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AB - Abstract Between the 1940s and the 1960s, strategy was at the heart of security studies and closely intertwined with International Relations (IR). Over the past three decades, however, the study of strategy has been relegated to a secondary position in the international security subfield and marginalized in IR theorizing. One important source of this disconnect is the challenge mounted by critical security advocates, who sought to reorient the study of security away from strategic studies. They reached into the philosophy of science and pulled out three familiar dichotomies, rationalism/constructivism, materialism/idealism, and problem-solving/critical theorizing, that they could utilize within security debates. Specifically, they argue that strategic studies leaves out too much of what is really important for security and world politics because it is rationalist, materialist, and retains an uncritical view of knowledge production. In this article, I turn the critical security conventional wisdom on its head and show that strategic studies, exemplified by the ideas of Carl von Clausewitz and Thomas Schelling, actually transcends these dichotomies and hence offers an indispensable source of insights for both security studies and IR. Clausewitz (Carl von), critical security studies, critical theory, materialism, rationalism, Schelling (Thomas C.), strategic studies Introduction1 Between the 1940s and 1960s, strategy was at the heart of security studies and closely intertwined with International Relations (IR) (Carr [1939] 1946, 109–13; Herz 1959; Aron 1962; Bull 1968, 1977, 184–99; Howard 1976, 1983, 36–48; Windsor 2002). The work of prominent IR scholars, such as Edward Mead Earle, Harold and Margaret Sprout, Arnold Wolfers, Nicholas J. Spykman, John Herz, Robert Osgood, Klaus Knorr, E. H. Carr, Hedley Bull, and Raymond Aron, regularly brought together security, international politics, and strategic studies, an interdisciplinary field which, at its core, examines the preparation, threat, use, control, and consequences of organized force for political purposes in the course of a dynamic interaction of (at least) two competing wills (Beaufre [1963] 1965; Poirier 1997; Betts 1997, 2000; Mahnken 2013).2 Over the past three decades, however, this connection between security, IR, and strategic studies has weakened. Along the way, the study of strategy has been relegated to a secondary position in the international security subfield and marginalized in IR theorizing.3 One important source of this disconnect is the challenge mounted by critical security advocates, who sought to reorient the study of security away from strategic studies. They reached into the philosophy of science and pulled out three familiar dichotomies—rationalism/constructivism, materialism/idealism and problem-solving/critical theorizing. They use these to argue that strategic studies leaves out too much of what is really important for security and world politics because it is rationalist, materialist, and retains an uncritical view of knowledge production (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 188; Waever 2015, 76–106). In the context of the end of the Cold War, using these dichotomies to contrast strategic studies and critical security was effective to set up alternative perspectives. Strategic studies served as a convenient foil to set apart new approaches and expand the range of topics and referent objects that would be studied in security studies, such as transnational migration, global health, food, energy, or human rights, involving individuals, substate groups, regions, and the biosphere. While the rationalist/constructivist, materialist/idealist, and problem-solving/critical theorizing dichotomies may have been useful to foster a broader conversation about security in the early 1990s, they have become an entrenched conventional wisdom that impedes intellectually productive dialogue between students of security, IR, and strategy. This disconnect is detrimental to all, and the field may find itself repeating its past mistakes: producing analyses of international affairs and foreign policy divorced from strategy and promoting neat and abstract policy solutions obtained by leaving out vital strategic dynamics. As E. H. Carr famously noted, “If every prospective writer on international affairs in the last twenty years had taken a compulsory course in elementary strategy, reams of nonsense would have remained unwritten” (Carr [1939] 1946, 111, 109–13). It is therefore a good time to put these dichotomies into question, an exercise that is in line with similar initiatives in IR, such as the effort to foster a fruitful conversation between realism and constructivism (Barkin 2010).4 In this article, I turn the critical security conventional wisdom on its head and show that strategic studies not only transcends but also synthesizes these dichotomies and hence offers an indispensable source of insights for the study of security and IR more generally. I begin by identifying the critical security challenge grounded in three philosophy of science dichotomies: rationalism/constructivism, materialism/idealism, and problem-solving/critical theorizing. I then revisit the canonical works of Carl von Clausewitz and Thomas Schelling to show that strategic studies helps to move beyond these conventional dichotomies and reconnect security, IR, and strategy. I conclude with a reassessment of the role that strategic studies should play in security and IR theorizing. Sources of Irrelevance? Rationalism, Materialism, and Problem-Solving in Strategic Studies In the political and intellectual climate of the peaceful end of the Cold War, there was a general sense that the perceived US-dominated focus on military capabilities and effectiveness in strategic studies was no longer adequate to address a range of pressing security issues, such as the rise of intrastate conflicts, refugee flows, and the decaying environment. As an umbrella concept, critical security studies (lower case) designate the diverse range of approaches that favor the broadening and deepening of security (Krause and Williams 1997; Krause and Williams 2018).5 Critical security advocates generally argued “in favor of deepening the referent object beyond the state, widening the concept of security to include other sectors than the military, giving equal emphasis to domestic and trans-border threats, and allowing for a transformation of the Realist, conflictual logic of international security” (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 188, 187–225). Despite their differences, critical security scholars share a vigorous “criticism of Strategic Studies” (Ayoob 1997, 138; Buzan and Hansen 2009, 101, 188; Mutiner 2013, 68–69). Specifically, they approach strategic studies through the prism of three familiar philosophy of science dichotomies: rationalism/constructivism, materialism/idealism and problem-solving/critical theorizing. Because rationalism, materialism, and problem solving are the most important philosophical-epistemological commitments made by strategic studies, so the argument goes, it leaves out too much of what is really important for security and world politics. From this perspective, the study of security and international relations benefits from staying away from strategic studies (Ayoob 1997, 138), and there is no need to explore and put to the task the “antecedent literature extending back before the Second World War which can largely be characterized as war studies, military and grand strategy, and geopolitics” (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 1). Rationalism Critical security advocates generally consider that the study of strategy is rationalist (Krause and Williams 1997, 49–51; Barkawi 1998; Der Derian 2001, 205–21; Booth 2005; Fierke 2007, 24–28; Williams 2007, 8–21; Buzan and Hansen 2009, 31, 57, 72–73, 77, 89–90, 196).6 Kenneth Booth (1995, 119) warns “[a]gainst the destructive and dismal rationality of Westphalia, Machiavelli and Clausewitz, which has shaped the statist outlooks of this and earlier centuries.” In the landmark volume that spearheaded the broadening and deepening of security, Keith Krause and Michael Williams argue more specifically that “traditional strategic/security studies” usually consider the genesis and structure of specific security problems as being rooted in “abstract assertions of transcendental rational actors and scientific methods” (Krause and Williams 1997, 50). To reshape how inquiries about security are conducted, it is important to move beyond “objectivist rational-actor theory,” which they see as consubstantial to strategic studies (Krause and Williams 1997, 52). For Michael Williams, in strategic studies “states are held to be rational actors, deploying an essentially instrumental rationality as their primary form of decision-making” (Williams 2007, 8). This characterization of strategic studies is by no means limited to the initial post–Cold War move to widen and deepen security. We find it essentially intact in more recent authoritative surveys of the security studies subfield. Realist strategic studies, Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen note, examine security through rationalist and positivist epistemologies (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 21). They emphasize the “commitment of Strategic Studies to ‘scientific’ methods (positivism, quantification, game theory)” (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 89). As they put it, “rationalist, economistic approaches” were “a feature again on display from the early years of deterrence theory and onwards” (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 57). Consequently, “Emotions or subjective factors were thus generally treated as noise, complicating the assumptions that researchers could make about ‘rational action,’ but the notion that rationality existed underneath was maintained” (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 245). For Ole Waver, strategic studies, inspired by the discipline of economics, has also been largely shaped by the “lasting contribution to game theory” exemplified by the “1950 invention at RAND of the prisoner's dilemma and the late 1950s bargaining twist given to game theory by Thomas Schelling,” as well as systems analysis (Waever 2015, 83). In short, critical security's proponents generally claim that strategic studies is rationalist. It neglects nonrational phenomena arising from emotions and perceptions. When they are acknowledged to exist, they are not specifically conceptualized as such. Moreover, in the study of strategy, they maintain, what is at stake are behavioral choices only. The identities and interests of the actors who make these choices are exogenously given and not part of the interaction process itself. The actors’ behavior can be understood by taking preferences as exogenous and working out their attempt to maximize some consistent utility function under constraints. Materialism Critical security advocates also claim that strategic studies’ understanding of power and security is predominantly materialist (Klein 1994, 75; Buzan 2012, 2, 3, 8; Williams 2007, 8–21; Buzan and Hansen 2009, 2, 37).7 Students of strategy, they argue, typically account for the effects of power, interests, and institutions by reference to basic material features that exist and have certain causal powers independent of ideas, like human nature, the physical environment, and technology (on materialism in IR, Wendt 1999, 92–138). As with the rationalism/constructivism dichotomy, their argument has remained remarkably constant from the 1990s until today. This materialism, they argue, is grounded in the notion that military power is made of quantifiable weapon-systems, such as tanks or ballistic missiles. For critical security advocates, the study of strategy “is essentially about the impact of military technology on relations between states” (Buzan 1991, 270; Buzan 1987; Buzan, Waever and de Wilde 1998). As Barry Buzan points out, the prevailing technologies available to political actors are a “fundamental variable” for strategic studies: “Technology is a major factor in determining the scope of military options, the character of military threat, and the consequences of resorting to the use of force. . . . The nature of those instruments sets a basic condition of strategy, and one that is subject to continuous pressures of technological change” (Buzan 1987, 6–7). As a consequence, strategic studies are characterized by their “materialist methodology” and, more generally, by their materialist way of thinking and theorizing (Buzan 1999, 3, 8). As Bradley Klein puts it: “There is . . . a strong empiricist streak in Strategic Studies which continually tempts the analyst to pose the world in realist, materialist terms, as if questions of political intention could be hived off from those of measurable military capability” (Klein 1994, 75). A “materialist ontology” (Williams 2007, 8) shapes the metatheoretical foundations of strategic studies. The quest for a science of strategy “privileges material phenomena in theory construction” (Williams 2007, 8). Threats are a given because they are “largely a product of material conditions in the military sector” (Buzan 1999, 2). Ultimately, in the study of strategy, “power is understood largely in terms of material capability” (Williams 2007, 8). In short, according to critical security proponents, what is distinctive about strategic studies is that brute material forces primarily constitute the effects of power. Problem-Solving Theorizing The final and most determined charge of critical security advocates is the claim that the study of strategy can only give rise to problem-solving, not critical, emancipation-oriented theory (Cox 1986, 204–54; Wyn-Jones 2005, 215–35; Booth 2007). Critical security studies commonly see strategy as the paradigmatic example of “problem-solving” theorizing that takes existing institutions and prevailing social and power relations for granted instead of calling them into question by exploring their origins and especially their potential for change. Strategic studies allegedly reifies and supports the domestic and international status quo; it is ahistorical and resistant to notions of contingency and change. It also ignores the ways in which security depends on key assumptions concerning the nature of politics. Strategic studies cannot be critical because it is unable to develop “a politics of opposition to those structures that produce, perpetuate, and naturalise human wrongs” (Booth 2007, 44; Mutimer 2013, 69; Campbell 1992; Klein 1994, 6–7; Ayoob 1997, 137–38; Dalby 1997, 9–12, 18–20; Wyn-Jones 1999, 94, 102, 131, 165–66; Booth 2005, 4, 181; Fierke 2007; Peoples and Vaughan-Williams 2014, 20; Dannreuther 2014, 49; Waever 2015). In sum, critical security advocates’ portrayal of strategic studies is firmly grounded in three familiar philosophy of science dichotomies: rationalist/constructivist, materialist/idealist, and critical/problem-solving. Two points are worth highlighting here. First, the notions of “rationalism,” “materialism,” and “critical theory” have of course rich, multiple connotations and are used in a wide range of disciplinary contexts. They also cut across ontological, epistemological, theoretical, methodological, and empirical issues. My aim here is not to provide a comprehensive overview of these ongoing conversations. I should stress that I rely on the specific ways in which critical security proponents understand and use “rationalism,” “materialism,” and “critical theory” when they assess strategy studies. My focus on these particular critical security understandings of epistemological issues inevitably means that I do not address other dimensions, for example those that fall under the realm of the historical or political. Second, I acknowledge that some specific strategic conceptions are close to the typical claims of critical security advocates, such as the Air Corps Tactical School theorists in the 1930s or operational research, for example (Watts 1984, 105–21; Thomas 2015). During the 1950s and 1960s, particularly in the United States, a number of thinkers and practitioners tried to morph strategic thought into systems analysis, a rationalist theory of strategy that delimits the range of conceivable solutions, specifies the relevant probabilities and utilities, and states the maximization criteria (Brodie 1949; Quade 1967).8 One of the inheritors of this attempt, the “bargaining theory of war,” is rationalist in the sense of rational-choice theorizing (Lake and Powell 1999; Slanchev 2011).9 However, this particular strategic conception should not be mistaken for strategic studies as a whole. I show below that the striking contribution of strategic studies is actually to surmount these divides and provide the foundation for a sustained synergistic engagement between security, IR, and strategy. Rethinking and Transcending Conventional Dichotomies: The Contributions of Strategic Studies In order to show how strategic studies helps rethink and transcend the rationalism/constructivism, materialism/idealism, and problem-solving/critical theorizing dichotomies, I work out the logic of the theories advanced by Carl von Clausewitz and Thomas Schelling. I select them for the following four reasons. First, both students of strategy and critical security advocates recognize Clausewitz and Schelling as paradigmatic figures. In strategic studies, On War is commonly viewed as a masterwork, and most would join Lawrence Freedman and consider Schelling as “the theorist who did more than any other to explore the conundrums of deterrence and nuclear strategy” “while remaining relevant to broader strategic questions” (Freedman 2013, 160). Critical security proponents agree. Kenneth Booth calls On War “a classic, a reference point for all thinkers about war and politics” (Booth 2007, 306), while Barry Buzan and Lene Hansen identify Clausewitz as one of the pre–international security studies “Classical figures” (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 9). They also present Schelling as an early “key thinker” (Buzan and Hansen 2009, 9, 92), one of the “leading representatives” who made a “lasting contribution(s) to game theory,” notably by giving it a “bargaining twist” (Waever 2015, 83). Critical security proponents accept these views widely (Dalby 1997, 23; Wyn Jones 1999, 93–124; Booth 2005, 5; Booth 2007, 305–20; Fierke 2007, 24; Kaldor 2010, 271; Barkawi and Brighton 2011, 524–41). In addition to serving as shared reference points, Clausewitz and Schelling made a substantial and enduring contribution to both the study of strategy and the wider theory of international relations. As On War is one the most important single works ever written on the theory of war, not including it in a discussion of knowledge claims in strategic studies would surely be a glaring oversight. Thomas Schelling received the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics “for having enhanced our understanding of conflict and cooperation through game-theory analysis.” If I had selected less well-known strategic theorists, such as Sun Bin, Charles Ardant du Picq, Alexander Svechin, or J. C. Wylie, my choice could easily be dismissed as unrepresentative of the accepted ways in which IR and international security scholars understand strategy. The centrality of Clausewitz and Schelling also helps to capture features of strategic studies that are widely seen as prominent, not hidden or marginal. Moreover, these thinkers’ conceptions are at the heart of the critical security studies challenge that encompasses strategic studies both in general and during the Cold War more specifically. Schelling made his major contribution to strategic studies in the 1950s and 1960s and addressed major Cold War issues such as nuclear strategy, limited war, and arms control. Clausewitz's ideas were a central component of Cold War strategic studies as well (Rapoport 1968, 13, 54–80; Bassford 1994, 200–9; Echevarria 2007a, 2007b; Strachan 2007, 24–25; Kinross 2008, 49–103). Selecting only pre-1945 strategic thinkers, such as Kautiliya, Alfred Thayer Mahan, or Giulio Douhet, would have left out key Cold War issues. While Clausewitz and Schelling's conceptions cannot represent the entire range of strategic traditions worldwide, their work covers both the prenuclear and nuclear worlds. Finally, I refrain from picking and choosing multiple references representative of an eclectic range of strategic thinkers over millennia. After all, it is always possible to find any argument in an ad hoc collection of heterogeneous strategic thinkers across time and space to contest this or that dichotomy taken in isolation. Instead, I provide one coherent, although not the only possible, interpretation of the theories of Clausewitz and Schelling, which addresses simultaneously all three dichotomies, rationalism/constructivism, materialism/idealism, and problem solving/critical theorizing. Along the way, I locate my own interpretation vis-à-vis the scholarship devoted to their work. My main claim is that all sides need to recognize this interpretation and trajectory of strategic studies.10 In doing so, I seek to go beyond the philosophy of science prism and highlight the important work on knowledge production that already exists within strategic studies, which has its own traditions of reflection on these issues (Vendryès 1952; Poirier 1983). Finally, to show that this is not an arcane matter of theoretical exegesis, I systematically provide, along the way, concrete examples of current international security work that is in line with the conceptions of Clausewitz and Schelling that I highlight. Reframing the “Rationalism-Constructivism” Debate For Clausewitz and Schelling, strategic actions are grounded in reason yet shaped by its limits. They both provide specific conceptualizations of nonrational components of strategy, such as friction, emotions, and moral influences (Clausewitz) or context-specific interactive rationality (Schelling). While they agree that actors choose behaviors by balancing ends and means in strategic interactions, they also acknowledge that actor identities come into play and can be altered. Clausewitz explores the interactive effect of shifting political conditions, such as the French Revolution, while Schelling investigates how identities and other ideational features can help actors find common ground in their search for focal points.11 To be sure, one of Carl von Clausewitz's core intentions in On War was to subjugate war to the reign of political reason (Aron 1976). Recognizing war as a political instrument, he famously noted: “Since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object, the value of its object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it in magnitude but also in duration” (Clausewitz 1832, 92 emphasis in original). Because relationships between ends and means are central, strategic thinking combines purposive and instrumental rationalities. It is not only political intelligence that brings reason into strategy but the complex necessities of military action itself, articulated to political aims. War plans, for example, “cover every aspect of war, and weave them all into a single operation that must have a single, ultimate objective in which all particular aims are reconciled” (Clausewitz 1832, 700). Keenly interested in methods of analytic and scientific reasoning, Clausewitz often described states, armies, and conflicts in terms borrowed from physics and mechanics, such as the concept of friction. He quoted approvingly Napoleon's claim that “many of the decisions faced by the commander-in-chief resemble mathematical problems worthy of the gifts of a Newton or an Euler” (Clausewitz 1832, 112, 146; Colson 2015, 240; Paret 2009, 104–43). However, situated at the nexus of the decline of the Enlightenment and the rise of Romanticism, he did not endorse a radical form of rationalism akin to rational-choice theorizing (Weil 1955, 295; Gat 2001, 255–56, 269–72; Heuser 2002; Lynn 2003, 179–217; Sumida 2008, 135–53; Girard 2007/2009; Engberg-Pedersen 2015; Cormier 2016; Scheipers 2018). Indebted to German idealism and historicism, he was vehemently opposed to the dogmatic rationalists of his age, like the Prussian military writer Heinrich Dietrich von Bülow, who thought they could reduce strategy to trigonometric calculations (Aron 1976, 77–88; Paret 2009, 104–43). He noted: “efforts were . . . made to equip the conduct of war with principles, rules, or even systems. This did present a positive goal, but people failed to take adequate account of the endless complexities involved” (Clausewitz 1832, 134). These dogmatic rationalists who aimed at “fixed values” failed in two ways. First, and this is related to the argument about materialism that I address below, they focused exclusively on physical quantities, “whereas all military action is intertwined with psychological forces and effects” (Clausewitz 1832, 136). Second, they only examined the unilateral plans and actions of one actor, “whereas war consists of a continuous interaction of opposites” (Clausewitz 1832, 136). Clausewitz rejected this reductionism: “absolute, so-called mathematical, factors never find a firm basis in military calculations. From the very start there is an interplay of possibilities, probabilities, good luck and bad that weaves its way throughout the length and breadth of the tapestry” (Clausewitz 1832, 85–86). Consequently, the notion of law does not apply to the phenomenon of war: “the theory of war [cannot] apply the concept of law to action, since no prescriptive formulation universal enough to deserve the name of law can be applied to the constant change and diversity of the phenomena of war” (Clausewitz 1832, 152). Clausewitz was not the first theorist of war to address the importance of morale and other nonmaterial forces, but he engaged directly with the need to integrate morale and emotions in any general theory of war. His conception of strategy incorporated both emotions and perceptions, and he saw uncertainty not merely as lack of information, like rational choice theorists, but as a problem of how to process and understand information. First, he recognized that war is never ruled by reason alone: “If war is an act of force the emotions cannot fail to be involved” (Clausewitz 1832, 76). At the core of his theory lies the “remarkable (wondrous) trinity” that establishes that wars are not only made of “pure reason”: emotions interact with the play of chance and probabilities of military art, as well as the rational finality that shape action. Instead of claiming that the conduct of warfare unfolds in a necessary dynamic, he stressed contingencies, distortion, and errors as an integral part of the phenomenon: “War is dependent on the interplay of possibilities and probabilities, of good and bad luck, conditions in which strictly logical reasoning often plays no part at all and is always apt to be a most unsuitable and awkward intellectual tool” (Clausewitz 1832, 580–81). Far from demanding a reasoning derived from axioms, he favored the military leader's capacity for judgment to process the complexity of a specific situation and act reasonably, meaning thoughtfully and appropriately (Sumida 2008, 135–53). In order to master the drift of events and turn them to their will, the political and military leaders’ strategic reasoning, he noted, “leaves the field of the exact sciences of logic and mathematics. It then becomes an art in the broadest meaning of the term—the faculty of using judgment to detect the most important and decisive elements in the vast arrays of facts and situations” (Clausewitz 1832, 593). Clausewitz did not regard strategy as something that could be learned and analyzed uniquely in terms of rational precepts. Generals who rely exclusively on “scientific formulas and mechanics,” he claimed, are “learned pedant(s)” (Clausewitz 1832, 145–46). Moreover, Clausewitz was acutely aware of war's tendency to elude, at least partially, rational control (Weil 1955, 295; Herberg-Rothe 2007; Waldman 2013). Friction, a key component of his conceptual system, designated the imponderable elements, both natural and social, like the imperfection of knowledge, the uncertainty vis-à-vis one's own and the enemy's army, spatial and temporal inaccuracies, or the resistances due to the characteristics of organizations. These dynamics all insert themselves between the reasonable calculations of the political and military actors and their implementation, which is often problematic (Clausewitz 1832, 69; Herbig 1986; Beyerchen 1992–93; Watts 1984; Niebisch 2011). In war, this tremendous friction, “which cannot, as in mechanics, be reduced to a few points, is everywhere in contact with chance, and brings about effects that cannot be measured, just because they are largely due to chance” (Clausewitz 1832, 120). Lastly, Clausewitz challenged the critical security notion that strategy is a means of technical control over an objectified reality. War being a duel on a larger scale, strategy presupposes an active adversary consciously pursuing his own coercive goals. It is inherently characterized by the reciprocity of voluntary actions: it “is not the action of a living force upon a lifeless mass (total nonresistance would be no war at all) but always the collision of two living forces . . . Once again, there is interaction. So long as I have not overthrown my opponent I am bound to fear he may overthrow me. Thus I am not in control: he dictates to me as much as I dictate to him” (Clausewitz 1832, 77). In addition, Clausewitz's theory of war carefully examined the sources and effects of identities and interests on power and strategic interactions, rather than taking identities as given (Clausewitz 1832, 577–637; Herberg-Rothe 2007; Strachan and Herberg-Rothe 2007; Herberg-Rothe, Honig, and Moran 2011; Daase and Davis 2015).12 Based on his own experience, he explored the ways in which the French revolutionary quest for a greater social and political equality and the rise of nationalism combined with Napoleon's strategic skills to change the character of war. The key ideas and political conditions stemming from the French Revolution contributed to the constitution of power, notably the fighting capacity of French armies and the interests of new leaders; that is, the ways in which they defined the ends they pursued. In turn, France's strategic actions against Prussia that lead to its crushing defeat in 1806 triggered a reform movement that contributed to altering Prussia's own political and strategic identity. As I further explore below, Clausewitz was directly involved in these reforms, and he understood how much these strategic interactions produced conceptions of self and other, altering identities and interests (Paret 1985; Colson 2016). Finally, instead of bracketing preferences, Clausewitz recognized the diversity of knowledge structures among international belligerents; for example, by contrasting the ideas and wartime strategies of Frederick the Great and Napoleon (Clausewitz 1832, 159–67, 179–80, 191–92, 196–97). In sum, while reason is an important component of Clausewitz's theory of strategy, he conceptualized nonrational dimensions of strategy and suggested heuristic ways to explore their sources and effects. Moreover, he recognized that intersubjective conditions help constitute material power and interests. Even more than Clausewitz, Thomas Schelling, trained as an economist and armed with professional experience as a trade negotiator in the 1950s and later with his association with RAND, where he focused on nuclear strategy, seems to fit the image of critical security advocates’ dogmatic rationalism.13 But one should be wary of too rapidly conflating his ideas with a radical version of rationalism, if only because he has been repeatedly critical of pretenses to formalizing mathematically what amounted in his view to an exercise of imagination and intuitive judgment (Schelling 1960, 127–31; Schelling 1966, vii, 180).14 Building up his argument from the broken link between war and instrumental rationality due to nuclear weapons, Schelling did not merely acknowledge nonrational forces but provided a specific conceptualization of what they are and the role they play. At the broadest level, Schelling pointed out that there is no such thing as a unique and mechanistic way to define rationality: contrary to other game theorists such as John Harsanyi, he claimed that all rational players do not make the same maximizing choices under the same circumstances (Schelling 1960, 267–90; Innocenti 2007, 2008). He maintained the following: Rationality is a collection of attributes, and departures from complete rationality may be in many different directions. Irrationality can imply a disorderly and inconsistent value system, faulty calculation, an inability to receive messages or to communicate efficiently; it can imply random or haphazard influences in the reaching of decisions or the transmission of them, or in the receipt or conveyance of information; and it sometimes merely reflects the collective nature of a decision among individuals who do not have identical value systems and whose organizational arrangements and communication systems do not cause them to act like a single entity. As a matter of fact, many of the critical elements that go into a model of rational behavior can be identified with particular types of rationality or irrationality. (Schelling 1960, 16). Moreover, he constantly played down the contribution of model building and a priori theorizing. “The fact is that for most American strategists, the influence of game theory has been modest and indirect” (quoted in Ayson 2004, 130). For Schelling, the study of strategic interactions is grounded first and foremost in empirical analysis: Some essential part of the study of mixed-motive games is necessarily empirical. This is not to say just that it is an empirical question how people do actually perform in mixed- motives games, especially games too complicated for intellectual mastery. It is a stronger statement: that the principles relevant to successful play, the strategic principles, the propositions of a normative theory, cannot be derived by purely analytical means from a priori considerations. (Schelling 1960, 162–63 emphasis in original). He warned game theorists against assimilating strategy to a branch of mathematics and stressed that the mathematical structure of the payoff function should not dominate the analysis. He considered too much abstractness from contextual details and too many complicating factors as unwarranted (Schelling 1960, 162). In addition, Schelling used the rationality assumption as a heuristic insight to enlarge the range of situations and interactions that strategic thinking explores, notably the meaning and influence of nonrationality (Schelling 1960, 16–17; Swedberg 1990, 194–97). The partners-adversaries, he argued, cannot control everything “rationally,” but they keep open the possibility of a “controlled loss of control” (Schelling as quoted in Trachtenberg 1991, 28; Hassner 1995, 59–60). “‘Chance,’ accident, third-party influence, imperfection in the machinery of decision, or just processes that we do not entirely understand” are all part of this dynamic, notably in his depiction of brinkmanship (Schelling 1960, 188). While Schelling argued that military action is an idiom, he acknowledged that this particular type of communication was not always articulate. Diplomacy “by maneuver” is “typically a good deal clumsier, with actions less subject to careful control for the message they embody, subject to background noise from uncontrollable events, and subject to misinterpretation” (Schelling 1966, 151). Most importantly Schelling's concept of “focal point solutions” transcends the rationalist/constructivist dichotomy. For him, two kinds of interdependency mattered in real-life strategic environments: the first is that each player's best action depends on what he expects other players to do; and the second is that each player tries to influence the other players’ choices by shaping their expectations of his choices. He proposed that focal points can solve the equilibrium-selection problem. However, for Schelling, focal points were contingent on the ways in which the game is played. The focal point emerges not merely because of some objective feature of the situation or “the bare logic of abstract random probabilities” (Schelling 1960, 57). Tacit coordination is the result of experience, intersubjective beliefs, and culturally conditioned meanings that allow expectations to converge (Schelling 1960, 57–58, 69–70, 111–18): People can often concert their intentions or expectations with others if each knows the other is trying to do the same. Most situations—perhaps every situation for people who are practiced at this kind of game—provide some clue for coordinating behavior, some focal point for each person's expectation of what the other expects him to expect to be expected to do. Finding the key, or rather finding a key—any key that is mutually recognized as the key becomes the key—may depend on imagination more than on logic; it may depend on analogy, precedent, accidental arrangement, symmetry, aesthetic or geometric configuration, casuistic reasoning, and who the parties are and what they know about each other. (Schelling 1960, 57 emphasis in original). This is precisely the sort of intersubjective understanding that constructivists or cognitive psychologists commonly investigate (Adler and Pouliot 2011, 9–13; Mercer 2013). My argument is not that Carl von Clausewitz's and Thomas Schelling's conceptions of rationality are flawless. Rather, I claim that the conventional rationalist/constructivist dichotomy does little justice to their insights and original contribution. They both recognize the significance of reason while conceptualizing phenomena that are difficult to reduce to rationalism, such as indeterminacy, contingency, and freedom of action. For them, the actors involved in strategic interactions certainly seek to balance ends and means, but their identities (political, cultural, etc.) are also involved. This in turn can redefine their interests and alter how they balance ends and means. Clausewitz and Schelling examined behavior and identities and accepted that both can vary. In short, the very possibility of a rationalist-constructivist dialogue, I argue, is rooted in strategic studies, and it is striking that the trajectory and contribution of strategy scholar Lawrence Freedman, for example, is best understood as contributing to realist-constructivism (Wilkinson and Gow 2017). In addition, a number of important traditions in strategic studies, such as revolutionary war theory, are grounded in the notion that political identities are a fundamental aspect of the strategic interaction. Ultimately, one finds among students of strategy vigorous criticisms of dogmatic rationalism, clear-headed assessments of the limits of strategic reason, as well as recognition of the importance of cultural and historical contexts (Kier 1997; Sagan 1995; Rosen 2007).15 Relating Materialism and Idealism For strategic studies, the effects of power are constituted both by material and ideational forces. To be sure, armaments and logistics are significant dimensions of strategy and a crucial part of specific strategic theories or conceptions, such as operational research or systems analysis (Fuller 1945; Rougeron 1948).16 Strategic perspectives generally recognize that material contexts, such as the weather, geography and technology, are restraining and empowering forces (Winter et al. 1998; Deudney 2007, 16–20, 27–60). However, Carl von Clausewitz and Thomas Schelling do not privilege material against ideas so much as deny the separation of material and ideas in the first place. Carl von Clausewitz noted that the study of war in earlier times often examined only the “total body of knowledge and skill . . . concerned with material factors,” such as numerical superiority of troops, supply, geometry, and geology (Clausewitz 1832, 153). However, far from endorsing such materialist views, he dismissed them sarcastically as barely capable of providing “a scientific problem for a schoolboy” (Clausewitz 1832, 208). Strategic theorists who direct their “principles and systems only to physical matters and unilateral activities” so that they can “reach a set of sure and positive conclusions” were, in his view, misguided (Clausewitz 1832, 134). Claiming that material factors such as numerical superiority, supply, or interior lines are the final arbiter for the conduct of war is a dangerous oversimplification, as “all military action is intertwined with psychological forces and effects” (Clausewitz 1832, 134–36, 184–85, 156). Such a focus on material factors is tantamount to confusing tactics and strategy. Tactic, Clausewitz argues, “is virtually limited to material factors, whereas strategic theory, dealing as it does with ends which bear directly on the restoration of peace, the range of possibilities is unlimited” (Clausewitz 1832, 147). Although this idea preexisted Clausewitz's theorizing, one of his central contributions was to formally introduce nonmaterial dimensions, such as popular enthusiasm, the warlike virtue of the army, and the genius of the war leader, into strategic theory (Clausewitz 1832, 64–65; Colson 2015, 124–42; Aron 1976, 195–235; Kleemeier 2007, 107–21). In his 1809 letter to Fichte, he considered that the “true spirit of war” consisted in mobilizing the energies of every soldier to the greatest possible extent and in infusing him with warlike feelings, so that the fire of war spreads to every component of the army. . . . To the extent that this depends on the art of war, it is achieved by the manner in which the individual is treated, but even more by the manner in which he his employed. The modern art of war, far from using men like simple machines, should vitalize individual energies as far as the nature of its weapons permits. (Clausewitz 1992, 282). Political theorist John Pocock captured a central insight when he famously called Clausewitz's work “a great idealist theory of war” (Pocock 1975, 536). While this interpretation may be one-sided, an interaction between materialism and idealism best characterizes his work (Paret 1985, 7–8). As Clausewitz pointed out: “One might say that the physical seem little more than the wooden hilt, while the moral factors are the previous metal, the real weapon, the finely-honed blade” (Clausewitz 1832, 185). He recognized that incorporating the “realm of moral values” made “theory . . . infinitely more difficult” (Clausewitz 1832, 157). Yet, including moral factors is indispensable for strategy, while tactic is more concerned with material factors. Most of the matters addressed in On War “are composed in equal parts of physical and of moral causes and effects” (Clausewitz 1832, 184–85). This is because the conduct of war is shaped by both: “military activity is never directed against material force alone; it is always aimed simultaneously at the moral forces which give it life, and the two cannot be separated” (Clausewitz 1832, 137, see also 97, 231, 528). Ultimately, for Clausewitz “[t]he effects of physical and psychological factors form an organic whole which, unlike a metal alloy, is inseparable by chemical processes” (Clausewitz 1832, 184, 184–85). As an economist, Thomas Schelling might have been expected to privilege material capabilities, particularly in the context of the Cold War, in which nuclear weapons played such a defining role. However, his core argument is that conflicts are fundamentally contests of wills, and the outcomes of strategic interaction do not necessarily reflect the balance of material capabilities. Setting aside materialism, he argued that: “[t]he critical targets in [limited wars] are in the mind of the enemy as much as on the battlefield; the state of the enemy's expectations is as important as the state of his troops; the threat of violence in reserve is more important than the commitment of force in the field” (Schelling 1966, 142–43). He noted that “international relations often have the character of a competition in risk taking, characterized not so much by tests of force”—as they are in standard materialist accounts—“as by tests of nerve . . . Issues are decided not by who can bring the more force to bear in a locality, but by who is eventually willing to bring more force to bear or able to make it appear that more is forthcoming” (Schelling 1966, 94). To Schelling, one of the most important factors shaping outcomes is the willingness to suffer. Air power initially, and then nuclear weapons, opened up new dimensions to war, understood not only as a contest of strength but as a contest of risk-taking and endurance. For purposes of bargaining, the ability to absorb pain counted just as much as the capability to inflict it. Schelling noted that the focus should be on the “psychological process by which particular things become identified with courage or appeasement or how particular things get included in or left out of a diplomatic package” (Schelling 1966, 93–94). Similarly, “whether the removal of their missiles from Cuba while leaving behind 15,000 troops is a ‘defeat’ for the Soviets or a ‘defeat’ for the United States depends more on how it is construed than on the military significance of the troops, and the construction placed on the outcome is not easily foreseeable” (Schelling 1966, 94). Ultimately, for Schelling, conflicts were as much psychological as they were physical. Moreover, acts of war were chosen in part for their signaling value, not merely for their destructive capacity. He did not deny the existence and independent causal powers of military technology, but he considered that they were less important than the contexts of meaning that human beings construct around them. In sum, the effects of power are constituted both by material and ideational forces for Clausewitz and Schelling. Their views are widely shared among strategic thinkers and students of international security, who are well aware that the real world of strategy consists of much more than material forces, such as military technology. They recognized that in some circumstances, one of the fundamental aims of strategic logics is actually to overcome unfavorable material situations, for example through the mobilization of ideational or cultural resources (Liddell Hart 1991, 326–28; Luttwak 1999, 1–15; Maoz 1989, 246; Gray 2010). The burgeoning literature on military effectiveness, for example, is one of the inheritors of this tradition that questions the conventional materialist/idealist dichotomy. Scholars have identified a broad range of nonmaterial factors, such as strategy and force employment, regime type, civil-military relations, military culture, and cohesion, all of which help explain what makes the militaries of some states highly proficient and others unable to execute the simplest tasks (Reiter and Stam 2002; Biddle 2004; Lieber 2005; Brooks 2008; Castillo 2014; Talmadge 2015). Similarly, international security scholars acknowledge that religious beliefs can influence warfare, for example by helping war leaders and their followers to shrug off failures and rising costs to continue the fight (Horowitz 2009. See also Hassner 2016; Toft, Philpott, and Shah 2011). Beyond Problem-Solving and Critical Theory Carl von Clausewitz's and Thomas Schelling's strategic conceptions put into question, and move beyond, the problem solving/critical theory dichotomy. Instead of being committed to the reproduction of the existing order for its own sake, they favored reforming the domestic (Clausewitz) and international (Schelling) orders. Carl von Clausewitz's theory and his policy views sit uneasily with the notion that problem-solving theorists take the prevailing social and power relationship as givens in their frameworks for action. To be sure, as a member of Prussia's political elite, Clausewitz mostly worked with and provided advice to policy-makers and acted within the reformist circles of the state establishment (Paret 1985, ix–x, 6–8; Paret 1993, 174–76; Paret 2009, 72–103; Paret 2015; Moran 1992, 223–35; Scheipers 2018, 61–86). While he recognized the need to adjust politically and strategically to the French Revolution, the central political and social fact of his generation, he was opposed to radical emancipatory change. In the dramatic circumstances of war, greater popular involvement in politics was necessary. Nevertheless, conditions of peace required a shift, and citizens’ support of the state became the priority (Clausewitz 1992, 335–68). Clausewitz was also ambivalent about representative government and the political involvement of average citizens and remained caught in the typical dilemmas of conservative revolutions from above—that is, modernizing without changing the social structure (Moran 1992, 231–35; Moore 1966, 433–52). Yet, his ideas do not fit the problem-solving/critical theory dichotomy. First, Clausewitz's understanding of strategic thinking and action went well beyond a basic instrumentalist view. He certainly did not intend On War as a practical problem-solving guide for commanders on the battlefield (Sumida 2008, 112–20). For him, “theory cannot equip the mind with formulas for solving problems” (Clausewitz 1832, 578) but should help to form judgments and enhance intelligent intuition instead (Beyerchen 1992; Sumida 2008, 112–20). Effective command at the strategic level cannot consist in merely taking an existing set of rules as a framework for action and making them work well. In the face of inadequate information, puzzling violent circumstances, and multiple contingencies, the gifted commander seeks to alter the existing conditions instead of taking them for granted. Most importantly, the tenor and the expression of Clausewitz's evolving political views do not conform to the unquestioned connection between problem-solving theory and political status quo. While in the first half of his career he idealized the Prussian state, in the second half he praised the achievements of the early liberal reformers against conservative criticisms. From 1806 until his death in 1831, he belonged to the group of political reformers who favored a constitution, responsible ministerial government, equality of legal rights, and a degree of political participation of the upper classes (Paret 1985, 214–21; Colson 2016, 296–303, 315–25).17 The objective of these reformers was, according to their leader Baron vom Stein, to endow “the oppressed sections of the population . . . with freedom, independence, and property” (quoted in Levinger 2000, 55).18 Instead of preserving the social hierarchy, he worked to dismantle what he saw as an obsolete political system. His vigorous questioning of the traditional ideas, social norms, and institutions of the conservative ruling elite sits uneasily with the critical security idea that strategic theorists automatically take the prevailing social and power relationship as given in their frameworks for action. In 1812, rather than acquiesce to the alliance between France and Prussia, he abandoned Prussia and sought service with Russia, an emotional crisis that marked his deep disappointment in the Prussian state (Moran 1992, 226). Later on, as he advocated greater individual moral worth, social equity, and governmental responsibility, he was suspected of Jacobinism and denied an ambassadorial position in the United Kingdom because, as the British envoy reported, in Berlin “there is not that confidence in his being wholly free from revolutionary views” (quoted in Paret 1992, 6).19 Evaluated in light of the political debate in 1820s Prussia, these views situated Clausewitz at the reformist center of the political spectrum. He was favorable to political reforms, notably a constitution and an expanded political life, and wished Prussia would move beyond the rigid authoritarianism that became pervasive after 1815. He promoted the cautious establishment of a political system that would lead the energies of society to “gradually invigorate the country's political life” (Paret 1993, 177; Colson 2016, 386). Finally, over time, Clausewitz sought not only to generate instrumental knowledge for policy-makers but to reach a broader reflexive public as well. In the early 1830s, he understood that the audience for his political argument could no longer be limited to the king as it was in the case of his 1812 “Political Declaration”; he moved to direct his writing to newspapers’ educated readers (Paret 1985, 406; Moran 1992, 234–35).20 Thomas Schelling also sought policy relevance, and his work was aimed at US policymakers at the highest level of government. While his degree of influence on specific decisions is difficult to assess, he rose to prominence among the “best and the brightest,” an elite group who did regular advisory work for the government. He was close to the Kennedy administration, and his views were shared by the civilian leadership under the Johnson presidency as well (Ayson 2004; Kuklick 2006, 152–67; McNamara et al. 1999, 169; Dodge 2006, 124, 110; Sent 2007). He was regularly appointed to different committees and boards addressing strategic problems, and in 1967, he was offered and nearly accepted a position in the State Department (Dodge 2006, 111). Schelling served as a consultant at RAND from 1958 until 1968 and ran political-military simulation games in the early 1960s to provide officials with decision-making experience in tense, dangerous, situations that could involve nuclear weapons. Game participants included officials from the White House, the State Department, the CIA, and the military (Schelling 1987, 426–44; Dodge 2006, 99–106). Yet, the problem solving/critical theory dichotomy does not capture the depth of reforms sought by Schelling nor the impact of these reforms. His work on arms control during the Cold War illustrates the point (Schelling and Halperin 1961). Arms control is a problem-solving conception, as it accepts the existence of nuclear weapons and seeks to stabilize deterrence through reductions and/or increases of certain kinds of military forces on both sides. Thomas Schelling repeatedly rejected the development of an antiballistic missile system (ABM) (Dodge 2006, 109–13). Some of his ideas regarding arms control negotiations contributed to the signature of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) and the ABM Treaty in 1972. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, which represents a critical security view of weapons of mass destruction, recognized this effect by setting back its famous “Doomsday Clock” to twelve minutes to midnight after these treaties were signed (Dodge 2006, 113). Schelling's conception of arms control took the structure of international politics and the existence of nuclear weapons as given, but for the individuals whose lives deterrence saved, it was emancipatory. His theoretical insights and his policy prescription show that a neopositivist social scientist can help alter existing goals and ends that are presupplied by the extant social structures. In sum, Clausewitz and Schelling's conceptions of strategy are not easily classified as either problem-solving or critical. Instead, they combine elements of both. Their views of strategy required creative speculation about desirable future political end states combined with dispassionate analysis of current factors and forces. Both men were committed to reform, either domestically or internationally. Conclusion: Reconnecting IR, Security, and Strategy By revisiting the conceptions of Carl von Clausewitz and Thomas Schelling, two central, yet distinctive, strategists, I have showed that strategic studies helps transcend the rationalism/constructivism, materialism/idealist, problem-solving/critical theorizing dichotomies and bridges gaps (see also Vennesson 2017). While reason certainly plays a central role in strategic studies, the field is not dogmatically rationalist and combines material and nonmaterial factors. The quest for emancipation is not only compatible with, but often necessitates, the logics of strategy. These dimensions have never been hidden or suppressed (except perhaps in critical security accounts): they have always been constitutive of strategic studies. Although these dichotomies prove to be misleading, it does not mean that nothing has been learned by engaging with them. One lesson is that it is important to distinguish strategic studies from related, but distinct, bodies of thought. These dichotomies miss the mark in part because strategic studies is at times conflated with weapon-systems-centered operational research, system analysis, or even Kenneth Waltz's neorealism. Such reductionist perspectives lead to a distorted view of the field as a whole. Critical security advocates are, nevertheless, correct that “hectic empiricism” and the permanent quest of the new fad has been a cause of strategic studies decline. Critics are also right to remind students of strategy that references to strategic thinkers such as Carl von Clausewitz or Thomas Schelling cannot remain shallow and ritualistic. While they should not become the exclusive focus of the field, conceptual and epistemological questions about strategy are important and deserve careful consideration (see for example Nordin and Öberg 2015). Breaking out of the conceptual jails in which strategy has been incarcerated makes it easier for students of security and IR to reappropriate strategy, one of the oldest and central forms of practice and knowledge surrounding international security. It offers a distinctive conception of the very nature of world politics and, more specifically, a theory of political action in international relations. While I can only sketch a research agenda here, several promising dimensions stand out. First, strategic thinking provides a versatile, not military-focused, view of security: it has a core—the threat and use of organized force for political ends—but it can go well beyond. This is because strategic thinking can be (and has been) used to analyze any security issue when actors interacting in a conflicting environment are involved and use a range of coercive means. Second, strategic studies is politics and polities-centered, not state-centric: any kind of political community, large or small, can develop strategic actions. Political communities’ political ends provide guiding parameters that are connected to diverse means in myriad ways. Third, strategy is global, not Western-centric, in its roots and manifestations (Vennesson 2017). Fourth, strategy is about real reason, how security actors actually think and feel, not rationalism. Fifth, it is social-materialist: it recognizes the reciprocal determination of technology and society. Finally, strategic thinking can make emancipations possible through problem-solving. Showing that strategic studies is not intrinsically rationalist, materialist, and acritical also facilitates the intellectual reacquisition of, and critical reengagement with, strategic thought. The examination of strategic thought reveals a rich repository of insights, concepts, precedents, and categories profoundly well suited to probe current situations and needs in world politics. Instead of dealing with strategic thinking at arm's length, security and IR specialists can embrace a vast reservoir of ideas, concepts, and mechanisms available for theory building. Strategic thinking provides an intricate set of information, knowledge, and concepts, which are partially universal and transhistorical and partially contextual historically and culturally. This information crystalizes in the discourses of strategic thinkers and in the actions of strategists. Security and IR scholars can profitably revisit this vast reservoir of concepts and mechanisms forged by strategists and strategic theorists and borrow and reformulate them to serve their purpose. Examples include polarity, escalation, grammar of war, freedom of action, stability, indirect approach, threat that leaves something to chance, and political-strategic expectation. Moreover, by focusing on how states use their material resources, strategic perspectives offer a promising path to reconceptualizing power (Biddle 2004; Seybert and Katzenstein 2018). They notably suggest that capability is not primarily a matter of material resources but how potential capacities are actualized in creative ways. Viewed through these lenses, the concept of power itself requires more disaggregate treatment, as it is inherently multidimensional and not easily fungible across specific tasks and geopolitical contexts. Strategic perspectives also suggest a careful examination of differences in the ways in which strategic actors actualize and employ their potential capacities. In addition, the strategic understanding of world politics emphasizes the logics of the situation and their interlocking features—including the tactics of the actors involved—and downplays preconditions, antecedents, or previously existing causes. It recognizes that international interactions have logics of their own and tend to take off and become independent from the conditions of their genesis. It seeks to explore what these critical events or processes are made of. In that sense, strategic thinking is indispensable for approaching what Lucia Seybert and Peter Katzenstein call “protean power”—that is, “the effect of improvisational and innovative responses to uncertainty that arise from actors’ creativity and agility in response to uncertainty” (Seybert and Katzenstein 2018, 4). Finally, going beyond conventional dichotomies helps reconnect practical and social scientific knowledge (Desch 2019). Strategic thought is a central form of enriched practical knowledge about conflict, and international relations more broadly, which finds its source over centuries of practical self-reflection and judgement. Emptying strategy out of security theories and policies that do not involve military force, such as poverty, famine, political oppression, and environmental degradation—to name but a few—is proving unwise, as well as unsustainable. These security issues might not directly implicate military power, but they often involve a set of mental and physical operations to calculate, prepare, and conduct finalized collective action in a conflictual environment. Footnotes 1 This article builds upon and expands Vennesson (2016). It complements my earlier rebuttal of the critical security claims that strategic studies is intrinsically focused on Cold War military issues and state- and Western-centric (Vennesson 2017). 2 For valuable overviews, see Mead Earle ed. 1943; Paret ed. 1986; Walt 1991; Gray 1999; Gray 2010; Heuser 2010; Hanson 2010; Baylis, Wirtz, and Gray 2019; Coutau-Bégarie 2012; Strachan 2013; Freedman 2013. On grand strategy, see Milevski 2016; Silove 2018. 3 Strategic theory as such has disappeared from most of security studies textbooks (Burgess 2010; Williams ed. 2013; Hough et al. 2015; Dunn Cavelty and Maurer 2011; Martin and Owen 2014). See also Peoples 2013. The most recent overview of international security studies largely ignores strategic studies (Gheciu and Wohlforth 2018). 4 There are also promising signs that international security scholars are increasingly thinking along similar lines. See, for example, Rovner 2016; Duyvesten and Worrall 2017. 5 This is distinct from, and significantly broader than, Critical Security Studies (upper case) which generally refers, following Ken Booth and Richard Wyn Jones, to one distinctive strand of emancipation-oriented critical approach, inspired by Antonio Gramsci and the Frankfurt School (Wyn Jones 1999; Booth 2007). I include this approach in my discussion, but I do not focus exclusively on it. 6 On rationalism and constructivism in IR, see Wendt 1999; Fearon and Wendt 2002. 7 Holmqvist 2013. 8 For insightful challenges, see Mirowski 2002; Erickson et al. 2013. 9 For critical assessments, see Brown et al 2000; Mercer 2013; Rathbun 2017. 10 I thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting this formulation. 11 For a different interpretation of the relations between rationalism and strategic studies, see Rasmussen 2006, 12–42. 12 On the identity-making role of war, see Scheipers 2018, 52–86. 13 Critical security theorists are not alone in using the rationalist/constructivist dichotomy to analyze the work of Thomas Schelling; see Allison and Zelikow 1999: 40–48; Lebow 2006; Sent 2007. 14 Ayson 2004. 15 On cultural influences, see Gray 1986; Heuser 1998; Johnson, Kartchner, and Larseneds 2009. 16 McNeill 1982; Van Creveld 1989; Mahnken 2008; Bousquet 2009. 17 For a different interpretation, see Behrens 1976, 44. 18 Simon 1955; Craig 1964, 37–81; Paret 1966. 19 Moran 1992, 227; Colson 2016, 315–25. 20 On Clausewitz's appreciation of the role of women in politics, see Bellinger 2016. Acknowledgments For their thoughtful suggestions on an earlier version of this article, I thank the editors and the two reviewers of the Journal of Global Security Studies, as well as Jesse Caemmerer, Sergio Catignani, Beatrice Heuser, Thomas Lindemann, Bernard Loo, Evan Resnick, and Bhubhindar Singh. For their questions, comments and suggestions, I also thank Thierry Balzacq, Christian Bueger, Mathias Delori, Eric Gjidala, Frédéric Ramel, Michael Reese, Ina Wiesner, and participants at seminars at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies; the University of Chicago (PIPES); All Souls College, University of Oxford; and Institut de Recherche Stratégique de l'Ecole Militaire (IRSEM), as well as at conferences of the Italian Standing Group on International Relations, the International Studies Association, and the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society. Jesse Caemmerer provided excellent research assistance. Any remaining errors are my own. 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TI - Is Strategic Studies Rationalist, Materialist, and A-Critical? Reconnecting Security and Strategy
JF - Journal of Global Security Studies
DO - 10.1093/jogss/ogz032
DA - 2020-07-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/is-strategic-studies-rationalist-materialist-and-a-critical-WI4JDveRAh
SP - 1
VL - Advance Article
IS - 
DP - DeepDyve
ER -