Bidinger et al. 2014). To obtain the biometric identification, refugees needed not only valid UNHCR and government papers, but also individual health certificates for family members over the age of 12, as well as lease contracts and the Jordanian landowner’s ID and property deed—an impossible task for many. Combined with a reduction in WFP food vouchers and low earnings, already at only 200 JDs per family of 10 persons (NRC 2015a: 5), these changes led many Syrians to resort to unsustainable coping strategies. Many were forced to further reduce food intake, leave health issues untreated and take children out of school to offset costs or bring an additional income through child labour (UNHCR 2015b). Similarly, changes to policy also impacted Iraqis’ quality of asylum in Jordan. Given depleting savings and the high cost of living, the average income for Iraqi households without formal employment was estimated at 119 JDs per month in early 2013—some 167 JDs less than required to cover essential expenses (CARE 2013: 9). Households responded by borrowing money, reducing food consumption, sharing accommodation and selling personal possessions (Chatelard et al. 2009; CARE 2013). As international funding priorities shifted, humanitarian assistance and services for Iraqis either dried up or were diverted to Syrians (Hart and Kvittingen 2016). For example, the more recently arrived Iraqi families no longer received a monthly cash grant from UNHCR; instead, they were given a one-off payment and, in December 2014, Iraqi children were required to pay school fees of around 40 JDs per semester for each child and to cover the costs of books, transport and uniforms. In August 2015, subsidized primary health care in public hospitals also ended, leaving Iraqis to pay the often-prohibitive foreigner fees or to leave health issues untreated (UNHCR 2015a). Cumulatively, these changes relegated displaced Iraqis to an even more precarious life in Jordan, balancing debt with intermittent donations or working in the informal economy, risking fines, imprisonment or, in some cases, deportation. Insufficient Access to Decent Work and Education Not surprisingly, a major grievance and motivator for leaving amongst both Syrians and Iraqis in Jordan is the lack of access to decent legal employment, broadly understood as including a fair wage, workplace safety and security, prospects for personal development and social protection. To be eligible to apply for a work permit, Syrian and Iraqi workers are expected to have valid residency or bail-out papers. Despite fee waivers for Syrians, administrative and financial barriers continued to hamper the attainment of work permits and, at the time of the research, only a tiny fraction of Syrian refugees held work permits (Stave and Hillesund 2015). Almost all Iraqi and Syrian interviewees who sought work did so in informal ‘out of sight’ jobs, such as in retail, service, farming and construction. Some also worked night shifts in medical facilities or in hospitality, serving coffee and food at private events. Working informally often meant enduring exploitation, humiliation and poor working conditions (Tamkeen 2016). Their wages were routinely lower than those of Jordanians and at times they were not remunerated. If caught by Ministry of Labour inspectors, interviewees claimed that procedures ‘depended on the officer’. One officer ‘might take pity’ and let them go with a warning, whilst another might fine them, confiscate their documents or even arrest them. In more recent times, they could be removed to Zaatari and Azraq refugee camps (for Syrians) or—worse still—back to Syria and Iraq. Iraqi and Syrian interviewees knew people who had been deported from Jordan. The risk was therefore deemed high enough to deter many refugees, Iraqis in particular, from seeking informal work. In addition to material hardship, lack of decent work also impacted refugees’ self-worth (UN Women 2016) and overall wellbeing. A Syrian refugee working for an NGO elaborated, saying: There’s no work, there’s no feeling of human value, I mean, you’re impotent, you’re dependent on society, you’re a refugee … [Syrians tell me]: ‘I don’t want money, don’t give me money or … assistance, no food packages, no, no, no’. The idea was always: just let me work, don’t make me feel that on top of all the other things I cannot do, I’m even more incapable of doing anything. Although procedures have since been eased to facilitate work permits for Syrians, the opportunities that opened, or are currently under discussion, are overwhelmingly low-skill jobs. Generally, non-citizens remain barred from ‘restricted professions’, which includes the majority of white-collar and specialized jobs. Iraqis are not part of the current discussions about refugee labour participation at all. The Iraqi and Syrian professionals we interviewed identified strongly with their professions; the idea of not being able to have access to decent work, rather than simply any work, was mentioned by many as an important motivator for leaving. A Syrian refugee said: These 250 dollars [spent on rent] would be better spent there, in a place where I can learn, where I can develop, where I can work. Here, there’s no way you can learn, develop, work …. You’re not allowed to work in your specialisation. What future is waiting for you here? An Iraqi man echoed a similar sentiment: We do not want to continue this way. I have been unemployed for a year and 4 months. I used to have a clinic, and you know, if a doctor stops working—we call it in Iraqi, yezanjer [to rust like chains], it means he is destroyed, corroded … . Here, I am not allowed to work. In addition, insufficient access to education, both basic and higher-level, was conveyed as a grievance. This is not surprising, as this touches the future of the refugees’ children. Although, at the time of research, Syrians and Iraqis had access to public primary and secondary schools, nearly 38 per cent of Syrian children remained out of school (Education Sector Working Group 2015: 20)—a similar rate to Iraqi children in 2013 (CARE 2013: 10). Factors that account for these figures include associated costs of schooling (materials, transportation, etc.), fear of bullying and the temporariness associated with life in Jordan. This state of limbo circumscribes aspirations and makes it difficult to engage meaningfully with the education system. Once formal schooling has ended, higher education and the prospects for employment and development in Jordan are difficult to come by. An Iraqi youth referred to his life in Jordan as a ‘prison with no bars’, pointing to barriers that inhibit him from reaching his potential. Protracted Temporariness as a Push Factor Whilst immediate hardship figured prominently in interviews, the vulnerability to exploitation and lack of opportunities to live a dignified life were interpreted as symptomatic of longer-term discrimination and exclusionary policies to prevent settlement and inclusion in Jordan. One Syrian woman said: Anyone who’s here knows that Jordan is sending a very clear message that Syrians should go and look after themselves; that they’re just a ‘visitor’ and not here to stay. Exclusionary and fluctuating policies left the interviewees feeling a sense of protracted temporariness and chronic fear of deportation. For example, one Syrian interviewee summarized: ‘there’s nothing that gives you a sense of safety for the future. Every moment, there’s the threat—the threat is continuous.’ More starkly, an Iraqi mother who arrived from Syria four years ago explained: We do not know what our future will be. Is the day going to come when the Jordanian government will decide to just dump all the Iraqis on the border? Whereas many interviewees, particularly Syrians, maintained that a right to work, and not just in a few sectors, would reduce the immediate need to leave Jordan, hardly any believed they could guarantee their own and their children’s future in Jordan. The solution to their current predicament was conceptualized as citizenship, such as that offered through resettlement programmes or progressively realized upon receiving asylum or, in the case of some Syrians, a return to a secure and liberated Syria. Only with longer-term stability and safety could refugees plan and build a future. An Iraqi refugee explained: Here the person is not stable. He doesn’t have a future for himself or his kids, I used to send my son to the school here, but now he studies at home …. Why should he go to school? … the situation is not stable here. Whereas, if I travel to Europe, then I would be able to establish a new life and all this will be over. I would forget about the past, … flip the page and … start my and my family’s life. Indeed, the lack of possibilities for meaningful integration, together with increased feelings of instability and insecurity, was among the refugees’ top motivations for secondary migration to Europe. Capricious Plans, Resources and Options to Migrate Syrian Refugees: From Temporary Safety to Irregular Onward Migration As already noted, a growing number of studies have shown that migration is not linear and journeys may be associated with different stages in migrants’ and refugees’ movements (Papadopoulou 2004; Collyer 2010; Brekke and Brochmann 2015; Valenta et al. 2015). Collyer and de Haas (2010) suggest that journeys are made in stages, and often take years, without fixed destination points. Syrian interviewees overwhelmingly attributed irregular secondary migration to restrictions and lack of opportunities in Jordan. Most had arrived in 2012 and 2013, before the large-scale movement to Europe, and none had come to Jordan with a view of travelling onward. It was commonly reported that moving southwards to Jordan was in search of immediate, temporary safety ‘when the shelling started’. Some interviewees left as children near the age of conscription or following arrests or targeting by the regime, and nearly half attributed their forced migration to the multiple and cumulative pressures caused by the conflict, particularly inaccessible education, health care and a lack of work. All waited to return to Syria pending safety but, as they ‘lost hope’ in a resolution to the conflict, their plans changed. A middle-aged Syrian man explained: At the beginning of the crisis, everyone was saying that there was still hope. That there was a solution, that the world wasn’t going to let it get to this point, or they were hopeful that things wouldn’t get this bad. No one imagined that the crisis would go on this long. As the prospects for safe return to Syria faded, their stay in Jordan protracted. With worsening conditions in Jordan, many began exploring the possibilities for secondary migration. In the spring of 2015, Christophersen (2016: 29) found that ‘many [Syrian refugees] were looking for opportunities beyond Jordan, mostly to be accepted in the UN resettlement programmes’. By the end of the year, most of our interviewees no longer held any hope of leaving through resettlement schemes. They asserted that, with Gulf countries essentially inaccessible, most Syrians they knew were thinking about migrating to Europe through irregular channels. Around half of our interviewees had concrete plans to leave; others had ‘started to think about it’. All interviewees had family members, neighbours, colleagues or friends who had already journeyed and from whom they received advice about alternative routes, smugglers, procedures and reception arrangements along the way. The arduousness of the migration route deterred only a handful of Syrian interviewees; a ‘quick death’ in the sea, we were told, was ‘better than dying a thousand deaths everyday’. Whilst the aspiration to leave Jordan was overwhelmingly common among Syrian interviewees, their abilities and means of travel varied considerably. Smuggling became more affordable in 2015, as access to Europe become easier but, at the time of research, it still cost around 3,000 USD per person for the flight to Turkey and journey across Europe, in addition to costs for issuing new passports, accommodation, etc. Therefore, many relied on support from relatives abroad, borrowed from family and friends in Jordan or sold assets to raise funds. Staged migration was a popular family strategy, where the father typically travelled alone and then applied for family reunification after arrival. We were also told that young boys were sometimes smuggled with relatives to fast-track reunification. Socio-economic resources clearly determined the means of mobility, although interviewees differed in their perception of how this impacted secondary movement. Studies have suggested that urban, educated, English-speaking Syrians are leaving to Europe while poorer Syrians from rural areas are returning to Syria (REACH 2015; Achilli 2016b). Our research shows similar patterns, yet we were also informed that those managing to access decent work opportunities and lead stable lives in Jordan were less inclined to travel to Europe. As one woman explained: I’m not forced to leave … so why would I go? Financially speaking … my family helps me out, and I can deal with living here … . So I feel like … . Why should I go? There’s no need. Despite this divergence, what is clear in our data is that poorer Syrians without assets or social networks to facilitate secondary movement more often returned to Syria. In the summer of 2015, UNHCR reported a steady rise in individual and family returns, with 4,000 people returning in August alone (NRC 2015b; UNHCR 2015c). The reasons cited included increasing vulnerability and lack of livelihood opportunities in Jordan. As a Syrian woman said: ‘A lot of people I know have returned. They do not have any other choice at all.’ Some of the interviewees agreed that, in addition to families, who returned to ‘liberated areas’ in southern Syria because they could not feed their children, or able-bodied young men, who returned to fight—for ideological reasons or to earn an income—an unknown number of those returning to Syria did so in order to avoid the cost of airline fares and travel to Europe by land. Changing Strategies: Iraqi Refugees—from Transit to Stranded Migrations Researchers stress that refugees often need to change their migration plans, and sometimes become ‘stranded’ in transit as they lack the resources and opportunities to continue their journeys (Collyer 2010; Schapendonk 2012; Valenta et al. 2015). Several of the Iraqis we met fell into this category. Jordan has long served as a transit country for Iraqis (Chatelard 2002, 2009) and, contrary to many Syrians, almost all our Iraqi interviewees had come to Jordan with the intent of migrating onward, mostly to resettle in the United States, Canada or Australia. However, for many, resettlement proved to be a long and fruitless process and they remained stranded in Jordan, which gradually transmuted to the country of destination. Another marked difference between the Syrians and Iraqis was their attitude towards irregular migrations. Compared to Syrians, most Iraqis expressed a greater hesitation about leaving Jordan irregularly. An Iraqi widow rationalized: ‘Did I take my children out of the risk of death in Iraq so that I could take them to another form of death?’ Whereas social networks, accessible land routes and a relatively easy visa regime had played a part in the decision to come to Jordan for Iraqis arriving prior to 2012, for the more recently arrived, the country was favoured primarily because resettlement was believed to be swifter than in Lebanon and Turkey, and files were more easily transferred from Iraq. Most were still in refugee status determination and resettlement processes and, since UNHCR files remain open until a solution is found, those recognized as refugees many years earlier still held onto the slim possibility of resettlement, believing their files were ‘still being studied’. For Iraqis with no prospect of legal travel, especially those who have been rejected for resettlement, a new and comparatively cheap opportunity to leave Jordan opened in 2015. According to a man who had been living in Amman for a couple of years, he had ‘started to think about [travelling irregularly to Europe] when people started to migrate earlier this year’. Another Iraqi claimed that Iraqis were increasingly considering irregular travel since: the Syrians came and they started doing it. I mean, our [Syrian] neighbours—it was only yesterday we were drinking tea with them, then a month later it’s ‘oh, hi Asmaa—where are you?’ And she said she was in Germany. Whilst irregular travel to Europe has been utilized by Iraqis for decades (Chatelard 2002: 31–32), land routes were perceived to be prohibitively risky and knowledge about navigating such routes was limited. Furthermore, the Dublin regulations posed additional hurdles for Iraqis, who often sought to rejoin relatives in specific countries, such as Sweden. We were told that, before 2015, people hesitated whereas, during the large-scale refugee migrations to Europe in 2015, crossing the Mediterranean was made easier through increased information sharing on smuggling processes and reduced smuggling costs, enabling irregular journeys. Iraqis living in Turkey left ‘via the sea’ first but, increasingly, so did those living in Jordan, as the experiences of those who had travelled fed back to waiting Iraqis. As one Iraqi explained: People … used to hesitate whereas now it’s being made easier—this year, it’s been made easier. So people are leaving. And people say to each other: ‘it’s pretty easy’. It is important to note that socio-economic disparities continued to play a key role in determining mobilities from Jordan. Those who could collect the money for the flight to Turkey and journey across Europe migrated onwards, while those who could not remained in Jordan. According to our interviewees, Iraqis who managed to leave Jordan either had relatives abroad who supported them or had arrived in Jordan more recently; they still possessed some assets that they could liquidate, unlike those who had depleted their assets waiting for resettlement. As one Iraqi youth explained: [Iraqis] living in Hashmi are in a really bad situation. Some of them have sponsors who have paid them money, and there are others who have relatives abroad, who helped them. Others that have houses in Iraq sold them … [and] there are people who borrowed money—they tell you, ‘when I get to’ whatever country, ‘they will give me a stipend and assistance … I will get the money and pass it straight on to you’. In addition to socio-economic resources, other factors impacted perceptions and strategies for onwards migration: many of the newly arrived Iraqis were inclined to wait for refugee status determination and resettlement, particularly Christian minorities, who believed they faced fewer security-screening hurdles in the resettlement process. Many had left their homes abruptly in the face of Islamic State advancement and, by the time they reached Jordan, had already spent most of their savings in the Kurdish-controlled areas and on visas and flights to Amman. In contrast to most Syrians we interviewed, hardly any Iraqis considered splitting their family to later apply for family reunification. They were anxious that changes to a family file could delay potential resettlement for remaining family members. Also, if the crossing to Greece failed, fears of being returned to Iraq (as they would not be admitted to Jordan again) were emphasized, with near-death escapes from Iraq, including targeted killings, figuring prominently in conversations. While, at the time of research, Syrians reported high recognition rates and relatively swift family-reunification processes in Europe, Iraqis did not get the same treatment and, despite sizeable Iraqi communities in European countries, few had immediate family members in Europe. Ambivalences and Concerns Regarding Secondary Migration to the European Union While some Syrian refugees were eager to migrate to the West, others claimed that they would prefer to stay in Jordan if the conditions were right. Remaining in an Arabic-speaking, culturally familiar country was favoured. Although interviewees expressed a strong sense of dislocation in Jordan, this was more often linked to changes in social roles and the lack of ability to provide for the family, rather than attributed to Jordanian culture and society as such. In fact, affinity with Jordanians was often expressed, as home cities and villages were only ‘kilometres away’ from the Jordanian border. A female interviewee summarized: Nobody happily leaves a country where their language is spoken. Aren’t you happy that you can hear the call to prayer? Aren’t you happy because you’re in the Middle East and everything’s in line with our culture and traditions and religion? The sense of being ‘in place’ in the Middle East was often coupled with wariness of social and cultural alienation in Europe. We were told that ‘Syrians are social people’, with several interviewees fearing they might not be able to re-establish strong networks in Europe as ‘no one visits each other there’. Concerns were also raised over losing ‘one’s roots’ and language and having to adopt European culture, moral codes and religious practices, with interviewees citing rising Islamophobia, the prohibition to wear the hijab and khimar in certain European countries and, occasionally, concerns over mixed-gender schooling. During a group discussion, anecdotes were retold of Syrian girls being pressured to swim during mandatory physical education classes in Germany while wearing compromising and ‘un-Islamic’ swimming costumes. Although a majority would still consider living in Europe because their legal and socio-economic status in Jordan precluded them from living a normal and stable life, such fears delayed secondary movement for some refugees. Information about ‘culture shock’ and families returning to Syria because they could not acclimatize, having spent their savings and inheritance on travelling to Europe, fed back to those considering leaving. A woman waiting for family reunification with her husband in Germany explained: Young Syrians migrated [to Europe] and they weren’t happy so they came back to Syria. And those who migrated talked to [my husband] and told him: ‘don’t travel, don’t travel, it is better for you to remain [in Syria]’ … and my husband isn’t happy there [in Germany] at all—he’s got really bad culture shock. Another Syrian refugee said: Emigration [for me] is out of the question. How am I going to acclimatise to a society with a totally different language and religion? … I mean, I know people who’ve lived in America for 20 years and they still don’t understand anybody and nobody understands them. Above-mentioned ambivalences towards onwards migration were common among the Syrians we met. In stark contrast, only a couple of our Iraqi interviewees said they would prefer to stay in Jordan for the longer term if conditions were such that they could live with ‘dignity’. In fact, even if granted full citizenship, most claimed they would still not consider staying in Jordan. Several factors may explain these differences: the Iraqis we met predominantly originated from central Iraq or, more recently, from the northern regions and very few had family links to Jordan. Nor did they express the same socio-cultural affinity towards Jordanians that Syrians did. Furthermore, for Iraqis who arrived before 2012, years of uncertainty and instability had already profoundly shaped their lives and experiences in Jordan—whether through poor treatment, housing, living conditions, health care or education. We often heard that ‘rich’ Iraqis in Western Amman would happily stay, but that the humiliating experience of those marginalized and living in Hashmi could not be erased. For many of the interviewees, their trying experiences in the country prevented them considering a future in Jordan: If the UN came and gave us Jordanian citizenship and gave us salaries, we still wouldn’t want to stay because of how much is inside us … . If there was another country, not Jordan, that was open … believe me, we’d all have gone there by now! Having arrived with the explicit aim of transiting, Iraqis contrasted their experiences in Jordan and other Arab countries with idealized perceptions of destinations in the West. Some had a long, exhausting and a mostly negative experience of fragmented migrations in several Middle-Eastern countries, which produced their expressed resentment. As one Iraqi mother who was registered as a refugee with UNHCR in Syria before seeking safety in Jordan said: ‘we don’t want Arab countries … . In the West there’s stability, and they treat you well.’ However, a growing number of studies show that, for those who migrated to Europe and North America, such idealized perceptions of life ‘there’ are gradually modified through encounters with the restrictive side of European asylum policy, discrimination, difficulty ‘fitting in’ in the new society and concerns about accessing employment and social services (Joly 1996; Mestheneos and Ioannidi 2002; Valenta and Bunar 2010; Worabo et al. 2016). For many, arrival in Europe just marks the next stage in fragmented migrations (Brekke and Brochmann 2015; Valenta et al. 2015). Conclusion For Syrians and Iraqis in Jordan, the kingdom is neither the first nor the last place of exile. Applying the concept of ‘fragmented journeys’, we have shown how Jordan is a stage in a series of fragmented migrations, which comprises a variety of movements and migration routes and can include regular and irregular secondary migrations from Jordan, short-term transit and long-term stay in Jordan, return migrations to the home country, return-transit migrations, migrations to Western Europe and North America, and migrations to third countries in the region. Focusing on Syrian and Iraqi refugees in Jordan, this article has illustrated how the two refugee communities engage in different forms of fragmented migrations, and how migration plans and practices change with changing circumstances of life in exile. Faced with similarly elusive return to their home countries as well as uncertain status and increasing vulnerability in Jordan, Iraqi and Syrian refugees expressed different attitudes towards secondary migration and utilized different strategies. Syrians initially saw Jordan as their temporary exile destination, where they would wait for security to improve before returning to Syria. But, with worsening conflict in Syria and precarious legal status and deteriorating conditions in Jordan, many began entertaining the idea and carefully considering and planning migrating irregularly to Europe. The sheer volume of Syrian migration in 2015 helped establish strong networks in Europe and facilitated information exchange about smuggling processes. Travelling irregularly to Europe was framed as a dangerous yet necessary strategy to escape deteriorating conditions in Jordan and establish normalcy. It also facilitated options for legal and safer travel through family reunification. For these Syrian refugees, therefore, exile in Jordan is a phase in their fragmented migrations. Iraqis had clearly different migration plans and practices. Almost all Iraqis had come to Jordan with a view that Jordan was a transit country, pending legal relocation to a third country. Many had experienced individual targeting in Iraq and would not consider returning there. As their resettlement or family-reunification procedures either failed or were delayed, and lacking the means to travel independently, many became stranded in Jordan. Despite this, Iraqis expressed unwillingness to migrate irregularly, holding onto a slim hope of regular migration. For the minority who considered irregular travel, they started doing so after Syrians commenced, but generally lacked the ability to collect the funds needed to make the journey. Interviewees suggested that newer arrivals from Iraq would now rather use their savings to travel onwards to Europe than deplete them waiting for lengthy and uncertain resettlement. It remains to be seen how feasible it will be to translate these plans into practice. 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Migration Letters 12 ( 3 ): 251 – 262 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS © The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com This article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (https://academic.oup.com/journals/pages/open_access/funder_policies/chorus/standard_publication_model)
TI - The Conditions and Migratory Aspirations of Syrian and Iraqi Refugees in Jordan
JO - Journal of Refugee Studies
DO - 10.1093/jrs/fey015
DA - 2019-03-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/the-conditions-and-migratory-aspirations-of-syrian-and-iraqi-refugees-anQCuI5SPD
SP - 106
VL - 32
IS - 1
DP - DeepDyve
ER -