TY - JOUR
AU - Little, Margaret Olivia
AB - Audi's book contains exemplary discussions of standard views about compat- ibilism, self-deception, incontinence and even justified belief (since he uses analogies with the latter in his treatment of rational action). The difficulties I have posed are not distinctive to his book and cannot be fixed by tinkering; we need a new framework which does not take the received views as adequate starting points for philosophical work on action. St Olqf College and University of Helsinki FREDERICK STOUTLAND Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments. BY R. JAY WALLACE. (Harvard UP, 1994. Pp. ix + 275. Price not given.) In this sophisticated and tightly argued book, Ja y Wallace sets out to explicate more fully the concept and conditions of moral responsibility, with an eye towards ex­ plaining why responsibility does not require the sort of strong freedom that is incompatible with determinism. Starting with an interesting development of Strawson's thesis that moral responsibility is best understood by reference to certain moral sentiments, he argues that this account reinforces the Kantian idea that moral agency is a capacity for rational reflection and direction; he then offers a sustained analysis of why concerns regarding agency are quite separate from concerns about the sort 
TI - Book Reviews
JF - The Philosophical Quarterly
DO - 10.2307/2956371
DA - 1996-10-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/book-reviews-NXbub4JVrD
SP - 541
EP - 544
VL - 46
IS - 185
DP - DeepDyve
ER -