TY - JOUR
AU - Dragos Aligica,, Paul
AB - Scheall’s book is both a pioneering investigation addressing the philosophical foundations of administrative theory and practice and, at the same time, an invitation to consider the applied level implications of the challenging foundational insights resulting from it. The book’s title is intimating a contribution at the interface of history of economic thought, philosophy of social sciences, and political theory. Yet, at a closer look, the book deals with a set of themes relevant not only from a foundational perspective but also from an applied-level standpoint. At its core is the very issue of decision makers and the knowledge base of the design, implementation, and assessment of the policies they are pursuing. More precisely, the book brings to the fore the issue of the epistemic foundations of policymaking and administrative practice. Hence, the potential relevance of the book for the readers of JPART, despite the fact that the title of the book apparently signals a topic rather distant from the applied level of administrative sciences. The argument advanced by the book starts with a simple observation: Citizens and scholars assume that politicians are—at least in principle—knowledgeable and capable enough to effectively address the policy tasks that pertain to their social and institutional role. Citizens may doubt the competence of one particular politician or another, but, in general, their understanding of what a “modal” politician is and can do, assumes that policymakers—as a class or as an ideal type—are sufficiently epistemically equipped to address complex policy issues. Indeed, at a closer look (the behavioral economics revolution with its “heuristics and biases” notwithstanding) that tacit understanding emerges as a powerful assumption in all applied fields that presume, as a precondition of an effective policy process, a combination of expert and political knowledge. Scheall’s book questions in a radical way that assumption: What if the assumption is downright wrong? What if politicians do in fact not have the capacity to understand and assess the basic social phenomena they have to deal with in their policy initiatives and interventions? What if their ignorance is generic when it comes to some basic and essential aspects and processes of social order? What if there are some intrinsic limits to politicians’ knowledge regarding social processes, limits that cannot be circumvented because they are the very limits of the human mind in relationship to the complexities of social systems? The second major claim made by Scheall in building his argument is rather bold as well, explicitly positioning the book as a pioneering contribution: “One scours the annals of thousands of years of political thought in vain for an argument that justifies the widely held assumption.” Then he continues by noting that, for whatever reason, thinkers throughout history, “have only rarely been interested in the question of the limits of limited policymaker knowledge and the consequences of these limits for political behavior and the success, or failure, of political action” (p. x). The author’s point seems an overstatement. Readers will recall instantly that classical political philosophy, starting with Plato and Aristotle, was intrinsically involved with the problem of knowledge and ignorance, as keys to the very ideal of what a good citizen or a good statesman should be (Barker 2012). Also, they may evoke straightaway Adam Smith’s point about “the man of system” whom in “his own conceit” has forgotten that “in the great chess-board of human society, every single piece has a principle of motion of its own, altogether different from that which the legislature might choose to impress upon it” (Smith 1759/2000). And, last but not least, one may bring to the fore the fact that in the traditional literature on statecraft, the issue of the limits of knowledge and sheer ignorance was always a major underling theme, witness the much quoted quip of Axel Oxenstierna, the seventeenth century Swedish statesman: “Behold my son, with how little wisdom the world is governed.” But, as we advance in getting familiar with Scheall’s argument, we realize that what the author meant was something more nuanced and profound. His point is that all those observations about knowledge and ignorance, on the lines illustrated above, have not been articulated and elaborated into a foundational philosophical position combining, in a consistent way, a theory of social order with an appropriate epistemology. Thus, one has missed the possibility to frame the very basic ways we think about the limits and nature of political action, broadly defined. That thrust of Scheall’s argument becomes clearer when he introduces the next major building block of the book’s argument. In his view, there is a singular exception to the general neglect of deriving the theoretical and philosophical implications from the ignorance condition of the policymaker. That exception is the Austrian School of economics. Ludwig von Mises’ (1922/1981) contribution to the analysis of the feasibility of central economic planning, at the beginning of the 20th century, created a path-breaking approach that was later elaborated by F. A. Hayek. The result was a conceptual apparatus able to address the problem of the epistemic capacities of prediction and control when it comes to decision-makers deliberately implementing public policies or instituting alternative economic systems. Hayek’s (1945) work on the uses of knowledge in society is thus, at the same time, a work on the limits of knowledge in political action. To develop these ideas, the book is structured into two parts, each containing three chapters. Part I is built around the thesis that policymakers’ ignorance is the fundamental problem of politics and, by implication, of administrative sciences. That point is associated, as already mentioned, with the claim that Austrian economists “have come closer than anyone else to recognizing the logical priority of the epistemic in political decision-making” (p. 6). The second part of the book is an in-depth look at the methods and approaches of analyzing the problem of policymaker ignorance and at the possible ways of dealing with it in practical terms in the real world. The emphasis continues to be on the elements of the Hayekian intellectual apparatus and, hence, the discussion, despite targeting directly the applied level, continues to be mediated by the focus on the foundational level. In a sense, the book could be read as an attempt to interpret and conceptually reconstruct Hayek’s work in light of the problem of epistemology of politics. As such, the book is also an original contribution to the Austrian theory tradition, as its goal of re-reading the Austrian school from this angle leads to adding a fresh and innovative new facet to this tradition. The Austrian scholars were the first to develop a coherent approach to the epistemics of politics. However, explains Scheall—and here we find quite a surprising move and a refreshing contribution—they failed to follow the argument of their own theory to its ultimate conclusions. They did not recognize that the problem of policymaker ignorance is so fundamental and so general, that it is “as relevant to liberal as to illiberal policymaking” (pp. 5–6). That is to say, the basic political epistemology argument they were advancing turns, by its intrinsic logic, against their own approach. Austrian theory scholars failed to recognize that the argument they were developing could be applied to their own ideas. After all, why would liberal politicians be different from other politicians?! Why would liberal policymakers possess the knowledge necessary to deliberately realize the goal of effectively liberalizing relatively illiberal societies? Hayek, explains Scheall, did not extend the political-epistemological reasoning he invented to explore its implications for political liberalism. “He apparently assumed, without argument or evidence, and subsequent Austrian economists have made the same unjustified assumption, that only illiberal policymaking confronts the problem of policymaker ignorance and that liberalization measures are somehow immune from the problem and its consequences” (p. 5). However, both the transitioning to a more liberal order from a relatively illiberal one and the efforts made in a liberal context in order to preserve existing liberal institutions are marred by the same epistemic problem, identified as foundational for any type of political decision making. It is important to note Scheall’s merit is pinpointing this reflexivity problem of the Hayekian position. As far as one can tell, he is the first to identify and theorize that paradox of the Hayekian vision of social sciences and social philosophy. Indeed, Schaell is right; any vision posting an epistemic function for politicians, irrespective of their ideological persuasions, falls under this argument. As even a cursory overview of its main themes reveals, the book is full of insights on a wide range of topics, from philosophy of science to economics and political theory. However, the underlying theme of the book, and several major arguments advanced by it, may have a special relevance for readers whose main interest is mostly in applied theory. Let us focus on three such contributions. First, the book draws attention to the significant but mostly ignored fact that the ways in which we think about administrative theory and practice strongly presumes certain foundational parameters that could be best described as being of a philosophical nature. Those foundational frameworks predetermine and shape in subtle but significant ways what we think to be feasible or unfeasible, desirable or undesirable in our policy interventions or designs. The book’s message is two-fold: First, we need to become more aware of those foundations and their influence. Second, political epistemology is an essential element of these—mostly hidden but influential—foundational components of the intellectual edifice of administrative sciences. The second relevant point made by the book in this respect is the thesis of “the priority of the epistemic” as a limiting and negative doctrine. The book suggests that a lot hinges on how one deals with the epistemic problem, as defined on the lines articulated by Scheall. Are we are aware of it? If, yes, how do we respond to it? Do we proceed in our policy theories or policy evaluations simply neglecting the problem? Scheall assumes a very strong stance in favor of the “logical priority of epistemic to other normative considerations in political—indeed, in all—decision-making” (p. 3). He argues that at least a minimal epistemic work has to take place “if only at a pre-conscious level” before “other normative (e.g., moral/ethical, prudential, pecuniary) considerations can be applied to a menu of options and a decision made” (p. 3). Yet, in emphasizing the epistemic predicament, it is not just a matter of what is selected to be considered but, more importantly, it is a matter of what is not selected: ignorance brackets the options from which we choose in all decision contexts. That framing and filtering function of the knowledge–ignorance dyad, could have direct operational implications for public policy and institutional design in multiple ways. Usually, in administrative sciences, we think in terms of the duality incentives-knowledge and the tradeoffs or complementarities between knowledge-oriented and incentive-oriented policies/interventions. Scheall’s primacy of the epistemic seems to suggest a certain sequencing or prioritization in our thinking about all these. But how that prioritization holds more precisely for design and implementation stages is not clear, and the book is not engaging substantively on that front. In fact, at this juncture, it is important to remember that the logic of the book’s approach continues to operate, even on these issues, at the foundational level and that the relevance of the priority of the epistemic/ignorance thesis for the applied level of policy and governance designs remains to be worked out. The third theme with practical relevance is the relationship between administrative decision-making and spontaneous order processes. As one may expect, this is a very sensitive theme. Hayek’s work is usually associated with the evolutionary theories of spontaneous order and an antagonism to social engineering—hence, by implication, somewhat adversary to administrative sciences and institutional design. The book engages this issue from a fresh angle. Scheall takes the argument to its implications: Hayekian political epistemology “investigates the potential for spontaneous forces to intervene to realize policy goals where policymaker knowledge is inadequate” (p. 5). If the targeted policy goal is to be realized, despite the fact that the epistemic circumstances of decision makers are of such a nature that preclude prediction and control, then spontaneous forces that operate beyond policymakers capacities must have a key role, and one must rely on them, like it or not. Understanding the patterns and logic of that type of order as well as how to operate collective decision making in conditions of uncertainty via second-order rules, laws and legislation becomes an essential task for those involved in policy theory and practice. Again, Scheall makes things explict by carefully articulating what is implicit in the broader logic of the Hayekian argument. The point is very well taken and its thrust converges both with the logic of the Hayekian argument and with common sense observations. Yet, again, the operational implications for adminstrative theory and practice are not fully elaborated. What does, more precisely, entail for administrative theory and practice the rather uncontroversial thesis (now backed solidly by the political epistemology elaborated in the book) according to which achieving a deliberately defined (policy) goal, necessarily requires the support of nondeliberative forces that operate outside of the epistemic reach of the decision makers? Should that mean a pardigm change of the very nature of our approaches? Should that mean an adjustement of degree and a bettter calibration of already existing mehods and approaches? To sum up, Scheall’s book is a remarkable contribution to the literature. Yet, although it opens up multiple venues in the direction of the applied level, the book remains to the end a foundational level work. It stops short of indicating, more concretely, what the applied lessons and insights are for standard public administration theory and practice. That being said, Scheall never claimed to aim to offer applied insights. The merit of the book is considerable by mere identifying the issue, articulating it at a foundational level and drawing attention to its potential significance beyond that level. What are, more precisely, the analytical and operational implications for administrative sciences and governance theorizing of the revamped Hayekian argument advanced by Scheall, is a different project, whose way was prepared by the change of perspectives advanced in this bold and unique book. References Barker , Ernest . 2012 . The political thought of Plato and Aristotle . New York, NY : Courier Corporation . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Hayek , Friedrich August . 1945 . The use of knowledge in society . The American Economic Review , 35 ( 4 ): 519 – 30 . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Mises , Ludwig von. ( 1922/1981 ). Socialism: An economic and sociological analysis . Indianapolis, IN : Liberty Fund . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Smith , Adam. ( 1759/2000 ). The theory of moral sentiments . Indianapolis, IN : Liberty Fund . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC © The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Public Management Research Association. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com. This article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (https://academic.oup.com/journals/pages/open_access/funder_policies/chorus/standard_publication_model)
TI - Ignorance, Political Decision, and the Philosophical Foundations of Administrative Sciences
JF - Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory
DO - 10.1093/jopart/muaa018
DA - 2020-06-23
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/ignorance-political-decision-and-the-philosophical-foundations-of-FC52exZRc0
SP - 1
VL - Advance Article
IS - 
DP - DeepDyve
ER -