TY - JOUR
AB - Abstract Drawing on personal experience, this practice note sets out lessons learned by two practitioners who were involved in bringing the case in the United Kingdom against Kumar Lama under universal jurisdiction. The authors start by setting out some guidance on strategic considerations in bringing a universal jurisdiction case, both in terms of fighting impunity in the country of origin and at the global level. They also include thoughts on using the outcome (which in this case was an acquittal). The practice note unpacks the potential legal and practical pitfalls involved. Throughout, the authors highlight the need to keep the complainants and witnesses’ interests at the centre of proceedings, and acknowledge how difficult that is across substantially different legal systems and cultures. At the heart of the work they identify a tension between human rights documentation principles and evidentiary rules applicable in any criminal prosecution. The practice note sets out how that applies to testimonial and documentary evidence, and stresses the value of and inherent risk in using contemporaneous evidence. In the absence of access to the country of origin by the prosecuting authorities (as was the case here), the practice note stresses the importance of building a team to do documentation with the understanding of its potential use as evidence in universal jurisdiction, ensuring a certain level of professionalism, and very importantly ensuring that confidentiality is guaranteed. 1. Introduction Between 2008 and 2016, the authors and many others (some of whom must remain anonymous) were instrumental in bringing about a universal jurisdiction (UJ) investigation and prosecution in the United Kingdom (UK). The case concerned a Nepal Army colonel, Kumar Lama, who was arrested in January 2013 while visiting the UK. He was charged on two counts of torture. After a long trial, he was acquitted on one count in August 2016, while the jury could not reach a decision on the second count. The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) in early September 2016 informed the court that it did not seek a retrial in respect of this second count. As both authors were called as witnesses during the trial, they were not able to attend it. This practice note therefore cannot address in any detail that final stage of the process. It first briefly addresses critical legal aspects of UJ. Then, it offers, as it were, a ‘behind the scenes’ insight into ‘the making of’ a UJ case, focusing on the early phases of the work and documenting the limitations and challenges in bringing such cases to a successful outcome. Chiefly among them, the authors explore tensions between substantial and process elements during preparations, such as the tension between identifying and using contemporaneous evidence and disclosure requirements. We also consider the challenges associated with victims’ support and representation under an adversarial justice system. Thirdly, we look at issues around equality of arms (an inherent and fundamental element of the right to a fair trial, acknowledged as such by leading human rights monitoring bodies) when accessing evidence in the country of origin. These are three key points of tension, the consideration of which in our view goes a long way to explain the ultimate outcome of the case against Kumar Lama. 2. Understanding of the context and the value that universal jurisdiction could add in furthering human rights discourse in the country of origin Universal jurisdiction cases are important for the global fight against impunity for crimes under international law. In respect of Nepal, it was part of our strategy from the beginning to use UJ to fight impunity for serious human rights violations, by levering the UJ case to force relevant Nepali actors to understand the changing international legal context, and in particular to pressure the government to introduce legal and administrative measures to incorporate crimes under international law into Nepali law and set up an effective transitional justice process. The idea was conceived in 2007 when the authors became aware of a tacit agreement between the political parties to condone the atrocities committed during the armed conflict between 1996 and 2006.1 We want to be clear from the outset that we would have preferred it if Colonel Lama was prosecuted for torture in Nepal, as is Nepal’s obligation under international law treaties to which it is a party.2 While acknowledging the diverse opinion on whether a systematic policy of prosecutions in a post-conflict scenario is sustainable (Freeman 2006, 2010), we strongly believe that in those cases where there is sufficient admissible evidence, it is to the benefit of the country and its people that the rule of law prevails and all those suspected of criminal responsibility are brought to justice in fair trials before ordinary civilian courts. We were part of the team that provided legal assistance to more than 120 people, who were victims of crimes under international law and serious human rights violations such as extrajudicial execution during the conflict, to help them file their complaints with the police, demanding criminal investigation. Despite sufficient prima facie evidence and court orders in many of these cases, no progress could be made in bringing those involved to justice (Advocacy Forum and Human Rights Watch 2008, 2009, 2010). Bringing the perpetrators of torture to trial was even more challenging than, for example, those responsible for unlawful killings, as torture was not defined as a crime in Nepal.3 This has resulted in the continual practice of torture in detention that these authors have been actively monitoring (Advocacy Forum, Publications on torture). As the country lacked the adequate legal framework to investigate and prosecute torture, in breach of its obligations under international law, it was not possible to charge Kumar Lama and prosecute him in Nepal. In fact, since Nepal became a party to the UN Convention against Torture in 1991, successive governments had repeatedly promised to make torture a crime under national law.4 Part of the wider strategy in the Colonel Lama case was to get torture criminalized, that is, to exert pressure through the UJ case to get the authorities in Nepal to realize that other UJ cases for torture could be brought if they did not criminalize this serious crime. As we will describe below, we were partly successful, as torture was incorporated as a crime into a new Penal Code which will come into force in August 2018. In addition, we were hoping that Colonel Lama’s arrest would pressure the government into setting up a credible transitional justice process. The establishment of transitional justice bodies had been part of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed in November 2006 after ten years of armed conflict between a Maoist insurgency and the security forces. There had been little or no progress by the time we started to document the case. Since then, in fact, two commissions (the Truth and Reconciliation Commission and a Disappearances Commission) have been set up and have received more than 60,000 complaints (Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Nepal; Rai 2016). 3. Identifying and locating the target/alleged perpetrator We would argue that to establish the whereabouts of the alleged perpetrator is probably the most challenging aspect of bringing a UJ case. Many human rights defenders will be able to tell you of a dozen or more strong cases of human rights violations where they have details of the alleged perpetrator(s) but they have no means of establishing their whereabouts, let alone their movements in and out of the country, their destinations, property abroad, and so on. We would recommend that anyone interested in initiating a UJ case should build strong links with the diaspora of the country of origin. This will assist with finding sources and information on alleged perpetrators’ whereabouts. Similarly, building a network of contacts within the security forces and border control authorities of the country of origin, as well as of possible forum countries (that is, countries to initiate UJ prosecutions) can be critical for the success of this work. In addition, it can be useful to gather publications (such as an army’s yearbook or similar) that likely will have photographs of senior security forces officers and other information (such as popular academic courses and other career paths) which will assist in mapping the possible movements and whereabouts of potential ‘targets’. It is also important to remember that you and your organization are not the only ones monitoring the human rights situation in your country. At the right time, it could be important to try and obtain as many personal details as possible about potential ‘targets’ from sources such as UN bodies, national and international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), security forces, diaspora, and others. It is important not to underestimate the difficulties involved in linking an individual perpetrator to a crime to a standard of beyond reasonable doubt. By its very nature, the crime of torture has few direct witnesses. In Nepal, it was common during the conflict to blindfold detainees, so even victims were not necessarily able to identify their torturers. You should therefore consider whether there could be any whistle-blowers within the security forces to draw on. This was not possible in the Lama case but may well be in other situations. In the case of Colonel Lama, the Nepal Army headquarters in a letter to the Kapilvastu district court had stated that he was studying in the United Kingdom, when the court was checking with the army on the implementation of its order to take disciplinary action against him. That, combined with information from NGO sources that Colonel Lama’s family was living in the UK, assisted us in establishing his whereabouts. We also at a critical point engaged a private detective to confirm his presence in the UK. 4. Be clear about the applicable legal framework and related procedural issues, including victim representation and disclosure Several organizations have produced handbooks on UJ and there are ample legal textbooks available, so we do not intend to go into detail on how to verify the applicable legal framework (FIDH 2009; REDRESS 2000). Below we focus on seven key questions, including the issue of immunity, victim support and representation, and rules of disclosure. 4.1 Documenting the steps in the state of origin to ensure accountability for the alleged crime Documenting whether there have been any legal proceedings against the target in the state of origin or whether there are ongoing and credible police investigations is an important element. This is important for several reasons: The country of origin may seek extradition. This did not arise in the Colonel Lama case as there is no extradition treaty between Nepal and the UK. Nevertheless, successive Nepal governments repeatedly made overtures to the UK to have Lama repatriated (Kathmandu Post 2015). It is understood that the UK made it clear that the separation of powers in the UK meant that the executive could not intervene once a case was sub judice. Not only the country of origin but also the defence lawyers may claim that the arrest and prosecution are in breach of international law. This happened in this case, where the defence appealed to the Court of Appeal on grounds that the UK had breached its obligations under the Convention against Torture by not informing Nepal that it was going to arrest Colonel Lama. The defence argued that this alleged procedural breach resulted in the suspension of the treaty in the relations between Nepal and the UK (KL and R, EWCA Crim 1729, 7 August 2014, para. 74).5 Under Section 135 of the UK’s Criminal Justice Act, the consent of the Attorney General is necessary for the prosecution of torture in the UK. The Attorney General will apply a public interest test to the case applying a number of criteria, including taking into account ‘important considerations of public policy or international nature’ (Crown Prosecution Service, Consents to Prosecute). We were not able to establish whether the then Attorney General considered the possibility of Colonel Lama being prosecuted in Nepal when on 4 January 2013 he reached his decision to allow the case to proceed. 4.2 Identify the exact crime—is it covered by universal jurisdiction in the country concerned? Is the period covered? Not all serious crimes are prosecutable under UJ nor do all states have national legislation enabling UJ. Thus, the first step of a legal strategy is to ascertain that the crime to be prosecuted falls under the categories of crimes allowing a state to prosecute under UJ and that the legal framework is already in place in the country where you intend to bring the case to allow such a prosecution (Harris and Sivakumaran 2015: 59). This may however not always be a strict requirement. There have been some cases, including one concerning Latvia, decided by the European Court of Human Rights where authorities have prosecuted suspects before the domestic legislation allowed for this, ruling that this did not violate the nullum crimen sine lege principle as those crimes were already crimes under customary international law (European Court of Human Rights, Kononov v. Latvia (Application no. 36376/04), Grand Chamber, Judgment of 17 May 2010). Although some countries have used customary international law as the basis to investigate and prosecute some crimes under UJ, most states rely on specific international treaties that allow them to use UJ. The crimes of genocide, torture, war crimes, crimes against humanity, apartheid and enforced disappearance are some of the crimes of human rights violations for which specific treaties allow and require states to invoke UJ.6 Some states parties to these treaties may exercise UJ over crimes committed only after they became a party to such treaty. The UK exercises UJ on torture only if the act of torture is committed after 1988 when the UK adopted the Criminal Justice Act 1988. Here, due to the dualist legal system, it is not the ratification of an international treaty that matters, but whether there is domestic legislation allowing for it (even if there is no ratification.) As the case of Kumar Lama was related to torture, we relied on Section 134 of the UK Criminal Justice Act which provides UJ for torture. The UK also has the Geneva Convention Act 1957 allowing UJ for war crimes, and the International Criminal Court Act 2001 providing UJ for war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity (Section 51). 4.3 Is the connection of the alleged perpetrator to the country of arrest sufficient to warrant action by the arresting authorities? Although the crimes that fall under UJ are supposed to be prosecuted irrespective of any connection between the alleged perpetrator and the country of prosecution, many countries have enacted or amended their legislation to assert UJ only where there is some level of connection (Human Rights Watch 2006: 28–30). Thus, many countries require the presence of the accused in the country in order to proceed with a prosecution under UJ. Although some countries may prosecute the person in absentia, such cases are rare (ibid: 58, 71, 94). UK law allows the authorities to launch an investigation even in the absence of the suspect from the territory when there is a likelihood of the suspect coming to their territory, but it does not prosecute the person if the person is not present in their territory (Hickman and Rose 2005). If a victim has become a resident or a citizen of the forum country, this could also be another connection that could trigger UJ—but the case will be on another jurisdictional basis. In many instances, victims of human rights violations fled their country and have sought asylum in another country. If that country has the legal framework for UJ, the presence of such victim could also be sufficient to allow UJ to be triggered even if the connection of the alleged perpetrator is weak (Ascensio 2003). Accordingly, as discussed earlier, diaspora networks can play an important role in opening the possibility for UJ. 4.4 Make sure the target does not enjoy immunity Under international law certain people in power have claimed immunity from arrest and prosecution. Thus, it is important to know that your target is not in a position to do so. There are two kinds of immunities under international law: personal immunity, known as immunity ratione personae, and material immunity, known as immunity ratione materiae. Immunity ratione personae relates to the immunity provided to certain office holders by virtue of their office (Wickremasinghe 2014: 379). Immunity ratione materiae relates to the immunity provided to the state officials for acts conducted in an official capacity. Normally, the head of the state or government and the foreign minister enjoy immunity ratione personae. Although it is not uniform in all jurisdictions, some states would also extend immunity ratione personae to other public officials visiting a state at the invitation of its government.7 At the same time, it has to be noted that immunity, even for heads of state, is not unlimited. At a minimum, there is no immunity from prosecution for heads of state before international criminal tribunals. This is recognized in Article 27 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) as well as in the jurisprudence of other courts such as the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. For example, in the case of Sudanese President Omar al-Bashir, two arrest warrants were issued by the ICC under charges of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Thus, it is important that the target does not fall under the categories of persons enjoying immunity, or that at least the possibility exists of using a waiver once the person is arrested. As immunity ratione personae arises from someone’s official position, it is normally the state of such an official that can waive the immunity. Article 27 of the Rome Statute of the ICC, however, makes it explicit that immunity shall not bar the court from exercising its jurisdiction. The issue of immunity ratione materiae was discussed in detail in the UK courts in the case of Pinochet and it provides a very strong precedent for how immunity is considered in potential UJ cases (Bianchi 1999). As Pinochet was already retired and would not be protected by immunity ratione personae, the UK court in this case had to decide whether he would enjoy immunity ratione materiae to resist the claim for his arrest and extradition to Spain. In this case, the House of Lords (at the time the UK’s highest court) concluded that he was not immune for the crimes committed after 8 December 1988 (when the UK ratified the UN Convention against Torture). The Convention provides UJ for torture and by ratifying the Convention, states implicitly recognize that immunity does not apply (though it may still need to be explicitly waived in most jurisdictions). The immunity is for the protection of the state’s conduct. If any conduct bears individual criminal responsibility, then immunity cannot be invoked, as the very nature of torture requires official involvement; moreover under international law torture cannot be regarded as a function of a head of state. On this basis, the court rejected Pinochet’s claim of immunity (ibid.). The issue of immunity was also raised in the case of Kumar Lama on the basis that he was serving as an expert with the UN Mission in South Sudan at the time of his arrest. This argument was rejected by Justice Sweeney in the first instance. The defence subsequently appealed to the Court of Appeal. In August 2014, the Court of Appeal concluded that Lama did not have immunity at the time of his arrest and detention (KL and R, EWCA Crim 1729, 7 August 2014: paras 76–101; Shrestha 2018). 4.5 Who can initiate proceedings? In some countries, victims have the right to bring complaints and to initiate prosecutions. The victims can submit evidence directly to a magistrate or a judge requesting them to launch a prosecution if investigations and prosecutions are refused by the normal investigating and prosecuting authorities. After analysing the evidence, the judge can decide whether to prosecute or not. This is referred as a private prosecution. Victims can get help from NGOs and legal firms when seeking to file a private prosecution.8 Considering the nature of UJ cases, where the forum countries may have different interests and no political will to prosecute the suspect, the right of the victims to demand prosecution is important. Many successful cases under UJ such as the cases of Pinochet and of Hissène Habré, were initiated through petitions from victims and NGOs to launch investigations (Brody 2015). Although this right of the victims and NGOs has been curtailed in many countries, it is still possible in some countries.9 This option may therefore need to be considered while developing the litigation strategy. While tort cases may be brought by interested parties, criminal prosecutions require actual victims to be party to the case. In other words, it will be important to choose the right people and cases to formally file complaints. In addition to these being cases with strong evidence, it is also important to consider how victims would hold up under the stress caused when filing such cases (including their ability to face inevitable delays, keep matters confidential, and handle cross-examination). In the case of Kumar Lama, it was the UK’s Metropolitan Police that launched the investigation and the Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) prosecuted him. However, the police were not keen to pursue the investigation in the beginning. At that stage, we explored the possibility of a private prosecution. Under the UK Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, Section 25(2), evidence can be submitted directly to a magistrates’ court if police fail to investigate an allegation that a crime has been committed. For example, the arrest warrant against a retired Israeli General by a magistrates’ court in the UK in 2005 was based on evidence presented by a UK law firm acting on behalf of a Palestinian human rights NGO.10 In the UK, this could be costly because the private party would have to carry the costs of the trial (including legal representation, bringing witnesses to the country, and so on) (Dodd 2006). Nevertheless, this could be part of the legal strategy when evidence is strong and resources are available. In cases where the authorities are not keen to pursue an investigation, it is important to consider other than legal means to pressure them into undertaking the investigation. This could be done through private interventions with members of parliament or other stakeholders such as academics who may have influence on the state’s authorities. However, there is a clear tension to be aware of here—that is, that the initiative could be leaked to the alleged perpetrator and/or his or her state of origin. 4.6 Disclosure rules Another aspect that needs to be considered is the forum country’s rules of disclosure. This may not exist in the legal system of the country of origin but may do so in the forum state. For instance, the UK Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, as amended by the Criminal Justice Act 2003, requires the prosecution to disclose materials that ‘might reasonably be considered capable of undermining the case for the prosecution … or of assisting the case for the accused’ (Attorney General’s Office 2013: para. 1). Thus, any material that may cast doubt on the accuracy of any of the evidence brought by the prosecution, its reliability, the credibility of prosecution witnesses, or admissibility of the prosecution’s evidence should be disclosed to the defence. The Criminal Justice Act allows the police to search and seize all the documents that may undermine the case of the prosecution. This includes electronic materials. Thus, a disclosure officer of the police, separate from those undertaking the investigation, would seek to obtain all information related to the case, including any email exchanges containing information about the case. In the case of Lama, there were severe delays in the start of the trial as the defence continued to seek disclosure of additional information, including email exchanges between different witnesses involved. This information was then used by the defence team to call into question the alleged criminal responsibility of Kumar Lama. Thus, it is important to have knowledge about the exact nature of the disclosure process and the critical role that it can play from the outset, and to keep meticulous records. 4.7 Victim support and representation during the trial Depending on its legal system, a country will follow different procedures for justice delivery. In those with an adversarial criminal justice system, such as in the UK, serious criminal cases are considered as crimes against the state. The state does the investigation and prosecution. It is the responsibility of the prosecutor to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt. In such adversarial systems, the role of the court is passive, functioning like an umpire in a battle between the two sides, the prosecutor and the defence. Witnesses provide their testimonies before the jury; they are cross-examined by the defence lawyers and that is supposed to help the jury to get to the truth. Priority is placed on examination and cross-examination of the witnesses. Under such system, a standard strategy of defence lawyers is to create doubts in the minds of the jury members about the evidence presented so the benefit of doubt could go to the accused. If the witnesses come from a country having an inquisitorial system, where examination and cross-examination may not be as adversarial and the court or the investigating judge play an active role in collecting and examining evidence and equal importance is placed on documentary evidence, they may find the process under an adversarial system intimidating and upsetting. In the case of Kumar Lama, many witnesses reported that they felt as if they were being accused when they were cross-examined by the defence lawyer and that they found it disturbing when the court did not intervene. In addition, many of the witnesses appeared in a court for the first time in their life and moreover in a foreign country, in a completely different environment, where they did not understand the court language (both substantially and culturally). In addition, several of us who were involved in the case, whom witnesses might have find comfortable to talk to, were not allowed to talk to them nor to each other, so as not to contaminate the evidence and the process, as we ourselves were also called as witnesses. In Nepal, witnesses are well briefed by their lawyers and the restriction on communication is something unheard of. In the UK, on the contrary, the witnesses had very little contact with the CPS and its legal counsel. Thus, the witnesses involved in the Lama case somehow felt isolated and at a loss, not understanding why ‘their’ lawyers could not properly brief them, which may have had some impact on the case as they felt less protected, especially at the time of the trial (Mandira Sharma interview with Janak Raut, late 2016). During run-of-the-mill cases involving UK residents, witnesses arguably return home at the end of a day of giving evidence and get support from their relatives and friends. In the case at hand, witnesses who had travelled from Nepal were hosted in a hotel, but were otherwise discouraged from any contact with each other, and/or with members of the Nepali community in the UK. Furthermore, the UK jury system was completely new to most of the witnesses involved in the case. The lack of understanding of its role was also reflected in the way the Nepali media reported the case, presenting the jury as a panel of experts (Sharma 2016). According to UK law, a 12-member jury in a criminal case like this must reach a unanimous decision on whether the accused is guilty or not guilty. Under the UK Juries Act 1974, Section 17, when a unanimous decision cannot be reached, the judge can allow a majority decision (meaning at least 10 out of 12 members have to agree to a guilty or not guilty verdict). In the case of Kumar Lama, he was charged with two counts of torture; on one count the jury found him not guilty but on the second count, after a week, the jury could not come to a consensus or majority decision. This situation is referred to as a ‘hung jury’ and it requires either a retrial of the case or withdrawal of all charges against the accused. In this case, after some weeks of consideration, the prosecutor decided not to go for a retrial but to discharge Kumar Lama from the charges. Although Nepal’s criminal justice system leans more towards the adversarial system, it has embraced many elements of the inquisitorial system, providing discretion to the court. Thus, it is important for NGOs or lawyers undertaking UJ cases to understand the criminal justice system in the forum state and to brief the witnesses accordingly, as the case largely depends on their support. Furthermore, once the UK police and CPS take charge of the case, any NGO or legal firm who had been working with the victims to present a dossier of evidence to the authorities no longer has a formal role. In certain jurisdictions (France and Spain, for instance), the lawyers representing the victims also appear during the trial and have a right to examine and cross-examine witnesses, alongside the prosecution and defence. This is not the case in the UK. Another aspect to explain concerns the limitations of criminal proceedings in realizing victims’ rights to redress, and more specifically the right to compensation. While in certain jurisdictions, and at the ICC, these rights are recognized, the UK criminal law system does not provide for any compensation.11 This is a point we had to repeatedly explain to the victims. If Kumar Lama had been found guilty, Janak Raut and Karam Hussein would not have thereby had the right to seek compensation from Lama himself, the Nepal state, or the UK state for that matter. It is important for NGOs to be clear about this from the outset, and to explain this to the victims and witnesses, so they have realistic expectations in this respect. On a related point, the victims as well as witnesses were provided basic payments for loss of income during their time away from Nepal. 5. Assessing and managing risk Needless to say, there can be many risks to the victims, witnesses, lawyers, interpreters and others involved in bringing a UJ case. We will focus here on key aspects of assessing and managing risks to victims and witnesses and how to uphold the duty of care towards them. 5.1 Risk assessment We first want to stress how essential it is to conduct a wide-ranging (more ‘high level’) risk assessment very early in the process. Key issues to consider are: the likely reaction of the government in the country of origin and forum country; the relationship between both countries; whether the government of the country of origin is likely to financially support the defence (which in this case initially happened, resulting in Kumar Lama hiring a prestigious law firm, Kingsley Napley, whose lawyers had earlier represented Pinochet); the likely reactions of specific ‘enemies’ or ‘allies’ within the administration of the relevant states; laws that can be used to target the organization and individuals involved in bringing the case; likelihood of support from international actors in the unlikely event of security risk, and so on. As part of the mitigating strategies, we highlight a few important ones to consider: the need to develop a record-keeping protocol (ensuring systematic centralized records which will be critical during the disclosure process—see section 4.6 above); the need to develop a communication protocol (ensuring secure communications between those collecting evidence on the ground and the investigating authorities throughout the duration of the case preparation and beyond); how to limit the number of people involved in putting the case together to ensure confidentiality of the initiative and its specific target; the need to monitor for potential infiltration and possible leakage of confidential information in the organization (linked to point above). We also want to highlight the need to have a wider communications strategy. The gist of this strategy must be to keep the initiative confidential until arrest and then keep the case out of the media until the conclusion of the trial. Whereas it is important to be transparent when taking statements from witnesses as to the exact purpose of the initiative, there is a clear risk that by doing so, information will reach the ‘target’ and the endeavour will be jeopardized. It is advisable to consider carefully the ethical duty of disclosure of purpose when seeking informed consent. It is worth remembering that the process is likely to take years and has many phases, and to consider the exact way to disclose the purpose at each of these stages. This should be part of the wider communications strategy developed from the outset. The need to limit media coverage during the trial is important, as otherwise the defence could argue that the accused cannot have a fair trial. There could also be a risk of being in breach of reporting restrictions which normally apply to criminal trials. We recommend building a small network of trusted journalists and conducting off-the-record debriefings at critical points during the process to ensure sympathetic media coverage which does not reveal sources. This will be important as a counterweight against adversarial and hostile coverage by other parties. It is also important that victims and witnesses maintain a distance from the media. This can be quite difficult to achieve over such a long period, where victims are keen to tell their story, and are faced by others speaking against them and in favour of the alleged perpetrator, but nevertheless it is critical that they do not speak out. In this case, as it resulted in acquittal, it was also important to discuss as part of the communication strategy how not to let the acquittal be used against the victims and the issue of justice. 5.2 Building your team Part of the security strategy must be a consideration of how best to maintain confidentiality of the initiative and its specific target. One way to do that is to keep to a minimum the number of individuals working on the case. It is essential to have someone in the team with direct experience of criminal law practice in the forum country for reasons set out above (the familiarity with the legal process and its quirks, the knowledge of how best to present evidence, disclosure requirements, and so on). Those interviewing the victims and witnesses have to be committed, as it can be a long-drawn-out process. They must be mature and unlikely to be influenced. It is important to consider the role of interpreters here—in the Kumar Lama case, we decided that the interviewing would be done by non-nationals (for security reasons), with only two or three Nepali nationals involved as interpreters. This was successful in keeping the initiative confidential up to the time of Kumar Lama’s arrest. After that, for reasons of disclosure as set out above, it was impossible to keep the names of all those involved (including the non-nationals and interpreters) confidential. It is important that this is explained clearly from the beginning to the staff, interpreters and others involved in the work. If human rights defenders, whether lawyers or others, act as interpreters it is important that they keep their own records following the protocol discussed above. These may have to be exhibited as evidence or at least as part of the disclosure process. 5.3 Looking after victims and witnesses In the Kumar Lama case, there were in the end around 15 material witnesses (including the two victims) and another dozen or so people called as witnesses for their role in putting the case together. The organization and individuals leading the initiative to bring a UJ case must consider their duty of care towards everyone involved (both material and other witnesses). A detailed security plan developed early on should include a consideration of relocating those involved from their places of residence, if there were to be any threats. Such relocation strategies can be linked to levels of threat; with local, national and international possibilities of relocation to be explored. We found that securing a budget for this can be a challenge, and advise allowing sufficient time for this. Regular communication with all involved is very important. We found that we needed to repeatedly explain the legal process and its various stages in detail. For instance, when the defence appealed to the Court of Appeal, with all the uncertainty that entailed, we spent a lot of time explaining the possible outcomes to the victims and key witnesses. Once the UK police embarked on their own investigations and ultimately arrested Kumar Lama in January 2013, they regularly kept the witnesses informed of the process, and any changes. This was much appreciated by the witnesses. We found that as part of the duty of care towards the witnesses, it was important for the NGO and legal advisers to check their ongoing commitment at regular intervals. People’s lives change over the years it takes to conclude a case like this. They get married, they have children, they change jobs, all of which can impact on their commitment to giving evidence. One witness, for instance, joined the civil service and stopped his involvement in the case, on the basis that the risk of losing his job was high, if he was seen to give evidence against a Nepal Army officer. 6. Building the case Looking back at the earlier phases of building our case file, one of the big lessons learned is to focus as much on process as on substance. We were very concentrated on finding the strongest evidence, possibly at the cost of considering the process of doing so. If we were to be able to go back, we would have sought the advice of the authorities in the forum state much earlier on in the process. We would have developed a joint strategy from the outset, with an agreement with the specialized police unit as to the way forward with gathering evidence. As it was unlikely that the UK police would be able to visit Nepal, we could have discussed third country options much earlier on in the process. This happened only in 2012, when several witnesses travelled from Nepal to Thailand and Singapore and gave evidence to the UK police there. 6.1 Gathering and presenting evidence: process considerations Although it is the responsibility of the police, prosecutor or the judge (depending on the system of the forum country) to launch the investigation, considering the sensitive nature of a UJ case they may not have cooperation from the territorial state. In the case of Kumar Lama, the Nepalese government did not cooperate with the investigation. Nepal neither allowed investigators to visit the country nor provided documents and evidence required by the investigators, despite being requested to do so. The defence lawyers faced no such restrictions; they were allowed to visit to collect evidence that could help to defend the accused and weaken the prosecution’s case. Considering the nature of UJ cases, it is most likely that investigating and prosecuting authorities must depend a lot on evidence collected by NGOs. Most human rights NGOs like ours are trained in human rights documentation. This is different from collecting evidence that could be used in criminal proceedings, for which state agencies have a specific authority as well as methodology. Even though the evidence is strong, the way it is collected, stored and transferred may weaken the case as this could be challenged by the defence to raise doubts in the mind of the jury or the court. In the UK, a statement taken in the prescribed format (set out in Section 9 of the Criminal Justice Act) is admissible in court. Thus, NGOs could take statements of witnesses in that prescribed format, but they must be aware that by doing so, they lay themselves open to this evidence being subject to cross-examination when the case reaches trial stage. Of course, it is not an easy task for NGOs under constant threat, intimidation, infiltration and attack to consider all those different aspects but, if an NGO foresees the possibility of being engaged in a potential UJ case, it is important that staff are appropriately trained, and that information storage systems are specifically designed for potential use in UJ cases.12 It is critical for information gathered at the time the human rights violation (and crime) is committed to be collected, verified and stored to the highest possible standard available at the time. To give just one example: it was standard practice in our organization during the armed conflict to destroy notes after entering information into a database system. In hindsight, if these notes had been available at the time we initiated the UJ case, it is likely that a more effective case would have been presented in court. Similarly, we designed our database to store information, which would be updated and edited as we got additional information from the field, without necessarily recording who made which changes and edits and when. If there is a potential use of such information from a database in UJ (and likely domestic) prosecutions, it is important to record any changes meticulously to counter the possible allegation of manipulation of information. This for sure should be part of initial discussions with the investigating and prosecuting authorities, so they can take that into account when developing their own strategy to arrest, charge and take to trial any alleged perpetrators. Another lesson is that once one is confident that a UJ case can succeed, it is necessary to approach the investigating authority in the forum country and seek their guidance on the process for taking statements. In many countries, special police units have been established to investigate cases under UJ. The police may be willing to engage with NGOs from early on to avoid any potential risks that may arise because of the way in which evidence was collected. Importantly, such a dialogue also can reduce the number of times a victim or witness is interviewed, which is both beneficial from a do-no-harm perspective and helps to avoid any discrepancies creeping in which may weaken the case. As statements are gathered from the victims and witnesses, it is advisable to limit the number of drafts of statements. Less is definitely better, as it minimizes the opportunities for the defence to later challenge how the statements were drafted and changed, trying to cast doubt into the mind of the jury or judge about the professionalism of the process of evidence collection. When taking statements for UJ cases, one would follow standard best practice, including following basic requirements such as to keep witnesses away from each other as much as possible, so you limit the possibility of evidence being contaminated. For example, as there may be witnesses who were held together at a place of detention, it would be important to interview them entirely separately, and then compare their statements. From that, you may want to further probe with specific individuals on the minute detail of the initial evidence they provided, focusing on aspects they are unlikely to have discussed with others before. But, as said above, minimize the number of drafts, and make only changes that you can justify to defence lawyers later in the process. 6.2 Contemporaneous evidence: strengths and weaknesses Contemporaneous evidence (that is, evidence existing, occurring, or originating during the time the alleged crime was committed or as near to it as possible) is among the strongest forms of evidence.13 During the initial phase of collecting all available information on the case, we looked high and low for any contemporaneous evidence that would be able to strengthen the case. But, while contemporaneous evidence carries a lot of weight during a trial, the defence can also use it to undermine the prosecution case, especially when it was not collected for the direct purpose of criminal investigation. It is good to examine what that may mean for the strength of the case. In the Lama case, for instance, we had records of a complaint to the local district court under the Torture Compensation Act of Nepal which requires victims to file the case within 35 days. The court had awarded compensation to the torture victim and ordered disciplinary action against Kumar Lama. We considered this a strong piece of documentary evidence. However, during cross-examination at trial, the defence managed to discredit the documents submitted to the district court, using a number of technicalities, to the extent of substantially undermining the case. During the conflict, those subjected to torture in the army barracks in particular would be released on condition that they would not report the case anywhere and they would regularly report to the barracks. This also happened in this case. During this period victims could not bring any complaint to any authority. Within two months after the political change of 2006, the victim filed a case. The courts in Nepal had already taken note of the context and interpreted that the release from detention would not only refer to the physical release but also the psychological one, taking cognizance of those cases where victims had to present themselves at barracks or before local government authorities. Accordingly, many cases were successfully filed in the courts. However, Kumar Lama’s defence argued that the victim’s access to the remedies in the district court in Nepal was done fraudulently (by allegedly misrepresenting the time frame of his initially conditional and ultimately unconditional release from detention) to undermine the evidence constituted by the local court’s decision. This arguably could have been avoided if we had provided fuller information to the prosecutors (and through them to the court). The prosecutors would have been readier to rebut this skewed presentation of the facts by the defence team. On the other hand, we identified a researcher of an international NGO who had visited the army camp concerned and interviewed Kumar Lama. As he had his original handwritten notes, as well as a report published at the time in which two of the witnesses in the case were named as torture victims, the testimony of that researcher was unable to be undermined by the defence barrister. As part of the search for contemporaneous evidence, it is also important to seek out any photographic and video evidence that may exist (including with local newspapers, online, other NGOs, the victims themselves, and so on). It may also be useful to consider Google earth or satellite imagery. Of course, it is also possible that the police may not be that interested in the beginning, as we experienced initially in the case of Kumar Lama. Therefore, seeking support from an experienced law firm in the forum state is also advisable. This would help not only to understand many of the legal issues discussed above but also to monitor the process. Thus, having a law firm supporting the victim and your NGO would be a critical step to consider from early in the process. 6.3 Expert evidence Depending on the judicial system, expert evidence can be submitted by a third party and/or obtained as part of the criminal investigation process and should be considered as a way to further strengthen the case. In the Lama case, we submitted a sworn statement by a former UN Special Rapporteur on torture, who had visited Nepal around the time the alleged torture of the victims in the case had taken place. This was in itself supported by various UN reports (including conclusions and recommendations on Nepal by the UN Committee against Torture (2007)). We also requested foreign as well as Nepali forensic experts to review the medico-legal documentation we managed to obtain, and to share medical notes related to the victims’ treatment. As with other contemporaneous evidence, the latter in hindsight proved to both strengthen and weaken the case, as it turned out that the contemporaneous notes were ambiguous. The defence used this during the trial to cast doubt over the veracity of the allegations. Like the victims and witnesses themselves, Nepali forensic experts also found the UK legal system and trial proceedings to be alien and were shocked at being cross-examined and having their professionalism questioned by the defence lawyer. The Metropolitan Police later sought the assistance of an academic as an expert witness to explain the historical context to the court and the jury. We assisted in this process and found it a challenge, as many academics were reluctant to engage at the risk of ending up at the wrong side of the Nepali government and losing their access to Nepal. In sum, we found that obtaining expert witnesses is important, challenging, and rife with possible pitfalls, similar to those encountered in respect of other witnesses. 6.4 Ensuring reliability of evidence As stated above (see section 4.7), proving beyond reasonable doubt that a specific individual is responsible for torture is difficult, partly due to the secretive circumstances under which torture normally takes place, and therefore it is important to consider whether it is possible to access any whistle-blowers. One way to try and corroborate accusations by victims against specific individuals would be to test out their evidence against reports from other areas and periods of deployment. In other words, to try to establish whether the alleged perpetrator is known to have been involved in similar methods of torture, used similar language when giving orders and so on in other parts of the country, or during other periods. It is well documented that victims of torture can suffer from post-traumatic stress for many years and how this can affect their memory (Silove 1999). During the Kumar Lama trial, one of the victims had difficulties recollecting information he had provided to the police in 2012, a point which the defence heavily relied on in its summing up. It is important therefore to check the quality of the witnesses’ memory during the early phases of evidence collection, to avoid this only emerging during the trial. To restate what we said above, it is very important to document the process of putting together a case file. Our advice would be to log every activity daily, so no suspicion is created when you work on a specific case over a number of years. 7. Strategy on using the outcomes While we waited for the jury to reach its decision, we had drafted press releases for every possible permutation of outcomes (acquittal, conviction and/or hung jury in respect of each of the two counts of torture). Having a press release ready has the advantage of being able to control the initial media response, ahead of others, like in this case the Nepal Army. Because UJ cases are so exceptional, they will have impact, whatever the outcome. This case has been signalled as a promising sign for future UJ cases in the UK (Shrestha 2018: 22). Regardless of whether or not a UJ trial ends in conviction or acquittal, it is important to consider how to use the outcome to advance human rights protection in the country of origin. As the Lama case progressed through the UK courts, victims of human rights violations during the conflict started to hope impunity would be addressed (Shrestha 2018). The veil of impunity that perpetrators enjoyed started to be shattered. Immediately after Lama’s arrest, the police and prosecutor in Dailekh district filed a case against some of the perpetrators involved in a murder during the conflict (Advocacy Forum 2014). Nepal also proceeded with passing legislation for and establishing two transitional justice bodies (see section 2 above). Some cases pending in the Nepali courts concluded with a conviction: five members of the Maoist Party were convicted of the murder of journalist Dekendra Thapa in December 2014; and in April 2017 three retired army officers were sentenced in absentia to life imprisonment for the murder of Maina Sunuwar (who died after torture in army custody) (Advocacy Forum 2014, 2017).14 In 2017, Nepal also adopted a new Penal Code which criminalizes torture (Amnesty International 2018). In a handful of other cases, charges have been filed against members of the security forces, but the trials are not proceeding. It is also clear that many in the army and other relevant institutions who regularly travel abroad have been conscious that there is a chance they may face arrest when doing so (Zeenews 2016). The case served as a political catalyst as state officials became mindful that if they did not deal with such crimes of international status in Nepal they could be taken up abroad, which is financially crippling (Shrestha 2018: 24). 8. Conclusion We hope that this ‘behind the scenes’ insight into ‘the making of’ a UJ case, focusing on the early phases of the work and documenting the limitations and challenges in bringing such cases to a successful outcome can contribute to the ongoing struggle for justice for conflict-era crimes in Nepal and elsewhere. In general terms, we have explored key points of tension between substantial and process elements during preparations, including between the identification and use of contemporaneous evidence and disclosure requirements and the challenges associated with victim support and representation under an adversarial justice system. Issues around equality of arms, especially in terms of accessing evidence in the country of origin have been highlighted, and we hope this will help those seeking to bring UJ cases to strengthen their litigation strategies. As we write this, the struggle to bring about a meaningful transitional justice process in Nepal continues. In many debates on this topic the Kumar Lama case and the role of UJ remains central. Most political actors in Nepal remain confident of enjoying impunity in Nepal. After the Lama trial, they are very aware of the changing international legal regime and are nervous of travelling abroad. The knowledge of this being possible in itself is a powerful message and has empowered the legal profession, human rights defenders and victims. We are satisfied to at least have contributed to the protection of human rights in Nepal that way. We hope that one day sooner rather than later there will be trials of alleged perpetrators of serious human rights violations in the Nepali courts. In the meantime, we hope that this practice note is useful for others seeking to bring UJ cases not only from Nepal but from other countries. Footnotes 1 Information on this point emerged at a meeting between a group of human rights defenders, including one of the authors, and then Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala in 2007. 2 Nepal’s ratification status can be accessed at http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=122&Lang=EN. 3 In theory, prosecutions under provisions for assault would have been possible, but the state never attempted to pursue these. In any event, international law is clear that crimes of torture should be defined as such, and that prosecutions under these lesser criminal charges do not meet state obligations. 4 Not only torture, but other serious international crimes are not criminalized in Nepal. However, the then Attorney General of Nepal confirmed that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Act is under review and that an amendment proposal includes the criminalization of serious violations such as torture, enforced disappearance, extrajudicial killings and sexual abuse (interview with one of the authors 27 March 2017). At the time of writing, this remained under review. 5 We would like to point to eminent sources which make it clear that the territorial state does not have priority to investigate and prosecute. Amnesty International stated in 2001: ‘[i]n the unlikely event that more than one state claimed priority to investigate and prosecute a suspect for the same crimes under international law based on the same conduct, the state with custody seeking to exercise universal jurisdiction would normally have a better claim than the territorial state to act on behalf of the international community, since the presence of the suspect outside the territorial state creates a presumption that the authorities of the territorial state are not acting with due diligence to investigate and prosecute. Failure to transmit an extradition request would be compelling evidence that the territorial state was not serious’ (Amnesty International 2001: 40). Likewise, the AU–EU Expert Report on the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction stated: ‘Positive international law recognises no hierarchy among the various bases of jurisdiction that it permits. In other words, a state which enjoys universal jurisdiction over, for example, crimes against humanity is under no positive legal obligation to accord priority in respect of prosecution to the state within the territory of which the criminal acts occurred or to the state of nationality of the offender or victims’ (African Union 2009: para. 14). 6 Article 5(2) of the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment; Article VI of the Genocide Convention; Article IV(b) of the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid; and Article 9(2) of the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance. There is no specific treaty for crimes against humanity; Article 7 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court criminalizes such crimes. 7 For example, Rstan Injatow, the chief of the Uzbek intelligence service, avoided prosecution based on this argument in 2008 in Germany. For more discussion, see Kaleck (2009). 8 In the UK, NGOs such as REDRESS, Civitas Maxima and others can provide such help. Hickman and Rose solicitors provided legal advice in the Kumar Lama case. 9 In 2011 the UK law was changed to require the permission of the Director of Public Prosecutions even in private prosecutions (see Ministry of Justice 2011). 10 On 10 September 2005 a British court issued a warrant for the arrest of Major General (retired) Doron Almog and the police were ready to arrest him on the allegation of war crimes. However, Mr Almog escaped arrest after refusing to leave his aeroplane at Heathrow airport following a tip off, and UK authorities allowed the plane to return to Israel. 11 Victims can theoretically seek compensation in separate sequential civil proceedings under tort law. This would be challenging when the crime was committed abroad and by foreigners, but it is at least theoretically possible. 12 Advocacy Forum used the Research Information Management System (RIMS) database system, which served its purpose in terms of documentation of thousands of human rights violations. However, it lacks the ability to clearly log any changes to existing data. 13 For instance, a reference to a case in a local NGO’s records and year report of the time the alleged crime was committed would be given considerable weight as evidence, as it was collected around the time of the alleged offence. 14 An appeal against the acquittal of a fourth soldier was rejected by the High Court in April 2018. At the time of writing the Supreme Court was considering an appeal by the Nepal Army challenging the district court’s jurisdiction over cases involving the military. Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank Marek Marczynski, Hugo Relva, and others who preferred to remain anonymous for their early review of this practice note. They also take the opportunity to thank the victims and witnesses who bravely agreed to take part in the proceedings against Kumar Lama. Their dedication to the work earns the utmost admiration and respect. Funding This work was supported by Open Society Foundation (Grant No. OR2015-20100). References Advocacy Forum . Publications, Torture. http://advocacyforum.org/publications/torture.php. Advocacy Forum . 2014 . District Court Convicts in a Journo Dekendra Thapa’s Murder Case. News item. 7 December. http://advocacyforum.org/news/2014/12/dekendra-thapa.php (referenced 4 June 2018). Advocacy Forum . 2017 . The District Court Kavrepalanchowk Convicts Three out of Four Army Officers Accused of Maina’s Murder. Press release. 17 April. http://advocacyforum.org/press-statement/2017/MainaPressRelease-ENG1.pdf (referenced 25 June 2018). Advocacy Forum and Human Rights Watch . 2008 . Waiting for Justice: Unpunished Crimes from Nepal’s Armed Conflict. http://advocacyforum.org/downloads/pdf/publications/waiting-for-justice-sep-10.pdf (referenced 2 June 2018). Advocacy Forum and Human Rights Watch . 2009 . Still Waiting for Justice: No End to Impunity in Nepal. http://advocacyforum.org/downloads/pdf/publications/Still-Waiting-for-Justice_final.pdf (referenced 2 June 2018). Advocacy Forum and Human Rights Watch . 2010 . Indifference to Duty: Impunity for Crimes Committed in Nepal. http://advocacyforum.org/_downloads/indifference-to-duty-english-version.pdf (referenced 2 June 2018). African Union (AU) . 2009 . Report of the AU–EU Technical Ad Hoc Expert Group on the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction. Available at http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/3D8256E1F0245F524925762C00229665-Full_Report.pdf (referenced 2 June 2018). Amnesty International . 2001 . Universal Jurisdiction: The Duty of States to Enact and Implement Legislation. IOR 53/002/2001. Amnesty International . 2018 . Nepal 2017/8. Annual Report, Nepal entry. https://www.amnesty.org/en/countries/asia-and-the-pacific/nepal/report-nepal (referenced 22 February 2018). Ascensio H. 2003 . Are Spanish Courts Backing Down on Universality? The Supreme Tribunals’ Decision in Guatemalan Generals . Journal of International Criminal Justice 1 ( 3 ): 690 – 702 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Attorney General’s Office . 2013 . Guidelines on Disclosure. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/attorney-generals-guidelines-on-disclosure-2013 (referenced 2 June 2018). Bianchi A. 1999 . Immunity versus Human Rights: The Pinochet Case . European Journal of International Law 10 ( 2 ): 237 – 77 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Brody R. 2015 . Bringing a Dictator to Justice: The Case of Hissène Habré . Journal of International Criminal Justice 13 ( 2 ): 209 – 17 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS Crown Prosecution Service . Consents to Prosecute: Legal Guidance. https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/consents-prosecute (referenced 5 March 2018 ). Dodd V. 2006 . UK Considers Curbing Citizens’ Right to Arrest Alleged War Criminals. The Guardian. 3 February. FIDH (Federation Internationale des Droits de L’Homme) . 2009 . A Step by Step Approach to the Use of Universal (Criminal) Jurisdiction in Western European States. https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/ComUniv522a2009.pdf (referenced 2 June 2018). Freeman M. 2006 . Truth Commissions and Procedural Fairness . Cambridge University Press . Freeman M. 2010 . Necessary Evils: Amnesties and the Search for Justice . Cambridge University Press . Harris D. , Sivakumaran S. . 2015 . Cases and Materials on International Law ( 8th ed .). Sweet and Maxwell . Hickman and Rose Solicitors . 2005 . UK Court Issues Warrant against Israeli General. 11 September. http://www.hickmanandrose.co.uk/site/about/press-releases/details/uk-court-issues-warrant-against-israeli-general (referenced 27 May 2017). Human Rights Watch . 2006 . Universal Jurisdiction: The State of the Art. https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/ij0606web.pdf (referenced 3 June 2018). Kaleck W. 2009 . From Pinochet to Rumsfeld: Universal Jurisdiction in Europe 1998–2008 . Michigan Journal of International Law 30 ( 3 ): 927 – 80 . Kathmandu Post . 2015 . Thapa Urges UK to End Col Lama’s Case. 20 December. http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2015-12-20/thapa-urges-uk-to-end-col-lamas-case.html (referenced 2 June 2018). Ministry of Justice . 2011 . Universal Jurisdiction. Press release 15 September. https://www.gov.uk/government/news/universal-jurisdiction (referenced 24 June 2018). Rai D. 2016 . TRC Set to Begin Investigation ‘Soon’. Kathmandu Post. 27 December. http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/printedition/news/2016-12-27/trc-set-to-begin-investigation-soon.html (referenced 14 August 2017). REDRESS . 2000 . Challenging Impunity for Torture: A Manual for Bringing Criminal and Civil Proceedings in England and Wales for Torture Committed Abroad. Sharma C. 2016 . Hearing on Col Lama’s Criminal Charges Gets Underway in London. Republica. 6 June. http://admin.myrepublica.com/feature-article/story/43803/hearing-on-col-kamal-lama-s-criminal-charges-gets-underway-in-london.html (referenced 2 June 2018). Shrestha S. 2018 . The Curious Case of Colonel Kumar Lama: Its Origins and Impact in Nepal and the United Kingdom, and its Contribution to the Discourse on Universal Jurisdiction. Transitional Law Institute, King’s College , Paper 2/2018. Silove D. 1999 . The Psychosocial Effects of Torture, Mass Human Rights Violations, and Refugee Trauma: Toward an Integrated Conceptual Framework . Journal of Nervous and Mental Disease 187 ( 4 ): 200 – 207 . Google Scholar CrossRef Search ADS PubMed Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Nepal. Official website. http://www.trc.gov.np. UN Committee against Torture . 2007 . Nepal: Concluding Observations and Recommendations. CAT/C/NPL/CO/2. Wickremasinghe C. 2014 . Immunities Enjoyed by Officials of States and International Organizations. In Evans M. D. (ed.), International Law ( 4th ed .), pp. 379 – 411 . Oxford University Press . Zeenews . 2016 . Fearing Arrest, Prachanda Cancels Australia Visit. 24 June. http://zeenews.india.com/news/south-asia/fearing-arrest-prachanda-cancels-australia-visit_1899652.html (referenced 5 March 2018). © The Author(s) 2018. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com This article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (https://academic.oup.com/journals/pages/about_us/legal/notices)
TI - Regina v. Lama: Lessons Learned in Preparing a Universal Jurisdiction Case
JF - Journal of Human Rights Practice
DO - 10.1093/jhuman/huy020
DA - 2018-07-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/regina-v-lama-lessons-learned-in-preparing-a-universal-jurisdiction-N5TkBFxp5r
SP - 327
EP - 345
VL - 10
IS - 2
DP - DeepDyve
ER -