TY - JOUR
AU1 - Lauer, Richard
AB - Journal for General Philosophy of Science https://doi.org/10.1007/s10838-022-09619-0 BOOK RE VIE W Quentin Ruyant: Modal Empiricism: Interpreting Science without Scientific Realism. Springer: Cham, 2021, 230 pp., €119,89 (Hardcover), ISBN: 9783030723484 Richard Lauer Accepted: 13 April 2022 © The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature B.V. 2022 Quentin Ruyant’s Modal Empiricism provides a rigorously argued alternative to Construc- tive Empiricism. Ruyant refers to his empiricism as “modal” empiricism. Modal empiri- cism rests, as its name suggests, on a set of modal considerations that constrain the ade- quacy of scientific theories, here thought of as classes of models. Chapters 1 and 2 provide an overview of the discussion about scientific realism and syntactic and semantic accounts of theories. Chapter  3 presents Ruyant’s two-stage account of scientific representation. Chapter 4 presents Ruyant’s articulation of modal empirical adequacy, which is the aim of science according to the modal empiricist. Chapter 5 articulates and defends a class of pos- sibility statements that Ruyant calls “situated possibilities”. Chapters  6–8 turn to discus- sions of scientific realism, progress and theory change, and a pragmatic orientation towards scientific theories and metaphysics. This review will focus on presenting readers with some of the core components of Ruyant’s position. I offer some brief commentary of 
TI - Quentin Ruyant: Modal Empiricism: Interpreting Science without Scientific Realism. Springer: Cham, 2021, 230pp., €119,89 (Hardcover), ISBN: 9783030723484
JF - Journal for General Philosophy of Science
DO - 10.1007/s10838-022-09619-0
DA - 2023-12-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/springer-journals/quentin-ruyant-modal-empiricism-interpreting-science-without-OS37Ge1r2H
SP - 631
EP - 635
VL - 54
IS - 4
DP - DeepDyve
ER -