TY - JOUR
AU1 - Bac, Mehmet
AB -  I study the first-round separating equilibrium of a buyer-seller bargaining game, extended to allow for asymmetric information, strategically delayed offers and offers restricted to a portion of the good. When bargaining is over a consumption good, in equilibrium the “strong” buyer uses a restricted offer if his optimal consumption path is conservative relative to the “weak” buyer. A pure restricted offer may even be a costless, efficient signal. When the good is durable, a pure strategic delay is involved in signaling a strong bargaining position if the discount factor is high.
TI - Signaling bargaining power: Strategic delay versus restricted offers
JF - Economic Theory
DO - 10.1007/s001990050336
DA - 2000-07-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/springer-journals/signaling-bargaining-power-strategic-delay-versus-restricted-offers-Q3KBB05dbJ
SP - 227
EP - 237
VL - 16
IS - 1
DP - DeepDyve
ER -