TY - JOUR
AU1 - Scholte, Jan Aart
AU2 - Verhaegen, Soetkin
AU3 - Tallberg, Jonas
AB - Abstract This article examines what contemporary elites think about global governance and what these attitudes might bode for the future of global institutions. Evidence comes from a unique survey conducted in 2017–19 across six elite sectors (business, civil society, government bureaucracy, media, political parties, research) in six countries (Brazil, Germany, the Philippines, Russia, South Africa, the United States) and a global group. Bearing in mind some notable variation between countries, elite types, issue-areas and institutions, three main interconnected findings emerge. First, in principle, contemporary leaders in politics and society hold considerable readiness to pursue global-scale governance. Today's elites are not generally in a nationalist-protectionist-sovereigntist mood. Second, in practice, these elites on average hold medium-level confidence towards fourteen current global governance institutions. This evidence suggests that, while there is at present no legitimacy crisis of global governance among elites (as might encourage its decline), neither is there a legitimacy boom (as could spur its expansion). Third, if we probe what elites prioritize when they evaluate global governance, the surveyed leaders generally most underline democracy in the procedures of these bodies and effectiveness in their performance. This finding suggests that, to raise elites' future confidence in global governance, the institutions would do well to become more transparent in their operations and more impactful problem-solvers in their outcomes. Contemporary society confronts major global transformations and governance challenges: problems that require a significant degree of collective world-scale response. Think only of pandemics, ecological changes, economic restructuring, financial crises, migration, peacebuilding, cyber security and so on. Yet, we are commonly told, current prospects for global governance are grim, hampered by institutional shortcomings, dissatisfaction among emerging powers, the rise of economic nationalism and rejection of globalism by populists.1 As this widely prevailing diagnosis would have it, ‘global governance is in crisis just when we need it most’.2 Yet what is the actual situation, if we consider the attitudes of the people who most directly influence whether and how global governance happens, namely elites? Are elites in a global-sceptic moment, poised to retreat from multilateralism, as exemplified by Trump's United States, Bolsonaro's Brazil, Putin's Russia and Duterte's Philippines? Or, contrary to the sovereigntist rhetoric of certain leaders, do today's elites overall actually embrace collective world-scale policy responses and champion global regulation? To the extent that elite opinions fall between these extremes, what considerations could push the future balance more in one direction or the other? This question is important. Elites—understood here as people who hold leading positions in key organizations in society that strive to be politically influential—have pre-eminent roles in setting agendas, producing knowledge, constructing institutions, taking and implementing strategic decisions, and assessing policy outcomes. No regime, national or global, can thrive if it lacks substantial endorsement from elite circles. Negative elite attitudes towards global governance could encourage a decline of multilateral and other global authority, while positive elite attitudes could promote more policy coordination and institutional expansion at the global level. Hence, knowing what elites think can suggest what amounts and types of global policy are in prospect in the future—as well as what steps could stimulate more (or less) elite backing for global regulatory institutions. Knowledge of elite attitudes, as developed in this article, also lays the ground for comparisons with general public opinion, including possible divergences in views of global governance between elites and citizens at large. Up to now, we have had little detailed evidence on elite attitudes towards global governance. Several studies have theorized about elites in global politics, often presuming them (rightly or wrongly) to be liberal–capitalist cosmopolitans.3 Other more specific research has considered how elites affect certain aspects of global governance processes.4 One investigation has surveyed views of globalization held by elites in the United States.5 However, no previous research has systematically collected and analysed substantial data on elite views of global governance, covering multiple countries, multiple sectors of society and multiple global governance institutions (GGIs). To address this gap, this article draws on an ambitious survey of elite attitudes towards global governance. We interviewed 860 leaders spread across six diverse countries (Brazil, Germany, the Philippines, Russia, South Africa and the United States) and a transnational elite group working in global organizations. Each geographical subsample included leaders in six sectors: government bureaucracy, political parties, business, civil society, media and research. Respondents reported their views on 14 GGIs dealing with a diverse range of policy fields. As elaborated below, our findings yield three broad insights into contemporary elite attitudes towards the future of global governance. First, regarding the principle of global governance, our data suggest that, overall, elites hold considerable readiness to support world-scale policy. Respondents indicate a notable preference for decision-making at a global level in a range of issue areas. On this evidence, today's elites are far from taking a nationalist–protectionist–sovereigntist turn against global governance—and if anything are sooner primed for its expansion. Second, turning to the actual practice of global governance, our analysis finds that elites on average hold medium levels of confidence in existing GGIs. This broad pattern of tentative elite endorsement holds—albeit with certain notable variations in specific contexts—across the 14 GGIs, the six countries and the six elite types examined. This evidence suggests that, while there is at present no legitimacy crisis of global governance among elites (as might encourage its decline), neither is there a legitimacy boom (as could spur its expansion). Hence, on the basis of this study, current elite attitudes point towards a future of continued muddling through on global governance—as indeed sluggish world-scale responses to COVID-19 and climate change appear to confirm. Third, regarding what might be done to create a more positive future trajectory for global governance, our data suggest that, on the whole, more democratic procedures and more effective performance could do most to lift elite confidence in world-scale policy-making. Elites' endorsement of global governance associates especially strongly with their satisfaction with the institutional qualities of the organizations involved. The surveyed political and societal leaders generally prioritize transparency above expertise and impartiality on the procedure side of global governance, and problem solving over democracy promotion and fair distribution on the performance side. Thus, albeit that all elites do not fit one mould, attention to more democratic operations and more effective outcomes could, in general, do most to raise overall elite backing for global governance in the future. Analytical framework This article offers a descriptive and interpretative account rather than an explanatory and causal analysis. We carefully explore the levels and patterns of elite attitudes towards global governance, considering contextual circumstances by institution, country and sector. Before proceeding, however, we must clarify our conceptual framing, particularly in respect of ‘elites’, ‘global governance’ and ‘attitudes’. Elites As noted above, we take ‘elites’ in a sociological sense to encompass people who hold leading positions in key organizations in society that strive to be politically influential.6 Our focus here on elites by no means denies the importance for global governance (both in political practice and on democratic principle) of the wider citizenry. Indeed, considerable research has examined public opinion on global governance.7 The present analysis focuses on elite perspectives, on the argument that leaders' views also merit detailed investigation in their own right. Elites generally have the greatest access and inputs to global governance: shaping opinions,8 providing research,9 injecting or withholding funds,10 lobbying for influence,11 and making and executing policies.12 In a word, no global governance transpires without elite engagement, and these leaders heavily influence the particular directions that global governance takes. Our study examines both ‘political’ elites and ‘societal’ elites. In our conception, ‘political’ elites occupy the formal decision-taking positions in governance. Political leaders include both the senior officials who operate the institutions of governance and the politicians who decide upon the policies that the bureaucracy elaborates and implements. Meanwhile, ‘societal’ elites hold leadership positions outside governance institutions. These players include senior academics, civil society organizers, business executives and media commentators. Societal elites feed prominently into policy deliberations—and sometimes also participate more directly in governance processes. As well as encompassing political and societal elites, our analysis considers both ‘national’ and ‘global’ leaders. Research has long highlighted the importance of elites in the national sphere, that is, those who operate primarily within a given country.13 In contrast, global elites exert their influence mainly through transnational networks.14 These leaders include managers of global business corporations, conveners of global civil society activities, researchers attached to global think tanks, journalists with global media networks and officials working for GGIs. Given the importance of transnational leaders in today's world, our data cover not only national elites (in six countries), but also a sample of global elites. Global governance We understand ‘global governance’ to encompass processes of societal regulation that operate on a planetary scale.15 By global governance ‘institutions’ we mean the bureaucratic apparatuses which formulate and administer concrete policy measures that apply to actors and locations spread across the world. In earlier times, GGIs mainly took shape as intergovernmental organizations (IGOs)—that is, formal, permanent, treaty-based bodies with state members.16 More recently, GGIs have diversified in form to include also transgovernmental networks (informal regulatory collaborations among national civil servants),17 private mechanisms (self-regulatory frameworks among commercial actors),18 and multistakeholder initiatives (governance collaborations among representatives of different groups that affect and are affected by a particular issue).19 Indeed, these alternative forms of GGIs have proliferated over the past three decades, while the adoption of new multilateral treaties has slowed considerably.20 Hence, although people tend to be less aware of global governance beyond IGOs (as our elite survey results confirm below), the future of transboundary cooperation may well lie substantially with these newer institutional designs. Reflecting this situation, our study mainly assesses elite views on the better-known IGOs, but also extends to cover GGIs more broadly. Among IGOs we include the International Criminal Court (ICC), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United Nations (UN), the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the World Bank (WB), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). In addition, our analysis incorporates a transgovernmental network (the Group of Twenty, G20), a private global governance apparatus (the International Federation of Association Football, FIFA) and three multistakeholder arrangements: the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) and the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS). As this coverage indicates, we address GGIs in diverse policy fields, including culture, economy, environment, health, human rights and security. Taking the various institutional forms and policy areas together, we see that global governance has grown considerably during recent decades, with many GGIs now playing front-line roles in their respective fields. One need think only of the WHO and disease control, the G20 and financial regulation, ICANN and internet infrastructure, the UN in various conflict settings and the UNFCCC in climate governance. Still, the size and resources of GGIs remain modest overall, with budgets, staffs, remits, policy measures and sanctions far below most states. Global governance sceptics favour these modest proportions, and if anything advocate a future contraction of GGIs,21 while global governance proponents underscore deficits and gaps that require a major expansion of GGIs.22 Attitudes As the debates just mentioned indicate, elites can hold widely varying attitudes towards global governance. Our study presumes that the ways in which elites regard global governance inform their actions in this area and, in turn, will shape the future course of policies and institutions relating to global issues.23 We highlight three attitudes in particular, for reasons indicated below. First we assess elites' predisposition towards global governance: that is, how far political and societal leaders are ready in principle to contemplate policy-making at a global level. After all, if elites were to envision global venues as being only a minor adjunct to and last resort in societal governance, then they would see little future role for global policy. In this case, leaders' assessments of existing global governance arrangements (the second attitude that we address) would be of less consequence. Then, regardless of whether elites viewed current GGIs as having high or low legitimacy, leaders would still prefer policy-making to occur mainly at regional, national and local levels, relegating global governance to the margins. However, if on the contrary elites were in principle to regard the global level as an important—perhaps even favoured—site of governance, then they would be attitudinally well primed for substantial and possibly (much) enlarged global policy-making. In this case, leaders' evaluations of existing GGIs would matter far more. So, after first establishing how appropriate in principle elites regard the global level as a site for dealing with policy problems, we second examine leaders' attitudes towards existing GGIs, focusing in particular on perceptions of legitimacy. We understand legitimacy to be the belief and perception that a governor has a right to rule and exercises it appropriately.24 Legitimacy thereby entails stable, diffuse, foundational approval of a governance arrangement: hence more than contingent support that depends on certain officeholders or particular policies.25 While modern political theory has conventionally focused on legitimacy beliefs towards the state,26 recent research has (fittingly) given increased attention to legitimacy in relation to regional and global governance arrangements.27 Our concern in this study lies with sociological rather than normative legitimacy: that is, we empirically examine how observed audiences (in this case political and societal elites) evaluate a governor (in this case the 14 selected GGIs).28 We are not concerned here to develop and apply our own philosophical criteria for judging the rightness and appropriateness of GGIs.29 Sociological legitimacy is a particularly important source of power for any governor, including a GGI. The more legitimacy a governance apparatus attracts, the less it needs to coerce and manipulate its subjects in order to make an impact. To the extent that GGIs secure legitimacy, they might more readily obtain resources, participation, decisions, compliance, and progress on problem solving. Legitimacy can also help a GGI to hold its own against potential rival sites of governance, including regional and national institutions as well as other global bodies.30 The legitimacy perceptions of elites warrant specific attention, given their pivotal positions in governance processes. High levels of elite legitimacy beliefs towards global governance could encourage an enlargement of GGI competences, resources and impacts. In contrast, medium degrees of elite legitimacy in GGIs could tend to keep global administration at current levels, while elite perceptions of low or no legitimacy towards GGIs could undermine global regimes. To explore what might raise or lower these levels of legitimacy beliefs in the future, our study examines a third attitude: namely, elites' relative preferences in respect of institutional qualities of GGIs. Multiple studies have found that assessments of the institutional procedure and performance of GGIs are the strongest drivers of legitimacy beliefs towards global governance.31 To be sure, research also accords some significance in shaping legitimacy perceptions inter alia to utilitarian calculations of self-interest, to constructions of identity (e.g. feeling more national or feeling closer to the world) and to cues from domestic politics.32 However, the highest levels of correlation associate elite legitimacy beliefs with evaluations of institutional procedure and performance.33 Hence our study looks particularly in this area for clues to future trends. The more specific question then arises: which institutional features matter most to elites when they assess the workings of global governance? Theory has typically identified democracy, effectiveness and fairness as three qualities of institutional procedure (often termed ‘input’) and performance (‘output’) that especially matter for generating legitimacy beliefs.34 Regarding democratic procedure, audiences assess how far the organization operates in a participatory, transparent and accountable manner. Regarding democratic performance, audiences consider how far a GGI promotes popular self-determination in wider society. Regarding effective procedure, audiences evaluate how far a GGI makes policy efficiently and using the best available expertise. Regarding effective performance, audiences judge how far a GGI solves the problem at hand. Regarding fair procedure, audiences determine how far a GGI takes decisions in a consistent and impartial fashion. Regarding fair performance, audiences weigh how far a GGI promotes equitable sharing of costs and benefits, as well as social justice more broadly. Previous research has established that all three of these qualities of institutional procedure and performance have important bearing on legitimacy beliefs towards GGIs.35 Yet those who seek to shape the future of global governance will want to know which features matter relatively more. What do elites prioritize when they assess GGIs: democratic, effective or fair procedure? Democratic, effective or fair performance? Answers to this question would suggest where advocates of global governance could best focus their reforms of GGIs—and equally where opponents of global governance could best aim their contestation. Survey design We operationalized the above analytical framework in a survey questionnaire that we administered between October 2017 and August 2019 to 860 individuals spread across six elite sectors in seven geographical settings. We now briefly discuss our choice of the survey method and how we executed it. A full technical report of the project is available elsewhere.36 Several methods are available to investigate elite attitudes towards global governance, including in-depth individual interviews and content analysis of public statements. Our study employs a survey approach for several reasons. First, this tool allows us to cover a large and diverse sample of respondents. Second, surveys conducted under conditions of anonymity and confidentiality are more likely than speeches and interview ‘performances’ to reveal privately held views. Third, carefully formulated survey questions provide evidence of general assumptions and values, whereas remarks in public statements and open-ended interviews often relate to specific situations. Fourth, asking common questions across several surveys enables direct comparisons to be made, for example, between elite attitudes and overall public opinion. To be sure, survey questionnaires miss greater nuance and contextual details, and subsequent research could further unpack findings from our present study with, say, extended personal interviews. Our 860 survey respondents distribute more or less evenly across six countries (Brazil, Germany, the Philippines, Russia, South Africa and the United States) plus a global elite group. We selected these seven geographical sites in order to encompass a wide diversity of contexts in world politics: different regions; different geopolitical positions; different regime types; different economic situations; different languages; different ecological exposures; and different historical experiences of world politics. Such diversity would encourage the survey both to draw out variation and to identify commonalities in elite attitudes. In addition, these specific countries include traditional champions of the liberal international order (Germany, United States) as well as long-time critics of it (Russia, South Africa). All six countries have seen recent populist turns in their domestic politics, inviting an investigation of possible reverberations of this trend on elite attitudes towards global governance. We selected individual elites for interview through quota sampling. This approach is particularly suitable in situations where random sampling is not possible, as a way to ensure that respondents cover a wide variety of positions and contexts. However, not using a random sample also means that we cannot extrapolate the findings as being statistically representative of the whole elite populations in question. Our quota-sampling formula required at least 100 interviews for each country and for the global sphere.37 Within each geographical group, half of the respondents are political elites (minimum 25 each for bureaucracy and political parties) and the other half are societal elites (minimum 12–13 each for business, civil society, media and research). In the global sample, political elites consist of permanent officials of GGIs (bureaucrats) and national representatives at GGIs (proxy ‘politicians’). We have also striven to attain diversity in terms of the levels of institutions where people work (subnational, national and international) and the policy issues they handle. Regarding political parties, we cover a broad ideological spectrum for each country, but have taken most responses from the largest parties in the respective national legislatures. The survey examines legitimacy in terms of ‘confidence’, in line with an established practice in political science literature that takes confidence (or alternatively ‘trust’) as a proxy for legitimacy.38 (The German version of the survey in fact used the word Vertrauen.) We opted for ‘confidence’, since it taps legitimacy's quality of a deeper faith in a governing power. Importantly, too, ‘confidence’ does not incorporate into the indicator possible sources of legitimacy (e.g. democracy or effectiveness) or possible outcomes of legitimacy (e.g. compliance). Some critics have questioned whether ‘confidence’ adequately captures the underlying normative justifiability of a governing power, as entailed by legitimacy.39 Indeed, occasions could arise where certain individuals retain ‘confidence’ in an authority while also perceiving that this governor is violating key societal values. However, even critics accept that the confidence measure is relevant to legitimacy beliefs, and they offer no better alternative indicator. We rolled out the survey for the most part concurrently across the geographical settings. In six of the seven locations data collection started in October–November 2017. The exception is Russia, where it took longer to lay the groundwork. Quotas were reached between May 2018 and August 2019. No significant events occurred during the months of non-congruence between subsamples that we consider could affect the survey results. The questionnaire was in English for the Philippines, South Africa, the United States and the global sample. We used professional translations into Portuguese for Brazil, German for Germany and Russian for Russia. Interviews were conducted under conditions of anonymity and confidentiality, in order to encourage frank responses and to respect the political exposure of participants, many of whom have high public visibility. Our preferred survey mode was by telephone (81.5 per cent of the interviews), with a backup online option if the respondent requested it (18.5 per cent of the total). Findings Our study provides a unique systematic picture of current elite assessments of global governance. Overall, this wide-ranging sample of contemporary elites (a) expresses considerable readiness for global-level policy-making in principle; (b) accords medium levels of legitimacy towards current global governance in practice; and (c) especially values democratic procedure and effective performance in global governance. Thus this large and diverse collection of current elites (a) are by no means turning against the idea of global governance; (b) are experiencing neither a crisis nor a boom of confidence in existing GGIs; and (c) would likely respond most to improvements (or deteriorations) in the democratic inputs and effective outputs of GGIs. Finding 1: Elites express considerable readiness for global governance in principle Our first main discovery is that, overall, elites are quite sympathetic to the idea of global governance, especially in certain policy fields. Contrary to the anti-globalist pronouncements favoured by some contemporary politicians, our respondents widely regard the global level as a suitable site of policy-making. Indeed, they even prefer it to the national level in a number of issue areas. The data show some variation by country and sector, but the general picture is of substantial elite readiness in principle to pursue global governance. This finding is all the more notable given that a majority of the respondents (57.3 per cent) work mainly on national and subnational matters. We asked elites what they regard as the most appropriate level for handling ten policy fields, with answer options of ‘subnational level’, ‘national level’, ‘regional level’ and ‘global level’. As indicated in figure 1 (overleaf), more than half selected the global as their preferred level of governance in respect of human rights, environment and trade. A plurality also prioritized the global over other levels in respect of migration and development. In addition, 35.8 per cent preferred the global level of governance for health. Predilections regarding defence split 50/50 between national and international levels, albeit favouring regional more than global. In contrast, elites overwhelmingly prioritized the national level for taxation, education and employment, with less than 10 per cent preferring global governance in these three areas. These results suggest that, rather than riding an anti-globalist wave, today's elites are on the contrary quite prepared to contemplate global governance where they judge it relevant. Figure 1 Open in new tabDownload slide Substantial elite preference for global-level governance in various issue-areas, percentage Source: LegGov Elite Survey. Figure 1 Open in new tabDownload slide Substantial elite preference for global-level governance in various issue-areas, percentage Source: LegGov Elite Survey. That said, considerable variation in preferences for global-level governance emerges when we disaggregate the data by geographical settings, as shown in figure 2 (overleaf). On average, interviewed elites in Germany find the global level most appropriate for decision-making (4.4 out of 10 issue areas), even more than the global elite sample (3.8 issue areas). At the lower end, elites in the Philippines (3.1), South Africa (2.8) and—especially—Russia (2.3) give least preference to the global level. Brazil (3.5) and the United States (3.7) fall in between, not much below the global sample. In general, elites in more privileged geopolitical locations (Germany, the United States, transnational) are more positively disposed to global-level governance than the geopolitically less advantaged (the Philippines, Russia, South Africa). Figure 2 Open in new tabDownload slide Geographical variation in elite preference for global-level governance: average number of policy areas preferred to be handled at each level Source: LegGov Elite Survey. Figure 2 Open in new tabDownload slide Geographical variation in elite preference for global-level governance: average number of policy areas preferred to be handled at each level Source: LegGov Elite Survey. Comparing global with national preferences, the German subsample strikingly favours the global level over the national level in more policy fields, while the global and US subsamples rank the global and the national more or less equally. In contrast, elites in non-core geopolitical locations (Brazil, the Philippines, Russia, South Africa) decidedly prefer national government over global governance in more issue areas. That said, none of the geographical subsamples prefers the national level in over half of the ten policy fields, so no group shows a distinctly state-centric orientation. Indeed, adding up preferences for the global level and the regional level accentuates even further the readiness of elites in all the geographical contexts examined to contemplate governance beyond the state. Comparatively little variation appears by elite type regarding inclination to pursue global governance. As shown in figure 3, the highest preferences for the global level come from civil society and media leaders (each at 3.9 issue areas), while the lowest come from bureaucracy (3.1 issue areas) and business (3.0 issue areas). Preference for the regional level is lower than the global level across all sectors, ranging from 1.4 issue areas among civil society elites to 2.1 issue areas among business elites. All six sectors express a similar level of preference for the national level, at between 3.9 and 4.2 issue areas. Most elite types prefer the national level to the global level for more issue areas, although for civil society and media the scores are close to the same. Five of the six sectors (the bureaucratic excluded) incline slightly more towards international (global and regional) governance than domestic (national and subnational) governance. Figure 3 Open in new tabDownload slide Sectoral variation in elite preference for global-level governance: average number of policy areas preferred to be handled at each level Source: LegGov Elite Survey. Figure 3 Open in new tabDownload slide Sectoral variation in elite preference for global-level governance: average number of policy areas preferred to be handled at each level Source: LegGov Elite Survey. In sum, then, our sampled elites are substantially primed for global governance. Overall these political and societal leaders are prepared, particularly in some issue areas, to contemplate significant policy-making at the global level. Certain subgroups (e.g. Philippines, Russia and (sub)nationally focused bureaucracy) are notably less inclined towards global governance than others (e.g. Germany, the global group and civil society). Yet in general the surveyed elites are positively receptive to global governance in principle. Finding 2: Elites accord medium-level legitimacy to current global governance in practice While the surveyed elites may be quite ready to endorse global governance in principle, where they deem it suitable, their evaluations of existing GGIs generally fall in an intermediate range, showing neither high nor low legitimacy beliefs. We asked respondents to indicate their level of confidence (as the proxy indicator of legitimacy) in 14 GGIs, with answer options of ‘none at all’ (0), ‘not very much’ (1), ‘quite a lot’ (2) and ‘a great deal’ (3). Overall averages mostly cluster towards the middle of the scale; however, larger variation appears when one examines views in particular countries and particular elite types regarding particular GGIs. Given that contextual circumstances can push elite legitimacy beliefs in different directions for one or the other GGI, we are unlikely to see rapid large shifts at the level of aggregate world elite legitimacy perceptions in respect of global governance. As shown in figure 4, taking our data in aggregate, elites on average hold medium levels of confidence in most of the 14 GGIs. Only one institution, the WHO, clears an average ‘quite a lot of confidence’ (2.1), and only one GGI, FIFA, averages ‘not very much confidence’ (0.8). (Note, however, that the survey was conducted before contestation of the WHO's performance around the COVID-19 pandemic, reminding us that a survey is always a snapshot in time.) In four other cases (UN, UNFCCC, ICC, ICANN), the average assessment at 1.7–1.8 leans towards ‘quite a lot of confidence’. In eight other cases (WB, FSC, WTO, IMF, UNSC, NATO, G20, KPCS), the average confidence level of 1.4–1.6 sits around the middle of the scale. In aggregate, then, elites on average have neither strikingly high nor strikingly low legitimacy perceptions vis-à-vis these 14 diverse existing GGIs. Figure 4 Open in new tabDownload slide Levels of elite confidence in global governance institutions Notes: Regional governance institutions are: the Mercado Comun do Sul (MERCOSUL) for Brazil; the EU for Germany; the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for the Philippines; the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) for Russia; the African Union (AU) for South Africa; and the North American Free Trade Agreement/United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (NAFTA/USMCA) for the United States. National governance institutions included are the government and the parliament. Source: LegGov Elite Survey. Figure 4 Open in new tabDownload slide Levels of elite confidence in global governance institutions Notes: Regional governance institutions are: the Mercado Comun do Sul (MERCOSUL) for Brazil; the EU for Germany; the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for the Philippines; the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) for Russia; the African Union (AU) for South Africa; and the North American Free Trade Agreement/United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (NAFTA/USMCA) for the United States. National governance institutions included are the government and the parliament. Source: LegGov Elite Survey. This general verdict of medium-level legitimacy is reinforced when one looks more closely at the distribution of confidence scores, as set out in figure 5 (see page 16). Although 11 of the 14 GGIs attract more positive evaluations (2 and 3) than negative evaluations (0 and 1), few respondents have ‘a great deal of confidence’ in the GGIs (score 3). Only for the WHO, UNFCCC and ICC do more than 20 per cent of elites indicate this highest rating. The dominant pattern (holding for all these GGIs except FIFA and the WHO) sees very large majorities clustered in the middle (scores of 1 and 2). Figure 5 Open in new tabDownload slide Distribution of elite confidence by institution, percentage Source: LegGov Elite Survey. Figure 5 Open in new tabDownload slide Distribution of elite confidence by institution, percentage Source: LegGov Elite Survey. Interestingly, elite confidence in a GGI is in nearly all 14 cases positively correlated with experience of that GGI. Thus contact with a GGI may bolster elite confidence in it, or alternatively elites with greater confidence in a GGI may decide to interact more with it. In contrast, elite knowledge about global governance more generally does not have a consistent statistically significant relationship with elite confidence in GGIs. Thus, specific experience of GGIs can matter, but general knowledge of global governance apparently does not.40 Evidence regarding institutional design is mixed, although not especially encouraging for proponents of new forms of GGIs. In particular, the results do not show a shift in elite confidence from old-style multilateralism to new-style multistakeholderism. In general, IGOs attract somewhat higher levels of average elite confidence than recent innovations. The five most highly ranked institutions include only one non-traditional GGI (ICANN), whereas new organizational types occupy three of the bottom five positions (G20, KPCS, FIFA). That said, scandal-ridden FIFA may not be a reliable barometer for private global governance in general, and average confidence in the other four non-IGO bodies is broadly similar to that for most of the IGOs. Moreover, around half of respondents answered ‘don't know’ when asked about their confidence in the three multistakeholder initiatives (FSC, ICANN, KPCS). So maybe it is early to draw firm conclusions regarding elite preferences for institutional design. Some notable variation in average levels of elite confidence in existing GGIs appears between issue areas. In particular, the three IGOs in the realm of sustainable development (UNFCCC, WB, WHO) have a combined mean score of 1.9, close to ‘quite a lot of confidence’. In contrast, state-based GGIs in the areas of security (ICC, NATO, UNSC) and economy (G20, IMF, WTO) score around the middle of the scale, with averages of 1.6 and 1.5, respectively. These differences are consistent with our earlier finding, where environment, development and health ranked among the policy fields for which elites prioritized global-scale governance, while defence, taxation and employment attracted decidedly lower preferences for the global level. To this extent, levels of legitimacy beliefs appear to vary depending on a GGI's purpose.41 As figure 4 further indicates, elites express broadly similar levels of confidence towards governance institutions at global, regional and national levels. The average for the 14 GGIs is 1.6, the same as the average confidence in national governance (1.6) and just below the average confidence in regional governance (1.7). On the basis of this aggregate evidence, it seems that elites do not feel especially positive or negative towards any level of governance. That said, as figure 6 (overleaf) shows, disaggregation by country reveals some interesting variation. For example, elites in Brazil and the United States have more confidence in GGIs (1.8 and 1.7, respectively) than in national governance (1.2 and 1.4, respectively)—results that are perhaps influenced by domestic political turmoil in these countries at the time of the survey. The opposite holds for elites in South Africa and Germany, who accord more legitimacy to national institutions (1.6 and 2.2, respectively) than to global governance (1.3 and 1.8, respectively). Figure 6 Open in new tabDownload slide Comparing elite confidence in national, regional and global institutions Notes: Elites in the global sample were asked to rate all six regional governance institutions; country elites only the regional organization of which their country is a member. Regional governance institutions are: the Mercado Comun do Sul (MERCOSUL) for Brazil; the EU for Germany; the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for the Philippines; the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) for Russia; the African Union (AU) for South Africa; and the North American Free Trade Agreement/United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (NAFTA/USMCA) for the United States. National governance institutions included are the government and the parliament. FIFA, FSC, ICANN and KPCS are excluded owing to high percentages of ‘don't know’ responses. Source: LegGov Elite Survey. Figure 6 Open in new tabDownload slide Comparing elite confidence in national, regional and global institutions Notes: Elites in the global sample were asked to rate all six regional governance institutions; country elites only the regional organization of which their country is a member. Regional governance institutions are: the Mercado Comun do Sul (MERCOSUL) for Brazil; the EU for Germany; the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for the Philippines; the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) for Russia; the African Union (AU) for South Africa; and the North American Free Trade Agreement/United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (NAFTA/USMCA) for the United States. National governance institutions included are the government and the parliament. FIFA, FSC, ICANN and KPCS are excluded owing to high percentages of ‘don't know’ responses. Source: LegGov Elite Survey. Figure 6 further indicates this geographical variation in elite legitimacy beliefs towards the collective GGIs, although all scores remain broadly in the medium range. On the higher end, elites in Brazil, Germany and the global group lean more towards ‘quite a lot of confidence’, each with a composite average score of 1.8, followed by elites in the United States and the Philippines with a mean of 1.7. On the lower end, elites in Russia fall at the midpoint, with a mean confidence score for existing GGIs of 1.5, while elites in South Africa drop towards the ‘not very much confidence’ pole, with a composite mean of 1.3. None of these average legitimacy perceptions points to a country whose elites decisively champion existing GGIs. Nor, contrary to possible expectations, do the sampled global elites show higher average confidence in current GGIs than most of the country-based elites. Yet it is important to look behind these aggregate averages to variations at the level of individual GGIs (table 1). For example, at around 1.9, the Russian ratings are in fact quite high for security institutions where the Russian Federation has considerable voice (UN, UNSC and SCO, as well as WHO). The composite average for Russia falls due to low figures for NATO, the ICC and global economic institutions, bodies that many Russian elites likely view as ‘western-dominated’.42 Table 1 Levels of confidence in GGIs, by country and institution . Brazil . Germany . Global . Philippines . Russia . South Africa . United States . WHO 2.4 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.0 2.0 2.0 UN 2.0 1.8 1.9 2.0 1.9 1.4 1.7 UNFCCC 2.0 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.7 ICC 2.0 2.5 2.0 1.8 1.4 1.2 1.6 ICANN 1.9 1.6 1.8 1.3 1.9 1.3 1.9 World Bank 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.8 FSC 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.3 1.7 1.2 1.7 WTO 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.6 IMF 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.7 UNSC 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.7 1.9 1.2 1.5 NATO 1.4 1.8 1.9 1.4 0.6 1.0 2.2 G20 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.2 1.6 KPCS 1.7 1.5 1.7 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.4 FIFA 0.6 0.2 0.7 1.4 1.4 1.0 0.7 Regional institutions1 1.4 2.0 1.5 1.8 2.0 1.1 1.8 National institutions2 1.2 2.2 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.4 . Brazil . Germany . Global . Philippines . Russia . South Africa . United States . WHO 2.4 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.0 2.0 2.0 UN 2.0 1.8 1.9 2.0 1.9 1.4 1.7 UNFCCC 2.0 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.7 ICC 2.0 2.5 2.0 1.8 1.4 1.2 1.6 ICANN 1.9 1.6 1.8 1.3 1.9 1.3 1.9 World Bank 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.8 FSC 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.3 1.7 1.2 1.7 WTO 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.6 IMF 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.7 UNSC 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.7 1.9 1.2 1.5 NATO 1.4 1.8 1.9 1.4 0.6 1.0 2.2 G20 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.2 1.6 KPCS 1.7 1.5 1.7 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.4 FIFA 0.6 0.2 0.7 1.4 1.4 1.0 0.7 Regional institutions1 1.4 2.0 1.5 1.8 2.0 1.1 1.8 National institutions2 1.2 2.2 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.4 1Regional governance institutions are: the Mercado Comun do Sul (MERCOSUL) for Brazil; the EU for Germany; the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for the Philippines; the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) for Russia; the African Union (AU) for South Africa; and the North American Free Trade Agreement/United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (NAFTA/USMCA) for the United States. Elites in the global sample were asked to rate all six regional governance institutions, country elites only the regional organization of which their country is a member. 2National governance institutions included are the government and the parliament. Source: LegGov Elite Survey. Open in new tab Table 1 Levels of confidence in GGIs, by country and institution . Brazil . Germany . Global . Philippines . Russia . South Africa . United States . WHO 2.4 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.0 2.0 2.0 UN 2.0 1.8 1.9 2.0 1.9 1.4 1.7 UNFCCC 2.0 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.7 ICC 2.0 2.5 2.0 1.8 1.4 1.2 1.6 ICANN 1.9 1.6 1.8 1.3 1.9 1.3 1.9 World Bank 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.8 FSC 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.3 1.7 1.2 1.7 WTO 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.6 IMF 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.7 UNSC 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.7 1.9 1.2 1.5 NATO 1.4 1.8 1.9 1.4 0.6 1.0 2.2 G20 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.2 1.6 KPCS 1.7 1.5 1.7 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.4 FIFA 0.6 0.2 0.7 1.4 1.4 1.0 0.7 Regional institutions1 1.4 2.0 1.5 1.8 2.0 1.1 1.8 National institutions2 1.2 2.2 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.4 . Brazil . Germany . Global . Philippines . Russia . South Africa . United States . WHO 2.4 2.1 2.1 2.3 2.0 2.0 2.0 UN 2.0 1.8 1.9 2.0 1.9 1.4 1.7 UNFCCC 2.0 1.8 2.0 1.9 1.6 1.6 1.7 ICC 2.0 2.5 2.0 1.8 1.4 1.2 1.6 ICANN 1.9 1.6 1.8 1.3 1.9 1.3 1.9 World Bank 1.7 1.7 1.8 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.8 FSC 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.3 1.7 1.2 1.7 WTO 1.8 1.7 1.8 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.6 IMF 1.6 1.6 1.8 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.7 UNSC 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.7 1.9 1.2 1.5 NATO 1.4 1.8 1.9 1.4 0.6 1.0 2.2 G20 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.8 1.2 1.6 KPCS 1.7 1.5 1.7 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.4 FIFA 0.6 0.2 0.7 1.4 1.4 1.0 0.7 Regional institutions1 1.4 2.0 1.5 1.8 2.0 1.1 1.8 National institutions2 1.2 2.2 1.7 1.5 1.6 1.6 1.4 1Regional governance institutions are: the Mercado Comun do Sul (MERCOSUL) for Brazil; the EU for Germany; the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) for the Philippines; the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) for Russia; the African Union (AU) for South Africa; and the North American Free Trade Agreement/United States–Mexico–Canada Agreement (NAFTA/USMCA) for the United States. Elites in the global sample were asked to rate all six regional governance institutions, country elites only the regional organization of which their country is a member. 2National governance institutions included are the government and the parliament. Source: LegGov Elite Survey. Open in new tab In South Africa, only the WHO (2.0) and the UNFCCC (1.6) attract relatively higher scores. Average legitimacy beliefs towards the other GGIs are low, between 1.0 and 1.4, across all policy fields. At the regional level, where South Africa holds greater sway, the African Union (AU) does no better, at 1.1. Thus, average South African elite opinion of current governance beyond the state looks decidedly sceptical. As this closer examination indicates, medium-level average confidence scores in the aggregate data can hide considerable geographical variation vis-à-vis individual GGIs. For example, figure 4 indicates medium (1.5) confidence in NATO on average, but this figure varies from high (2.2) in the United States to low (0.6) in Russia. Similarly, elites in Germany show much more confidence (2.5) in the ICC than those in South Africa (1.2). These variations in the fine-grained data suggest that country contexts can have substantial bearing on elite legitimacy beliefs. Moving from geographical to sectoral comparisons, figure 7 shows little variation at aggregate level: mean confidence scores for all six elite types again land in the medium range. With an average of 1.8, the sampled bureaucratic leaders by a small margin hold the highest confidence in current GGIs, although the difference from business elites in second place at 1.7 is not statistically significant. With the somewhat lower average confidence rating of 1.5, civil society elites express overall the most qualified overall confidence in GGIs, as one might expect given civil society's role as watchdog over global governance.43 Middle-of-the-road attitudes across all six sectors suggest that no elite group is poised to mount either major resistance against or major promotion of current GGIs. Figure 7 Open in new tabDownload slide Elite confidence in GGIs, by sector Note: The institutions included are: G20, ICC, IMF, NATO, UN, UNFCCC, UNSC, WHO, World Bank and WTO. FIFA, FSC, ICANN and KPCS are excluded owing to high percentages of ‘don't know’ responses. Source: LegGov Elite Survey. Figure 7 Open in new tabDownload slide Elite confidence in GGIs, by sector Note: The institutions included are: G20, ICC, IMF, NATO, UN, UNFCCC, UNSC, WHO, World Bank and WTO. FIFA, FSC, ICANN and KPCS are excluded owing to high percentages of ‘don't know’ responses. Source: LegGov Elite Survey. This finding is reinforced when we examine the data on elite types more closely in relation to individual GGIs.44 The largest differences occur between business and civil society elites in relation to the economic GGIs. Business elites have quite a lot of confidence in the IMF and WTO (mean 1.8), while civil society elites have less confidence in these organizations (1.2). In general, however, these differences between elite types are much smaller than the differences between countries. In sum, we may conclude that the often considerable readiness for global governance that elites express in principle (finding 1) is not matched by strong legitimacy beliefs for current global governance in practice (finding 2). Overall levels of confidence in existing GGIs are neither so high that we could expect elites to push for a significant expansion of global governance, nor so low that we could expect elites to obstruct or even dismantle the institutions. Notable pockets of greater and lesser legitimacy beliefs for individual GGIs appear in relation to certain geographical and sectoral groups, and these variations could prompt contradictory future tendencies in different quarters. Taken in aggregate, however, evidence from this elite survey suggests a future of neither crisis nor boom for global governance, but rather a process of muddling through. At the same time, overall medium levels of elite confidence in GGIs could offer reasonably secure ground on which to construct greater global governance as and when future conditions might push for it. Finding 3: More transparency and greater problem solving could boost elite confidence in global governance Having determined that sampled elites are broadly well disposed to global governance in principle, but overall rather tentative towards current GGIs in practice, we turn to the question of what sorts of changes in circumstance could raise or lower elite legitimacy beliefs towards global governance in the future. In particular, we may recall that legitimacy perceptions of GGIs relate most strongly to satisfaction with institutional qualities.45 More than any other factor, people care whether GGIs are democratic, effective and fair in their institutional procedure and performance. As discussed below, our evidence suggests that elite legitimacy beliefs would overall respond most strongly to changes in transparency on the procedure side and to changes in problem-solving capability on the performance side. We reach this conclusion by examining priorities: that is, how elites rate the comparative importance of democracy, effectiveness and fairness in respect of the procedure and performance of GGIs. Regarding global governance procedure, we asked elites to rank-order their priorities between transparency (as a core aspect of democracy), expertise (as a core aspect of effectiveness) and impartiality (as a core aspect of fairness). We also asked respondents to rank-order their priorities in respect of global governance performance as between improving democracy in affected countries, delivering solutions (as a core aspect of effectiveness) and achieving fair distribution of costs and benefits. With respect to institutional procedure, we find that elites overall accord highest relative importance to transparency (42.6 per cent), followed by expertise (30.8 per cent) and impartiality (26.6 per cent). On these measures, then, democracy ranks well ahead of effectiveness and fairness as the principal criterion for elite judgements of the ways that GGIs operate. With respect to institutional performance, we find that elites overall accord by far the highest relative importance to delivering effective solutions (63.4 per cent), with a distant second for democracy promotion (20.6 per cent) and an even lower third place for equitable distribution (16.0 per cent). On these measures, then, effectiveness greatly outstrips democracy and fairness as the primary basis for elite assessments of desirable outcomes of GGIs. These overall patterns of relative priorities hold across most of the geographical groupings (see table 2). Regarding procedure, the order of transparency–expertise–impartiality applies in respect of Germany, the Philippines, South Africa and the global group. Sampled elites in the United States rated transparency and expertise equally, with impartial procedure a distant third. Likewise, the German and global groups accord by far the lowest priority to impartial procedure. This finding suggests that elites in geopolitically favoured locations are relatively less concerned with equity in GGI policy-making arrangements than elites in positions more to the geopolitical margins. Table 2 Prioritized institutional features, by geographical area Procedures: % giving highest priority to: Democracy The international organization is transparent in its decision-making procedures Effectiveness The international organization takes decisions based on expertise Fairness The international organization takes decisions in an impartial way Brazil 41.8 23.0 35.3 Germany 49.2 30.3 20.5 Global 48.2 34.1 17.8 Philippines 45.5 29.8 24.8 Russia 20.0 30.5 49.5 South Africa 49.2 27.1 23.8 United States 40.8 40.8 18.3 Performance: % giving highest priority to: Democracy The international organization improves democracy in affected countries Effectiveness The international organization delivers effective solutions to policy problems Fairness The benefits and costs of the international organization's policies are fairly distributed Brazil 16.3 56.1 27.6 Germany 22.7 69.8 7.6 Global 16.8 65.7 17.5 Philippines 17.5 66.7 15.8 Russia 14.3 72.4 13.3 South Africa 35.3 45.4 19.3 United States 21.7 68.3 10.0 Procedures: % giving highest priority to: Democracy The international organization is transparent in its decision-making procedures Effectiveness The international organization takes decisions based on expertise Fairness The international organization takes decisions in an impartial way Brazil 41.8 23.0 35.3 Germany 49.2 30.3 20.5 Global 48.2 34.1 17.8 Philippines 45.5 29.8 24.8 Russia 20.0 30.5 49.5 South Africa 49.2 27.1 23.8 United States 40.8 40.8 18.3 Performance: % giving highest priority to: Democracy The international organization improves democracy in affected countries Effectiveness The international organization delivers effective solutions to policy problems Fairness The benefits and costs of the international organization's policies are fairly distributed Brazil 16.3 56.1 27.6 Germany 22.7 69.8 7.6 Global 16.8 65.7 17.5 Philippines 17.5 66.7 15.8 Russia 14.3 72.4 13.3 South Africa 35.3 45.4 19.3 United States 21.7 68.3 10.0 Open in new tab Table 2 Prioritized institutional features, by geographical area Procedures: % giving highest priority to: Democracy The international organization is transparent in its decision-making procedures Effectiveness The international organization takes decisions based on expertise Fairness The international organization takes decisions in an impartial way Brazil 41.8 23.0 35.3 Germany 49.2 30.3 20.5 Global 48.2 34.1 17.8 Philippines 45.5 29.8 24.8 Russia 20.0 30.5 49.5 South Africa 49.2 27.1 23.8 United States 40.8 40.8 18.3 Performance: % giving highest priority to: Democracy The international organization improves democracy in affected countries Effectiveness The international organization delivers effective solutions to policy problems Fairness The benefits and costs of the international organization's policies are fairly distributed Brazil 16.3 56.1 27.6 Germany 22.7 69.8 7.6 Global 16.8 65.7 17.5 Philippines 17.5 66.7 15.8 Russia 14.3 72.4 13.3 South Africa 35.3 45.4 19.3 United States 21.7 68.3 10.0 Procedures: % giving highest priority to: Democracy The international organization is transparent in its decision-making procedures Effectiveness The international organization takes decisions based on expertise Fairness The international organization takes decisions in an impartial way Brazil 41.8 23.0 35.3 Germany 49.2 30.3 20.5 Global 48.2 34.1 17.8 Philippines 45.5 29.8 24.8 Russia 20.0 30.5 49.5 South Africa 49.2 27.1 23.8 United States 40.8 40.8 18.3 Performance: % giving highest priority to: Democracy The international organization improves democracy in affected countries Effectiveness The international organization delivers effective solutions to policy problems Fairness The benefits and costs of the international organization's policies are fairly distributed Brazil 16.3 56.1 27.6 Germany 22.7 69.8 7.6 Global 16.8 65.7 17.5 Philippines 17.5 66.7 15.8 Russia 14.3 72.4 13.3 South Africa 35.3 45.4 19.3 United States 21.7 68.3 10.0 Open in new tab Departing from the overall prevailing rank order, elites in Brazil place impartial procedure in second position after transparent procedure and put expertise a distant third. This greater emphasis on fairness perhaps reflects a heritage in Brazil of dependency theory, perceived ‘Yankee imperialism’, IMF-sponsored structural adjustment policies and World Social Forum mobilization for a more equitable global order.46 Democracy considerations have also played notably in Brazilian engagement with global governance.47 Yet the greatest deviation from the aggregate pattern regarding procedural criteria appears in respect of Russia. Here elites give impartiality the highest priority by a considerable margin, perhaps reflecting a feeling that many GGIs have treated Russia unfairly, as well as a tradition in Russian politics that accepts and even endorses authoritarian rulers so long as they act justly.48 Notably also, Russian elites put transparency in third place, giving it a much lower rating than the other geographical groups. Many contemporary elites in Russia associate ‘democracy’ in global politics with perceptions of western neo-liberal invasion of their country in the 1990s, and they may also be accustomed to limited transparency in their domestic politics.49 Regarding the performance of GGIs, all seven geographical subsamples follow the overall pattern of according highest importance to problem solving relative to democracy promotion and fair distribution. In five of the seven cases the gap between problem solving and the second priority is strikingly wide, at between 47 and 50 percentage points. In contrast, the gap is only 10 points in South Africa, where less than half of the respondents (45.4 per cent) prioritize problem solving, while a notable 35.3 per cent prioritize democracy promotion. This discrepancy may reflect perceptions among South African elites that global governance through the UN played an important role in bringing down the former apartheid regime in their country.50 In Brazil, meanwhile, elites give a much higher priority to fair distribution than their counterparts in other geographical contexts, possibly for similar reasons as mentioned above in respect of fair procedure. Equitable distribution obtains a particularly low third place among sampled elites in Germany and the United States, again perhaps reflecting their advantaged positions in the contemporary global political economy. Disaggregating the data by elite type (table 3), we see that the rank order transparency–expertise–impartiality in respect of global governance procedure holds for all six sectors except the party-political category, where a slightly larger percentage prioritizes impartiality before expertise. That said, the degree to which transparency prevails over expertise differs considerably by sector: the margin is large in respect of the research, civil society and media groups (where indeed one might expect an especially strong emphasis on transparency) and smaller in the cases of bureaucracy, business and political parties. In general, variations in relative priorities regarding global governance procedure are smaller between sectors than between countries (also when Russia is disregarded). Table 3 Prioritized institutional features, by sector Procedures: % giving highest priority to: Democracy The international organization is transparent in its decision-making procedures Effectiveness The international organization takes decisions based on expertise Fairness The international organization takes decisions in an impartial way Bureaucratic 38.8 32.6 28.6 Business 41.8 36.9 21.4 Civil society 46.3 28.5 25.2 Media 50.0 27.1 22.9 Party-political 39.8 29.1 31.1 Research 46.2 29.8 24.0 Performance: % giving highest priority to: Democracy The international organization improves democracy in affected countries Effectiveness The international organization delivers effective solutions to policy problems Fairness The benefits and costs of the international organization's policies are fairly distributed Bureaucratic 13.4 71.4 15.2 Business 21.2 68.3 10.6 Civil society 23.0 57.4 19.7 Media 24.7 58.1 17.2 Party-political 28.1 56.1 15.8 Research 15.5 67.0 17.5 Procedures: % giving highest priority to: Democracy The international organization is transparent in its decision-making procedures Effectiveness The international organization takes decisions based on expertise Fairness The international organization takes decisions in an impartial way Bureaucratic 38.8 32.6 28.6 Business 41.8 36.9 21.4 Civil society 46.3 28.5 25.2 Media 50.0 27.1 22.9 Party-political 39.8 29.1 31.1 Research 46.2 29.8 24.0 Performance: % giving highest priority to: Democracy The international organization improves democracy in affected countries Effectiveness The international organization delivers effective solutions to policy problems Fairness The benefits and costs of the international organization's policies are fairly distributed Bureaucratic 13.4 71.4 15.2 Business 21.2 68.3 10.6 Civil society 23.0 57.4 19.7 Media 24.7 58.1 17.2 Party-political 28.1 56.1 15.8 Research 15.5 67.0 17.5 Open in new tab Table 3 Prioritized institutional features, by sector Procedures: % giving highest priority to: Democracy The international organization is transparent in its decision-making procedures Effectiveness The international organization takes decisions based on expertise Fairness The international organization takes decisions in an impartial way Bureaucratic 38.8 32.6 28.6 Business 41.8 36.9 21.4 Civil society 46.3 28.5 25.2 Media 50.0 27.1 22.9 Party-political 39.8 29.1 31.1 Research 46.2 29.8 24.0 Performance: % giving highest priority to: Democracy The international organization improves democracy in affected countries Effectiveness The international organization delivers effective solutions to policy problems Fairness The benefits and costs of the international organization's policies are fairly distributed Bureaucratic 13.4 71.4 15.2 Business 21.2 68.3 10.6 Civil society 23.0 57.4 19.7 Media 24.7 58.1 17.2 Party-political 28.1 56.1 15.8 Research 15.5 67.0 17.5 Procedures: % giving highest priority to: Democracy The international organization is transparent in its decision-making procedures Effectiveness The international organization takes decisions based on expertise Fairness The international organization takes decisions in an impartial way Bureaucratic 38.8 32.6 28.6 Business 41.8 36.9 21.4 Civil society 46.3 28.5 25.2 Media 50.0 27.1 22.9 Party-political 39.8 29.1 31.1 Research 46.2 29.8 24.0 Performance: % giving highest priority to: Democracy The international organization improves democracy in affected countries Effectiveness The international organization delivers effective solutions to policy problems Fairness The benefits and costs of the international organization's policies are fairly distributed Bureaucratic 13.4 71.4 15.2 Business 21.2 68.3 10.6 Civil society 23.0 57.4 19.7 Media 24.7 58.1 17.2 Party-political 28.1 56.1 15.8 Research 15.5 67.0 17.5 Open in new tab Turning to criteria for global governance performance, a substantial majority of respondents in all six elite sectors gives highest priority to problem solving. Four of the six categories also follow the overall pattern of placing democracy promotion in the second position and fair distribution in third. However, that order reverses in the case of the bureaucratic and research sectors, which give slightly more weight to equity concerns. Business elites accord by some measure the least priority to fair distribution, perhaps reflecting the strength in commercial circles of a liberal market ethos. In sum, based on these results we might in general expect elites to respond most positively to increased transparency in the operations of GGIs and to increased problem-solving capability in the results of global governance policies. To this extent, proponents who seek to boost global governance (as well as opponents who seek to undermine it) could most advantageously focus their reforms (or their contestations) in these areas. That said, geographical and sectoral variation suggests that initiatives for change will elicit different reactions from different elite audiences. As ever, one size does not fit all, and policy practitioners would be ill-advised to pin their hopes on blanket solutions. Moreover, elite attitudes on these matters might not correspond with the priorities of citizens at large, in which case attending only to elite preferences could potentially intensify popular disquiet with global governance. Conclusion Elite attitudes are crucial to the future of global governance. As principal agenda-setters and decision-takers, elites strongly influence whether global governance will expand or contract as society confronts the major policy challenges of our time. Hence we undertook the unprecedented survey discussed in this article, covering views of global governance among 860 individual elites in highly diverse geographical and sectoral positions around the world. In summary, our study finds little evidence among elites of ‘global governance in crisis’. The carefully sampled political and societal leaders show themselves to be overall quite ready to accept global-level decision-making, especially in certain policy fields. At the same time, these elites are somewhat hesitant about current GGIs, holding on average medium levels of confidence that speak of neither a legitimacy crisis nor a legitimacy windfall. Our analysis further suggests that elites could respond especially positively to reforms that raise transparency in and problem solving by GGIs. Since elites have significant political impact, the future of global governance could hinge substantially on moving GGIs in these directions. Yet our analysis has also stressed throughout the need to nuance these headline insights. On each main point—preferences for levels of decision-making, assessments of existing GGIs and priorities for institutional features—we find some notable variations in respect of geographical locations, elite types and individual GGIs. Elite attitudes by no means fall on one line, and it would be foolish to expect that reforms to global governance would elicit uniform elite responses. Context matters. Important contextual variation may also occur over time. As always, data reflect the moment of their collection. Our study gives a snapshot of elite attitudes towards global governance in the late 2010s. Even in the year since our survey finished, developments such as the global COVID-19 pandemic and burgeoning evidence of climate change may have shifted elite views of certain GGIs or even global governance as a whole. As ours is the first systematic assessment of elite attitudes towards global governance, no basis exists as yet for longitudinal analysis. Hence further research is needed that extends this investigation to other moments in time—as well as to additional countries and additional GGIs. Moreover, as already intimated at several points in this article, the present study invites future exploration of the relationship between elite and general public perspectives on global governance. Now that this article has provided a more precise picture than previously available of elite views on world-scale rules and regulatory institutions, we have a basis for comparison of these attitudes with those of citizens at large. Such future study could establish whether there is, as some have contended, an opinion gap on global governance between ‘out of touch’ elites and the broader population.51 For the present, however, we conclude that evidence from this study contradicts notions that today's political and societal leaders are, à la 1930s, turning against the idea of global governance. 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Dellmuth, Jan Aart Scholte and Jonas Tallberg, ‘Institutional sources of legitimacy for international organisations: beyond procedure versus performance’, Review of International Studies 45: 4, pp. 627–46. 8 Schmidtke, ‘Elite legitimation and delegitimation’. 9 Haas, ‘Introduction’. 10 Goetz and Patz, eds, ‘Special issue: resourcing international organizations’. 11 Scholte, Building global democracy?; Dür et al., The political influence of business in the European Union. 12 Cox and Jacobson, eds, The anatomy of influence; Hawkins et al., eds, Delegation and agency in international organizations. 13 Mosca, The ruling class; Mills, The power elite; Khan, ‘The sociology of elites’. 14 Van der Pijl, Transnational classes and International Relations; Sklair, The transnational capitalist class; Rothkopf, Superclass; Kakabadse and Kakabadse, eds, Global elites; Philips, Giants. 15 Thomas G. Weiss and Rorden Wilkinson, Rethinking global governance (Cambridge: Polity, 2019). 16 Michael Barnett and Martha Finnemore, Rules for the world: international organizations in global politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004). 17 Kal Raustiala, ‘The architecture of international cooperation: transgovernmental networks and the future of international law’, Virginia Journal of International Law 43: 1, 2002, pp. 1–92; Anne-Marie Slaughter, A new world order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). 18 Rodney Bruce Hall and Thomas J. Biersteker, eds, The emergence of private authority in global governance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Tim Büthe and Walter Mattli, The new global rulers: the privatization of regulation in the world economy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011). 19 Mark Raymond and Laura DeNardis, ‘Multistakeholderism: anatomy of an inchoate global institution’, International Theory 7: 3, 2015, pp. 572–616; Harris Gleckman, Multistakeholder governance and democracy (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018). 20 Kenneth W. Abbott and Benjamin Faude, ‘Choosing low-cost institutions in global governance’, International Theory, publ. online June 2020, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-theory/article/abs/choosing-lowcost-institutions-in-global-governance/E4C6825D40595761B61273EB7DFDFA2A (accessible on 11 Feb. 2021). 21 David Miller, National responsibility and global justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). 22 Thomas Hale and David Held, Beyond gridlock (Cambridge: Polity, 2017). 23 Richard K. Herrmann, ‘Perceptions and image theory in International Relations’, in Leonie Huddy, David O. Sears and Jack S. Levy, eds, The Oxford handbook of political psychology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 334–63. 24 Max Weber, Economy and society: an outline of interpretive sociology (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978; first publ. 1922); Mark C. Suchman, ‘Managing legitimacy: strategic and institutional approaches’, Academy of Management Review 20: 3, 1995, pp. 571–610. 25 David Easton, ‘A re-assessment of the concept of political support’, British Journal of Political Science 5: 4, 1975, pp. 435–57; Marc J. Hetherington, ‘The political relevance of political trust’, American Political Science Review 92: 4, 1998, pp. 791–808; Pippa Norris, Democratic deficit: critical citizens revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011). 26 Rodney Barker, Political legitimacy and the state (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); David Beetham, The legitimation of power (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013). 27 Ian Clark and Christian Reus-Smit, eds, ‘Special issue: resolving international crises of legitimacy’, International Politics 44: 2–3, 2007; James Brassett and Eleni Tsingou, eds, ‘Special issue: legitimacy and global governance’, Review of International Political Economy 18: 1, 2011; Dominik Zaum, ed., Legitimating international organizations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Jonas Tallberg, Karin Bäckstrand and Jan Aart Scholte, eds, Legitimacy in global governance: sources, processes, and consequences (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 2018); Klaus Dingwerth, Antonia Witt, Ina Lehmann, Ellen Reichel and Tobias Weise, International organizations under pressure: legitimating global governance in challenging times (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019); Jonas Tallberg and Michael Zürn, ‘The legitimacy and legitimation of international organizations: introduction and framework’, Review of International Organizations 14: 4, 2019, pp. 581–606. 28 Ian Hurd, After anarchy: legitimacy and power in the United Nations Security Council (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2007); Christian Reus-Smit, ‘International crises of legitimacy’, International Politics 44: 2, 2007, pp. 157–74; Michael Zürn, A theory of global governance: authority, legitimacy, and contestation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); Tallberg et al., eds, Legitimacy in global governance. 29 Cf. Simon Caney, Justice beyond borders: a global political theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005); Allen Buchanan and Robert O. Keohane, ‘The legitimacy of global governance institutions’, Ethics and International Affairs 20: 4, 2006, pp. 405–37; Daniele Archibugi, Mathias Koenig-Archibugi and Raffaele Marchetti, eds, Global democracy: normative and empirical perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 30 Renate Mayntz, Legitimacy and compliance in transnational governance, working paper (Cologne: Max-Planck-Institut für Gesellschaftsforschung, 2010); Thomas Sommerer and Hans Agné, ‘Consequences of legitimacy in global governance’, in Tallberg et al., eds, Legitimacy in global governance, pp. 153–68. 31 Hurd, After anarchy; Martin Binder and Monika Heupel, ‘The legitimacy of the UN Security Council: evidence from recent General Assembly debates’, International Studies Quarterly 59: 2, 2015, pp. 238–50; Dellmuth and Tallberg, ‘The social legitimacy of international organisations’; Dellmuth et al., ‘Institutional sources’; Brilé Anderson, Thomas Bernauer and Aya Kachi, ‘Does international pooling of authority affect the perceived legitimacy of global governance?’, Review of International Organizations 14: 4, 2019, pp. 661–83. 32 Pippa Norris, ‘Global governance and cosmopolitan citizens’, in Joseph S. Nye and John D. Donahue, eds, Governance in a globalizing world (Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2000), pp. 155–77; Dellmuth and Tallberg, ‘The social legitimacy of international organizations’; Sara B. Hobolt and Catherine E. de Vries, ‘Public support for European integration’, Annual Review of Political Science, vol. 19, 2016, pp. 413–32; Lisa M. Dellmuth and Jonas Tallberg, ‘Why national and international legitimacy beliefs are linked: social trust as an antecedent factor’, Review of International Organizations 15: 2, 2020, pp. 311–37. 33 Soetkin Verhaegen, Jan Aart Scholte and Jonas Tallberg, ‘Explaining elite perceptions of legitimacy in global governance’, European Journal of International Relations, available online at https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/1354066121994320 (accessed 11 March 2021). 34 Fritz W. Scharpf, Governing in Europe: effective and democratic? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Jan Aart Scholte and Jonas Tallberg, ‘Theorizing the institutional sources of global governance legitimacy’, in Tallberg et al., eds, Legitimacy in global governance, pp. 56–74. 35 Dellmuth et al., ‘Institutional sources’. 36 Soetkin Verhaegen, Lisa Dellmuth, Jan Aart Scholte and Jonas Tallberg, LegGov elite survey: technical report, Oct. 2019, https://www.statsvet.su.se/polopoly_fs/1.460425.1572338507!/menu/standard/file/LegGov%20Elite%20Survey%20-%20Technical%20report.pdf (accessible on 8 March 2021). 37 See statistical annex I for precise figures by country and sector, available at https://www.statsvet.su.se/polopoly_fs/1.545766.1615476039!/menu/standard/file/Statistical%20Annex%20IA.pdf. 38 Pippa Norris, ‘Confidence in the United Nations: cosmopolitan and nationalistic attitudes’, in Yilmaz Esmer and Thorleif Pettersson, eds, The international system, democracy, and values (Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Upsaliensis, 2009), pp. 17–48; Marc Bühlmann and Ruth Kunz, ‘Confidence in the judiciary: comparing the independence and legitimacy of judicial systems’, West European Politics 34: 2, 2011, pp. 317–45; Johnson, ‘Guilt by association’; Dellmuth et al., ‘Institutional sources’. 39 Viktoria Kaina, ‘Legitimacy, trust and procedural fairness: remarks on Marcia Grimes' study’, European Journal of Political Research 47: 4, 2008, pp. 510–21; Christian Schnaudt, Political confidence and democracy in Europe (Cham: Springer, 2019). 40 On the first point, the survey asked respondents: ‘How much experience do you have interacting with the following international organizations?’ On the second point, the survey included three general knowledge questions about global governance. See annex II for further details; available at https://www.statsvet.su.se/polopoly_fs/1.545766.1615476039!/menu/standard/file/Statistical%20Annex%20IA.pdf. 41 Tobias Lenz and Lora A. Viola, ‘Legitimacy and institutional change in international organizations: a cognitive approach’, Review of International Studies 43: 5, 2017, pp. 939–61. 42 Discussions of our survey results in Moscow at the Center for International Institutions Research (4 Oct. 2019), Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences (22 Oct. 2019) and Institute of World Economy and International Relations (18 Nov. 2019). 43 Scholte, ed., Building global democracy?. 44 See annex III available at https://www.statsvet.su.se/polopoly_fs/1.545766.1615476039!/menu/standard/file/Statistical%20Annex%20IA.pdf. 45 See Hurd, After anarchy; Binder and Heupel, ‘The legitimacy of the UN Security Council’; Dellmuth and Tallberg, ‘The social legitimacy of international organizations’; Dellmuth et al., ‘Institutional sources’; Anderson et al., ‘Does international pooling of authority affect the perceived legitimacy of global governance?’; Verhaegen et al., ‘Explaining elite perceptions’. 46 Markus Fraundorfer, Brazil's emerging role in global governance: health, food security and bioenergy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015). 47 Markus Fraundorfer, Rethinking global democracy in Brazil (London: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2018). 48 Steven L. Myers, The new tsar: the rise and reign of Vladimir Putin (New York: Vintage, 2016); discussions of our survey results in Moscow at the Center for International Institutions Research (4 Oct. 2019), Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences (22 Oct. 2019) and Institute of World Economy and International Relations (18 Nov. 2019). 49 Mary Elise Sarotte, ‘Perpetuating US preeminence: the 1990 deals to “bribe the Soviets out” and move NATO in’, International Security 35: 1, 2010, pp. 110–37; Carol S. Leonard and David Pitt-Watson, Privatization and transition in Russia in the early 1990s (Abingdon: Routledge, 2013); discussions of our survey results in Moscow at the Center for International Institutions Research (4 Oct. 2019), Institute of Scientific Information on Social Sciences (22 Oct. 2019) and Institute of World Economy and International Relations (18 Nov. 2019). 50 UN, The United Nations and apartheid, 1948–94 (New York, 1994). 51 Ronald Inglehart and Pippa Norris, ‘Trump and populist-authoritarian parties: the silent revolution in reverse’, Perspectives on Politics 15: 2, 2017, pp. 443–54; Dani Rodrik, ‘Populism and the economics of globalization’, Journal of International Business Policy 1: 1–2, 2018, pp. 12–33; Hooghe et al., ‘Contested world order’. Author notes We could not have conducted this research without the help of colleagues worldwide. We thank in particular José Maurício Domingues (Instituto de Estudos Sociais e Politicos, Universidade do Estado do Rio de Janeiro (IESP-UERJ) and colleagues for fieldwork in Brazil; Bonn Juego (Department of Social Sciences and Philosophy, University of Jyväskylä) for expertise on elites in the Philippines; Alexey Kuznetsov and colleagues at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (IMEMO) in Moscow for fieldwork in Russia; Siphamandla Zondi and colleagues at the University of Pretoria for fieldwork in South Africa; the survey platform CivicPulse, under the coordination of Nathan Lee, for help in collecting responses from state-level political representatives in the United States; and the researchers of the Legitimacy in Global Governance (LegGov) programme for sharing their expertise on global elites. We emphasize that these colleagues have had no influence over survey responses and bear no responsibility for the data analysis that we present here. We further thank the referees of International Affairs for sharpening our analysis. The research has been funded by Riksbankens Jubileumsfond (Grant M15-0048:1). Soetkin Verhaegen received additional funding from the FRS-FNRS (Grant 1.B.421.19F). © The Author(s) 2021. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal Institute of International Affairs. This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted reuse, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited. © The Author(s) 2021. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal Institute of International Affairs.
TI - Elite attitudes and the future of global governance
JF - International Affairs
DO - 10.1093/ia/iiab034
DA - 2021-05-10
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/elite-attitudes-and-the-future-of-global-governance-DJ6bP2mSqt
SP - 861
EP - 886
VL - 97
IS - 3
DP - DeepDyve
ER -