TY - JOUR
AU - Shih, Chih-Yu
AB - The relational turn of IR stresses the processual constitution of the state. The indigenous theory of Chinese IR adopts the relational turn but contends that the Chinese experiences are distinctive. Relying on the case of Singapore-Taiwan relationship, this paper argues that the Chinese relationality attests to a bilateral sensibility that does not confront the relational turn in general, which is multilateral. The case further contributes to the relational turn in showing non-security and affirmative components of relationality to the extent that the studies of the relational turn have remained embedded in the security concerns. The case applies the theory of “balance of relationship,” in which nations can practice self-restraint not in response to unilateral strategic calculus or multilateral rule making, but to bilateral reciprocity. The balance of relationship of the two proceeds at both the statist and the personal levels, introducing the affect of passion to the relational turn. Singapore, Taiwan, relational turn By any realist standard, Singapore and Taiwan are small states on the world stage. At the same time, the United States has been viewed as the most dominant force, especially during the Cold War, undergirding the anti-Communist regimes of these two regional allies. However, Singapore and Taiwan were not in close contact with each other during this period. The Shanghai Communiqué signed by Washington and Beijing in 1972 changed the situation. Following its signing, these two anti-Communist regimes began to consider each other as potential allies and initiated mutual engagement without the United States’ prior knowledge. They also enhanced their mutual relations within a very short period of time. In fact, through greater acquaintance with Chiang Ching-kuo and his top officials in Taipei, Singapore’s then prime minister Lee Kuan Yew changed his previously suspicious attitude toward Chinese culture and became an ardent advocate of Asian values. The bilateral relationship continued smoothly until the mid-1990s, peaking in 1993 when Singapore hosted the first official talk between Taipei and Beijing. Taipei continued to provide military training to Singapore’s army well into the second decade of the new century. This military arrangement allowed Singapore to not exclusively depend on major powers or seek military training sites in those other countries in the region that did not want to alienate Indonesia or Malaysia. Anthropologists have shown that weaker actors are capable of transcending power and interest through their insistence on fair prices and surplus sharing to survive in a subsistence economy (Randall and Charlesworth 2000; Scott 1976). Smaller states likewise contribute to International Relations (IR) theory when they strike deals, interact stylistically, and generate moral incentives, regardless of the constraints on power (Ingebritsen, Neumann, and Gstöhl 2006). What smaller actors can do without much caring at times, greater states certainly can, too. The “non-competitive” Singapore–Taiwan relationship that existed between 1973 and 1996 did not eye power competition, status competition, or exchange of interests, and thus has theoretical and practical significance. Theoretically, there was no specific policy goal on either side to begin their kinship-like partnership. In addition, despite the prediction of network theory (Freeman 1979; Böhmelt 2009) (i.e., their shared alliance with the United States was conducive to enhancing their connectedness), when, how, and why the two decided to enhance their relationship without the United States having prior knowledge remains unclear. Because most IR theories tackle competition, estrangement, and defense, non-competitive relations external to balance of power, desire for status, or enforcement of norms in an imagined anarchy are, by and large, left unexplained. Furthermore, international theories that are primarily multilateral theories, and bilateral relationships that constitute almost all international processes, are not well attended to at the theoretical level (Moran 2005). Practically, the evolution of a lukewarm relationship into one of mutual trust and caring requires a processual analysis in order for the student of International Relations to appreciate the relational nature of their subject matter. The case of Singapore–Taiwan relations illustrates a non-competitive relationship, a practical theory of diplomacy and bilateralism. The article joins the relational turn in both Western and Chinese International Relations to further enlist the Balance of Relationship (BoR) theory to explain the rise of non-competitive relationships and the diplomatic process leading to it. The “relational turn” attends broadly to relationship-embedded role identities that motivate the quest for recognition, exertion of self-restraint, and normative role taking, as opposed to the pursuit of interests, resort to self-help, and interventionary enforcement. The relational turn asks why and how national actors can make and take roles, incorporate collective identities, and act on behalf of an imagined entity greater than the nation in itself. The relational turn is particularly suitable for the analysis of non-competitive relationships, in which national actors do not seek to gain anything particular or immediate from each other. Without largely non-competitive relationships in the background, nations would not be able to concentrate on the rather few security agendas that make up contemporary IR research. The article will begin with a brief discussion of the relational turn in the study of International Relations and a comparison with the relational turn in Chinese International Relations. Next, in light of the fact that the Chinese turn actually relies on a socio-psychological literature, the article will provide an account of the emotional aspect of the relational turn and argue that Chinese relationality is about anxiety instead of passion. Then, in view of what Chinese IR owes to the reciprocal bilateralism of Confucianism, the article will proceed to discover the bilateral sensibilities of Chinese IR to contrast the predominantly multilateral concerns of Western IR and introduce a Balance of Relationship (BoR) theory. The ensuing case of the Singapore–Taiwan relationship will highlight three theoretical possibilities in Chinese BoR: 1) bilateral relationality enables the two nations to more easily engage in an affirmative relationship rather than a defensive relationship; 2) affirmative relationality is more conducive than defensive relationality to the development of positive passion; and 3) the positive affect more easily trickles down to the personal level in a bilateral than a multilateral relationship, but composes no necessary condition of relationality. Connecting Western and Chinese IR The Relational Turn The relational turn in the English literature of International Relations has an ontological divide. The relational turn that abides by the statist ontology sees relations as social and cultural capital (Slaughter 2009, 113). Such a statist relational analysis advocates the substitution of connectivity for material strength. Connectivity, which is similarly measured in military, economic, and cultural terms, is arguably a fungible power resource. According to the network statists, a wider network of social capital always constrains any mutual relationship (Hafner-Burton, Kahler, and Montgomery 2009; Maoz 2011). The other side of the divide asserts relational ontology and believes that relations come before states (Jackson and Nexon 1999). This perspective emphasizes processes and analyzes how such processes constitute the states. For example, one’s “narrative sociability” in an initial encounter with a group cannot only define one’s relationship with the other members of the group in subsequent centuries but also perpetuate one’s identity (Neumann 2011). For another example, belonging to a community and, above all, a security community results in self-restraint being an intrinsic quality of the state (Adler 2008). Small-state diplomacy achieves epistemological equality in the relational turn, the practice turns, and International Relations. This is because the attributes of the state, primarily in terms of power (but not limited to it), give way to process and relationality to the effect that greater states, much like smaller states, are relationally constituted and process driven. By exercising self-restraint, the evolving self-understanding, mutual expectation, and behavioral interaction of the greater power are constituted by the smaller power, and vice versa. For example, there have been Chinese practices of enacting the greater power’s self-restraint, as perceived and proclaimed by Beijing, in its Hong Kong, Taiwan, North Korea, and Vietnam policies (You 2001; Womack 2006). China could have been allegedly much harsher if so opted. The targeted smaller parties helped in making the role identity of China into a benevolent center. There have also been US practices of being the greater power by renouncing self-restraint in its military action toward Grenada, Libya, Panama, Iran, and Afghanistan to reproduce the role identity of the United States as the guardian of the hegemonic order. How much room the United States allows its smaller counterparts to maneuver intrinsically defines the identity of the greater power. Even between smaller powers, the bilateral relationship may have broader implications for IR theorization as well as the diplomatic practices of the greater power. This is both because the function of the relationship could be clearer where confrontation is less likely and because their relationship indirectly and yet practically affects the greater power. For example, anti-Communist sentiments in Singapore and Taiwan reinforced their alliance with the United States, as they each aimed to contain the expansion of Communist China. The enhanced association between the two smaller states—albeit uninformed to Washington—was not a challenge even though the Shanghai Communiqué subverted the image of China as the Communist on the other side of the Cold War divide. The bilateral relationship made up the damage done to anti-Communism and benefited Washington indirectly. In brief, the Singapore–Taiwan relational unity reproduced China as Communism, ideologically, so Washington–Beijing rapprochement could appear as primarily power play rather than ideology change. Such a power concern confirmed the anarchical nature of the system, the severity of which ironically justified the adoption of realist rapprochement. Together, power and ideology allowed for the persistence of the United States’ role identities during the Cold War. That nation-states are relationally constituted is too general a proposition to become useful for explaining the Singapore–Taiwan initiative. To improve the relational analysis, Daniel Nexon (2008) identifies three specific mechanisms in the relational analysis—network, field, and discourse. They are still insufficient to explain the evolution of the Taiwan–Singapore relationship, however. Nexon’s network analysis would point to the shared alliance with the United States, but Washington did not encourage or even know of the initiative. His field analysis would then attend to the geo-proximity and the dense Chinese population in both Singapore and Taiwan since they could facilitate the potential expansion of China toward them. This change would render them strategically related and psychologically sympathetic to each other. However, this potential expansion should have been clearer during the Cultural Revolution than in the aftermath of the Sino–Soviet clash and the Shanghai Communiqué. No such association was attempted in the heyday of the Bloc confrontation or the Cultural Revolution. Singapore has also remained extremely cautious when the situation in China was reversed. Thus, Singapore opted not to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing until 1990. By contrast, Tokyo, Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok, and Manila all moved beyond the containment between 1971 and 1975 in exchanging diplomatic recognition with Beijing. Finally, the discourse analysis would seek their motive to form a relationship in protecting anti-Communism, which was the foundation of the internal legitimacy undermined by the Shanghai Communiqué. However, the discourse analysis does not work well because Singapore’s aversion to the Chinese identity was in sharp contrast with Taipei’s adamant effort to align its identity with the Chinese cultural renaissance. Their association could thus be discursively counterproductive to their purpose of consolidating legitimacy. The growth of passionate mutuality between Singapore and Taiwan in the early 1970s suggests that non-competitive bilateral relationality is undertheorized. The “relational turn” in international studies has reached Chinese International Relations studies in a peculiar manner: through the Chinese indigenous posture, as seen from Qin Yaqing’s call for relational studies (Qin 2010, 2012). In this process, he takes advantage of the relational literature, which has already emerged in the Anglophone scholarship. Specifically, he refers to Thaddeus Jackson and Daniel Nexon’s processual relationalism to situate his relational studies (Qin 2009). However, the indigenous psychologist Hwang Kwang-kuo’s Confucian relationalism similarly inspires Qin (Hwang 1987, 944–74; Qin 2011, 2012). Both Qin and Hwang adhere to the ontological characteristics of relational studies resulting in the relational turn’s ontology string of their analysis. That said, the Chinese school further stresses the difference, instead of the similarity, of Chinese relationality. Confucianism aside, both Qin and Hwang nonetheless hold that Chinese uniqueness can be clearly presented in a scientifically universal epistemological horizon (Qin 2012, 75–77; Hwang 2013, 105–12). They enlist the notion of the “greater self” to convey how the personal self, submerged in a variety of relational selves that together contemplate the personal self as the “little self” or “lesser self” (Hwang 2012; Ho 1998; King 1985), is an intrinsically constituted process. Although their relationality is allegedly a multilateral tool of analysis, their analytical frame predominantly adopts bilateralism. In light of that network, field and discourse tackle multilateral relations; this bilateral sensibility is a clue that can bridge the allegedly indigenous Chinese school to the Western relational turn. Hwang’s (1987) scientific sensibility first appeared in an article on renqing (benevolent emotion) and face, where he laid out a type of relationality consisting of the interaction between two abstract roles—a petitioner and an allocator. He proposes two rules on resource allocation, one based on need (kin oriented) and another that is based on interest (rational). The need rule carries a positive affect, whereas the interest rule resonates with the cool-headed calculus of social capital. In between the two is the mixed rule in which an interest-driven petition improves its plausibility by enlisting a kinship metaphor. In Hwang’s formulation, relationality is both ontological as a need and strategic to the extent that relationality is incurred in the interaction via a metaphor of kinship. This strategic relationality, which takes advantage of ontological relationality, echoes Qin’s concerns over the Chinese foreign policy style of always trying to relate to the other side, as if relating is the foundation of security (Y. Qin 2011, 139–43) without which the self would suffer the loss of meaning and be unable to sustain itself. Thus, Qin stresses the “emotional convergence” (Qin 2009, 12–13) that parallels Hwang’s reference to positive affect. It is important to note that in the theorizations of both Qin and Hwang, relationality is a process of reproducing hypothetically established relationships, not one of re/constructing fresh relations as in Jackson and Nexon’s formulation. Another difference with Jackson and Nexon lies in Qin’s and Hwang’s examples of relationality being dyadic rather than multilateral. The seeming unique notion of the greater self is actually a generalizable mode of bilateralism. Positive versus Negative Affect The social psychological literature has not confirmed the designation of positive affect to a relationship constituted by the greater self. The greater self is literally a Confucian notion of collective identity, the contents of which varies in accordance with the encountered social context (Hwang 2012; Hwang, Francesco, and Kesslear 2003; Ho and Chiu 1998). The social psychological translation of the greater self points to the incurring of the relational self so that roles taken by one constitute one’s self-identity (Barbalet 2014; Qi 2011). The greater self is therefore a sociological necessity despite that it is Chinese culture that injects a distinctive moral significance into the conscious celebration of its prevailing (Yang 1995; Hsu 1971). Nevertheless, social identity theory consistently demonstrates that the sheer belonging to an artificially constructed group is sufficient to incur favoring behavior to the in-group and discrimination against the out-group (Oldmeadow and Fiske 2010; Stephan and Stephan 1985). This partially explains the rationality of constructing a greater self and securing one’s membership whatever the context. The greater-self-consciousness is thus not uniquely Chinese, although the Chinese culture of the greater self is arguably more sophisticated than the Western greater self is. The literature contrarily suggests that, under the condition of relational self, the emotional aspect of role identity is easily registered in anxiety or stress (Simon 1992; Burke 1991). The self-discrepancy in one’s performance of a role, as evaluated by the counterpart, is a major source of anxiety (Higgins 1987; Roseman 1984). Moreover, symbolic interactionism and dramaturgical sociology concur with the observation that significant others hold the key to one’s emotional state of stress (Turner and Stets 2006, 26–32). Note that the relational turn in psychoanalysis similarly points to the important subject of separation anxiety (Dimen 2012, 396; Renolds 2007), implying the dreaded loss of a role partner. In addition, studies of Chinese psychology note the critical function of relationships in the maintenance of mental health (Hwang and Chang 2009; Lin, Tseng, and Yeh 1995). A role, in both multilateral and bilateral settings, is constantly examined externally to cause stress (Hsu 1983, 1985, 100). As such, a stable relationship can generate the positive affect, but a national actor would rarely encounter this situation. Rather, relationality as a process of constant adaptation is the IR condition of national role identity. Feeling for others is not essential to the enactment of role identities. Rather, it is the feeling concerned with how others regard the fulfillment of the role identity that maintains social harmony and order (Barbalet 2001, 108). The emotional stress thus incurred renders the very relevance of the small state in international relationality since the small states, with their large number, compose an imagined audience. Major powers such as Moscow, Washington, and Beijing do not easily acquire support or consent from one another. Given the widespread status anxiety (Renshon 2015; Onea 2014), their status as major powers, their national role conceptions, and their aspirations in world politics can be confirmed only via their interactions with certain smaller states. They do this either by dominating multilateral agendas where small states are acquiescent, or by reciprocating bilateral agendas where small states are articulate. In the face of small states, a major power usually enjoys bilateralism more than multilateralism (Cha 2012). This does not necessarily mean that a major power will procure specific interests by forcing a concession out of the smaller state. Rather, a major power can relatively more easily enlist a small state’s support via both positive and negative incentives through a bilateral relationship. In such a way, it can secure a conception of a greater self and set up a role model for other bilateral relationships. In this sense, bilateralism that reproduces the image of status can actually be less stressful to major powers. The Singapore–Taiwan relationship presents a puzzle, though, to the extent that the emotional aspect of their bilateral relationality has appeared positive. It is an exception to the general feeling of anxiety ingrained in relationality. The emotional literature repeatedly confirms that satisfied pursuit of self-esteem motivates relational behavior and brings forth the positive affect (Marcussen 2006; Ervin and Stryker 2001; Rosenberg et al. 1995). As the article will show later, emotional convergence that existed between the two nations was possible due to the personalization of relationality. This case suggests that bilateral relationality embedded in a non-competitive relationship produces an emotional state that is qualitatively different from a competitive relationship dealing with security, status, or norms. It suggests that the non-competitive relationship allows the positive affect to trickle down from the level of the state to that of the individual (Kleinman 1986), as the latter can enhance the leaders’ self-esteem through mutually assuring recognition (Hsu 1985). However, the case demonstrates that emotional convergence produced by personalization is not a necessary condition for the formation or continuation of relationality as claimed by Chinese IR. Multilateral Versus Bilateral Meanwhile, Western literature on the relational turn has consistently shown a preference for a multilateral approach in dealing with relationships between a nation and its group, society, alliance, or system. These larger social gatherings are composed of processes through which rules are established (e.g., balance of power, global governance, and hierarchy). The aims of such processes are to define the meaning of gatherings and specify the proper code of conduct, hence the pressure to synchronize the practices of their members. The assumption that relations necessarily encompass nations follows Alexander Wendt’s constructivism and Anthony Gidden’s structuration, in which structures and agents are mutually constituted (Qin 2010, 143). Accordingly, rules that reflect structures or norms, which agents interpret and practice, are constantly reinvented. In this sense, the process of synchronization is never ending and relationality, by definition, becomes process driven so that all interacting parties are differently related in line with Hegelian dialectics. This sort of relationality is essentially dynamic. The ontology of relationality is “change” at both the structural and agent levels, and the epistemology that follows is “changing.” By contrast, the discussion of change in Chinese literature refers primarily to methodological changes that require no ontological adaptation. Presumably, each Chinese self acquires the skill to adapt, thus ensuring their continuous belonging to the same and known greater self. Purely by logic, the unsynchronized world cannot possibly subscribe to the same rule without much revision in each country. Advocacy for any universal rule, however liberal, cannot help but involve intervention. Empirically, China’s position within multilateral settings has been consistently passive. Sheer abstention characterizes the Chinese voting style on those issues whereby China, the Third World, and China’s significant other partner cannot reach a consensus. Together, logic and practice determine that active relationality embedded in non-intervention, non-substantialism, and the greater-self-consciousness has to be bilateral. Such bilateral sensibilities incorporate the reciprocal relationship stressed in Confucian culture, substituting the generalizable dyadic relationship for the uniqueness claim made by Qin or Hwang as regards the greater self. Chinese IR are composed of a multilateral self meant to passively satisfy the ritual function required of the little self, and a bilateral self to actively practice negotiation to secure relationality. Both Qin and Hwang conceive of relationship as an epistemological critique on synchronization. Qin makes an important commentary on Western relationalism as it falls back to substantialism on the real-world research agenda. The extent is attributed to agents determining the process of adaptation in accordance with the calculus of their own interests, albeit under the influence of external relations. For Qin, the thesis and antithesis in Chinese epistemology do not meet each other in conflict; instead, they interpret, define, and complement each other to constitute a harmonious whole (Qin 2010, 143–45). This statement indicates a kind of relationship in which everyone remains intrinsically related yet unsynchronized. Thus, changes are deemed methodological rather than ontological, and relationships are viewed as ontologically binding. Changing relationships would simultaneously destroy nations, such that synchronization and intervention become anti-ontological. The purpose of change is to ascertain that each accepts the other as a legitimate dyadic partner so as to continue their relationship. Based on these views, Western relationality is a process of becoming synchronized, whereas Chinese relationality is one of staying accepted. Arranging a relationship is a process of guaranteeing each other’s place in the greater self and, in the context of BoR, the dyadic self, which consists of these two “elements.” Therefore, nations are defined by their identities vis-à-vis their multiple dyadic selves, not by what they are themselves. In this sense, Chinese relationality is an affectively reassuring process, in which differences pose no barrier to one’s inclusion in the dyadic self, as long as the roles required by the relationship are faithfully enacted. Nevertheless, Chinese relationality is by no means peaceful since it would require a destructive policy in the face of a perceived wrong relationship. This Chinese relationality in diplomatic interaction was what prompted Chiung-chiu Huang and Chih-yu Shih to construct the “Balance of Relationship” (BoR) theory to transcend the alleged Chinese uniqueness (Huang and Shih 2014). The Affirmative Balance of Relationship The thrust of the BoR theory is that nations balance the loss of relationship either by investing more in the amendable relationship or by removing the eclipsed one that has been judged to be beyond mending. The technique chooses between exerting or renouncing self-restraint as a way to restore or destroy the greater self, respectively. The culturally free notion of BoR theory moves Qin and Hwang’s reference to relationality away from cultural specification. Even though Confucianism provides a distinctive access to relationality in the Chinese context, other countries each have their own stylistic accesses to BoR. From the perspectives of Jackson and Nexon, BoR theory is broadly ontological, and yet it, according to Shih and Huang, is also rational, due to the presence of a long-term stabilized reciprocal relationship, which is a more efficient way of coping with anarchy than self-help, qua balance of power (Shih and Huang 2015). Therefore, a nation is always in search of a stabilized bilateral relationship, which is essential for ensuring relational security (Huang 2015), one that a multilateral framework is unable to offer. Differently put, a nation is always capable of turning bilateral if multilateral rules are unenforceable or disadvantageous. Bilateral relationships provide a leeway from rules as long as the other side reciprocates. Nations engage in both types of relationality under different circumstances, which are contingent on their judgment on the plausibility of one or another kind of relationality. Accordingly, the seeming contrast between Chinese relationality with Western relationality is, to a large extent, a contrast between bilateral relationality and multilateral relationality, which is therefore culturally neutral. Culture makes a difference in one’s proclivity toward a particular kind of relationality over the other. The management of Chinese relationality is more likely to take place within the bilateral context. Harmonizing a series of bilateral relationships independently is much less complicated or confrontational than synchronizing a multilateral relationship involving many parties. Multilateral relationality calls for the nation's self-restraint to practically abide by the community's security rules at the expense of its immediate interest (Adler 2008), which implies an adamant attitude toward other deviant behaviors. By contrast, self-restraint in bilateral relationality refers to the patience and concession at one’s immediate expense to remain accepted by the other, which appears recalcitrant (Shih 2014). The following two principles of self-restraint result from the quest for bilateral relationality as exemplified by the study of Huang and Shih on relational security: 1) exerting self-restraint through compromise in the face of an unintended act of violation, which is considered to convey sincerity for the existing relationship; and 2) jettisoning self-restraint through confrontation in the face of an intended act of violation to destroy the broken relationship and start a fresh one (Huang and Shih 2014; Shih and Huang 2013). Given that stable relationships are valuable across all countries regardless of their power level, the decision on whether to compromise or to confront is not a matter of power calculus but a matter of judging intention. This finding explains why, from time to time, the weak can challenge the strong and the strong can concede to the weak under relational bilateralism (Huang 2015; Huang and Shih 2014). Comparing the use of multilateral and bilateral tools, a weaker party usually prefers the former in defending against the imposition of rules by the stronger state (Cha 2012). However, the disadvantage of a multilateral frame for a weaker party is that it will be unlikely to succeed in acquiring gains from the stronger party. Therefore, depending on what its goals are, the weaker party often mixes the use of multilateral and bilateral tools. Notions of compromise, confrontation, and self-sacrifice may fail to convey any positive affect or emotional convergence expected by either Qin or Hwang. Instead, the affective tendency leans more toward anxiety than enthusiasm when it comes to monitoring one’s acceptance by the other side after one’s performance of a self-perceived act of self-restraint. In comparison, anxiety could be comparatively less significant in a multilateral than a bilateral situation because one could always find justification in enforcing a multilateral rule. Furthermore, the degree of anxiety could be less under the multilateral circumstance where the nation remains in control over how much to adapt and integrate into a group. In contrast, the other side holds the key to the fate of the greater self in the quest for bilateral relationality, without which one is left completely without relationality. The analyses presented by Qin and Jackson and Nexon recognize the “unowned” nature of the process of relational politics (Jackson and Nexon 1999; Qin 2009). However, the degree of an unowned process is hardly insignificant in a bilateral process, given how the purpose of enlisting long-term bilateral relationality is to bypass multilateral principles and stay un-compliant. This formulation of relational security reflects an important feature of bilateral relationality; that is, its exemption from the multilateral rule. Anxiety in multilateral relationality pertains to the recognition of one’s amenability to the group a nation belongs to, whereas bilateral relationality is about the acceptance of one’s unsynchronized values and identities by the other side. The level of anxiety is presumably higher for great powers at the multilateral level where they compete for support to make rules. Where there is no such competition, usually between small powers, anxiety is also higher when it comes to revising rules that impinge on the bilateral relationship. In short, the emotional contrast does not exist between Western and Chinese relationalities. Both are about anxiety. A higher level of anxiety exists in the bilateral than the multilateral relationalities and is higher for the greater power than the smaller power in the multilateral relationality. Anxiety is widespread inasmuch as relationality involves security issues and involves constant group scrutiny incurred by these issues. Enthusiasm, rather than anxiety, is likely to characterize the affective perspective in occasions where a greater power is to achieve a new rule or sanctioned violation. Again, this is not about the difference between Chinese and Western relationalities. The relational turn reproduces structural studies of International Relations in the sense that the discipline continues to be preoccupied with the pressures of threat, competition, and survival under conditions of anarchy. Daily International Relations, which are uncompetitive or unsynchronized, as in the example of Singapore–Taiwan relations, require future attention so that the next stage of relational turn studies can be initiated. The ease of witnessing the delicate process of relationalism compared with substantialism in non-competitive, unsynchronized interaction is due to the irrelevance of substantialism wherever synchronization is not valued. The making of most countries as well as their evolving self-understanding may result from non-competitive, bilateral relations as opposed to their participation in multilateral processes. The Singapore–Taiwan interaction case can contribute to the relational turn in three aspects. First, it bridges Western relationality and Chinese relationality by bringing forth the bilateral (i.e., non-cultural) relationship through BoR theory. Their case would demonstrate how bilateral relationality requires a different nature of relationality, based on acceptance instead of conversion and which is accessible to all. This article follows the general relational turn to explain the social capital consideration of initial contact between the two countries. Second, this article enlists and extends BoR theory proposed by Huang and Shih by proposing two rules of common-sense gift giving, in order to explain the evolution of non-competitive relationality. This upgraded balance of relationship is affirmative as opposed to being defensive in the sense of balancing other major powers. This relationship aims at generating a reciprocal relationship under circumstances of no threat via goodwill and benevolence. This process helps one party sympathize with the other side and encourages it to reciprocate at a time of need in the future. Any country can adopt bilateral reciprocity to transcend multilateral rules. A long-term affirmative BoR includes the following two characteristics: 1) offers unexpected benevolence to enable the imagination of an emerging dyadic self; and 2) continues benevolence despite any abruption of benevolence by the other side in order to preserve the existing dyadic self (Hattori 2003; Klotz 1995, 13). Third, the case brings in personal interaction between the top leaders of the two countries to explain how passion, not anxiety, can grow to reinforce such an interstate relationship. Although personalization is not typical of BoR, the exception often reveals the rule. The rise and fall of personalization show that Chinese IR relationality is not about emotional convergence or positive renqing, which Qin and Hwang claimed. Affirmative BoR at the state level can trickle down to the personal level, though, which can cause BoR to become emotionally positive. The case illustrates that the Chinese convention of treating foreign leaders with intense courtesy is no more than a diplomatic technique to reinforce reciprocity at the state level. Once personalization fades, BoR continues, nonetheless. This alludes to a generalizable rule of bilateral relationships between all nations regardless of their relative levels of power, indicating that, after all, BoR does not rely on the attitudes of national leaders toward each other. The Singapore–Taiwan relationship demonstrates that state relationality is surely processual, but not personal (see Table 1). Table 1. International relationality in a comparative perspective Western IR Relationality Chinese IR Relationality Balance of Relationship Scope Multilateral Multilateral Bilateral Actors Major powers Major powers All nations Identity Rule-constituted self Greater self Dyadic selves Practice Self-restraint to honor the rule Self-restraint to avoid enforcement Self-restraint to bypass the rule Emotion Anxiety and passion Alleged passion but anxiety Anxiety or passion Self-image Self-determined Other-determined Other-determined Personalization Unlikely Unlikely Likely Issue area Security and governance Security and interest Interest Ideal state Synchronicity Harmony Reciprocity Policy orientation Competitive or interventionary Defensive Concessionary or affirmative Western IR Relationality Chinese IR Relationality Balance of Relationship Scope Multilateral Multilateral Bilateral Actors Major powers Major powers All nations Identity Rule-constituted self Greater self Dyadic selves Practice Self-restraint to honor the rule Self-restraint to avoid enforcement Self-restraint to bypass the rule Emotion Anxiety and passion Alleged passion but anxiety Anxiety or passion Self-image Self-determined Other-determined Other-determined Personalization Unlikely Unlikely Likely Issue area Security and governance Security and interest Interest Ideal state Synchronicity Harmony Reciprocity Policy orientation Competitive or interventionary Defensive Concessionary or affirmative Table 1. International relationality in a comparative perspective Western IR Relationality Chinese IR Relationality Balance of Relationship Scope Multilateral Multilateral Bilateral Actors Major powers Major powers All nations Identity Rule-constituted self Greater self Dyadic selves Practice Self-restraint to honor the rule Self-restraint to avoid enforcement Self-restraint to bypass the rule Emotion Anxiety and passion Alleged passion but anxiety Anxiety or passion Self-image Self-determined Other-determined Other-determined Personalization Unlikely Unlikely Likely Issue area Security and governance Security and interest Interest Ideal state Synchronicity Harmony Reciprocity Policy orientation Competitive or interventionary Defensive Concessionary or affirmative Western IR Relationality Chinese IR Relationality Balance of Relationship Scope Multilateral Multilateral Bilateral Actors Major powers Major powers All nations Identity Rule-constituted self Greater self Dyadic selves Practice Self-restraint to honor the rule Self-restraint to avoid enforcement Self-restraint to bypass the rule Emotion Anxiety and passion Alleged passion but anxiety Anxiety or passion Self-image Self-determined Other-determined Other-determined Personalization Unlikely Unlikely Likely Issue area Security and governance Security and interest Interest Ideal state Synchronicity Harmony Reciprocity Policy orientation Competitive or interventionary Defensive Concessionary or affirmative From Rational IR to Processual Relationality Singapore–Taiwan relations have moved rapidly beyond simply being an exchange of interests since the first secret contact in 1973. Singapore has played a significant role as a liaison for Taiwan’s external relations. The country’s most noteworthy effort has been to facilitate the two unprecedented dialogues between Taipei and Beijing since the Communist victory in the Civil War in 1949. Singapore took advantage of its relationship with both Taipei and Beijing to facilitate two historical meetings, in 1993 and 2015, respectively, which produced no immediate good for Singapore other than the fulfillment of a friend’s obligation. In 1993, not only did Singapore offer the venue for an entire week for free, its Ministry of Foreign Affairs also laboriously organized all the details. The Singapore team ascertained that every detail was arranged to fully take care of Taipei’s primary concern of being equal to Beijing. Even the Singaporean media ensured that all reports and photos of the two sides were in the same length and size to soothe Taipei’s extreme anxiety regarding its quest for equal status. Indeed, Singapore left no stone unturned to accomplish the task of diplomatically protecting Taipei’s sense of inferiority without intervening in the negotiation process. Most importantly, Singapore expected no return for its faithful service to both sides, especially from Taipei (Chiu 2013). However, Singapore–Taiwan relations underwent an intense crisis after the 1993 meeting. This crisis never changed Kuan Yew’s persistent and passionate quest to address the uncertain future of Taiwan. Taiwan’s pro-independence leader, Lee Teng-hui, launched the first attack on Kuan Yew in his remarks on Singapore’s undemocratic political system (Chen 2002, 141). Kuan Yew later recalled his goodwill to Teng-hui, but the latter’s attack had his “ears burned” (Ruan 2000, 186). Teng-hui even invited Samuel Huntington to Taiwan to render his judgment that “[t]he Freedom and creativity that President Lee [Teng Hui] has introduced in Taiwan will survive him. The honesty and efficiency that Senior Minister Lee [Kuan Yew] has brought to Singapore are likely to follow him to his grave” (Huntington 1997, 13). The pro–Lee Teng Hui’s Ziyou Shibao (Liberty Times) carried a series of discreditations on behalf of Teng-hui about Kuan Yew’s cashing in on his relationship with Taiwan for his own business profit (Tzou 2001, 360–63). Nevertheless, Kuan Yew returned to Taiwan during the term of the succeeding pro-independence President Chen Shui-bian, despite the then minister of foreign affairs’s disgraceful statement that Singapore is “a state the size of nose shit” that “pampers China’s balls” (Chang and Chen 2012, 56–57). Kuan Yew set aside these deliberate attacks and remained focused on Taiwan’s future, maintaining continued contact with Taipei well into the twenty-first century. Before Lee passed away in March 2015, he visited Taiwan 25 times. This level of commitment exceeded anything required by Singapore’s national interests embedded in anti-Chinese Communism as well as economic exchange with China. “Chineseness” has bothered Singapore since the country’s independence. Kuan Yew led Singapore’s independence from Malaysia as a result of the dispute over the equal rights of non-indigenous residents. Prior to independence, Singapore executed a few Indonesian mariners involved in an explosion, who became Indonesia’s national heroes. The repercussions continued into the twenty-first century (Chua 2015). The anti-Communist coup in Jakarta right after Singapore declared independence simultaneously incurred a massive anti-Chinese massacre. Thus, Singapore was faced with a dire situation in which the Chineseness of Singapore could embarrassingly lead to serious danger. This potential outcome could be attributed to the hostility of its neighbors to the potentially pro-Communist Chinese population (Barr 1999). On top of that, it was followed by the coincidental simultaneity in the background of Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia, which terminated Chinese language education for the sake of anti-Communism or nation-building in the recent decade. All of these led to the decision that Singapore had to avert its Chineseness to some extent by installing a nationwide Anglophone education (Josey 1974). Hence, anti-Communism and multiculturalism together marked the national spirit of Singapore within its uncertain neighborhood. In hindsight, anti-Communism could have served as a basis for a relationship with Taiwan. However, Taipei’s determined pursuit of representative Chineseness constituted an embarrassing connection better passed by Kuan Yew. The adjustment of the lukewarm relationship only emerged upon Nixon’s surprise visit to China in February 1972—the anti-Communist allies in East and Southeast Asia anxiously watched the visit, and resulted in the Shanghai Communiqué. In response, the exodus of Taiwanese migrants to the Western world in the early 1970s reflected the anxiety of the Taiwanese population toward the uncertain future of Taiwan. Earlier in 1971, Beijing replaced the Kuomintang’s seat in the United Nations. A series of diplomatic setbacks began in the late 1960s and continued throughout the 1970s. Over 30 nations switched their recognition from Taipei to Beijing three years after Taipei lost its seat in the United Nations. To secure its international status and ensure that Taipei could still have alternative routes to access international resources, the stance of anti-Communist Singapore, which did not join the trend of recognizing Beijing, suddenly loomed significant. Together, Taipei and Singapore planned Kuan Yew’s secret visit in 1973. For both sides, the need to expand the anti-Communist network was the drive and, hence, the main social capital consideration. According to Peter Pi-teh Chang’s secret memo to Minister Shen Chang-huan,1 Taipei’s representative to Singapore, the US ambassador in Singapore immediately followed up on Kuan Yew’s trip and asked Chang about it. He then reported to Shen his exchange with his US counterpart. His account of Kuan Yew’s trip stressed Kuan Yew’s strategic judgment on Taiwan’s indirect but significant role in diverting Beijing from any substantial ambition in Southeast Asia. Washington’s ignorance of Kuan Yew’s trip indicated that strategic interests of smaller states could make a sufficiently strong base of agency for change in policy orientation, without any hint from their common leader seated in Washington. Many other messages that carry important theoretical implications stood out in the same memo and the exchanges that followed. In the memo, Kuan Yew’s reflections after returning from Taipei were actually first fed to Shen by Chang. Chang reportedly gathered the information from a “reliable source,” which confirmed Kuan Yew’s extremely favorable impression of his host. After all, Taiwan posed a model of being Chinese and anti-Communist at the same time. Furthermore, Kuan Yew told Chang’s source that Taiwan must remain strong and prosperous so that Southeast Asia could stay away from the Chinese threat. Kuan Yew allegedly expressed his determination to help Taiwan with its international trade wherever Beijing’s pressure was intense. He also planned for Singapore to be a transit for Taiwan to export goods and import strategic materials wherever Taipei needed to bypass the likely boycott by Beijing. (Later, Taiwan’s purchase of light arms from Tel Aviv went through Singapore’s mediation.) Chang’s report proceeded with a key conversation with the parliamentary secretary to Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ong Soo Chuan, who insinuated that Singapore would not have diplomatic relationships with Beijing in the quoted statement “as long as the US maintains her influence in Thailand and Indonesia, Singapore will remain [the] statu[s] quo” (citation year). Finally, Chang noticed a qualitative change in Singapore’s attitude toward Taiwan, as Taiwan’s Minister of Finance K. T. Lee’s visit and request to meet with Kuan Yew was instantly approved. This change was “a dramatically improved” development compared with how past similar requests were considered (citation year). The abovementioned exchanges provide a few theoretical implications. First, the consideration of national interest in Kuan Yew’s first visit indeed prevailed over the value difference. However, once policy reification of such consideration starts, the momentum that follows may become more relational than rational. Kuan Yew’s strategic interests in Taiwan aside, the reorientation toward Taiwan attests to the volatile nature of political value in shaping foreign policy. Kuan Yew was a noted supporter of constitutional democracy in his early career, which is embedded in his British intellectual preparation (Lee 1998, 131). In that regard, he was even antagonistic to Confucianism, which he considered unsuited for the modern conditions.2 Regardless of Taiwan’s national campaign on Confucianism and the lack of democratic preparation, the aforementioned anxiety toward the possible demise of Taiwan under the Nixon shock nonetheless emerged in a proposal to help Taiwan, which was made by Singapore’s minister of finance, Hon Sui Sen. According to the proposal: Under certain circumstances where direct trade contacts are not possible, Singapore will provide [the] Republic of China with the facilities of transshipment so that the Republic of China can secure the supplies from certain countries indirectly. The Central Trust of China and the Intraco Limited will be designated to work together for this purpose. (Ministry of Finance 1973) On one hand, Hon promised to help Taiwan with the knowledge to “establish a Development Fund similar to what is operated by the government of Singapore and its budgetary procedures” (citation, year). A Taiwanese team would also go to Singapore to learn “Singapore’s Central Provident Fund, Housing Program, and Urban Renewal Project” (Ministry of Finance 1973). In return, Taiwan would “provide [the] PUB [Public Utilities Board] of Singapore with engineering services and experiences in the establishment of nuclear power plant, which include the selection of specifications, personnel training and wherever possible loan of personnel, etc.” (Ministry of Finance 1973). None of the abovementioned goodwill was expected to yield concrete and calculable benefits for either side. They were not exchanges in the business sense; instead, they resembled an exchange of “gifts.” Such expression of goodwill apparently led to the growth of reciprocal relationship in the long run. Second, a well-developed relationship may further reconstitute initial identities. Kuan Yew’s own view on Confucianism changed dramatically since 1970. He was alienated from the cultural tradition of his family. This alienation could be intellectually based since he was well trained in Western pedagogy, which instilled in him a modern and scientific schema that was distrustful and even hostile toward Confucianism. This difference could also be strategic because he knew how Chineseness had been a threat to his neighbors or former nationals in Malaysia, which could lead to suspicion. Pragmatically, he also knew how Chineseness was subject to Communist China’s infiltration and could lead to the disruption of his own society (Preston 2007, 130). This negative view of Confucianism stood in stark contrast to Lee’s attitude since the 1990s. By then, Kuan Yew had already revitalized Chinese cultural awareness in full gear and rehabilitated Chinese language education. A period of reconstitution had to exist in between. In fact, he listened to Mahathir Mohamad in 1980 as the latter tried to promote so-called “Asian values.” Since then, liberal democracy was no longer a favorable reference for Kuan Yew. In 1983, Singapore established the Institute of East Asian Philosophies (IEAP) precisely to study Confucianism. The IEAP later evolved into the Institute of East Asian Political Economy and finally settled as the East Asian Institute. However, this move did not mean that his aversion to Communist China changed. Quite the contrary; upon observing underdevelopment during his first visit to China in 1976, he felt so confident that he decided to allow open access to China for his countrymen so that they would give up on any lingering loyalty to the imagined Motherland (Lee 2000, 573–94). His determined cultural reversal, together with his disdain toward China, pointed to Singapore’s newly acquainted anti-Communist and yet Confucian leadership in Taipei. The reason that Taipei authorities could exert their cultural influence on Singapore was because the former were able to convert a rational exchange of national interest to a mutually constituted identity. This represents the third theoretical implication. From Taipei’s perspective, countries in the region rushed to exchange diplomatic recognition with Beijing and to sever their ties with Taipei. Singapore was the exception. However, the major nations in the Arab world remained on Taipei’s side. In a conversation at a family dinner on April 7, 1978, Kuan Yew mentioned the lack of channels with Saudi Arabia, a country with which Singapore wished to establish formal diplomatic ties. Shen took up the issue immediately, and in just three weeks, he received a message from his ambassador in Jeddah, who heard positive feedback from the Saudi Foreign Ministry. Shen then wrote Kuan Yew confidentially on May 9 to inform him of the situation; Shen also reminded him that the Kingdom’s readiness to establish diplomatic relations with Singapore and to exchange envoys at the ambassadorial level could be delayed due to the shortage of personnel, staffed only by a Chargé d’Affaires, in the early stage.3 Kuan Yew expressed his gratitude to Shen in his confidential reply on May 17 for his ability to “move so quickly.”4 Note, though, that two-thirds of the confidential message was to refresh the former’s unforgettable encounter of the evening with Wego, the younger brother of President Chiang Ching-kuo (to be discussed later). Fourth, once relationality of the greater self constituted Singapore’s role identity, Singapore’s concern for Taiwan’s future never faded. This fact has remained despite the change in direction of Singapore’s China policy. In 1978, Deng Xiaoping visited Singapore. The following year, 1979, Singapore and Beijing signed a trade agreement providing mutually preferential treatment. In 1980, the two countries established a trade office in each other’s capital. Singapore’s investment in China began to pick up in the early 1980s. Eventually, the relationship became so intertwined that Singapore’s minister of finance Goh Keng Swee formally served as an advisor of a Special Economic Zone in China’s Coastal Area in 1985. From Anxious Relationality to Passionate Relationality Offering benevolence certainly carries a conscious expectation that one could be accepted as a worthy partner within a dyadic relationship. However, the decision to form a greater self lies in the judgment of the other side. This uncertainty generated anxiety, as shown in Peter Chang’s intelligence work following Kuan Yew’s impression of his secret trip. That both parties continuously offered benevolence and showed goodwill proves that they are both willing to invest in the formation of a long-term bilateral relationship. No immediate national interest gains could be obtained from these investments in terms of knowledge sharing, information exchange, or military cooperation. Then, the noteworthy development of interpersonal friendship transformed the emerging and yet uncertain greater self into an enjoyable and caring relationship. The personalization of interstate reciprocity could exempt both sides from spending too much in attempts to show continued benevolence while remaining confident in the health of the greater self. The following discussion illustrates what “emotional convergence” means in practice. Chiang Kai-shek passed away on April 5, 1975, which was the year Singapore’s troops began their training in Taiwan. Kuan Yew sent personal condolences to Madame Chiang and Ching-kuo on April 22. In the first letter, which was brief, Lee wrote a more appropriate compliment for private than public condolences because of its flattering intent: “[T]he respect and devotion of the thousands of people who mourned his loss in Taipei reflected the place he held in their hearts and, indeed, in history.”5 His letter to Ching-kuo revealed a personal compassion for the loss of an important friend, beginning with a line on relationships: “My wife, children, and I send you and your family our deepest condolence on the death of your father.”6 It touched on the betrayal of the United States: “Taiwan has been able to ride through the very turbulent changes caused by the change of America’s policy on China.”7 Kuan Yew was on a trip to New Zealand and could only arrange for Pang Tee Pow, permanent secretary of the Ministry of Defense, to attend the funeral from nearby. However, he flew to Taiwan on May 23 from Tokyo on another secret trip. As stated in an internal letterhead of MOFA meant to be circulated exclusively among the 15 top leaders of Taiwan, which cautioned against news leaks, the only actual reader allowed to access this particular memo was Chiang Ching-kuo. The primary purpose of Kuan Yew’s side trip was not likely to be about military training, as Taiwan’s Ministry of Defense was not given access to this memo. From a very early stage, Kuan Yew’s visits to Taiwan involved enjoying gatherings with the Shen couple and even the Chiang couple. Take, for example, the aforementioned family dinner on April 7, 1978, in which Wego participated. This example was already the second time Kuan Yew met him, and Wego so greatly impressed Kuan Yew that he wrote that it had been an unexpected bonus to meet General Chiang Wego again and to have him explain his remarkable capacity of mind over muscle. However, of great [significance] was your distinction between learning the physical aspects of ch’i kung and meditation and the philosophical basis on which one tackles the problems of life. It left a deep and abiding impression on me.8 Note that Kuan Yew wrote his letter at the same time a message was written acknowledging the coming diplomatic breakthrough with Saudi Arabia. The obscure line between official and private interaction indicated that the personal relationship must have improved quickly and steadily in the past three years. Kuan Yew later invited Wego to visit Singapore so that the former could learn more about Chinese ch’i kung. The witty general had to decline upon the pretext of his workload because he had thought of himself as only bragging. One time in 1982, Chiang sent Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Frederic Chien to Singapore to inform Lee of Chiang’s eye operation, which would keep him from receiving Kuan Yew at the airport in person as he had always done. Considering that Chiang never received any other foreign leader in the capacity of president at the airport, his sending Chien deeply touched Lee “by the enormous demonstration of courtesy and friendship,” which had no apparent purpose for the national interest.9 Over three decades later, Chien still recalled having seen tears in Kuan Yew’s eyes at the very moment.10 In the same exchange dated February 22, 1982, Kuan Yew attended to the issue of aborted arms sales to Taiwan and conveyed his worry that Ronald Reagan could be under “more pressure” to downgrade Taiwan’s importance. On February 15, 1982, Kuan Yew called Chiang after his eye operation, during which they sent greetings to each other on behalf of their wives. Shen also passed gifts from Madame Chiang to Kuan Yew’s and Shen’s respective wives. As an appropriate practice between friends, they often exchanged small gifts, such as special flavored curry that Kuan Yew’s wife once prepared for the Shens.11 Upon returning, Kuan Yew wrote Chiang that “[I]t cheered me greatly to find you in such good spirits … There was no flagging in vitality or vigour despite the operation. Your voice was spritely and clear, and your mind sharp and crisp.”12 They had known each other so well by then that Kuan Yew encouraged his friend at the end of the letter: I hope you will recover soon. You [will need] to keep fit in other ways, now that you may not be able to go out to the countryside to visit the farmers as you did in the past. Your health is crucial. During this testing period, the Republic of China requires a leader who is well known for his steadfastness, and will be respected for being an upright and just ruler.13 Shen discussed Chinese culture every time he escorted Kuan Yew to different sites in Taiwan, for official and leisure purposes, during Kuan Yew’s many visits. Over the years, tourism in Taiwan has encountered extensive exposure to Chinese traditional religions and cultures filled with historically and philosophically challenging topics, which provided the two thinkers with food for thought and subjects of comparison between the Taiwanese and Singaporeans. Shen arranged all the trips up to the smallest details to the comfort of the guest, especially when Lee’s wife came along. A letter by Lee dated March 31, 1984, indicates such considerate caring as follows: I appreciate your personal attention so that my wife and I were comfortable in the old wing of the Grand Hotel, that dinner was sited just across the hall opposite my suite, and that it was a [W]estern dinner so that we could finish early. Thank you for accompanying us to the Museum and the home of Chang Ta-chien [a classic painter], and sending us off to the airport. I feel a sense of guilt at having intruded into so much of your time.14 Evidence suggests that Kuan Yew’s visits to Taiwan, especially those with Shen, were immersed in intensive acculturation. Other than visits, their conversations and correspondences often cited Chinese aphorisms. In his letter on March 31, for example, Kuan Yew complimented the “redeeming advantage” of his trip to be “by travelling together in a car I had the opportunity to hear you speak candidly… You taught me another Chinese aphorism, sit in a command tent and devise strategies that will assure victory a thousand li away. It is apposite of President Chiang … .”15 Kuan Yew actually handwrote the newly acquired aphorism in Chinese characters in parentheses behind the citation, albeit an error in one of the words. Obviously he was not worried if his writing appeared handsome. In Shen’s reply typed on April 13 by his secretary Ma Ying-jeou (Taiwan’s president between 2008 and 2016), another Chinese aphorism was cited to compliment Kuan Yew: “I myself learn a great deal from you every time we are together. This can best be described by another Chinese aphorism—‘one talk with you gives me more than what I can learn in ten years of study,’” followed by Shen’s handwritten Chinese characters.16 Although Shen assured Kuan Yew that “there was absolutely no intrusion of my time,” he apologized for his belated reply, dated May 7, because of “the busy political season … in this country.”17 Shen signed his letter in handwritten Chinese. In 1985, Kuan Yew received Chiang’s son Hsiao-wu as Taiwan’s representative to Singapore so that the latter could stay away from the political storm caused by a scandalous political assassination involving the latter. Role Identity Beyond Personalization Contemporary diplomatic history has witnessed other examples of emotionally rewarding personalization, for example Reagan–Thatcher (US–UK), Schmitt–Mitterrand (Germany–France), or Mao–Ho (Chi–Minh) (China–Vietnam). While personalization contributes to diplomacy, neither the Balance of Power (BoP) theory nor the BoR theory considers it essential to an international relationship. A complete turn of a personal relationship between Singapore and Taiwan in the 1990s thus demonstrates the tenacity of relationality independent of positive emotions. Kuan Yew’s frequent visits to Taiwan did not end after 1990, which was the very year Singapore and Beijing established their diplomatic relationship. In the same year, Lee Teng-hui began his own presidential term after two years of acting at the death of Chiang Ching-kuo. Kuan Yew provided Teng-hui the best the former could—to undertake an international trip in March 1988 to Singapore in the capacity of president, although Teng-hui arrived not in the official title of the Republic of China. He agreed to use the title “President from Taiwan.” This event was considered a diplomatic breakthrough for Teng-hui, granted that Teng-hui’s intention collided with Kuan Yew’s long-standing judgment that the Chinese Mainland would eventually reunify with Taiwan. Kuan Yew was also the first world leader who visited Taiwan after Chen Shui-bian became president in 2000, despite Chen’s apparently pro-Taiwan independence. Kuan Yew’s acquaintance with Ma has lasted over two decades. Ma notes Kuan Yew’s consistent concerns over Taiwan that one would not see in any other national leader in the world. Ma was the first president of Taiwan who could visit a country that recognized the People’s Republic of China in Beijing without the explicit support of Washington, in order to pay respect to the Lees after Kuan Yew’s death. Judging from the instances cited above, the period of personalization of the bilateral relationship was an exception. It was self-restraint for the sake of an affirmative relationship that enabled Kuan Yew and his son–successor to continue to care about Taiwan’s future with China even after Chiang and Shen passed away one after the other. His pragmatic judgment that unification is inevitable did not change his initial strategic suggestion that Taiwan should be a strategic point to check on China. His willingness to mediate between Taipei and Beijing was voluntary. It was typically self-restraint because both Teng-hui and Chen intended to be destructive in the bilateral relationship. By then, Kuan Yew’s adherence to self-restraint and his show of goodwill were no longer vital to the national interest of Singapore because China was no longer a revolutionary threat. In short, Kuan Yew was able to care for Taiwan’s future despite the fact that passion toward Chiang was no longer relevant. Kuan Yew received both Ma and his pro-independence competitor in Singapore before the presidential elections in 2008 (Er 2007, 45) to continue affirmative BoR. Generally speaking, personal liking brings passion into interstate relationships. Its disruption contrarily testifies to greater-self-role identity that transcends personalization. President Ma, Chiang’s secretary, was able to facilitate, together with Chinese president Xi Jinping, their summit in 2015 in Singapore, the first such summit ever since 1949 between the two rivals. Beijing must have trusted Singapore so much that the former’s insistence that the two sides should never meet officially at an international site was relaxed. Singapore’s relationality policy, which binds Singapore with Taiwan and China, respectively, successfully explains away the internationality of its site being outside sovereign China. In short, the greater selfhood is sufficiently convincing that Singapore does not represent internationality to China. Ironically, such self-restraining by all sides began with Singapore’s and Taiwan’s anti-Communism but eventually transcended it via enhanced relationality. Nevertheless, President Lee of Singapore arranged a meeting with Ma in the aftermath in order for Ma to claim, for the domestic audience in Taiwan that abhors unification, that he was in an international, as opposed to a Chinese internal, occasion. Lee’s considerate arrangement is by all means the continuation of affirmative BoR. Conclusion: The Bilateral and Affirmative Relational Turn By explaining how Singapore and Taiwan could successfully develop a long-lasting reciprocal relationship, this article bridges the Western and Chinese relational turns. Their relationality did not evolve from practicing a collective norm that eventually reconstituted the national identity of the two states. Rather, it was the result of conscious performance of care and consideration of both sides that enabled the transcendence over the initially strategic calculus. The processual analysis of the case further shows that the two countries did not form their emotional alliance through a give-and-take negotiation. Both of them unilaterally prepared needed “gifts” for the other. To that extent, it was more a balance of relationship than one of interest or power. This is in line with Chinese IR that stresses the importance of the greater self, which is embedded in role-playing and does not request reconstitution of the national identity of an individual state. Such relationality appears different from the one described by the relational literature that emphasizes the self-restraining practice of collective norms and the ensuing change in self-identity. This article qualifies the uniqueness claim made by the Chinese relational turn, though, by pointing to its bilateral sensibilities. It argues that the affirmative balance of relationship demonstrated by Singapore and Taiwan reproduced the Cold War at the systemic level. Theoretically, the case illustrates how bilateral relationality even between small states can constitute International Relations in general, without which the relational turn is at best incomplete. In fact, both failed to adapt to the emerging norm of détente due to strong domestic anti-communism and made up for the loss of multilateral relationality through their bilateral relationality. The Western and Chinese relational turns are thus simultaneously complementary and contradictory. They are complementary to the extent that in both the nascent dyadic greater self provided relational security where Cold War alliance loosened. They are contradictory in the sense that bilateral relationality transcends multilateral rules and norms. Last, but not least, the bilateral sensibilities of Chinese International Relations offer a methodological vehicle to the study of relationality. As it stands now, the relational turn emphasizes the constitution of the state more than that of relationality. The formation as well as change of relationality is an empirically researchable subject on the bilateral agenda where the interaction of the two states evolves into an ontological entity to constrain and motivate their policy options. This methodological bilateralism encourages the procedural analysis that is unclear in the focus on national self-identity as constituted by existing relationality, but essential to the understanding of relationality that necessarily evolves out of differing practices of all states. For example, it attends to specific policy of the other state, its leadership, and its emotional characteristics to enable a nuanced analysis of the dynamics of relationality. This work is supported by the Ministry of Science and Technology Project 103-2420-H-002-043-MY3, Taiwan. 1 The handwritten confidential memo, numbered 29, was dated June 11, 1973, read by Shen on June 16, and forwarded to the deputy minister on June 18. 2 Lee Kuan Yew to Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies, April 20, 1965 (quoted in Barr 1999, ##…quoted in the footnotes 27–35 in Barr 1999). 3 Shen Chang-huan, “strictly Confidential” letter to Prime Minister Lee, May 9, 1978. 4 Lee Kuan Yew, “confidential” letter to Shen Chang-huan, May 17, 1978, (67) N. 2461, file no. 09111. 5 Lee Kuan Yew to “Dear Madame Chiang Kai Shek,” April 22, 1975, delivered through Peter Chang on April 24 in a confidential envelope. 6 Lee Kuan Yew to “Dear Madame Chiang Kai Shek,” April 22, 1975, delivered through Peter Chang on April 24 in a confidential envelope. 7 Lee Kuan Yew to Madame Chiang Kai Shek, April 22, 1975. The letter was delivered by Peter Chang on April 24 in a confidential envelope. 8 Lee Kuan Yew to Shen, May 17, 1978. 9 Lee Kuan Yew to Chiang, February 22, 1982. In this letter, which was dated on February 22, 1982, Lee handwrote the title of “My dear President Chiang” and signed “Yours ever Kuanyew.” 10 Lee said to Chien, “I was overwhelmed” (Yi and Wang 2000). 11 Lee Kuan Yew to Chiang, February 22, 1984. Shen to Lee, May 15, 1984, which was delivered in person by Taiwan’s representative in Singapore Hu Shin. 12 Lee Kuan Yew to Chiang, February 22, 1982. 13 Lee Kuan Yew to Chiang, February 22, 1982. 14 Lee Kuan Yew to Shen, March 31, 1984. Lee already handwrote Shen’s title in his letter. 15 Lee Kuan Yew to Shen, March 31, 1984. The aphorism presumably engrosses the speaker in the imagined massive geography of China’s ancient battlefield where only rationality and determination count. 16 Shen to Lee, May 15, 1984. 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TI - Affirmative Balance of the Singapore–Taiwan Relationship: A Bilateral Perspective on the Relational Turn in International Relations
JF - International Studies Review
DO - 10.1093/isr/viw024
DA - 2016-06-11
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/affirmative-balance-of-the-singapore-taiwan-relationship-a-bilateral-EyysM2a3fn
SP - 1
EP - 701
VL - Advance Article
IS - 4
DP - DeepDyve
ER -