TY - JOUR
AU - TOWRY, KRISTY L.
AB -  1. Introduction An essential role of management is organizational control, or the process of “ensuring that the organization operates in the intended manner and achieves its goals” ( Hilton 2008: 6 ). Accountants support managers in this role by providing information that forms the basis of performance evaluation and incentive‐based contracting. However, managers also have available to them other relevant employee performance information — that is, information not explicitly contracted on because it represents unforeseen circumstances, cannot be jointly verified or requires interpretation or judgment. To incorporate this noncontractible information into compensation decisions, firms often allow managers discretion in determining subordinates’ compensation. Specifically, many firms use discretionary bonus pools as the mechanism via which managers apply discretion in compensation. Whereas the size of a bonus pool (in dollars) is typically based on some predetermined formula, firms vary greatly in the extent to which managers are endowed discretion to allocate that pool ( Murphy and Oyer 2003 ). That is, some plans allow managers full discretion in allocating the bonus pool, whereas other plans allow discretion over only a portion of the total pool, with the remainder contractually allocated by formula. In this paper, we investigate the effect of 
TI - Dividing the Pie: The Influence of Managerial Discretion Extent on Bonus Pool Allocation *
JO - Contemporary Accounting Research
DO - 10.1111/j.1911-3846.2011.01073.x
DA - 2011-12-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/wiley/dividing-the-pie-the-influence-of-managerial-discretion-extent-on-TyCnqig5oN
SP - 1562
VL - 28
IS - 5
DP - DeepDyve
ER -