TY - JOUR
AU - Horsfall, Daniel
AB - Abstract Contemporary empirical explorations of the welfare state have paid much attention to its multidimensional nature, noting that nations blend differing approaches to the various dimensions of the welfare state. Sometimes such behaviours can even be contradictory with behaviour in one policy arena perhaps being typically liberal in contrast to the corporatist roots of other behaviours. In much the same way those who argue that the welfare state has changed so substantially as to warrant redefining offer nuanced and multidimensional accounts of what has replaced the welfare state. In this paper we see how nations engage with the competition state as the successor to the welfare state and are presented with data that suggests countries, while engaging with the competition state model, are doing so in their own ways. 1 Introduction Tales of the demise of welfare states are legion. The prevailing logic is that the underlying conditions necessary to support national welfare states began to crumble at some point in the 1970s. That the welfare state has died is by no means accepted, with many believing that the changes in the global economy represent a convenient justification for those with ideological oppositions to the welfare state. However, while it has its critics, the model of war-time birth, golden-age of consensus, and finally, slow decline of the welfare state remains central to welfare state debates in many OECD countries. One particular body of work has even suggested that the welfare state is dead and in its place the competition state has risen (Cerny & Evans, 1999). The purpose of this paper is not to address this broad debate, rather to present the findings of an empirical investigation into this claim. This paper simply asks, if the welfare state has undergone substantial alteration and if we were to accept that the competition state has risen in its place, what would an empirical investigation tell us? Previous work has suggested that two distinct competition state models can be evidenced, one classically neo-liberal, the other driven largely by active labour market programmes (Horsfall, 2010), however this conclusion was reached using data from one time-point and a methodology that is perhaps not equipped to capture the complex and multidimensional nature of the political economy of welfare states. A more thorough exploration of the competition state thesis can be found in the works of Cerny (1997, 2010a, 2010b), Cerny and Evans (1999, 2003, 2004), Hay (2004) and Lunt (2010), but for the purpose of contextualising this investigation the competition state can be considered as a replacement for the welfare state. In brief, the competition state takes many of the core features of welfare states and reshapes them to meet the new ‘economic realities’ brought about by globalisation. In particular, Cerny and Evans believe that the shift amongst developed nations from a manufacturing economy marked by relatively static capital to a more service-based economy in which capital is highly mobile has had a profound impact on not just the economy, but also the provision of core welfare services. By simultaneously breaking down the territorial limits of economies on one front and undermining the bonds of solidarity that pervaded Fordist industry, globalisation rendered the welfare state less viable, relevant, and legitimate (Cerny & Evans, 1999, 2003, 2004). Or so Cerny and Evans argue. For its advocates the competition state fundamentally shifted the focus of states from the provision of welfare for their citizens, to the pursuit of economic success. Cerny and Evans argue that this occurred not simply because the political elites of the 1980s and 1990s wished it to, but rather because globalisation had simply shifted the goal posts with regards to what governments should and could do. The programmes of privatisation, rise of new public management, and shifts towards activation rather than passive welfare as witnessed across the OECD are for Cerny and Evans prime examples of the competition state at work. Ultimately, the very features of the state utilised in the provision of a general level of welfare for the citizenry of most advanced wealthy nations have now been co-opted into the pursuit of the competitive advantage and in turn, economic success. Of course the outline of the competition state provided above is brief, simplistic, and fails to capture much of the nuance provided by its key proponents. The main points however are covered; in competition states where the general well-being of the populace is not the primary goal, welfare services, which are of course funded through taxation, are deemed as burdens to economic efficiency. The fundamental messages of competition states are that government should largely get out of the way of business except to legislate in a pro-business manner, people should work rather than be paid when out of work, and business should not be unduly burdened by regulation or taxation less they decide to take their operations elsewhere. 2 Operationalising the competition state Operationalising the competition state thesis is a multi-stage process. As with any empirical investigation of welfare (states) there are decisions regarding what variables best capture the phenomenon, which countries should be studied, and what methodology should be adopted for measurement and analysis. To this end many of the decisions taken in this investigation relating to the sample used and the dimensions operationalised follow the lead of an early attempt to empirically investigate the competition state (see Horsfall, 2010). The main departure however is in the nature of the methodology utilised here. Whereas the only attempt to measure the competition state to date adopted an additive index approach common to many welfare state studies, this paper presents the findings of a fuzzy set ideal-type analysis (see introduction to issue) of the competition state. 3 Fuzzy set ideal-type competition state Having committed to employing a fuzzy set methodology, the process of deciding how to construct, calibrate, and combine the competition state sets represents the next task. Following on from previous work and reflecting on the reception it received (see Evans, 2010; Horsfall, 2010), a sample of 25 OECD countries was selected. In addition, the dimensions that would be operationalised as sets were largely informed by earlier work. These four dimensions, hereafter referred to as sets, are: minimal welfare; activation; employment protection; and, taxation. The expectation would be that competition states would have low levels of taxation, employment protection, and welfare expenditure, and high levels of activation. While selecting cases and deciding what dimensions should be operationalised as sets is relatively straightforward and is informed by previous studies of both the welfare state and the competition state, calibrating these sets is much more complex. This is largely because there is no clear precedent to follow when calibrating some of the sets. This means that the researcher must make decisions as to where breakpoints should be set, and crucially, justify such decisions (Berg-Schlosser & De Meur, 2009, pp. 25–26; Cronqvist & Berg-Schlosser, 2009, p. 77; Ragin, 2000, pp. 150, 318; 2009, pp. 93, 118; Yamasaki and Rihoux, 2009, p. 132). This is evident in the calibration of the first set in this study, that of minimal welfare. Here we would expect that competition states would favour lower expenditures. In this study the decision was taken to set the upper threshold of 1 (fully in the minimal welfare set) at social expenditures at 10% of GDP and below and the lower breakpoint of zero set at 25% of GDP. The rationale for such breakpoints lay in an historical analysis of data coupled with the application of a stringency principle. Historical trends show that those countries often referred to as generous welfare states or as having a big state have maintained spending levels as a proportion of GDP over 25% for the last thirty years, while average expenditure has held steady at close to 20% (OECD, 2010). We can say with confidence then that countries that are spending over a quarter of their GDP on social programmes are acting contrary to the expectations of the competition state. Setting the lower boundary is more complex; an historical analysis of data points towards a breakpoint being set around 15%. However, in an attempt to ensure countries are not ‘mis-labelled’ as competition states, a more stringent level of 10% is adopted. Given that the competition state is not a universally accepted theory, applying a more stringent requirement for full membership of the minimal welfare set is prudent. The next set to be calibrated is the activation set. This is more straightforward than the minimal welfare set because here there is a precedent that is useful, meaningful, and transferable. In accordance with Vis, active labour market programme expenditure is utilised, with the first qualitative breakpoint of zero set at 5. Vis sets this threshold as it represents expenditure of 0.05% of GDP per 1% of unemployment and is so low that any country exhibiting scores at such levels cannot have a realistic intention to activate its unemployed citizenry (Vis, 2007, p. 111). Conversely, she argues, countries that spend more than 0.25% of GDP per 1% of unemployment can be considered as having a high level of dedication to activation (Vis, 2007, p. 111). Consequently the breakpoint of 1 is set at 25. Operationalising the EPL set is similarly straightforward as once again, this study follows a precedent. Here the qualitative breakpoints used by both Vis (2007) and Hudson and Kühner (2010) are adopted. Vis breaks down the EPL variable into its 14 constituent elements and suggests that any country that achieves a high score on half of the protective dimensions should be considered as part of the fully protective set (Vis, 2007, p. 112). This of course runs contrary to the expectations of the competition state and as such in this study, exhibiting such behaviour would see a case as fully out of the set. To demonstrate membership of Vis’ set, a country would need to exhibit a score over 3, which could only be achieved if a country received a high score on at least half of the indicators that make up the EPL score and consequently it would prove difficult to terminate an employee's contract in that country (Vis, 2007, p. 112). The score of three then represents the qualitative breakpoint of zero in the competition state operationalisation of EPL. The second breakpoint of one, which represents full membership, is achieved using a similar thought process on Vis’ part. Here she demonstrates that a score of 0.5 can only be achieved if a country scores the maximum high score on only one of the fourteen indicators. Vis insists that where this is the case, a country has weak protective legislation and the termination of contracts is not difficult (Vis, 2007, p. 112). The final set to be calibrated is that of taxation. Taxation on business namely in the form of corporation taxation is viewed as a major barrier to innovation and entrepreneurship as well as a potential driver of capital flight (Hay, 2006, p. 209). While asserting that corporation tax should be low in competition states should be low is unquestionable, once again we find that setting the breakpoints is not as straightforward. The fist breakpoint, fully in the competition state set for corporate taxation was set at 20%. The rationale for setting this level was really a product of descriptive statistical analysis of contemporary data, an acknowledgement of recommendations made by the CBI, and the adoption of the ‘stringency principle’ utilised in setting the qualitative breakpoints for the minimal welfare set. The establishment of the first breakpoint of full membership at 20% is lent credence by recent reports by the CBI. This bodyinsists that a tax rate significantly below the current OECD average is required to ensure that the British business is not only competitive in the short term, but also in the medium term (CBI, 2008, p. 42). The confluence of these three factors, descriptive data analysis, the recommendations of the CBI, and a generally stringent approach to setting the qualitative breakpoints, suggests that 20% represents a reasonable threshold to set. With no clear indication from either the business world or the academy as to exactly what level of corporation tax would be ‘un-competitive’, the establishment of the lower breakpoint required rather more subjective input. An historical analysis of corporate tax levels suggests that a level of around 45% would be sufficiently high to be deemed as uncompetitive. Historically, rates at and above this level were common until the end of the twentieth century, representing stability not just through the golden age of the welfare state, but also throughout the 1980s and early 1990s (Clausing, 2007, p. 122; Devereux, Lockwood, & Redoano, 2008, p. 1222). However, to acknowledge that this rate was derived through what was undoubtedly the least robust process relative to the setting of all other breakpoints, it was felt that extra consideration and to a certain extent caution, was warranted. As such, a slightly higher breakpoint was established at 50%, which has a neat clarity to it in conceptual terms; it is with extreme confidence that we can say that where a country takes over half of a corporation's profits, it is most definitely not acting like a competition state. Having calibrated the sets the final remaining task was to make sense of all logical combinations of sets. As figure one shows, each possible model was assigned a label (type) that makes sense of that combination of sets or best describes the real world manifestation of the model in terms of the competition state. In some cases the same label is applied to more than model, signifying that these models are phenotypically similar. As Fig. 1 shows, labels have been attached to models in a way that reflects whether a country demonstrating the behaviour denoted by its model can be considered as being neo-liberal rather than active, or perhaps more focused on the non-welfare state elements of the competition state programme. While in some situations it is possible to suggest that two different models are similar enough to be considered as the same type, it is also possible to group types that are similar. So, as depicted in table one the neo-liberal, neo-liberal+ (NL+), and strong neo-liberal+ (SNL+), types all share neoliberal features and can be considered as part a broader neo-liberal group. Fig. 1 Open in new tabDownload slide Competition state ideal-types. Fig. 1 Open in new tabDownload slide Competition state ideal-types. Before discussing the results it is perhaps worth working through the assumptions being made for membership of at least one group of types. If we take the active grouping, at the most basic level a country can demonstrate membership of this group by meeting two basic criteria. First, a country must be a member of the activation set. Second, the country cannot be a member of the minimal welfare set. By fulfilling these requirements a country is demonstrating membership of the active type and as such belongs to the active group of types. The same country could also meet these requirements and also be a member of either or both the EPL and taxation sets and thus would be considered as a member of either the active+ (A+) or strong active+ types (SA+), but still also a member of the active group of types. 4 Findings As Fig. 2 illustrates,1 all but one country in 2007 demonstrate membership of a competition state type, with the weak pro-competition state policy (WPCSP) type being the most densely populated. Three of the four groups of types are populated and at this group level, most countries’ memberships make qualitative sense, fitting with established welfare state and competition state literature. First, we should note that there does appear in 2007 to be separate competition state forms, falling loosely into three groups or worlds. Furthermore, within these worlds there is heterogeneity, with countries falling into different types within groups. Perhaps the most striking observation that can be made of figure two is that no country occupies the pure, hybrid pure, or post-welfare contacting state (PWCS) types. Indeed, as we will see, only one country at one point in time manages to occupy any of these three types. The hybrid pure and PWCS type are throughout the time period studied, along with the pure type in 1997 and 2007, quite simply logical yet unpopulated competition state types or ‘logical remainders’ (Ragin, 2000, pp. 107, 198). They key message to be taken from this observation is that neo-liberal aspects of the competition state and active aspects do not present together. Fig. 2 Open in new tabDownload slide Fuzzy set ideal type country memberships (2007). Fig. 2 Open in new tabDownload slide Fuzzy set ideal type country memberships (2007). The implication of this finding, that active and neo liberal behaviours are not reconciled by any country, is particularly interesting. Two logical conclusions present themselves at this juncture. Either (a), that activation in the form of ALMP expenditure is not an indicator of the competition state, or (b), the active/neo liberal split represents two profoundly divergent poles within the competition state. The fact that so many countries occupy the active group as a whole, while none populate the weakest active type may be instructive. Furthermore the active group as a whole is populated in much the way one would expect. As Fig. 2 outlines, this active grouping is entirely inhabited by those countries identified by Esping-Andersen as social democratic in terms of decommodification, along with Switzerland, which just misses out of this group in Esping-Andersen's study (Esping-Anderson, 1990, p. 52). Turning attention to the neo liberal grouping, those countries that demonstrate membership of one of the neo liberal types come as no real surprise, though the fact that the US does not inhabit the SNL+ type is interesting. The fact the US occupies the NL+ set rather than the stronger variant is a consequence of its high levels of corporate taxation. High levels of US corporate taxation are identified as problematic and seen as a barrier, along with structural problems within the corporate tax system, to competitiveness (Desai & Hines, 2004, p. 27; JEC, 2005, p. 16). The fact that the US corporate tax system and rate is not conducive to business is reflected in the extremely low score and rank2 received by the US in the WEF competitiveness indicator of macroeconomic environment (WEF, 2010, p. 19). That said, while the US performs poorly on this indicator, its overall position of fourth suggests that other features of the US economy are more conducive to business. While the neo liberal group offers little by the way of surprises in terms of those countries that are members, the omission of New Zealand and the UK from this grouping does run contrary to expectations. As the model would denote, these countries are included in the pro-competition state policy (PCSP) type owing to the fact that they achieved membership of the EPL and tax sets, while demonstrating non-membership of the activation and minimal welfare sets. The UK and New Zealand memberships of the PCSP type is particularly interesting for two reasons. Firstly, as Lunt discusses, the British and Kiwi competition states have much qualitatively in common (Castles & Mitchell, 1990, pp. 11, 14, 18–21; Lunt, 2010, p. 34). Both, he says, have worked to establish a national narrative within which to place the competition state project, fusing neo liberal elements with social investment and opportunity (Lunt, 2010, pp. 31–32). The second reason that UK and New Zealand membership of the PCSP is interesting lies in the fact that the competition state thesis is largely built around the US and UK cases, with occasional references to Australia and New Zealand (Cerny, 1997, 2000, 2008, 2010a, 2010b; Cerny & Evans, 1999, 2003, 2004; Evans, 2010, p. 105). The PCSP represents a type quite distinct from either the active or neo liberal groups of types. Moreover, its members cannot be considered as ‘new’ democracies; these are established economies with traditional Beveridgean/Keynesian welfare state histories (Castles & Mitchell, 1990, pp. 17–18; Lunt, 2008, p. 409). Furthermore, as we shall see, these two old nations with long democratic roots and deeply embedded welfare states, around which many of the core arguments on which the competition state thesis were able to crystallise, exhibit stable membership of the PCSP over time. There is a degree to which the stable membership of two such nations adds credence to the suggestion that variant competition state forms exist. Where the membership of the PCSP is particularly interesting largely because the countries that made up its membership are often considered as core neo liberal competition states, the WPCSP is interesting for a range of reasons. First, this type is populated in 2007 by an eclectic mix of countries. In this type we find countries labelled as corporatist by Esping-Anderson (1990), as well as countries belonging to amongst others: Ferrera's (1996) ‘Southern’ model; Leibfried's (1992) ‘Latin Rim’ model; Siaroff's ‘Late Female Mobilization’ (1994) model; Vis’ (2007) ‘Conservative Welfare’ model; and Hudson and Kühner's (2010) ‘Weak productive-protective’, ‘Weak protective’, and ‘Productive-protective’ models. Second, the WPCSP type, despite being a manifestation of two models, is almost completely homogenous in its construction, with all cases except Japan owing their membership of this type to their membership of the tax set. Third, as we will see, many countries became members of this type after 2002 and, as such, this represents a recent transition within the competition state. Fourth, again as we will see, this transition is far from homogenous, with a diverse range of trajectories travelled by the countries that came to rest in this type as of 2007. Finally, this type is interesting as it represents the only one of three types in which membership of only one set was sufficient for membership of that type, which was actually populated in 2007. As figure two shows, the neo liberal and active types are simply logical remainders. The fact that the WPCSP type is the most populous in figure two suggests that while the findings of this paper can be considered as tentative support for the broad thrust of the competition state thesis, many countries still only exhibit the minimum level of behaviour required to achieve the status of competition state. Indeed many of the countries that are in 2007 members of the WPCSP were in fact members of the Conservative welfare type in 1997. From this we can draw two conflicting conclusions. It could be argued that this set represents only scant acknowledgement of the competition state at best, with behaviour not conforming to competition state expectations outweighing behaviour that does conform. To be a member of this type after all requires a country to demonstrate non membership of three-out-of-four competition state sets. Conversely, we can perhaps consider membership of this type as representing the first step towards greater competition state behaviours. Indeed, as Figs. 3–5 show some nations in this sample have moved from membership of this type towards types embedded within the neo liberal and active groups. It is also worth noting that even what can be considered as rather mild competition state membership represents a fundamental shift for countries such as France and Italy with their strong conservative/corporatist roots (Castles & Mitchell, 1990, p. 9; Esping-Anderson, 1990, p. 27). Fig. 3 Open in new tabDownload slide Fuzzy membership across time for those countries that were members of the neo liberal group in 2007. Fig. 3 Open in new tabDownload slide Fuzzy membership across time for those countries that were members of the neo liberal group in 2007. Fig. 4 Open in new tabDownload slide Fuzzy membership across time for those countries that were members of the active group in 2007. Fig. 4 Open in new tabDownload slide Fuzzy membership across time for those countries that were members of the active group in 2007. Fig. 5 Open in new tabDownload slide Fuzzy membership scores across time for those countries that were members of the pro-competition state policy group in 2007. Note: Greece and Spain, as well as Poland exhibit crossover scores of 0.5 at stages of the analysis and as such two different routes have been charted for these countries. Poland's routes are marked by the broken/dashed line while the routes of Greece and Spain are marked by dotted line. Fig. 5 Open in new tabDownload slide Fuzzy membership scores across time for those countries that were members of the pro-competition state policy group in 2007. Note: Greece and Spain, as well as Poland exhibit crossover scores of 0.5 at stages of the analysis and as such two different routes have been charted for these countries. Poland's routes are marked by the broken/dashed line while the routes of Greece and Spain are marked by dotted line. 5 Fuzzy set ideal-type memberships over time What the WPCSP type underscores is that the shifts over time are extremely important. The conclusions that can be drawn from a WPCSP membership that is stable over time are rather different from those that can be drawn from a membership that burgeons only towards 2007 and includes many nations with only weak membership. Fig. 3 shows the trajectories of countries that were classified in 2007 as belonging to a type within the neo liberal group. While only the US and Korea demonstrate stability to type across all three time points, Canada and Australia also display stability of group membership. Similarly, while there is a departure from the neo liberal group in 2002, Ireland begins and ends within the group. The only country included in chart three that does not hold membership of the neo liberal group in 1997 is the Slovak Republic. Instead the Slovak Republic demonstrates a surge from membership of the Conservative welfare type, to the PCSP type, and eventually the SNL+ type. The fact that this group remains stable over time and includes the countries one would expect, offers much to suggest that as a broad model, the neo liberal competition state is robust. The barrier to US membership of the strongest variant of the neo liberal competition state has been discussed. The Korean case is similar in as much as it is behaviour in one set that that stops Korea joining the strongest neo liberal type. In the Korean case however it is the prevalence of strict EPL that places the country in the NL+ type. Park (1999) suggests that the prevalence of ‘disguised’ employment, which he insists represents an extremely large and burgeoning sector of employment, may hold the key to Korea's non-membership of the EPL set (Park, 1999, p. 12). Also, while protection of recognised contracts may be relatively strict, in reality many Koreans find themselves in employment that is not official and as such does not fall under the purview of existing laws, most notably the Labor Standards Act (Jones, 2005, p. 5; Park, 1999, pp. 12, 25). If we turn now to Fig. 4 we can see the trajectories of those nations that demonstrated membership of the active group in 2007. We can see that the majority of countries that were located in the active group in 2007 had been members of the group throughout the study. Indeed, we can also say that those countries that demonstrated stability within the group were equally stable within their respective types. Whether Austrian and Belgian membership of the active group and A+ type is likely to prove stable is less clear, however the fact that they have joined the A+ type rather than the active type is interesting. In the Austrian case this reflects the fact that pro competition state policy was already in evidence prior to joining the active group. The stability of the Austrian membership of the tax set ensured that any shift towards the active group would by-pass the ‘weaker’ active type. While Austria owes its membership of the A+ type to its longer term membership of the taxation set and recent strengthening of its activation commitment, Belgium's membership is built on recent transitions in both the taxation and activation sets. Overall Belgian membership of the A+ type is stronger than Austria's, however where Austria's weakness lay in its activation, Belgium's weakness relates to its membership of the taxation set. In the Austrian case, while it must be acknowledged that the shift towards activation may prove to be only fleeting, evidence suggests it is part of an upward trend in ALMP expenditure. In the Belgian case, while it is obviously true that taxation lowered, hence the shift towards membership of the tax set, it did so only in the last time period and with little literature and no newer data, making predictions about the future pathway of taxation membership relies more on guesswork than conjecture. The dividing line between the A+ countries and the SA+ countries is drawn as a consequence of differences in EPL set membership. All countries in the active group combine the necessary membership of the activation set with membership of the tax set. It is in the arena of EPL that the active countries demonstrate heterogeneity. Here the raw data shows that only Austria and the Netherlands make progress towards membership of the EPL set by 2007. Even then, both countries are still more out of the set than in. Sweden and Belgium remain consistently out of this set, while Norway is consistently out of the EPL set. Denmark and Switzerland on the other hand demonstrate membership of the EPL set and consequently the SA+ type. The reasons that determine the membership or non-membership of the EPL set within the group of countries featured in Figure Three undoubtedly owes much to domestic factors such as the strength of unions alongside the path dependent nature of policy (Albaek, Van Audenrode, & Browning, 2002, pp. 472–473). To this end, Norway representing the strictest arrangement can be reasonably considered a consequence of the fact that Norway was a front runner in establishing EPL as a priority as early as the 1930s (Sigeman, 2002, p. 258). If we turn now to our final group of competition state types, Fig. 5 illustrates the fuzzy memberships over time for those countries that populated the PCSP and WPCSP types in 2007. The stability of the UK and New Zealand membership serves to underscore much of the earlier debate, suggesting that the PCSP type represents an important and stable competition state form. Whether it represents a competition state type that is accessible to other nations, or whether it is simply a moniker for the British and Kiwi competition states can perhaps be illuminated by exploring the pathways taken by countries in the WPCSP type. What is most striking about Fig. 5 is how messy it is compared to previous comparable graphics. If we focus on those countries that populate the WPCSP type, we can see a multitude of various pathways taken to reach membership in 2007. As we can see, only Finland demonstrates a completely stable pathway within the WPCSP type over time. Furthermore, Finland's membership appears secure as well as stable, exhibiting scores of 0.64; 0.71; and 0.61 across the time period. Poland comes close to demonstrating similar stability, however fleetingly demonstrates a crossover score, which sees it populate both the WCSP and PCSP type in 2002 before returning to the WCSP in 2007. Likewise both Greece and Spain demonstrated crossover scores, though in their cases in both 1997 and 2002. As such both countries can be considered either as having a relatively stable membership of the WCSP that has strengthened since 2002 or as having made the transition from the Conservative welfare type after 2002. The remaining five members of the WPCSP type can be split into two categories for discussion. The first, which consists of Portugal and the Czech Republic is used to structure discussion simply because both countries demonstrate membership of the WPCSP type in both 2002 and 2007. Furthermore, both the Portuguese and Czech Republic's pathway begins in the Conservative welfare type. Despite similar pathways, the two countries have different membership strengths and their trajectories and membership scores suggest they may have different future memberships. If we look at the progression of Portuguese membership scores we can see that Portugal shifts from non-membership (score being 0.42), to weak membership (0.57), and finally reasonably strong membership (0.78) in 2007. Furthermore Portugal remains resolutely and fully out of the EPL set and as such the PCSP type, which suggests that the WPCSP type may house Portugal at least in the near future. Czech stability is less assured however. Like Portugal the Czech Republic appears stable in the tax set, but where Portuguese non-membership of the EPL set and as such the PCSP type appears unlikely to shift, the Czech Republic does not demonstrate particularly strong non-membership of the EPL set. As such, Czech Republic ‘ascension’ to the PCSP type would require a less extreme policy shift than would be necessary for Portuguese membership. The second category includes three countries that made the transition to the WPCSP type after 2002. To this end France and Italy would appear to have more in common with each other than they do with Japan. However, it should be acknowledged that all three nations are often grouped together in comparative studies (Esping-Anderson, 1990, p. 52; Korpi & Palme, 1998, pp. 670, 675). This is largely as a consequence of their perceived corporatist, conservative, and on occasions pluralist tendencies (Esping-Anderson, 1990, p. 52; Howard, 1998, p. 216). What unites France and Italy within the data as well as separating them slightly from Japan is that both France and Italy are members of the Conservative welfare type in both 1997 and 2002 before making the shift towards membership of the WPCSP type in 2007. In addition, both countries exhibit membership scores that while more in than out are still reasonably low.3 It could be argued then that it is too early to predict whether either country is likely to enjoy long-term membership of the WPCSP type. The Japanese case is unique insofar as it represents the only example of a country whose transition runs contrary to the expectations of the competition state thesis. As Fig. 5 shows, Japan actually reversed competition state behaviours in one domain, that of neo liberalism. This rejection of neo liberalism seems strange given the insistence of Cerny that neo liberalism once established would lock itself in (Cerny, 1997, pp. 264–266; 2008, p. 16). It should be noted however that Japan exhibits scores just below the crossover point for the minimal welfare set and as such, a return to the neo liberal group in the future should not be easily dismissed. The discussion of the WPCSP type opened by noting how messy it appeared graphically. Despite the fact that there appeared to be a considerable amount of heterogeneity within the type, this masked a substantial amount of similarity. Every country except Japan was a member of the tax set rather than the EPL set. Many countries appear to be securely ensconced within the type, displaying only moderate evidence that they may make the transition to either the PCSP or Conservative welfare type in the near future. Where there is diversity in terms of the strength of membership or the route taken to membership it may very well be explained by the fact that this represents the most basic and in many cases only engagement with the competition state. 6 Reflection It is perhaps useful to begin a discussion about the bigger picture by mentioning Germany and Ireland. Throughout the entire time period Germany held resolutely to a rejection of the competition state thesis. For some, such an achievement surely represents a triumph of national identity, national priorities, and national sovereignty over the global economy. Germany's persistence in terms of its rejection of the competition state coupled with relative economic success in some respects, poses key questions for the competition state thesis. Does Germany stand as testament to the fact that nations are not forced into a competition state? Is the case of Germany evidence that adoption of the competition state is not the only mechanism for survival in the global economy? Or finally, is it simply a matter of time? While Germany has remained consistently within the Conservative welfare type, on the activation, tax, and EPL sets Germany has moved from strong non-membership to much closer to the crossover point. While Germany clearly rejects the competition state in 2007, whether such a rejection will last is far from clear. Given that France, Italy, and Belgium — countries often grouped with Germany (Abraham & Houseman, 1993, p. 15; Bonoli, 1997, p. 361; Esping-Anderson, 1990, p. 74; Korpi & Palme, 1998, pp. 670, 675; Scrugs, 2006, p. 354) — all vacated the Conservative welfare type with similar slow downward trends in EPL and taxation, we might predict that Germany will follow suit in the near future. While Germany came to represent a rejection of the competition state thesis, Ireland's performance as its standard bearer seems altogether more muted. Having demonstrated the most extreme scores in previous studies (see Horsfall, 2010), Ireland failed to stand out in this study. This is in part due to the fact that the fuzzy-set methodology negated the impact of extreme behaviour on one dimension as a compensatory factor on others. The Irish case is still extremely interesting and perhaps still represents the best candidate for a future inhabitation of the pure type. Ireland populated this type in 2002, but by 2007 found itself back in the SNL+ category, with a reasonably weak membership score of only 0.57. The fact that Ireland appears so weak is not a reflection of a low score in the welfare, tax, or EPL sets, rather a low score in the non-membership of activation set. Ireland's activation score of 0.43 is by no means emblematic of a wholesale rejection of activation on the part of the Irish government. Indeed, there is always the possibility that future data will show an Irish readjustment to redress the impact of rising unemployment. Ultimately, while at the time of writing things may seem less clear, as of 2007 the Irish competition state is still alive. The fact that it seems less strong is a reflection of the model underpinning the SNL+ type rather than a shift away from competition state behaviours. In essence, Ireland is unevenly punished for not quite demonstrating membership of the active set. Of course a clear limitation to this study is the fact that at the time of writing, the most recent data related to 2007. Whilst it is quite correct that no great shifts are witnessed over the time-period covered here, we leave the story just as the global financial crisis begins to take hold. How this will impact the long-term direction of countries’ welfare states, or competition states, is still unclear. Immediate fiscal stimulus programmes, running contrary to the principles of the competition state have been followed in some countries by rather severe austerity programmes. Even where change has been witnessed though, approaches have been mixed. Germany for example has reduced its overall commitment to social programmes, in particular unemployment insurance, whilst strengthening support for the family (Fleckenstein, Saunders, & Seeleib-Kaiser, 2011). The UK, which is not classified as a liberal competition state in 2007 on account of its relatively large social expenditure has embarked upon a seemingly stringent austerity programme, however social expenditure has increased. It may be that the financial crisis has provided political cover for political elites to entrench competition state behaviours or it may be that the crisis has enabled politicians to ‘bring the State back in’ (Schmidt, 2009). What will be interesting is whether competition state behaviours strengthen or relaxpost 2007. Also, if a strengthening of competition state tendencies occurs, will this be across the board, or will countries simply appear as stronger members of the competition state categories they have been shown to inhabit here prior to the economic crisis? It may indeed be that the economic crash represents an environment in which path dependency can be shaken to a certain degree and as such, profound changes can be made to countries’ approaches to social policy. However, in 2007 at the onset of this crisis the overall picture presented in this study does substantiate some of the observations made in previous work. There is also undoubtedly a general shift towards the competition state, with only Germany having resisted at this stage. For many of the recent converts to the competition state, this shift is largely driven by taxation policy, however in many cases trends suggest that this will not remain the case. Only a few of the more recent additions to the overall competition state project have cleaved to either the active or neo liberal models however, suggesting that while these countries recognise the need to harness the global economy, at this stage they are not prepared to fundamentally scale back their welfare state. 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Configurational comparative analysis: Qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) and related techniques . 2009 ; CA : Sage Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Footnotes 1 Only data for 2007 is presented in this manner, with simplified diagrams illustrating shifts over time presented at a later stage of the discussion. 2 The USA ranks 87th out of 139 in terms of the competitiveness of its macroeconomic environment, which places it just below Vietnam and Nepal and one place in above the Dominican Republic. 3 France scores 0.51 while Italy scores 0.53. © 2013 Policy and Society Associates (APSS) This article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (https://academic.oup.com/journals/pages/open_access/funder_policies/chorus/standard_publication_model)
TI - A fuzzy set ideal-type approach to measuring the competition state
JO - Policy & Society
DO - 10.1016/j.polsoc.2013.10.006
DA - 2013-12-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/a-fuzzy-set-ideal-type-approach-to-measuring-the-competition-state-XvC1vO3BIl
SP - 345
EP - 356
VL - 32
IS - 4
DP - DeepDyve
ER -