TY - JOUR
AU - Zhang, Nana
AB - Abstract The article uses a longitudinal case study of China’s high-speed rail from the sectoral system perspective to show how a latecomer achieves catch up in the context of complex products and systems (CoPS). Results indicate the coevolution among high-speed train CoPS, the complementary assets, and government engagement are important to the sectoral system’s catch up. To achieve catch up, a latecomer can choose a strategy in which the complementary assets take precedence over the CoPS, and the coordination of the two systems is maintained with government engagement. In addition, two elements involving the sectoral system’s knowledge base and government engagement play fundamental roles enabling the evolution of the competences of the CoPS and the leverage of complementary assets for catch up. The article contributes to the literature on catch up in the CoPS context using a sectoral system framework. 1. Introduction Complex products and systems (CoPS) are high cost, engineering-intensive products, systems, networks, and constructs (Hobday, 1998: 690) that play vital roles supporting the sectoral development and competitiveness of modern economies (Hobday et al., 2000). However, it is extremely challenging for latecomer countries to catch up in CoPS for several reasons. First, CoPS have many customized and interconnected elements, with development relying on both components and architectures (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Hobday, 1998). The complex coordination difficulties among components and subsystems mean a latecomer requires higher technological capabilities to catch up, not only to master critical required components and technologies but also to leverage the system integration (Hobday et al., 2000). Second, the product complexity and hierarchical architectural features of CoPS require diverse knowledge domains’ synergy and many interfirm collaborations to achieve innovations (Hughes, 1983; Brusoni et al., 2001). The disadvantage of industrial actors in latecomer countries is that technology knowledge, human resource, and networks have locked them into low competitiveness of products in CoPS catch up (Chesbrough and Kusunoki, 2001). Third, CoPS are mainly produced in small batches of projects, with innovations embedded in the fluid phase of long product systems’ life cycles (Davies, 1997), far from being dominant designs (Davies and Hobday, 2005). Pioneers in CoPS have very stable market positions and can construct entry barriers that result in very few windows of opportunities for technological leapfrogging and breakthrough by latecomers (Perez and Soete, 1988). All these factors suggest it is more difficult for latecomers to catch up in CoPS than in mass-produced goods (Park, 2013). Accordingly, there are few theoretical and empirical investigations on CoPS catch up, while only a few studies have explored the possibility of catch up success in CoPS (e.g., Zhang and Igel, 2001; Choung and Hwang, 2007; Park, 2013; Kiamehr et al., 2014). Three streams of literature have highlighted the fundamental factors which affect latecomers’ catch up in CoPS: the simultaneous adoption of foreign technologies and in-house R&D (Zhang and Igel, 2001; Choung and Hwang, 2007); the technological and integration capabilities of integrator firms in sectors (Hobday et al., 2005; Kiamehr et al., 2014; Lee and Yoon, 2015); and government engagement and industrial policy (e.g., Mahmood and Rufin, 2005; Mazzoleni and Nelson, 2007; Evans, 2012). We adopted the sectoral system framework developed by Malerba (2002) to explain how a latecomer can achieve catch up in the context of CoPS. The notion of a sectoral system emphasizes the structure of the system in terms of products, agents, knowledge and technologies, and its dynamics and transformation, which indicates a collective emergent outcome of the interaction and coevolution of the various elements in broader terms (Malerba, 2002: 251). We argue the sectoral system framework provides comprehensive insights to address latecomers’ catch up in CoPS. First, the intrinsic feature of CoPS deriving from the very many components and subsystems makes the technological and engineering know-how extremely complex at the architecture level (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Hobday, 1998), with the relevant knowledge elements extending to the various fields in a sector (Dosi, 1988). Further extending to the sector’s downstream of CoPS, knowledge about complementary assets and markets is also important (Malerba and Nelson, 2011). Therefore, diverse knowledge inputs and the effective orchestration (e.g., foreign component and architectural technologies, domestic R&D, and innovations) are necessary for the emergence of innovation and the development of CoPS (Hobday et al., 2000). Second, the coordination and collaboration of mutually interdependent heterogeneous organizations and sectoral elements are at the heart of CoPS’ innovation management (Dosi et al., 1988; Hobday, 1998). Regarding the catch up of CoPS, successful strategies not only refer to the capabilities of sectoral integrators, but the fit across network learning, co-evolution of capabilities, and the access to complementary assets of sectoral systems (Malerba and Nelson, 2011). Third, the government plays an important role shaping the interactions among actors and elements of sectoral systems in latecomers’ catch up (Malerba, 2002; Mazzoleni and Nelson, 2007; Niosi, 2011), such as exerting sectoral regulations and policies on the strategic decision-making of CoPS, playing as the final customer for specific CoPS, and directly participating CoPS innovation (Hobday et al., 2000). Our research focuses on how a latecomer achieve catch up in the context of CoPS from the sectoral system framework, using China’s high-speed rail (HSR) sector as a case study. Our research addresses the gaps in the literature as follows. First, the latecomer catch up phenomenon has attracted attention in prior literature (e.g., Lee and Lim, 2001; Lee and Malerba, 2017), while catch up issues in the context of CoPS have had little theoretical and empirical investigation. On the role of CoPS in the interconnection and interdependency of components and subsystems, the systemic-level coordination among many actors or subsystems on architecture is important (Comfort et al., 2004; Carlsson, 2007; Choung and Hwang, 2007; Malerba and Nelson, 2011). We thus explain our research question from the lens of sectoral system, extending the limited prior literature on CoPS catch up mainly from the focal integrator perspective (e.g., Hobday et al., 2005; Kiamehr et al., 2014; Lee and Yoon, 2015). Second, CoPS are usually embedded in specific sectoral systems, involving not only the components and architectures of CoPS and relevant actors and knowledge, but also complementary assets and institutional elements (Hobday et al., 2000; Malerba and Nelson, 2012). Previous literature has described the latecomer catch up phenomenon using the sectoral system perspective extensively, such as the automobile and mobile phone sectors in China (Lee et al., 2009), the mobile phone industry in Korea (Giachetti and Marchi, 2017), the semiconductor memory industry in Japan and Korea (Shin, 2017), and the global regional jet industry (Vértesy, 2017). However, there is little knowledge addressing an entire sectoral system’s catch up. We thus focus on the catch up of latecomers from the perspective of a sectoral system’s catch up in the context of CoPS—China’s HSR. Third, we added the analysis of government engagement in a sectoral system’s catch up. CoPS are generally institutionalized under government regulations and controls (Park, 2013), as governments have diverse roles as CoPS users (Choung and Hwang, 2007), as innovation participators (Hobday et al., 2000), and as rule makers (Park, 2013). However, prior literature has claimed both successes and failures from government’s engagement in innovation systems (Edquist, 2011) which further enhance the system complexity in the catch up process (Comfort et al., 2004). Starting with China’s Reform and Opening initiative in 1978, firms and sectors were encouraged to learn and use external technological and management resources due to China’s existing poor industrial basis, particularly through the national policy Market for Technology incentives which leveraged manufacturing sectoral competitiveness quickly (Zheng et al., 2018). However, the policy was also criticized for China’s unsuccessful development of domestic sectoral systems like automobiles (Zheng et al., 2018). Thus, it is necessary to develop an in-depth understanding of the government engagement in complex innovation systems in catch up (Niosi, 2011), particularly in the context of China which is scarce in the literature (Huang et al., 2016). 2. Literature review 2.1 Characteristics of CoPS and catch up CoPS are made up of many customized, interconnected control units, subsystems, and components (Hobday et al., 2000: 795), acting as major capital goods that underpin and enable industrial development (Acha et al., 2004). Compared to mass-produced commodity goods, CoPS have different characteristics (Hobday, 1998; Park, 2013): a CoPS is created by project-based multifirm collaborations, rather than produced by a single firm; a CoPS engages diverse actors like sectoral firms and suppliers, research institutes and government agencies; a CoPS relies on user involvement in innovation rather than supplier-driven innovation; a CoPS has larger numbers of components and an elaborate system architecture that integrates the components, which increases the complexity of the system compared to commodity goods; a CoPS’s innovation represents emergent properties; and the market for a CoPS is heavily regulated and influenced by the government (Choung and Hwang, 2007). These characteristics mean CoPS are more difficult for latecomers to catch up in (Miller et al., 1995; Park, 2013) due to the coordination challenge of many actors, the technological and knowledge complexity of both components and architecture, the inferior technological capabilities, and the high entry barriers (Hughes, 1983; Perez and Soete, 1988; Miller et al., 1995; Hobday et al., 2000). In addition, the consistently high rate of product innovation means a specific CoPS is always far from reaching the dominant design, which further constrains latecomers’ catch up by leveraging mass productions (Park, 2013). Given the importance of CoPS but the difficulty of catching up, a few positive catch up cases have been discussed in limited sectors of latecomer countries including the electricity generation systems of Iran (Kiamehr et al., 2014), the TDX and CDMA telecom systems of Korea (Choung and Hwang, 2007; Park, 2013), the stored program control switching system of China (Zhang and Igel, 2001), the military aircraft sector system of Korea (Lee and Yoon, 2015), the telecommunication equipment sector systems of Brazil, China, India, and Korea (Lee et al., 2012), and the commercial aerospace sector system of China (Smith and Zhang, 2014). All these explorations have highlighted the simultaneous adoption of foreign technologies and in-house R&D (Zhang and Igel, 2001; Choung and Hwang, 2007), the technological and integration capabilities of sectoral integrator firms (Hobday et al., 2005; Kiamehr et al., 2014; Lee and Yoon, 2015), and government engagement and industrial policy (e.g., Mahmood and Rufin, 2005; Mazzoleni and Nelson, 2007; Evans, 2012) as the fundamental factors which affect latecomers catching up in CoPS. 2.2 Catch up of the sectoral system Catching up occurs in the economic sectors of latecomers (Malerba and Nelson, 2011, 2012). To highlight the factors which matter to the catch up process among different sectors, the sectoral system framework was constructed (Malerba, 2002, 2004). A sectoral system emphasizes the nature, structure, organization, and dynamics of innovation and production in sectors (Malerba and Nelson, 2011: 1649), regarding key elements involving the knowledge base and technologies, key actors, and institutions that shape the interactions among actors (Malerba, 2002, 2004). The coevolution of these elements changes the dynamic and transforms a sectoral system (Nelson, 1994), with actors entering and exiting, new types of vertical and horizontal interconnections formed, and a knowledge base accumulated over time (Malerba and Nelson, 2011). The sectoral system framework has been widely adopted to explain the catch up phenomenon in latecomer economies, such as Samsung’s catch up to Nokia in Korea’s mobile phone industry (Giachetti and Marchi, 2017), the catch up of the automobile and mobile phone sectors in China (Lee et al., 2009), the dynamic catch up strategy of the semiconductor memory industry in Japan and Korea (Shin, 2017), the catch up and leadership dynamics of the regional jet industry (Vértesy, 2017), the path-creating catch up of Japan and the stage-skipping catch up of Korea in the steel industry (Lee and Ki, 2017), the linking–leveraging–learning process of the commercial aerospace sector in China (Smith and Zhang, 2014), and the interchangeable-lens camera industry in Japan and Korea (Kang and Song, 2017). On the differences in catching up by nations in sectors, the formation and evolution of sectoral systems are contextualized in actors’ involvement, subsystems’ coordinations, technological and knowledge bases, and public policies for learning and knowledge interactions (Niosi, 2011). In contrast, elements such as actors learning, access to foreign know-how, skilled human resources, and active government policy are regarded as common across catch up in sectors (Malerba and Nelson, 2011). 2.3 Enablers of sectoral systems’ catch up in CoPS We articulate the sectoral system framework to the catch up in CoPS with three enablers matter to the outcomes regarding the existing literature. The first refers to the technology prowess competence. Technology prowess is a firm’s ability to apply its knowledge stock to the innovation initiative at hand (Appleyard and Chesbrough, 2017: 316), and its influence can extend to the whole supporting system for collaborative actors sharing profits around an open project (Appleyard and Chesbrough, 2017). The knowledge stocks in CoPS are composed of component and architectural knowledge (Henderson and Clark, 1990; Hobday, 1998), relating to the capabilities more than engineering know-how, but modes of coordinating and integrating the interconnected components and subsystems (Malerba and Nelson, 2011). Therefore, the catching up in CoPS requires high-level competence, both in mastering critical component technologies and improving system integrations (Hobday et al., 2000; 2005). It is important for latecomers to continuously leverage technology prowess competence in an open initiative. The technology prowess first constructs the knowledge base of a sector system (Malerba, 2002; Malerba and Nelson, 2011). It also plays a role as absorptive capacity for latecomers assimilating external know-how (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990), which encourages learning and catching up when accessing foreign know-how and adopting foreign technologies (Choung and Hwang, 2007; Malerba and Nelson, 2011). On interfirm collaboration, CoPS involve partners with interdependent competencies (Brusoni et al., 2001) and embed collective learning and adaption (Comfort et al., 2004; Carlsson, 2007), which facilitates the elements coordination and innovation emergence in systems (Hobday et al., 2000). With the increasingly complex and specialized nature of technology, the interdependence and mutualism in systems become even more prevalent (e.g., Iansiti, 1997). The second enabler matter to latecomers catch up targets complementary assets (Teece, 1986, 2000, 2006). The concept of complementary assets originates from Teece (1986), with an innovation’s successful commercialization depending on applying the know-how knowledge and technology with other assets or capabilities that are difficult to replicate (Teece, 1986, 2000), such as complementary technologies, competitive manufacturing, distribution, and service (Teece, 1986, 2006). Innovators that do not access such specialized and co-specialized assets may lose value capture to competitors or followers (Teece, 2000). From the perspective of latecomers, organizations and industries in nations trying to catch up do benefit from innovations in strategically investing and developing world-class complementary skills and assets, and building open relationships with pioneering developed countries’ firms and industries as well, rather than through straight imitation from developed countries (Teece, 2000). The third enabler refers to government engagement, representing the key institutional factor shaping the interactions among sectoral actors and the evolution of sectoral systems (Malerba and Nelson, 2011). Prior literature has discussed several aspects of government engagement on sectoral systems’ catch up in the context of CoPS, such as direct guidance of decision-making and innovation involvements in CoPS (e.g., aerospace, telecommunications, and rail systems) (Hobday et al., 2000), the stimulating role on learning and capability formation of domestic actors (e.g., pharmaceuticals, automobiles, telecommunications, agro-food, semiconductors, and software) (Malerba and Nelson, 2011, 2012), the regulation making of sectoral systems and the final customer for some specific CoPS (Hobday et al., 2000), and the control of new firms’ entry rates and technology diffusions in sectoral system evolution (Malerba, 2002). Due to the potential negative effects of over-involvement and policy lock-in on CoPS development (Hobday et al., 2000), the government engagement should be introduced effectively, complementing other important elements to achieve catch up in sectors (Malerba and Nelson, 2011). 3. Methodology 3.1 Research design and case selection We adopted an inductive, in-depth, and longitudinal case study on the evolution of China’s HSR sector. The single case analysis was suitable not only for investigating a phenomenon with relatively poor understanding in existing theory (Siggelkow, 2007), but also for assessing the extraordinary circumstances (Yin, 1994), particularly from the longitudinal perspectives confirmed by the sequence of key events and potential causal relationships (Eisenhardt, 1989; Leonard-Barton, 1990). We used the sectoral system approach to explore the catch up of China’s HSR. Given that our research design relates to the dynamic co-evolution among subsystems, a single longitudinal case study fits our target well (Langley et al., 2013). We chose China’s HSR sector for several reasons. China is the world’s second largest economy, with rapid technological and economic development after the Reform and Opening Initiative in 1978 (Barkema et al., 2015), which is a suitable unique geographical context for concerning catch up (Li et al., 2008). China’s extremely inferior sectoral bases and technological capabilities in 1978 made the country highly focused on sectoral catching up, involving both industrial actors proactively sourcing global resources (Greul et al., 2018) and relevant government involvement in sectoral development (Mahmood and Rufin, 2005; Musacchio et al., 2015). Since the “Market for Technology” strategy in 1978 (Zheng et al., 2018), the sectoral production capacity of China has gradually exceeded that of Western countries in the past two decades, due to China’s comparative advantages of the massive market upon its population, and low-cost material and human resources (Huang et al., 2016). Of all the sectors, the rapid development of HSR is considered China’s most successful sectoral catch up case (Chesbrough et al., 2021), with the HSR line in length increased rapidly from 2003 according to the latest world UIC data summarized in Figure 1. Further extending to early 2019, China has taken the world’s longest HSR network of 31,304 km (representing 67.5% of the world’s total HSR length), and the largest use with more than seven billion people served by the end of September 2017.1 The HSR is characterized as a typical sectoral system in the context of CoPS composed of interconnected elements and subsystems (Hobday, 1998; Hobday et al., 2000), with the mutual adaptation and coordination among subsystems important to the systems’ development and innovation emergence (Atay and Jost, 2004; Comfort et al., 2004; Katz, 2016). All these characteristics represent a “revelatory case” setting (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). Figure 1. Open in new tabDownload slide HSR line length in the world (km). Figure 1. Open in new tabDownload slide HSR line length in the world (km). 3.2 Data sources and collection We collected data from diverse sources to access multiperspective observations of the phenomenon (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). Data collection was carried out in two stages combining both first-hand interviews and second-hand data sources. We first gathered extensive archives from secondary sources to develop a chronological history of China’s HSR. We mainly relied on books involving documentary literature and China Railway Yearbooks. The archives contained more than 1000 pages. Two research groups were set up with each containing one professor, one postdoctoral researcher, and two PhD students. Each group built the initial chronological history of key events from archive data independently. Interactive discussions then occurred until a consensus was reached. The combined research group then carried out semistructured interviews with key informants, such as the vice Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of China Railway Rolling Stock Corporation (CRRC) and the Chief Manager of China South Railway (CSR), to ensure data consistency and cross-validity. Five informants were selected using the following criteria: key managers of China’s HSR dominant organizations—e.g., Sifang Train Company, Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive Vehicles Plant—with long tenure to ensure the temporal perspective and knowledge of the sectoral evolution; informants who directly experienced key and major events of HSR projects capable of providing first-hand knowledge on major research projects; and a functional variety of interviewees’ affiliations, such as marketing, operations, R&D, and overseas management team. In the second research phase from early 2015 to September 2017, we further analyzed in-depth data from multiple sources on core technologies of high-speed trains, complementary assets (e.g. railway construction, tunnel engineering, bridge engineering, and construction of HSR stations), and government engagement such as financial investment, research project investment, industrial policy, and HSR diplomacy. We first added semistructured interviews with another two informants. We then complemented the interviews with indirect interview fragments from related videos, with each fragment lasting about 30 s to 2 min. Secondary detailed qualitative sources were also added, with over 2000 pages of notes. Table 1 summarizes all the data sources in the two stages. Table 1. Data sources for the two phases Phase 1: Initial chronological history . Phase 2: In-depth data analysis . Primary data . Secondary data . Primary data . Secondary data . Interview/ minutes . Informant . Company documents . Industry archives . Additional interviews/minutes . Informant . Company documents . Industry archives . A/150 min Senior Executive Members of CNR 14 CSR Yearbooks (2002–2015) 14 CNR Yearbooks (2002–2015) 17 China Railway Yearbooks (1999–2015) F/120 min Director of Human Resource and Director of External Cooperation of CRRC 14 CSR Yearbooks (2002–2015) 18 China Railway Yearbooks (1999–2016) B/120 min Vice CEO of CSR One book on narrative history of China’s HSR G/90 min R&D Director and Operation Management Director of CRRC 14 CNR Yearbooks (2002–2015) Four books on narrative history of China’s HSR C/69 min Director of Overseas Operation of CSR Sifang Key government documents 20 indirect interview fragments (0.5–2 min) #Senior Fellows of Railway Institutes, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Chinese Academy of Engineering, and major universities #Senior Executive Members of CRRC and China Rail Corporation One CRRC Yearbook on 2016 Key government documents D/120 min Marketing Director of CSR Six research reports of CRRC 10 published cases of HSR E/120 min Manager of CSR Sifang Phase 1: Initial chronological history . Phase 2: In-depth data analysis . Primary data . Secondary data . Primary data . Secondary data . Interview/ minutes . Informant . Company documents . Industry archives . Additional interviews/minutes . Informant . Company documents . Industry archives . A/150 min Senior Executive Members of CNR 14 CSR Yearbooks (2002–2015) 14 CNR Yearbooks (2002–2015) 17 China Railway Yearbooks (1999–2015) F/120 min Director of Human Resource and Director of External Cooperation of CRRC 14 CSR Yearbooks (2002–2015) 18 China Railway Yearbooks (1999–2016) B/120 min Vice CEO of CSR One book on narrative history of China’s HSR G/90 min R&D Director and Operation Management Director of CRRC 14 CNR Yearbooks (2002–2015) Four books on narrative history of China’s HSR C/69 min Director of Overseas Operation of CSR Sifang Key government documents 20 indirect interview fragments (0.5–2 min) #Senior Fellows of Railway Institutes, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Chinese Academy of Engineering, and major universities #Senior Executive Members of CRRC and China Rail Corporation One CRRC Yearbook on 2016 Key government documents D/120 min Marketing Director of CSR Six research reports of CRRC 10 published cases of HSR E/120 min Manager of CSR Sifang Open in new tab Table 1. Data sources for the two phases Phase 1: Initial chronological history . Phase 2: In-depth data analysis . Primary data . Secondary data . Primary data . Secondary data . Interview/ minutes . Informant . Company documents . Industry archives . Additional interviews/minutes . Informant . Company documents . Industry archives . A/150 min Senior Executive Members of CNR 14 CSR Yearbooks (2002–2015) 14 CNR Yearbooks (2002–2015) 17 China Railway Yearbooks (1999–2015) F/120 min Director of Human Resource and Director of External Cooperation of CRRC 14 CSR Yearbooks (2002–2015) 18 China Railway Yearbooks (1999–2016) B/120 min Vice CEO of CSR One book on narrative history of China’s HSR G/90 min R&D Director and Operation Management Director of CRRC 14 CNR Yearbooks (2002–2015) Four books on narrative history of China’s HSR C/69 min Director of Overseas Operation of CSR Sifang Key government documents 20 indirect interview fragments (0.5–2 min) #Senior Fellows of Railway Institutes, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Chinese Academy of Engineering, and major universities #Senior Executive Members of CRRC and China Rail Corporation One CRRC Yearbook on 2016 Key government documents D/120 min Marketing Director of CSR Six research reports of CRRC 10 published cases of HSR E/120 min Manager of CSR Sifang Phase 1: Initial chronological history . Phase 2: In-depth data analysis . Primary data . Secondary data . Primary data . Secondary data . Interview/ minutes . Informant . Company documents . Industry archives . Additional interviews/minutes . Informant . Company documents . Industry archives . A/150 min Senior Executive Members of CNR 14 CSR Yearbooks (2002–2015) 14 CNR Yearbooks (2002–2015) 17 China Railway Yearbooks (1999–2015) F/120 min Director of Human Resource and Director of External Cooperation of CRRC 14 CSR Yearbooks (2002–2015) 18 China Railway Yearbooks (1999–2016) B/120 min Vice CEO of CSR One book on narrative history of China’s HSR G/90 min R&D Director and Operation Management Director of CRRC 14 CNR Yearbooks (2002–2015) Four books on narrative history of China’s HSR C/69 min Director of Overseas Operation of CSR Sifang Key government documents 20 indirect interview fragments (0.5–2 min) #Senior Fellows of Railway Institutes, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Chinese Academy of Engineering, and major universities #Senior Executive Members of CRRC and China Rail Corporation One CRRC Yearbook on 2016 Key government documents D/120 min Marketing Director of CSR Six research reports of CRRC 10 published cases of HSR E/120 min Manager of CSR Sifang Open in new tab We used the various data sources to facilitate a triangulation approach for our inductive longitudinal case study for reliability and validity (Yin, 1994). To mitigate bias and leverage validity, we cross-checked statements across interviews and secondary archives, based on the two research groups undertaking analysis independently and then making iterative interactions until consensus. To further ensure consistency and validity, the combined research group constructed a report on the evolution of HSR, and circulated it to the key interviewees and relevant industry practitioners in workshops. Errors were corrected and further modifications were made according to the feedback until we finally categorized the evolution of HSR in China into four stages (see Figure 2) and developed our preliminary findings. Figure 2. Open in new tabDownload slide Evolution of China’s HSR sectoral system. Figure 2. Open in new tabDownload slide Evolution of China’s HSR sectoral system. 3.3 Data analysis We used content analysis (Strauss and Corbin, 1997) to analyze the data. We first aggregated data from the primary interviews and data from the secondary archives according to Table 2 to build holistic data materials. Following Park (2013), we lay out the conceptual argument first related to the classification of HSR sectoral systems. The general classification of HSR sectoral systems was composed of train-based CoPS and railway-based complementaries,2 and the government played as an innegligible institutional factor of HSR sector (Sun, 2015). We thus coded the aggregated holistic data to identify and categorize key constructs with relatively loose concepts (Laamanen and Wallin, 2009), and used tables and graphs to facilitate data analysis and sort the pieces of evidence (Huberman and Miles, 1994). To keep track of coding agreement, the two research groups in the study each carried out the coding separately and then compared their coding schemes with shared written and verbal notes. Further interactions and revisiting of the data took place until a common understanding was reached (Nag and Gioia, 2012). The whole process was iterative, cycling among literature and research data (Santos and Eisenhardt, 2009). Table 2. The coding rule of data Data sources . Data category . Coding . First-hand data Semi-structure interview A1: A1a, A1b… Indirect interview A2: A2a, A2b… Second-hand data Industrial Yearbook B1: B1a, B1b… Published books B2: B2a, B2b… Policy document B3: B3a, B3b… Published paper B4: B4a, B4b… Research Report B5: B5a, B5b… Data sources . Data category . Coding . First-hand data Semi-structure interview A1: A1a, A1b… Indirect interview A2: A2a, A2b… Second-hand data Industrial Yearbook B1: B1a, B1b… Published books B2: B2a, B2b… Policy document B3: B3a, B3b… Published paper B4: B4a, B4b… Research Report B5: B5a, B5b… Open in new tab Table 2. The coding rule of data Data sources . Data category . Coding . First-hand data Semi-structure interview A1: A1a, A1b… Indirect interview A2: A2a, A2b… Second-hand data Industrial Yearbook B1: B1a, B1b… Published books B2: B2a, B2b… Policy document B3: B3a, B3b… Published paper B4: B4a, B4b… Research Report B5: B5a, B5b… Data sources . Data category . Coding . First-hand data Semi-structure interview A1: A1a, A1b… Indirect interview A2: A2a, A2b… Second-hand data Industrial Yearbook B1: B1a, B1b… Published books B2: B2a, B2b… Policy document B3: B3a, B3b… Published paper B4: B4a, B4b… Research Report B5: B5a, B5b… Open in new tab 4. Findings: catch up of china’s high-speed rail 4.1 Development stage 1 (before 2004) The world’s first HSR system started by Shinkansen in Japan on October 1, 1964, and the European’s first high-speed train “TGV” emerged in France in 1981 at 260 km/h speed level and later operated regularly at 300 km/h from 1989. Later on, other countries involving Italy and Germany (in 1988), Spain (in 1992), Belgium (in 1997), UK (in 2003), South Korea (in 2004) joined the HSR community in succession.3 Compared with the developed countries, China’s HSR originated from the completion of the “Beijing–Shanghai High-speed Railway Research Program Report” in 1990. In that year, although China’s investment in railway construction reached 10.0716 billion RMB, accounting for 6.3% of the state’s total infrastructure investment, the foundation of the rail sector was at least 30 years behind that of developed countries (A1: interviewee B). For example, the operation speed of the passenger railway lines in 1993 was 48.1 km/h, far behind other developed countries (B2). To catch up with the world’s HSR sector, China strategically promoted a domestic-based sectoral system agenda by developing its first high-speed train and railway. 4.1.1 Government engagement in the sectoral system The government was important to the initiation of the HSR sectoral system, and active government engagement was exerted toward subsystems of HSR using collaborative projects. Starting from the goal of constructing a high-speed railway, the government actively engaged in four aspects. First, government navigated the major research and demonstration program Beijing–Shanghai HSR. The National Science and Technology Council, the National Development Planning Commission,4 the National Economic and Trade Commission,5 and the State Commission for Restructuring the Economic System6 worked collaboratively and issued 553 relevant R&D subprojects to domestic sectoral players after the approval of the program in 1993 (B2, B4). Second, government determined the long-term industry dominant technology of HSR. There were industry-wide controversies between the options of wheel-track railway and magnetic levitation railway, but the State Council eventually approved wheel-track railway as the dominant direction in 2003 (A1: interviewee A and B). Third, government made direct investments in both R&D and construction of the first high-speed railway. In particular, in November 1998, the Ministry of Railways (MoR) held a seminar specifically on key technologies of Qin–Shen passenger dedicated line and bridge engineering. The following year in 1999, research projects on China’s first high-speed Qin–Shen passenger dedicated railway line, designed at 250 km/h and with an investment of 15 billion RMB, were issued by the State Council to 13 agencies including the MoR, the Railway Bureau, key research institutes and universities (B2). Finally, government initiated a plan to leverage the existing railways’ speed. Compared to a strong involvement in railway systems, the central government mainly gave autonomy to local railway bureaus and domestic EMU manufacturers on the development of CoPS in high-speed Electric Multiple Units (EMUs), and only invested in the R&D of major train projects. For instance, in April 2001, the MoR issued the high-speed EMUs (270 km/h) design task via an industrialization project on “China Star,” targeting the production of about 15 high-speed EMUs in two years with an investment of 130 million RMB (B2, B5). In addition, five research projects on interface coordination between high-speed train and railway subsystems were promoted by the MoR, specifically in pantograph catenary coupling, wheel rail coupling, fluid structure coupling, and electromechanical coupling. 4.1.2 The systems of CoPS and complementary assets Chinese CoPS for EMUs emerged from intensive collaborations among key domestic players, including EMUs “White Shark,” “Pioneer,” “Changbai Mountain,” “Blue Arrow,” and “China Star” which came into operation between 1999 and 2001 (B1, B2, B5). These indigenous EMU models, summarized in Table 3, indicated the architectural knowledge base for integration capabilities in high-speed trains. In particular, on November 27, 2002, the “China Star,” with a total investment of 130 million RMB, had a 321.5 km/h peak test speed on Qin–Shen passenger dedicated line (B1, B2). Based on the five high-speed train models, the EMUs also enabled the sectoral actors to accumulate technology prowess competences in core components. Accordingly, by 1999, the domestic sector had completed the design and test of the EMUs’ core components, including hollow shaft drive bogie and car body, key communication signal technologies (e.g., on-board signal equipment, interlocking, dispatching command, radio frequency, optical communication self-healing loop), electromagnetic compatibility in power trains, special communication network signal transmission channel support, and track circuit reference (B1). The completion of “China Star” also achieved the indigenous innovation of technological subsystems in AC drive, high-speed braking, and high-speed bogie. Table 3. The indigenous EMU models Year . Name of product . Technology basis . Policy initiation . Collaborations in architecture . Performance . 1999 White Shark EMU with centralized power Design and R&D task of 200 km/h EMUs by MoR *Mode: joint development *Key actors: Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive Vehicles Plant, Changchun Railway Vehicles Plant, Sifang Locomotive Vehicles Plant, Puzhen Vehicles Plant, Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive Vehicles Research Institute *Speed: 200 km/h *Came to market but retired in 2002 due to lack of reliability 2001 Pioneer EMU with distributed power 9th Five-Year national S&T projects *Mode: joint development *Key actors: Puzhen Vehicles Plant, Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive Vehicles Research Institute, Shanghai Railway University, MoR Science Research Institute *Speed: 200 km/h *Faults in components integration and structure failure, retired soon after operation 2005 Changbai Mountain EMU with distributed power HSR indigenous innovation agenda *Mode: indigenous R&D *Key actors: Changchun Railway Vehicles Company *Speed: 210 km/h *Came to market but retired due to serious driving failure 2000 Blue Arrow EMU with centralized power Design and R&D task of 200 km/h EMUs by MoR *Mode: joint development *Key actors: Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive Vehicles Plant, Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive Vehicles Research Institute, Changchun Railway Vehicles Plant, Guangshen Railway Company *Speed: 200 km/h *Faults in traction motor fixing bolt, car body underframe, and wheel, and retired in 2012 2001 China Star EMU with centralized power Design and R&D task of 270 km/h passenger EMUs issued by MoR *Mode: 442 U-I Collaboration and co-founding *Key actors: four enterprises like Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive Vehicles, Sifang Locomotive Vehicles, Changchun Railway Vehicles, Datong Vehicles; four research institutes like Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive Vehicles, Qishuyan Locomotive Vehicles, Railway Research Institute, and Sifang Vehicles; and two universities like Central South University and Southwest Jiaotong University *Founding sources: the total investment of 130 million RMB, with 40 million each from national government and MoR, and 50 million from participating enterprises *Speed: 270 km/h and achieved the highest speed 321.5 km/h *Bogie failure in test, retired in 2006 due to safety accidents and lack of stability Year . Name of product . Technology basis . Policy initiation . Collaborations in architecture . Performance . 1999 White Shark EMU with centralized power Design and R&D task of 200 km/h EMUs by MoR *Mode: joint development *Key actors: Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive Vehicles Plant, Changchun Railway Vehicles Plant, Sifang Locomotive Vehicles Plant, Puzhen Vehicles Plant, Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive Vehicles Research Institute *Speed: 200 km/h *Came to market but retired in 2002 due to lack of reliability 2001 Pioneer EMU with distributed power 9th Five-Year national S&T projects *Mode: joint development *Key actors: Puzhen Vehicles Plant, Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive Vehicles Research Institute, Shanghai Railway University, MoR Science Research Institute *Speed: 200 km/h *Faults in components integration and structure failure, retired soon after operation 2005 Changbai Mountain EMU with distributed power HSR indigenous innovation agenda *Mode: indigenous R&D *Key actors: Changchun Railway Vehicles Company *Speed: 210 km/h *Came to market but retired due to serious driving failure 2000 Blue Arrow EMU with centralized power Design and R&D task of 200 km/h EMUs by MoR *Mode: joint development *Key actors: Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive Vehicles Plant, Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive Vehicles Research Institute, Changchun Railway Vehicles Plant, Guangshen Railway Company *Speed: 200 km/h *Faults in traction motor fixing bolt, car body underframe, and wheel, and retired in 2012 2001 China Star EMU with centralized power Design and R&D task of 270 km/h passenger EMUs issued by MoR *Mode: 442 U-I Collaboration and co-founding *Key actors: four enterprises like Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive Vehicles, Sifang Locomotive Vehicles, Changchun Railway Vehicles, Datong Vehicles; four research institutes like Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive Vehicles, Qishuyan Locomotive Vehicles, Railway Research Institute, and Sifang Vehicles; and two universities like Central South University and Southwest Jiaotong University *Founding sources: the total investment of 130 million RMB, with 40 million each from national government and MoR, and 50 million from participating enterprises *Speed: 270 km/h and achieved the highest speed 321.5 km/h *Bogie failure in test, retired in 2006 due to safety accidents and lack of stability Open in new tab Table 3. The indigenous EMU models Year . Name of product . Technology basis . Policy initiation . Collaborations in architecture . Performance . 1999 White Shark EMU with centralized power Design and R&D task of 200 km/h EMUs by MoR *Mode: joint development *Key actors: Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive Vehicles Plant, Changchun Railway Vehicles Plant, Sifang Locomotive Vehicles Plant, Puzhen Vehicles Plant, Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive Vehicles Research Institute *Speed: 200 km/h *Came to market but retired in 2002 due to lack of reliability 2001 Pioneer EMU with distributed power 9th Five-Year national S&T projects *Mode: joint development *Key actors: Puzhen Vehicles Plant, Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive Vehicles Research Institute, Shanghai Railway University, MoR Science Research Institute *Speed: 200 km/h *Faults in components integration and structure failure, retired soon after operation 2005 Changbai Mountain EMU with distributed power HSR indigenous innovation agenda *Mode: indigenous R&D *Key actors: Changchun Railway Vehicles Company *Speed: 210 km/h *Came to market but retired due to serious driving failure 2000 Blue Arrow EMU with centralized power Design and R&D task of 200 km/h EMUs by MoR *Mode: joint development *Key actors: Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive Vehicles Plant, Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive Vehicles Research Institute, Changchun Railway Vehicles Plant, Guangshen Railway Company *Speed: 200 km/h *Faults in traction motor fixing bolt, car body underframe, and wheel, and retired in 2012 2001 China Star EMU with centralized power Design and R&D task of 270 km/h passenger EMUs issued by MoR *Mode: 442 U-I Collaboration and co-founding *Key actors: four enterprises like Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive Vehicles, Sifang Locomotive Vehicles, Changchun Railway Vehicles, Datong Vehicles; four research institutes like Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive Vehicles, Qishuyan Locomotive Vehicles, Railway Research Institute, and Sifang Vehicles; and two universities like Central South University and Southwest Jiaotong University *Founding sources: the total investment of 130 million RMB, with 40 million each from national government and MoR, and 50 million from participating enterprises *Speed: 270 km/h and achieved the highest speed 321.5 km/h *Bogie failure in test, retired in 2006 due to safety accidents and lack of stability Year . Name of product . Technology basis . Policy initiation . Collaborations in architecture . Performance . 1999 White Shark EMU with centralized power Design and R&D task of 200 km/h EMUs by MoR *Mode: joint development *Key actors: Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive Vehicles Plant, Changchun Railway Vehicles Plant, Sifang Locomotive Vehicles Plant, Puzhen Vehicles Plant, Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive Vehicles Research Institute *Speed: 200 km/h *Came to market but retired in 2002 due to lack of reliability 2001 Pioneer EMU with distributed power 9th Five-Year national S&T projects *Mode: joint development *Key actors: Puzhen Vehicles Plant, Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive Vehicles Research Institute, Shanghai Railway University, MoR Science Research Institute *Speed: 200 km/h *Faults in components integration and structure failure, retired soon after operation 2005 Changbai Mountain EMU with distributed power HSR indigenous innovation agenda *Mode: indigenous R&D *Key actors: Changchun Railway Vehicles Company *Speed: 210 km/h *Came to market but retired due to serious driving failure 2000 Blue Arrow EMU with centralized power Design and R&D task of 200 km/h EMUs by MoR *Mode: joint development *Key actors: Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive Vehicles Plant, Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive Vehicles Research Institute, Changchun Railway Vehicles Plant, Guangshen Railway Company *Speed: 200 km/h *Faults in traction motor fixing bolt, car body underframe, and wheel, and retired in 2012 2001 China Star EMU with centralized power Design and R&D task of 270 km/h passenger EMUs issued by MoR *Mode: 442 U-I Collaboration and co-founding *Key actors: four enterprises like Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive Vehicles, Sifang Locomotive Vehicles, Changchun Railway Vehicles, Datong Vehicles; four research institutes like Zhuzhou Electric Locomotive Vehicles, Qishuyan Locomotive Vehicles, Railway Research Institute, and Sifang Vehicles; and two universities like Central South University and Southwest Jiaotong University *Founding sources: the total investment of 130 million RMB, with 40 million each from national government and MoR, and 50 million from participating enterprises *Speed: 270 km/h and achieved the highest speed 321.5 km/h *Bogie failure in test, retired in 2006 due to safety accidents and lack of stability Open in new tab The sectoral system of HSR leveraged complementary assets in three aspects. First, the high-speed railway subsystem was leveraged step by step, with the sector system achieving construction competence from the quasi high-speed Guangzhou–Shenzhen railway in 1998 to the first high-speed railway Qin–Shen passenger dedicated line in 2002. Second, advanced know-how technologies of HSR were introduced such that on December 4, 1998, the Minister of MoR met the president of the transport department of Alston, France, and signed contracts for a joint venture project of railway special shock absorbers (B1), and German traction power supply technology, equipment and management were also introduced and adopted in the quasi high-speed railway (B1). Third, complementary assets were systematically enhanced, summarized in Table 4. Table 4. Typical cases of complementary assets in HSR sectoral system in stage 1 Complementary assets . Typical cases . High-speed railway *On May 28, 1998, China’s first electrified railway Guangzhou–Shenzhen railway was completed, at 139.46 km in length , 160 km/h speed, and investment of 700 million RMB (B1) *On June 16, 2002, Qin–Shen passenger dedicated line was completed for operation, as China’s first 404.65 km-long indigenous HSR (B1, B2) Tunnel *On August 29, 1999, Qinling Tunnel of Xi’an–Ankang railway achieved holing-through. The tunnel was 18.46 km long, with maximum buried depth of 1.6 km, which was the longest tunnel body, the deepest embedment and the first-time hard surrounding rock designed for full section project in China (B1) *On September 26, 2002, the world’s longest tunnel (1.686 km) in plateau permafrost—Kunlun Mountain Tunnel—achieved holing-through, in a permafrost area with an altitude of 4.6–4.8 km (B1) Bridge *On January 8, 1999, Jiujiang Yangtze River Bridge won the First Prize National Science and Technology Progress Award (NSTPA) of 1998 (B1) *On January 8, 2001, Asia’s highest bridge—Huatupo Bridge—passed the technology auditing of the MoR. It was 678.5 m long, with 15 piers including the highest one of 110 m (B1) HSR station *On November 6, 2001, Beijing West Railway Station, which was the largest investment and advanced technologies of China’s railway construction, formally achieved its acceptance check (B1) Complementary assets . Typical cases . High-speed railway *On May 28, 1998, China’s first electrified railway Guangzhou–Shenzhen railway was completed, at 139.46 km in length , 160 km/h speed, and investment of 700 million RMB (B1) *On June 16, 2002, Qin–Shen passenger dedicated line was completed for operation, as China’s first 404.65 km-long indigenous HSR (B1, B2) Tunnel *On August 29, 1999, Qinling Tunnel of Xi’an–Ankang railway achieved holing-through. The tunnel was 18.46 km long, with maximum buried depth of 1.6 km, which was the longest tunnel body, the deepest embedment and the first-time hard surrounding rock designed for full section project in China (B1) *On September 26, 2002, the world’s longest tunnel (1.686 km) in plateau permafrost—Kunlun Mountain Tunnel—achieved holing-through, in a permafrost area with an altitude of 4.6–4.8 km (B1) Bridge *On January 8, 1999, Jiujiang Yangtze River Bridge won the First Prize National Science and Technology Progress Award (NSTPA) of 1998 (B1) *On January 8, 2001, Asia’s highest bridge—Huatupo Bridge—passed the technology auditing of the MoR. It was 678.5 m long, with 15 piers including the highest one of 110 m (B1) HSR station *On November 6, 2001, Beijing West Railway Station, which was the largest investment and advanced technologies of China’s railway construction, formally achieved its acceptance check (B1) Open in new tab Table 4. Typical cases of complementary assets in HSR sectoral system in stage 1 Complementary assets . Typical cases . High-speed railway *On May 28, 1998, China’s first electrified railway Guangzhou–Shenzhen railway was completed, at 139.46 km in length , 160 km/h speed, and investment of 700 million RMB (B1) *On June 16, 2002, Qin–Shen passenger dedicated line was completed for operation, as China’s first 404.65 km-long indigenous HSR (B1, B2) Tunnel *On August 29, 1999, Qinling Tunnel of Xi’an–Ankang railway achieved holing-through. The tunnel was 18.46 km long, with maximum buried depth of 1.6 km, which was the longest tunnel body, the deepest embedment and the first-time hard surrounding rock designed for full section project in China (B1) *On September 26, 2002, the world’s longest tunnel (1.686 km) in plateau permafrost—Kunlun Mountain Tunnel—achieved holing-through, in a permafrost area with an altitude of 4.6–4.8 km (B1) Bridge *On January 8, 1999, Jiujiang Yangtze River Bridge won the First Prize National Science and Technology Progress Award (NSTPA) of 1998 (B1) *On January 8, 2001, Asia’s highest bridge—Huatupo Bridge—passed the technology auditing of the MoR. It was 678.5 m long, with 15 piers including the highest one of 110 m (B1) HSR station *On November 6, 2001, Beijing West Railway Station, which was the largest investment and advanced technologies of China’s railway construction, formally achieved its acceptance check (B1) Complementary assets . Typical cases . High-speed railway *On May 28, 1998, China’s first electrified railway Guangzhou–Shenzhen railway was completed, at 139.46 km in length , 160 km/h speed, and investment of 700 million RMB (B1) *On June 16, 2002, Qin–Shen passenger dedicated line was completed for operation, as China’s first 404.65 km-long indigenous HSR (B1, B2) Tunnel *On August 29, 1999, Qinling Tunnel of Xi’an–Ankang railway achieved holing-through. The tunnel was 18.46 km long, with maximum buried depth of 1.6 km, which was the longest tunnel body, the deepest embedment and the first-time hard surrounding rock designed for full section project in China (B1) *On September 26, 2002, the world’s longest tunnel (1.686 km) in plateau permafrost—Kunlun Mountain Tunnel—achieved holing-through, in a permafrost area with an altitude of 4.6–4.8 km (B1) Bridge *On January 8, 1999, Jiujiang Yangtze River Bridge won the First Prize National Science and Technology Progress Award (NSTPA) of 1998 (B1) *On January 8, 2001, Asia’s highest bridge—Huatupo Bridge—passed the technology auditing of the MoR. It was 678.5 m long, with 15 piers including the highest one of 110 m (B1) HSR station *On November 6, 2001, Beijing West Railway Station, which was the largest investment and advanced technologies of China’s railway construction, formally achieved its acceptance check (B1) Open in new tab By the end of the first stage in 2003, China had completed the initial construction of its HSR sectoral system, composed of five indigenous EMUs (“White Shark,” “Pioneer,” “Changbai Mountain,” “Blue Arrow,” and “China Star”), and one high-speed railway—the Qin–Shen passenger dedicated line, becoming the world’s eighth country achieving to offer the HSR services domestically. However, the failures of all the indigenous high-speed EMUs hindered the initiation and triggered the redirection of the sectoral development agenda. For instance, in the influential first operation testing of “China Star” on November 28, 2002, the bearing temperature reached 109°C at a speed of 285 km/h which caused serious malfunction of the bogie system. This led MoR to herald the end of more than 10 years’ HSR indigenous development. On June 28, 2003, Zhijun Liu, then Minister of MoR, said at a railway leapfrog development seminar about HSR development: We can reach the same target as the developed countries did with their path, but with less time, fewer steps, and at lower cost. In the process, we can skip some unnecessary procedures which we do not have to repeat, to take full advantage of the technology achievements that have been made by other countries, formulate latecomer advantage, and eventually catch up with developed countries. (A2) 4.2 Development stage 2 (2004–2008) China started the second stage of its HSR catch up in early 2004, when the central government initiated the “introduction, absorption and re-innovation” development agenda for HSR. The high-speed train CoPS and the sectoral complementary subsystems were leveraged under very active government engagement on both subsystems of the HSR sector. 4.2.1 Government engagement in the sectoral system Government engagement was still directed toward the complementary subsystems through active industrial policy and project-based investment in HSR. In January 2004, the State Council approved the Medium and Long Term Railway Network Planning, with the aim to construct a 12,000 km network of “four vertical and four horizontal” HSR lines domestically, which was a key market attraction with government endorsement for the technology biddings of foreign EMUs’ interactors in China’s HSR. The four vertical and four horizontal lines reflected the government grand blueprint to drive HSR sector catch up, with the four horizontal lines of Shanghai–Chengdu (1922 km), Qingdao–Taiyuan (906 km), Xuzhou–Lanzhou (1346 km), and Shanghai–Kunming (2264 km); and the four vertical lines of Beijing–Dalian (1612 km), Beijing–Shanghai (1318 km), Shanghai–Shenzhen (1650 km), and Beijing–Hong Kong (2350 km) (A2, B1, B2, B3). Of all the lines relevant to the network, the Beijing–Tianjin Intercity Rail Transit project and the Beijing–Shanghai HSR project were regarded as benchmarking projects that required the involvement of central government. On July 4, 2005, the central government made an investment of 12.34 billion RMB in the Beijing–Tianjin Intercity Rail Transit project designed for a speed of 350 km/h and 115 km total length (A2). Later on February 26, 2006, the State Council’s 126th meeting approved the construction proposal of the 350 km/h Beijing–Shanghai HSR, 1318 km in length with 23 stations and 220.94 billion RMB investment. This was the largest one-time investment construction project since the founding of the new China in 1949 (B1, B2). In contrast to the first stage, the government engaged proactively to leverage the CoPS of high-speed trains with multiple interventions. First, the government issued an industrial agenda policy. On April 9, 2004, the State Council held a special meeting and stated the HSR development agenda to “introduce advanced technology, joint design and develop, and build Chinese brand” (B2, B3). Second, to strengthen the integration capabilities of CoPS’ technology prowess competence, a duopoly competitive sectoral system structure was designed by supporting only two players (CSR and CNR) as integrators of high-speed EMU manufacturing (A1: interviewee A and B), which created a learning race between the domestic integrators to introduce foreign high-speed train technology and adaptive re-innovations. Third, the MoR issued tender bidding for high-speed EMUs at 200 and 300 km/h speed, and guided the high-speed EMU tenders with strict rules to facilitate the systematic learning and absorption of CoPS from advanced foreign know-how. The rules included the joint bidding rule, with one of either CSR or CNR and the other party being a foreign player with advanced EMUs; foreign companies must transfer the core technologies of high-speed EMUs, must charge a reasonable price, and must use the Chinese brand; and for each tendered package with 20-sets EMUs, one set must be originally introduced from foreign companies, two sets were distributed introduced in components and then assembled in China, and the last 17 sets were manufactured completely in China (B1, B2). 4.2.2 The systems of CoPS and complementary assets The high-speed train CoPS of China gradually leveraged technology prowess competence. First, the MoR issued two rounds of tenders to introduce EMUs and maintain resource balance and oligarchy competition between the CSR and CNR consortiums. On July 28, 2004, the MoR introduced EMUs at 200 km/h speed, involving one package with 20-sets “Regina C2008” from Bombardier to CSR’s “CRH1,” three packages with 60-sets “E2-1000” from Kawasaki to CSR’s “CRH2,” and three packages with 60-sets “Pendolino 600/610” from Alston to CNR’s “CRH5”; Later on November 20, 2005, the MoR introduced three packages with 60-sets “Velaro E” from Siemens to CNR’s “CRH3” at 300 km/h speed (A1: interviewee B; B1, B2, B3). Simultaneously, learning and adaptive improvements were made systematically on the inbound EMUs as follows: CRH1A—steel structure of car body, bogie, traction motor, and network control system; CRH2A—bogie, inside distance of wheel set, tread shape, and pantograph catenary flow; CRH5A—car body widening, and cold and snow protection; CRH3C—car body widening, tread shape, inside distance of wheel set, and bogie (B2). All these incremental innovations on components of high-speed train CoPS enhanced the domestic technology prowess competence in component technologies. Synchronized with the development of high-speed trains’ CoPS, the complementary subsystems were further leveraged, with the domestic HSR sector comprehensively introducing know-how in high-speed railway technologies and tunnel technologies as well. Typical cases are listed in Table 5. Table 5. Typical cases of complementary assets in HSR sectoral system in stage 2 Complementary assets . Typical cases . High-speed railway *On Nov. 19, 2005 China and Germany signed the ballastless track technology transfer contract, and four types of ballastless track technologies were introduced into China: Germany’s Borg CRTSII track technology was applied in Beijing–Tianjin Intercity HSR; Germany’s Asahi Lin ballastless track technology was applied in Zhengzhou–Xi’an HSR; and Germany’s RHEDA 2000 ballastless track technology and Japan’s Shinkansen CRTS I ballastless track technology were applied in Wuhan–Guangzhou HSR passenger line (B1, B2) *On Nov. 18, 2006, the Minister of MoR met the president of Germany’s Balfour Beatty Railway for components of railway traction power supply equipment and overhead contact systems (B1) Tunnel *In August 2005, construction started on Wenzhou–Fuzhou HSR with tunnels and bridges taking 81% of the total length. The railway had 71 tunnels with 146 km in total. Tunnel construction was achieved, e.g., the 13.099 km Puxia Tunnel, constructed through five major geological faults and many underground rivers, with maximum water inflow of 23,400 cubic meters a day during excavation; and the 9.8 km Fenshuiguan Tunnel, which was the longest single excavation tunnel in Asia at that time (B1, B2) *On Nov. 22, 2006, the Minister of MoR met the president of Heirik Company of Germany for tunneling technology collaborations (B1) Bridge *On Sep. 28, 2004, Wuhan Tianxingzhou Yangtze River Bridge project was launched, which was the longest highway and railway dual-purpose bridge (4657 m in length) with 11.06 billion RMB investment (B1) *On Sep. 14, 2006, the Nanjing Dashengguan Yangtze River Bridge started construction, with 4.56 billion RMB investment and 9273 m in length at 300 km/h speed, being the world’s first six-line HSR bridge, longest and largest loading HSR bridge, and used a total of 300,000 tons of steel and 1,260,000 cubic meters of concrete (A2, B1) HSR station *On Dec. 24, 2005, Beijing South railway station was reconstructed and expanded, with a building area of 226,000 square meters (B4) *On April 20, 2006, China’s railway passenger dedicated line project promotion meeting was held. More than 200 HSR stations with over 2 million square meters construction area were promoted to 50 architectural design enterprises from 13 countries (B1) Complementary assets . Typical cases . High-speed railway *On Nov. 19, 2005 China and Germany signed the ballastless track technology transfer contract, and four types of ballastless track technologies were introduced into China: Germany’s Borg CRTSII track technology was applied in Beijing–Tianjin Intercity HSR; Germany’s Asahi Lin ballastless track technology was applied in Zhengzhou–Xi’an HSR; and Germany’s RHEDA 2000 ballastless track technology and Japan’s Shinkansen CRTS I ballastless track technology were applied in Wuhan–Guangzhou HSR passenger line (B1, B2) *On Nov. 18, 2006, the Minister of MoR met the president of Germany’s Balfour Beatty Railway for components of railway traction power supply equipment and overhead contact systems (B1) Tunnel *In August 2005, construction started on Wenzhou–Fuzhou HSR with tunnels and bridges taking 81% of the total length. The railway had 71 tunnels with 146 km in total. Tunnel construction was achieved, e.g., the 13.099 km Puxia Tunnel, constructed through five major geological faults and many underground rivers, with maximum water inflow of 23,400 cubic meters a day during excavation; and the 9.8 km Fenshuiguan Tunnel, which was the longest single excavation tunnel in Asia at that time (B1, B2) *On Nov. 22, 2006, the Minister of MoR met the president of Heirik Company of Germany for tunneling technology collaborations (B1) Bridge *On Sep. 28, 2004, Wuhan Tianxingzhou Yangtze River Bridge project was launched, which was the longest highway and railway dual-purpose bridge (4657 m in length) with 11.06 billion RMB investment (B1) *On Sep. 14, 2006, the Nanjing Dashengguan Yangtze River Bridge started construction, with 4.56 billion RMB investment and 9273 m in length at 300 km/h speed, being the world’s first six-line HSR bridge, longest and largest loading HSR bridge, and used a total of 300,000 tons of steel and 1,260,000 cubic meters of concrete (A2, B1) HSR station *On Dec. 24, 2005, Beijing South railway station was reconstructed and expanded, with a building area of 226,000 square meters (B4) *On April 20, 2006, China’s railway passenger dedicated line project promotion meeting was held. More than 200 HSR stations with over 2 million square meters construction area were promoted to 50 architectural design enterprises from 13 countries (B1) Open in new tab Table 5. Typical cases of complementary assets in HSR sectoral system in stage 2 Complementary assets . Typical cases . High-speed railway *On Nov. 19, 2005 China and Germany signed the ballastless track technology transfer contract, and four types of ballastless track technologies were introduced into China: Germany’s Borg CRTSII track technology was applied in Beijing–Tianjin Intercity HSR; Germany’s Asahi Lin ballastless track technology was applied in Zhengzhou–Xi’an HSR; and Germany’s RHEDA 2000 ballastless track technology and Japan’s Shinkansen CRTS I ballastless track technology were applied in Wuhan–Guangzhou HSR passenger line (B1, B2) *On Nov. 18, 2006, the Minister of MoR met the president of Germany’s Balfour Beatty Railway for components of railway traction power supply equipment and overhead contact systems (B1) Tunnel *In August 2005, construction started on Wenzhou–Fuzhou HSR with tunnels and bridges taking 81% of the total length. The railway had 71 tunnels with 146 km in total. Tunnel construction was achieved, e.g., the 13.099 km Puxia Tunnel, constructed through five major geological faults and many underground rivers, with maximum water inflow of 23,400 cubic meters a day during excavation; and the 9.8 km Fenshuiguan Tunnel, which was the longest single excavation tunnel in Asia at that time (B1, B2) *On Nov. 22, 2006, the Minister of MoR met the president of Heirik Company of Germany for tunneling technology collaborations (B1) Bridge *On Sep. 28, 2004, Wuhan Tianxingzhou Yangtze River Bridge project was launched, which was the longest highway and railway dual-purpose bridge (4657 m in length) with 11.06 billion RMB investment (B1) *On Sep. 14, 2006, the Nanjing Dashengguan Yangtze River Bridge started construction, with 4.56 billion RMB investment and 9273 m in length at 300 km/h speed, being the world’s first six-line HSR bridge, longest and largest loading HSR bridge, and used a total of 300,000 tons of steel and 1,260,000 cubic meters of concrete (A2, B1) HSR station *On Dec. 24, 2005, Beijing South railway station was reconstructed and expanded, with a building area of 226,000 square meters (B4) *On April 20, 2006, China’s railway passenger dedicated line project promotion meeting was held. More than 200 HSR stations with over 2 million square meters construction area were promoted to 50 architectural design enterprises from 13 countries (B1) Complementary assets . Typical cases . High-speed railway *On Nov. 19, 2005 China and Germany signed the ballastless track technology transfer contract, and four types of ballastless track technologies were introduced into China: Germany’s Borg CRTSII track technology was applied in Beijing–Tianjin Intercity HSR; Germany’s Asahi Lin ballastless track technology was applied in Zhengzhou–Xi’an HSR; and Germany’s RHEDA 2000 ballastless track technology and Japan’s Shinkansen CRTS I ballastless track technology were applied in Wuhan–Guangzhou HSR passenger line (B1, B2) *On Nov. 18, 2006, the Minister of MoR met the president of Germany’s Balfour Beatty Railway for components of railway traction power supply equipment and overhead contact systems (B1) Tunnel *In August 2005, construction started on Wenzhou–Fuzhou HSR with tunnels and bridges taking 81% of the total length. The railway had 71 tunnels with 146 km in total. Tunnel construction was achieved, e.g., the 13.099 km Puxia Tunnel, constructed through five major geological faults and many underground rivers, with maximum water inflow of 23,400 cubic meters a day during excavation; and the 9.8 km Fenshuiguan Tunnel, which was the longest single excavation tunnel in Asia at that time (B1, B2) *On Nov. 22, 2006, the Minister of MoR met the president of Heirik Company of Germany for tunneling technology collaborations (B1) Bridge *On Sep. 28, 2004, Wuhan Tianxingzhou Yangtze River Bridge project was launched, which was the longest highway and railway dual-purpose bridge (4657 m in length) with 11.06 billion RMB investment (B1) *On Sep. 14, 2006, the Nanjing Dashengguan Yangtze River Bridge started construction, with 4.56 billion RMB investment and 9273 m in length at 300 km/h speed, being the world’s first six-line HSR bridge, longest and largest loading HSR bridge, and used a total of 300,000 tons of steel and 1,260,000 cubic meters of concrete (A2, B1) HSR station *On Dec. 24, 2005, Beijing South railway station was reconstructed and expanded, with a building area of 226,000 square meters (B4) *On April 20, 2006, China’s railway passenger dedicated line project promotion meeting was held. More than 200 HSR stations with over 2 million square meters construction area were promoted to 50 architectural design enterprises from 13 countries (B1) Open in new tab The HSR sectoral system made rapid development both in high-speed train CoPS and the railway-based complementary assets under the active engagement of the government. Triggered by the “introduction, absorption and re-innovation” development agenda and the HSR network planning, China attracted global leading EMU manufacturers to join the high-speed train collaborations. In addition, the joint bidding rule for two domestic oligarchy players and four international co-bidders leveraged the negotiating power of MoR and secured the introduction of EMUs on the principle of “reasonable price, technology transfer, and Chinese brand.” Based on the failure experience of Siemens on the first tender bid on 200 km/h EMUs, Siemens charged 350 million RMB for one original EMU set and 390 million Euros core technology transfer fee, which greatly exceeded the bottom-line acquisition fee, leaving Siemens out of the winning companies for the tender. In November 2005, Siemens returned to bid for 300 km/h EMUs, and charged 250 million RMB for one original set and 80 million Euros for core technology transfer (A2). In addition, the duopoly competition of CSR and CNR constructed a race of learning, absorption, and adaptive improvement in high-speed train CoPS, with the 20-set package EMU introduction rule further enhancing the systematic learning on both component and architectural technologies. By the end of 2007, China’s HSR sectoral system had completed the absorption of advanced foreign know-how in high-speed trains, having built a solid foundation for the indigenous CRH (A1: interviewee A and B). In addition, the Beijing Tianjin Intercity Railway designed at 350 km/h had realized the quasi operation conditions, indicating the leverage of the domestic sectoral system. 4.3 Development stage 3 (2008–2013) On February 26, 2008, the Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST) and the MoR jointly issued the “Joint Action Plan of Indigenous Innovation of China’s High-speed Rail,” which opened the third stage of the indigenous innovation agenda for the HSR sectoral system. 4.3.1 Government engagement in the sectoral system The government played a role in actively leveraging the technology prowess competence of high-speed train CoPS at this stage, specifically targeting the “CRH380” EMUs’ complex product systems, to achieve catch up of the sectoral system with its indigenous innovation agenda. Based on the “Joint Action Plan of Indigenous Innovation of China’s High-speed Rail,” the MoST and MoR co-established 226 office specially responsible for the execution of indigenous R&D of “CRH380” (B3). Accordingly, 2.2 billion RMB was invested during the 11th Five-Year Development Plan on major science and technology projects for the “CRH380.” In contrast to the concentrated engagement in the indigenous innovation of “CRH380,” the government supported the complementary subsystems in diverse ways. First, it upgraded the objective of industrial planning, so that the State Council renewed the Medium and Long Term Railway Network Planning (2008 adjustment) on November 27, 2008, aiming to increase targeted high-speed passenger-dedicated railway network construction from 12,000 to 16,000 km (B2, B3). Second, it made strong investments in major high-speed railway engineering. For instance, on the Beijing–Shanghai high-speed railway, the daily investment reached 190 million RMB, using 10,000 tons of steel, 35,000 tons of cement, and 110,000 cubic meters of concrete per day (A2). Third, the government made an additional investment after the financial crisis in 2008. The central government made a four trillion RMB investment in infrastructure construction, mainly in 2009 and 2010, with railway construction worth nearly one trillion RMB (B2, B3). 4.3.2 The systems of CoPS and complementary assets Representing the major domestic CoPS of high-speed trains, “CRH380” ran 486.1 km/h in a test section of Beijing–Shanghai HSR on December 3, 2010, which was the world speed record at that time. The CoPS’ technology prowess competence was highly upgraded as follows: first, the R&D of “CRH380” had integrated multiple domestic university-industry collaborators of the sectoral system in architectural design and development, involving 25 universities, 11 research institutes, 51 national laboratories and engineering centers, 68 academicians, over 700 professors and research fellows, and more than 10,000 technicians (B2). Second, there were sufficient EMU tests for reliability, such as the testing of “CRH380” involving 152 categories with more than 2800 items in total, equivalent to more than 200 million kilometers of the test length (A1: interviewee G). Third, the main technological components had achieved the development of the domestic sectoral actors, with the integration of the bogie system adaptively improved by CSR on CRH2C EMUs, the traction system developed by Zhuzhou Electric Machinery and Yongji New Speed Company, the network control system supplied by Zhuzhou CSR and Times Electric, and the braking system supported by Knorr, Puzhen Company, Qishuyan Institute, and Rail Science Academy (B2). Last, the HSR sector had established indigenous technology prowess competence in components, such as the high-speed bogie winning the First Prize NSTPA in 2009, the safe operation detection technology and key traction power supply equipment winning the Second Prize NSTPA in 2012, and the successful R&D of high-speed train key components in control software, raw material, AC drive locomotive traction converter, network control system, microcomputer controlled brake, wheel, and grease (B1). At the same time, the complementary assets experienced rapid improvement, including not only large-scale engineering constructions on high-speed railways, tunnels, bridges, and HSR stations, but the mastering of core technologies in high-speed railway. In addition, with the accumulation of technology and engineering know-how of high-speed railway, China began to export its competence in complementary assets, represented by the Ankara–Istanbul HSR in Turkey, and the Makkah–Medina HSR in Saudi Arabia (A1: interviewee C). Table 6 describes the typical cases. Table 6. Typical cases of complementary assets in HSR sectoral system in stage 3 Complementary assets . Typical cases . High-speed railway *Extensive constructions started in 2008: Beijing–Shanghai (April), Lanzhou–Chongqing (Sep.), Guizhou–Guangxi (Oct.), Shijiazhuang–Wuhan (Oct.), Tianjin–Qinhuangdao (Nov.), Nanning–Guangzhou (Nov.), Nanjing-Anqing (Dec.), Nanjing–Hangzhou (Dec.), Chongqing–Lichuan (Dec.) (B1) *On Dec. 1, 2012, Harbin–Dalian HSR was put into operation, which was world’s first HSR operating in an alpine area with a total length of 921 km at 350 km/h speed (B1, B2) *Research and application of ballastless track technology of Suining-Chongqing Railway won the First Prize NSTPA in 2010, and the ballastless track technology was successfully adopted by other lines such as the Wuhan–Guangzhou line (B1) Tunnel *The 11.82 km Dadu Mountain Tunnel of Shanghai–Kunming HSR started construction in 2010. It passes through limestone, mudstone, marl, sandstone and other strata, including 7 geological faults, 8 crushing zones, and 4 soluble rocks and non-soluble rock contact zone, including 44 caves, and 1 underground river (A2) *The Tianhua Mountain Tunnel started construction in 2012, which was Asia’s longest single-hole and double-track HSR tunnel, crossing 15.9 km in mountains at an average altitude of 1–2.4 km and a maximum buried depth of more than 1 km, with the investment of more than 40 million RMB (A2, B1, B4) Bridge *The Beipan River Bridge started construction in 2013, which was 1341.4 m long and 565.4 m high, with a total investment of 1.028 billion RMB. It was the world’s largest span reinforced concrete arch HSR bridge, and the world’s most advanced rigid control of long span bridge (A2, B3) *China solved technology problems like structural type, dynamic stability, and precise assembly of long-span bridges, and constructed the Dashengguan Bridge that was the world’s largest volume and span, and the highest speed railway bridge (A2, B1) HSR station *On December 27, 2008, Hangzhou East Railway Station’s expansion started construction. It had 32 million square meters of station space, 34 tracks, and 18 platforms, used 600,000 cubic meters of concrete (A2) *On Dec. 2008, Chengdu East Railway Station started construction, a transport hub of 87.1 hectares with station buildings of 108,000 square meters. It had 14 platforms and 26 HSR lines, with a designed passenger throughput of 200,000 people (B4) Complementary assets . Typical cases . High-speed railway *Extensive constructions started in 2008: Beijing–Shanghai (April), Lanzhou–Chongqing (Sep.), Guizhou–Guangxi (Oct.), Shijiazhuang–Wuhan (Oct.), Tianjin–Qinhuangdao (Nov.), Nanning–Guangzhou (Nov.), Nanjing-Anqing (Dec.), Nanjing–Hangzhou (Dec.), Chongqing–Lichuan (Dec.) (B1) *On Dec. 1, 2012, Harbin–Dalian HSR was put into operation, which was world’s first HSR operating in an alpine area with a total length of 921 km at 350 km/h speed (B1, B2) *Research and application of ballastless track technology of Suining-Chongqing Railway won the First Prize NSTPA in 2010, and the ballastless track technology was successfully adopted by other lines such as the Wuhan–Guangzhou line (B1) Tunnel *The 11.82 km Dadu Mountain Tunnel of Shanghai–Kunming HSR started construction in 2010. It passes through limestone, mudstone, marl, sandstone and other strata, including 7 geological faults, 8 crushing zones, and 4 soluble rocks and non-soluble rock contact zone, including 44 caves, and 1 underground river (A2) *The Tianhua Mountain Tunnel started construction in 2012, which was Asia’s longest single-hole and double-track HSR tunnel, crossing 15.9 km in mountains at an average altitude of 1–2.4 km and a maximum buried depth of more than 1 km, with the investment of more than 40 million RMB (A2, B1, B4) Bridge *The Beipan River Bridge started construction in 2013, which was 1341.4 m long and 565.4 m high, with a total investment of 1.028 billion RMB. It was the world’s largest span reinforced concrete arch HSR bridge, and the world’s most advanced rigid control of long span bridge (A2, B3) *China solved technology problems like structural type, dynamic stability, and precise assembly of long-span bridges, and constructed the Dashengguan Bridge that was the world’s largest volume and span, and the highest speed railway bridge (A2, B1) HSR station *On December 27, 2008, Hangzhou East Railway Station’s expansion started construction. It had 32 million square meters of station space, 34 tracks, and 18 platforms, used 600,000 cubic meters of concrete (A2) *On Dec. 2008, Chengdu East Railway Station started construction, a transport hub of 87.1 hectares with station buildings of 108,000 square meters. It had 14 platforms and 26 HSR lines, with a designed passenger throughput of 200,000 people (B4) Open in new tab Table 6. Typical cases of complementary assets in HSR sectoral system in stage 3 Complementary assets . Typical cases . High-speed railway *Extensive constructions started in 2008: Beijing–Shanghai (April), Lanzhou–Chongqing (Sep.), Guizhou–Guangxi (Oct.), Shijiazhuang–Wuhan (Oct.), Tianjin–Qinhuangdao (Nov.), Nanning–Guangzhou (Nov.), Nanjing-Anqing (Dec.), Nanjing–Hangzhou (Dec.), Chongqing–Lichuan (Dec.) (B1) *On Dec. 1, 2012, Harbin–Dalian HSR was put into operation, which was world’s first HSR operating in an alpine area with a total length of 921 km at 350 km/h speed (B1, B2) *Research and application of ballastless track technology of Suining-Chongqing Railway won the First Prize NSTPA in 2010, and the ballastless track technology was successfully adopted by other lines such as the Wuhan–Guangzhou line (B1) Tunnel *The 11.82 km Dadu Mountain Tunnel of Shanghai–Kunming HSR started construction in 2010. It passes through limestone, mudstone, marl, sandstone and other strata, including 7 geological faults, 8 crushing zones, and 4 soluble rocks and non-soluble rock contact zone, including 44 caves, and 1 underground river (A2) *The Tianhua Mountain Tunnel started construction in 2012, which was Asia’s longest single-hole and double-track HSR tunnel, crossing 15.9 km in mountains at an average altitude of 1–2.4 km and a maximum buried depth of more than 1 km, with the investment of more than 40 million RMB (A2, B1, B4) Bridge *The Beipan River Bridge started construction in 2013, which was 1341.4 m long and 565.4 m high, with a total investment of 1.028 billion RMB. It was the world’s largest span reinforced concrete arch HSR bridge, and the world’s most advanced rigid control of long span bridge (A2, B3) *China solved technology problems like structural type, dynamic stability, and precise assembly of long-span bridges, and constructed the Dashengguan Bridge that was the world’s largest volume and span, and the highest speed railway bridge (A2, B1) HSR station *On December 27, 2008, Hangzhou East Railway Station’s expansion started construction. It had 32 million square meters of station space, 34 tracks, and 18 platforms, used 600,000 cubic meters of concrete (A2) *On Dec. 2008, Chengdu East Railway Station started construction, a transport hub of 87.1 hectares with station buildings of 108,000 square meters. It had 14 platforms and 26 HSR lines, with a designed passenger throughput of 200,000 people (B4) Complementary assets . Typical cases . High-speed railway *Extensive constructions started in 2008: Beijing–Shanghai (April), Lanzhou–Chongqing (Sep.), Guizhou–Guangxi (Oct.), Shijiazhuang–Wuhan (Oct.), Tianjin–Qinhuangdao (Nov.), Nanning–Guangzhou (Nov.), Nanjing-Anqing (Dec.), Nanjing–Hangzhou (Dec.), Chongqing–Lichuan (Dec.) (B1) *On Dec. 1, 2012, Harbin–Dalian HSR was put into operation, which was world’s first HSR operating in an alpine area with a total length of 921 km at 350 km/h speed (B1, B2) *Research and application of ballastless track technology of Suining-Chongqing Railway won the First Prize NSTPA in 2010, and the ballastless track technology was successfully adopted by other lines such as the Wuhan–Guangzhou line (B1) Tunnel *The 11.82 km Dadu Mountain Tunnel of Shanghai–Kunming HSR started construction in 2010. It passes through limestone, mudstone, marl, sandstone and other strata, including 7 geological faults, 8 crushing zones, and 4 soluble rocks and non-soluble rock contact zone, including 44 caves, and 1 underground river (A2) *The Tianhua Mountain Tunnel started construction in 2012, which was Asia’s longest single-hole and double-track HSR tunnel, crossing 15.9 km in mountains at an average altitude of 1–2.4 km and a maximum buried depth of more than 1 km, with the investment of more than 40 million RMB (A2, B1, B4) Bridge *The Beipan River Bridge started construction in 2013, which was 1341.4 m long and 565.4 m high, with a total investment of 1.028 billion RMB. It was the world’s largest span reinforced concrete arch HSR bridge, and the world’s most advanced rigid control of long span bridge (A2, B3) *China solved technology problems like structural type, dynamic stability, and precise assembly of long-span bridges, and constructed the Dashengguan Bridge that was the world’s largest volume and span, and the highest speed railway bridge (A2, B1) HSR station *On December 27, 2008, Hangzhou East Railway Station’s expansion started construction. It had 32 million square meters of station space, 34 tracks, and 18 platforms, used 600,000 cubic meters of concrete (A2) *On Dec. 2008, Chengdu East Railway Station started construction, a transport hub of 87.1 hectares with station buildings of 108,000 square meters. It had 14 platforms and 26 HSR lines, with a designed passenger throughput of 200,000 people (B4) Open in new tab By the end of the third stage in 2013, China had completed indigenous innovation on “CRH380” EMUs’ CoPS with the average operational speed at 283.7 km/h, which kept the second world fastest point-to-point average speeds in HSR commercial operations. In addition, the construction of China’s domestic HSR networks increased drastically, exceeded 50% of the world’s HSR line in length,7 with its HSR engineering exported to Turkey and Saudi Arabia. Compared to the HSR sectors of other major nations such as France, Germany, and Japan, China had leveraged the entire sectoral system. This achievement guided China’s HSR to internationalization development. 4.4 Development stage 4 (2013-) The fourth stage of China’s HSR started at the end of 2013, when China began the internationalization agenda of its HSR sectoral system, on the basis of the competitiveness of both its high-speed train CoPS and high-speed railway complementary system. 4.4.1 Government engagement in the sectoral system The government actively engaged in supporting the export of China’s HSR sectoral systems using several methods. First, HSR diplomacy was launched by the central government of China, triggering intergovernment cooperation on both the high-speed train CoPS and the engineering of high-speed rail. In October, 2013, China and Thailand officially signed the Rice for High-speed Rail Plan Agreement, together with successful HSR diplomacy cases such as the Sino–Russian High-speed Railway Cooperation Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in October 2014, Jakarta–Bandung High-speed Rail Cooperation MoU in November 2014, HSR export to Hungary and Serbia in November 2015, Sino–Laos Joint Promoting MoU for “One Belt One Road” Cooperation in September 2016, and other HSR diplomacy with Australia, Germany, India, Malaysia, Romania, UK, and US from 2013 to 2017 (B2). As one of the senior officers navigating HSR diplomacy, China’s Premier Keqiang Li was called the world’s best HSR seller during 2013–2015 because of his frequent international diplomatic visits related to HSR. Second, the government issued major global-oriented HSR industrial policies. The “One Belt One Road Initiatives” and “China Manufacturing 2025” were officially launched in 2015, formulating the overseas expansion strategy of high-end equipment manufacturing industry (B3). In addition, typical industrial policies were issued specifically targeting further leveraging on both high-speed railway and the EMU train CoPS. On the railway complementary system, the Medium and Long Term Railway Network Planning in 2016 aimed to modify industry planning from the “four vertical and four horizontal” to the “eight vertical and eight horizontal” HSR network, increasing the total length of China’s HSR network from 19,000 km in 2015 to 30,000 km in 2020, and leveraging the scale of the railway network to reach 175,000 km with 38,000 km of HSR in 2025 (B3). For high-speed train CoPS, the government intervened to establish the CRRC by merging the sectoral duopolies CSR and CNR at the end of 2014, to construct a single domestic high-speed EMU integrator giant for global competition (B3). 4.4.2 The systems of CoPS and complementary assets The first three stages and the successful R&D of indigenous “CRH380” enabled China to build solid technology prowess competence on the CoPS of high-speed trains, both in architecture and component technologies. On December 27, 2013, with the emergence of the first 6500 V high voltage IGBT chip with the largest voltage level and the highest power density locally produced by CRRC Zhuzhou Institute, the sectoral system of China’s HSR had achieved full indigenous R&D of all the major required components and subsystem technologies of the high-speed train CoPS. As the only domestic agency that fully mastered the R&D of IGBT chip technology, module packaging test and system application, CRRC Zhuzhou Institute further invested 1.4 billion RMB to build China’s first 8-inch IGBT chip production base (A1: interviewee G; A2). In addition, the CRRC further applied its technology prowess competence in upgrading EMUs both domestically and expanding overseas. Taking China’s standard 400 km/h speed EMU “Renaissance,” the rapid iterations in architectural know-how started from the design scheme review meeting on September 1, 2014, then ran 420 km/h in comprehensive tests on Zhengzhou–Xuzhou HSR on July 1, 2016 which created the world’s highest operational EMU speed then, and finally moved to officially launch operations on the Beijing–Shanghai HSR on June 26, 2017 (B4). Further, CRRC has emphasized the export business since its establishment, and has exported more than 1200 rail locomotives, buses, trucks and light rail vehicles to Thailand since 2015, 70 high-speed EMUs to Iran since 2016, and has been selected as the main high-speed EMU supplier in Laos’ domestic market since 2015 (A1: interviewee C and D). The “eight vertical and eight horizontal” HSR blueprint enhanced the systematic development of the complementary system of HSR as well, and the accumulated mature technologies and engineering know-how on high-speed railway construction were exported to other nations. Table 7 lists typical cases that represent the leveraging of complementary assets. Table 7. Typical cases of complementary assets in HSR sectoral system in stage 4 Complementary assets . Typical cases . High-speed railway *In July, 2016, the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Transport, and China Railway Corporation jointly issued the Eight Vertical and Eight Horizontal High-speed Railway Network Blueprint (B3) *China has undertaken HSR construction in Thailand (873 km in length, 179 billion baht budget), Russia (770 km Moscow–Kazan HSR, 20.79 billion rubles), Indonesia (150 km, 5.5 billion US dollars), Laos (418 km HSR, 40 billion RMB), Hungary and Serbia (350 km), Bangladesh (173 km, 1.23 billion dollars), and Iran (926 km, 2.1 billion RMB) (B2, B4) Tunnel On August 16, 2019, Ningbo–Zhoushan HSR passed feasibility evaluation, designed by a combination of “bridge and tunnel” spanning 77 km. The Jintang subsea tunnel was 16.2 km long and 78 m in maximum buried depth, which was the world’s highest in tunnel length and shield cross-section scale (B1) Bridge *In 2014, China mastered the core technologies of frame pier systems on the Shanghai–Nantong Yangtze River Bridge (B1, B4) *In 2015, China solved technology problems on beam structural design and constructions of deep water large section open caisson, mastered the durability technology of bridge concrete structure in high temperature, high humidity and strong corrosion marine environment, and developed automatic pre-stressed tension system for railway bridge (B1) *High-speed railway standard beam bridge technology and application won the Second Prize NSTPA Award in 2016 (B1) HSR station *By the end of Sep. 2019, there were 505 HSR stations in China mainland, forming a HSR station operation system classified as super-station, first-class station, second-class station and third-class station according to the business scale (B4) *Five super railway stations: 1. Guangzhou South Station has 15 platforms. The number of arrivals and departures at the station during the Spring Festival of 2017 was almost 15 million, and the daily average number of arrivals and departures was 368,600; 2. Hangzhou East Station had a total investment of 25 billion RMB; 3. Shanghai Hongqiao Station has a waiting hall area of 11,340 square meters, to hold up to 10,000 people; 4. Zhenzhou East Railway Station, with a total construction of 411,841 square meters and a total investment of 9.47 billion RMB; 5. Xi’an North Station has a passenger room of 171,000 square meters and a waiting area of 90,000 square meters, for up to 80,000 passengers at the same time, which is the largest in Asia (B4) Complementary assets . Typical cases . High-speed railway *In July, 2016, the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Transport, and China Railway Corporation jointly issued the Eight Vertical and Eight Horizontal High-speed Railway Network Blueprint (B3) *China has undertaken HSR construction in Thailand (873 km in length, 179 billion baht budget), Russia (770 km Moscow–Kazan HSR, 20.79 billion rubles), Indonesia (150 km, 5.5 billion US dollars), Laos (418 km HSR, 40 billion RMB), Hungary and Serbia (350 km), Bangladesh (173 km, 1.23 billion dollars), and Iran (926 km, 2.1 billion RMB) (B2, B4) Tunnel On August 16, 2019, Ningbo–Zhoushan HSR passed feasibility evaluation, designed by a combination of “bridge and tunnel” spanning 77 km. The Jintang subsea tunnel was 16.2 km long and 78 m in maximum buried depth, which was the world’s highest in tunnel length and shield cross-section scale (B1) Bridge *In 2014, China mastered the core technologies of frame pier systems on the Shanghai–Nantong Yangtze River Bridge (B1, B4) *In 2015, China solved technology problems on beam structural design and constructions of deep water large section open caisson, mastered the durability technology of bridge concrete structure in high temperature, high humidity and strong corrosion marine environment, and developed automatic pre-stressed tension system for railway bridge (B1) *High-speed railway standard beam bridge technology and application won the Second Prize NSTPA Award in 2016 (B1) HSR station *By the end of Sep. 2019, there were 505 HSR stations in China mainland, forming a HSR station operation system classified as super-station, first-class station, second-class station and third-class station according to the business scale (B4) *Five super railway stations: 1. Guangzhou South Station has 15 platforms. The number of arrivals and departures at the station during the Spring Festival of 2017 was almost 15 million, and the daily average number of arrivals and departures was 368,600; 2. Hangzhou East Station had a total investment of 25 billion RMB; 3. Shanghai Hongqiao Station has a waiting hall area of 11,340 square meters, to hold up to 10,000 people; 4. Zhenzhou East Railway Station, with a total construction of 411,841 square meters and a total investment of 9.47 billion RMB; 5. Xi’an North Station has a passenger room of 171,000 square meters and a waiting area of 90,000 square meters, for up to 80,000 passengers at the same time, which is the largest in Asia (B4) Open in new tab Table 7. Typical cases of complementary assets in HSR sectoral system in stage 4 Complementary assets . Typical cases . High-speed railway *In July, 2016, the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Transport, and China Railway Corporation jointly issued the Eight Vertical and Eight Horizontal High-speed Railway Network Blueprint (B3) *China has undertaken HSR construction in Thailand (873 km in length, 179 billion baht budget), Russia (770 km Moscow–Kazan HSR, 20.79 billion rubles), Indonesia (150 km, 5.5 billion US dollars), Laos (418 km HSR, 40 billion RMB), Hungary and Serbia (350 km), Bangladesh (173 km, 1.23 billion dollars), and Iran (926 km, 2.1 billion RMB) (B2, B4) Tunnel On August 16, 2019, Ningbo–Zhoushan HSR passed feasibility evaluation, designed by a combination of “bridge and tunnel” spanning 77 km. The Jintang subsea tunnel was 16.2 km long and 78 m in maximum buried depth, which was the world’s highest in tunnel length and shield cross-section scale (B1) Bridge *In 2014, China mastered the core technologies of frame pier systems on the Shanghai–Nantong Yangtze River Bridge (B1, B4) *In 2015, China solved technology problems on beam structural design and constructions of deep water large section open caisson, mastered the durability technology of bridge concrete structure in high temperature, high humidity and strong corrosion marine environment, and developed automatic pre-stressed tension system for railway bridge (B1) *High-speed railway standard beam bridge technology and application won the Second Prize NSTPA Award in 2016 (B1) HSR station *By the end of Sep. 2019, there were 505 HSR stations in China mainland, forming a HSR station operation system classified as super-station, first-class station, second-class station and third-class station according to the business scale (B4) *Five super railway stations: 1. Guangzhou South Station has 15 platforms. The number of arrivals and departures at the station during the Spring Festival of 2017 was almost 15 million, and the daily average number of arrivals and departures was 368,600; 2. Hangzhou East Station had a total investment of 25 billion RMB; 3. Shanghai Hongqiao Station has a waiting hall area of 11,340 square meters, to hold up to 10,000 people; 4. Zhenzhou East Railway Station, with a total construction of 411,841 square meters and a total investment of 9.47 billion RMB; 5. Xi’an North Station has a passenger room of 171,000 square meters and a waiting area of 90,000 square meters, for up to 80,000 passengers at the same time, which is the largest in Asia (B4) Complementary assets . Typical cases . High-speed railway *In July, 2016, the National Development and Reform Commission, the Ministry of Transport, and China Railway Corporation jointly issued the Eight Vertical and Eight Horizontal High-speed Railway Network Blueprint (B3) *China has undertaken HSR construction in Thailand (873 km in length, 179 billion baht budget), Russia (770 km Moscow–Kazan HSR, 20.79 billion rubles), Indonesia (150 km, 5.5 billion US dollars), Laos (418 km HSR, 40 billion RMB), Hungary and Serbia (350 km), Bangladesh (173 km, 1.23 billion dollars), and Iran (926 km, 2.1 billion RMB) (B2, B4) Tunnel On August 16, 2019, Ningbo–Zhoushan HSR passed feasibility evaluation, designed by a combination of “bridge and tunnel” spanning 77 km. The Jintang subsea tunnel was 16.2 km long and 78 m in maximum buried depth, which was the world’s highest in tunnel length and shield cross-section scale (B1) Bridge *In 2014, China mastered the core technologies of frame pier systems on the Shanghai–Nantong Yangtze River Bridge (B1, B4) *In 2015, China solved technology problems on beam structural design and constructions of deep water large section open caisson, mastered the durability technology of bridge concrete structure in high temperature, high humidity and strong corrosion marine environment, and developed automatic pre-stressed tension system for railway bridge (B1) *High-speed railway standard beam bridge technology and application won the Second Prize NSTPA Award in 2016 (B1) HSR station *By the end of Sep. 2019, there were 505 HSR stations in China mainland, forming a HSR station operation system classified as super-station, first-class station, second-class station and third-class station according to the business scale (B4) *Five super railway stations: 1. Guangzhou South Station has 15 platforms. The number of arrivals and departures at the station during the Spring Festival of 2017 was almost 15 million, and the daily average number of arrivals and departures was 368,600; 2. Hangzhou East Station had a total investment of 25 billion RMB; 3. Shanghai Hongqiao Station has a waiting hall area of 11,340 square meters, to hold up to 10,000 people; 4. Zhenzhou East Railway Station, with a total construction of 411,841 square meters and a total investment of 9.47 billion RMB; 5. Xi’an North Station has a passenger room of 171,000 square meters and a waiting area of 90,000 square meters, for up to 80,000 passengers at the same time, which is the largest in Asia (B4) Open in new tab By the end of 2019, China’s mainland had produced 2430 high-speed train sets, occupying 49% of the total numbers in the world,8 completed the construction of 35,388 km HSR line taking 67.4% of world’s HSR line in length,9 taken 71.2% of world’s HSR market share in passengers kilometer by the end of 2018,10 and built on its capabilities in fully mastering the indigenous R&D and innovation in both key component and architecture know-how of high-speed trains, and the technologies and constructions of complementary systems involving high-speed railways, tunnels, bridges, HSR stations. According to the high-speed train’s technological assessment in speed, China also performed well, summarized in Table 8. All these indicated the successful catch up of entire China’s HSR sector system all over the world. Table 8. World fastest point-to-point HSR average speeds in commercial operations Country . Average speed . Train . Line . Date . China 313.0 km/h CRH2C Wuhan—Guangzhou North (922.0 km) 2009– China 283.7 km/h CRH380A Shijiazhuang—Zhengzhou (383.0 km) 2010– France 279.3 km/h TGV Duplex Lorraine TGV—Champagne-Ardenne TGV (167.6 km) 2007– Japan 263.4 km/h E5 Series Shinkansen Omiya—Sendai (294.1 km) 2013– France 263.3 km/h TGV Duplex Lyon-St Exupéry—Aix-en-Provence (289.6 km) 2005– Japan 263.2 km/h E6 Series Shinkansen Sendai—Morioka (171.1 km) 2013– Japan 256.0 km/h N700-7000/8000 Hiroshima—Kokura (192.0 km) 2011– Japan 250.4 km/h Nozomi Shinkansen Hiroshima—Kokura (192.0 km) 1997– China 249.5 km/h Shanghai Maglev Shanghai Pudong Int. Airport—Central Pudong (30.5 km) 2004– France 163.0 km/h Etendard St-Pierre-des-Corps—Poitiers(100.0 km) 1973–1989 Country . Average speed . Train . Line . Date . China 313.0 km/h CRH2C Wuhan—Guangzhou North (922.0 km) 2009– China 283.7 km/h CRH380A Shijiazhuang—Zhengzhou (383.0 km) 2010– France 279.3 km/h TGV Duplex Lorraine TGV—Champagne-Ardenne TGV (167.6 km) 2007– Japan 263.4 km/h E5 Series Shinkansen Omiya—Sendai (294.1 km) 2013– France 263.3 km/h TGV Duplex Lyon-St Exupéry—Aix-en-Provence (289.6 km) 2005– Japan 263.2 km/h E6 Series Shinkansen Sendai—Morioka (171.1 km) 2013– Japan 256.0 km/h N700-7000/8000 Hiroshima—Kokura (192.0 km) 2011– Japan 250.4 km/h Nozomi Shinkansen Hiroshima—Kokura (192.0 km) 1997– China 249.5 km/h Shanghai Maglev Shanghai Pudong Int. Airport—Central Pudong (30.5 km) 2004– France 163.0 km/h Etendard St-Pierre-des-Corps—Poitiers(100.0 km) 1973–1989 Source: Wikipedia. Open in new tab Table 8. World fastest point-to-point HSR average speeds in commercial operations Country . Average speed . Train . Line . Date . China 313.0 km/h CRH2C Wuhan—Guangzhou North (922.0 km) 2009– China 283.7 km/h CRH380A Shijiazhuang—Zhengzhou (383.0 km) 2010– France 279.3 km/h TGV Duplex Lorraine TGV—Champagne-Ardenne TGV (167.6 km) 2007– Japan 263.4 km/h E5 Series Shinkansen Omiya—Sendai (294.1 km) 2013– France 263.3 km/h TGV Duplex Lyon-St Exupéry—Aix-en-Provence (289.6 km) 2005– Japan 263.2 km/h E6 Series Shinkansen Sendai—Morioka (171.1 km) 2013– Japan 256.0 km/h N700-7000/8000 Hiroshima—Kokura (192.0 km) 2011– Japan 250.4 km/h Nozomi Shinkansen Hiroshima—Kokura (192.0 km) 1997– China 249.5 km/h Shanghai Maglev Shanghai Pudong Int. Airport—Central Pudong (30.5 km) 2004– France 163.0 km/h Etendard St-Pierre-des-Corps—Poitiers(100.0 km) 1973–1989 Country . Average speed . Train . Line . Date . China 313.0 km/h CRH2C Wuhan—Guangzhou North (922.0 km) 2009– China 283.7 km/h CRH380A Shijiazhuang—Zhengzhou (383.0 km) 2010– France 279.3 km/h TGV Duplex Lorraine TGV—Champagne-Ardenne TGV (167.6 km) 2007– Japan 263.4 km/h E5 Series Shinkansen Omiya—Sendai (294.1 km) 2013– France 263.3 km/h TGV Duplex Lyon-St Exupéry—Aix-en-Provence (289.6 km) 2005– Japan 263.2 km/h E6 Series Shinkansen Sendai—Morioka (171.1 km) 2013– Japan 256.0 km/h N700-7000/8000 Hiroshima—Kokura (192.0 km) 2011– Japan 250.4 km/h Nozomi Shinkansen Hiroshima—Kokura (192.0 km) 1997– China 249.5 km/h Shanghai Maglev Shanghai Pudong Int. Airport—Central Pudong (30.5 km) 2004– France 163.0 km/h Etendard St-Pierre-des-Corps—Poitiers(100.0 km) 1973–1989 Source: Wikipedia. Open in new tab 5. Lessons and discussions We explore the latecomer’s catch up in CoPS from the sectoral systems perspective, based on the longitudinal evolution of China’s HSR sectoral system. We identify two lessons as follows. First, China’s successful catch up of high-speed train CoPS was mainly due to the entire HSR sectoral system’s catch up, based on the coordination of the high-speed train CoPS and the complementary assets under the government engagement. Along with the stages of the sectoral system’s evolution, both China’s high-speed train CoPS and its complementary assets have achieved the development and upgrade in technology prowess competence. A latecomer can choose a catch up strategy in which the complementary system takes precedence over the CoPS, and maintain the coordination of the two systems with government engagement, in order to achieve the overall catch up and success of the sectoral system. Figure 3 describes the coordination process in four stages. Figure 3. Open in new tabDownload slide The competence upgrade and the coordination of the CoPS and complementary assets of China’s HSR. Figure 3. Open in new tabDownload slide The competence upgrade and the coordination of the CoPS and complementary assets of China’s HSR. Second, regarding the sectoral system’s overall catch up, we argue two elements involving the subsystem’s knowledge base and government engagement played fundamental roles in the evolution of the competences of the CoPS and the leveraging of complementary assets, summarized in Table 9. Accordingly, the competences of high-speed train CoPS represent discontinuous evolution and emergence characteristics in the sectoral system development. The initial formation of the competences took three stages of HSR development, until the indigenous “CRH380” successfully came into operation in 2010. This CoPS competence emergence was due to the ongoing interactive effects of the knowledge base and government engagement. The domestic failure of high-speed trains contributed to the initial knowledge base and absorptive capacity for advanced foreign know-how, combining the introduced four types of mature foreign high-speed trains and constructing a solid knowledge base. At the same time, government engagement positively enhanced the learning of knowledge and formation of competences, with the alignment of the import-oriented agenda, the “20-sets package scheme” technology introduction rules, the duopoly industrial structure, and the joint bidding rule of two consortiums. All these elements worked coordinately to breakthrough the competence formation of CoPS. After that, continuous leverage of the knowledge base and government engagement supported the improvement of competences and the upgrade of the CoPS. With the combination of component technology adaptive improvements and the government maintaining engagement through special industrial policy and financial investment, the sectoral system of China’s HSR mastered all component and architectural technologies of high-speed trains, and upgraded the indigenous EMUs from the “CRH380” at 350 km/h to the “Renaissance” at 400 km/h. Finally, in the fourth stage, the competitive indigenous high-speed trains’ knowledge base and government engagement via international diplomacy, export-oriented industrial policies, and domestic resource integration further enhanced the expansion of competences. Table 9. The evolution of HSR sectoral system in elements Subsystem . Competences evolution . Main stages . Representative performance . Knowledge base . Government engagement . CoPS of high-speed train Competences initial formation Stages 1, 2, and 3 The first indigenous high-speed train “CRH380” and its successful operation *Domestic sources: failure of high-speed trains’ R&D: “White Shark,” “Pioneer,” “Changbai Mountain,” “Blue Arrow,” and “China Star” *Foreign advanced sources: mature high-speed trains involving Bombardier’s Regina C2008, Kawasaki’s E2-1000, Alston’s Pendolino and Siemens’ Velaro E, and their relevant components *Industrial policy on HSR development agenda: from indigenous R&D, to technology introduction, and then to indigenous innovation on high-speed trains *“20-sets package scheme” technology introduction rule for systematic learning *Duopoly industrial structure design for learning and innovation race *The joint bidding rule for CSR and CNR consortiums competition and technology integration (including CSR–Bombardier and CSR–Kawasaki; CNR–Alston and CNR–Siemens) Competences improvement and upgrade Stages 3 and 4 *The R&D of indigenous high-speed trains on “CRH380” series at 350 km/h speed *The 400 km/h speed China’s standard EMU “Renaissance” *Successfully mastering all the key required components and technologies of high-speed trains (e.g., IGBT, bogie, traction converter) *Adaptive improved localized high-speed trains: involving CSR’s CRH1 from Bombardier’s Regina C2008 and CRH2 from Kawasaki’s E2-1000, and CNR’s CRH5 from Alston’s Pendolino and CRH3 from Siemens’ Velaro E. *The indigenous high-speed train “CRH380 *Special government agency responsible for indigenous innovation agenda (e.g., 226 Office) *Special industrial policy (Joint Action Plan of Indigenous Innovation of China’s High-speed Rail) *Financial investment on indigenous R&D of high-speed trains (e.g., 2.2 billion RMB investment on major S&T projects of “CRH380”) Competences expansion Stage 4 *Mass production of indigenous high-speed trains *Export of China’s high-speed trains to other nations Indigenous high-speed trains, such as “CRH380” series and “Renaissance” *HSR industrial planning (demand creation) *Domestic resource integration on high-speed train production (establish CRRC by merging CSR and CNR) *HSR diplomacy *Global-oriented HSR industrial policies (e.g., One Belt One Road) Complementary assets of HSR Initial formation Stage 1 The first high-speed railway’s construction and application: Qin–Shen passenger dedicated line *Existing railway system, and engineering experience of bridge and tunnel construction *The engineering of quasi high-speed railway Guangzhou–Shenzhen line *Industrial planning and determine technology option of wheel-track railway *Financial investment in R&D and engineering (e.g., 15 billion RMB on Qin–Shen passenger dedicated line) Improvement and upgrade Stage 2&3 The construction and application Beijing–Tianjin intercity high-speed railway; Beijing–Shanghai high-speed railway; other railways along four vertical and four horizontal network lines *First high-speed railway: Qin–Shen passenger dedicated line *Advanced technology introduction (e.g., ballastless track technologies) *R&D investment and accumulation (e.g., Beijing–Shanghai high-speed railway) *Industrial planning (e.g., four vertical and four horizontal HSR network) *Financial investment on R&D and engineering (e.g., about one trillion investment in railway construction in the four trillion plan) Expansion Late stages 3 and 4 Construction of eight vertical and eight horizontal networks; Overseas high-speed railway construction projects *Accumulated infrastructure engineering experience and relevant knowledge system (involving railways, tunnels, bridges, and HSR stations) *HSR diplomacy *Global-oriented HSR industrial policies (e.g., One Belt One Road) *Industrial planning (e.g., eight vertical and eight horizontal HSR network) Subsystem . Competences evolution . Main stages . Representative performance . Knowledge base . Government engagement . CoPS of high-speed train Competences initial formation Stages 1, 2, and 3 The first indigenous high-speed train “CRH380” and its successful operation *Domestic sources: failure of high-speed trains’ R&D: “White Shark,” “Pioneer,” “Changbai Mountain,” “Blue Arrow,” and “China Star” *Foreign advanced sources: mature high-speed trains involving Bombardier’s Regina C2008, Kawasaki’s E2-1000, Alston’s Pendolino and Siemens’ Velaro E, and their relevant components *Industrial policy on HSR development agenda: from indigenous R&D, to technology introduction, and then to indigenous innovation on high-speed trains *“20-sets package scheme” technology introduction rule for systematic learning *Duopoly industrial structure design for learning and innovation race *The joint bidding rule for CSR and CNR consortiums competition and technology integration (including CSR–Bombardier and CSR–Kawasaki; CNR–Alston and CNR–Siemens) Competences improvement and upgrade Stages 3 and 4 *The R&D of indigenous high-speed trains on “CRH380” series at 350 km/h speed *The 400 km/h speed China’s standard EMU “Renaissance” *Successfully mastering all the key required components and technologies of high-speed trains (e.g., IGBT, bogie, traction converter) *Adaptive improved localized high-speed trains: involving CSR’s CRH1 from Bombardier’s Regina C2008 and CRH2 from Kawasaki’s E2-1000, and CNR’s CRH5 from Alston’s Pendolino and CRH3 from Siemens’ Velaro E. *The indigenous high-speed train “CRH380 *Special government agency responsible for indigenous innovation agenda (e.g., 226 Office) *Special industrial policy (Joint Action Plan of Indigenous Innovation of China’s High-speed Rail) *Financial investment on indigenous R&D of high-speed trains (e.g., 2.2 billion RMB investment on major S&T projects of “CRH380”) Competences expansion Stage 4 *Mass production of indigenous high-speed trains *Export of China’s high-speed trains to other nations Indigenous high-speed trains, such as “CRH380” series and “Renaissance” *HSR industrial planning (demand creation) *Domestic resource integration on high-speed train production (establish CRRC by merging CSR and CNR) *HSR diplomacy *Global-oriented HSR industrial policies (e.g., One Belt One Road) Complementary assets of HSR Initial formation Stage 1 The first high-speed railway’s construction and application: Qin–Shen passenger dedicated line *Existing railway system, and engineering experience of bridge and tunnel construction *The engineering of quasi high-speed railway Guangzhou–Shenzhen line *Industrial planning and determine technology option of wheel-track railway *Financial investment in R&D and engineering (e.g., 15 billion RMB on Qin–Shen passenger dedicated line) Improvement and upgrade Stage 2&3 The construction and application Beijing–Tianjin intercity high-speed railway; Beijing–Shanghai high-speed railway; other railways along four vertical and four horizontal network lines *First high-speed railway: Qin–Shen passenger dedicated line *Advanced technology introduction (e.g., ballastless track technologies) *R&D investment and accumulation (e.g., Beijing–Shanghai high-speed railway) *Industrial planning (e.g., four vertical and four horizontal HSR network) *Financial investment on R&D and engineering (e.g., about one trillion investment in railway construction in the four trillion plan) Expansion Late stages 3 and 4 Construction of eight vertical and eight horizontal networks; Overseas high-speed railway construction projects *Accumulated infrastructure engineering experience and relevant knowledge system (involving railways, tunnels, bridges, and HSR stations) *HSR diplomacy *Global-oriented HSR industrial policies (e.g., One Belt One Road) *Industrial planning (e.g., eight vertical and eight horizontal HSR network) Open in new tab Table 9. The evolution of HSR sectoral system in elements Subsystem . Competences evolution . Main stages . Representative performance . Knowledge base . Government engagement . CoPS of high-speed train Competences initial formation Stages 1, 2, and 3 The first indigenous high-speed train “CRH380” and its successful operation *Domestic sources: failure of high-speed trains’ R&D: “White Shark,” “Pioneer,” “Changbai Mountain,” “Blue Arrow,” and “China Star” *Foreign advanced sources: mature high-speed trains involving Bombardier’s Regina C2008, Kawasaki’s E2-1000, Alston’s Pendolino and Siemens’ Velaro E, and their relevant components *Industrial policy on HSR development agenda: from indigenous R&D, to technology introduction, and then to indigenous innovation on high-speed trains *“20-sets package scheme” technology introduction rule for systematic learning *Duopoly industrial structure design for learning and innovation race *The joint bidding rule for CSR and CNR consortiums competition and technology integration (including CSR–Bombardier and CSR–Kawasaki; CNR–Alston and CNR–Siemens) Competences improvement and upgrade Stages 3 and 4 *The R&D of indigenous high-speed trains on “CRH380” series at 350 km/h speed *The 400 km/h speed China’s standard EMU “Renaissance” *Successfully mastering all the key required components and technologies of high-speed trains (e.g., IGBT, bogie, traction converter) *Adaptive improved localized high-speed trains: involving CSR’s CRH1 from Bombardier’s Regina C2008 and CRH2 from Kawasaki’s E2-1000, and CNR’s CRH5 from Alston’s Pendolino and CRH3 from Siemens’ Velaro E. *The indigenous high-speed train “CRH380 *Special government agency responsible for indigenous innovation agenda (e.g., 226 Office) *Special industrial policy (Joint Action Plan of Indigenous Innovation of China’s High-speed Rail) *Financial investment on indigenous R&D of high-speed trains (e.g., 2.2 billion RMB investment on major S&T projects of “CRH380”) Competences expansion Stage 4 *Mass production of indigenous high-speed trains *Export of China’s high-speed trains to other nations Indigenous high-speed trains, such as “CRH380” series and “Renaissance” *HSR industrial planning (demand creation) *Domestic resource integration on high-speed train production (establish CRRC by merging CSR and CNR) *HSR diplomacy *Global-oriented HSR industrial policies (e.g., One Belt One Road) Complementary assets of HSR Initial formation Stage 1 The first high-speed railway’s construction and application: Qin–Shen passenger dedicated line *Existing railway system, and engineering experience of bridge and tunnel construction *The engineering of quasi high-speed railway Guangzhou–Shenzhen line *Industrial planning and determine technology option of wheel-track railway *Financial investment in R&D and engineering (e.g., 15 billion RMB on Qin–Shen passenger dedicated line) Improvement and upgrade Stage 2&3 The construction and application Beijing–Tianjin intercity high-speed railway; Beijing–Shanghai high-speed railway; other railways along four vertical and four horizontal network lines *First high-speed railway: Qin–Shen passenger dedicated line *Advanced technology introduction (e.g., ballastless track technologies) *R&D investment and accumulation (e.g., Beijing–Shanghai high-speed railway) *Industrial planning (e.g., four vertical and four horizontal HSR network) *Financial investment on R&D and engineering (e.g., about one trillion investment in railway construction in the four trillion plan) Expansion Late stages 3 and 4 Construction of eight vertical and eight horizontal networks; Overseas high-speed railway construction projects *Accumulated infrastructure engineering experience and relevant knowledge system (involving railways, tunnels, bridges, and HSR stations) *HSR diplomacy *Global-oriented HSR industrial policies (e.g., One Belt One Road) *Industrial planning (e.g., eight vertical and eight horizontal HSR network) Subsystem . Competences evolution . Main stages . Representative performance . Knowledge base . Government engagement . CoPS of high-speed train Competences initial formation Stages 1, 2, and 3 The first indigenous high-speed train “CRH380” and its successful operation *Domestic sources: failure of high-speed trains’ R&D: “White Shark,” “Pioneer,” “Changbai Mountain,” “Blue Arrow,” and “China Star” *Foreign advanced sources: mature high-speed trains involving Bombardier’s Regina C2008, Kawasaki’s E2-1000, Alston’s Pendolino and Siemens’ Velaro E, and their relevant components *Industrial policy on HSR development agenda: from indigenous R&D, to technology introduction, and then to indigenous innovation on high-speed trains *“20-sets package scheme” technology introduction rule for systematic learning *Duopoly industrial structure design for learning and innovation race *The joint bidding rule for CSR and CNR consortiums competition and technology integration (including CSR–Bombardier and CSR–Kawasaki; CNR–Alston and CNR–Siemens) Competences improvement and upgrade Stages 3 and 4 *The R&D of indigenous high-speed trains on “CRH380” series at 350 km/h speed *The 400 km/h speed China’s standard EMU “Renaissance” *Successfully mastering all the key required components and technologies of high-speed trains (e.g., IGBT, bogie, traction converter) *Adaptive improved localized high-speed trains: involving CSR’s CRH1 from Bombardier’s Regina C2008 and CRH2 from Kawasaki’s E2-1000, and CNR’s CRH5 from Alston’s Pendolino and CRH3 from Siemens’ Velaro E. *The indigenous high-speed train “CRH380 *Special government agency responsible for indigenous innovation agenda (e.g., 226 Office) *Special industrial policy (Joint Action Plan of Indigenous Innovation of China’s High-speed Rail) *Financial investment on indigenous R&D of high-speed trains (e.g., 2.2 billion RMB investment on major S&T projects of “CRH380”) Competences expansion Stage 4 *Mass production of indigenous high-speed trains *Export of China’s high-speed trains to other nations Indigenous high-speed trains, such as “CRH380” series and “Renaissance” *HSR industrial planning (demand creation) *Domestic resource integration on high-speed train production (establish CRRC by merging CSR and CNR) *HSR diplomacy *Global-oriented HSR industrial policies (e.g., One Belt One Road) Complementary assets of HSR Initial formation Stage 1 The first high-speed railway’s construction and application: Qin–Shen passenger dedicated line *Existing railway system, and engineering experience of bridge and tunnel construction *The engineering of quasi high-speed railway Guangzhou–Shenzhen line *Industrial planning and determine technology option of wheel-track railway *Financial investment in R&D and engineering (e.g., 15 billion RMB on Qin–Shen passenger dedicated line) Improvement and upgrade Stage 2&3 The construction and application Beijing–Tianjin intercity high-speed railway; Beijing–Shanghai high-speed railway; other railways along four vertical and four horizontal network lines *First high-speed railway: Qin–Shen passenger dedicated line *Advanced technology introduction (e.g., ballastless track technologies) *R&D investment and accumulation (e.g., Beijing–Shanghai high-speed railway) *Industrial planning (e.g., four vertical and four horizontal HSR network) *Financial investment on R&D and engineering (e.g., about one trillion investment in railway construction in the four trillion plan) Expansion Late stages 3 and 4 Construction of eight vertical and eight horizontal networks; Overseas high-speed railway construction projects *Accumulated infrastructure engineering experience and relevant knowledge system (involving railways, tunnels, bridges, and HSR stations) *HSR diplomacy *Global-oriented HSR industrial policies (e.g., One Belt One Road) *Industrial planning (e.g., eight vertical and eight horizontal HSR network) Open in new tab In contrast, the leveraging of the HSR’s complementary assets present continuous evolutionary characteristics, with the interactive influence of both the knowledge base and government engagement. The initial formation of complementary assets (represented by the construction of Qin–Shen passenger dedicated line) was completed in the first stage, supported by the quasi high-speed Guangzhou–Shenzhen line and the government’s active industrial policy and financial investment. Moving to the second and third stages, the central government maintained or even increased its investment in the “four vertical and four horizontal” high-speed railway network planning, and concentrated on investing in R&D of major benchmarking projects such as Beijing–Shanghai high-speed railway. Simultaneously, the sectoral actors proactively accessed advanced foreign high-speed railway technologies, such as ballastless track technologies from Germany and France, to leverage the engineering knowledge base of the Qin–Shen passenger dedicated line. Finally from stage 3 to the last stage, China began exploring the export of high-speed railway construction and further expanded high-speed railway network construction in line with the “eight vertical and eight horizontal” planning, with the expansion of complementary assets fully supported by government HSR diplomacy, industrial planning and export-oriented policies, and backed up by the accumulated extensive infrastructure engineering know-how. 6. Conclusions and contributions The article focuses on the catch up in CoPS of HSR from the sectoral systems perspective, and addresses how a latecomer can achieve catch up in the context of CoPS on the basis of the entire sectoral system’s catch up. We used a longitudinal case study of the sectoral system of China’s HSR, and examined the evolution of China’s HSR in four stages. We draw the following conclusions. First, the catch up of CoPS is embedded within the sectoral system’s catch up, which is based on the coevolution among the CoPS, the system of complementary assets, and government engagement of the sectoral system. Second, to achieve the entire sectoral system’s catch-up in the context of CoPS, it is important to leverage the competences of the CoPS and complementary assets simultaneously. Specifically, a latecomer can choose a catch up strategy in which the system of complementary assets takes precedence over the CoPS, and maintain the coordination of the two systems with continuous support from the government. Third, the knowledge base and government engagement play fundamental roles in the competences evolution of the CoPS and the leveraging of complementary assets in stages (involving the initial formation, the improvement and upgrade, and the expansion), enabling the latecomer to eventually achieve the entire sectoral system’s catch up. We contribute to the prior literature in three aspects. First, the prior literature has very limited explorations of latecomers’ catch up in the context of CoPS. We therefore use a longitudinal case study on the catch up of HSR in China. More specifically, we shed new light on the CoPS catch up literature from the sectoral system perspective from Malerba (2002), which extended the previous literature streams in highlighting the importance of simultaneously adopting foreign technologies and in-house R&D (Zhang and Igel, 2001; Choung and Hwang, 2007), the technological and integration capabilities of integrator firms (Hobday et al., 2005; Kiamehr et al., 2014; Lee and Yoon, 2015), and government engagement and policy (e.g., Mahmood and Rufin, 2005; Mazzoleni and Nelson, 2007; Evans, 2012). Accordingly, we argue it is the sectoral system’s catch up that is most important to the leverage of CoPS, and the effective coordination between the CoPS and the system of complementary assets under government engagement of sectoral systems should be enhanced. Second, there have been many studies discussing the latecomers’ catch up phenomenon from the sectoral system lens, including the electricity generation systems of Iran (Kiamehr et al., 2014), the TDX and CDMA telecom systems of South Korea (Choung and Hwang, 2007; Park, 2013), the stored program control switching system of China (Zhang and Igel, 2001), the military aircraft sector of Korea (Lee and Yoon, 2015), the telecommunication equipment sectors of Brazil, China, India, and Korea (Lee et al., 2012), and the commercial aerospace sector of China (Smith and Zhang, 2014). However, very little knowledge was generated from the entire system’s catch up perspective. We attempt to fill the gap by exploring how the latecomer nation China achieved catch up of its entire HSR sectoral system. Accordingly, we argue the coordination of China’s high-speed train CoPS and the complementary assets under the continuous government support drove the catch up of HSR. In addition, to achieve the sectoral system’s catch up, the leverage of complementary assets should take precedence over the CoPS, with the government supporting the two systems’ coordination. Finally, we respond to the prior sectoral system literature highlighting government engagements in the context of CoPS catch up (e.g., Malerba and Nelson, 2011; Park, 2013; Lee and Malerba, 2017), and further enrich the literature by arguing that the knowledge base and government engagement interact to drive the CoPS’ competences evolution and the leveraging of complementary assets, so as to support the successful catch up of the entire sectoral system. Acknowledgments The authors thank Prof. Henry Chesbrough for his great comments at the Berkeley Innovation Seminar, and thank Prof. David Teece for his great guidance and support on Industrial and Corporate Change. We are also grateful for the extremely constructive comments from Prof. Franco Malerba, Giovanni Dosi, Keun Lee, Jin Chen, Elena Cefis, and other great scholars at ICC-Tsinghua Conference 2019, and the detailed and constructive comments and suggestions from the anonymous reviewers, which allow us to improve the manuscript substantially. In addition, we really appreciate the great works of Editorial Manager Adriana Mongelli. We finally thank Prof. Jin Chen from School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University for his mentoring, and Dr. Weinan Wang for his support. This work was supported by the China Ministry of Education Youth Fund for Humanities and Social Sciences [grant number 20YJC630102]; Natural Science Foundation of Beijing Municipality, China [grant number 9204030]; National Natural Science Foundation of China [grant numbers 71704090]; The Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities, China [grant number 2021JBW109]. Footnotes 1 Data sources: China Railway Statistics Yearbook, and UIC: https://uic.org/highspeed. 2 https://uic.org/passenger/highspeed/. 3 Data about the HSR history are from UIC: https://uic.org/passenger/highspeed/article/high-speed-rail-history. 4 Renamed by National Development and Reform Commission in 2003. 5 Revoked on March 10, 2003 with its function replaced by the State’s Ministry of Commerce. 6 Replaced by State Prime Minister and Ministers in 1997. 7 Data source: UIC (2016). 8 Data from UIC: https://uic.org/IMG/pdf/20200127_high_speed_rolling_stock.pdf 9 Data from UIC: https://uic.org/IMG/pdf/20200227_high_speed_lines_in_the_world.pdf 10 Accoridng to the UIC’s HIGH SPEED RAIL Brochure—2018, the market share of world’s HSR were distributed as follows: China Mainland 71.2%, Japan 10.8%, France 6.0%%, Germany 3.3%, Spain 1.7%, Italy 1.6%, Korea 1.6%, Other European Countries 2.7%. References Acha V. , Davies A. , Hobday M. , Salter A. 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TI - Catch up of complex products and systems: lessons from China’s high-speed rail sectoral system
JF - Industrial and Corporate Change
DO - 10.1093/icc/dtab004
DA - 2021-03-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/catch-up-of-complex-products-and-systems-lessons-from-china-s-high-UNVZvVo18d
SP - 1
EP - 1
VL - Advance Article
IS - 
DP - DeepDyve
ER -