TY - JOUR
AU - Vidovic, Dragana
AB - Abstract Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) experienced an unprecedented wave of nonsectarian antigovernment protests in 2014. Although the key motivating factors generally highlighted, such as economic marginalization and poor governance, were common throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, the protests did not extend to all parts of the country. Notably, despite very similar initial conditions in the two jurisdictions of the country, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) saw major unrest with a large number of participants in many locations while subsequent protest mobilization was much more limited in the Republic of Srpska (RS). We take advantage of the variation in the responses from the two governments in the same country to evaluate how observed and anticipated government responses can shape the willingness to join dissident activity. We argue that variation in government responses and its impact on perceptions of prospects for successful collective action can help account for the differences in mobilization across the two entities. We test our expectations using a new data set on protest events, participants, and government responses in BiH from January to April 2014. Our findings are consistent with the argument that coherent repressive government policies tend to suppress mobilization, while mixes of repressive responses and concessions from the government can encourage further mobilization. The results for FBiH show clear variation in protest following changes in government behavior and are consistent with the claim that repressive responses likely suppressed mobilization in the RS. protests, nonviolence, violence, repression, accomodation, Bosnia-Herzegovina Introduction In early 2014, Bosnia and Herzegovina experienced a period of extensive large-scale antigovernment protest following initial demonstrations and riots in the town of Tuzla on February 5 (Sadiković 2014, 71). The 2014 protests in Bosnia and Herzegovina were unusual in that mobilization focused on dissatisfaction over the widespread economic marginalization and generally poor governance in the country, rather than on cleavages between the three main ethnic groups (i.e., Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs). As such, the largely nonsectarian 2014 protests presented a clear departure from the dominant ethnic narrative seen as characteristic of the country since the civil war in the 1990s (see Beber 2006, 2014). Bosnia and Herzegovina has a unique political structure where the country is divided into two largely autonomous governing units, the primarily Bosniak and Croat Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) and the mainly Serb Republic of Srpska (RS). As we will show in more detail later, similar initial social and economic conditions in the two units provide a clear common motivation for grievances against the government in both jurisdictions. Yet, only in the FBiH did the initial 2014 protest escalate into major mobilization. The RS, on the other hand, did not see the same degree of mass unrest. We argue that the role of observed and anticipated government responses in shaping individual perceptions of the prospects for successful collective action, and hence the willingness to join in dissent, can account for the differences in mobilization across the two entities. In particular, we argue that an inconsistent mix of accommodative and repressive responses in the FBiH increased individual expectations about the efficacy of protests and thus the willingness to participate in dissent, while the consistent repressive responses in the RS quashed hopes for concessions and undermined individual participation and growth in mobilization. Our propositions build on an extensive body of prior theoretical and empirical research on how differences in government responses affect mobilization (e.g., Cunningham and Beaulieu 2010; Klandermans 1984; Lichbach 1987; Rasler 1996). However, the unique dual government structure in Bosnia and Herzegovina provides an exceptional case to directly examine the impact of differences in government responses for participation and expectations. The widespread social and economic problems faced by the population at large are similar throughout the country. The unusual political and administrative division between the two parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina provides us with two distinct yet comparable cases with partly independent government responses. This allows us to observe how different observed and expected government responses can affect popular mobilization, while holding constant plausible grievances and initial conditions. Our study uses a new event dataset that we have created using local news media sources on the protests in Bosnia and Herzegovina from January to April 2014. These sources provide much greater coverage than would be available had we relied only on information from English language media reports. In addition to protests, our event data also record government responses to individual events and thus allow us to evaluate systematically our propositions regarding the effects of government repression and accommodation on subsequent mobilization or level of contentious collective action. Unlike other time-series analyses of individual countries, we can consider actual variation in government responses across two different jurisdictions within the same country, thus plausibly holding a number of other simultaneous and contextual factors constant when making comparisons. The results from our empirical analysis support the argument that the use of consistent repressive policies in the RS likely suppressed contentious activity and mobilization, while an inconsistent mix of repressive and accommodative policies in the FBiH encouraged contentious activity and mobilization. We first provide a brief overview of the 2014 protests in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the historical background and motivation for the protests. We then highlight the divergent patterns of mobilization, contrasting the escalating mass-mobilization in the FiBH to the lack of major mobilization in the RS. We show more formally how the salience of grievances per se does not provide a plausible explanation for the divergent patterns. We then argue that differences in responses by each government, and their effects on individual mobilization, provide a more plausible explanation for the divergent events. Our new data and qualitative evidence provide support for this hypothesis. Grievances and Opportunities in Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina The 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) aimed to establish peace and democratic rule in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Although the DPA clearly succeeded in ending the country's devastating civil war and in preventing a recurrence of armed violence, neither of the two semi-independent entities in Bosnia and Herzegovina that resulted from the agreement—the FBiH and the RS—have seen much progress in terms of sustained economic reconstruction or developing effective governance. The unfinished transition to a fully functional independent and democratic state after the DPA has left individual citizens in contemporary Bosnia and Herzegovina with very little space to play a meaningful active role in politics, beyond casting votes at regular elections. After the initial social and economic devastation of the civil war in the 1990s, citizens in Bosnia and Herzegovina have continued to endure widespread poverty, severe unemployment, political ineffectiveness, and very high levels of corruption (Beber 2006; Mujanovic and McRobie 2014; Pugh 2005). The 2014 protests were very much rooted in political and economic grievances, rather than in the ethnic cleavages that often dominate politics in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The most proximate triggering events arose over a breakdown in labor relations, a consequence of the privatization of former state-owned factories that left many workers throughout the country unemployed, stripped of assets, in debt, and without access to health care or key social benefits (Šunj 2014). More specifically, workers at the Dita detergent factory in the FBiH's northeastern city of Tuzla had threatened the government with the strike action since 2009. They initiated their first actual strike in August 2011 over claims that the company owed its employees seven months of unpaid salaries, as well as twenty-two months of pension and health insurance payments (Busuladžić 2014, 15). After the first strike, employees of other former state-owned companies such as the Konjuh furniture factory in the nearby town of Živinice, as well as the Guming motor firm and the Poliohem chemical plant in Tuzla, joined the workers at the Dita factory (Arsenijević 2014). Protests also targeted the government and its highly nontransparent privatization policies, which led to job losses and layoffs and gave some companies favorable treatment by allowing them to declare bankruptcy (Radio Sarajevo 2014). By most accounts, all of the key political institutions in the BiH largely ignored the plight of the workers throughout 2013. This reflected in part the common perception that there was little threat of protest escalation, even if the broader grievances and views expressed by workers were widely shared by other segments of the population. However, on February 5, 2014, the workers’ movement in Tuzla successfully managed to mobilize over one thousand people to demonstrate in front of the local cantonal government. This largely nonviolent march on Tuzla's local authority headquarters prompted thousands of protesters to take to the streets in twenty-four other towns and cities across the country over the next couple of days, including the capital Sarajevo and major cities such as Banja Luka, Brcko, Jajce, Mostar, and Zenica, (Marzal 2014; Milan 2014). Although there were some minor and isolated acts of violence, antigovernment mobilization in the BiH remained predominantly nonviolent. Moreover, there was increasing evidence of dissident organization and coordination as the events unfolded (De Noni 2014). After some government buildings were set on fire in early February 2014, many protesters turned out to clear debris to show that they were prepared to “clean up this mess, like we’ll clean up the politicians who made this happen” (ZuvelaSito-Sucic 2014). Furthermore, it was clear that the protest enjoyed widespread support. A poll carried out by the news portal Klix (2014) on February 12, 2014, one week after the first events in Tuzla, showed very high support for antigovernment protest among a majority of the country's population. After this initial period, however, escalation in popular mobilization in the FBiH did not extend to the RS. Despite some early minor protests in the RS capital city of Banka Luka, the incipient popular uprising in the RS remained at a very low level of mobilization throughout the remainder of the year (Arsenijević 2014). This was somewhat surprising, since the basis for grievances and opportunities for mobilization appeared very similar across the two jurisdictions. Many perspectives on mobilization highlight the material basis of grievances and how this can give rise to alienation and frustration that in turn motivates individual action and supports the growth of broader social movements (Gurr 1970; Kerpelman 1969; LeBon 1896). However, existing economic data and estimates point to pervasive marginalization throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and thus provide little basis substantiating significantly worsening conditions or stronger grievances in the FBiH, relative to the RS. According to the Labour Force Survey's (2014) official statistics, we see very high unemployment rates in both of Bosnia's units: 28.4 percent in the FBiH and 25.7 percent in the RS. Although the rate in FBiH is marginally higher, unemployment rates in excess of 25 percent are very high in absolute terms by comparison to other European countries and even higher than Greece's atypically extreme unemployment rate. An effort to derive a composite index of social exclusion, based on the risk of poverty, financial depravation, and employment security estimates, suggests that half of the BiH population is socially marginalized, with estimated excluded population rates standing at 52.6 percent for the RS and 45.6 percent in the FBiH (Ceriani and Laderchi 2015, 16). By this measure, levels of social exclusion seem high in absolute terms across both units and, if anything, higher in the RS than in FBiH. Moreover, high levels of social exclusion are long-standing trends in the country, and there is no evidence suggesting dramatic social or economic changes immediately prior to 2014 in either jurisdiction. With regards to political grievances, most observers agree that similar qualities of clientelistic rule with ineffective and corrupt bureaucracies have been prevalent and had similar effects across the country's two jurisdictions. There is also no clear ethnic bias when it comes to political and economic marginalization, which affects Bosniak, Croat, and Serb communities alike. In fact, the initial 2014 protests highlighted the notion that common motivations mobilized Bosnian citizens across ethnic divides that had dominated the country since the civil war. In fact, the protesters used the chant “we are hungry in all three official state languages” to demonstrate the common and cross-ethnic bases of their grievances (E.S. 2014; International Crisis Group 2014). Beyond similarities in plausible motivations for protest, there are also no obvious differences in factors affecting opportunities for mobilization across the two units that might explain the divergent outcomes. For example, it is commonly argued that collective action is more difficult across ethnic groups due to lack of trust and that the barriers to nonsectarian mobilization should be higher in ethnically divided societies (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002, 2005). This would thus imply that mobilization should have been easier in the more ethnically homogenous RS, compared to the more heterogeneous FBiH where protests grew the most. Moreover, there are no obvious differences when it comes to the structure and the influence of preexisting formal political organizations, such as labor unions, nongovernmental organizations, or informal social networks that may facilitate collective action differently across the two jurisdictions (Fischer 2006). Given similarities in various preconditions to the protests, and the cross-ethnic composition of the protesters themselves, it is difficult to see how variation in structural conditions and grievances specific to individual ethnic groups suffice to explain the different trajectories we observe in the evolution of protests across Bosnia and Herzegovina's two semi-independent entities. Instead, we turn to the different government and opposition conflict dynamics unfolding in the FBiH and in the RS during the initial months of the 2014 uprising. Drawing on prior research by Cunningham and Beaulieu (2010), Klandermans (1984), Lichbach (1987), and Rasler (1996), we posit that differences in government responses to protest, and how these responses affect perceptions of the prospects for successful collective action, can better account for the differences in observed mobilization patterns in the FBiH and RS. In particular, government responses that accommodate protestor demands increase expectations about the efficacy of mass mobilization and positively affect the willingness of others to join ongoing dissent after the initial phase of mobilization. By contrast, repressive responses are likely to reinforce beliefs that dissent is unlikely to be effective and undermine individual willingness to participate. As such, government responses to dissent and protest play a crucial role, and we can see either increasing or decreasing subsequent mobilization, depending on how the government is expected to respond to dissent. We argue that consistent repressive government responses in the RS undermined any hope for success and dampened optimistic expectations about the ability to obtain political demands through protest. By contrast, the mix of repressive and accommodative responses by the FBiH government helped increase individuals’ willingness to participate in protest, as people became persuaded that protest could be effective. Mixed government responses helped to promote the political goals of protestors and increase initial levels of participation by encouraging other individuals to join in on the action. Grievances, Collective Action, and Mobilization in Dissent Olson (1965) popularized the problem of collective action by demonstrating that common interests alone do not suffice to generate collective mobilization as individual incentives often undermine mass participation. In dissent, the costs of participation are borne by each individual and are potentially very high, while any benefits to action are collective and nonexcludable to nonparticipants. As such, common grievances and the potential benefits reaped from successful efforts are not sufficient to elicit individual participation into collective mobilization. Individuals will generally have incentives to free ride on the contributions of others, rather than to participate in dissent. There is an extensive body of research that examines how the collective action problem can be overcome and what factors convince people to participate in dissent despite the lack of clear individual incentives (Lichbach 1995). Perhaps most prominent is the resource mobilization school, which argues that various structural factors facilitate mobilization. This includes political factors such as a more liberal political regime that constitutes a more permissive environment, social and economic resources for mobilization such as higher human capital and individual skills, or more developed social capital including preexisting organizations and better established networks that make it easier to coordinate large-scale contentious collective action (Andrews and Biggs 2006; Gamson 1975; Gamson et al. 1992; Marx and Wood 1975; McCarthy and Zald 1977; Oberschall 1973; Snow, Zurcher and Ekland 1980; Zald and McCarthy 1979). As discussed above, however, similarities in social and economic conditions across contexts imply that resources may be insufficient when it comes to understanding when initial low-level mobilization turns into major protest campaigns, and when it does not. A more promising alternative explanation lies in investigating how interaction between dissidents and authorities shapes the subsequent growth or quelling of incipient political mobilization. Social movement research generally argues that extra-institutional contentious collective action grows as a result of the interactions between nonstate actors and the state. According to Tilly and Tarrow (2007, 92), for example, “in most of such (major protest) cycles, contention begins moderately and in interaction with institutions.” Extra-institutional protests aim to produce political change, and actors are particularly likely to resort to direct action methods when they believe that changes cannot be obtained through regular institutional political channels or conventional politics. Irregular political dissent typically arises from small, local networks of people that know each other. However, the growth of contentious collective action from initial mobilization often arises through more encompassing social networks with a sufficient number of loosely connected individuals and organizations (i.e., the strength of weak ties phenomenon) (Granovetter 1978; McAdam 2003; Tarrow 1994; Tilly and Tarrow 2007). By following specific interactions among mobilized social actors and authorities, we may see an “upward scale shift” across space and sectors of society, ultimately leading to much higher mobilization and more intense and geographically diffused contentious activity (see Tarrow 1994; Tilly and Tarrow 2007).1 Whether initial mobilization results in an upward scale shift or not ultimately depends on the extent of individual participation in a collective action, which again raises the problem of net collective gains versus individual rationality (Oberschall 1973). In general, individuals will be reluctant to contribute alone unless they have private incentives, or alternatively, something changes expectations that their own decision to participate is likely to affect others. Klandermans (1984) points to how expectations about the ability to change existing social and political conditions through protest shape individual willingness to participate following initial events. Thus, government responses to initial protest may indeed further reinforce or change individual expectations about the effectiveness of contentious action, based on the belief that individual participation will make a difference and help foster mobilization. Much of the existing literature on the evolution of mobilization has focused on repressive responses. There is a clear consensus that dissent perceived to constitute a threat is likely to generate repressive state responses, but much less agreement over the consequences of repression for dissent or mobilization (Davenport 2007). As summarized by Rasler (1996, 133), existing research finds that “repression has both positive and negative effects on government opposition.” Some argue that government repression increases subsequent dissent through perceptions of injustice and outrage (Chenoweth and Stephan 2008, 2011; Francisco 1995; Kocher, Pepinsky, and Kalyvas 2011; Piazza and Walsh 2010), while others find that repression tends to successfully deter and decrease dissent and impede the ability of the opposition to mobilize (Downes 2008; Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Oberschall 1973; Tilly 1978). Some scholars have argued for more complex nonlinear relationships, arguing that large-scale repression deters future dissent while lower level repression may fuel grievances and mobilization (Khawaja 1993; Muller and Weede 1990; Olivier 1991). One limitation to many studies of repression is the lack of attention to other possible government responses and how these affect mobilization. Accommodation is typically treated implicitly, as one of several alternatives that may happen in the absence of repression. Cederman, Gleditsch, and Wucherpfenning (2017) find evidence that government reforms reduce the likelihood of violent ethnic conflict or promote conflict termination, but many concessions fall short of what dissidents seek and can also potentially encourage beliefs that greater concessions can be won through further mobilization in active conflict (Cederman et al. 2015).2 In some cases, accommodation may be selective, to specific demands, and reflect efforts by governments to divide movements (Cunningham 2011). In other cases, governments simultaneously combine repressive and accommodative policies as a response to unrest in general or to particular tactics (Cunningham and Beaulieu 2010; Lichbach 1987, 267). Government repression and accommodation/concessions are not mutually exclusive responses, and the government is not always unified around a clear response or speaks with one voice (Lichbach 1987). At the extreme, inconsistent responses can both raise expectations of concessions or efficacy through protest, while also increasing grievances over repression. Thus, the contradictory findings in existing research on the relationships between government responses and mobilization arise out of a failure to consider the full range of government responses. Few existing studies take into account the role of contradictory government responses, where we see both repression and concessions and how this affects the subsequent evolution of dissent. One important exception is Rasler (1996), who analyzes government repression and concessions and protest escalation in the Iranian revolution. The limited availability of detailed or disaggregated protest event data has prevented broader comparative empirical studies, and most studies have been forced to rely on aggregated annual counts of events without detailed information on the responses of governments to specific individual events. By contrast, our study offers a new dataset of protests in Bosnia and Herzegovina with daily coding of protests events and government responses. These allow us to consider the number of participants in events as a measure of mobilization intensity at a much more disaggregated level and introduce variation in government responses across two different jurisdictions within the same country. By doing so, we thus plausibly hold a number of potential confounding factors constant. We expand on our propositions below to show how differences in government responses to protest can shape subsequent mobilization, using the case of the 2014 protests in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Explaining the Divergent Mobilization in the FBiH and RS In line with Klandermans’ (1984) expectancy-value theory, we argue that government responses to initial protests shape individual expectations about the ability and effectiveness of fostering social and political change through protests, and thus individuals’ willingness to participate. The grievances that motivated the protests in 2014 were widely shared throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, subsequent government responses influenced people's views on whether protests would be effective or not, thus shaping individual willingness to participate. We first substantiate the common appeal of the protest, before turning to factors affecting perceptions of efficacy and individual willingness to participate. Beyond the material basis for widespread grievances in terms of severe social, economic, and political motives such as poverty, corruption, and unemployment present throughout all of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the widespread appeal of the protests is borne out by opinion survey. The Klix (2014) survey mentioned above indicates that a clear majority supported the protests in both entities, with 93 percent and 78 percent of respondents in the FBiH and RS expressing support, respectively. The appeal of the protests was also bolstered by their largely nonviolent nature. Although the initial protest events by workers in former state-owned companies included some displays of disorder such as a number of buildings set on fire, the movement generally managed to contain violence and prevent further escalation of isolated, lower-level violence. This is important for a number of reasons. First, it has been shown that nonviolent direct action has generally lower barriers to increased participation, as it does not require specific skills of or extensive training and also does not require overcoming moral barriers as the resort to violence often entails. In principle, nonviolent dissent can thus attract a much larger number of participants more quickly, relative to violent dissent (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Dahl et al. 2016). Second, violence can often crowd out participation. Indeed, more than half of the respondents in the Klix (2014) survey said that they would stop supporting antigovernment protests in the event that violence becomes widespread.3 There is also evidence of both accommodation and repression to the antigovernment protest wave. In the FBiH we observe both responses simultaneously, as the government on the one hand expressed a great deal of sympathy toward the motives of the protestors and on the other condemned the disruptive effects of the protests and called for them to cease “for the good of the country.” For example, when more than ten thousand people took to the streets in Tuzla, Sarajevo, and other key towns in the FBiH on February 7, 2014, four Cantonal prime ministers and forty-three FBiH government officials resigned (Sladojević and Lingo-Demirović 2014). We believe that this highlighted to the protesters the possible efficacy of nonviolent protest against political elites and encouraged further mobilization. At the same time, the government also engaged in acts of repression, as they sought to ban protest activities and threatened severe sanctions against individuals taking parts in protests, including five-year prison sentences for terrorism (see Sladojević and Lingo-Demirović 2014). We posit that the key element for understanding different mobilization trajectories in the FBiH and RS over the January–April 2014 period is divergence in government responses to protest and how these responses shaped expectations about the efficacy of protest to obtain desired political outcomes and thus prospects for large-scale mobilization. Irrespective of the value of a collective good, individuals will have little incentive to participate in collective action if they do not expect participation will yield change or that their individual participation will have some influence. Thus, government responses can shape mobilization in positive and negative ways. Although individuals do not precisely know what will happen, they develop expectations about their ability to obtain desired policy outcomes through dissent based on how the state reacts to contentious political behavior. The 2014 protest wave originated in the common economic quagmire of postwar BiH, but the initial events in the FBiH changed expectations about the prospects for success. The workers at a pharmaceutical plant in Tuzla who filed lawsuits in 2011 after not receiving salaries or access to health care managed to enlist the support and participation of other workers in former state-owned companies, and the legal struggle evolved into coordinated nonviolent protests and occupations. Until the beginning of 2014, however, the courts did not rule on any of the lawsuits, and the Tuzla Cantonal court strongly condemned workers for engaging in unlawful acts of civil disobedience such as street blockage (Bhprotestfiles 2014). In January 2014, when the national courts finally ruled in favor of their lawsuit, people conceived of the government action as a legitimization of workers’ demands and subsequent protest activities.4 This concession, we argue, led potential mobilizers to update their beliefs and expectations regarding the efficacy of extra-institutional contention for political and social change and increased individuals’ willingness to participate. From February 5–8, 2014, the number of protesters increased by thousands, and the demonstrations spread to many large cities in the FBiH and RS, including Sarajevo, Zenica, Mostar, Bihac, Banja Luka, and Prijedor.5 In the FBiH, the police met protesters with increasing violence, and dissent became increasingly confrontational, including storming and setting fire to government buildings. The protests lead to the resignation of many local authorities. Leading political figures lent support for the legitimacy of the campaign, including the president of the FBiH, Živko Budimir, who said that “social uprising in the BiH has been on the horizon for years, it was only a matter of time before it would escalate” (DL.O. 2014). However, these statements stood in stark contrast to the repressive reactions of the police forces on the ground (DL.O. 2014). We believe that inconsistent responses in the FBiH, in particular the mix of repressive and accommodative behaviors, helped highlight enduring grievances and encouraged further nonviolent mobilization and also indicated the possible efficacy of protest to citizens and social networks in the FBiH. By contrast, government officials responded to initial mobilization in the RS almost exclusively with repression, threatening imprisonment, fines, and otherwise discrediting the protests. The president of the RS, Milorad Dodik, actively disparaged protesters by calling them traitors and rabble-rousers and argued that their primary aim was the destruction of the RS (Jukić 2014). Furthermore, President Dodik challenged antigovernment criticisms voiced by former RS soldiers, a group generally supportive of RS institutions since the end of the civil war (Jukić 2014). These consistently repressive government reactions likely lowered the perceptions of individuals in the RS that protest could be effective and thus ultimately undermined individual willingness to participate in the wake of the initial events. Figure 1 summarizes our argument that that the FBiH government's inconsistent repressive and accommodative behavior increased the value of collective dissent through individual expectations regarding the promise of contentious collective action to generate social and political change through a higher willingness to participate. By contrast, the RS government's consistent repressive behaviors decreased the expected efficacy of protest activities, thereby decreasing the individual willingness to participate in the antigovernment campaign and undermining the growth of extra-institutional contention activities. Figure 1. View largeDownload slide Government inconsistency and mobilization Figure 1. View largeDownload slide Government inconsistency and mobilization In the next section, we present new data on participation in primarily nonviolent contentious collective activities in the BiH in 2014 and then use these data to test our argument. Data on the 2014 Protests and Government Responses We collected daily protest event data on the 2014 protests in the BiH, drawing on two databases of daily news reports: one based on English language sources and another based on local sources. Local reports on incidents in the BiH far outnumber the coverage in English language sources and thus provide for a much more detailed database than if we had relied solely on foreign media sources. We used the LexisNexis database to extract news items from English-language sources, including among others the Guardian, Agence Presse France, BBC, and Reuters.6 We used the INFOBIRO database to extract local daily news reports from digitized local sources in Bosnia including Nezavisne, Oslobodjenje, Dnevni Avaz, and Danevni List.7 Moreover, the local sources are diverse both in terms of orientation and geographic origins. In the FBiH, Oslobodjenje and Dnevni Avaz are based in the BiH capital of Sarajevo and Dnevni List is based in Mostar, while Nezavisne Novine is based in Banja luka, the capital of the RS entity. Table A1 in Appendix 1 provides a complete list of sources with the number of items extracted for each. In addition, we note that the audience and monthly circulation of each local newspaper differs: Oslobodjenje and Dnevni Avaz are mainly read by Bosniaks in the FBiH, Dnevni List by Croats and Bosniaks in the FBiH, and Nezavisne Novine by the Serb population in the RS. We used a search string of keywords intended to capture protest-related articles from the electronic sources. The full set of the keywords used is listed in Appendix 1. Based on these searches, we first retrieved all potentially relevant articles for the period January 1, 2014 to April 30, 2014, and then applied manual inspection and a more detailed classification scheme. The majority of the protest events and government responses occurred in the month of February, and our data covers the entire cycle of the 2014 protest. We focus our analyses on the effects of government responses to that period. Figure 2 displays the recorded daily events by canton to illustrate the variation across the country. Figure 3 displays the recorded number or protesting individuals by canton. Finally, Figure 4 displays the BiH territorial and administrative structure with the location of the cantons of the FBiH and the RS Figure 2. View largeDownload slide Daily protest events by FBIH canton and the RS Figure 2. View largeDownload slide Daily protest events by FBIH canton and the RS Figure 3. View largeDownload slide Estimated participants by FBiH canton and the RS Figure 3. View largeDownload slide Estimated participants by FBiH canton and the RS Figure 4. View largeDownload slide Cantons of FBiH and the RS (source: http://asusilc.net/scr101/les1/bosna1.jpg) Figure 4. View largeDownload slide Cantons of FBiH and the RS (source: http://asusilc.net/scr101/les1/bosna1.jpg) In our analyses below, we treat government responses from each jurisdiction as a single unit (i.e., the FBiH and RS respectively). Note that beyond the separation between the two governments or jurisdictions, Bosnia and Herzegovina is not a federal unit and the local regions/cantons have limited autonomy or repressive power. Hence, there is little basis for trying to examine variations across regions based on differences in responses from local authorities, and we believe that individuals primarily responded to what they see as their central government. In line with our argument, the complex composition of the government also implies that inconsistency can arise as a result of the actions of different individuals, rather than changes in the position of a unified executive per se (Nardelli et al. 2014). Whereas public displays of grievances such as strikes and demonstrations dominated during the month of February, efforts to organize indoor assembly meetings called plenums become more common in the following months. In our data we do not code these plenums as protest events. They do not constitute public challenges through direct action, given the indoor nature of the event. Moreover, the lack of news coverage makes it more difficult to track adequately the number of plenum participants. Finally, the move from street protest to these popular assemblies, held to be “open to all citizens,” in our view illustrates the regularization of dissent after the peak of protest mobilization toward conventional political action, which contrasts with the more spontaneous nature of the initial protest wave. These assemblies were formed primarily to let participants formulate in a more structured way claims against state institutions and political leaders as the initial irregular protest momentum was fading away (De Noni 2014). Our database also contains information on the mode of actions that protesters engaged in (i.e., whether clearly nonviolent or violent), the specific tactics used in the event (e.g., occupation, demonstration), the location where the event took place, the recording of the specific cities/towns as well as the canton and/or entity, and finally the government responses observed in the aftermath of the event and whether these were repressive or accommodative. We also identify the institutional source of repressive and accommodative behaviors (i.e., government at the municipal, cantonal, entity or national level). Our data also identify various types of contentious collective action (threatening authorities with protests, direct democratic action, confrontational action, violent action, decision/call to stop protest action, progovernment protest action), with several sublevels used to determine the particular action type (see Table B1 and B4 in Appendix 2). Similarly, the variables coding government response—GOVERNMENT_repression and GOVERNMENT_concession—have several different indicators. Both GOVERNMENT_repression and GOVERNMENT_concession are coded as categorical ordinal variables where a value of 2 represents high levels of repression and concession, 1 signifies low-level responses, and 0 indicates no repression/no concession (see Table B2 and B3 in Appendix 2 for full details). To code inconsistency in government responses and test its impact on subsequent protests events, we examined whether we see repression, concessions, or a mixture of both during the same day or period. In our raw data, the variable GOVERNMENT_inconsistency takes a value of 0 if the response is consistent and the government uses only repression or only concession during a particular day, or neither. The variable is assigned a value of 1 indicating inconsistency if the government used both repression and concession on the same day. In our analyses below, we aggregate the coding of inconsistency for combinations of concessions and repressions over longer windows of several days. We also combine high and low repression in the analyses, given the small number of available data points to conduct separate analyses to distinguish variation in the relative balance or degree of mixes toward more or less repressive and accommodative inconsistent responses. Figure 5 displays the distribution of government responses at the daily level. As shown, the modal category is no direct response, but clear concessions are more common than repression only for cases where we observe a direct response. Figure 5. View largeDownload slide Distribution of government responses to protest Figure 5. View largeDownload slide Distribution of government responses to protest While concessions are somewhat more common overall, we see a clear differentiation between the two administrative units of the BiH. The RS government has mainly responded to protest activities by discrediting participants in the FBiH and actively ignoring protests in the RS. By contrast, the FBiH government has used highly repressive tactics, such as beatings, imprisonment, and terrorist charges, for the protesters that allegedly participated in burning of the government buildings in Sarajevo. That said, the FBiH government also used a wide range of accommodative tactics ranging from the release of political prisoners, reshuffling of administrative personnel, resignations, investigations into corrupt officials, meeting with protesters to hear their demands, announcing social reforms and legal measures, and changing electoral laws, among many others. Empirical Analysis We have argued that differences in government responses and their impact on individual expectations can help account for differences in protest mobilization trends between the RS and FBiH. This claim is difficult to test explicitly in the case of the RS because it relies on a counterfactual, or something that we do not observe. In other words, we observe only repression and no accommodation to protests in the RS, and hence no inconsistent behavior that could have motivated people to increase participation in protest. However, we can evaluate the implications of the argument by looking at variation over time in protests in the FBiH. Figure 6 shows the daily number of protest participants in the FBiH. If our argument is correct, then participation should evolve as a reaction to government responses. Figure 6. View largeDownload slide Daily number of protest participants in FBiH Figure 6. View largeDownload slide Daily number of protest participants in FBiH To test the plausibility of this expectation, we use the raw data described above to create a daily data set of all events and the recorded number of protests in all of the FBiH. We only examine the aggregate number of participants, since most of the government responses are not specific to particular cantons. Our data contain a number of very small protest events, but most protesters also participated in a few very large events that seem qualitatively different. We believe that the number of protestors provides the most appropriate test for our argument on mobilization escalation. When events are highly aggregated, the correlation between total participation and event frequency is generally low or modest, and the findings from one measure do not generally extend to the other measure (Biggs 2016). However, we also provide robustness tests with the number of protest events, which may potentially better reflect growth in the geographical scope of mobilization. Figure 7 shows the distribution of distinct protest events by day for the FBiH. Although the first peak coincides for events and participants, the number of events alone cannot distinguish between those with limited and very high participation. Figure 7. View largeDownload slide Daily number of protest events in the FBiH Figure 7. View largeDownload slide Daily number of protest events in the FBiH To examine inconsistency in government responses, we look at the three days preceding a protest event and code government responses as inconsistent if we see both repressive and accommodative responses over this period. The logic of looking at the three days prior to an event is that we expect individuals to form their expectations to mobilize with some lag. In order to know about an event, individuals would need to see reports (which typically emerge the following day) and then prepare for participation. A window of three days should be sufficient to capture the impact of inconsistency on participation. To evaluate our claim, we first conduct a series of regressions with the logged number of protests per day in Table 1. We use the logged number of participants, since the number of participants is measured in thousands for many days. We use Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression rather than a count model since the latter typically is better suited for moderate counts. As the results from Model 1 show, we find a large positive coefficient for government inconsistency, indicating that higher participation is likely to follow inconsistent responses to protest. These results are consistent with our claim that inconsistent behavior serves to both highlight existing grievances and changes expectations about the opportunities for concessions in the FBiH. Table 1. Regression of log protestors Dependent variable: Log protesters (1) (2) (3) Government inconsistency (past) 4.177*** 4.140*** 3.119*** (0.706) (0.837) (0.762) Time 0.002 –0.013 (0.021) (0.019) Repression (current) 2.393*** (0.860) Concessions (current) 2.091** (0.916) Constant 0.550 0.506 0.330 (0.481) (0.718) (0.618) Observations 69 69 69 R2 0.343 0.343 0.542 Adjusted R2 0.333 0.323 0.513 Residual std. error 2.926 (df = 67) 2.948 (df = 66) 2.500 (df = 64) F Statistic 35.0*** (1; 67) 17.2*** (2; 66) 18.9*** (4; 64) Dependent variable: Log protesters (1) (2) (3) Government inconsistency (past) 4.177*** 4.140*** 3.119*** (0.706) (0.837) (0.762) Time 0.002 –0.013 (0.021) (0.019) Repression (current) 2.393*** (0.860) Concessions (current) 2.091** (0.916) Constant 0.550 0.506 0.330 (0.481) (0.718) (0.618) Observations 69 69 69 R2 0.343 0.343 0.542 Adjusted R2 0.333 0.323 0.513 Residual std. error 2.926 (df = 67) 2.948 (df = 66) 2.500 (df = 64) F Statistic 35.0*** (1; 67) 17.2*** (2; 66) 18.9*** (4; 64) Note: Statistical significance: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. View Large Table 1. Regression of log protestors Dependent variable: Log protesters (1) (2) (3) Government inconsistency (past) 4.177*** 4.140*** 3.119*** (0.706) (0.837) (0.762) Time 0.002 –0.013 (0.021) (0.019) Repression (current) 2.393*** (0.860) Concessions (current) 2.091** (0.916) Constant 0.550 0.506 0.330 (0.481) (0.718) (0.618) Observations 69 69 69 R2 0.343 0.343 0.542 Adjusted R2 0.333 0.323 0.513 Residual std. error 2.926 (df = 67) 2.948 (df = 66) 2.500 (df = 64) F Statistic 35.0*** (1; 67) 17.2*** (2; 66) 18.9*** (4; 64) Dependent variable: Log protesters (1) (2) (3) Government inconsistency (past) 4.177*** 4.140*** 3.119*** (0.706) (0.837) (0.762) Time 0.002 –0.013 (0.021) (0.019) Repression (current) 2.393*** (0.860) Concessions (current) 2.091** (0.916) Constant 0.550 0.506 0.330 (0.481) (0.718) (0.618) Observations 69 69 69 R2 0.343 0.343 0.542 Adjusted R2 0.333 0.323 0.513 Residual std. error 2.926 (df = 67) 2.948 (df = 66) 2.500 (df = 64) F Statistic 35.0*** (1; 67) 17.2*** (2; 66) 18.9*** (4; 64) Note: Statistical significance: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. View Large Model 2 in Table 1 adds a time trend to the model in order to consider whether the inconsistent behavior may simply reflect some secular trend where the government responses became more erratic over time. As shown, we find no simple linear trend in these data, and our estimate of inconsistency is not affected. Finally, to ensure that increased participation does not reflect accurate expectations about repression and accommodation, we add a term indicating whether events ultimately are repressed or accommodated. As can be seen, both of these terms are positive, indicating a possible endogenous relationship where events with higher participation are more likely to receive a response from the government. However, they do not change the sign or significance of the past inconsistency variable, indicating that our results cannot be dismissed as an artifact of future expectations. Table 2 repeats the previous analysis with the number of events rather than protestors. The results are similar quantitatively, although the effects of inconsistency are more muted, possibly as a result of counting locations rather than the scaled magnitude of events. Using shorter/longer windows of one/five days for inconsistency yield qualitatively similar results. Alternative estimates using a negative binomial model of the number of events also yield substantively similar results. Hence, we conclude that variation across events and over time, regardless of whether we look at the number of protesters or events, supports our argument. Table 2. Regression of log events Dependent variable: Log events (1) (2) (3) Government inconsistency (past) 0.871*** 0.774*** 0.413** (0.168) (0.197) (0.156) Time 0.005 0.002 (0.005) (0.004) Repression (current) 0.436** (0.176) Concessions (current) 0.885*** (0.188) Constant 0.277** 0.160 0.074 (0.114) (0.169) (0.127) Observations 69 69 69 R2 0.287 0.297 0.629 Adjusted R2 0.277 0.275 0.606 Residual std. error 0.695 (df = 67) 0.695 (df = 66) 0.513 (df = 64) F Statistic 27.0*** (1; 67) 13.9*** (2; 66) 27.1*** (4; 64) Dependent variable: Log events (1) (2) (3) Government inconsistency (past) 0.871*** 0.774*** 0.413** (0.168) (0.197) (0.156) Time 0.005 0.002 (0.005) (0.004) Repression (current) 0.436** (0.176) Concessions (current) 0.885*** (0.188) Constant 0.277** 0.160 0.074 (0.114) (0.169) (0.127) Observations 69 69 69 R2 0.287 0.297 0.629 Adjusted R2 0.277 0.275 0.606 Residual std. error 0.695 (df = 67) 0.695 (df = 66) 0.513 (df = 64) F Statistic 27.0*** (1; 67) 13.9*** (2; 66) 27.1*** (4; 64) Note: Statistical significance: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. View Large Table 2. Regression of log events Dependent variable: Log events (1) (2) (3) Government inconsistency (past) 0.871*** 0.774*** 0.413** (0.168) (0.197) (0.156) Time 0.005 0.002 (0.005) (0.004) Repression (current) 0.436** (0.176) Concessions (current) 0.885*** (0.188) Constant 0.277** 0.160 0.074 (0.114) (0.169) (0.127) Observations 69 69 69 R2 0.287 0.297 0.629 Adjusted R2 0.277 0.275 0.606 Residual std. error 0.695 (df = 67) 0.695 (df = 66) 0.513 (df = 64) F Statistic 27.0*** (1; 67) 13.9*** (2; 66) 27.1*** (4; 64) Dependent variable: Log events (1) (2) (3) Government inconsistency (past) 0.871*** 0.774*** 0.413** (0.168) (0.197) (0.156) Time 0.005 0.002 (0.005) (0.004) Repression (current) 0.436** (0.176) Concessions (current) 0.885*** (0.188) Constant 0.277** 0.160 0.074 (0.114) (0.169) (0.127) Observations 69 69 69 R2 0.287 0.297 0.629 Adjusted R2 0.277 0.275 0.606 Residual std. error 0.695 (df = 67) 0.695 (df = 66) 0.513 (df = 64) F Statistic 27.0*** (1; 67) 13.9*** (2; 66) 27.1*** (4; 64) Note: Statistical significance: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. View Large Discussion and Conclusion The protests in the BiH in 2014 are interesting for a number of reasons. First, they illustrate that economic marginalization and poor governance can create common grievances and mobilization, even in deeply ethnically divided societies with pervasive mistrust (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002). The 2014 wave of antigovernment protests indicates that common cross-ethnic social problems and political ineffectiveness actually can unite individuals across ethnic lines, even if Serbs protested to a lesser extent, as events and participation numbers did not grow to the same extent in the RS as in the FBiH. Second, we believe that the special case of an administratively divided state with similar political and economic conditions in both units (i.e., the FBiH and RS) provides an interesting laboratory for studying variation in government responses and their effect on mobilization. Despite similar initial economic conditions, the FBiH saw major contentious collective action, while the unrest did not extend to the RS. We have argued that that the consistent repressive tactics by the RS government and inconsistent responses by the FBiH account for differences in mobilization across the two entities. Our findings are in line with Lichbach's (1987) model that suggests that consistent government responses, whether repressive or accommodative, can reduce dissent. Inconsistent government responses, on the other hand, seem to signal to people that change is possible and may increase individual willingness to participate and join others in dissent (Klandermans 1984). Our highly disaggregated database on the 2014 protests in the BiH allow for a more direct test of the argument that government responses shape collective action. With regards to policy implications, our results could be interpreted negatively as providing support for the effectiveness of preemptive repressive tactics, as used in the RS. They may also be seen as highlighting the perils of combining attempts to contain protest with efforts to provide at least some recognition of protestor concerns. While we may deplore these implications from a moral perspective, it is hard to deny that perceived repression often can be effective in deterring dissent. However, this does not mean that dissent can never yield political change or that all efforts to mobilize over grievances are necessarily futile. All societies have vulnerabilities, and organized dissident helps bring them to light (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Mobilization against Milosević in Serbia struggled through a series of failures before finally achieving success (Popović 2014). Protest events should thus serve as a signal to politicians across levels of government that the plight of the people should not be ignored and that protest can arise even when the odds are against mass mobilization, taking a government by surprise. Supplementary Information Supplementary information is available at the Journal of Global Security Studies data archive. Footnotes 1 Tilly and Tarrow (2007, 95) argue that “[u]pward scale shift is one of the most significant processes in contentious politics. It moves contention beyond its local origins, touches on the interest and values of new actors, involves a shift of venue to sites where contention may be more or less successful, and can threaten other actors or entire regimes.” 2 Of course, concessions may also be a result of prior dissent or accommodation (see Cederman et al. 2015; Thomas 2014). 3 Some prior research has considered how the consistency of government responses to particular tactics affects the future tactical choices of dissidents (e.g., violent or nonviolent strategies) (Cunningham and Beaulieu 2010). This is interesting in its own right, but in our view less relevant to the 2014 BiH protests, where there was no organized violence, and resorting to large-scaled organized violence would not have been feasible over the relatively short period. Thus, the main strategic issue for the dissident movement was to control incidental violence or fighting with security forces. 4 See documentary at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_NwDIW3wBDY. 5 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LjLiFhtR8t0; DefenceWeb, 10 February 2014. Bosnia rocked by spreading antigovernment unrest. 6 See http://www.lexisnexis.com. 7 See http://www.infobiro.ba/. Acknowledgements We are grateful to comments from Kristin Bakke, Daniel Berger, Cullen Hendrix, and all the participants at the workshop on “Urban Insecurity and Civil Conflict” at Oxford University on November 22–23, 2015. The authors are listed in alphabetical order, equal authorship implied. Gleditsch acknowledges the support of the European Research Council (313373) and the Research Council of Norway (213535/F10). Belgioioso acknowledges the support of the Economic and Social Research Council (1511095). Funding Belgioioso was funded Economic and Social Research Council (1511095). 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TI - A Tale of Two Governments? Government Responses and Perceived Influence in the 2014 Protests in Bosnia and Herzegovina
JF - Journal of Global Security Studies
DO - 10.1093/jogss/ogy008
DA - 2018-07-04
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/a-tale-of-two-governments-government-responses-and-perceived-influence-GSwUpl89qK
SP - 1
EP - 301
VL - Advance Article
IS - 3
DP - DeepDyve
ER -