TY - JOUR
AU1 - Ciplet,, David
AB - Abstract Recent scholarship presents conflicting views on the ability of grassroots movements to resist neoliberal globalization. This article moves beyond this broad debate. It explores the specific challenges and opportunities faced by networks of the marginalized, and their allies, as they attempt to transform neoliberal global governance. The Global Alliance of Waste Pickers, a transnational advocacy network of informal recyclers and their allies, sought to influence the practices of the Clean Development Mechanism between 2009 and 2015. I assess their efforts via a “historical dialectic” framework that bridges neo-Gramscian theory with liberal constructivist scholarship. It differentiates between more and less “embedded” networks, categorizes distinct forms of policy change, and helps us to understand the factors that contribute to more or less transformative policy gains. I identify four distinct forms of policy: transformative, concessional, problem-solving, and maintenance. I argue that the network gained mostly concessional, rather than transformative, changes. My analysis suggests that concessional gains are likely in contexts in which embedded advocacy networks effectively combine discursive and institutional forms of leverage but fail to mobilize political leverage in the form of a powerful “counterhegemonic bloc.” In the early 2000s, scholars began to study new forms of transnational resistance to neoliberal globalization, including resistance efforts in global governance (Gill 2002; Munck 2006; Evans 2008). Some argue that contemporary globalization creates conditions that make it easier for social movements to challenge neoliberal governance (for example, Evans 2008, 273). Others argue that these challenges amount to merely “small perturbations” in adjustments to capitalism (for example, Burawoy 2010, 302). Neglected by this broad debate are the concrete challenges and opportunities faced by networks of the marginalized, and their allies, as they attempt to transform neoliberal global governance. The Global Alliance of Waste Pickers1 is a transnational advocacy network that brings together informal recyclers (“waste pickers”), waste picker organizations, nongovernmental organization (NGO) allies, and funders. The network was particularly active in the United Nations (UN) Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) between 2009 and 2015. It successfully pushed for an alteration to a core carbon crediting methodology of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). Network members argued that this methodology encouraged the privatization of waste management by favoring disposal technologies that threatened to put waste pickers out of work. What explains their success? And what does that tell us more generally about the dynamics of similar movements in their efforts to transform neoliberal governance? The specific characteristics of the Global Alliance of Waste Pickers make their success puzzling. It was a small network with relatively limited financial resources, low initial technical expertise, and few political connections. Waste pickers in the global South assumed an active leadership role in the network. They were new to engagement in global governance processes. They represented constituents without a broadly recognized identity in international politics. There are few (if any) examples within related scholarship of such a network achieving a high-level global governance policy victory. I develop and deploy a “historical dialectic” analytical framework to make sense of their success. This framework complements neo-Gramscian theory with insights from liberal constructivist theory and scholarship. Neo-Gramscian theory provides a way to distinguish between distinct types of network interventions and outcomes as they relate to macrostructures of world order. This includes those interventions that align with, and those that meaningfully challenge, neoliberal policies, practices, and discourses. In turn, liberal constructivist theory and scholarship provides analytical tools to explore transnational advocacy network strategies and leverage at a microlevel. In bridging these macro- and microlevel contributions, my framework provides a means to strengthen understanding of the transformative potential (or lack thereof) of advocacy networks in relation to neoliberal global governance processes. The framework includes six components: normative orientation, strategies for leverage, political opportunity structure, institutional response and form of policy gain, and the degree of network embeddedness—defined as the extent to which an advocacy network is integrated into, and derives its leadership from, a directly impacted community. These components sequentially shape the transformative (or nontransformative) nature of policy changes, which can take four possible forms: transformative, concessional, problem-solving, and maintenance. I argue that embedded transnational advocacy networks that, first, amplify concerns of impacted actors on the ground, second, utilize the full scope of their network to enlist strategic allies, and, third, target unfulfilled institutional norms and expose flawed methodologies have the potential to win policy gains under favorable institutional conditions. They can do so even in the absence of the economic, technical, and political resources conventionally associated with institutional influence. However, the waste picker network achieved largely “concessional,” rather than “transformative,” policy changes. While potentially meaningful for impacted peoples, concessional gains do not in themselves threaten to transform what Gramsci ([1971] 2012, 161) calls the “decisive nucleus of economic activity.” The analysis suggests that concessional gains are likely in contexts in which advocacy networks effectively combine discursive and institutional forms of leverage to advance counterhegemonic positions but fail to mobilize political leverage in the form of a powerful “counterhegemonic bloc.” Through the method of process-tracing (Betsill and Corell 2008, 30–32), I track how network demands and strategies did and did not translate into policy change. This includes assessing how network demands altered over time. I engage as a participant-observer with the network in the UNFCCC negotiations in Copenhagen, Denmark, in 2009; Cancun, Mexico, in 2010; and Durban, South Africa, in 2011. I conducted twenty-five formal interviews and numerous informal interviews with waste pickers, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and foundation members of the network, and CDM Board members, during the period of 2009 to 2015. I collect observational data during network meetings, side events, press conferences, demonstrations, and policy interventions. I also track various forms of network communication including written statements such as formal submissions, sign-on statements, press releases, op-eds, email action alerts, and policy reports; verbal communication including statements in formal meetings and plenaries, press conferences (including those captured via webcast), lobbying meetings, and side events; and visual or symbolic communication including protests, signs, chants, and demonstrations. The article proceeds in four steps. First, I discuss existing scholarly debates and insights related to the transformative capability of directly impacted peoples, movements, and networks in relation to neoliberal global governance. I outline two distinct theoretical perspectives in the global governance literature: liberal constructivism and neo-Gramscian historical dialectic. Second, building from these two approaches, I develop a historical dialectic framework for analyzing transnational advocacy network influence in relation to neoliberal governance. Third, utilizing this framework, I discuss and analyze the case study, with a focus on the network's strategies to shift the waste methodology in the CDM. In the conclusion, I explore the implications of this case for understanding the potential of advocacy networks to transform neoliberal global governance processes and pose future research directions in this area. Transnational Resistance to Neoliberal Global Governance An estimated fifteen million people globally make their living working in the informal sector as waste pickers. This includes reclaiming recyclable and reusable materials cast aside as waste (Medina 2008, 1). Such work ranges from sorting through trash in landfills and roadsides, to more organized door-to-door pickup of materials. Many waste pickers organize for rights and better working conditions through worker cooperatives, some of which are contracted by municipalities. Numerous studies make the case that incorporating waste pickers into waste management planning is preferable in terms of social benefits and livelihoods to new formal waste recycling systems that exclude them (Wilson, Velis, and Cheeseman 2006, 797; Nzeadibe 2009, 93). Scholars frame waste picker struggles in various countries as countermovements to neoliberal policies. This includes policies related to the privatization and monopolization of waste management and the dispossession of informal workers from resources and livelihood opportunities in countries including Colombia, Brazil, India, Egypt, and South Africa (Kuppinger, Hourani, and Kanna 2014, 621; Rosaldo 2016, 351; Samson 2015, 813). As Rosaldo (2016, 361) argues, “since the 1980s privatization has successfully threatened recyclers’ very existence by cutting them off from their three access points to waste—dumps, streets, and buildings.” Moreover, neoliberalism and the consolidation of democracy, he argues, created distinct political opportunities and threats that galvanized waste picker mobilization for policy change (ibid., 368). Neoliberalism refers to the “politically guided intensification of market rule” in place of public governance (Brenner, Peck, and Theodore 2010, 184). It includes a focus on market mechanisms (Meckling 2011, 26; Corson, MacDonald, and Neimark 2013, 1) and resource privatization to address problems (Bakker 2005, 544), the neglect of normative concerns that do not conform with narrowly defined economic and scientific forms of measurement (Gareau 2013, 230), and a growing role for the private sector (Corson 2010, 595) and other forms of “exclusive” decision-making (Ciplet and Roberts 2017, 151). Neoliberalism is never implemented uniformly and faces forms of resistance and critique that condition its living articulations (Brenner et al. 2010, 197). Several studies argue that neoliberalism has become a dominant logic of multilateral governance, including international environmental governance (Gareau 2013, 230; Okereke 2007, 168; Lucier and Gareau 2015, 515; Ciplet and Roberts 2017, 154). A broad literature details the ability of transnational advocacy networks to influence global governance processes and institutions (Keck and Sikkink 1999; Betsill and Bulkeley 2004; Park 2005; Stone 2008; Clark 2010) including shaping its neoliberal forms. Drawing upon Foucauldian theory, scholars focused on “neoliberal governmentality” argue that civil society organizations often replicate neoliberal discourses and structures in multilateral contexts (Okereke, Bulkeley, and Schroeder 2009, 67; Gareau 2012, 90). For example, in the case of the Montreal Protocol, several NGOs focused their policy proposals on profitability, individualism, and market competition rather than environmental precaution (Gareau 2012, 93). Other scholarship directs attention to transnational advocacy networks that involve in their leadership directly impacted peoples and seek to transform dominant political economic structures (Ciplet 2014, 90–93; Schroeder 2010, 323–25; Martinez-Torres and Rosset 2010, 157–60). Scholars have also drawn attention to the ways in which transnational advocacy networks fail to maintain strong leadership from grassroots actors (Bretherton 2003, 114–16). However, despite this growing (but still limited) focus, few theorize or document the specific and distinct forms of leverage or barriers facing such networks in this pursuit. This is notable in a context of intensified neoliberal governance in environmental regimes including the UNFCCC (Ciplet and Roberts 2017, 154), the Montreal Protocol (Gareau 2013, 230), and the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal (Lucier and Gareau 2015, 515), among others (Okereke 2007, 168). Moreover, in contexts such as the UNFCCC, there has been a notable uptick in the participation of directly impacted peoples in governance processes (Hadden 2015, 12). Two theoretical approaches to global governance might inform our understanding of how transnational advocacy networks influence neoliberal global governance. First, a liberal constructivist lens presents state action in global governance as primarily influenced by processes of interaction and learning (Wendt 1992, 391). Civil society is conceptualized as a transformative force that may reshape global governance architecture and challenge the primacy of an anarchic statist system (Rosenau 1990, 6). Material relationships of power are deemphasized with a focus on the normative and ideational processes of learning and norm diffusion and the ability of “norm entrepreneurs” and “epistemic communities” to reorient state cooperation around universalist values, including those of impacted peoples (Barnett and Duvall 2004, 6). Similarly, liberal institutionalist or regime theory variations suggest that multilateral institutions may inflate the influence of actors that lack material and military force beyond what their power capabilities are outside of such institutions (Krasner 1985, 8). From such perspectives, given the right ideas, expertise, resources, strategies, and opportunity structure, transnational advocacy networks, including those involving impacted peoples, have the potential to transform core governance institutions and the norms that guide them (Keck and Sikkink 1999, 91–92). Moreover, neoliberal globalization, due to its sociocultural, organizational, and economic shortcomings, may be especially vulnerable to responses by transnational movements for democratic and progressive transformation (Evans 2008, 273; Smith and Wiest 2012, 2–9). Moreover, contemporary movements and networks are believed to possess new forms of leverage, due to their abilities to shift scales and organize across domestic to transnational contexts, including in global governance processes (Evans 2008, 275). Scholars rarely imply that such movements are likely to overturn the whole hegemonic apparatus. However, they do suggest that transnational advocacy networks, and global civil society more generally, constitutes a potentially formidable challenge to “business as usual” (Evans 2000, 231), particularly in regimes with more “open” political opportunity structures (Sikkink 2005, 157). Some scholars critique the liberal constructivist approach for failing to differentiate between counterhegemonic and reformist demands (Ford 2003, 122). Moreover, scholarship on epistemic communities overlooks the ways in which such networks sometimes reinforce existing power relations (Gareau 2013, 30; Litfin 1994, 12). Directly impacted actors in embedded networks may depend on funders or NGO networks for resources, technical expertise, and political connections to mobilize transnationally and “scale shift” (Della Porta and Tarrow 2005, 125), which may influence their goals and strategies. Various pressures motivate better resourced actors in civil society to take positions and adopt strategies aligned with powerful market and state actors (Mayo 2005, 34–52; Gareau 2013, 30). Inequalities also permeate civil society across class, race, and other divisions, undermining democratic participation (Chandhoke 2005, 359). Others argue that globalization also presents distinct scale issues for mobilization, particularly for marginalized communities or social groups that generally lack the resources to self-organize transnationally to intervene in global governance processes (Tarrow and McAdam 2005, 122–24). While some global governance processes provide opportunities for intervention by marginalized groups, by shifting the locus of authority to the international and corporate realm, neoliberal economic globalization may also consolidate power in ways that increasingly buffer decision-makers from democratic challenges (Conca 2001, 65–66). This includes the ways in which scientific information may rationalize or reinforce existing political conflicts (Litfin 1994, 12). Overall, while concessions may be won, these concessions potentially forestall, rather than prefigure, transformation (Burawoy 2010, 302). A second theoretical conception, referred to by neo-Gramscian scholar Robert Cox as “historical dialectic” (Cox 1992, 176–80), and developed by other global governance scholars under the name “strategic power” (Levy and Egan 2003, 809; Ciplet 2015, 248; Ciplet, Roberts, and Khan 2015, 27), does not preemptively aggrandize the agency of advocacy networks in relation to structures of dominance. Rather, it approaches multilateralism “as a problem in the making of a new world order” in which structures of power are historically contingent, malleable, and a site of conflict (Cox 1992, 176). Neo-Gramscian scholars of global governance are primarily concerned with how strategic bottom-up processes of negotiation and resistance interact with hegemonic ideological, institutional, and political economic systems. As a terrain for this interaction, multilateralism can be analyzed from two standpoints: first, as the maintenance of existing order in the negotiation of consent and legitimacy; second, as the locus for the transformation of the existing order through a “war of position” between dominant and subordinate classes (Cox 1992, 163). Cox argues that “[o]nly where representation in international institutions is firmly based upon an articulate social and political challenge to hegemony—upon a nascent historic bloc and counterhegemony—could participation pose a real threat” (Cox 1983, 173). In this process, depending on their political orientation and leverage, transnational advocacy networks can serve to either reinforce or transform relationships of inequality (Ford 2003, 121; Ciplet 2017, 1055). As Levy and Egan (2003, 813) explain, this approach brings “attention to the capacity of agents to comprehend social structures and effect change, while simultaneously being constructed and constrained by them.” While offering a useful macrolevel framework for analysis of political change and stagnation, scholarship in this area overlooks the specific factors and forces that condition related outcomes. A synthesis between liberal constructivist and a historical dialectic theory and concepts offers a means to both assess and explain the transformative capability of transnational advocacy networks in relation to global structures of hegemony. In what follows, I draw upon these approaches to develop such an analytical framework (outlined in Figure 1). Specifically, I draw upon a historical dialectic approach to differentiate the normative orientation of networks, institutional responses, and forms of policy change in relation to dominant structures of world order. In turn, I draw upon liberal constructivism to assess distinct forms of advocacy network leverage in relation to political opportunities. Figure 1. View largeDownload slide Historical dialectic framework to assess transnational advocacy network influence Figure 1. View largeDownload slide Historical dialectic framework to assess transnational advocacy network influence A Historical Dialectic Framework for Analysis of Transnational Advocacy Network Influence Network Embeddedness The first component of this framework is the degree of embeddedness of the transnational advocacy network. The term embeddedness is used primarily to describe the extent to which economic and market behavior is grounded in structures of social relations (Polanyi 1944, 46; Granovetter 1985, 481). Some scholars have also extended the concept to explain the extent to which social movement organizations or activists have strong relations with members of a particular community (Ansell 2003, 126; Bosco 2006, 343). There are two dimensions of embeddedness: “relational” and “organizational” (Granovetter 1992, 56). Moreover, discussion of embeddedness should signify “who is embedded to what” (Hess 2004, 167; Pike, Lagendijk and Vale 2000, 64). Embedded relationships can be primarily “context-based,” rooted in a single locale, or “issue-based,” according to a shared identity that extends beyond a given locale, including transnationally (Ansell 2003, 124). Here I use the concept of embeddedness to refer to the extent to which a given advocacy network is integrated into, and derives its leadership from, a directly impacted community, in terms of its interpersonal relationships and organizational structures. Accordingly, I use the term embedded transnational advocacy networks to differentiate transnational advocacy networks with deliberate, albeit imperfect, processes to engage directly impacted groups in decision-making and leadership, and not just consultation or involvement. This reflects Ford's distinction of those organizations, movements, and networks with concerns resulting from direct experience of the problems (Ford 2003, 122). In contrast to an embedded transnational advocacy network, a disembedded (or weakly embedded) advocacy network can be defined as that in which social relations and organizational structures of the network are detached from those directly impacted by the issue. To be clear, advocacy networks are never perfectly embedded, but, rather, exist across a spectrum at any given moment. Normative Orientation Second, the framework differentiates the normative orientation pursued by advocacy networks on a given issue. Embedded transnational advocacy networks may not always challenge dominant political and economic structures; rather, as represented in the figure by the dual arrows, they may sometimes have more moderate or reformist goals and strategies. The reverse is also true: disembedded advocacy networks may also at times pursue counterhegemonic positions. Consistent with neo-Gramscian theory, the framework differentiates between hegemonic and counterhegemonic orientations of networks and interventions (Katz 2006, 334; Ford 2003, 122). Specifically, a counterhegemonic orientation refers to a position or frame with two characteristics. First, it seeks to confront inequalities experienced by directly impacted peoples, including struggles against what Fraser (2005, 60) calls “maldistribution, misrecognition, and misrepresentation.” Second, it challenges a dominant political economic rationale or structure, for example, those of marketization and exclusive decision-making in neoliberal governance. Alternatively, a hegemonic orientation refers to positions or frames that conform to or seek to leverage a dominant structure and/or do not explicitly advance the interests of marginalized communities. In the current historical context, hegemonic structures generally align with neoliberal ideals. Such a distinction accepts that advocacy networks may at times assume hegemonic and counterhegemonic orientations simultaneously. Strategies of Leverage Third, the framework directs attention to the strategies that the network utilizes to achieve leverage for policy change and what forms of leverage it fails to conjure. Scholarship on transnational advocacy networks points to three main strategies through which leverage is achieved. The strategy of “political leverage” involves forming broad alliances including market, state, and civil society actors with the power to move decision-makers in one way or another (Meckling 2011, 29–32). This involves networks calling “upon powerful actors to affect a situation where weaker members of a network are unlikely to have influence” (Keck and Sikkink 1999, 95). They often involve “norm entrepreneurs” putting forward policy proposals that offer innovative, novel, or compromise approaches (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, 893). From a neo-Gramscian perspective, such alliances in transnational civil society may either conform with and strengthen or, alternatively, challenge hegemonic structures and rationalities as part of a “counterhegemonic historic bloc” (Katz 2006, 336). The strategy of “discursive leverage” exposes deficiencies and incongruities of master frames, institutional practices, and normative constructs, thereby threatening the basis of credibility and broad-based consent (Ciplet 2015, 265–66). This includes mobilizing identities of vulnerability and symbolism to challenge the legitimacy of systems of power, through what Keck and Sikkink refer to as the “mobilization of shame” (Keck and Sikkink 1999, 97). Such normative interventions can vary in the extent to which they are contentious, disruptive, and rooted in protest, as compared to interventions that are more agreeable with systems of power (Hadden 2015, 26). The strategy of “institutional leverage” involves aligning demands in terms that resonate with technical, scientific, or “objective” institutional constructs (McCormick 2007, 609–10) or expose contradictions between the expressed values or mission of institutional bodies and their practices and procedures. Such efforts rely on “expert knowledge” (Lund 2013, 741), “information-based lobbying” (Gulbrandsen and Andresen 2004, 60), and providing technical reports and assistance. Related interventions may also focus on making institutional structures of representation, transparency, and accountability more open and inclusive. Note, these three forms of leverage are not mutually exclusive; indeed, they often work in concert. The Political Opportunity Structure Fourth, the political opportunity structure (represented by the dotted line in Figure 1) refers to the degree of openness or closedness of international institutions and related political and social structures to the participation and influence of a transnational network on a given issue (Sikkink 2005, 156). The political opportunity structure is never fixed, but, rather, constrains or enables activist influence, while simultaneously being a terrain of contestation and transformation (Sikkink 2005, 153). Khagram, Riker, and Sikkink (2002, 20) argue that moving advocacy politics from domestic contexts to international institutions adds complexity in terms of the types of actors and potential allies and adversaries that participate and the opportunity structures with which they engage. Overall, this points to “the existence of established international norms, institutions, and organizations as important variables affecting chances of activist success” in relation to the strategies that they wield for leverage (Price 2003, 597). Institutional Response Fifth, the framework directs attention to the institutional response to the network's intervention. It differentiates between two distinct responses: continuity and discontinuity. Institutional continuity includes processes of stability, reproduction, and adaptation of existing norms, meaning, and practices (Streeck and Thelen 2005, 8). As such, a response of continuity by international institutions takes place when the foundational constructs, logic, decision-making practices, and/or systems of accountability are maintained so as to fundamentally preserve the ways in which it functions. Discontinuity, alternatively, refers to when such foundational aspects of an institution are meaningfully disrupted and/or replaced. Form of Policy Change Sixth, the framework directs attention to four distinct forms of policy gains that result from the aforementioned factors. A transformative policy gain is one in which a normatively counterhegemonic intervention fundamentally makes an institution more representative of network demands. For example, a transformative gain might include shifting the decision-making criteria of an institution that is focused solely on reducing climate-changing emissions to that of incorporating enforceable human rights protections. For Gramsci, hegemony is undergirded by an alignment of discursive, material, and institutional interests, called a “historic bloc,” which is coordinated with the general interests of subordinate groups (Gramsci 2012 [1971], 181). Some neo-Gramscian scholars build upon this conception to articulate the alignment of interests around a narrow issue area, for example, biotechnology in agriculture (Andrée 2005, 136). Disrupting hegemony, it follows, requires the formation of a powerful counterhegemonic bloc. This refers to a coalition of civil society, state, and market actors with the capability to meaningfully challenge and disrupt existing interests and the basis of consent. The effectiveness of such a “counterbloc” may rest on three characteristics: (1) the degree of political organization and aggressiveness of rival forces; (2) the strength of the alliances they manage to mobilize; and (3) their level of political consciousness and ability to advance an alternative discourse capable of bridging disparate class interests (Katz 2006, 336). Notably, the interpretation of Gramsci presented in this article posits that counterhegemonic change need not occur all at once in society; rather, it may result from the struggle over and transformation of issue-specific institutional, ideological, and political structures. A likely more common policy outcome by advocacy networks promoting counterhegemonic positions in multilateral regimes is that of a concessional gain. Such gains involve a network extracting strategic concessions from those in power to make an institution more inclusive of previously marginalized interests. However, unlike transformative gains, in themselves, concessional gains do not fundamentally disrupt or transform the institution or its logic. For example, a network might achieve a promise of funding for vulnerable populations to adapt to climate change. However, the outcome is not transformational because funds are delivered according to the institutional, geopolitical, and business interests of donor countries (Ciplet, Roberts, and Khan 2013, 61–64). Thus, despite the delivery of funds to support important needs, relationships of inequality remain largely intact. This is reflective of Gramsci's understanding that modern systems of political organization offer opportunities for subordinate actors to negotiate material, ideological, and institutional concessions as part of the fomentation of consent to systems of rule (Gramsci 2012 [1971], 161; Ciplet 2015, 268). As Gramsci argues, “[t]he fact of hegemony presupposes that account be taken of the interests and tendencies of the groups over which hegemony is to [be] exercised and that a certain compromise equilibrium should be formed—in other words that the leading group should make sacrifices of an economic corporate kind” (Gramsci 2012 [1971], 161). Such concessions may either prove as stepping stones for more transformative changes, or, alternatively, they may serve to solidify and stabilize hegemonic structures and conditions of rule. Like transformational gains, problem-solving gains by advocacy networks cause discontinuity in existing institutional structures. However, these gains are distinct in that they align with, rather than subvert, dominant systems, interests, and discourses of power. Specifically, such gains result from positions advanced by advocacy networks that take existing power relations, organizing logics, and dominant systems of production as a given (Cox, 1992, 169). Because problem-solving involves the disruption of existing institutional processes to “solve” complex or contentious problems, these gains often rely on advocacy network alliances with powerful market or state actors. For example, in the UNFCCC, NGOs including the Environmental Defense Fund and the Pew Center on Global Climate Change partnered with major oil, energy, and manufacturing companies to advance the market-based solution of carbon trading (Meckling 2011, 33). This coalition fundamentally altered the approach to climate change mitigation but did so in a way that was consistent with neoliberal tenets. The power of such coalitions may rest in the compromise or moderate nature of the demands, which finds influence precisely in aligning with the interests of the powerful. Finally, “maintenance” policy gains by advocacy networks are those that are hegemonic in orientation and do not cause significant discontinuity in the target institution. While they may improve the functioning of a regime or institution, these policy gains primarily maintain and stabilize, rather than disrupt, hegemonic structures. For example, a maintenance gain might be that of streamlining the eligibility criteria for projects backed by the CDM, thereby making offset markets function more efficiently. These gains often stem from advocacy networks or “epistemic communities” providing techno-rational support to state and market actors that align with existing institutional structures and through generating innovative proposals. Related activities may include “articulating the cause-and-effect relationships of complex problems, helping states identify their interests, framing the issues for collective debate, proposing specific policies, and identifying salient points for negotiation” (Haas 1992, 2). This results in regime responses that replicate existing institutional frameworks but may do so more efficiently or effectively in relation to the goals of the regime. In the next section, I apply this analytical framework to the case of the Global Alliance of Waste Pickers’ intervention with the CDM. Network Embeddedness To begin, I ask the following: to what extent can this network be understood as embedded? From its beginning, the Global Alliance of Waste Pickers involved directly impacted waste pickers in the leadership and formation of the network. In 2008, the connection between the UN climate regime and waste pickers was first established at the first World Conference of Waste Pickers, in Bogotá, Colombia. A waste picker union in India called Kagad Kach Patra Kashtakari Panchayat (KKPKP) at the conference reported that informal recyclers were being displaced by new disposal projects backed by the CDM. The discarded materials at these sites were now being landfilled or burned for energy production, and waste pickers were no longer being granted access to them. Shortly after the conference in Colombia, the general secretary of KKPKP helped to connect staff of the Global Alliance for Incinerator Alternatives (GAIA), a global NGO-led network of organizations working for sustainable and socially just waste practices, with another transnational NGO, Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO), to collaborate on this issue. GAIA had already begun in 2007 to intervene in the UNFCCC process to call against funding for waste to energy incineration technologies. This was considered important in terms of supporting waste pickers and also for establishing international norms of the negative impacts of waste to energy technologies. WIEGO approached the work with informal sector workers from a gender and labor rights perspective. Both of the transnational NGOs are networks themselves, with membership structures, staff in both the global North and global South, and a commitment to building leadership from the grassroots. WIEGO had received a significant grant from the Gates Foundation, to partner with waste picker organizations, as part of its efforts to combat urban poverty. With encouragement from GAIA, WIEGO's staff viewed the UNFCCC process as a potential focal point for building a global network. Thus, it was the prospect of network-building rather than the particular issue in the UNFCCC that first motivated WIEGO to dedicate funds to this campaign. As for GAIA, while the organization was focused on issues of environmental injustice, it had not worked closely with waste picker groups in the past. This collaboration offered GAIA a means to support livelihood opportunities for waste pickers, while continuing to intervene in the UNFCCC process to challenge subsidies for waste incineration. After they had agreed on a partnership, WIEGO and GAIA offered travel funds to waste picker networks in Latin America and India, who then selected waste pickers to serve as representatives in the negotiations in Bonn and Copenhagen in 2009. Thus, the waste picker network was able to shift scales from local and national levels to the international level largely through a process of “brokerage” (Tarrow and McAdam 2005, 127). This involved NGOs linking networks across two or more previously unconnected sites. The waste pickers that attended these negotiations embarked in this network from a diversity of perspectives. Some viewed this as an important opportunity to strengthen regional and international ties among waste pickers to address common threats, with little initial focus on climate change policy. Others saw the CDM as threat to waste picker livelihoods. Some also saw this as a potential opportunity to bring new funding streams to waste picker organizations for their ability to recover recyclable materials and mitigate greenhouse gas emissions.2 In addition, waste picker organizations saw the benefit of international media attention on enhancing political clout with local, state, and national governments at home. The participants in the negotiations generally included a mix of waste pickers, NGO advocates, and, sometimes, funders. Overall, during the six years in which the network was active in the UNFCCC, there were approximately eighty network representatives that participated in the negotiations. This included people from twenty-four countries and five continents, including approximately forty waste picker leaders. Individuals from Latin American countries as well as India and South Africa were particularly well represented. Approximately twenty-eight organizations, including NGOs, cooperatives, and funders, were directly involved in the network activities. For example, the delegation at the negotiations in Copenhagen in 2009 included twenty-one people from ten different countries, ten of which were waste pickers. This included waste pickers from Pune, Delhi, and Mumbai, India, as well as from Brazil, Colombia, Argentina, and Chile. Along with the waste pickers, there were representatives of WIEGO and GAIA and representatives from national-level NGOs that work to support waste pickers, including the advocacy and research organization Chintan and waste picker association Safai Sena in India and funders from the organization AVINA. Waste picker representation also varied based on where the negotiations were held. For example, while negotiations in Cancún, Mexico, had significant representation from Latin America, negotiations in Durban, South Africa, had a strong contingent of African waste pickers. The major positions and strategies adopted by the network, particularly in the formative negotiations in Copenhagen, were actively informed by the waste pickers. Prior to negotiations in each host country, the network convened to develop positions, principle statements, and strategies and to share knowledge before intervening in the regime. The NGO network leaders went to great lengths to translate all group conversations into multiple languages,3 to spend extensive time educating waste pickers about the complex processes of the UNFCCC and CDM, and to ensure that major network decisions were made with waste picker representation, input, and consent. However, this is not to say that power dynamics within the network between relatively well-funded NGOs and waste pickers did not ultimately shape the positions, activities, and strategies within the network. It seems highly unlikely, had the Gates Foundation not prioritized global network building of informal workers, that waste pickers would have prioritized engagement within the UNFCCC process over local and regional organizing. While decision-making processes were inclusive of waste pickers during the negotiations, during the interim periods, much of the technical interventions were led by GAIA and WIEGO staff, with input derived over a shared list-serve. Asymmetries in funding, information and technology access, language differences, professionalization of work status, and experience with the UNFCCC and other policy processes among network participants played a large role in shaping network activities and strategies. Overall, given that its interventions were developed with leadership from directly impacted groups across diverse geographies, the network is characterized by issue-based (rather than context-based) embeddedness. However, while specific waste picker participation varied over the years, as professional paid staff, the NGO leaders were a more consistent presence in the network throughout the campaign, and GAIA staff led many of the technical interventions. Moreover, many of the checks and balances within the network occurred informally, relying on trust-building among network participants, rather than formal decision-making structures inclusive of waste picker representatives. Normative Orientation In this section, I ask, to what extent were network positions counterhegemonic in orientation? I will argue that the network put forward moderately counterhegemonic positions. This is despite numerous pressures to weaken their demands and competing interests and positions among network members. Based on the needs that were discussed during numerous meetings, the main positions that the network took in relation to the CDM were fourfold. First, they called on the CDM, the UNFCCC, and national governments to recognize the critical and productive role that the informal recycling sector contributes to climate change mitigation and to other environmental and social benefits. Specifically, on technical grounds, NGO members of the network argued that the CDM waste methodology, by not taking inventory of existing waste picker recycling activities, failed to account for rising emissions caused by these projects (Advocacy Project 2009). They argued that this error in accounting made funding waste-to-energy projects appear a favorable mitigation strategy, when it was not.4 Second, on the grounds of social justice and human rights, they called for an end to support for all waste projects that divert waste from recycling into incineration and landfilling. Specifically, they argued that waste-to-energy projects are displacing waste pickers around the world and should be opposed for moral and ethical reasons and for failing to conform to the CDM's own commitment to sustainable development. Third, they asserted that waste pickers and other recycling workers in the informal economy “are owed a climate debt for our historical and current contribution to reducing greenhouse gas emissions and solid waste costs” (Inclusive Cities 2009). Finally, they argued for increased representation and accountability mechanisms for waste pickers and network members in CDM decision-making processes. The most controversial issue among network participants was whether waste pickers should seek out a methodology at the CDM that would provide carbon credits for waste picker projects to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The CDM was introduced in 1997 and established in 2000 as part of the Kyoto Protocol to help countries to meet their emissions commitments through what are known as emissions offsets. The CDM's purpose is to provide a flexible means by which wealthy countries can invest in projects in developing countries to achieve emissions reductions at a lower cost than would be possible on their own soil. The CDM allows emissions reduction projects in developing countries to earn what are called certified emission reduction (CER) credits. These credits can be traded and sold and have been used by industrialized countries to meet a part of their emission reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol. Numerous justice-oriented networks consider carbon trading and emissions offsets by the CDM “false solutions” to climate change. Specifically, they argue that the CDM promotes market-based neoliberal forms of development that fail to respond to the root causes of climate change and inequality. This includes assertions that the CDM enables the continued polluting of communities of color in the global North, the privatization of public resources, and the violation of human rights in countries in the global South where CDM projects are financed. In the case of the Global Alliance of Waste Pickers, representatives of GAIA expressed their own strong preference to not seek out carbon credits from the CDM for waste pickers. They expressed justice concerns related to carbon markets broadly, as well as human rights concerns related to the CDM, in particular. Strategically, given the high costs of project certification and the large-scale nature of most projects, they argued that it was also unlikely that waste pickers would ever see financial benefits through the CDM. They also feared that creating criteria for waste pickers to access carbon credits would provide a means for CDM board members to claim action, without addressing the core concerns of the network related to waste-to-energy incineration. However, they said that they would respect the decision of the waste picker leaders on the issue. Several of the waste picker leaders, particularly those from Latin American countries, expressed an obligation to their cooperatives at home to work for better access to funding. As such, they supported the idea of pursuing funding through the CDM. Others, including leaders from India, expressed more radical critiques of carbon markets. After much deliberation within the network, including a session with only waste picker leaders and translators, there was tacit agreement in Copenhagen on both principled and practical grounds that the network would intervene at the CDM only to challenge the eligibility of waste-to-energy projects for CDM credits, not to seek financing for waste pickers. As for finance, the network chose to focus its efforts on another institution called the Green Climate Fund, which had been proposed but not yet established. This was a decision that was not always popular moving forward, as some waste picker leaders and other network representatives viewed not engaging with the CDM for potential funding for waste pickers as a missed opportunity. The network also expressed opposition to proposals put forward by the CDM that did not fully address the expressed concerns of waste pickers. For example, in 2010, the CDM board approved a new, small-scale methodology for recycling plastics (CDM Methodology AMS-III.AJ, 2010). The network advocates argued that, if this did become a source of significant funds, there existed the danger that well-capitalized businesses would step in and compete with waste pickers for the carbon credits, thereby undermining waste picker livelihoods.5 Overall, while the network (as I discuss below) sometimes aligned its demands with the institutional constructs of the CDM, its positions were largely counterhegemonic in orientation. On one hand, the network generally adopted positions promoted by waste pickers that sought to address forms of dispossession and inequality on the ground. On the other hand, while not necessarily always consistent with the desire of waste pickers in the network to secure funding for their cooperatives, the network intentionally oriented its positions as oppositional to carbon offsets through the CDM. This position was consistent with some other social justice networks involved in the negotiations, such as those working against CDM backing of large-scale dams. Strategies of Leverage and the Political Opportunity Structure In this section, I ask, what strategies did the network pursue to achieve leverage with the CDM and what conditions shaped network success? Despite notable financial, technical, and political limitations of the network, it was able to find some success in its efforts. The network pursued the three main strategies: discursive leverage, institutional leverage, and political leverage. Moreover, participants oriented these strategies to the unique strengths of their network and did so in ways that took advantage of the particular opportunity structure that they faced. However, as an embedded network lacking key resources associated with influence in related scholarship, they also faced distinct limitations in their interventions. Discursive Leverage The network gained attention and leverage through discursive strategies that utilized identities of vulnerability to highlight forms of oppression and marginalization. This included two main tactics. First, a strategy of moral shaming involved leveraging identities of vulnerability in political engagement, reports, and demonstrations. On numerous occasions, the network organized demonstrations of waste pickers sorting recyclables in front of passing delegates in the conference centers. For example, in Copenhagen, the waste pickers sorted through the materials, creating a visual representation of their work and their struggle. They also held up signs painted on cardboard boxes reclaimed from the display booths and chanted slogans such as “Don't Incinerate my Livelihood!” These visual demonstrations drew attention to livelihoods, policy impacts, and systems of marginality that were normally outside the view of decision-makers. They also released numerous sign-on statements from the network as well as a report titled, “Respect for Recyclers.” These actions not only brought attention to the issues facing waste pickers associated with the CDM, but they built awareness of the identity of waste pickers as a constituent group within the UNFCCC process. The network also pursued direct and public face-to-face confrontations with the CDM decision-makers. They flooded the CDM question-and-answer sessions at all of the major negotiations, including those in Copenhagen, Cancún, Durban, Lima, and Bonn. These interventions involved specific stories told by waste pickers of how CDM policies disrupted their livelihoods and conditions of survival for them and their families. The waste pickers also critiqued board members directly for their complicity in the injustice being caused. In doing so, they amplified the real-world consequences of otherwise technocratic policy processes and pressured decision-makers to respond to normative concerns often excluded from the policy dialogue. As part of this, they critiqued norms within the regime, such as the lack of human rights protections in the CDM. As Mariel Vilella from Spain with the organization GAIA argued, I found that those interactions were very hard to deny, and the information that was coming out from those interactions was very obvious and very evident that there is this community that is that big that is actually losing their livelihoods out of this, and when they were speaking in first person, when the testimonies were so powerful in front of these policy people who were realizing what they were saying doesn't make any sense, I think that was very powerful.6 For example, the first major policy intervention by the new network was in Copenhagen in 2009 at the CDM Executive Board question-and-answer meeting. Baby Mohite, one of the waste pickers from Pune, India, raised the issue to the board that waste picker livelihoods were being threatened by the CDM's waste methodology, including the well-being of her own children. Similarly, in Cancún in 2010, the question-and-answer session began with Marlén Chacón, an informal recycler from Costa Rica, attempting to convey in Spanish through a translator the scale of the issue at hand: Are you aware that there are more than twenty million humans in this world that make a living from recycling? And that financing incinerators puts their profession and their lives at danger and the whole world also?7 In response, the board members often stated that they didn't have the authority to implement a methodology based on the social impacts of projects. Methodologies, they argued, were solely based on the ability of projects to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. For example, in Durban in 2011, the chair of the board, Martin Hession, responded with the following: What I would say is that mainly that these are questions of social and environmental impacts of projects and therefore a host country to deal with from our perspective. We can't make judgments on technologies, and we don't make judgment on different ways of reducing emissions reductions.8 Second, the network leveraged the strong media presence at the negotiations as a tactic of “identity amplification.” Unlike other embedded advocacy networks in the negotiations, such as gender justice and Indigenous peoples’ networks (Ciplet 2014), waste pickers did not previously have broad recognition or a codified identity within the international political community. Members of the network constantly met with reporters and held press conferences discussing their reasons for intervening in the UN climate process. They shared stories with reporters about waste pickers being marginalized at home, despite providing a valuable service in fighting climate change. For example, in Copenhagen in 2009, in front of media cameras and passing delegates, a waste picker from Chile, Exequiel Estay, explained to the crowd: We, the poor nations, are teaching you how to mitigate climate change. The solutions that our countries need aren't the supposed “clean energy” projects (of waste-to-energy incineration and landfilling), nor the carbon markets, since more than fifteen million women and men earn a living from recycling. That's why we invite you now to learn how we can protect the climate together.9 As a result of these interventions, the network gained strong media coverage including stories in more than fifty media outlets. Major stories appeared in the French newspaper, Le Monde, and an Associated Press article covered in outlets such as the Washington Post, Fox News, and the Hindu, among others. For example, the beginning of the Associated Press article in 2010 reads: Clambering over garbage heaps, rummaging through trash cans, Supriya Bhadakwad didn't set out to save the planet when she was [thirteen] years old, just her family. But two decades later, in the global arena of climate negotiations, the sari-clad Indian woman and other scavengers are making their voices heard, tilting with big corporate players in a tug-of-war over the world's dumpsites. (Associated Press 2010) Others network members in their home countries outside the negotiations engaged with local media to draw attention to the connection between waste-picking and climate change mitigation. For example, leaders of the Alliance of Indian Wastepickers, a network of thirty-three waste picker organizations and material purchasers throughout India, gathered in Chennai, India, to release a statement condemning what they called “false solutions” such as waste-to-energy incineration. By devoting significant time and attention to gaining media coverage, the network amplified the relatively small presence of waste pickers in the negotiations. Media actions likely drew significantly more attention to waste picker concerns with the CDM board and simultaneously strengthened waste picker identity as a marginalized, vulnerable, and politically strong transnational constituency in international politics. In terms of the political opportunity structure, the case suggests that moral-shaming interventions have leverage when they involve a public forum that enables impacted peoples to draw upon their identities of vulnerability to confront decision-makers directly and gain media attention. The discursive interventions by the network likely benefitted from the novelty of making visible the real-world conditions of human suffering in a political environment that was otherwise detached from this reality. The exceptionally large media presence at the negotiations likely also facilitated this coverage. Moreover, the network was likely aided by the fact that waste pickers targeted the CDM at a moment when it was plagued by numerous controversies that undermined its credibility. This potentially made board members more responsive to network demands in order to enhance the institution's legitimacy. Namely, the CDM came under fire in mid-2010 for issuing permits to numerous projects, totaling |${\$}$|2.7 billion dollars of investment, that actually increased greenhouse gas emissions, and others that suffered from various forms of corruption or alleged human rights abuses (Szabo 2010). Similarly, just prior to the meeting in Durban in 2011, a cable from Indian government officials revealed by WikiLeaks said that none of the CDM projects in India could be claimed as reducing emissions from what would have been the case without such credits (Böhm 2013). Notably, leaders of the network reported that their access to decision-makers lessened in the latter years of their intervention at the CDM. This had the impact of limiting opportunities for personal interaction with CDM board members and decreasing transparency regarding how decisions were made. Likewise, after their first demonstration in Copenhagen, waste pickers were subsequently prohibited by conference organizers to conduct demonstrations within the conference center. Instead they were relegated to less visible areas outside. This was part of a general policy to limit protesting in the conference halls. Given that public protest is often a core strategy of embedded networks that lack other resources, access to public spaces with decision-makers is vital. Institutional Leverage Importantly, the network complemented its more confrontational normative strategies to gain discursive leverage with tactics of institutional alignment. This took three main forms. First, the network pursued a strategy of “venue-shopping.” This involved engaging simultaneously in multiple institutions in search of influence over policies and discourse. The network engaged with institutions including the World Bank, the International Labor Organization, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, United Nations Environment Program and the Clean Development Mechanism, and domestic political institutions, among other venues. While some of these interventions were inconsequential, others offered small technical wins that were then utilized by network actors to try to influence the core policy issues in the CDM process. For example, acknowledgement of waste picker services and rights in the United Nations Environment Program waste report was then utilized to gain traction within the CDM process. Notably, it took more than two years of organizing in distinct venues and institutional processes for the network to discover an effective course of institutional engagement within the CDM process. A second institutional tactic was that of “boundary work.” As sociologist Gieryn argues, “science is no single thing: its boundaries are drawn and redrawn in flexible, historically changing, and sometimes ambiguous ways” (Gieryn 1983, 781). Other scholars have applied this concept to social movements, arguing that “boundary movements” challenge the authority of science and push “the limits in what is defined as normal scientific practice” (Brown et al. 2004, 54). There have been three main forms of boundary work pursued by the waste picker network in its engagement with the CDM. The strategy of “categorical boundary work” is that which sought to expand the scope of considerations that guide institutional decision-making to encompass separate categories of concern. In this case, the network advocated for the CDM to develop methodologies with “sustainable development” criteria, including attention to human rights. This was an area that was neglected by the institution, despite sustainable development representing a core area of its mission. The waste picker network, along with other justice advocates, argued that current practices failed to account for the social impacts of its projects and human rights considerations. While these interventions failed to produce notable changes in the CDM decision-making criteria, it put CDM board members in a defensive position and challenged the legitimacy of the institution's ability to uphold its own mission. The network also pursued a strategy of “methodological boundary work,” which sought to reveal biases and inaccuracies within existing decision-making processes, scientific criteria, and methodologies. In this sense, they assumed the role of “knowledge brokers” through authoritative framing (Litfin 1994, 188). Namely, they acted as intermediaries between original producers of knowledge and policy-makers who consumed and utilized such knowledge to inform policy (Litfin 1994, 4). Most notably, the waste picker network challenged the CDM's waste methodology for neglecting existing recycling activities of waste pickers and thereby increasing greenhouse gas emissions. Specifically, the network worked to revise the waste-to-energy methodology to account for preexisting waste picker recycling in baseline greenhouse gas calculations. This, they argued, would have a substantial impact on analyses of purported greenhouse gas benefits of waste-to-energy technologies. As Neil Tangri, the global policy director from the United States with the organization GAIA, explained to the CDM Board in Durban in 2011: You had made the point earlier that the competition between waste pickers and incinerators or landfills is a sustainable development question, which it certainly is, but it is also very much an emissions question because when material that's being recycled is burned, emissions go up. And yet the waste methodologies do not have any requirement to calculate that impact. It's not included in the baselines. I know that the waste methodologies are under revision now, and I want to know if that is going to be included or frankly if you are going to keep ducking that responsibility.10 The network also pursued methodological boundary work by raising concerns with the implementation of CDM methodologies, including how they were applied to specific projects such as an incinerator project in China waiting to be registered by the CDM. A final strategy of “procedural boundary work” included efforts to push the institution to create more favorable practices of civil society inclusion and procedural justice. Network members advocated for more transparent decision-making and documentation, increased opportunities for civil society intervention in CDM processes, and more expansive public comment periods.11 For example, they unsuccessfully submitted comments to the CDM in support of a proposed procedure whereby affected communities could appeal against the support of incinerators and landfill gas projects. In terms of the political opportunity structure, the network benefited from the well-supported environmental benefits of recycling over waste-to-energy technologies. As a result, the waste picker network could make credible critiques of the scientific justification of the waste methodology according to the CDM's own logic. Importantly, measuring recycling activities, including that of waste pickers, was well within the scope and mandate of existing institutional practices. As such, not doing so was difficult to justify on a scientific basis. Moreover, they intervened at precisely the time that this methodology was undergoing a formal review, pointing to the importance of regime timing. In addition, due to the relatively public processes of the CDM, the waste picker network could discuss their concerns directly with CDM board members, both in public venues and in private. However, this access was potentially limited in comparison to private-sector actors in the process, including the incineration industry,12 as well as better resourced civil society groups. The network initially engaged with the CDM with very limited technical expertise related to CDM processes and methodologies. This was notable given the highly complex processes associated with changes to CDM methodologies and the fact that professional consultants and industry insiders that frequent CDM meetings are well versed in its technical terms. The network also devoted a large amount of time and resources to building democratic processes and addressing points of conflict within the network. Importantly, the level of technical expertise, resources, and time required for success in such strategies largely elevated the role of organizations with more policy and technical expertise within the network, especially GAIA. Waste picker organizations and individuals played a less central role in institutional strategy formulation. Political Leverage A third core network strategy of the Global Alliance of Waste Pickers was to enlist political allies to make technical-rational and normative arguments and to pressure decision-makers on their behalf through “leverage politics” (Keck and Sikkink 1999, 95). While initially lacking powerful political allies often associated with network influence, the network pursued two main tactics in this area. First, they utilized a tactic of “client mobilization,” in which network members sought to leverage a financial client of the CDM to find influence. In this case, they fomented conflict between the CDM and its major client, the European Union (EU). As the largest purchaser of CDM credits, dissent from European Union Parliamentarians represented a potential threat to the financial solvency of the CDM. Notably, just a few months prior, the European Union had decided to cease the purchase of CDM credits for the destruction of HCF-23 gas, due to related controversies. As such, there was already precedent of the European Union taking a strong and proactive stance in relation to CDM methodologies. To influence the Parliamentarians, the network engaged in direct lobbying, sending targeted emails from the GAIA network, releasing a report outlining the inconsistency of CDM financing with EU waste directives, and using media to draw attention to the issue. In addition, GAIA released a sign-on letter to the European Commission urging it to end the purchase of CDM carbon credits from incinerators and landfills. The letter argued that the European Commission was financing projects through the purchase of CDM credits that would be illegal in the European Union due to its various waste directives. The letter was signed by ten members from the European Parliament from various political parties and civil society organizations from twenty-three countries. The network also sought to raise concerns with other clients of the CDM, such as Brazilian and Indian officials. The impact of this strategy was likely amplified given the financial strain on the CDM at that moment. After peaking in mid-2011, the value of global carbon market transactions plunged 36 percent by the end of 2012 (Carr 2013). Without a clear future for the Kyoto Protocol, the main global trading mechanism, the CDM, was reported in dire need of rescue by the assessment of a UN panel due to a more than fivefold collapse in the price of credits. Second, the network pursued a tactic of “solidarity-building” to strengthen political leverage. This involved engaging to educate more moderate and less embedded civil society organizations such as the Climate Action Network and to enlist them to support their demands. For example, the Global Alliance of Waste Pickers was effective in getting the Climate Action Network to publicize their gains in the newsletter, ECO, which is widely read by attendees at the UNFCCC meetings. The network also spent a large amount of time meeting with other justice-oriented networks and organizations discussing shared concerns, drafting collective sign-on statements, and participating in joint protests.13 The case suggests that a key factor for building political leverage is that of cultivating political allies with shared concerns and with direct leverage over the target institution and mobilizing grassroots support to apply pressure. Notably, as encompassing leadership from disenfranchised or marginalized social groups, embedded transnational advocacy networks are unlikely to have the same political connections as better resourced advocacy networks and may be unwilling to partner with actors that don't share basic principles. Better resourced advocacy networks are often comprised of organizations that also have political connections and influence in their domestic contexts. Ultimately, while its efforts at political leverage were likely one factor that influenced the CDM to tweak its waste methodology, the network lacked a broad coalition of NGOs, states, and business actors with the power to meaningfully challenge the legitimacy and operations of the CDM at a more fundamental level. Institutional Response and Form of Policy Change In this section, I turn to the final two aspects of the framework: institutional response and form of gains. Specifically, I ask, what was the institutional response and to what extent does it represent discontinuity of the institution? Moreover, what does this reveal about the type of policy changes achieved by the network? Notably, in response to the network's engagement, a new draft methodology was approved by the CDM in 2012 that contained language to ensure that existing recycling practices are accounted for in project assessments. The revised methodology required that “the project does not reduce the amount of waste that would be recycled in the absence of the project activity.” This closely reflected the core demand of the network and was thus viewed as a major policy victory. The CDM also included explicit inclusion of a definition of waste pickers that was approved by the network (CDM Methodology AMS-III.AJ/Version 3, 2012). Another gain was language added that required that that the organic fraction (food and green waste) of the waste stream not be disposed of in solid waste disposal sites. However, in practice, there is no institutional framework or explicit guidelines to ensure that informal-sector recycling is accurately assessed. Assessments are carried out by project developers and consultants, with limited institutional oversight, who have a direct financial interest in building a case for the environmental benefit of the proposed project. Ensuring that the full scope of waste picker recycling activities is appropriately accounted for in practice would require funding, capacity, and expertise far greater than existing network capabilities. Accordingly, in their comments to the CDM, the network pointed out what they considered flaws in the proposed methodology, such as the omission of a survey of current recycling and composting practice and the fact that emissions from incineration of organic materials weren't accounted for. The network also argued that a lack of specific requirements to analyze preexisting and expost recycling rates might mean that the methodology as written lacked enforceability. Most critically, the waste picker network was not successful in shifting the broader decision-making logic of the CDM to consider social justice and human rights concerns. Rather, the changes made represented continuity within the CDM. As far as the type of gains achieved, I argue that they are best characterized as concessional. Namely, in response to counterhegemonic demands by a largely embedded advocacy network, an evaluative structure of the institution was made more inclusive of previously marginalized viewpoints. It seems highly unlikely that these changes would have been made without the consistent engagement of the network and its use of diverse strategies to pressure the CDM to act. However, these gains in themselves are not likely transformative to neoliberal governance structures because they did not fundamentally disrupt or transform the institution or its guiding logic. In this sense, the network can be understood to have effectively negotiated institutional concessions as part of the legitimation of the institution and its practices. As of yet, it is not clear as to whether these concessions will prove as stepping stones for more transformative changes in the future.14 However, given the financially weakened state of the CDM, the largest impact of the network may be that of setting precedence for waste methodologies in future carbon market institutions. Conclusion This article sets out to strengthen understanding of the potential for transnational networks to transform neoliberal global governance structures. I develop and apply an analytical framework that bridges neo-Gramscian theory and liberal constructivism. It synthesizes macrolevel insights concerning political economic structures and their transformation with microlevel considerations of advocacy network leverage and political opportunities. As we have seen, it provides insight into the factors that contribute to policy gains by embedded advocacy networks, as well as the quality of such gains in relation to dominant structures of world order. Despite lacking financial, political, and technical resources often associated with advocacy network influence, the Global Alliance of Waste Pickers achieved policy change in the form of strategic concessions. However, the network could not create discontinuity within the CDM to promote more transformative change, particularly in terms of human rights provisions, social standards, and institutional accountability and representation. The case suggests that embedded advocacy networks have distinct power asymmetries that shape network functionality and effectiveness. These stem from the technical and funding requirements for transnational mobilization. As a relatively small network, organized by two international networks strongly committed to grassroots leadership, the network was able to maintain relative cohesion over the course of its engagement with the CDM. However, as noted, the network experienced disagreements over goals and strategies. Some reports suggest that, by elevating the status of some waste picker leaders over others, the network contributed to tensions within waste picker cooperatives at the national level. Some waste pickers and NGO leaders also express concern that devoting resources to an international campaign could distract from more pressing local organizing. Larger embedded transnational advocacy networks seeking to build leadership across such diversity would have to devote considerable resources and time to developing systems of accountability. This may prove challenging under conditions in which funders expect of quantified network policy or material gains under rigid time constraints. Policy victories require extended time investments and technical expertise; network members have unequal access to knowledge, time, and communication technologies. The needs of directly impacted network members are dynamic and changing. In short, the inherent diversity and asymmetry in power relations between members of embedded transnational advocacy networks presents unique challenges for achieving cohesive network coordination and leadership, unity in strategy, goals and principles, and targeted and effective advocacy. Future research should compare the distinct systems of accountability pursued by embedded transnational advocacy networks promoting counterhegemonic positions to respond to asymmetrical power relations and forms of inequality. Second, achieving discontinuity in target institutions is likely far more challenging than problem-solving gains that align with hegemonic interests. As Lund (2013, 744) argues, “since the discourse dominating the negotiations is likely to reflect prevailing power structures, it will benefit interests that are already privileged, thus reinforcing power relations.” Indeed, scholarship documents how transnational civil society actors, often in coordination with state and market actors, play a critical role in shaping global environmental governance as a reflection of historic systems of power (Goldman 2007; Gareau 2013). Additionally, a lack of traditional resources—such as political capital, finances to sustain interventions over the long term, willingness to seek out powerful partners with compromised positions, and technical capacity—may create distinct limitations for embedded networks. This does not mean that embedded transnational advocacy networks cannot influence policy in their favor. Indeed, the Global Alliance of Waste Pickers found some success in leveraging discursive, institutional, and political influence. The case suggests that embedded networks that effectively amplify concerns of impacted actors on the ground, utilize the full scope of their network to enlist strategic political allies, target unfulfilled norms (such as the CDM's commitment to sustainable development), and expose deficient technical methodologies have the potential to win strategic concessions. Such concessions may modestly broaden otherwise narrowly constructed scientific and political debates and decision-making processes, making them more inclusive of the interests of marginalized actors. Serendipitous timing (in the case of revision of the CDM waste methodologies), fortuitous political allies (in the case of the European Union), financial and legitimacy struggles in the target institution, and exceptional access to decision-makers and media all likely played a role in the success of network interventions. The Gates Foundation grant, as well as other funding, meant that the network had modest, but sufficient, resources to engage for multiple years. These resources allowed it to fly numerous waste pickers from around the world to negotiations. In other words, success is highly contingent on a favorable political opportunity structure. This includes access to decision-makers and spaces of protest, relatively weak political adversaries (in this case, the incinerator industry), and contexts that make decision-maker responsiveness more likely. It seems improbable that many of these conditions are present for many other embedded transnational advocacy networks in international governance processes; future research should assess strategies and structures that shape success and failure of policy interventions across multiple cases. Moreover, the analysis of the case suggests that concessional gains within a given institution may be undermined by structural forms of inequality that extend beyond the regime in terms of how policies are implemented. Thus, even when embedded networks can influence the adoption of important policy modifications within an international governance institution, they may lack the means to ensure that the policy is implemented effectively (Newell and Bumpus 2012, 62). This points to the national level as an important field of analysis for how such international gains are translated into disrupting structures of inequality. Finally, the analysis of the case suggests that international neoliberal institutions are adept at adapting to isolated challenges through continuity-based modifications to policy and, in doing so, may buffer against more transformative challenges. It is through this “microresponsiveness” that institutions such as the CDM likely find resiliency and maintain legitimacy (among its many institutional crises), over time. Transformative policy change in the context of neoliberal governance necessitates fundamentally shifting institutional logics to place democratic participation and the welfare of marginalized peoples at the core of decision-making. From a neo-Gramscian perspective, this will likely require that embedded transnational advocacy networks effectively build or link up with a counterhegemonic bloc with the political organization, strength of alliances, and discursive strength capable of rivaling existing hegemonic forces and bridging disparate class interests on a given issue. As Lucy Ford argues, the point is “not merely to ‘bring social movements in,’ but to focus on radical agency and its challenge to global hegemony” (Ford 2003, 184). Notes Author's note: This work was partially supported by the Robert and Patricia Switzer Foundation. I am grateful to the members of the Global Alliance of Waste Pickers, the Global Alliance for Incinerator Alternatives, and Women in Informal Employment: Globalizing and Organizing for including me in network activities and talking with me at length. I am grateful to Neil Tangri for his insightful comments on a draft of this article. Additionally, I want to thank the reviewers of this article and the editors at International Studies Quarterly for their helpful comments and insights. David Ciplet is an assistant professor of environmental studies and the University of Colorado Boulder. His research focuses on issues of power, inequality, and social change in global environmental governance. He has published articles in journals such as Global Environmental Change, Review of International Political Economy, Global Environmental Politics, and Global Governance. He is lead author of Power in a Warming World: The New Global Politics of Climate Change and the Remaking of Environmental Inequality (MIT Press, 2015). Footnotes 1 Originally called the Global Alliance of Waste Pickers and Allies. 2 Interviews with author, Copenhagen, December 2009. 3 Languages spoken included English, Hindi, Spanish, Portuguese, and Marathi. Later meetings included Thai, French, and Zulu. 4 Major institutional regulatory bodies such as the United States Environmental Protection Agency and the European Commission (European Commission 2008; US Environmental Protection Agency 2002; US Environmental Protection Agency n.d.) and peer-reviewed academic articles are nearly unanimous that recycling is a more favorable approach to waste management in terms of environmental benefits and climate change impacts than waste-to-energy incineration. In a metastudy of twenty case studies of life cycle analyses of waste management, Cleary (2009) finds that “all but one of these concurred with the ‘hierarchy of waste’ that the environmental performance of landfilling is lower than that of all the other treatment methods and that thermal treatments [waste-to-energy incineration] are inferior to recycling.” 5 Comment to AMS-III.AJ, CDM Small-Scale Methodology for Recycling Solid Waste. 6 Skype interview, recorded. 7 Captured by notes and a recording. 8 Captured via author notes and video recording. 9 Captured via author notes and audio recording. 10 Captured via author notes and video recording. 11 CDM EB 55th meeting. 12 Civil society is generally understood as being at a structural disadvantage in terms of its access when compared to the private sector. See Lund (2013, 9). 13 This strategy was central to the network's activities beyond the CDM process. Network actors worked in a joint coalition to influence the Green Climate Fund to support subnational actors seeking funding. 14 After this victory in 2012, the network became less active in the negotiations, particularly at the CDM. References Advocacy Project . 2009 . “ Cooling Agents: An Analysis of Climate Change Mitigation By the Informal Sector in India .” Accessed March 20, 2019. http://www.chintan-india.org/documents/research_and_reports/chintan_report_cooling_agents.pdf . Andrée Peter . 2005 . “ The Genetic Engineering Revolution in Agriculture and Food: Strategies of the ‘Biotech Bloc.’ ” In The Business of Global Environmental Governance , edited by Levy David L. , Newell Peter , 135 – 66 . Cambridge, MA : MIT Press . Ansell Christopher . 2003 . “ Community Embeddedness and Collaborative Governance in the San Francisco Bay Area .” In Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action , edited by Diani Mario , McAdam Doug , 123 – 47 . Oxford : Oxford University Press . Associated Press . 2010 . “ Scavengers Leave Dumps to Speak Out on UN Stage .” Fox News, December 3. https://www.foxnews.com/world/scavengers-leave-dumps-to-speak-out-on-un-stage . Bakker Karen . 2005 . “ Neoliberalizing Nature? Market Environmentalism in Water Supply in England and Wales .” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 95 ( 3 ): 544 . Barnett Michael , Duvall Raymond , eds. 2004 . Power in Global Governance . Vol. 98 . Cambridge, MA : Cambridge University Press . Betsill Michele Merrill , Corell Elisabeth , eds. 2008 . NGO Diplomacy: The Influence of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Environmental Negotiations . Cambridge, MA : MIT Press . Betsill Michele Merrill , Bulkeley Harriet . 2004 . “ Transnational Networks and Global Environmental Governance: The Cities for Climate Protection Program .” International Studies Quarterly 48 ( 2 ): 471 – 93 . Böhm Steffen . 2013 . “ Why Are Carbon Markets Failing? ” Guardian , April 12. https://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/blog/why-are-carbon-markets-failing . Bosco Fernando J. 2006 . “ The Madres De Plaza De Mayo and Three Decades of Human Rights’ Activism: Embeddedness, Emotions, and Social Movements .” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 96 ( 2 ): 342 – 65 . Brenner Neil , Peck Jamie , Theodore Nik . 2010 . “ Variegated Neoliberalization: Geographies, Modalities, Pathways .” Global Networks 10 ( 2 ): 182 – 222 . Bretherton Charlotte . 2003 . “ Movements, Networks, Hierarchies: A Gender Perspective on Global Environmental Governance .” Global Environmental Politics 3 ( 2 ): 103 – 19 . Brown Phil , Zavestoski Stephen , McCormick Sabrina , Mayer Brian , Morello-Frosch Rachel , Altman Rebecca Gasior . 2004 . “ Embodied Health Movements: New Approaches to Social Movements in Health .” Sociology of Health & Illness 26 ( 1 ): 50 – 80 . Burawoy Michael . 2010 . “ From Polanyi to Pollyanna: The False Optimism of Global Labor Studies .” Global Labour Journal 1 ( 2 ): 301 – 13 . Carr Matthew . 2013 . “ Carbon Market Dropped 36% in 2012 As Permits Declined .” Bloomberg Business , January 3. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-03/carbon-market-value-dropped-36-last-year-as-offset-prices-fell.html . CDM Methodology AMS-III.AJ . 2010 . Recovery and Recycling of Materials from Solid Wastes , Version 1.0 . https://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/D/N/1/DN10CTO3X86IFPMB9EHU25VWAGJZ4L/Final%20response.pdf?t=ZjN8cG9vcG9ifDAG4a4HtQZoGabHzDsf4ZRC . CDM Methodology AMS-III.AJ . 2012 . Recovery and Recycling of Materials from Solid Wastes , Version 3.0 . Accessed March 20, 2019. http://cdm.unfccc.int/filestorage/T/1/I/T1INGS9C34QMRP2YXJ78UHAZVD5FL6/EB62_repan10_Revision_AMS-III.AJ_ver03.pdf?t=WVZ8cG9tZnUyfDBG-L-X8yea-Ia1rqNbSBIb . Chandhoke Neera . 2005 . “ How Global is Global Civil Society? ” Journal of World-Systems Research 11 ( 2 ): 355 – 71 . Ciplet David . 2015 . “ Rethinking Cooperation: Inequality and Consent in International Climate Change Politics .” Global Governance 21 ( 2 ): 247 – 74 . Ciplet David . 2014 . “ Contesting Climate Injustice: Transnational Advocacy Network Struggles for Rights in UN Climate Politics .” Global Environmental Politics 14 ( 4 ): 75 – 96 . Ciplet David . 2017 . “ Subverting the Status Quo? Climate Debt, Vulnerability, and Counter-Hegemonic Frame Integration in United Nations Climate Politics–a Framework for Analysis .” Review of International Political Economy 24 ( 6 ): 1052 – 75 . Ciplet David , Roberts J. Timmons . 2017 . “ Climate Change and the Transition to Neoliberal Environmental Governance .” Global Environmental Change 46 : 148 – 56 . Ciplet David , Roberts J. Timmons , Khan Mizan . 2013 . “ The Politics of International Climate Adaptation Funding: Justice and Divisions in the Greenhouse .” Global Environmental Politics 13 ( 1 ): 49 – 68 . Ciplet David , Roberts J. Timmons , Khan Mizan . 2015 . Power in a Warming World: The New Global Politics of Climate Change and the Remaking of Environmental Inequality . Cambridge, MA : MIT Press . Clark Ann Marie . 2010 . Diplomacy of Conscience: Amnesty International and Changing Human Rights Norms . Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press . Cleary Julian . 2009 . “ Life Cycle Assessments of Municipal Solid Waste Management Systems: A Comparative Analysis of Selected Peer-Reviewed Literature .” Environment International 35 ( 8 ): 1256 – 66 . Conca Ken . 2001 . “ Consumption and Environment in a Global Economy .” Global Environmental Politics 1 ( 3 ): 53 – 71 . Corson Catherine . 2010 . “ Shifting Environmental Governance in a Neoliberal World: US AID for Conservation .” Antipode 42 ( 3 ): 576 – 602 . Corson Catherine , MacDonald Kenneth Iain , Neimark Benjamin . 2013 . “ Grabbing ‘Green’: Markets, Environmental Governance, and the Materialization of Natural Capital .” Human Geography 6 ( 1 ): 1 – 15 . Cox Robert W. 1983 . “ Gramsci, Hegemony, and International Relations: An Essay in Method .” Millennium 12 ( 2 ): 162 – 75 . Cox Robert W. . 1992 . “ Multilateralism and World Order .” Review of International Studies 18 ( 2 ): 161 – 80 . Della Porta Donatella , Tarrow Sidney . 2005 . “ Transnational Processes and Social Activism: An Introduction .” In Transnational Protest and Global Activism , edited by Porta Donatella Della , Tarrow Sidney , 1 – 20 . Oxford : Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc . European Commission . 2008 . “ Directive 2008/98/EC of the European Parliament and the Council on Waste and Repealing Certain Directives .” Official Journal of the European Union 312 ( 3 ). Accessed March 20, 2019. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32008L0098 . Evans Peter . 2000 . “ Fighting Marginalization with Transnational Networks: Counter-Hegemonic Globalization .” Contemporary sociology 29 ( 1 ): 230 – 41 . Evans Peter . 2008 . “ Is an Alternative Globalization Possible? ” Politics & Society 36 ( 2 ): 271 – 305 . Finnemore Martha , Sikkink Kathryn . 1998 . “ International Norm Dynamics and Political Change .” International Organization 52 ( 4 ): 887 – 917 . Ford Lucy H. 2003 . “ Challenging Global Environmental Governance: Social Movement Agency and Global Civil Society .” Global Environmental Politics 3 ( 2 ): 120 – 34 . Fraser Nancy . 2005 . Reframing Justice . Amsterdam : Uitgeverij Van Gorcum . Fraser Nancy . 2012 . “ The Limited Influence of Global Civil Society: International Environmental Non-Governmental Organisations and the Methyl Bromide Controversy in the Montreal Protocol .” Environmental Politics 21 ( 1 ): 88 – 107 . Gareau Brian . 2013 . From Precaution to Profit: Contemporary Challenges to Environmental Protection in the Montreal Protocol . New Haven, CT : Yale University Press . Gieryn Thomas F. 1983 . “ Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Science from Non-Science: Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists .” American Sociological Review 48 ( 6 ): 781 – 95 . Gill Stephen . 2002 . “ Constitutionalizing Inequality and the Clash of Globalizations .” International Studies Review 4 ( 2 ): 47 – 65 . Goldman Michael . 2007 . “ How ‘Water for All!’ Policy Became Hegemonic: The Power of the World Bank and Its Transnational Policy Networks .” Geoforum 38 ( 5 ): 786 – 800 . Gramsci Antonio . (1971) 2012 . Prison Notebooks . Vol. 2 . New York : Columbia University Press . Granovetter Mark . 1985 . “ Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness .” American Journal of Sociology 91 ( 3 ): 481 – 510 . Granovetter Mark . 1992 . “ Problems of Explanation in Economic Sociology .” In Networks and Organizations: Structure, Form, and Action , edited by Nohria Nitin , 25 – 56 . Cambridge, MA : Harvard Business School Press . Gulbrandsen Lars H. , Andresen Steinar . 2004 . “ NGO Influence in the Implementation of the Kyoto Protocol: Compliance, Flexibility Mechanisms, and Sinks .” Global Environmental Politics 4 ( 4 ): 54 – 75 . Haas Peter M. 1992 . “ Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination .” International organization 46 ( 1 ): 1 – 35 . Hadden Jennifer . 2015 . Networks in Contention . Cambridge, MA : Cambridge University Press . Hess M. 2004 . “ ‘Spatial’ Relationships? Towards a Reconceptualization of Embeddedness .” Progress in Human Geography 28 ( 2 ): 165 – 86 . Inclusive Cities . 2009 . “ Wastepickers and Climate Change: Delegation Statement .” Accessed March 19, 2019. https://www.colorado.edu/ecenter/sites/default/files/attached-files/wastepickers_campaign_0.pdf . Katz Hagai . 2006 . “ Gramsci, Hegemony, and Global Civil Society Networks .” Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations 17 ( 4 ): 332 – 47 . Keck Margaret E. , Sikkink Kathryn . 1999 . “ Transnational Advocacy Networks in International and Regional Politics .” International Social Science Journal 51 ( 159 ): 89 – 101 . Khagram Sanjeev , Riker James V. , Sikkink Kathryn . 2002 . “ From Santiago to Seattle: Transnational Advocacy Groups Restructuring World Politics .” In Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms , edited by Khagram Sanjeev , Riker James V. , Sikkink Kathryn , 3 – 24 . Minneapolis : University of Minnesota Press . Krasner Stephen . 1985 . Structural Conflict: The Third World Against Global Liberalism . Berkeley : University of California Press . Kuppinger Petra , Hourani Najib B. , Kanna Ahmed . 2014 . “ Crushed? Cairo's Garbage Collectors and Neoliberal Urban Politics .” Journal of Urban Affairs 3 ( 2 ): 621 – 33 . Levy David , Egan Daniel . 2003 . “ A Neo-Gramscian Approach to Corporate Political Strategy: Conflict and Accommodation in the Climate Change Negotiations .” Journal of Management Studies 40 ( 4 ): 803 – 29 . Litfin K. T. 1994 . Ozone Discourses . New York : Columbia University Press . Lucier Cristina A. , Gareau Brian J. . 2015 . “ From Waste to Resources?: Interrogating ‘Race to the Bottom’ in the Global Environmental Governance of the Hazardous Waste Trade .” Journal of World-Systems Research 21 ( 2 ): 495 . Lund Emma . 2013 . “ Environmental Diplomacy: Comparing the Influence of Business and Environmental NGOs in Negotiations on Reform of the Clean Development Mechanism .” Environmental Politics 22 ( 5 ): 739 – 59 . Martinez-Torres Maria Elena , Rosset Peter M. . 2010 . “ La Vía Campesina: The Birth and Evolution of a Transnational Social Movement .” Journal of Peasant Studies 37 ( 1 ): 149 – 75 . Mayo Marjorie . 2005 . Global Citizens: Social Movements and the Challenge of Globalization . Chicago : Zed Books . McCormick Sabrina . 2007 . “ Democratizing Science Movements A New Framework for Mobilization and Contestation .” Social Studies of Science 37 ( 4 ): 609 – 23 . Meckling Jonas . 2011 . “ The Globalization of Carbon Trading: Transnational Business Coalitions in Climate Politics .” Global Environmental Politics 11 ( 2 ): 26 – 50 . Medina Martin . 2008 . “ The Informal Recycling Sector in Developing Countries: Organizing Waste Pickers to Enhance Their Impact .” Gridlines ( 44 ). Washington, DC : World Bank . Munck Ronaldo . 2006 . Globalization and Contestation: The New Great Counter-Movement . New York : Routledge . Newell Peter , Bumpus Adam . 2012 . “ The Global Political Ecology of the Clean Development Mechanism .” Global Environmental Politics 12 ( 4 ): 49 – 67 . Nzeadibe Thaddeus Chidi . 2009 . “ Solid Waste Reforms and Informal Recycling in Enugu Urban Area, Nigeria .” Habitat International 33 ( 1 ): 93 – 99 Okereke Chukwumerije . 2007 . Global Justice and Neoliberal Environmental Governance: Ethics, Sustainable Development, and International Co-Operation . New York : Routledge . Okereke Chukwumerije , Bulkeley Harriet , Schroeder Heike . 2009 . “ Conceptualizing Climate Governance Beyond the International Regime .” Global Environmental Politics 9 ( 1 ): 58 – 78 . Park Susan . 2005 . “ How Transnational Environmental Advocacy Networks Socialize International Financial Institutions: A Case Study of the International Finance Corporation .” Global Environmental Politics 5 ( 4 ): 95 – 119 . Pike Andy , Lagendijk Arnoud , Vale Mário . 2000 . “ Critical Reflections on ‘Embeddedness’ in Economic Geography: The Case of Labour Market Governance and Training in the Automotive Industry in the North-East Region of England .” In Restructuring Industry and Territory. The Experience of Europe's Regions. London: The Stationery Office , edited by Giunta Anna , Lagendijk Arnoud , Pike Andy , 59 – 82 . London : Routledge . Polanyi Karl . 1944 . The Great Transformation: Economic and Political Origins of our Time . New York : Rinehart . Price Richard . 2003 . “ Transnational Civil Society and Advocacy in World Politics .” World Politics 55 ( 4 ): 579 – 606 . Rosaldo Manuel . 2016 . “ Revolution in the Garbage Dump: The Political and Economic Foundations of the Colombian Recycler Movement, 1986–2011 .” Social Problems 63 ( 3 ): 351 – 72 . Rosenau James . 1990 . Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity . Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press . Samson Melanie . 2015 . “ Accumulation by Dispossession and the Informal Economy—Struggles Over Knowledge, Being and Waste At a Soweto Garbage Dump .” Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 33 ( 5 ): 813 – 30 . Schroeder Heike . 2010 . “ Agency in International Climate Negotiations: The Case of Indigenous Peoples and Avoided Deforestation .” International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics 10 ( 4 ): 317 – 32 . Sikkink Kathryn . 2005 . “ Patterns of Dynamic Multilevel Governance and the Insider-Outsider Coalition .” In Transnational Protest and Global Activism , edited by Porta Donatella Della , Tarrow Sidney , 151 – 73 . Oxford : Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc . Smith Jackie , Wiest Dawn . 2012 . Social Movements in the World-System: The Politics of Crisis and Transformation . New York : Russell Sage Foundation . Stone Diane . 2008 . “ Global Public Policy, Transnational Policy Communities, and Their Networks .” Policy Studies Journal 36 ( 1 ): 19 – 38 . Streeck Wolfgang , Thelen Kathleen Ann , eds. 2005 . Beyond Continuity: Institutional Change in Advanced Political Economies . Oxford : Oxford University Press . Szabo Michael . 2010 . “ World Bank Defends Controversial HFC Carbon-Cut Plants .” Reuters , August 23. http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/08/23/us-hfc-bank-hfc-idUSTRE67M2CK20100823 . Tarrow Sidney , McAdam Doug . 2005 . “ Scale Shift in Transnational Contention .” In Transnational Protest and Global Activism , edited by Porta Donatella Della , Tarrow Sidney , 121 – 50 . Oxford : Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc . United States Environmental Protection Agency . n.d . “ Sustainable Materials Management: Non-Hazardous Materials and Waste Management Hierarchy .” Environmental Protection Agency. Accessed March 20, 2019. https://www.epa.gov/smm/sustainable-materials-management-non-hazardous-materials-and-waste-management-hierarchy . United States Environmental Protection Agency . 2002 . “ Solid Waste Management and Greenhouse Gases: A Life Cycle Assessment of Emissions and Sinks .” Environmental Protection Agency. “EPA's Waste Reduction Model (WARM) ” . Wendt Alexander . 1992 . “ Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics .” International Organization 46 ( 2 ): 391 – 425 . Wilson David C. , Velis Costas , Cheeseman Chris . 2006 . “ Role of Informal Sector Recycling in Waste Management in Developing Countries .” Habitat International 30 ( 4 ): 797 – 808 . © The Author(s) (2019). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Studies Association. This article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (https://academic.oup.com/journals/pages/open_access/funder_policies/chorus/standard_publication_model)
TI - Means of the Marginalized: Embedded Transnational Advocacy Networks and the Transformation of Neoliberal Global Governance
JF - International Studies Quarterly
DO - 10.1093/isq/sqz015
DA - 2019-06-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/means-of-the-marginalized-embedded-transnational-advocacy-networks-and-NdGa0WIBCn
SP - 296
VL - 63
IS - 2
DP - DeepDyve
ER -