TY - JOUR
AU - Peterson, V. Spike
AB - Abstract Global restructuring has dramatically affected the value, extent, and significance of informal economic activities worldwide. Approaching informalization as a systemic phenomenon, this essay illuminates linkages among economic processes, widening inequalities, “governance gaps,” and global insecurities. It considers the historical context in which distinctive approaches to informality emerged and reviews three principal “islands” of existing research: mainstream, structuralist, and feminist. These variously illuminate patterns of economic inequality that are central to studies of international political economy. Informality's significance to IR and security studies is further illuminated through a discussion of the processes and political economy of informalization in relation to global migrations, and the interaction of economic and political informalization in the context of “new” wars and security crises. Informality is not a static concept but a contested space that is useful precisely because it reveals underlying patterns of social power that stretch from the behavior of individuals…to the dynamics of national state alliances and international financial, labor and trade flows. (Cross 2000:1) The objective of this essay is to raise awareness of, increase interest in, and advance our understanding of informalization as a structural feature of contemporary globalization.1 I argue that the systemic aspect of informalization provides a uniquely productive vantage point for analyzing linkages among economic processes, widening inequalities, “governance gaps,” and global insecurities. These topics and their inter-relationships are central to international political economy (IPE), international relations (IR) and security studies, but have yet to be illuminated through a lens on informalization. This essay initiates such a project, and attempts to move beyond inherited binaries and disciplinary boundaries to examine the analytical, economic and political challenges posed by informality. How and Why Informalization Matters The phenomenon of the informal economy is both deceivingly simple and extraordinarily complex, trivial in its everyday manifestations and capable of subverting the economic and political order of nations. (Portes and Haller 2005:403) In recent decades, processes of global economic restructuring have dramatically altered the scale and significance of informal (unofficial, unregulated) economic activities. While the importance of these activities is acknowledged in a variety of literatures, systemic analyses of informalization remain elusive. For most of the twentieth-century informal activities were undertheorized because economists saw them as marginal to “official” economic activity and expected them to wane as industrialization and state development inexorably “formalized” all economic processes. Their persistence into the twenty-first century and expansion during economic downturns has forced analysts to rethink their views (Barta 2009). But doing so is hampered by conceptual debates and complicated by the following observations. Informal activities are extremely heterogeneous. They range from household maintenance and microenterprise to trade in drugs and nuclear materials. They variously occur in urban and rural locales, in industrialized, transitional and developing countries, and in household, corporate and government spheres. This heterogeneity complicates how to define and hence how to measure informality. But the prevailing view today is that informal activities are neither marginal nor fading—recent studies suggest that they constitute more than one-half of all economic output and 75% of the gross domestic product of some countries.2 At whatever scale, the effects of informality are felt at the personal as well as household, local, national, regional and global levels. Informalization matters economically because of its extent and value, its effects on working conditions, tax revenues, wages and profits, and its tendency to exacerbate inequalities within and between nation-states. It matters politically because it complicates government authority and diminishes worker protections: unreliable accounts of labor and production generate misguided policies, unregulated work practices pose safety, health, and environmental risks, and criminal activities threaten individual and collective security. Informalization matters analytically because it exposes prevailing analyses as inadequate and challenges foundational assumptions: it is not waning as expected but growing in many countries and assuming new forms; it problematizes either-or category constructions (binaries of paid-unpaid, licit-illicit, public-private, productive-reproductive); and it is correlated with political informalization that affords opportunities for criminal activities and challenges to “legitimate” authority. In effect, informalization forces us to think across conventional boundaries and to situate economic activities—formal and informal—in the larger context of sociocultural and political relations, including civil conflicts and the “global war on terror.” Because of its unanticipated extent and troubling implications, informalization now draws attention from a variety of perspectives. Liberal economists praise its entrepreneurial dynamism, especially in developing and transitional economies. Political economy analysts denounce its criminal aspects and disturbing role in financing conflicts. Marxist economists argue that it favors capital over labor by putting downward pressure on wages and eroding hard-won worker protections. Feminists expose both its role in devaluing women's labor and its increasing salience as a household survival strategy. Other critical scholars reveal how patterns of race, class and gender shape what devalorized informal work is available (for example, domestic work, personal services, manual “unskilled” labor) and who is most likely to be doing it (marginalized populations: the poor, ethnic minorities, women, youth, migrants, the urban underclass). In short, while all agree that informal activities matter worldwide, disparate analytical, disciplinary and ideological starting points preclude agreement on how to interpret these phenomena. “Islands” of valuable research and analysis exist, but there is little traffic between them; the insights of each remain isolated rather than integrated. The result is partial and incomplete analyses of problematic and systemic developments. It is especially worrisome that IR and even IPE remain largely silent on informalization, in spite of noting its disturbing role in “new” security dilemmas.3 Approaching informalization as a systemic phenomenon, this essay illuminates linkages among economic processes, widening inequalities, “governance gaps,” and global insecurities. I begin with the most immediate issues of definition and review the historical context in which analytically distinctive approaches to informality emerged. The bulk of the paper reviews the three most developed “islands” of research—mainstream, structuralist, feminist—distinguished by their core assumptions, central questions, and policy recommendations. This overview suggests how the selective attention and commitments of each approach produce internally valid and valuable but fragmented, hence inadequate, analyses of systemic processes. In the most obvious sense, the overview illuminates patterns of economic inequality that are central to studies of IPE and feature in personal and collective insecurities. But the overview also permits identification of linkages among sociocultural, economic and political manifestations of informality that are otherwise obscured by disparate starting points. To further illustrate how these linkages are key to IR and security studies (as well as IPE), I consider two additional topics of inquiry: the processes and political economy of informalization in relation to global migrations, and the interaction of economic and political informalization in the context of “new” wars and security crises. The conclusion urges moving beyond inherited binaries and disciplinary boundaries to more adequately address the analytical, economic and political challenges posed by informality. What Are We Dealing With? Where Do We Begin? The informal economy simultaneously encompasses flexibility and exploitation, productivity and abuse, aggressive entrepreneurs and defenseless workers, libertarianism and greediness. (Castells and Portes 1989:11) Conceptual boundaries are always political: they reflect particular interests, selectively focus our attention, and involve subjective investments. Characterizing the boundary between formal and informal is particularly fraught. The distinctions entailed map on to a variety of either-or dichotomies (licit-illicit, public-private, politics-economics, modern-traditional, productive-reproductive) that are cornerstones of social science inquiry. If the formal-informal boundary is disturbed, the stability and (oppositional) logic of other binaries is threatened as well. (Consider, for example, the political, economic, legal, civil, familial and normative implications of undermining the boundaries of public and private.) Yet cumulative evidence indicates, and the discussion that follows demonstrates, that constituting formal and informal as mutually exclusive—rather than interdependent—compromises our ability to understand and analyze informalization in practice.4 The basic point is that there is a great deal at stake in defining informal activities,5 investigating their effects, and generating adequate analyses. At issue is no less than what activities “count” in terms of “work,”“productivity,”“growth,”“value,” and “economics” (Gaughan and Ferman 1987; Mingione 1991). And as the initial Cross quotation suggests, how the boundaries of these terms are drawn reveals underlying patterns of social power and raises a variety of political issues. To afford the widest examination of dimensions and linkages among them, in this essay formal and informal activities are understood as interactive and overlapping, along a continuum that still permits a variety of distinctions without presuming discrete or monological categories. At the least formal end are activities involving socially necessary labor and voluntary work; these are rarely considered illicit and cash compensation is not expected. Intervention by the state is usually considered inappropriate and regulation is not presumed (for example, childcare, housework, neighborhood projects). These merge with a vast array of activities involving “nonstandard”“work,” where some form of enterprise and payment is presumed. Activities may be licit or illicit, but legal regulation is either difficult to enforce or intentionally evaded (for example, microenterprise, street vending, “moon-lighting,” petty trade, sex work, drug dealing). At the most formal end are activities that are the focus of conventional economic accounts, where not only paid compensation but governmental recording and regulatory activities are presupposed (for example, waged labor, industrialized production, corporate business). As we will see, this is a particularly inclusive orientation because many studies treat illicit activities separately and most exclude the labor of social reproduction. Emerging Visibility of Informal Activities With informal economies the principle of attention is particularly appropriate. Investigators of informal economies compete in what they choose to bring to our attention. (Miller 1987:28) For much of the twentieth century the focus of western economic theories effectively marginalized informality. Pre-occupied with commodified labor and formal market exchanges, economists assumed that informal activities were a remnant of traditional, kin-based societies, were already minimal in advanced economies, and would soon disappear in developing countries as their markets and governments modernized. When informal practices were encountered, a model of “dual (traditional and modern) sectors” initially seemed sufficient for making sense of both the remnant and positing its eventual absorption by modernization processes. The general sense was that informal activities signaled economic “backwardness,” and their existence in developing countries reflected weak markets and incompetent state apparatuses (Tabak 2000:2). Renaming and rethinking were spurred primarily by field research in the early 1970s. Contrary to expectations, development economists realized that the traditional sector not only continued with modernization but included profitable self-employment and other creative income-generating activities. These unexpectedly successful dimensions of unregistered enterprises prompted a change in terminology, from the aspersion associated with “traditional” to more positive connotations of “informal.” Theorization changed as well. Recognizing the persistence of informal activities, some theorists simply extended the time horizon for their anticipated absorption. Others argued that the development processes enabling early (European) modernization might not be replicated in the context of “Third World” development, where informal activities might proliferate. Still others challenged the adequacy of dual sector models and prevailing theories of development (for example, World Development 1978; Chen 2004), asking instead “for what and for whom are developmental reforms intended?” (Moser 1978:1060). In the 1970s and early 1980s, studies of informality extended into new areas, investigating survival strategies of the urban poor in American cities and the “parallel” or underground economy in socialist planned economies (Ferman, Henry, and Hoyman 1987; Portes and Borocz 1988; Sampson 1988). During this period, the circle of scholars pursuing questions of decolonization, nation-building, and economic development grew wider. In particular, feminists investigated informal activities in relation to social reproduction, at the same time exposing the crucial role of “women's work” in development success (Boserup 1970; Mies 1982). As research findings accumulated, the economic model of separate spheres lost ground to recognizing linkages between formal and informal activities (Pahl 1985; Robinson 1988; Harding and Jenkins 1989; Mingione 1991). Most analysts concluded that no clear distinction could be sustained, and many argued as well that the formal economy depended on an extensive and foundational informal economy. The quandaries posed by informalization multiplied in the 1980s and 1990s. Financial crises in Latin American and Asia revealed a cyclical pattern, with informal activities expanding as formal opportunities contracted (Tokman 1992; Lee 1998). Informality also expanded as structural adjustment policies (SAP) increased unemployment and compromised smaller enterprises oriented to local and national (rather than export) markets (Sassen 2000). After 1989, the informal sector gained attention in transitional economies as the “secondary” economy quickly appeared to dominate market transactions (Feige and Ott 1999). As global restructuring gained momentum, informalization became visible where it was least anticipated: in advanced, industrialized economies. Decentralizing of production, flexibilization of labor, and expansion of outsourcing and subcontracting variously and in combination spurred informal activities worldwide (Piore and Sabel 1984; Portes, Castells, and Benton 1989b; Standing 1999)—and notably, “at the expense of already formalized work relationships” (Castells and Portes 1989:13). More recently, informalization in the form of criminal activities has gained attention. States weakened by economic restructuring or destabilized by militarized conflicts are less able—and sometimes unwilling—to impose control over nonstate actors and informal activities. New security issues have emerged as the absence of economic governance enables exploitation of opportunities for informal and often criminal transactions. Whether illicit informal earnings are the means toward military-political objectives, or become economic ends in themselves, the resolution of conflicts and success of reconstruction are compromised by these developments. As empirical evidence and unresolved theoretical questions accumulate, the informal economy has taken on new salience and studies have proliferated.6 The next section considers in greater detail how three “schools of thought” approach and analyze informalization. For reasons of space, variations within each school are slighted in favor of distinguishing the conceptual starting points of each and how these impede more systemic analysis. Where Selective Attention Takes Us: Islands of Knowledge Mainstream Economics The major driving forces behind the size and growth of the shadow economy are an increasing burden of tax and social security payments, combined with rising restrictions in the official labor market. (Schneider and Enste 2002a:6) Mainstream economists are primarily interested in productive, value-enhancing and formal market activities.7 Most rely on the tenets of neoclassical economic theory formulated with reference to the development of “modern” capitalist economies. The success of western industrialization and postwar reconstruction bolstered confidence in prevailing economic theory: the “rest” were expected to follow the “west,” and activities that did not conform to mainstream expectations were “misinterpreted” or simply ignored (Mingione 1991: chapter 1). In effect, discussions of economic activity were “silent on informality in order to enhance formality” (Ferman et al. 1987:10). When informal activities could not be ignored their study was marginalized: understood as a residual feature of developing countries or questionable survival tactics among the urban poor and immigrant communities. As already noted, field studies in the 1970s revealed the resilience, vitality and income-generating effects of informal activities in developing economies. The ILO's (1972) report on employment conditions in Kenya and Hart's (1973) study of the unemployed in Ghana pronounced the “informal sector” a creative and robust sphere of economic activity. In effect, the dual sector model then favored by the ILO assumed a “benign” relationship between the sectors: each in its way was economically efficient and each had comparative advantages (Tokman 1978). In a widely cited study of Peru, De Soto (1989) argued that the state's obsessive rule-making policies, and the difficulty of conforming to them, effectively “forced” enterprising individuals to realize their creativity and productivity outside of the formal sector. In the 1990s, resurgence of informal activities in transition economies and their increasing visibility in advanced industrialized countries (AICs) prompted many economists to pay closer attention. Informalization matters to economists not least because making sense of the economy and generating effective policies requires reliable data. If the informal economy is large but is not “counted,” estimates of the official economy and tax base are distorted, and policies based on faulty estimates have many implications (Houston 1990). For example, accurate measures of the national economy, money supply, and unemployment are essential for establishing appropriate fiscal and monetary policies, yet may be distorted by informal incomes, criminal revenues, and disguised employment.8 Similarly, if unemployment rates are over-estimated (because informal jobs are excluded), welfare policies may “mistakenly” direct benefits to those who are actually working and, hence, not have their intended effect (Miller 1987; Feige 1989). While the informal economy generates dilemmas regarding appropriate policies at the national level, it also affects regional and international governance. Tanzi (1999:341) notes how powerful political interests “have come to depend on the size of the official GNP.” Consider the significance of national output estimates for satisfying entry criteria for membership in the European Union, establishing contribution levels to the EU budget, allocating voting rights in international organizations, and securing low-interest loans from international financial institutions (Fleming, Roman, and Farrell 2000:393). In short, there is a political dimension to these estimates, how they are generated, and how they are deployed (Harding and Jenkins 1989; Tanzi 1999). How to measure informality and interpret its relationship to the official economy remains controversial. But for the most part, mainstream economists now tend toward a favorable view of informal enterprises.9 A recurring theme is praise for the creativity and initiative attributed to micro-entrepreneurs and own-account workers, who are viewed as exhibiting a flexible response to “inefficient” or “excessive” regulation. No longer simply an obstacle to development, the informal economy is seen as a “breeding ground” for small-scale enterprises and “a potential site for robust economic growth” (Tabak 2000:1). In Tokman's (1978:1065) words, “informal sector activities generate surplus or can do it provided that the policy environment does not discriminate against them.” Others argue that income earned informally stimulates the formal economy by injecting otherwise unavailable revenues. Indeed, Bajada and Schneider (2005:2) claim that “a significant portion of income (at least two-thirds) earned in the underground economy is immediately spent in the legitimate economy.” Perhaps most compelling is increasing evidence of the expansion of informality and its centrality for job production, especially in developing countries. Without even including agricultural labor or unpaid work in the home, the ILO estimates that one-half to three-quarters of employment in developing countries is informal, and non-standard work comprises 25–30% of employment in many advanced economies (ILO 2002b:7). This favorable and even optimistic view is explained in part by which segments of informality are being “counted.” Mainstream economists tend to focus on small scale enterprises, family-owned businesses and self-employment (for example, Maloney 2004). These activities are seen as supportive of and contributing to liberal objectives of economic vitality and growth. And they are associated with highly esteemed qualities: a strong “work ethic” and spirit of independence, entrepreneurial creativity, and willingness to take risks. In short, the informal activities being examined are not deemed antagonistic to, but actually important for, successful capitalist development. This orientation shapes interpretation of causes and formulation of policies. Starting from a focus on self-employed and enterprising activities, mainstream economists generally see informal work as an “exit” option from excessive regulations in the formal economy. In one of the most comprehensive studies to date, Schneider and Enste (2002b:190) conclude that “failing economic policy” is “the most important cause” of increased informal activity. Feeling overburdened by state regulations, individuals “exit” rather than exercise their political “voice” in an attempt to shape taxation and social security policies. A dangerous spiral may result if the state responds to decreased revenues by increasing budget deficits or taxation, thus driving more actors to exit the formal sector. Their specific recommendation is to reduce the attractiveness of the exit option, primarily through fundamental tax reform. More generally, the liberal and neoliberal policy recommendation is to reduce government intervention in market and labor activities (including support of unions), so that entrepreneurial informality can flourish.10 Because they start from different vantage points, others who assume the continuity, vitality and importance of the informal economy arrive at different policy conclusions. Most salient and internationally visible in this regard is the ILO, whose policy prescriptions start from a commitment to the rights of workers and reflect attention to a wider array of informal activities. Economic crises and adjustments during the 1980s prompted extensive debates regarding informality and spurred demands for more reliable data. Confronting the “dilemma of the informal sector” (ILO 1991), the ILO responded in 1993 with a statistical definition of the informal sector that was “based on production units rather than employment relations” and included “all unregistered or unincorporated enterprises below a certain size” (micro-enterprises, own-account operations, informal work).11 This effectively expanded the definition to include “not only the self-employed but also their employees,” as well as unpaid workers in family businesses (Chen 2005:30). “Rethinking informality” continued throughout the 1990s, as it became increasingly obvious that in developing and transitional countries especially, the bulk of new employment was being generated informally. Given conditions of high un- and under-employment, these jobs were often the primary source of income for countless individuals and households. At the same time, because of restructuring in advanced economies, previously formal and protected employment arrangements were declining in favor of non-standard (informal) arrangements that lacked secure contracts, worker benefits or social protection. The dilemma for the ILO was how to take seriously the much needed income from informal activities without abandoning a critique of employment relations that render workers more, not less, vulnerable. The ILO responded by adopting a broader definition of the informal economy and advancing four pillars of a “decent work” agenda: opportunities, rights, protection and voice (Torres 2001). The definition (ILO 2002b, 2003) expanded to “all forms of employment without secure contracts, worker benefits or social protection,” thus including paid work (that lacked benefits or protection) whether for informal or formal enterprises, a household or no fixed employer (Chen 2005:31). It thus encompasses casual day employees, industrial outworkers and homeworkers, and shifts the emphasis from the nature of the enterprise to the employment relationship (Chen 2005:31–2). The “decent work” agenda (Torres 2001; ILO 2002b) takes labor market developments seriously—acknowledging the importance of informality for providing jobs and income, and the permanence of informality as a feature of capitalist development. But the agenda also emphasizes that informal work is marked by vulnerability and its expansion threatens a further erosion of organized labor's hard-won gains. Informal work is simply not “decent” compared to “recognized, protected, secure, formal employment” (ILO 2002b). In effect, informal work denies workers “seven essential securities” (ILO 2002b:3), with the most severe deficits affecting workers at the “bottom end” of the informal-formal continuum. But the ILO recognizes that deficits variously affect formal employment as well, and their goal is to promote decent work along the entire continuum (ILO 2002b:4, italics in original). ILO policy recommendations then diverge from the mainstream by seeking not less but more government intervention. They pursue “decent work” and poverty reduction in the immediate and longer term by tackling the negative manifestations of informality as well as their root causes.12 This involves investing in the workforce (to promote employability, productivity and flexibility); making it easier for micro- and small enterprises to start up and grow in the formal economy; and ensuring supportive institutional structures and good governance. All are essential for enabling upward movement along the continuum and pursuing decent and formal—rather than insecure and informal—work for all (paraphrasing ILO 2002b:4–9). Mainstream economists focus primarily on quantifiable economic indicators, sustain a belief in the promise of small scale entrepreneurial enterprises, and argue for the systemic benefits of capitalist development. Their selective attention renders non-productive activities (from the vantage point of neoclassical economics) and the politics of systemic inequalities relatively invisible. ILO analysts take the latter seriously, illuminating the insecurities wrought by informalization and proposing ameliorative reforms. Both perspectives exclude from their accounts divisions of labor and resources in the household, the systemically necessary labor of social reproduction, and all unequivocally illicit income generation. While these accounts disrupt the conventional dichotomy of formal and informal, and in the ILO literature that of politics and economics, they tend to perpetuate apparently categorical distinctions between paid-unpaid, productive-reproductive and licit-illicit activities. Critical, Marxist, and Structuralist Approaches While informal sector employment may provide employees with basic subsistence needs, it does so in the face of oppressive and/or unsafe working conditions; incomes usually at or below the poverty line; restricted access to state-provided social protection, training and social services; and frequent exploitation and infringement of workers' rights. (Fleming et al. 2000:398) The second school of thought is distinguished primarily by its critical orientation and focus on the structural vulnerability of informal workers. Because they tend to have fewer skills and less access to credit, training and technology, individuals are more likely to be doing informal work because they lack other options than because they are “stretching a dollar” or exploring innovative ideas.13 The early dualist model assumed that informality involved marginal activities that were “distinct from and not related to the formal sector” (Chen 2004:6). This understanding was later modified to acknowledge “benign” linkages and a complementary relationship between the sectors, leading ultimately to the mainstream view that informal activities are for the most part beneficial to economic development. From a critical orientation, the sectors are decisively not separate. Rather, they are mutually constituted in a structural relationship wherein informal activities are subordinated to and dependent on the formal capitalist sector. In this crucial sense, the linkage between them is not “benign” but exploitative (Moser 1978). Compared to the methodological preferences of mainstream economists, structural critics are more engaged in historical and holistic analyses, more attentive to “marginalized” phenomena, and more suspicious of status quo politics. Their conceptual boundaries are differently constituted: for some, the systemic level of the “world economy” is the starting point and primary lens, rather than the territorial state and its national economy. Others draw on marxian analysis of petty commodity production to explain the devalued status of informal activities. Hence, there are a number of variously interweaving threads underpinning the critical structuralist position. Key questions center on: how worker vulnerability is produced; how informal activities are in a dependent relationship to the formal sector; and how the exploitative effects of informalization are reproduced over time. It is primarily through a long-term and systemic view that the structural dynamics of informalization become visible. A key resource is the volume edited by Tabak and Crichlow (2000) that integrates analyses of the capitalist world-economy with historical research on informalization per se. As one chapter author notes: “Informalization and casualization are not anomalies, as is often thought, but are integral to periodic restructuring in the face of cyclical downturns and systemic impasses that hinder capital accumulation” (Broad 2000:24). From this perspective, informalization in advanced economies is not “new.” That it appears new is because of conceptual selectivity (focus on industrialized production, formal activities, etc.), the relegation of informal activities to theories of development, and the preponderance of various case studies rather than historical research that affords long-term and systemic observations.14 In Tabak's words, “conceptual tools in use before the 1970s were not crafted to register—or were crafted not to register—the shadowy part of economic transactions” (Tabak 2000:5). In contrast, historical studies of the longue duree reveal informalization as both a constant and cyclical feature of capitalist relations. It is constant insofar as capital accumulation depends not only on profits gained through formal mechanisms of production and exchange but also, and continuously, on accumulation through an array of non-capitalist, unregulated, non-standard, artisanal, subsistence, and domestic economic activities that are in various senses “informal.”15 These activities sustain capital accumulation by absorbing costs of social reproduction and exerting downward pressure on wages in the formal sector.16 A familiar dimension of this thesis is that capital's pursuit of the highest possible profit entails maintaining a reserve pool or surplus of labor that is not currently—or formally—employed but potentially employable. This surplus elevates profits by depressing wages, decreases labor power by compelling workers to compete with each other, and disciplines all workers through the threat of replacement from these reserves. Historically, capital has ensured a supply of (vulnerable) workers by eliminating alternative means of livelihood (land enclosures, destroying local industries), directly and indirectly coercing work relations (enslaved indentured, and familial labor), and expanding access to labor geographically (ruralization, colonization, imperialism). If subsistence options are eliminated, the presence of labor reserves in the absence of organized labor power deepens workers” vulnerability: few have any choice but to seek earnings however and wherever they can. Informalization is cyclical insofar as a tightening of labor supplies and economic downturns (linked to long cycles of expansion and contraction) squeeze profit margins and spur capital to reconstitute profits by ever more severe cost-cutting measures. In earlier downturns (1350–1450, 1650–1750) ruralization and “putting out” practices were the readily available and effective measures; they enabled capital to avoid the higher wages that prevailed in cities because of the organizational power of guilds (Tabak 2000:9). In the contemporary period, the relative foreclosure of primary accumulation, direct coercion, and colonial domination has increased informalization pressure as a means of lowering production costs and increasing profits in the core zones of the world economy. Employment relations that were previously formal are effectively dismantled—informalized—through (de-regulated) processes of downsizing, flexibilization, casualization, relocating, outsourcing, and subcontracting. These moves replenish the pool of vulnerable workers and cut production costs, while attacks on organized labor undermine hard-won worker benefits and protections, reduce the size of the middle-class, and further diminish the bargaining power of labor. At the same time, neoliberal restructuring has eroded many states' commitments to, or capacities for, providing public services and welfare supports, which exacerbates the polarization of haves and have-nots. Global competition spurs a “race to the bottom” that deepens structural inequalities within and among states and multiplies experiences of insecurity. Worker vulnerability is also expressed through the structural dependence of informal activities more generally. Relative to the formal sector and large firms, workers and enterprises in the informal economy are constrained by lower skill levels, smaller operations, and limited access to capital, technology, and high-level business contacts. They are generally subject to (and unable to influence) pricing and market conditions set by the formal sector. One effect is paying higher prices for inputs and receiving lower prices for outputs, “as a result of such factors as discriminating and exploitative subcontracting and monopolist protection, and the fact that the capitalist sector has control over such institutional means of accumulation as credit facilities, contracts and licences” (Moser 1978:1059). In multiple ways, informal enterprises are structurally disadvantaged when competing with larger or export-oriented firms, and hence unable to “escape” dependence or transform existing conditions of production.17 Critics do agree with liberals regarding the diversity of informal activities. The heterogeneity alone suggests that a few particularly well resourced enterprises may transition into capitalist production, and depending on locale and conditions, some workers will access formal employment (Gerry 1978). Systemic trends, however, suggest that the dependent status and exploitative effects of informalization are not only being reproduced but their polarizing effects are increasing. Population growth, urbanization, external migration and informalization mean that excess (vulnerable) labor supplies are being sustained, to the advantage of capital and economic elites. A reserve pool of unemployed, underemployed and informalized workers perpetuates competition among workers, maintains downward pressure on wages, and weakens the bargaining power of all workers. Economic inequalities within nations are exacerbated by neoliberal policies and polarization of income earnings and wealth distribution (Centeno and Portés 2006). Geopolitical inequalities deepen insofar as advanced economies dominate scientific, technological and intellectual research and development; set the priorities of global production, investment and financial strategies; and through control of international institutions define the rules of the game and reproduce an uneven playing field (Hoogvelt 2001; Peterson 2003; Scholte 2005). Key questions pursued by structural critics flow from their selective focus and theoretical starting points. Looking beyond the relatively favorable position of micro-entrepreneurs and small businesses, critics examine the structural vulnerability of the vast majority of informal workers. This bottom-up perspective begins to suggest how and why informality is continually produced and “who” the vulnerable are (Castells and Portes 1989:26). And from a structuralist perspective, the unfavorable position of the majority is viewed not as a matter of individual skill or enterprising attitude but structural location in historically marginalized or “underdeveloped” populations. The historical orientation of this research reveals informalization as both a secular, structural feature of the capitalist world economy (absorbing the costs of social reproduction and maintaining downward pressure on wages) and a long-term cyclical process (expanding in downturns to weaken labor power, reduce costs and renew profitability). A structuralist lens reveals the dependent status of informal activities, their exploitation by the formal sector, and the difficulty of “escaping” these dynamics. It also problematizes how capitalism is rendered monolithic and informalization rendered invisible, when the vast majority of people are involved in some form of non-standard, unregulated, reproductive, non-proletarian—that is, informal—work (Wallerstein 1983; Von Werlhof 1988; Tabak 2000). Variations in starting points generate diverse policy prescriptions. Some critics support ILO policies insofar as the “decent work” initiative recognizes the vulnerability of informal workers, cultivates an awareness of systemic economic issues, and attempts to improve the conditions and rights of all workers. Reform-oriented policies are also endorsed by those who seek “realistic” responses that can more adequately address “the reorganization of economic activities into decentralized arrangements that have acquired their own momentum” (Portes, Castells, and Benton 1989a:309). Some critics promote delinking informal activities from large capitalist enterprises to the extent possible. Others are far less optimistic. “Without radical changes to the economy as a whole, there exists little or no possibility of an across-the-board improvement in the living and working conditions” of informal producers (Gerry 1978:1147). In short, if the problem is systemic, only systemic transformation will address it. This approach to informalization takes structural inequalities as its starting point. Its more historical, relational and holistic analysis reveals the vulnerability and insecurity of not only informalized but formal workers as well. It renders a categorical distinction between formal-informal unsustainable and problematizes corollary dichotomies of politics-economics, public-private, and paid-unpaid labor. At the same time, its focus on economic hierarchies of class and core-periphery marginalizes the politics of identity, sociocultural transformations and reproductive activities within the household.18 It reproduces the exclusion of illicit activities (Portes and Haller 2005), which leaves the licit-illicit boundary unchallenged, and only begins to address the politics of gender and race and how households are affected by, and respond to, informalization. Feminist Perspectives The household is a basic unit of every society and the foundation of the world economy. (Douglass 2006:421) The concept of social reproduction…calls attention to the traditionally female world of family labor, but points beyond the family itself to the larger organization of power and production. (Folbre 1994:129) The third approach to informalization is distinguished primarily by its feminist orientation and focus on gendered social reproduction in relation to informal work and devalorized workers. Its significance lies in revealing linkages among state politics, formal markets, and household realities. Some argue that fully counting “women's work” would challenge not only our empirical understanding of the informal sector but our knowledge of economics more generally (Chen, Sebstad, and O'Connell 1999:604). When informality surfaced in the 1970s as a significant phenomenon and potential problem for economic theory, liberal and marxist-oriented approaches were the primary paradigms. Neither prioritized an analysis of social reproduction or gendered divisions of labor that permeated economic phenomena. During the 1980s, however, material and analytical developments heightened the visibility of these topics. On one hand, awareness of women's roles in economic development, social movements, political governance and militarized conflicts increased worldwide (Enloe 1990; Peterson and Runyan 1999; Hawkesworth 2006). On the other hand, theoretical debates were problematizing the ahistorical, reductionist and unreflective tendencies attributed to dominant paradigms in economics and IR. The feminist theory and practice that emerged drew variously on old and new theoretical frames and a wide array of disciplinary starting points. Using gender as an empirical category (constituting embodied male-female difference), feminists initially “added women” to prevailing economic models. This revealed, for example, the crucial significance of women's contributions to development (Boserup 1970). Understanding gender as an analytical code (privileging masculinized over feminized qualities), feminists exposed gendered identities and ideologies operating in the political-economy of work, informalization, and globalization (Peterson 2003). Contemporary feminists also examine intersections of stratifications based on ethnic/racial, economic and gender/sexual hierarchies as these are implicated in informalization.19 The key questions in feminist approaches to informality center on: how gendered divisions of labor shape and are shaped by informalization; the relationship of social reproduction and household provisioning to informal and formal economies; and how globalization and informalization are exacerbating polarization of resources and devalorization of feminized workers. Feminists approach these questions from diverse vantage points and generate a variety of policy recommendations. Gendered divisions of labor are most obvious with respect to describing how women and men are differently situated in the informal economy. Studies indicate that women are over-represented in the continuum of informal activities worldwide; the informal economy is the primary source of earnings for women in most developing countries; women are the majority of part-time informal workers in AICs; and the gender gap that persists globally is even wider in the informal than in the formal economy.20 Yet these accounts presumably underestimate gender inequalities because women are concentrated in the least visible, rarely counted activities (Chen et al. 1999; Carr, Alter Chen, and Tate 2000; ILO 2002a). More specifically, official statistics on informality conventionally exclude work in agriculture and only sometimes include subsistence activities or paid domestic work; women's contributions to family enterprises are not counted; and unpaid domestic and social reproduction are excluded on the premise that they do not count as “work” (Benería 1999; Chant and Pedwell 2008:11). Within the informal “paid” economy, women have even lower levels of skills and education and less access to credit and technology than men, and they are more likely to be engaged in the most insecure and poorly compensated informal activities: as own account traders or producers, piece-rate and other home-based workers, and paid domestic workers (Prügl 1999; Chen 2001; ILO 2002a). Men are more likely to be waged employees, the “middle-men” between subcontracted homeworkers and formal enterprises, and those who employ others in small businesses. In particular, men tend to have more contacts with the formal sector and state agents, and more cultural “encouragement” to be aggressive in acquiring resources, selling wares, and expanding enterprises. They are more likely to be heads of family businesses and exercise more control over household resources. In Chen's words, “Men tend to have better tools of the trade, operate from better work sites/spaces and have greater access to productive assets and financial capital…[and] often produce or sell a higher volume or a different range of goods and services” (Chen 2004:13–14, emphasis deleted). Explaining why women and men are differently situated requires thinking about gender analytically—as a governing code that permeates expectations, identities, conceptual categories and social institutions. Deeply naturalized gender stereotypes continually shape our lives. Identified as breadwinners, men are expected to earn income in the commercial, productive economy of market exchanges. Identified as care-givers, women are expected to work, but not be paid, in the domestic, reproductive economy of familial relations. This coding links social reproduction and household provisioning to labor hierarchies and differential valorization of economic activities more generally. For example, gender stereotyping is important for explaining why labor markets continue to be sex-segregated worldwide (Heintz 2006): men dominate where authority, skills and high compensation levels are presumed, and women dominate where “feminized” skills (personal service, “caring” labor) are preferred but poorly paid. Similarly, and in spite of being inaccurate,21 the assumption prevails that women are “secondary” earners, which is used to justify their lower wages. These gendered patterns are reproduced in informal (and formal) economies: women cluster in the least authoritative and what are construed as the “least skilled” categories; they are expected to be more subservient and self-sacrificing than male family members; and when economic conditions deteriorate—as an effect of recessions, restructuring, or militarized conflicts—they are expected to ensure family well-being with as little disruption of gender norms as possible.22 This constitutes a tremendous burden on women and fuels a “crisis of social reproduction” as expectations exceed what human capacities and structural conditions permit (Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2002; Bakker and Gill 2003; Bakker 2007). Gender-sensitive analyses reveal these codes in operation. In pursuit of flexibility, subcontractors prefer home-based workers they assume will be unorganized (undemanding), docile but reliable, available for part-time and temporary work, and willing to accept low-wages. Gender socialization, patriarchal belief systems, and women's weaker bargaining position render them exemplary candidates. Women working “at home” simultaneously provide often desperately needed income and socially necessary domestic labor and care of dependents, without disrupting gendered norms. The relative invisibility of women's home-based work serves the interests of firms wishing to avoid costly regulations and families wishing to appear gender normative. In Snyder's words: “Women's informal production work satisfies the needs of the formal economy for cheap labor, the informal economy's drive for profit, the state's need for economic growth and development while preserving the public role and household responsibilities of women” (Snyder 2005:15). Different “strands” of feminist scholarship make a variety of structural arguments linking reproductive labor, household provisioning, and gendered work in the context of globalization. One strand is associated with marxist feminists who analyze not only the role of surplus labor in depressing wages but also the production of labor power itself. They argue that the feminized work of social reproduction is essential for producing workers who are then available to produce marketable commodities. Employers reckon wages as a cost of production, but the unpaid labor of social reproduction–even though it is an essential input–constitutes an unacknowledged reduction of their costs. In effect, “the more labor is embodied in its reproduction the less it costs the employer” (Picchio 1992:97). This strand then insists that economic theory must address how labor itself is produced before that labor is made available for either informal or formal deployment. A second strand appears in feminist variations of world systems theory. While this research overlaps with the structuralist account presented earlier, the focus here is on households as economic units and how these pool income and resources in the context of the world economy and its global division of labor.23 A key point is that informal labor associated with the household (for example, subsistence, housework, petty commodity production and distribution) is itself a structural feature of capitalist accumulation. Household strategies for pooling informal and formal resources are shaped by different spatial locations within and temporal transformations of the world-economy (Smith et al. 1984; Smith and Wallerstein 1992). In the periphery where incomplete proletarianization is the rule, households rely heavily on informal activities to supplement wage income and secure cash resources. In the core, “poor” households rely primarily on “welfare” in various forms to supplement meager wages, and households above the poverty level (but beneath elite wealth) combine wage income—increasingly enhanced by women's earnings—with self-provisioning labor and “do-it-yourself” activities (Wallerstein and Smith 1992b:256–60). A third and related strand also takes seriously the global division of labor and households within it. But it extends this to theorize gendered divisions of labor within and outside of households as well as the devaluation of feminized labor more generally in the form of “housewifization.” The latter refers to global processes whereby even male workers can no longer anticipate salaried or unionized wage-labor (formal, proletarianized) employment and find themselves in the situation of housewives: atomized, unorganized, and economically insecure. Deploying housewifization to describe the plight of increasing numbers of men foregrounds the gender dimension—and changing gender identifications—implicated in global restructuring.24 This strand shares the structuralists' claim that informalization is not “new,” but the point is less about historical capitalism than historical patriarchy. The latter legitimates, and the former takes advantage of, gendered divisions of labor that assign men work that is deemed “productive” (therefore skilled) and warranting material payment, while assigning women work that is merely “reproductive” (“natural” and therefore unskilled), and done “for love” not money. In this sense, devalorized characteristics of informal work are a constant for women and only appear newsworthy at this point because global restructuring increasingly subjects (non-elite) men to devalorization (housewifization, feminization). Finally and crucially, contemporary feminists deploy intersectional analysis, “drawing attention to the simultaneous and interacting effects of gender, race, class, sexual orientation, and national origin as categories of difference” (Hancock 2007; also note 19). The key point for present purposes is that not only women but poor men, migrant workers, youth, and the urban “underclass” are feminized by association with informal, devalorized work. Stated differently, today's global polarization of skills, jobs, wages and resources coincides with masculinizing the high end jobs (professionals, corporate elites, highly skilled service providers, etc.) and feminizing the low end jobs characterized as semi- or unskilled and dominated by women and marginalized populations. In general, the high end jobs continue to be formal, with benefits and status, while the low end jobs—and an increasing proportion of jobs in the middle range—are informal, insecure, and without benefits. Policy recommendations vary widely because of the disciplinary and ideological diversity among feminists. Many support the ILO's “decent work” initiatives as significant for recognizing systemic economic problems and improving the conditions of informal workers. Patterns in women's work pose additional challenges: much of the labor takes place “invisibly” within households and many observers are wary of monetizing work done “for love” (Himmelweit 1995; Folbre and Nelson 2000). Proponents of structural critiques may endorse short-term reforms to address already stark conditions for the global majority, but argue that in the long-term only systemic transformations can render a more just and equitable playing field. Feminist studies of informalization build on and move beyond dominant economic theories and critical structural analyses. This literature addresses gendered divisions of identity, labor and resources; the socially necessary but unpaid labor that sustains individuals, families/households and kin-based networks; and the effects of devalorizing feminized identities, skills and work across a continuum of formal-informal activities. It exposes foundational dichotomies as economically problematic and politically suspect—serving more often to devalorize the feminine than advance our analyses. With the exception of research on human trafficking, however, feminists too neglect illicit informal activities. Linking Informalization, Inequalities and Global Insecurities While their starting assumptions—hence analyses and prescriptions—differ, the approaches surveyed above agree on the growing significance of informalization and variously acknowledge its relationship to inequalities, or the “dark side” of globalization. That income inequalities within and among nations are stark—and growing—is widely attested in recent empirical studies (Cornia 2004; Wade 2004; Korzeniewicz and Moran 2005; APSA 2008). Mainstream economists have responded by advocating poverty reduction strategies, pursued primarily through economic growth and enhancing safety nets for the poor (Cornia 2004:3). This narrow focus, however, is at the expense of addressing the deeper, more complex issues of rising inequalities: their structural causes, their subjective and social-cultural impact, their effects on individuals and households, and their relationship to global insecurities. In this section, I consider how informalization illuminates these issues, reveals linkages among them, and suggests crucial avenues of inquiry.25 Historical structuralist approaches illuminate the polarization of resources worldwide, as unfettered capitalism concentrates economic resources and political power in a small global elite whose interests and experiences are rarely those of the global majority. This historical pattern is not new, nor unexamined. But, as feminists critiques of informalization show, a selective focus on “economic” inequalities has obscured how the latter involve inequalities based on ethnicity/race and gender. An orientation that integrates diverse approaches to informalization can illuminate these intersections while addressing issues at the core of IPE and IR inquiry. As one example, I consider the processes and political economy of informalization in relation to global migrations. As another, I turn finally to informalization as a disturbing—and too narrowly examined—feature of new security dilemmas. As economic conditions deteriorate, the extent of poverty, un- and underemployment leave many without access to formal employment, “decent work,” or jobs that would make full use of acquired skills. The geographical unevenness of employment opportunities engenders internal and external labor migrations. Income differentials have a strong effect on migration patterns and migration flows reflect polarized opportunities: at the top an elite pool of highly skilled professionals and technicians flourishes (linked to transnational corporatist opportunities, and the “brain-drain” from developing countries), and at the bottom a much larger and generally devalorized pool of semi- or unskilled workers takes whatever work is available (linked to urban areas, corporate agriculture, global cities, and the “care-deficit” in AICs). In effect, informalization and its inequalities both “produce” economic migrations and informal work is a “product” of migrations insofar as it constitutes a primary mode of income generation, especially for recent migrants. Inequalities feature here by virtue of historical, structural hierarchies shaping whose vulnerability renders them subject to economic migration, what education and training they have received, what forms of relatively devalorized labor they can access, and to what extent “old” hierarchies and identity politics are reproduced in new contexts. Inequalities play out in a variety of ways. Consistent with structural vulnerabilities and the nature of “unskilled” jobs available (cleaning, harvesting, domestic service, sex work), informal workers tend to be marked by ethnicity/race and gender/sexuality. A “care deficit” affects household reproduction transnationally, as women leave their own families to provide care for richer families, where divisions of labor are also reconfigured (Ehrenreich and Hochschild 2002; Zimmerman, Litt, and Bose 2006). The insecurity of migrants may be exacerbated in unfamiliar contexts, where they typically also face cultural marginalization. Ethnicity-based networks constitute important sources of social support and work contacts, and participation in them variously shapes identity allegiances that have political effects (Portes and DeWind 2007). The informal work available to migrants is often physically arduous, and may involve illicit activities. The latter are lucrative for a few, but are insecure for all and put many individuals at extreme risk. The form and extent of economic gains will vary among individuals and contexts, and can have transnational effects. As one indicator, migrant workers often contribute to their “sending” country's economy by remitting significant amounts of income earned—often informally and sometimes illicitly—in host countries.26 Political outcomes also vary. State power operates to favor some but not other modes of informality, and to include some but not others in citizenship claims. As one observer notes, while skilled laborers are “often afforded opportunities to gain residence and even citizenship in the host country,…[they are] minor in numbers compared to the explosive growth in the number of low-wage workers who are not afforded any chance for resident status or citizenship” (Douglass 2006:422). The turbulence of people on the move—for work, escape, or recreation—spurs cultural encounters and affects identity investments, with complex and often politically significant effects. Examples of particular interest to IR scholars include nationalist movements, ethno-cultural diasporas, anti-immigrant racism, religious fundamentalisms, and even “ethnic cleansing.” Informalization matters here insofar as it exacerbates inequalities, shapes migration flows, immigration politics, and transnational economics, reconfigures divisions of labor and household formations, and affects group identities, cultural reproduction, and political commitments. The globalized economy and deregulation not only fuel informalization and migration, but polarize income distribution, decrease the state's tax revenues and provision of public welfare, and facilitate transnational flows of licit and illicit resources. Stated in more political terms, globalization erodes the autonomy of the state and its ability to regulate activities, advance public welfare, maintain its legitimacy, and ensure public order through centralized authority. In short, deteriorating economic conditions and the inequalities they generate are inextricably linked to political realities and the dilemmas of insecurity they entail. Global insecurities are fueled by multiple dynamics. All of us are less secure when—as a result of weakened governance—health, safety, and environmental protections are inadequately enforced or intentionally violated. As argued here, the majority of the world's workers are less secure because of processes of flexibilization and informalization. The current crisis in financial markets reveals the vulnerability (insecurity) of even the rich, and portends a worsening of economic conditions that deepens the insecurities of all. My concluding example focuses, however, on insecurities fueled by the diminishing ability of states to regulate economic and political activities more generally, and the conduct of war more specifically. Clandestine and criminal activities have been marginalized in most studies of informalization, and previously neglected by IPE scholars. Illicit activities do feature in recent security studies, and have assumed a key role in the study of “war economies” since 9/11. My focus here is on the rapidly growing literature that variously explores the interaction of what Zartman (2005) calls “need, creed, and greed” in contemporary conflicts.27 The shared starting point is that modalities of warfare are profoundly altered by globalization processes. To frame the issues posed by “new wars,” I paraphrase Kaldor's (2001:1–12) account. The goals of warfare have shifted from territorially-based geopolitical objectives (typically legitimated by “political” ideologies) to objectives framed more often as “identity politics” that are relatively delinked from state-centric interests. The methods of warfare have shifted from more vertically organized (state-based) units to more horizontally organized and decentralized (nonstate-based) units; the latter mobilize identity-based allegiances in support of combat objectives, which exacerbates exclusivist identities and intensifies inter-group hostilities. The financing of war has shifted from state-centric to decentralized and external resources; these involve informal and often illicit activities, as well as funding from diaspora donations, migrant remittances, and foreign investments. Warfare continues to vary dramatically. Hence, not all conflicts display these shifts, nor have “new wars” displaced all other forms. For my purposes, the “new wars” literature is focal because in an important sense, the absence of functioning state governance effectively informalizes the economy (Jung 2003; Portes and Haller 2005). Hence, I focus on the war economies literature because it provides a particularly compelling illustration of how informalization matters both economically and politically. Indeed, the key point of this literature is the urgency of moving beyond inherited dichotomies and disciplinary divisions to produce analyses that integrate economics and politics. This is especially imperative in relation to armed conflicts, where inadequate analyses are likely to propel ineffective, even disastrous, policies. Inequalities of resource distribution are key to both “causes” of conflict (for example, fueling resentments and militarizing demands for redistribution) and capacities for sustaining conflict (for example, supplying and financing militarized activities). Insofar as today's conflicts are increasingly intra- rather than international, provision of military supplies and war financing is not centralized: nonstate combatants must secure them elsewhere. Informal activities in general expand as state-based authority, provisioning and regulation deteriorate. This affects families too as social reproduction and household income generation become more difficult. Illicit activities often expand as black markets constitute a source of war-making materials and trafficking—in lootable goods, natural resources, drugs, etc.—provides necessary financing to purchase supplies and sustain combat activities. Licit and illicit funding also occurs through partnerships with armed groups, arms merchants, criminal networks, corporate suppliers, and corrupt governments.28 As conflicts evolve, the proliferation of profit-making opportunities shapes incentive structures. For some combatants and especially “conflict entrepreneurs,” seeking private economic gains may become more important than pursuing military objectives. The effect may be to prolong conflicts, as profits become not merely a means to political ends but an economic end in themselves. Hence, the importance of tracking licit and illicit informal activities and resource flows to make better sense of the causes, dynamics and consequences of war economies and the conflicts they sustain (Biersteker and Eckert 2008). Summarizing from a global perspective, informalization and often illicit financial flows increase as the centralized power, regulatory capacity, and public accountability of states are eroded in favor of unaccountable decentralized markets, international agencies, and private interest networks. In conflict zones there are powerful incentives for seeking, and multiple opportunities for securing, resources and profits through both licit and illicit informal activities and deregulated financial transfers. States weakened by neoliberal policies and/or protracted conflict are less able—and sometimes insufficiently motivated—to impose and maintain law and order, even when peace is proclaimed. Without effective public control and authority, post-conflict reconstruction may be continually undermined by established and effective networks of private—and often illicit—resource provision. This literature starkly reveals the importance to IR and IPE scholars of taking informalization seriously. In particular, it demonstrates that either-or distinctions between formal-informal, licit-illicit, and public-private are misleading, impede more adequate economic analyses, and may generate less effective, potentially disastrous, policies. While these are crucial contributions, what this literature fails to take seriously is the gender coding that pervades both informalization (as noted above) and war economies. In the latter, devalorization of the feminine shapes both “causes” and consequences of conflict. Cultural humiliation and frustrated economic aspirations fuel resentments that spur many—especially young men—to engage in conflict, especially when identity-based allegiances are mobilized and offer a focus for expressing resentments. Militarization heightens investments in masculinist ideologies (sex differentiated roles, war-making, patriarchal fundamentalisms) that have been historically manipulated (European imperialism, Bush's “war on terror”) to “justify” violence against the “other” in defense of “our” and “their” women (Peterson 2007). Given the subordinate status of “women”—ideologically and structurally—their insecurities rarely decrease but are more often exacerbated when militarized conflicts ensue. Gender insensitive analyses disregard the additional burdens placed on women who are assigned responsibility for social reproduction, that is, to ensure the survival and well-being of individuals, households and kin-based networks. They are expected to do so while combat casualties increase the number of female-headed households, conditions of war increase emotional and physical traumas, and deterioration of basic infrastructure, state provisioning and formal work options undermine safe and reliable access to food, water, medical services, shelter and economic resources. Militarized masculinism exacerbates the devalorization of “the feminine” and objectification of women. As pawns in male-dominated war zones, women are variously subject to domestic violence and rape as a “weapon of war,” and are often captured to be used as political hostages, for ransom, for sexual exploits and/or for sex trafficking. In contexts of glorified patriarchy and patriotism, they typically find their access to public spaces and political voice compromised. While women may have a particular stake in ending conflicts they are rarely recognized as important players or included in political negotiations. In these and other ways, gender coding operates “invisibly” but systemically to perpetuate inequalities and the conflictual dynamics they fuel. Conclusions The conventional categories of understanding seem out of joint with the times. For scholars and activists alike, it has become necessary to refuse received conceptual boundaries, to search for new forms of understanding, and to develop a clearer sense of the complex relationships between theory and practice, knowing and being. (Walker 1988:7) Scholars necessarily make use of inherited categories and hence reproduce their conceptual boundaries. But we also know that boundaries and ways of thinking deemed productive at one point may be inadequate, problematic and even repressive at another. Across analytical and disciplinary divides, those who study informal activities agree that their significance has increased dramatically and their nature poses a variety of individual, local, national and international concerns. This essay argues that without more systematic attention to, and more integrated analyses of informalization, we are dangerously ill-equipped to adequately understand and appropriately respond to rising inequalities and global insecurities as these concern IR and shape all of our futures. A review of existing schools of thought indicates a wealth of research on informal activities, but the important insights of each, and overlaps among them, remain unfamiliar to most IR, IPE and security scholars. A discussion of global migrations suggests how inequalities and insecurities are produced by and amplify informal activities, generating a variety of old and new inequalities and insecurities—marked by race, class and gender—in their turn. A discussion of the war economies literature reveals how inequalities and insecurities fuel violent conflicts and how political informalization spurs further informal activities: as coping strategies to reproduce everyday life, as combat strategies to secure war-fighting resources, and as criminal strategies to pursue private economic gain in ways that complicate political, and especially “peace-seeking” objectives. While rarely addressed in conventional accounts, feminists argue that social reproduction involves domestic, caring and informal labor that sustains the individuals and families/households upon which all else—everyday life, production, consumption, war-making and peacebuilding—depends. They also argue that gender coding is pervasive and operates not only to devalorize “what women do” but to ideologically legitimate and hence reproduce inequalities and insecurities that globally affect men as well. My condensed accounts of diverse areas of inquiry are problematic: they omit debates within each, over-simplify complex relationships, and inadequately document the range of literatures underpinning my claims. I attempt to render less problematic accounts in other publications, but the “overview” objective of this essay required a schematic presentation. While their starting points and primary foci differ, the informalization studies surveyed here converge in problematizing conventional categories and boundaries: in particular, familiar (inherited) distinctions between formal-informal, politics-economics, public-private, licit-illicit, and production-reproduction. New, more relational and integrated frames of analysis are required. This essay attempts to demonstrate the importance of and, in a preliminary way, to produce such analysis. It moves beyond inherited binaries and disciplinary boundaries to examine the analytical, economic and political challenges posed by informalization. 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Footnotes 1 Globalization in this essay refers primarily to economic restructuring according to neoliberal policies of deregulation, liberalization and privatization (and their political correlates), which in its contemporary form began in the 1970s and accelerated in the 1990s. 2 Estimates differ depending on what is included: in 1999 the world's “underground economy” was estimated to be worth US$9 trillion, approximately equal to one-fourth of the “world product” for that year (The Economist 1999:59); the value of “housework” is US$10–15 trillion (UNDP 1995:6; Tetreault and Lipschutz 2005:25); one-half to three-quarters of non-agricultural work in developing countries is informal and in Africa accounted for over 90% of new jobs in the past decade (ILO 2002b:5); and offshore tax abuses are estimated to cost the US$100 billion yearly (The Economist 2008, no page number). 3 As I discuss later in the paper, the growing literature on “new wars” and “illicit international political economy” (IIPE; Andreas 2004) focuses on underground and transnational criminal activities, without analyzing these in relation to more systemic aspects of informalization. 4 My essay assumes familiarity with critiques of the binary logic that prevails in positivist epistemologies. The point of such critiques is not to dispense with categories and the boundaries they entail, but to problematize essentialized categories—exemplified in the dichotomies referenced throughout the essay—as ahistorical and reductionist, and to expose the rigid boundaries they entail as impediments to more adequate and systemic analyses. 5 Problematics of definition and measurement feature especially in early treatments; see references in note 4. Journal of International Affairs (2000) discusses pertinent issues; Schneider and Enste (2002b) offer an extensive account that includes international estimates; Portes and Haller (2005) provide an overview; measurement debates are reviewed and methods tested using Brazilian survey data in Henley, Arabsheibani, and Carneiro (2009). 6 Books and special issues of journals through 2000 alone include World Development (1978); Feige (1979); Mattera (1985); Ferman et al. (1987); Benería and Roldan (1987); Harrod (1987); Social Justice (1988); Harding and Jenkins (1989); Portes et al. (1989b); Mingione (1991); Lubell (1991); Thomas (1992); Tokman (1992); The Yale Law Journal (1994); International Journal of Urban and Regional Research (1994); Rifkin (1995); Boris and Prügl (1996); Lippert and Walker (1997); Standing (1999); Feige and Ott (1999); Journal of International Affairs (2000); International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy (2000); Tabak and Crichlow (2000). 7 For example, the most recent edition of the Oxford Dictionary of Economics (Black 2002) has short entries for “dual economy” and “household production” but no reference to informal or traditional activities, a shadow economy, caring labor, or social reproduction. 8 Bajada and Schneider (2005:3) note that under-estimation of national output distorts “measures of economic growth (Houston 1990), the rate of inflation (Reuter 1982), the size of the business cycle (Bajada 2003), the rate of unemployment (McDonald 1984), productivity (Carson 1984), the size of the tax base (Hansson 1982), and the volume of savings (Greenfield 1993).” 9 Sabel and Zeitlin (1997); Lippert and Walker (1997); Tanzi (1999); Schneider (2000); Maloney (2004); Bosch and Maloney (2008). 10 This neoliberal principle has been promoted for several decades, as evidenced clearly and repeatedly in World Bank and International Monetary Fund reports. The current financial crisis (2008–2009) will presumably prompt some “adjustment” of this position, but informal work is also commended as a survival option (Barta 2009). 11 A statistical definition featuring production units (rather than work relations) was chosen for congruence with the System of National Accounts (ILO 2002a:11; also ILO 2002b; Chen 2005). 12 The root causes include: the legal and institutional obstacles that make it difficult, if not impossible, for either enterprises or workers to become or to stay formal; the policies of national governments that often directly or indirectly constrain employment creation in the formal economy; the absence of or lack of access to strong and effective market and non-market institutions; demographic trends including large-scale rural-urban migration and the HIV/AIDS pandemic; direct and indirect discrimination against women and other disadvantaged groups; and the lack of representation and voice of those in the informal economy (ILO 2002b:5). 13 This and the following section emphasize the vulnerability of workers at the expense of acknowledging as well their agency and resistance. For the latter, see Dickinson and Schaeffer (2001); Rupert and Solomon (2006). 14 I understand the Tabak and Chrichlow volume to complement work associated with the “regulation school” that is similarly concerned with large-scale and long-term accumulation but less attentive to informalization and hence less central to the present essay. Also relevant is the scholarship associated with histories of capitalism, long cycles, world systems, the dependency school, unequal exchange, and “underdevelopment.” 15 This claim is at odds with liberal and some marxist expectations that economic development inexorably formalizes or proletarianizes labor relations. Historical materialists argue that capital does not seek full proletarianization—where labor is “wholly dependent for remuneration/reproduction on the capital-wage-labor relation” (Broad 2000:31)—because this would undercut the expansionary pursuit of not just any but the highest realizable profit rates. “Proletarianization may be positive for capital with respect to accessibility of labor, but for reasons of cost, complete proletarianization would be negative” (Broad 2000:36). The constancy of informalization also challenges mainstream claims that capitalism is monolithic and that “there is no alternative.” Rather, capitalist development is based on a mix of formal and informal, as well as dominant (capitalist) and submerged (reciprocity, barter, socialist) forms of economic activity (Smith, Wallerstein, and Evers 1984; Miller 1987; Broad 2000). 16 The main cost-saving feature of informality in AICs is less the absolute level of wages than the avoidance of the “indirect wage” formed by social benefits and other employee-related payments to the state. By lowering the cost of labor and reducing the state-imposed constraints on its free hiring and dismissal, the informal economy contributes directly to the profitability of capital (Castells and Portes 1989:30). 17 The general argument is that the formal-informal economy relationship is one of unequal exchange, similar to that which operates internationally and ensures that surplus generated in the informal sector and peripheral countries is transmitted through the formal sector to accumulate in the core. This perspective builds on earlier studies of dependency and unequal exchange; the argumentation specific to analyzing the informal economy is clarified in Tokman (1978); Moser (1978); Gerry (1978). 18 For feminist critiques of this neglect, see Ward (1993); Ward and Pyle (1995); Misra (1999); Dunaway (2001). Feminist adaptations of marxist and world-systems theory are discussed below. 19 This widely acknowledged shift from empirical to analytical gender reflects changing epistemological and political orientations. For discussions in relation to IPE see Waylen (2000); Waylen (2006); Rai (2002); Peterson (2005). On intersectionality see Mohanty (2003); Brah and Phoenix (2004); Knapp (2005); Yuval-Davis (2006); Peterson and Runyan (2010). 20 Virtually all researchers note the problematic nature of data on informality, but these generalizations are widely accepted (See Standing 1999; UN 2000; Chen 2001; ILO 2002a,b; Beneria 2003; Chen, Vanek, and Carr 2004; Chen 2004; Snyder 2005). 21 Income-generating work for women has long been critical to all but elite and middle-class households, and definitively so in female-headed households. The latter are increasing worldwide and in some countries constitute a very significant 30% of households (United Nations 1991; Buvinić 1997; Chant 1997, 2007). 22 Research in support of these claims is extensive and global (see Çağatay and Ozler 1995; Sassen 1998; DAW 1999; Wichterich 2000; Marchand and Runyan 2000; Peterson 2003; Beneria 2003). 23 Wallerstein and Smith (1992a:13) define households as “the social unit that effectively…enables individuals…to pool income coming from multiple sources in order to ensure their individual and collective reproduction and well-being….We do not presume that all members of the household are necessarily kin, much less a nuclear family….Nor do we presume that a household is necessarily a group resident in the same house [though both conditions may often be the case].” This definition is atypical in its economistic emphasis on income pooling and specifically does not address the “the internal structure of the households, and how power and goods are distributed” (Wallerstein and Smith 1992a:12). Chant (1997) discusses the complexity of defining households and offers a preliminary typology of women-headed households. 24 Housewifization is elaborated in Mies (1998/1986) and Mies, Bennholdt-Thomsen, and von Werlhof (1988). Insofar as this term exacerbates the denigration of activities associated with housewives and housework, I prefer “feminization” to convey devalorization of “feminine” identities and characteristics, so constituted by overvalorization of masculinized identities and characteristics. See for example Peterson (2007). 25 The brief account here draws on publications (Peterson 2008, 2009) that are components of a book in progress. 26 The data on remittances suggests the financial importance of these flows. Counting only officially recorded transfers, the World Bank expected worldwide remittances to reach $318B in 2007 (World Bank 2007: Brief 3, 2). This is twice the level recorded in 2002 and twice as large as official aid to developing countries. Including unrecorded flows would increase the figure significantly, perhaps by 50% (World Bank 2006:xiii). 27 Paraphrasing Arnson's (2005:11) description: “need” refers to grievances ranging from political repression to economic deprivation; “creed” to generalized belief and identity feelings; “greed” to personal or factional ambitions of private gain. Key texts drawn on here include Friman and Andreas (1999); Berdal and Malone (2000); Kaldor (2001); Duffield (2001); Naylor (2002); Ballentine and Sherman (2003); Pugh and Cooper (2004); Jung (2003); Arnson and Zartman (2005); Ballentine and Nitzschke (2005). 28 On the blurring of licit-illicit, see especially Ruggiero (2000); Duffield (2001); Naylor (2002). On “coping, combat and criminal informal economies” generally see Peterson (2008); and on a preliminary case study of these in Iraq, see Peterson (2009). © 2010 International Studies Association
TI - Informalization, Inequalities and Global Insecurities
JO - International Studies Review
DO - 10.1111/j.1468-2486.2010.00930.x
DA - 2010-06-07
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/informalization-inequalities-and-global-insecurities-ZXg0t3JUQ7
SP - 1
EP - 270
VL - Advance Article
IS - 2
DP - DeepDyve
ER -