TY - JOUR AU - Mohan, M P, Ram AB - (1) Convention on Nuclear Safety As of March 2018, there are eighty-four contracting parties and sixty-five signatories to the Convention on Nuclear Safety. Cuba, which signed the instrument in 1994, deposited its acceptance in July, which came into force in October. Madagascar and Serbia deposited their instruments of accession respectively during March and December, which entered into force in June 2017 and March 2018 respectively. The Syrian Arab Republic, which signed the instrument in 1994, ratified with declaration/reservation in September and entered into force in December. The declaration/reservation of Syria is reproduced below: The ratification of the Convention by the Syrian Arab Republic shall not imply in any way whatsoever recognition of Israel, entry into direct or indirect relations with it, or involvement with it in any activities governed by the provisions of the Convention. … The Syrian Arab Republic has reservations regarding implementation of the provisions of Article 17.(iv) of the Convention relating to consultations in connection with the sitting of a nuclear installation on the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic. (Original received in Arabic) (A) Seventh Review Meeting The Convention on Nuclear Safety held its seventh Review Meeting of the Contracting Parties from 27 March to 7 April at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. The president of the review meeting, during the opening address, stated that the main objective of the meeting continues to be effective participation by contracting parties and ensuring full transparency in discussion. The president observed that: for the first time, with the goal of transparency in mind, all national reports will be posted on the CNS public website 90 days after the review meeting, unless a request to not do so is received. Our commitment to transparency can be demonstrated by each Contracting Party proactively posting their national report, as well as their questions and answers report, on the public CNS website. Additional transparency is achieved by inviting the media to the opening and closing plenaries.’ () The director general of IAEA, in his remarks to the seventh review meeting, outlined his plan of building on the Action Plan on Nuclear Safety. The director general conveyed that the draft Nuclear Safety Review 2017, published in February 2018, gives details of priority activities with respect to nuclear, radiation, transport, and waste safety. By giving examples, he says that ‘we plan to give increased attention to issues such as the safety of radioactive sources used in industry, health care and other non-power applications. We will continue to focus on regulatory effectiveness, safety culture and capacity-building’ (). The meeting noted that the seventh Review Meeting had the highest level of participation by contracting parties to date. Seventy-seven of the eighty contracting parties participated in the Review Meeting. Three contracting parties—Cambodia, Paraguay, and the Republic of Moldova—did not attend the Review Meeting. Three countries—Lebanon, Libya, and Uruguay–did not attend the country group sessions. At the time of the Review Meeting, twenty-one contracting parties had made their national reports publicly available on the IAEA website; several other contracting parties also published their national reports on their national public websites. The summary report covers common issues arising from country groups discussions (full report is available at ). Edited portions of the key major cross-cutting issues discussed in country groups are detailed below: Safety Culture. A number of Contracting Parties reported progress in developing approaches to oversight of the operator’s safety culture in regulatory body processes. However, the Contracting Parties noted that systematic approaches to oversight of licensee safety culture, and to the embedding of processes to promote and sustain the safety culture of the regulatory body itself, are not widely adopted and further strengthening of the guidance may be needed. International Peer Reviews. One of the responses to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power station accident was to increase participation in international peer reviews and exchange of information. The reviews, based on existing peer review mechanisms, have covered regulators, plant operators, designers and other organizations. Contracting Parties noted that these reviews, although of significant benefit, can be resource-intensive and need to be coordinated to ensure that they do not detract from the continuing attention that the regulatory body and operator must give to operational nuclear safety. Legal Framework and Independence of Regulatory Body. The Contracting Parties noted that establishing a legislative and regulatory framework that meets the obligations of the Convention remains a challenge for some Contracting Parties, especially for embarking and non-NPP countries. Some Contracting Parties reported that progress towards establishing effective separation of these functions remains an issue. Financial and human resources. Several Contracting Parties identified challenges associated with the funding and resourcing of the regulatory body. These included the absence of legislation that makes provision for adequate financial resources to enable the regulatory body to recruit and retain personnel with the necessary competencies to deliver an effective regulatory capability. Knowledge management. Difficulties facing regulatory bodies and operators in finding suitably qualified and experienced persons were also reported, and in some countries these are exacerbated by the demographic challenge, whereby significant numbers of experienced personnel are approaching retirement age. Supply Chain. This is a major common issue both for Contracting Parties which operate NPPs and those which are considering embarking on a nuclear power programme. For those which operate NPPs, one common issue is the availability of components to replace those which are ageing, due to non-availability of identical replacement parts from original manufacturers, obsolescence or developments in technology. Another common issue is the need to detect non-conforming, counterfeit, suspect or fraudulent items received from suppliers before they are installed in the plant. A further issue is the number of original tests or inspections whose results are now being called into question, raising concerns over the adequacy and reliability of the manufacturing and quality assurance processes. Managing the Safety of Ageing Nuclear Facilities and Plant Life Extension. Several Contracting Parties reported challenges relating to the establishment of ageing management programs. This includes the identification and implementation of reasonably practicable safety improvements and the definition of technical assessment and regulatory requirements supporting decisions on continued operation. Emergency Preparedness Contracting. Contracting Parties agreed that an important area warranting continued focus is the development of harmonized approaches for cross-border emergency planning zone definition and management. There was also acknowledgement of the need to further develop emergency preparedness and response measures to take account of multi-unit and external hazard events. Consultation & Communication. Contracting Parties acknowledged that open and transparent communication with the public can enhance trust in the regulatory body. This can include involvement of the public in development of policy and regulations regarding nuclear safety infrastructure. Outreach activities by operators in the local communities could also enhance public understanding of the nuclear industry. Contracting Parties further noted that communication of understandable, accurate and transparent information to the public and decision-makers during emergency situations needs to be planned and carefully considered at a time where rapid access to social media information, which may be of questionable provenance, is now widely available. (2) Nuclear Safety Review 2017 The director general of the IAEA, in his opening remarks during the seventh review meeting of the Convention on Nuclear Safety, spoke about the preparation of the draft of the Nuclear Safety Review 2017. The draft was submitted for approval to the Board of Governors session meeting that was held in March. The final approved report of the Nuclear Safety Review 2017 took account of the full the discussions held during the Board of Governors and also of the comments received from the member states. The executive overview of the Nuclear Safety Review 2017 states in its first paragraph: The Review 2017 includes the global trends and the Agency’s activities in 2016. It also presents priorities and related activities for 2017 and beyond, as identified by the Agency, for strengthening nuclear, radiation, transport and waste safety. The Executive Overview provides a summary of the trends, activities and priorities covered in this report. They include those related to general safety areas; radiation, transport and waste safety; safety in nuclear installations; emergency preparedness and response (EPR); management of the safety and security interface; and strengthening civil liability for nuclear damage. The Appendix provides details on the activities of the Commission on Safety Standards (CSS) and activities relevant to the Agency’s safety standards. () (3) Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent Fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management (Joint Convention) The third extraordinary meeting of the contracting parties was held in May. This meeting was held on the basis of the decision of the fifth review meeting, wherein contracting parties had decided to hold an extraordinary meeting prior to the organizational meeting for the sixth review meeting. The sixth review meeting of the contracting parties of the Joint Convention on Article 30 will be held at the headquarters of the IAEA in Vienna, Austria, from 21 May to 1 June 2018. As of March 2018, there were seventy-eight parties and forty-two signatories to the Joint Convention. Cuba, which signed the instrument in 1994, deposited acceptance in July 2017, which came into force in October 2017; Madagascar and Serbia deposited their instruments of accession respectively during March 2017 and December 2017, which entered into force in June 2017 and March 2018; Mexico deposited its instrument of accession in February 2018, which will enter into force during May 2018. © The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com This article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (https://academic.oup.com/journals/pages/open_access/funder_policies/chorus/standard_publication_model) TI - 1. Nuclear EnergyA. Nuclear Safety JF - Yearbook of International Environmental Law DO - 10.1093/yiel/yvy038 DA - 2017-01-01 UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/1-nuclear-energya-nuclear-safety-MOTs8fq04q SP - 151 VL - 28 IS - DP - DeepDyve ER -