TY - JOUR
AU - Abe, Takaaki
AB - We study stable strategy profiles in a pure exchange game of bads, where each player dumps his or her bads such as garbage onto someone else. Hirai et al. (Mathematical Social Sciences 51(2):162–170, 2006) show that cycle dumping, in which each player follows an ordering and dumps his or her bads onto the next player, is a strong Nash equilibrium and that self-disposal is α\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}\usepackage{amsmath}\usepackage{wasysym}\usepackage{amsfonts}\usepackage{amssymb}\usepackage{amsbsy}\usepackage{mathrsfs}\usepackage{upgreek}\setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}\begin{document}$$\alpha $$\end{document}-stable for some initial distributions of bads. In this paper, we show that a strategy profile of bullying, in which all players dump their bads onto a single player, becomes α\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}\usepackage{amsmath}\usepackage{wasysym}\usepackage{amsfonts}\usepackage{amssymb}\usepackage{amsbsy}\usepackage{mathrsfs}\usepackage{upgreek}\setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}\begin{document}$$\alpha $$\end{document}-stable for every exchange game of bads. We also provide a necessary and sufficient condition for a strategy profile to be α\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}\usepackage{amsmath}\usepackage{wasysym}\usepackage{amsfonts}\usepackage{amssymb}\usepackage{amsbsy}\usepackage{mathrsfs}\usepackage{upgreek}\setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}\begin{document}$$\alpha $$\end{document}-stable in an exchange game of bads. In addition, we show that repeating an exchange after the first exchange makes self-disposal stationary.
TI - Buck-passing dumping in a garbage-dumping game
JF - Theory and Decision
DO - 10.1007/s11238-021-09858-5
DA - 2022-10-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/springer-journals/buck-passing-dumping-in-a-garbage-dumping-game-N5oPlHibeu
SP - 509
EP - 533
VL - 93
IS - 3
DP - DeepDyve
ER -