TY - JOUR
AU1 - Susanne, Jaspars,
AB - Abstract Inequality is a major determinant of access to food in Sudan, with power, wealth and services concentrated within a central Sudan elite, leaving much of the country marginalized, impoverished and suffering repeated emergencies. This article discusses how food aid both contributed to the state’s exclusionary development process and tried but failed to assist crisis-affected populations in its peripheries. In the 1950s, food aid explicitly aimed to support the state but from the late 1980s, emergency food aid bypassed the state and its manipulation led to economic and political benefits for the Sudan government and its closely-aligned private sector. By the 2000s, the Sudan government controlled international food aid and established its own food aid apparatus, which it could use to further its political and military goals. New resilience-based food technologies developed in the aftermath of the 2008 food crisis, and applied in Darfur, have unintentionally facilitated the government’s strategies. This article argues that the ‘actually existing development’ resulting indirectly from food aid has benefited the government and private sector but has left most people facing a protracted emergency. Sudan has received food aid for more than fifty years, and has experienced an emergency requiring external assistance every year since 1984. In 2010, the Food and Agricultural Organisation (FAO) included Sudan on its list of countries in protracted crisis, based on the duration of crisis, large-scale humanitarian assistance needed and its economic and food security status.1 It was the top recipient of humanitarian aid in the first decade of the 2000s and was in the top ten percent of food aid recipients for nineteen years between 1988 and 2010.2 The Darfur conflict led to the World Food Programme’s (WFP) largest global operation in 2005. In 2016, food distribution continued, but in reduced quantities despite ongoing conflict and displacement and levels of acute malnutrition well above emergency thresholds.3 This article argues that food aid rarely met its intended objectives of improving production, saving lives or supporting livelihoods, but unintentionally supported Sudan’s unequal development process, transformed the state’s own food aid apparatus and has become an intimate part of the country’s political economy. The effect of food aid in Sudan can be seen as an example of what Mark Duffield has called ‘actually existing development’: the development which occurs indirectly or in spite of official development efforts. He refers in particular to the shadow economies which evolve when structural adjustment or globalization reduce formal employment and income earning opportunities.4 In a later article, Duffield states that the term originates from ‘actually existing socialism’ to describe the contrast between positive ideology of socialism as a worker’s paradise and the negative conditions of shortages, regimentation and corruption.5 This article uses the term to mean the development which occurred indirectly as a result of food aid and the actual effect on crisis-affected populations in contrast to the positive ideology of resilience. In Sudan, food aid was first used explicitly to support the state but even when international aid agencies bypassed the state, it transformed the state because the Sudan government used its experience to establish its own food aid apparatus. As this article will show, government food aid is used largely to maintain or attract government support and to maintain friendly alliances with neighbouring countries, much in the way of international food aid. The indirect effect of food aid went beyond the frequently described benefits to local authorities or leaders from diversion or from their strengthened authority through involvement in distribution.6 This study was inspired by Michel Foucault’s analysis of power as not simply being exercised by the state but working through a range of tactics and techniques.7 As such, food aid can be considered a technology of governance because it involves a range of policies and practices, authorities and organizations, and has the power to shape behaviour, attitudes and social relations. Furthermore, Foucault emphasizes the importance of examining the actual function of practices, even if they appear to fail in meeting their intended aims.8 The study builds on existing scholarship using Foucauldian approaches to analyse the effects of aid. James Ferguson’s research in Lesotho, for example, found that even though a World Bank agricultural project failed to improve agriculture, it did result in an expansion of bureaucratic state power, including through the political control gained through food-for-work projects.9 Jenny Edkins similarly found that in Eritrea, food-for-work projects had failed in either providing income for the poorest or to improve production or reduce dependency on food aid. Its actual effect was to create a group of vulnerable peasants to be monitored and disciplined, and to increase the power of central administration, international organizations and commercial companies through a whole apparatus of advice, selection, transport, distribution, and supervision.10 In Sudan, David Keen used a Foucauldian approach to analyse the ‘benefits of famine’. During the conflict and famine in Bahr Al-Ghazal in 1988, international food aid operations only reached famine-affected populations in small quantities. This not only exacerbated the famine and was part of the Sudan government’s counter-insurgency, but had important benefits for certain groups. Merchants benefited from increased grain prices and lower livestock prices, and commercial farmers in the north benefited because populations displaced through conflict became a source of cheap labour.11 Rather than analyzing the effect of a single project or famine response, this article is unique in analysing the effect of food aid over a period of fifty years. It shows that the manipulation of food aid during the Bahr Al-Ghazal famine in Sudan was not an isolated incident. The manipulation of food aid for political and economic ends continued to evolve over the following two decades, from continued benefits through delays in the 1990s to a massive expansion of the transport sector in the 2000s associated with the Darfur food aid operation, and finally a convergence between aid agency practices and counter-insurgency from 2008 onwards. This article focuses in particular on the power effects produced through the interaction between food aid and state and non-state forms of governance. The state was not only strengthened directly by its involvement in food distribution, but it was transformed through a process of learning and adaptation over a period of fifty years. The analysis is based on an examination of policy documents and evaluations going back 50 years and on interviews with government officials, traders, transporters, aid workers and beneficiaries conducted during fieldwork in El Fasher (North Darfur) and Khartoum in 2012 and 2013. In total, the research included over 80 interviews (unstructured and semi-structured) and focus groups discussions. The article starts with an overview of inequality as a determinant of food insecurity in Sudan and is followed by an analysis of the effects of food aid within this context. The evolution of food aid practices is then divided into three parts. First, food aid as state support; second, food aid as livelihood support which led to a struggle for control of food aid between government and aid agencies; and third, food aid for resilience promotion which converged with the ‘Sudanisation’ of food aid and Sudan government control. This is followed by a section which argues that contemporary aid practices facilitate government counter-insurgency strategies and policies of return in Darfur. As, over the past fifty years, most food aid practices have been tested in Sudan, the findings of this research have wider applicability to aid practices globally. Inequality and food security in Sudan Access to food is highly unequal in Sudan. Inequality is both social and geographical: wealth and power has been concentrated mostly within northern tribes in Sudan’s riverine heartland. This inequality goes back as far as colonial times, when the colonial government of the Anglo-Egyptian condominium (from 1898 to 1956) granted tenancies along the Nile to traditional and religious leaders to buy their loyalty. This created an interconnected northern political and economic elite in central Sudan which dominated the independent government and which immediately led to civil war with the underrepresented south. The domination of central Sudan in terms of representation in government and allocation of resources has persisted.12 It is not surprising then that the only parts of Sudan which did not suffer from emergency levels of acute malnutrition in 2013 are those in central Sudan.13 The maintenance of wealth and power within central Sudan has persisted despite several changes in government, including three military coups and two popular uprisings. Jaafar Nimeiri (1969–1983) and Omar Al-Bashir’s (1989–present) coups led to the most sustained attempts at transforming both state and society. Both also had policies of national food self-sufficiency but ended up increasing vulnerability to famine and governing through patronage, violence and fear. Nimeiri replaced native administration (traditional leadership) with a system of local councils, which increased vulnerability because it undermined traditional leaders in their role of protecting communities from famine and new government structures were underfunded. In addition, changes in administrative boundaries led to conflict as one tribe could now control the territory of another.14 In the 1970s, the country achieved food self-sufficiency for a brief period by attracting foreign investment for agricultural development in central Sudan and by a peace agreement with the south.15 In contrast to neighbouring countries, Sudan was able to avoid famine in 1973/4 because the government offered relief and crisis-affected people were able to find work on farms in central Sudan.16 By the end of the decade, however, many of the development projects had failed and the country’s economy entered a period of decline. Failure to pay debts led to a reduction in public sector services and the sale of state assets. In 1983, in an attempt to hold on to power Nimeiri made an alliance with the Muslim Brothers which, together with changes in regional government, led to a resumption of civil war in the south.17 Of key importance to later conflicts is Nimeiri’s use of local militia to fight this war, which remained a strategy throughout the war in southern Sudan and more recently in Darfur. Militia strategies have led to some of Sudan’s most severe famines and humanitarian crises as the aim has been to systemically destroy the livelihoods of those perceived to support the enemy. In 1984/5, drought, marginalization and economic crisis led to severe famine in Darfur, Kordofan and Red Sea State. Nimeiri’s failure to acknowledge the famine led to a popular uprising and ultimately his overthrow in April 1985. The international relief operation that followed was the first of many. Darfur subsequently experienced periods of food scarcity and famine, followed by food distribution in 1988, 1991–94, 1996–97 and 2001–02, and a severe conflict-related humanitarian crisis from 2003 onwards. In its revolutionary phase (1989–99), Omar Al-Bashir’s government of National Salvation aimed to transform all social, economic and administrative institutions into agents of Islam. It was driven to a large extent by its ideological leader Hassan Al-Turabi. Their economic programme included expansion of commercial agriculture with aims of food self-sufficiency, trade liberalization and privatization of state-owned enterprises, many of which ended up in the hands of Islamists.18 Both the political and economic programme involved the use of force. The expansion of commercial agriculture for example, was closely linked with conflict, the forced confiscation of land and the use of displaced populations as agricultural labourers. The revolutionary phase ended when Al-Bashir dissolved parliament in 1999 and removed Turabi from power. Some of the key Islamists joined the rebellion in Darfur. In the 2000s, the so-called ideological phase was over and the regime maintained power largely by managing ethnic and political allegiances, and by the use of militia and its security apparatus. At the same time as the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, Sudan as a whole experienced the largest period of economic growth in its history as a result of revenue from oil exploration, Middle Eastern and Asian investment in telecommunications, and commercial farming.19 Increases in government revenue were, however, spent on defence, national security and public order rather than on education and health.20 Wealth and services remained concentrated in central Sudan. The remainder of this article analyses how food aid has been part of these historical processes, from supporting or strengthening the state to attempting to alleviate what became a chronic emergency in Sudan’s peripheries and its unintended consequences. Food aid as state-support When Sudan first received food aid, in 1958, it was for explicitly political purposes. The US offered food aid as part of the Eisenhower doctrine, under which a country could request US economic and military assistance to defend itself against threats from another state, in particular the Soviet Union. With Egypt’s purchase of Soviet weapons in 1955, Western influence in Sudan became of strategic importance. Sudan at first rejected US aid because it required accepting an anti-Egypt stance, which would exacerbate division within government, but it made an informal request soon after a US mission in 1957, most likely for economic reasons.21 The acceptance of US aid led to fierce resistance from opposition parties, including strikes and demonstrations, and the acceptance of food aid could not be confirmed until after a military coup. It was the start of an ongoing struggle within the Sudanese government to resist food aid on political or ideological grounds but to accept it on the grounds of economic need. Food aid increased in the 1970s when socialist regimes were established in neighbouring Ethiopia and Libya, large numbers of refugees and returnees entered Sudan, and WFP established its first development project. The global food crisis in 1974 led to more development-oriented food aid. Like development programmes generally, this was state-centred and promoted modern agricultural practices, industrialization and urbanization. In Sudan, it supported the country’s existing unequal development process. Programme food aid was sold and formed the basis of an urban bread subsidy and the proceeds from the sale were used to develop infrastructure (roads, canals) for modern agriculture in central Sudan. WFP’s project food aid was similarly focussed on central Sudan, including food aid for resettlement on irrigated schemes along the Nile, timber, dairy, gum Arabic and school-feeding projects. Darfur and Sudan’s other peripheries were largely excluded. Food aid supported government budgets and reduced the threat of social unrest associated with rapid urbanization and with large refugee influxes as evidenced by the inevitable riots when bread subsidies have been removed. Refugees and returnees (after the 1972 Addis Ababa peace agreement with southern Sudan) received emergency food aid. At first, this was also done through the Sudanese state, but in the late 1970s and 1980s international NGOs expanded their operations. Donors and UN agencies preferred to bypass the state, which was now considered weak and corrupt following years of economic decline. From this time onwards, international agencies worked directly with communities to save the lives and livelihoods of crisis-affected populations and indirectly influenced the policies of the Sudan government. Struggle for control over emergency food aid The 1980s and 1990s were a struggle for control over food aid between international agencies and the Sudan government and saw the integration of food aid into Sudan’s political economy. From the mid-1980s, food aid to Sudan increased, first in response to famine in Darfur, Kordofan and Red Sea State and later in response to the humanitarian consequences of conflict in the south. The quantity of emergency food aid and the numbers of international NGOs increased. Whereas emergency food aid was previously largely provided to refugees in camps, from the 1980s onwards, international NGOs provided food aid directly to crisis-affected populations to support livelihoods at community level. The 1980s also saw a shift from the provision of food aid for development in central Sudan, to emergency food aid in Sudan’s peripheries. In the 1984/85 international relief operation, despite donor requirements to target the most vulnerable, food aid was slow to reach rural areas as government authorities prioritized urban populations. In Darfur, it was only in 1986 when Save the Children (SC-UK) acquired sufficient staff and transport capacity that they could ensure food reached rural populations in substantial quantities.22 Sudanese officials resented the ‘invasion’ of International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs), their bypassing of government and the limited involvement of Sudanese staff in international relief operations. This resentment worsened with additional INGOs coming to work with conflict-affected populations in southern Sudan. The national Relief and Rehabilitation Commission responded with a programme of Sudanisation: regulating INGO activities, promoting a shift to rehabilitation, and the creation of local NGOs.23 This has remained an aim of the Sudanese authorities in the succeeding three decades. At the same time, food aid was manipulated for political and economic purposes. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, food deliveries were late and well-below distribution plans. Delays and under-distribution in 1984–85 were due in part to transporters maximizing profits by using a cheap but ineffective means of transport (the railways) and delivering food only to more accessible places or after the rains when transport was cheaper.24 With a weakening formal economy, government budgets shrank and food aid was diverted to feed soldiers or to subsidize local government. Traders manipulated markets for greater profit and the state appropriated land for agricultural schemes. The Western Relief Operation (WRO) in response to drought and food insecurity in western Sudan in 1988 provides a good example of the failure of local institutions to prioritize humanitarian concerns over profit. The Agricultural Bank of Sudan (ABS) exported good quality stocks rather than keep them for relief because this achieved higher prices and after delays, the price of the remaining stocks increased. The private contractor hired to deliver food to Darfur only delivered to easily accessible places. Only about 30 percent of the planned deliveries were made.25 The restriction of relief to populations in southern Sudan perceived to support the opposition was even more severe. Bahr Al-Ghazal, in southern Sudan, and South Kordofan, to which people fled, received only limited food aid allocations and even less actually reached conflict-affected populations. The interests of government, traders, commercial farmers and the military converged in restricting food aid. Police and military escorts carried goods to sell at high prices in the south, and took local products to sell in the north. Traders and soldiers sold sorghum at high prices and bought cattle at low prices from famine victims. Commercial farmers benefited from cheap labour as displaced populations sought work.26 The resulting famine was one of the most severe in Sudan, and ultimately led to Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS) in 1989, an operation in which the UN negotiated access to all war-affected populations. This set a pattern for the remainder of the 1990s: continuous food distribution in Sudan’s peripheries (including Darfur and southern Sudan), and manipulation of food aid by government and a closely-linked private sector for political and economic ends. In Darfur, all food distributions in the 1990s were late and quantities were well-below estimated needs. Evaluations from the 1990s concluded that relief operations failed to meet their intended impacts of meeting food needs, relieving food insecurity or protecting livelihoods.27 The decade started with famine in northern Sudan in 1991 but during its revolutionary phase Al-Bashir’s government of National Salvation resisted international food aid because it conflicted with its aim of self-sufficiency. It took six months for the Sudan government and donors to agree on the size of the ‘food deficit’.28 For international agencies, assessments were tightly controlled, with malnutrition and mortality data being particularly sensitive. Any mention of famine or food aid needs was highly controversial. Despite the ideological stance, both government and the private sector benefited. International aid operations were a key source of foreign currency for the government. Contracts, for food aid transport for example, could only be in Sudanese currency and foreign currency was held by the Bank of Sudan. Khartoum’s largest trader estimated that 70 percent of money brought in went to the central bank.29 Contracts for transporting food aid often went to companies closely linked to the government, or in some cases owned by serving Members of Parliament. Preventing government support through food aid was difficult. In 1994, SC-UK tried to overcome the monopoly of two parastatal transport companies in Darfur by organizing transport direct from Al-Obeid (in Kordofan) to Darfuri villages, but the newly-hired drivers refused and SC-UK paid more when rains closed the roads.30 In southern Sudan, despite OLS’s aim to assist all war-affected populations, the Sudan government could deny access for relief deliveries and did so regularly. Bahr Al-Ghazal did not receive OLS relief until 1992 and denial of humanitarian access was part of the reason for the famine in southern Sudan in 1998.31 Some aid, however, did go to opposition-held areas in the south and for this reason government officials viewed the 1990s as the time when food aid became politicized. They saw OLS as supporting rebel movements and ultimately contributing to the secession of the south. In the north, restriction of INGO activities was tightened with a country agreement, requirements to limit international staff and to twin with Sudanese NGOs.32 A key aspect of Sudan’s drive towards self-sufficiency was the expansion of mechanized agriculture. Agricultural expansion was closely linked with displacement and forced acquisition of land, in particular in South Kordofan’s Nuba mountains and in areas around Wau in Bahr Al-Ghazal. Limiting food aid to rural areas also encouraged displacement: the government had excluded the Nuba mountains from OLS. Displaced populations were resettled in ‘peace villages’ and worked as labourers on commercial farms. Limited amounts of government relief, and some food-for-work, were provided in the ‘peace villages’, whose purpose was not only to provide agricultural labour but also to transform the Nuba’s cultural and political identity as part of the Islamist project.33 As the 1990s wore on, rather than resisting food aid, the Sudan government learnt the language of international aid agencies and endorsed food security assessments which decreased estimated quantities of food aid, encouraged a shift from relief to rehabilitation and promoted local purchase. Aid agencies and Sudan government policy converged on these issues, but their motivations were different: for aid agencies these changes were to improve food security programmes but for government it also supported their ideology of self-sufficiency and at the same time provided economic benefits to the Khartoum regime. For example, aid agencies promoted local purchase to provide a faster and more cost-effective response and to avoid damaging local markets. When donors agreed on local purchase in 1996, however, the government suggested purchase from the Agricultural Bank of Sudan. Donors refused and six month open tenders were agreed but the contract was given to a company with close links to government.34 The evaluation of the 2001 relief operation in Darfur summarizes the issues well: late recognition of the crisis led donors to purchase locally, commercial farmers and Khartoum-based merchants and transporters received lucrative contracts in an emergency, and could transport cash crops and livestock at cheap prices back to central Sudan. When relief was delayed so much, and rains had started, air drops were organized using a private air transport company with close government links.35 These trends changed and evolved with the humanitarian response to the Darfur conflict. The Sudanisation of food aid In the second decade of the twenty-first century, the Sudanisation of food aid included the restriction of INGOs and promotion of local NGOs, a national strategic grain reserve and government food distribution. Whilst international food aid was less important to the country’s economy, the government’s 50 years’ experience of international food aid fed into the establishment of its own food aid apparatus. From the early 2000s, traders and transporters benefited from large WFP contracts, the strategic reserve, and from the sale of food aid by beneficiaries in Darfur. Government food aid to maintain or attract government support became a particularly important strategy when international food aid decreased from 2008 onwards. For a brief period in 2004 and 2005, international agencies could access conflict-affected populations in Darfur with relative ease. Rather than intervene militarily to stop the conflict and protect civilians, Western governments put pressure on the Sudan government to facilitate the delivery of aid.36 During this period, WFP launched its largest operation in Darfur – and globally – and the humanitarian operation for the first time successfully reduced levels of malnutrition and mortality and supported livelihoods.37 The large quantities of food aid also supported many traders in Darfur, as beneficiaries sold food aid to meet other needs, and large Khartoum-based transport companies expanded massively with WFP support. They also made profits from transporting the food aid sold by beneficiaries back to Khartoum because in 2005 and 2006, wheat and sorghum was cheaper in Darfur than in central Sudan.38 Two of the main transport companies used by WFP now have multinational operations. From 2006, however, the government tightened control over international food aid. Following the first failed peace agreement, access to rebel-held areas became more difficult. Attacks on international NGOs and hijacking of cars decreased access further. In March 2009, 13 INGOs were expelled and three local NGOs suspended after the ICC indicted President Bashir for genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity and issued a warrant for his arrest. Four of the expelled agencies distributed food aid.39 By 2011, access to rebel-held areas was almost non-existent, including for WFP. When conflict started in Blue Nile and South Kordofan in 2011, government officials were determined to keep international agencies out. After their experience in southern Sudan and Darfur, they made sure that food aid was provided and led by the government.40 After the INGO expulsions in 2009, the President announced that aid would be Sudanised. National NGOs took over much of the work of the expelled INGOs and remaining INGOs made new agreements with local partners. In Darfur, by 2013, WFP’s main partners were community-based organizations and government ministries.41 From 2010, data for regular WFP food security assessments and monitoring has been collected by the Ministry of Health and Ministry of Agriculture. This facilitates access but also gives government authorities control over information. It can take many months for the publication of results to be authorized. The establishment of the national strategic reserve in 2001 is an essential component of the Sudanisation of food aid. In Darfur, various ad hoc initiatives were taken to establish state-wide or regional reserves after the 1985 famine and throughout the 1990s as part of the strategy to become self-sufficient.42 At national level, the ABS was responsible for national reserves up to 1992 and again from 1996. In 2001, oil revenue provided the government with sufficient funds to establish the national Strategic Reserve Authority. By 2011 and 2012, official figures state that just over 350,000 metric tonnes (MT) was held in the reserve.43 The official objective of the reserve is price stabilization and to act as a purchase and sales agent, and to address food deficits in different parts of the country.44 The latter has included distributions to emergency-affected populations in Darfur, Kordofan and Blue Nile. In practice, the strategic reserve has not acted to stabilize prices and has provided emergency food aid largely in return for government support. Rather than buying cereal when it is cheap and selling when expensive, the reserve does the opposite. Not purchasing immediately after the harvest allows brokers and middlemen to buy grain cheaply and sell it at higher prices to the reserve. In addition, its preferred method of deferred payment gives an advantage to banks and large traders.45 WFP indirectly supported this process because when it purchased food locally, it bought from one or two large traders with access to the strategic reserve. These were the only traders who could provide food quickly in sufficient quantities.46 According to the traders themselves, the government has a policy that traders should purchase from the reserve for WFP tenders.47 The government has used the reserve largely for political purposes. Internationally, it has learnt from US food aid and has provided food aid to strategically important countries. It donated food to Chad, Ethiopia and Somalia in 2011/12. Government food has also been used to ensure cheap food supplies to urban areas by providing subsidized feed for poultry farms close to Khartoum, Gezira and Kassala and thus ensuring low meat prices.48 Low bread prices in Khartoum and other urban areas are maintained through preferential exchange rates, whereby the Ministry of Commerce issues licences to commercial importers to import wheat at these rates. In Darfur, the government used food aid to maintain or attract political support. In the early stages of the conflict, it provided food to Arab populations, from which it recruited militia, because they were left out of WFP’s food distribution. WFP’s distribution initially focussed on displaced populations.49 In North Darfur, allocations of government food aid ranged from just under 2,000 MT in 2003 to almost 13,000 MT in 2005.50 When WFP reduced food aid from 2008 onwards, the strategic importance of government food aid increased. In 2009, for example, Sudan’s Humanitarian Aid Commission distributed food aid to areas held by rebel movements who had signed the Darfur Peace Agreement in 2006. Food aid was provided to areas of Al-Malha locality from 2009 to 2012, during which the town was controlled by government and part of the surrounding area by the SLA. In 2013, the government organized food distributions in response to floods, and in 2014 to parts of North Darfur that had been attacked by rebels, or had been affected by high food prices.51 Food aid to support government employees also remained a priority. The government even started making inroads into some of the biggest camps, to which it had no access in the early days of the conflict. According to some interviewees, IDPs were offered food and financial incentives to bring them over to the government’s side. This is easier when other forms of assistance are being reduced. Complicity of the international aid community Donors and international agencies have failed to effectively challenge government denials of access in Darfur, South Kordofan and Blue Nile and have reduced food aid in Darfur in the face of ongoing and worsening conflict and levels of acute malnutrition well above generally-accepted emergency thresholds. This has facilitated the Sudan government’s counter-insurgency in Darfur and its policy of dismantling the camps for internally displaced populations. In contrast to the 1990s and OLS, donors and UN agencies have not been able to mount a coordinated challenge to government access denials. The War on Terror has split donors. For the US, Sudan is seen as both an enemy Islamist state and a provider of intelligence. In the early stages of the Darfur conflict, pressuring the government over Darfur was thought to risk the peace process in the south and Chinese interests watered down Security Council resolutions.52 In 2013, donor representatives commented that they could not negotiate with an indicted war criminal and that lack of access led to lack of information on the humanitarian situation which in turn made it difficult to argue for greater access.53 WFP continues to negotiate access to insecure areas but does not challenge denials on the basis of insecurity.54 In Darfur, WFP has required clearance from Sudan’s Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC), national security and military intelligence for deliveries into rural North Darfur since 2010,55 and access to rebel-held areas has been almost non-existent since 2011. INGOs largely stay silent for fear of being expelled. This has enabled some access to conflict-affected populations in government areas, but compromises humanitarian principles of humanity (alleviate suffering wherever it is found), impartiality (provide assistance on the basis of need) and neutrality (not taking sides in hostilities). By 2014, both international and government food aid in Darfur was confined to government-held areas. In Blue Nile and South Kordofan, access is limited even to government-held areas. With the 2016 EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative, also known as the Khartoum Process, the EU collaborates with the Sudan government to stem migration flows into Europe. Working with the Sudan government no longer appears an obstacle as domestic concerns about migration to Europe have overridden human rights concerns about the government’s actions in Sudan.56 The reduction in food aid since 2008 was in part a result of access and funding constraints but has also been justified by the adoption of food-based resilience approaches. Resilience has been defined as the ability to resist, recover from and adapt to shocks, and in Sudan, as elsewhere, improving resilience has become a key aim of humanitarian operations.57 USAID, for example, sees a shift from general food distribution to food-for-work and food vouchers in Darfur as a means of building resilience because it brings variety into diets and strengthens the economy.58 Many donors view improving nutrition as key to resilience because stronger, healthier populations are considered better able to endure emergencies and conflict.59 According to WFP’s global strategic plan, food assistance can improve resilience by supporting nutrition, establishing safety nets and working with the private sector. WFP Sudan implements different types of feeding programmes, food vouchers for part of their beneficiaries, and promotes food-for-assets and seasonal rations for a proportion of the population in rural areas.60 Much of this involves working with the private sector: with traders and transporters to supply food for voucher beneficiaries and with companies to produce nutritious supplementary foods and micro-nutrient powder.61 Feeding programmes include integrated supplementary feeding for mothers and children under-three in areas with persistently high prevalence of acute malnutrition, seasonal supplementary rations for children under-five, as well as supplementary feeding for moderately malnourished children and therapeutic feeding for severely malnourished children. Integrated supplementary feeding includes both specialized foods and education on food and hygiene practices.62 Such a focus on treatment and behaviour change firmly places responsibility for addressing malnutrition with the individual and can be used to justify the withdrawal of general food distributions. In Darfur, quantitative food security assessments provided further justification. WFP uses the Food Consumption Score (FCS) in its assessments as a means to estimate the severity of food insecurity, but a number of researchers have found that the FCS underestimates food insecurity compared to other indicators.63 In addition, new comprehensive vulnerability assessments in 2011 and 2012 were conducted in the post-harvest period and gave the impression of a reduction in food insecurity despite increases in violence, harvest failure, and raised food prices.64 Aid agencies assumed that households had developed new coping strategies to meet part of their food needs, as evidenced by WFP’s assessments which include a range of them.65 This was also linked to the perceived need to reduce dependency on food aid. As one aid worker explained: ‘we need to get people back to production [but] otherwise… people have developed new skills, and have some coping mechanisms’.66 Little information is, however, available about the threats to livelihoods, the livelihoods options that people have and the risks that different livelihoods strategies entail post-2009. This includes information on the effect of reductions in food aid. Earlier studies show that displaced populations were largely dependent on precarious, marginal and unsustainable strategies such as brickmaking, firewood collection and charcoal making or casual labour such as domestic work or seasonal farm work. Theft and begging also became common in some of the camps.67 For rural populations on the government side, strategies have become increasingly militarized and might include demanding protection fees (for example to protect convoys of trucks or for farmers to stay on their farmland), joining militia or paramilitary groups.68 For those who do not find new ways of ‘coping’, outmigration of one or more family members appears to be one of the few remaining options. The effectiveness of new aid practices also needs to be examined more carefully. While food vouchers have generally been seen as positive, it requires well-functioning markets and local food availability, neither of which is the case in North Darfur where the majority of WFP’s voucher beneficiaries are located. Voucher interventions have been relatively well-researched and evaluated, in comparison to food-for-assets and other targeted food distributions. WFP’s 2013 country evaluation states that only 2 percent of WFP’s beneficiaries received food-for-assets, most likely due to the difficulties of implementing such projects with limited access and ongoing conflict, and the necessary mobility of populations in rural areas.69 The majority of WFP’s assistance in Darfur is therefore targeted free food rations but the last study of food aid targeting was done in 2008, when food aid was in fact not targeted at the poorest. Feeding programmes suffer from low coverage: for example, coverage of Community Managed Acute Malnutrition programmes was found to be only 32 percent in an evaluation conducted in December 2013.70 It appears therefore, that in terms of food security in Darfur, the ideology of resilience in effect meant a reduction in food aid,71 high levels of acute malnutrition, and little information about the ongoing risks to livelihoods or the effectiveness of food-based resilience approaches. There is little indication that options for viable livelihoods in Darfur have increased since 2009. Resilience-oriented food aid practices and the reduction in food aid did have a number of alternative functions for aid agencies and government. For aid agencies, quantitative and medicalised practices can more easily be remotely-managed which is essential if international agencies are to continue working in insecure environments. As Duffield notes, the aid world has become increasingly dependent on remote management and digital technologies whether because of denial of access or because of perceptions of an unpredictable and dangerous operating environment.72 For this reason, he also links the shift towards remote management with resilience approaches, which promote individual adaptation to uncertainty.73 Second, by focussing on individual behaviour and actions as causes of malnutrition and food security, less attention is given to the wider social and political causes thus enabling aid agencies to continue to work in Sudan’s highly politicized environment. However, this also removes government responsibility for causing malnutrition and food insecurity through its uneven development, its war strategies, and the manipulation of food aid. It allows the Sudan government to continue its political use of food aid and removes international responsibility for protecting civilians. As such, it makes aid agencies complicit with the actions of the Sudan government. In addition, the reduction in food aid facilitates the government’s counter-insurgency strategy and its policy of emptying the camps. People within rebel-held areas, or where rebels are known to be present (such as parts of North Darfur), have received little or no assistance since 2010. Since this time, the government’s Darfur strategy for displaced populations has been to encourage return, or at least encouraging displaced populations to become peri-urban settlers, preferably close to their village of origin. The majority of displaced populations have resisted this, because of ongoing attacks in their village or because their political leaders have not signed peace agreements. A reduction in food aid, however, makes it easier for government to buy the allegiance of some displaced with food or financial incentives or force them to leave the camp and even Darfur. For crisis-affected populations in Darfur, resilience means little assistance in the face of ongoing hardship and crisis. Conclusion In Sudan, the ‘actually existing development’ which occurred indirectly as a result of food aid has a number of components, including financial benefits to government and the private sector, a process of learning to manage and control international organizations and the food aid they provide, and the establishment of Sudan’s own food aid apparatus and its use to control populations. Food aid has both supported Sudan’s unequal development process and tried to alleviate its consequences. Food aid was initially used to support the state in its policy of prioritizing commercial agriculture in central Sudan and preventing social unrest associated with rapid urbanization. Darfur, and other peripheries, were not only excluded from agricultural support but also received little school-feeding or other food aid projects until 1984. When economic decline, political marginalisation and drought eventually led to famine in 1984, international food aid became the main response. Food aid and crisis in Sudan’s peripheries was almost continuous from 1984 onwards, whilst wealth and services remained concentrated in the centre. Despite trying to bypass the state, these thirty years of emergency food aid has unintentionally led to the transformation of the Sudanese state through the Sudanisation of food aid. The Sudanisation of food aid has involved controlling international food aid and the agencies that provide it, and the establishment of a national strategic reserve, national NGOs and government food distribution. Control has been exerted through the denial of access and by using INGOs own language of promoting self-reliance, local purchase of food aid and the adoption of assessment methods which reduce food aid. As for much international food aid, the Sudan government uses its own food aid largely as a political tool. It uses food aid to promote friendly relations with neighbouring countries and to attract political support at home. Many Sudan government officials are now experts in food aid. The indirect effect of long-term food aid in Sudan therefore goes beyond effects such as the strengthening of government control in contested areas or increasing the power of government agencies, whether through diversion or supervision and surveillance.74 In Sudan, government agencies, rebel movements, leaders of displaced populations have all been strengthened through their involvement in food aid at various points in time. The larger effect is, however, that through a process of learning, adaptation and resistance, the state has developed its own food aid apparatus, modelled on that of the West. With the exception of 2004 and 2005, food aid in Darfur has not had its intended impact of increasing production, saving lives or supporting livelihoods. In the 1980s and 1990s, a combination of government resistance, donor reluctance, and profit-boosting delays by transporters and traders led to delayed distributions of food aid well-below estimated needs. In 2004 and 2005, food aid successfully met food needs and supported livelihoods but information on the effectiveness of food aid operations since then is limited. Food aid did, however, provide considerable benefits for the Sudan government and its closely-linked private sector. Government, army, and trader manipulation of food aid, as found by Keen in the Bahr El Ghazal famine, continued and evolved over time.75 Food aid continued to provide foreign exchange, local government subsidies and lucrative contracts for transporters and traders in the early days to a massive boost for Sudan’s transport sector in the 2000s. Furthermore, the restriction of food aid to some groups and the manipulation of markets provided additional benefits to merchants, soldiers and commercial farmers. In the 2000s, Khartoum-based traders benefited from transporting sold food aid back to central Sudan. Finally, the reduction in food aid in Darfur from 2008 facilitated government counter-insurgency and the strategic use of government food aid to increase government support and empty the camps. The food-based resilience technologies promoted in Darfur from 2008 onwards facilitate government insurgency and hide the ongoing conflict, the constraints in providing assistance, and its effect on Darfur’s population. Food aid has been reduced because of access denials which have not been coherently challenged, because of assumptions that people have developed coping strategies, and because of a medicalised nutrition which focuses on treatment and behavioural practices at the level of the individual. Little is known about ongoing risks to livelihoods, the impact of the reduction in food aid, or the effectiveness of targeted food distributions. It appears that Sudan’s, and in particular Darfur’s, ‘actually existing development’ means food aid benefits government and the private sector, but for crisis-affected populations in Sudan’s peripheries it means little or no food assistance and being dependent on a limited range of precarious and risky strategies to try and survive in a context of permanent emergency. The implications of the research presented in this article go beyond Sudan. Sudan is not the only country which has received long-term food aid, or where remote-management or aid practices to promote resilience have become the norm. Within Africa, Ethiopia, Somalia and Kenya are all long-term and large-scale food aid recipients and will have experienced similar changes in international food aid practices over the past fifty years.76 This article has shown the importance of analysing the actual political effects of these practices over time, and the dangers of depoliticized resilience practices in normalizing violence and food crises. Susanne Jaspars (sj43@soas.ac.uk) is a Research Associate at the Food Studies Centre, SOAS, University of London, and at the time of submitting this article, an Honorary Research Associate at the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies, University of Bristol. Thanks to Mark Duffield, Youssif El-Tayeb, Atta El-Batahani, Shafie El-Mekki, and Sahar El Faki for supporting the research on which this article is based. The feedback from anonymous reviewers is also much appreciated. Footnotes 1. WFP and FAO, ‘The state of food insecurity in the world. Addressing food insecurity in protracted crises’ (FAO, Rome, 2010). 2. I extracted data from WFP’s food aid information system. 3. UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs ‘Humanitarian response plan. January to December 2016’ (OCHA, Khartoum, 2010). 4. Mark Duffield, ‘Social reconstruction and the radicalization of development: Aid as a relation of global liberal governance’, Development and Change 33, 5 (2002), pp. 1049–1071. 5. Mark Duffield, ‘The resilience of the ruins: Towards a critique of digital humanitarianism’, Resilience 4, 3 (2016), pp. 147–165. 6. See for example Alex De Waal, Famine crimes: Politics and the disaster relief industry (James Currey, London, 1997); and Joanna Macrae and Anthony Zwi (eds), War and hunger: Rethinking international responses to complex emergencies (Zed Books, London, 1994). 7. Michel Foucault, ‘Truth and power’, in Colin Gordon (ed.), Power/knowledge: Selected interviews and other writings (Pantheon Books, New York, NY, 1980), pp. 109–133. 8. Michel Foucault, Security, territory, population: Lectures at the College de France 1977–78 (Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2007), pp. 117–118. 9. James Ferguson, The anti-politics machine: ‘Development’, depoliticisation, and bureaucratic power in Lesotho (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990). 10. Jenny Edkins, Whose hunger? Concepts of famine, practices of aid (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN, 2000). 11. David Keen, The benefits of famine: A political economy of famine and relief in south-western Sudan 1983–89 (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1994). 12. Tim Niblock, Class and power in Sudan: The dynamics of Sudanese politics 1889–1985 (University of New York Press, Albany, NY, 1987); Benaia Yongo-Bure, ‘Marginalization and war: From the south to Darfur’, in Salah M. Hassan and Carina E. Ray (eds), Darfur and the crisis of governance in Sudan: A critical reader (Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 2009), pp. 68–83. 13. Federal Ministry of Health, ‘Report of a simple spatial surveying method survey in Sudan’ (FMoH, Khartoum, 2014). 14. de Waal, Famine crimes, pp. 86–105. 15. Tony Barnett, ‘Introduction: The Sudanese crisis and the future’, in Tony Barnett and Abbas Abdelkarim (eds), Sudan: State, capital and transformation (Croom Helm, London, 1988). 16. Jay O’Brien, ‘Sowing the seeds of famine: The political economy of food deficits in Sudan’, Review of African Political Economy 33 (1985), pp. 23–32. 17. African Rights, Food and power in Sudan: A critique of humanitarianism (African Rights, London, 1997). 18. Abdulahi Gallab, The first Islamist Republic: Development and disintegration of Islamism in the Sudan (Ashgate, Aldershot, 2008); Abdelrazig Elbashir and Adam Ahmed, ‘Study on food security policies in Sudan. Study prepared for the World Food Programme in Khartoum, Sudan’ (WFP, Khartoum, 2005). 19. World Bank, ‘Sudan: The road toward sustainable and broad-based growth’ (World Bank, Washington DC, 2009). 20. Luke Patey, ‘Crude days ahead? Oil and the resource curse in Sudan’, African Affairs 109, 437 (2010), pp. 617–636. 21. US Government, ‘United States policy objectives in the Sudan, 1955–57’, <https://uwdc.library.wisc.edu/collections/frus/> (15 June 2013). 22. SC-UK, ‘The development of SCF’s programme in Darfur’ (SC-UK, Khartoum, c1986). 23. Interview, former Relief and Rehabilitation Commissioner, Khartoum, Sudan, 27 June 2012. 24. David Keen, ‘Targeting emergency food aid: The case of Darfur in 1985’, in Simon Maxwell (ed.), To cure all hunger: Food policy and food security in Sudan (Intermediate Technology Publications, London, 1991), pp. 191–206. 25. Mark Duffield, ‘From emergency to social security in Sudan – Part II: The donor response’, Disasters 14, 4 (1990), pp. 322–334; Margaret Buchanan-Smith, ‘Evaluation of the Western Relief Operation 1987/88’ (MASDAR [UK] Ltd., Wokingham, 1989). 26. Keen, The benefits of famine. 27. Margaret Buchanan-Smith and Susanna Davies, Famine early warning and response - the missing link (Intermediate Technology Publications, London, 1995). pp. 84–110; DFID, ‘Report on Sudan emergency food distributions’ (DFID, London, 1997); Victor Tanner, ‘Save the Children (UK)’s response to drought in North Darfur 2000–2001: Evaluation’ (SC-UK, London, 2002). 28. Buchanan-Smith and Davies, Famine early warning and response. 29. Interview, grain trader, Khartoum, Sudan, 20 January 2013. 30. Ibrahim Diraige, ‘Summary of WFP relief and development activities in Darfur three states in 1994 and recommendation for 1995’ (WFP, Al-Fashir, 1994). 31. Ataul Karim, Mark Duffield, Susanne Jaspars, Aldo Benini, Joanna Macrae, Mark Bradbury, Douglas Johnson, George Larbi, and Barbara Hendrie, ‘Operation lifeline Sudan: A review’ (University of Birmingham, Birmingham, 1996); Human Rights Watch, ‘Famine in Sudan, 1998: The human rights causes’ (Human Rights Watch, New York, 1998). 32. Karim et al., ‘Operation lifeline Sudan’. 33. African Rights, Food and power in Sudan, p. 179. 34. DFID, ‘Report on Sudan emergency food distributions’. 35. Tanner, ‘SC-UK response to drought in North Darfur’. The company used, Azza, was later subjected to US sanctions for supplying arms to the Janjaweed and contributing to the conflict in Darfur. 36. Paul Williams and Alex Bellamy, ‘The responsibility to protect and the crisis in Darfur’, Security Dialogue 36 (2005), pp. 27–47. 37. Helen Young, ‘Looking beyond food aid to livelihoods, protection and partnerships: Strategies for WFP in the Darfur states’, Disasters 31, Supplement 1 (2007), pp. S40–56. 38. Margaret Buchanan-Smith and Susanne Jaspars, ‘Conflict, camps and coercion: The ongoing livelihoods crisis in Darfur’, Disasters 31, Supplement 1 (2007), pp. S57–S76. 39. CARE International, Save the Children-US, Action Contre La Faim, and Solidarite. 40. Interview, Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) Director-General and Director of Emergencies, Khartoum, Sudan, 10 April 2014. 41. WFP, ‘Sudan: An evaluation of WFP’s portfolio 2010–2012. Vol. I – evaluation report. Country portfolio evaluation’ (WFP, Rome, 2013). 42. Elbashir and Ahmed, ‘Study on food security policies in Sudan’. 43. Margaret Buchanan-Smith et al., ‘Against the grain: The cereal trade in Darfur’ (Tufts University, Boston, 2014). 44. Alemu Asfaw and Sirry Ibrahim, ‘The strategic reserve corporation of Sudan: Learning from best practices’ (Technical discussion paper 1, FAO and the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, Khartoum, 2008). 45. Adam Ahmed, Sawsan Abdelsalam and Khaled Siddig, ‘Do grain reserves necessarily contribute to prices stability and food security in Sudan? An assessment’, Journal of the Saudi Society of Agricultural Sciences 11 (2012), pp. 143–148. 46. Interview, WFP staff member, Khartoum, Sudan, 17 January 2013. 47. Interview, grain trader, Khartoum, Sudan, 30 January 2013. 48. Interview, former government official, Khartoum, Sudan, 2 February 2013. 49. Liam Mahoney, Sarah Laughton and Mark Vincent, ‘WFP protection of civilians in Darfur’ (WFP, Rome, 2005). 50. Asfaw and Ibrahim, ‘The strategic reserve corporation of Sudan’. 51. Humanitarian Aid Commission, ‘Humanitarian situation in Sudan’ (Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs, Khartoum, 2009); Interview, two representatives from Malha, Al-Fashir, Sudan, 27 September 2013; Radio Dabanga, ‘Sudan presidency to provide East and South Darfur with 10,000 tons of sorghum’, 18 May 2014, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201405190728.html> (19 May 2014); Sudan Vision, ‘N. Darfur provides humanitarian aid to affected localities’, 22 April 2014, <http://news.sudanvisiondaily.com/details.html?rsnpid=234771> (23 April 2014). 52. Williams and Bellamy, ‘The responsibility to protect and the crisis in Darfur’. 53. Phone interview with donor, 8 January 2014. Phone interview with donor representatives, 29 May 2014. 54. Interview, WFP staff member, Khartoum, Sudan, 3 February 2013. 55. Interview, WFP staff member, Al-Fashir, Sudan, 26 September 2013. 56. PAX, ‘Sudan alert: The EU’s policy options for Sudan’ (PAX, Utrecht, 2016). 57. See, for example: Simon Levine and Irina Mosel ‘Supporting resilience in difficult places. A critical look at applying the ‘resilience’ concept in countries where crises are the norm’ HPG Commissioned Report (Overseas Development Institute, London, 2014); Julian Reid, ‘The biopoliticisation of humanitarianism: From saving bare life to securing biohuman in the post-interventionary societies’, Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 4, 4 (2010), pp. 391–411; Tom Scott-Smith, ‘Paradoxes of resilience: A review of the World Disasters Report 2016’, Development and Change 1–16. DOI: 10.1111/dech.12384 (2018). 58. Interview, Teleconference with donor representatives, 29 May 2014. 59. EU, ‘EU approach to resilience: Learning from food crises’ (EU, Brussels, 2012); USAID, ‘Multi-Sectoral nutrition strategy 2014–2025’ (USAID, Washington, 2014). 60. This includes food for the construction of community infrastructure (e.g. water reservoirs), food for training (e.g. in fuel efficient stoves, income generation, agriculture), or support for small farmers in government micro-finance schemes to improve production. 61. WFP, ‘Protracted relief and recovery operations – The Sudan 2008’ (WFP, Rome, 2015). 62. This combination of specialist foods and education was informed by articles in the Lancet in 2008 which reported that simple interventions such as micro-nutrient supplements and changes in breastfeeding and weaning practices could substantially reduce undernutrition. 63. Doris Wiesmann, Lucy Bassett, Todd Benson, and John Hoddinott, ‘Validation of food frequency and dietary diversity as proxy indicators of household food security report’ (WFP, Rome, 2008); Daniel Maxwell, Bapu Vaitla, and Jennifer Coates, ‘How do indicators of household food insecurity measure up? An empirical comparison from Ethiopia’, Food Policy 47 (2014), pp. 107–116. 64. WFP, Darfur States Ministries of Agriculture and North Darfur State Ministry of Health, ‘Comprehensive food security assessment in Darfur’ (WFP, Khartoum, 2011); WFP, ‘Darfur comprehensive food security assessment. Sudan, 2012–2013’ (WFP, Khartoum, 2014). 65. See for example: WFP, ‘Darfur Comprehensive Food Security Assessment. Sudan, 2012–2013’ (World Food Programme, Khartoum, 2014). 66. Interview, aid workers, Al-Fashir, Sudan, 24 September 2013. 67. Buchanan-Smith and Jaspars, ‘Conflict, camps and coercion’; Interview, three IDP leaders from Abou Shook camp, Al-Fashir, Sudan, 26 September 2013. 68. Susanne Jaspars and Sorcha O’Callaghan, ‘Challenging choices: Protection and livelihoods in Darfur – A review of DRC’s programme in Eastern West Darfur’ (HPG Working Paper, Overseas Development Institute, London, 2008); Helen Young, Abdulmounim Osman, Ahmed Abusin, Michael Asher, and Omer Egemi, ‘Livelihoods, power and choice: The vulnerability of the northern Rizeigat, Darfur, Sudan’ (Tufts University, Boston, 2009). 69. WFP, ‘Sudan: An evaluation of WFP’s portfolio 2010–2012’. 70. Valid, UNICEF, MoH, ‘Review of community management of acute malnutrition: Republic of Sudan’ (Valid, Oxford, 2013). 71. From 438,804 MT distributed in 2005 to about 260,000 MT (including food vouchers) in 2011 and 2012. The number of beneficiaries increased from 2.3 million in early 2005 to 3.7 million in 2008 and remained at this level until 2011. See Margaret Buchanan-Smith et al., ‘Against the grain’. From 2015, only one third of the protracted displaced populations received general food distribution. See WFP, ‘IDP profiling results: Geneina town camps, West Darfur’ (WFP, Khartoum, 2015). 72. Mark Duffield, ‘From immersion to simulation: Remote methodologies and the decline of area studies’, Review of African Political Economy 41, Supplementary 1 (2014) pp. S75–S94; Duffield, ‘The resilience of the ruins’. 73. The increased distance between aid workers and those who they aim to assist, and the convergence of food-based resilience approaches and remote management is also discussed in more detail in: Susanne Jaspars, Food aid in Sudan: A history of power, politics and profit (Zed Books, London, 2018). 74. De Waal, Famine crimes; Macrae and Zwi (eds), War and hunger; James Ferguson, The anti-politics machine; Edkins, Whose hunger? 75. Keen, The benefits of famine. 76. Chris Barrett and Daniel Maxwell, Food aid after fifty years: Recasting its role (Routledge, London, 2005). © The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of Royal African Society. 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TI - The state, inequality, and the political economy of long-term food aid in Sudan
JF - African Affairs
DO - 10.1093/afraf/ady030
DA - 2018-10-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/the-state-inequality-and-the-political-economy-of-long-term-food-aid-X2BY4VEpJp
SP - 592
VL - 117
IS - 469
DP - DeepDyve
ER -