TY - JOUR
AU - Ougolnitsky, G. A.
AB - The discrete- and continuous-time network models of opinions control and resource allocation in marketing are considered. Three cases of interaction of economic agents are studied: independent behavior, cooperation, and hierarchical control by the resource-owning Principal. The corresponding dynamic games are analytically solved. The agents’ payoffs in these cases are compared. Two concepts, “enough resources” and “a lack of resources,” are introduced and investigated. The theoretical results are illustrated by a numerical example.
TI - Dynamic Resource Allocation Networks in Marketing: Comparing the Effectiveness of Control Methods
JF - Dynamic Games and Applications
DO - 10.1007/s13235-023-00494-y
DA - 2024-05-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/springer-journals/dynamic-resource-allocation-networks-in-marketing-comparing-the-Sb65GsU4ga
SP - 362
EP - 395
VL - 14
IS - 2
DP - DeepDyve
ER -