TY - JOUR
AU - Craft, Jonathan
AB - Abstract Appointed political staffs were featured in the initial elaboration of the ‘policy advisory systems’ (PAS) model yet have received considerably less attention than other components. This article revisits the PAS model and argues that political staffs engage in important procedural advisory activities masked by the PAS focus on location and control. The principle contention being that political staffs influence within advisory systems may also be a product of their procedural brokerage of other sources of policy advice. The article advances a conceptual framework to understand political staffs brokerage as ‘bridging’. Setting out ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ forms that can be arrayed along ‘administrative-technical’ and ‘partisan-political’ types. A Canadian sub-national case study is examined using the framework revealing variance in the type and nature of bridging based on institutional location of political staffs and the specific brokerage tasks they undertake. First minister's office bridging is found to be considerably more limited than that undertaken by minister's office political staffs, particularly in relation to the bridging of exogenous sources of policy advice. The framework and empirical findings enrich the policy advisory systems literature by demonstrating the importance of coupling spatial considerations with attention to the actual tasks of advisory system members. Additionally, highlighting the importance of procedural policy advisory brokerage as a source of influence within advisory systems. 1 Introduction A prominent and ongoing discourse in the contemporary international policy literature involves the perceived erosion of public sector ‘policy capacity’.1 Despite differences in the operationalization of terms or the cases examined, a common narrative of concern prevails. As Tiernan (2011) phrases it, the concern is “about the ability and willingness of the public service to provide high quality advice to policy-makers, its research and analytical capabilities; its relationship with Ministers and their private office staff; and its role as policy adviser in an increasingly pluralized, complex, demanding and contested policy environment” (2011:336). This admonition echoes others in tracing shifts in the supply and demand dynamics of policy advice (Dobuzinskis, Howlett, Laycock, 2007; Parsons, 2004; Prince, 2007; Weller & Rhodes, 2001), but also signals the importance of the use, or processes associated with ministers’ private offices2 and the operation of ‘policy advisory systems’ (PAS). Such systems can be thought of as an interlocking set of actors, with a unique configuration in each sector and jurisdiction, who provided information, knowledge and recommendations for action to policy-makers (Halligan, 1995). This article contends that political staffs are important and often overlooked instruments for policy advisory brokerage. These actors are uniquely positioned to serve as ‘bridges’ for the brokerage of policy advice endogenously within government as well as from exogenous sources. A conceptual framework is advanced that arrays bridging along ‘positive’ integrative, or ‘negative’ gatekeeping forms of brokerage. These mutually exclusive categories are advanced to reflect contemporary empirical evidence of political staffs as actors that engage in the prevention and/or facilitation of policy advisory input integration within the executive (Bennister, 2007; OECD, 2011; Tiernan, 2007). A second dimension set out is advanced to capture the orientation of their bridging along ‘partisan-political’ or ‘administrative-technical categories’. This reflects the unique nature of the policy work of political staffs who as appointed political actors, are typically exempt from statutes and guidelines that govern the behavior and activities of non-partisan public servants. Or, alternatively political staff are often governed by particular provisions that recognize their partisan-political linkages and explicit partisan-political policy advisory activity (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010; King, 2003; Zussman, 2009). Empirical evidence has revealed that political staffs’ brokerage also occurs with non-partisan policy actors including public servants, stakeholders, and policy ‘experts’ (Maley, 2011; OECD, 2007, 2011). As such, their bridging activity can also be theorized to potentially involve non-partisan or ‘administrative-technical’ brokerage activities. This second distinction is not advanced to reintroduce a political-administrative dichotomy. Rather, it distinguishes among the orientation of their brokerage activities within the executive, acknowledging that political staffs may be called upon to engage in either or both forms of brokerage. These concepts are further specified below. A Canadian subnational case study is examined using this framework. The analysis is based data collected from qualitative interviews with ministers, deputy ministers, and political staffs from minsters’ and the first minister's offices (n = 14). The findings support the utility of the model as a conceptual heuristic to improve descriptive mapping of appointed political staffs’ brokerage activities. Revealing for example, differences in the orientation of political staffs’ bridging at the first minister's and ministers office locations. Significantly, ministers’ office political staffs were found to be the predominant actors who bridged exogenous policy advice from stakeholders, for partisan-political and administrative-technical purposes, into the policy advisory system. Ministers’ office political staff also reported higher levels of ‘negative’ bridging, more frequently acknowledging a gatekeeping function in relation to their advisory system participation. These findings further the study of advisory systems which have traditionally relied on locational and control autonomy considerations as will be reviewed below. The evidence suggests that for accurate description and understanding of advisory systems it is crucial to marry spatial considerations with attention to the actual advisory system policy tasks members undertake. The conceptual framework advanced offers greater specificity in understanding how brokerage functions may vary and their impact on advisory system operation and dynamics. 2 Conceptualizing appointed political staffs’ bridging Policy advice can more generally be arrayed into two rubrics, as part of the policy formulation process or as a component of broader knowledge utilization (MacRae & Whittington, 1997). The former understands policy advice as “covering analysis of problems and the proposing of solutions” (Halligan, 1998:1686). The latter, as Peters and Barker contend, understands policy advice as a means by which governments “deliberately acquire, and passively receive … advice on decisions and policies which may be broadly called informative, objective or technical (1993:2)”. Both approaches can however usefully be understood through spatial models that array policy advice into market like supply-demand-brokerage ‘sets’ (Howlett, 2011; Lindquist, 1998). The PAS model goes beyond market based heuristics in that it adds a second control-autonomy dimension to the locational distinctions prominent in market based interpretations (see Table 1). This facilitates descriptive locational analysis of advisory systems components but also suggests differences in the influence accorded to various components is contingent upon on their proximity and controllability by government. Table 1 Location of policy advice and degree of influence. Location Government control High Low Public Service Senior departmental policy advisors Central Agency advisors/strategic policy unit Statutory appointments in public service Internal to Government Political Advisory systems Temporary advisory policy units Ministers Offices First Ministers Offices Parliaments (e.g. a House of Commons) Permanent advisory policy units Statutory authorities Legislatures (e.g., U.S. Congress External Private sector/NGOS on contract Community organizations subject to government Federal international organizations Trade unions, interest groups, etc. Community groups Confederal international communities/organizations Location Government control High Low Public Service Senior departmental policy advisors Central Agency advisors/strategic policy unit Statutory appointments in public service Internal to Government Political Advisory systems Temporary advisory policy units Ministers Offices First Ministers Offices Parliaments (e.g. a House of Commons) Permanent advisory policy units Statutory authorities Legislatures (e.g., U.S. Congress External Private sector/NGOS on contract Community organizations subject to government Federal international organizations Trade unions, interest groups, etc. Community groups Confederal international communities/organizations Source: Adapted from Halligan (1995). Open in new tab Table 1 Location of policy advice and degree of influence. Location Government control High Low Public Service Senior departmental policy advisors Central Agency advisors/strategic policy unit Statutory appointments in public service Internal to Government Political Advisory systems Temporary advisory policy units Ministers Offices First Ministers Offices Parliaments (e.g. a House of Commons) Permanent advisory policy units Statutory authorities Legislatures (e.g., U.S. Congress External Private sector/NGOS on contract Community organizations subject to government Federal international organizations Trade unions, interest groups, etc. Community groups Confederal international communities/organizations Location Government control High Low Public Service Senior departmental policy advisors Central Agency advisors/strategic policy unit Statutory appointments in public service Internal to Government Political Advisory systems Temporary advisory policy units Ministers Offices First Ministers Offices Parliaments (e.g. a House of Commons) Permanent advisory policy units Statutory authorities Legislatures (e.g., U.S. Congress External Private sector/NGOS on contract Community organizations subject to government Federal international organizations Trade unions, interest groups, etc. Community groups Confederal international communities/organizations Source: Adapted from Halligan (1995). Open in new tab Political staffs were included in the original elaboration of the conventional model (Halligan, 1995; Plowden, 1987). Their functions as advisory system members along with their influence have long been acknowledged to be contingent; dependent upon the unique institutional structures and the importance and seniority accorded to them within their respective machineries of government (Bakvis, 1997; Doern, 1971; Halligan, 1995). Additional specificity in determinations of influence beyond such contingencies can be gained through finer grained analysis of the policy tasks political staff perform. The PAS model was developed as a means to take stock of shifts in supply, demand, and the influence of variously located advisory system components. The contention here is that the policy influence of political staffs within advisory systems extends beyond their close proximity to decision makers and the high degree of control government exerts over them. They are not only a privileged locational supplier of content-based policy advice of a partisan-political nature as is implicit in the original PAS modeling. They also derive influence from their ability to engage in process-based policy advisory brokerage involving the circulation of policy advice or its prevention within advisory systems (Boston, 1992; Dahlström, Guy Peters, & Pierre, 2011; Hamburger, Stevens, & Weller, 2011; Peters, 1998). Given the argued plurality and porousness that characterizes contemporary advisory systems, brokerage of policy advice (or the lack thereof) is consequential to executive operation and governance (Connaughton, Sootla, & Peters, 2008; Pedersen, Sehested, & Sørensen, 2011; Peters, Rhodes, & Wright, 2000). Extant studies of political staffs have documented them undertaking important policy advisory brokerage activity. Eichbaum and Shaw for example, in their study of New Zealand political staff, found public service actors perceived political staffs as “broadening the advice base, increasing ministers’ options, testing officials’ advice, and democratizing processes by providing an additional point of entry for external policy actors” (2007:457). Others have also documented procedural policy activities such as ‘connecting’, ‘brokering’, or ‘coupling’ (Gains & Stoker, 2011; Maley, 2000:458; OECD, 2011). These empirical findings have however far outpaced conceptual work to understand and contextualize political staffs as executive advisory system actors (Shaw & Eichbaum, 2012). Gains and Stoker (2011) have recently used policy theory and knowledge utilization literature to suggest that U.K. political staffs play important functions in the ideational ‘transmission’ processes in policy making more generally. The coneceptual framework developed below focuses on policy advice specifically, providing a new heuristic to better depict, analyze, and link political staffs advisory activity to that of other advisory system actors and policy outcomes. From the outset, advisory systems were conceived of as including various types of advice. That is, they included actors and supplies of policy advice that were non-partisan and partisan-political in orientation (Plowden, 1987; Weller, 1987). Halligan's original model followed this logic differentiating between the ‘political’ and ‘public service’ supplies in conventional advisory systems. Contemporary scholarship has however underscored the limitations associated with content-based advisory modeling predicated on traditional partisan-political versus ‘administrative’ or ‘technical’ dimensions (Craft & Howlett, 2012). Yet, administrative politicization as an advisory system dynamic suggests an explicit shift in policy advisory practices on process and/or substantive dimensions involving an intervention that “offends against the principles and conventions associated with a professional and impartial civil service” (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2008:343). Conceptualizing the policy advisory brokerage activities of political staff thus requires attention to the partisan-political and non-partisan practices associated with advisory system activity. Partisan-political bridging is advanced in Table 2 below as a means of capturing the procedural partisan-political advisory activity political staff may engage in tied to political aspects of policy advice. For example, determinations of politically feasibility, (Majone, 1975; May, 2005; Weber, 1986), the calculus of political risk or potential electoral consequences, and blame avoidance (Althus, 2008; Hood, 2010). This form of bridging is posited to involve the brokerage of policy advice among partisan-political advisory system members including but not limited to variously located partisan-political staffs, elected officials, or partisan policy stakeholders (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2011; Maley, 2011; OECD, 2011). From a procedural perspective, brokerage then involves activities designed to secure the accommodation of political interests, transactional ideational exchanges, and participative and consultative exercises among partisan-political actors aimed at fostering political legitimacy (Aucoin, 1986; Wallner, 2008). Table 2 Conceptualizing appointed political staffs’ bridging. Bridging (process-based integration of advisory activity) Nature of policy advisory activity Partisan-political Administrative-technical ‘Positive’ bridging Integration of policy advice for partisan-political purposes (e.g. from the first minister's office or external partisan-political stakeholders) Integration of policy advice from non-partisan advisory system members (e.g. synthesizing public service and non-partisan stakeholder policy advice for elected officials) ‘Negative’ bridging Partisan-political ‘gatekeeping’ (e.g. ‘gatekeeping’ of policy advice from other partisan-political actors or stakeholders) Non-partisan administrative-technical ‘gatekeeping’ (e.g. ‘gatekeeping’ public service or non-partisan stakeholders policy advisory inputs) Bridging (process-based integration of advisory activity) Nature of policy advisory activity Partisan-political Administrative-technical ‘Positive’ bridging Integration of policy advice for partisan-political purposes (e.g. from the first minister's office or external partisan-political stakeholders) Integration of policy advice from non-partisan advisory system members (e.g. synthesizing public service and non-partisan stakeholder policy advice for elected officials) ‘Negative’ bridging Partisan-political ‘gatekeeping’ (e.g. ‘gatekeeping’ of policy advice from other partisan-political actors or stakeholders) Non-partisan administrative-technical ‘gatekeeping’ (e.g. ‘gatekeeping’ public service or non-partisan stakeholders policy advisory inputs) Source: Author. Open in new tab Table 2 Conceptualizing appointed political staffs’ bridging. Bridging (process-based integration of advisory activity) Nature of policy advisory activity Partisan-political Administrative-technical ‘Positive’ bridging Integration of policy advice for partisan-political purposes (e.g. from the first minister's office or external partisan-political stakeholders) Integration of policy advice from non-partisan advisory system members (e.g. synthesizing public service and non-partisan stakeholder policy advice for elected officials) ‘Negative’ bridging Partisan-political ‘gatekeeping’ (e.g. ‘gatekeeping’ of policy advice from other partisan-political actors or stakeholders) Non-partisan administrative-technical ‘gatekeeping’ (e.g. ‘gatekeeping’ public service or non-partisan stakeholders policy advisory inputs) Bridging (process-based integration of advisory activity) Nature of policy advisory activity Partisan-political Administrative-technical ‘Positive’ bridging Integration of policy advice for partisan-political purposes (e.g. from the first minister's office or external partisan-political stakeholders) Integration of policy advice from non-partisan advisory system members (e.g. synthesizing public service and non-partisan stakeholder policy advice for elected officials) ‘Negative’ bridging Partisan-political ‘gatekeeping’ (e.g. ‘gatekeeping’ of policy advice from other partisan-political actors or stakeholders) Non-partisan administrative-technical ‘gatekeeping’ (e.g. ‘gatekeeping’ public service or non-partisan stakeholders policy advisory inputs) Source: Author. Open in new tab Many jurisdictions recognize the unique policy advisory functions of political staffs along such lines by way of their exclusion from the rules and regulations that govern non-partisan public service advisory activity (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2010; King, 2003). Political staffs are appointed in many cases precisely to engage in policy advisory activities involving the application of an explicitly political lens (Head, 2008) that the public service is limited if not precluded from providing.3 The contention here is that appointed political staffs can be conceived of, given their appointed political status within the executive, and potential interactions with non-partisan advisory system members, as engaging in brokerage activity that may span partisan-political and non-partisan or ‘administrative-technical’ categories. ‘Administrative-technical’ bridging is set out below as involving the brokerage of non-partisan forms of policy advice. For example, appointed political staffs may bridge policy advice received from variously located public service officials, non-partisan ‘experts’ outside of government, international bodies, or any number of potential stakeholders. Both types of bridging from this perspective can be considered ‘positive’ in that they serve to increase the availability or circulation of policy advice by way of leveraging it from variously located sources within the advisory system. This type of ‘positive’ brokerage may confer benefits on advisory systems operation through the avoidance of information asymmetries and indirect advisory capacity gains. Bridging is however conceived of below as not only consisting of the ‘positive’ integration of policy advice by political staffs but also potentially as a ‘negative’ or exclusionary activity. Involving, for example, so-called ‘gatekeeping’ activity whereby political staffs ‘filter’, ‘block’, or ‘screen’ advisory inputs prior to their reaching elected decision makers (Eichbaum & Shaw, 2008; Tiernan, 2007). Here again, differences in the purposes of such ‘negative’ bridging can be differentiated along administrative-technical or partisan-political dimensions. With political staffs ‘gatekeeping’ public service or other non-partisan sources of policy advice, or excluding or gatekeeping partisan-political sources of policy advice. Understood in this way, bridging goes beyond content exclusive ‘translation’ functions that brokers are often conceived as undertaking (Lindvall, 2009; Verschuere, 2009; Ward, House, & Hamer, 2009). Recognizing additional procedural activities beyond explanation or repackaging of policy advice into ‘digestible’ forms for decision makers. Instead, conceptualizing bridging as including positive and negative types of brokerage improves the depiction and understanding of political staffs brokerage functions and the dynamics of advisory systems themselves. For instance, facilitating the tracing of shifts in the accessibility of advisory systems to various exogenous inputs, with direct implications for determinations of structural changes to advisory system operation. Additionally, recognizing that bridging may involve brokerage for partisan-political and/or ‘administrative-technical purposes also improves our understanding of advisory system operation. For one, suggesting that brokerage has different procedural orientations irrespective of the content of the policy advice in question (Craft & Howlett, 2012), and that advisory systems can be structured or operate with preferences for the nature of brokerage within them. 3 Case and method This study reports on a single sub-national case, that of British Columbia (B.C.) Canada. It is the third most populated province in the country and operates under a Westminster style cabinet government and parliamentary system (Statistics Canada, 2012). It has a unicameral legislature where the first minister's appoint ministers and approves the appointment of all political staffs (Craft, 2012; Ruff, 2005; White, 2001). B.C. political staffs were introduced as part of a larger Westminster trend in the 20th century to provide additional capacity to the political arm of government and to break the perceived public service monopoly over policy advice (Bakvis, 1997; Savoie, 2003). As ‘counterstaffs’ they are an instrument by which elected officials can secure greater control over the machinery of government and avoid so-called ‘bureaucratic capture’ (Peters, 2001; Dahlström et al., 2011). Until the 1980s, the first ministers’ offices in B.C. served as personal support offices with limited policy advisory roles (Ruff, 2010). B.C. and Canadian political staffs more generally have been argued to have become influential policy actors, particularly those in the employ of first ministers (Aucoin, 2010, 2012; Ruff, 2005, 2010; White, 2005). Historical data is unavailable, but data gleaned from a decade of official government reports indicates that contemporary B.C. first ministers’ office political staffs typically number forty (see Table 3). The vast majority of which perform administrative or logistical functions related to correspondence, communications, or event planning. Traditionally, only two senior political staff (a chief of staff and a deputy chief of staff) engage in formally recognized policy advisory functions (Ruff, 2005, 2010). Table 3 British Columbia premier's office expenses and staffing 2001–2011. Year 2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004 2004–2005 2005–2006 2006–2007 2007–2008 2008–2009 2009–2010 2010–2011 Expenses ($000) 2882 2818 2818 2786 3104 3549 3676 3810 3319 2878 Number of Staff (FTE) 470a 35 35 35 41 40 40 40 40b 39c Year 2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004 2004–2005 2005–2006 2006–2007 2007–2008 2008–2009 2009–2010 2010–2011 Expenses ($000) 2882 2818 2818 2786 3104 3549 3676 3810 3319 2878 Number of Staff (FTE) 470a 35 35 35 41 40 40 40 40b 39c aThe staffing figure for 2001–2002 are considerably larger for this year as it includes five other central administrative agencies and secretariats in addition to premier's office. No figures were available for premier's office staff alone. Revised figures drawn from 2002–2003 service plan, office of the premier. bThe staffing level for the premier's office is reported as estimated in the 2009/10–2011/12 premier's office service plan. Figures for 2009–2010 and 2011 were not listed, even as estimates in the yearly service plans likely due to a change in the first minister occurring in 2011. cThis figure is listed as ‘planned’ in the 2009/10–2011/12 Premier's office service plan. Source: Compiled by the author from various premier's office performance reports. Open in new tab Table 3 British Columbia premier's office expenses and staffing 2001–2011. Year 2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004 2004–2005 2005–2006 2006–2007 2007–2008 2008–2009 2009–2010 2010–2011 Expenses ($000) 2882 2818 2818 2786 3104 3549 3676 3810 3319 2878 Number of Staff (FTE) 470a 35 35 35 41 40 40 40 40b 39c Year 2001–2002 2002–2003 2003–2004 2004–2005 2005–2006 2006–2007 2007–2008 2008–2009 2009–2010 2010–2011 Expenses ($000) 2882 2818 2818 2786 3104 3549 3676 3810 3319 2878 Number of Staff (FTE) 470a 35 35 35 41 40 40 40 40b 39c aThe staffing figure for 2001–2002 are considerably larger for this year as it includes five other central administrative agencies and secretariats in addition to premier's office. No figures were available for premier's office staff alone. Revised figures drawn from 2002–2003 service plan, office of the premier. bThe staffing level for the premier's office is reported as estimated in the 2009/10–2011/12 premier's office service plan. Figures for 2009–2010 and 2011 were not listed, even as estimates in the yearly service plans likely due to a change in the first minister occurring in 2011. cThis figure is listed as ‘planned’ in the 2009/10–2011/12 Premier's office service plan. Source: Compiled by the author from various premier's office performance reports. Open in new tab Ministers’ offices are even more skeletal with two political staff typically allotted per office. This includes a single executive assistant who tends to administrative matters and constituency business and a single ‘ministerial assistant’ to assists with legislative, policy, and departmental business (Craft, 2012; Ruff, 2010). In all instances, political staff are accountable to the minister they serve, who is in turn accountable through the legislature to the electorate (Ruff, 2005; White, 2001). Political staffs are appointed by order in council and serve at the pleasure of the government of the day. In British Columbia, the first minister's office typically deals with all recruitment and corporate training provided to political staffs (Craft, 2012). The senior departmental public servants, deputy ministers, are also order in council appointments ratified by cabinet but on the recommendation of the first minister. In the B.C. case this includes a ‘Deputy Minister to the Premier (first minister) also appointed by the first minister (Lindquist & Vaskil, 2013). Table 4 provides aggregate figures for the number of political staff in various administrations since 1996. Changes to the tracking and classification over the years precludes the provision of discreet figures for ‘ministerial assistants’. Table 4 Total appointed political staff in British Columbia (1996–2011). Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 108 97 101 115 140 159 109 105 101 101 96 109 114 119 112 100 Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 108 97 101 115 140 159 109 105 101 101 96 109 114 119 112 100 Source: Adapted from a table provided to author November 8, 2011 by the B.C. Public Service Commission. Open in new tab Table 4 Total appointed political staff in British Columbia (1996–2011). Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 108 97 101 115 140 159 109 105 101 101 96 109 114 119 112 100 Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 108 97 101 115 140 159 109 105 101 101 96 109 114 119 112 100 Source: Adapted from a table provided to author November 8, 2011 by the B.C. Public Service Commission. Open in new tab The case study was completed in 2010, during the final term of the three-term majority Liberal government of Gordon Campbell. In addition to secondary document analysis, 14 one-hour semi-structured not for attribution interviews were carried out with ministers, deputy ministers, and political staff with officially recognized policy advisory functions (from ministers’ and the first minister's office). The analytic approach was interpretive and iterative (Patton, 1990). A coding framework was developed using a combination of inductive codes derived directly from the data as well as theoretical codes derived from pertinent literature. These initial overlapping ‘fuzzy categories’ were subsequently refined using the analytical and theoretical ideas developed during the research to produce a smaller set of themes. A smaller set of more refined codes was then constructed by identifying linkages among the categories through thematic grouping, sorting, and pattern matching among the main and subsidiary themes (Ritchie & Lewis, 2003; Yin, 2009). Key themes derived from this stage of analysis were subject to further analysis and iterative testing against the data. 4 Findings: appointed political staff and bridging in B.C. Across all categories of respondents political staffs at both institutional locations were most often described as synthesizers and distillers of disparate sources of policy advice flowing to ministers. First minister's office political staffs interviewed placed a premium on their abilities, tied to their institutional location, to integrate various sources partisan-political and administrative-technical policy advice circulating within the advisory system. That is, they reported policy advisory interactions with ministers, central agency and line department officials, and to a more limited extent ministerial political staffs and exogenous actors. Respondents made clear there was no shortage of policy advice and described one of their principle functions as involving the integration and synthesis of that policy advice. The two responses from first minister's office political staffs below paint a clear picture of their positive bridging, involving administrative-technical and partisan-political advisory activity. The challenge with the advice is that there is so much of it it's tough to digest or even read in the time that's available. So I think you need someone who can take a large amount of information because there's so much reading and the fact that you may not be able to read it all. You develop relationships with people and you can talk to them, get the input, synthesize down what the arguments for and against are and relay that to a decision maker and allow them to hopefully make a well-informed decision. (First minister's office political staff) The smart ones [Deputy Ministers] that had a desire to reconcile the cabinet or premier's policy direction, that was inherently something that they were pushing for, worked closely with us from early on right through the cabinet approval process. And they would be sensitive to their need to rely on us for political acumen and political support including at the caucus level because that's a body that the civil servants typically don’t interact with at all. (First minister's office political staff) This positive form of bridging is an important procedural activity within advisory systems. Political staffs are by no means the only broker operating in such systems. However, their proximity to decision makers and ability to engage with partisan-political and non-partisan advisory system members provides them with unique opportunities to serve as instruments for additional organizational policy capacity within the executive (Tiernan, 2011). When asked questions about their interactions with non-government sources of policy advice, first minister's office political staff were frank in their assessments. Respondents shared the perspective that overall, bridging to and from external actors, particularly stakeholders, was infrequent. The limited instances it was reported were described as restricted to broader sector or group-based interactions. For example, meeting with large sector associations or labor representatives as opposed to smaller issue specific stakeholder interactions. In fact, a clear preference was articulated for ‘pushing out’ policy advisory consultation and bridging activity to ministers, their appointed political staffs, and departmental officials. Another first minister's office political staff explained that, on balance, exogenous bridging was “not often” undertaken because, “the ministries were the primary people that interacted with stakeholders”. The advisor did offer the following caveat: Occasionally though you know if I was particularly interested in an area of public policy or we were working on something in public policy I might seek out the council of people, various stakeholders would be the wrong word it would be experts. The nature of the type of information I was looking for was not so much that I would go and talk to one specific company. The public policy issues that we grappled with normally aren’t targeted at one company. So industry associations were of value to try and understand how the sector worked and they were someone good to talk to. And really it was more of an educational process than anything else. The long-serving former first minister's Chief of Staff Martyn Brown has publicly suggests the Campbell administration improved its ability to broker exogenous policy advisory inputs through more robust consultative policy making in its second term. As he puts it: The Campbell administration did far more to properly process contentious policy issues in its second term, which helped immensely. It took more time to lay out the nature of the issues it was aiming to address, and it did more to inform and engage the public in shaping those policies. Consultation efforts became more substantive and genuine. Policies were often adjusted to reflect public input and feedback, as opposed to being just more artfully imposed (Brown, 2012, Chapter 2). However an interview with former deputy minister to the premier Alan Seckel (2009–2011) revealed that, from his perspective, progress notwithstanding, the first minister's office had overall not been very effective at the brokerage of non-governmental policy advice. His response was rather candid: My frank assessment would be that it didn’t function particularly well. I think one of the criticisms I would have about the premier's office [first minister's office] in British Columbia was that it did not have a consistent approach to dealing with stakeholders. Most of the stakeholder relations were pushed out to the ministries and ministers so they would be relatively more hit or miss. (Former Deputy Minister to the Premier, Alan Seckle) While determinations of how well positive bridging activities were undertaken may be debatable, there was consensus among all categories of respondents that the bridging of exogenous policy advisory inputs were ‘pushed out’ to departments and ministers’ offices. The cascading effect being that first minister's political staffs would most often engage in positive bridging of exogenous sources of policy specific advice that had itself previously been bridged by ministerial counterparts or departments. This is an important finding as it suggests particularly important function for ministers’ office political staffs for the brokerage of exogenous advisory inputs. First minister's office political staff reported a limited amount of gatekeeping or ‘negative’ bridging along either partisan-political or administrative-technical dimensions by first minister's office political staff. When reported, it was almost exclusively in the context of preventing various exogenous policy actors seeking to do ‘end-runs’ around the responsible minister or department. On the partisan-political dimension, ministers in B.C. widely reported having access to the first minister if needed, but also referenced frequent interactions with appointed political staffs in his office. When asked to describe the nature of their policy advisory interactions with first minister's office political staffs most ministers characterized it as consisting of coordination and brokerage. As one minister explained: Although it can be on a file that relates to the specific portfolio it may be on a file that relates to, that crosses multiple ministries, where there are different ministers that share responsibility for it. Or it may be a file that has nothing to do with your specific ministry but want to be engaged in the discussion. So those would be the normal reasons why you would do that. (Minister) Most ministers agreed, or noted that their interactions centered around ‘big’ policy problems or in relation to cabinet activity. One first minister's office political staff emphasized interactions with ministers and cabinet were typically for contentious policy issues and described engaging in positive bridging, explaining: There was a lot of informal interaction with the cabinet, which would have been done just over the phone because these things come up rather unexpectedly and you’re just trying to navigate your way through them. So that was a big part, was probably the most significant piece of involvement with cabinet is these sort of one off meetings that happened regularly with various ministers. (First minister's office political staff) Ministers’ office political staff were much more active in relation to ‘positive’ bridging along both dimensions than their first minister's office counterparts. They universally described their close proximity to ministers made them effective hubs for multilateral policy advisory brokerage with various advisory system members. Bridging was most often reported as involving the brokerage of variously located policy advice to inform their ministers’ decision making in relation to both strategic policy priorities and on an ad hoc issue driven basis. A long-serving minister's office political staff stressed that a significant amount of their function vis-à-vis policy advice involved the brokerage and integration of information from various political and administrative sources. Their self-described policy advisory functions abounded with bridging activity: So often times I’ll be actioning [the minister's] will with the bureaucracy or with other politicians or with the premier's office. And vice versa, the premier's office uses me, uses my office to communicate their direction to the bureaucracy and to the minister. You know it's just one of the pathways of information and direction that flow. So I see myself as also, as just sort of almost like a hub, like the center of a wheel and on the … there's just a lot of information that is constantly coming in and coming out of this office. From the civil servants themselves, the ministry, the policy people, the communications staff which is the public affairs bureau in B.C., and the premier's office. And then my job is to make sure that the minister, of all the information that I’m receiving [the minister] is receiving what he needs to have and that [the minister's] direction is being received back to all of those bodies. (Ministerial political staff) Others described similar functions, emphasizing political staffs bridging extended to multiple sources of policy advice. Minister's confirmed that overall, appointed political staffs not only provided their own direct content-based policy advice but in many cases were crucial bridges with departmental officials and exogenous policy actors. Senior public servants echoed this emphasizing the utility of political staffs as brokers of stakeholder policy advice. As two deputy ministers explained: A good number of them [interactions with appointed political staffs] will involve the stakeholder engagement. Because they are active with the minister with a bunch of stakeholder engagements so sometimes feedback that they want to provide, sometimes they act as a conduit to the minister on certain lower level issues where I don’t need to speak to them [minister] directly. (Deputy Minister) You know again when it came to some of the [policy area] laws that were recently adopted I think it was, it was the political staff that were really reaching out to some of the constituents and stakeholders. Who were really I think trying to influence you know if we do this particular course of action this is the result that will happen. Here's how the stakeholder group will respond and what they will say. And ultimately what ability will we have in terms to get this program funded or people supporting it, whether it's in the house if there's legislative change required, or the approval of treasury board to fund something. Again, I think they provide a strong role in providing ongoing advice to the minister. (Deputy Minister) The bridging function of ministerial political staff was clearly understood to be of consequence and value to the operation of government. First minister's office political staff interviewed made clear that they relied on their ministerial counterparts to undertake such activity both with departmental officials, among themselves, as well as key policy stakeholders outside of government. Their influence as channels by which policy advice could be better circulated or supply increased was well understood. A senior first minister's office partisan advisor explained ministerial political staffs influence in terms of their ability to facilitate the circulation of information stating: The political staff needs the public service way more than the public service needs the political staff. But where the political staff can add value for the public service is around helping facilitate the flow of information around the minister and helping the public service get decisions in a timely manor (First minister's office political staff) For their part, minister's office political staffs knew full well that they gained influence from their particular and specialized knowledge of their policy file and relationships with stakeholders. Most explained that their dealings with stakeholders were fairly candid and sometimes resulted in new policy advice or perspectives being brokered into the advisory system. At times, this was information that their department's were unaware of or did not provide the minister's office. These respondents generally framed their bridging as positive in that it served to broaden or supplement policy advice provided by their respective officials. As one long-serving ministerial political staff described it: I don’t think I ever really went to the stakeholders to directly thwart anything that's happening in government but I’d communicate with stakeholders to become aware of their issues and when their issues came up, would filter up to the minister's office from the staff I’d be able to analyze what's happening and say hey do you think you’ve got the lay of the land right here? Because I’ve heard from this source and this source that this is how things are working. And a lot of the time the staff will be appreciative of that too because they wouldn’t have the same level of communications with the stakeholders. This positive bridging was also reported to occur at times for partisan-political benefit in that political staff would often engage in bridging among themselves. Sharing policy advice gained from their officials, or provided by external stakeholders. This was often characterized as serving to ensure that their counterparts were made aware of policy advice that was circulating that had a direct bearing on the work of their ministers. As another political staff explained: You know letting them [other political staff] know ok our staff in the bureaucracy came to us with this decision note - how's that impacting your stakeholders and such and so ok staff was saying they were talking to your staff does your minister know about this? Or hey you know we’re hearing some word out of some large stakeholders on this issue it could affect you can you ask you bureaucrats to look into it for us. (Ministerial political staff) This bilateral positive bridging also extended to exogenous actors as well. Frequent descriptions of bridging by minister's office political staffs included references to iterative policy advisory exchanges with key policy stakeholders outside of government. Those interviewed commented on the significant importance of knowing how stakeholders might react, and using such groups effectively to diversify and broaden available sources of policy advice. Respondents made clear that this positive bridging was at times partisan-political involving the use of stakeholders to secure policy legitimacy through providing them a sense of participation in advisory activity, or for supply diversification. A minister's office political staff described their advisory bridging with stakeholders as follows: Well for the most part we’re here for them. You know whether it be the BC [policy sector], the [stakeholders] association, you name it. Our reason for being is to further their industries make their lives hopefully easier and make sure they live by the rules. Creating jobs, creating opportunities, creating better jobs. So you know it's important that we understand what's important to them. Whether it be policy changes, regulatory initiatives, new initiatives, taxation, whatever. It's also a bit of a symbiotic relationship whereby, you know obviously there are times were stakeholder groups want something for us and there are times where we want something from stakeholder groups. (Ministerial political staff) Several ministers confirmed this view of appointed political staffs as key interfaces internally on partisan-political and administrative fronts as well as exogenously to and from policy stakeholders. Bridging extended to both partisan-political and administrative-technical dimensions. When asked to explain the primary function of appointed political staffs, a senior minister's response points to the extent and importance of their bridging with endogenous and exogenous actors within the advisory system. As the minister put it: Right, so the ministerial assistant is really the interface between the minister's office and the ministry. Obviously there is an almost constant interaction between the minister and deputy ministers. But I think that were the ministerial assistant is invaluable is working a lot with the deputy minister but with other staff in the ministry as well. You know things where the ministry needs attention of the minister, it's often through the ministerial assistant in terms of what the issue is, what the priority is, and it's often the ministerial assistant who in turn will do some of that outreach to other stakeholder groups to bounce ideas off, or to try and gauge what a … what reaction there might be to various government policy initiatives. (Minister) A greater reference to ‘negative’ bridging or gatekeeping along partisan-political and administrative-technical dimensions was reported at the minister's office level. Gatekeeping activity was not simply an exercise in limiting access. While this was certainly reported, ‘negative’ bridging was more often described as pre-sorting policy advice to ensure the prioritization of established policy agenda items. It should be emphasized that some variance was observed on this front with some ministers reporting that they appreciated such gatekeeping and expected their staff to perform such functions. Others reported that they ensured such forms of negative bridging were kept to a minimum. How frequently and to what degree appointed political staffs engaged in advisory gatekeeping was contingent upon the minister's preference. When asked to describe their policy advisory activity a minister's office political staff put it succinctly: I would say the best Coles Notes version of the way I see myself is letting the minister know what he needs to know when he needs to know it. So it's a very much, well one part, one aspect of it, is a sort of a gatekeeper role. It's keeping him aware of the things he needs to know and not bothering him with things he doesn’t need to know things that I can make decisions on. (Ministerial political staff) This points to the importance of negative bridging as a means for political staff to exercise influence in advisory systems. Those ministers interviewed were fully aware of this, but to a degree acknowledged their practical dependence on their political staffs given the overwhelming amount of policy advice in circulation and demands on their time. One minister explained: So as they take on direct responsibility for the establishment of priorities. In terms of, so they know that you know your schedule is relatively limited, your availability is relatively limited, and the desire for people to meet with you probably exceeds the hours and days that are available for you to connect with people. So a lot of times they are able to shape your views and opinions by who it is that they deem to be most important for you to connect with and talk to. (Minister) The findings demonstrate the positive and negative practices of bridging, which procedurally shape the operation of advisory systems by affecting the circulation of policy advice therein. At the first minister's office on an administrative-technical level, bridging was reported but it was limited to internal advisory system actors and much less frequently described in conjunction with exogenous policy advisory stakeholders. Ministers’ office political staffs in contrast were clearly more active with respect to the positive integration of policy advice from exogenous stakeholders for partisan-political and administrative-technical reasons. Further, they were much more explicit about their negative bridging functions that were described as improving the ability of ministers to tackle their priority files and avoid distraction or overload given the high number of inputs attempting to gain currency in the advisory system. Taken together, these findings suggest that bridging is an important advisory system task for appointed political staffs, one that can broaden or restrict policy advice circulation within such systems. 5 Implications and conclusion ‘Political aides’ have long been recognized components of policy advisory systems (Halligan, 1995; Prince, 2007; Weller, 1987). This study has demonstrated that location-based advisory system approaches can mask important procedural aspects of advisory system operation. The case study findings support the utility of assessing bridging as including ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ types of political staff advisory system activity. Activity that can facilitate or impede the brokerage of policy advice within advisory systems. The data surveyed above fills an important gap in the Canadian literature that has focused overwhelmingly on federal political staffs (Aucoin, 2010; Benoit, 2006; White, 2005).4 Demonstrating that political staff at the sub-national level may also be consequential policy actors able to effect advisory system operation. Revealing that institutional location remains a salient variable though not in relation to the proximity of political staffs to the first minister as is typically suggested (Savoie, 2003; White, 2001, 2005). Rather, in this case it was ministers’ office political staffs that were universally acknowledged to be crucial for the bridging of exogenous policy advice. Together with the different propensities for positive and negative types of bridging reported by political staffs at the two institutional locations, this suggests accurate depictions and analysis of advisory system behavior requires attention to the policy tasks undertaken by political staffs — or that of other advisory system members — in addition to their location within the advisory system. More generally, bridging as conceptualized above contributes to the advisory system literature by offering a new analytical tool for improved descriptive and analytical examination of political staffs as advisory system actors. This is germane to the growing body of empirical evidence that has documented political staffs as brokers of disparate sources of policy advice (Connaughton, 2010; Maley, 2000, 2011; LSE GV314 Group, 2012; Leal & Hess, 2004). It provides greater specificity related to considerations of how, with whom, and for what purposes such actors engage in brokerage. A subsidiary point is that this also highlights the notion of influence in advisory systems extends beyond proximity and control by governments. Advisory system member influence can be a product of not only of their content-based provision of policy advice, but also stem from the ability of members therein to procedurally leverage other sources of policy advice. That is, influence can be a product of advisory system members’ ability to positively or negatively broker policy advice, or their ability to do so for various partisan-political or administrative-technical purposes. As noted above political staffs advisory system influence has long been recognized as contingent. The findings reported above suggest that this contingency may extend beyond their seniority, ministerial preference, or the institutional design of any given machinery of government to also include the administrative-technical and/or partisan-political requirements of any given advisory system or policy area. Additional focus on the procedural aspects of political staffs advisory system brokerage complements other approaches that have focused attention on the content dimensions of the policy advice being proffered (Craft & Howlett, 2012). The advisory system concept was originally set out as a comparative tool to trace temporal shifts in the various components and supply and demand of policy advice. Attention to political staffs as components of such systems along with focused examination of the procedural aspects of their bridging strengthens the comparative nature of advisory system studies. Footnotes 1 Several competing definitions of policy capacity have been advanced (see Christensen & Gazley, 2008; Painter & Pierre, 2004; Parsons, 2004; Peters, 1996). 2 Ministers’ private offices refers to their personal support staff who are typically appointed at the discretion of the elected official or first minister/president and often include policy advisors. 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TI - Appointed political staffs and the diversification of policy advisory sources: Theory and evidence from Canada
JO - Policy & Society
DO - 10.1016/j.polsoc.2013.07.003
DA - 2013-09-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/appointed-political-staffs-and-the-diversification-of-policy-advisory-T705D2qbRz
SP - 211
EP - 223
VL - 32
IS - 3
DP - DeepDyve
ER -