TY - JOUR
AU - Bui, Ngoc, Son
AB - Abstract Laos, a socialist state in Southeast Asia, adopted an amended Constitution in 2015. This article investigates and explains this experience from the perspective of comparative constitutional amendment, supported by a qualitative empirical methodology: extensive formal interviews with several local constitutional amenders and informal conversations with a local lawyer and several legal scholars. It argues that Laos has introduced progressive constitutional amendments—notably, the redefinition of the position, structure, and functions of state institutions, including the imposition of term limits on executive power holders; strengthened commitment to a market economy; new commitments to human rights protection, judicial independence, and adversarial trials; and the creation of new institutions, namely, the local people’s councils, the state audit, and the election committee—to facilitate the improvement of its socialist constitutional system which in turn will promote the improvement of the material well-being of the living conditions of local people. 1. Introduction On December 8, 2015, the National Assembly of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (LPDR) (or Laos) approved an amended Constitution.1 This article investigates and explains how and why Laos amends its Constitution from the perspective of comparative constitutional amendment. Some background is helpful. Laos is a landlocked country in Southeast Asia, among five socialist countries (together with China, Vietnam, North Korea, and Cuba) remaining after the collapse of the Soviet Union, ruled by a single communist party named Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (or the Party), inhabited by approximately six million people, and one of the least developed countries in the world.2 The introduction of market reform to transform the Soviet-style planned economy in 1986 has been instrumental to the socio-economic transition in the country in the last three decades.3 The political dynamics are also evident,4 including the recent “critical moments of leadership renewal and transition” following the Tenth Congress of the Party and subsequently the National Assembly elections in 2016.5 Laos has recently drawn international attention on several issues, e.g. the Lao-China railway project, human right controversies, the rotating chair of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) in 2016, and the visits of former American President Barack Obama in 2016 and President Xi Jinping of China in 2017.6 The Lao Constitution has been underrepresented in comparative constitutional law.7 The field has been dominated by what Ran Hirschl called “usual suspect” countries,8 and this explains the underexploration of unusual constitutional experiences like those of Laos. In addition, as pointed out by Vicki Jackson, “the complexity of historical context” and “limitations of time and resources, limitation of language and contextual understanding”9 are also relevant factors. This article examines Lao constitutional amendment for its own sake and for the knowledge of comparative constitutional law. This is connected to what Tom Ginsburg calls “non-instrumental rationales for the study of foreign legal systems.”10 It locates Laos within the recent scholarship on comparative constitutional amendment.11 This study adopts a functional approach to comparative constitutional amendment. The approach focuses on the historical, institutional, political, and socio-economic surroundings of the constitutional amendment practice; the working of constitutional amendment rules and process; and the function of constitutional amendment’s contents. The functional approach is supported by a qualitative empirical methodology. In October 2017, I conducted fieldwork in Vientiane, the capital of Laos. I visited the Lao Ministry of Justice and the National Assembly and conducted extensive formal interviews with two political incumbents who had directly participated in the formal process of constitutional amendment. The first interview was with Inthananya Khieovongphachanh, the Director General of the Department of Legislation of the Lao Ministry of Justice.12 He participated in the formal process of constitutional amendment as a member of a subcommittee responsible for the drafting amendments to the Constitution’s chapters on the executive branch and local government. The second interview was with Amphay Chitmanonh, the Vice Chairman of the Law Committee of the Lao National Assembly.13 He was involved in the formal process of constitutional amendment as the head of the secretariat board of the National Committee for Amending the Constitution, and in this position he attended all meetings of this committee. This secretariat board was responsible for collecting proposals for constitutional amendments from different subcommittees and from the people and reporting to the National Committee for Amending the Constitution. The interviews were conducted at the offices of the interviewees.14 These formal interviews are contrasted with other sources. To begin with, I engaged in extensive informal conversations about Lao constitutional amendment and other legal issues with a Lao lawyer and three Lao legal scholars (one constitutional law scholar, one civil law scholar, and one scholar on international law and international relations) at the Faculty of Law and Politics of the Lao National University which I visited during my fieldwork. Because of the sensitive nature of the issues, the informal engagements inform this article but can be contextual only. In addition to interviews and conversations, this study is supported by written sources: official documents regarding the amendment process and the amended Constitution.15 The first document is the Lao National Assembly Standing Committee’s Proposal for Amending the 2013 Constitution of Laos in the 10th Congress of the National Assembly termed VII, 2015.16 Another document is the Lao Ministry of Home Affairs’ Summary of the Contents of the Amended Constitution of Lao People’s Democratic Republic of 2015.17 I have relied on two unofficial translations of the Lao amended Constitution of 2015, the English and Vietnamese versions. The English translation is by a Lao lawyer in Vientiane, and the Vietnamese translation is by a Lao officer studying in a law school in Hanoi. The citation of provisions in the Lao Constitution in this study is mainly based on the English version but is occasionally modified on the basis of comparison with the Vietnamese version. I argue that Laos introduces progressive constitutional amendments—notably, the redefinition of the position, structure, and functions of state institutions, including the imposition of term limits on executive power holders; strengthened commitment to a market economy; new commitments to human rights protection, judicial independence, and adversarial trials; and the creation of new institutions, namely, the local people’s councils, the state audit, and the election committee—to facilitate the improvement of the socialist constitutional system which in turn promotes the improvement of the material well-being of the living conditions of the local people. The remainder of this article is structured as follows: Section 2 introduces the background of the country’s constitutional history. Section 3 describes the Lao constitutional amendment in 2015. Section 4 analyzes it from the perspective of comparative constitutional amendment. Section 5 concludes with further reflections. 2. Background of Lao constitutional history The history of the Laotian state can be traced back to the Kingdom of Lan Xang (literally Million Elephants), a united kingdom existing from 1354 to 1707, one of the largest kingdoms in Southeast Asia.18 During the first half of the twentieth century, Laos was colonized by France as a part of Indochina.19 On March 9, 1945, Japanese forces seized the French colonial power in Indochina.20 In Laos, Crown Prince Savang Vatthana called “in the name of the king” for popular opposition to the Japanese.21 On April 8, 1945, under Japanese pressure, however, he was forced to declare the independence of Laos.22 The Japanese were defeated, and Prince Phesarath as viceroy and prime minister declared the independence of the unitary kingdom of Laos.23 At the same time, the French had returned to Luang Prabang, and the king welcomed their return while he dismissed his prime minister, whereupon a provisional People’s Assembly met in Vientiane to vote to depose the king, enacted a provisional constitution stipulating a constitutional monarchy, and appointed a provisional government called Lao Issara (Free Laos).24 The king declared all of the National Assembly’s activities illegal.25 The provisional government negotiated with the court: the king would legitimize it and its constitution in return for the position of constitutional monarch.26 On April 24, 1945, French troops reoccupied Vientiane, and the Lao Issara government fled to Thailand.27 The French also realized that constitution-making was necessary for Laos to be within the French Union.28 Therefore, the Constituent Assembly, elected on the base of universal male suffrage in December 1946, approved a constitution of the Kingdom of Laos in March 1947.29 The Constitution declared unity of the kingdom and recognized French as the official language.30 It then provided for basic institutions of a constitutional monarchical polity, namely, the King, the National Assembly, the government, and the Royal Council. Some criticized the Constitution for lacking fundamental rights and confirmation of national independence, as the 1945 Constitution had.31 The 1947 Constitution of the Kingdom of Laos had remained in force during the civil war and the second Indochina War, with several subsequent amendments, until it was abolished by the forced abdication of the king and the proclamation of the creation of the communist government in December 1975.32 The Issara government is the forerunner of the communist government, or the Lao People’s Democratic Republic. For the Issara leaders in Thailand, the French tutelage of Laos is unacceptable.33 However, “the government-in-exile was unable to obtain international recognition or assistance from any state other than Thailand.”34 In this context, the more effective way “was Vietminh directed activities along the Lao-Vietnamese boarder.”35 On August 13, 1950, with the consultation of Vietnamese communist leaders (Ho Chi Minh and Vo Nguyen Giap), the Lao communist movement, called Pathet Lao (the Land of the Lao), was created in northwestern Vietnam, with Souphanouvong as prime minister and minister of foreign affairs and Kaysone Phomvihane as minister of defense.36 On March 22, 1955, the communist party of Laos, which has its roots in the communist party of Indochina, was officially created as the Lao People’s Party (Phak Passon Lao), and took its current name, Lao People’s Revolutionary Party (Phak Pasason Pativat Lao), in 1975. By the end of the second Indochina War, the communist-backed Pathet Lao prevailed over the US-backed Royal faction in the coalition government called the Provisional Government of National Unity.37 In December 1975, the Pathet Lao dissolved the coalition government, forced the king to abdicate, and declared the creation of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic.38 For the next sixteen years, the communist government ruled Laos without a constitution. Stuart-Fox provided two possible explanations for the delay in communist constitution-making in Laos.39 The first is that “there existed profound differences between the Lao leadership and their Vietnamese counterparts and advisers over what form the Lao constitution should take.”40 The second concerns ethnic plurality: “A more difficult question for the regime to determine is what constitutional guarantees should be provided to define and protect the rights of minority groups making up half of the national population.”41 By the late 1980s and early 1990s, the communist government in Laos was confronted with more pressures on constitution-making. First, the collapse of communism resulted in the halt of socialist economic aid to Laos. Second, the domestic centralized economy proved a disaster. Third, the central government lost its control over local government. Therefore, the communist leaders needed a constitutional framework for economic reform and centralization of power.42 Consequently, the Supreme People’s Assembly approved the Constitution on August 14, 1991.43 This charter “was strongly influenced by the socialist Constitutions of Soviet Union, Vietnam, and People’s Republic of Kampuchia.”44 The 1991 Constitution was amended in 2013 to better “reflect the political and economic reality of contemporary Laos.”45 It was recently amended in 2015 to “respond to the Party’s renovation policies and the country’s development vision until 2030.”46 3. Lao constitutional amendment in 2015 3.1. Amendment rationales The Proposal for Amending the 2013 Constitution of Laos submitted to the 10th Congress of the National Assembly termed VII in 2015 provides official justifications for constitutional amendments. First, it proposed that amending the Constitution is necessary to implement the communist party’s strategy for socio-economic development from 2016 to 2026.47 In addition, the government believes that constitutional amendments are necessary to correct the shortcomings of the current constitution and more generally to provide a framework for long-term socio-economic development. To begin with, constitutional amendment is necessary to rectify the limits of the current Constitution. Constitutional amenders explained that the Constitution of 2003 was implemented to foster domestic social and economic changes, to extend international relations, to structure the state institutions, and to protect people’s rights. But, it had important limitations that required constitutional amendments. First, important state institutions, such as the state audit, had not yet been provided in the Constitution. Second, some important institutional reforms had been implemented but not yet reflected in the Constitution, such as the creation of the regional courts and regional procuracies. Third, the people’s rights in several regions had not yet been strongly promoted. Fourth, the people and officers at different levels had failed to respect the Constitution as expected.48 3.2. Amendment rules Constitutional amendment rules used in the 2015 circle are provided in the amended Constitution of 2003 and the related legislation called Law on Making Legislation of 2012. Accordingly, the National Assembly, the ordinary legislature, enjoys the exclusive power to amend the constitution. Article 53 of the Constitution provides for the powers of the National Assembly, including the power “to prepare, adopt or amend the Constitution.”49 Article 79 of the Constitution underlines that this is the exclusive power of the National Assembly: “Only the National Assembly session of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic has the right to amend the Constitution.”50 The adoption of constitutional amendments “requires the affirmative votes of at least two-thirds of the total number of the National Assembly members.”51 After the National Assembly’s approval, constitutional amendments will be promulgated by the President of State.52 The Law on Making Legislation of 2012 stipulates the creation of a “National Committee for Making or Amendment of the Constitution” vested with the functions to “collect information and conduct public consultations in a broader manner than making and amending of laws.”53 This law does not provide more details on the procedure of constitutional amendment but allows the National Assembly to “determine . . . the detailed regulations on the procedures for making and amending the Constitution.”54 3.3. Amendment principles The Proposal for Amending the 2013 Constitution of Laos articulates five basic “principles” for amending the constitution55: First, constitutional amendments must continue to confirm that the nature of Laos is a country of “people’s democracy,” that the communist party is the leading force, and that the state power is unified but there are distribution and cooperation of the powers and the mutual supervisions among the legislature, executive, and judiciary.56 Second, fundamental contents of the 9th Congress of the Party must be incorporated into the constitution. The National Committee of Constitutional Amendment will cooperate with the subcommittees to prepare the political report to be presented at the 10th Congress of the Party, and the strategy on the national socioeconomic development.57 Third, constitutional amendments must be based on the reality of the implementation of the 2003 Constitution, retain the “correct contents” that are in consistent with the reality, amend “inappropriate contents,” and supplement important and necessary contents based on the consultation of the whole country.58 Fourth, subcommittees are responsible for studying amendments of constitutional provisions in their respective areas to improve the whole Constitution, but the supplementation of the new contents or the abolition of certain contents must be collected and reported to the Politburo and the Secretary board of the Party for their guiding opinion.59 Fifth, consultation meetings “with oriented direction” will be held in six regions of the country to collect opinions and comments on the draft constitutional amendments; the results of these meetings will be referenced in the 8th Congress of the National Assembly and reported to the plenary congress of the central committee of the communist party.60 3.4. Amendment bodies On August 15, 2014 (the Constitution Day), the President of State issued a decision to create the National Committee for Amending the Constitution (NCAC). Presided by Sonexay Siphandone, the head of the Government Office, the NCAC was comprised of seventeen members, which was later extended to more than twenty members.61 These members are key state persons from major branches of the state. They included the president of the National Assembly, the vice president of the National Assembly, the heads of six National Assembly’s specific committees,62 the president of the supreme people’s courts, the president of the supreme procuracy, and the chair of the presidential office. The NCAC also included the heads of mass organizations such as the Lao Front for National Construction, the Lao Federation of Trade Unions, the Lao People’s Revolutionary Youth Union, and the Lao Women’s Union.63 The NCAC created specific subcommittees under the direct control of the former. These subcommittees were responsible for discussing and proposing amendments to different chapters of the Constitution. These subcommittees are consistent with the functions of the respective state institutions. For example, the Minister of Home Affairs is in charge of issues relating to local government, and therefore is responsible for discussing and proposing amendments to the Constitution’s chapter on local government. The heads of the state institutions are also the heads of the subcommittees.64 The NCAC also created a secretariat responsible for collecting and synthesizing the opinions of different subcommittees.65 3.5. Amendment procedures The constitutional amendment procedures can be understood as including four steps: drafting, consultation, approval, and ratification.66 Consider first drafting. The subcommittees studied the constitutional contents needing amendments. Proposals for constitutional amendments from different subcommittees were synthesized and reported to the National Assembly. The National Assembly discussed the proposals of constitutional amendments in its eighth session. The National Assembly discussions were televised. Official media also spread the discussions. On the basis of the National Assembly’s constitutional discussions, the NCAC prepared the first draft of constitutional amendments. The next step is constitutional consultation. The NCAC conducted two rounds of public consultations on the draft amended constitution in June 2014 and October 2015. In each round, a consultation meeting was concurrently undertaken on the same day in different regions. Participants of the meetings were major officials of the provinces, experts, academics, and retired officials. Approximately 400 to 500 participants attended the consultation meetings in Vientiane. The focus of each of the two rounds of public consultations was rather different. The first round focused on the rationales and proposals of the constitutional amendments, while the second one was more concerned with the expected outcomes of the constitutional amendments. In the meetings, people also asked many questions. Especially, the retired officials had many comments on the draft constitutional amendments. One of the important questions that was subject to vibrant discussion during consultation meetings concerned the proposal for creating a new body, the “people’s council,” at the local government level. People discussed who should be the head of the council. Should it be the secretary or vice secretary of the Party at the parallel local government? Although this is not a constitutional question, people were concerned because the secretary is the most powerful figure in a locality. People also discussed the name of this institution: some suggested that it should be called “provincial council” rather than “people’s council” because it was only proposed to be created at the provincial level. In addition to the general public consultations, the NCAC held more specific workshops. It organized more than twenty workshops to consult the opinions of different sectors of society, including the private sector, such as private companies, mainly in Vientiane.67 Especially, it also held a workshop at the Faculty of Law and Politics of Lao National University, attended by faculty members and students. On October 28–29, 2015, NCAC also organized a workshop on exchanging experiences of constitutional amendment with Vietnam’s National Assembly, entitled “Theory and Practice in Building and Amending the Constitution.”68 In addition, the NCAC also held meetings with subcommittees to discuss and resolve questions that were still the subject of disagreement. On the basis of the consultations, the NCAC revised the draft of the amended Constitution and submitted it to the National Assembly for further discussion and approval. Like the first round, the second round of the National Assembly discussions of constitutional amendment were televised. Retired officials closely followed the discussions to consider whether their comments had been reflected in the Constitution. The Constitution was approved by the National Assembly on December 8, 2015, ratified by the President of State on December 15, 2015, and went into effect on February 4, 2016. The Constitution is officially known as the Amended Constitution of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic of 2015.69 3.6. Substance of amendment The Amended Constitution of 2015 consists of the preamble and fourteen chapters divided into 119 articles. Compared with the 2003 version, the 2015 version has three more chapters and twenty-one more articles.70 The preamble has been amended to set down new constitutional goals, stating that the amended Constitution of 2015 is meant to improve “the high efficiency” of the state, “to create a new phrase for protecting and constructing the nation,” and “to integrate into economy into the region and the international community in the new era.”71 Turning to the body of the Constitution, nearly all chapters of the Constitution have new contents. Constitutional amendments touch on fundamental principles of the regime, constitutional rights and duties, and the nature and functions of state institutions. The government underlines that the important constitutional amendments focus on major central state institutions and local government.72 The contents of constitutional amendments can be explored by looking at the socialist constitutional order: constitutional instrumentalism, party vanguardism, “democratic centralism,” rights statism, and economic statism.73 This approach is useful to understand how fundamental features of the regime have been retained but modified, which creates the condition for constitutional change. (a) Instrumentalism The socialist regimes employ the Constitution as a tool for the state to manage the society.74 The amended Constitution of 2003 and the earlier 1991 Constitution confirmed this principle but have already stipulated that state bodies “must function within the bounds of the Constitution and the laws.”75 The amended Constitution of 2015 confirms this provision.76 This provision suggests the understanding that the Constitution is not only the instrument for the state to control the society; the state must also be bound by the Constitution and the law. The aspirational provision on the constitutionality and legality in the practice of the public power is a modification to constitutional instrumentalism. (b) Party vanguardism The socialist principle of party vanguardism considers the communist party a vanguard force that leads the state and the society.77 Like the previous versions, the amended Constitution of 2015 attributes, in its preamble, the major achievement of liberation of the nation from foreign domination to the “correct leadership of the former Indochinese Communist Party and the present Lao People’s Revolutionary [communist] Party.”78 Article 3 remains intact, considering the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party the “leading nucleus” of the political system.79 However, the amended Constitution of 2015 retains the established provision, which requires that the Party, like the state, “must function within the bounds of the Constitution and the laws.”80 This provision stipulates the aspirational commitment to the constitutionality and legality in the Party actions. (c) Democratic centralism The third socialist feature of “democratic centralism” and the structural institutions created according to it have more significant changes. This principle suggests that the state power is centralized on the popularly elected National Assembly, and other state institutions are subordinate to it, effectively rejecting the Western model of the separation of power and checks and balances.81 This principle is confirmed in article 5: “The National Assembly, the Local People’s Assemblies and other state organizations are established and function in accordance with the principle of democratic centralism.” However, important constitutional amendments redefine positions, structure, and the functions of the state institutions and create new institutions, which indicates clear distribution and independence of powers. These amendments can be classified as positional, functional, and structural amendments. Consider first the positional amendments. These amendments redefine the nature of the position of the three branches. The Constitution clearly defines the National Assembly as the legislative branch82 and the government as the executive branch,83 and for the first time defines that “the people’s courts are the judicial organs; only courts have the power to adjudicate and judge cases.”84 While the former two have already featured in the previous versions of the Constitution, the latter is a significant amendment as it provides the constitutional foundation for judicial independence and prevents the interference of other political institutions in the work of the judicial branch. Next are functional amendments. Many amendments are introduced to clearly define, adjust, delete, and supplement the functions of the major state institutions. The trend of these functional constitutional amendments is to make the state functions clearer, less concentrated, and more responsible. To begin with, several amendments define in more detail the functions of the National Assembly in deciding important socio-economic affairs and government formation.85 One amendment gives the National Assembly the power to void legal regulations issued by other state institutions found unconstitutional.86 Another amendment allows this institution to appoint and dismiss the prime minister.87 One amendment removes the power of the National Assembly’s Standing Committee to supervise the activities of the executive bodies, the courts, and the public prosecutors.88 This allows independence of powers to some extent, especially judicial independence. The Constitution also defines more specifically the functions of the President of State. In addition, the Constitution removes the power to appoint the prime minister which has been transferred to the National Assembly.89 At the same time, the Constitution adds the presidential powers to grant political asylum to persons of other nationalities and to negotiate or sign on international treaties and agreement on behalf of the state.90 One amendment requires the government to be accountable to the National Assembly and President of State.91 A parliamentary vote of no confidence is the mechanism for the National Assembly to hold the government accountable; it was established in the previous Constitution and reconfirmed in the amended Constitution of 2015: “The National Assembly may pass a vote of no confidence in any member or all members of the government if the National Assembly Standing Committee or one-fourth of the total number of National Assembly members raises the issue. In the event that the National Assembly has no confidence on any member or all members of the government the President has the right to request to the National Assembly for reconsideration or decides to terminate the member of the government.”92 The Constitution also defines in more detail the executive functions.93 In addition, it vests the government with more powers to “establish or liquidate districts, municipalities, and cities and determine the boundaries of the districts, municipalities, and cities after approval by the People Assembly of the provinces”; “establish or liquidate Special and Specific Economic Zone”; “decide on conferment, withdrawal, relinquishment, and re-acquisition of Lao nationality”; and “decide on granting a foreigner the right to become a honorary person.”94 The amended Constitution does not make many changes to the judicial functions. However, a new article has been added to stipulate adversarial trials, providing that “Litigants shall have the right to argue and debate at court-room and to participate in all stages of the case proceedings. Accused persons shall have the right to defend the case raised against them, either by themselves or by their guardians or lawyers.”95 The third type is structural amendments. These amendments are introduced to make the power structure less concentrated and more accountable. For example, one important amendment limits the presidential term to two consecutive terms.96 Another amendment provides that members of the government cannot hold two consecutive terms.97 These provisions aim to keep the power holders accountable. In addition, court structure has undergone a significant constitutional change. The 2003 amended Constitution created a court system in which local courts were based on local administrative units at provincial and district levels.98 The amended Constitution of 2015 removed this administration-based court system, stipulating that the court system includes the supreme people’s court, local people’s courts, and military courts.99 This allows the creation of local courts independent from administrative units, which can prevent the interference of local administrators in the judicial adjudication of local courts. The amended Constitution also changes the procuracy structure in the same manner.100 In the local government, the most important change is the creation of the “local people’s councils” which is detailed in a new chapter of the Constitution, Chapter VIII divided into nine articles.101 The local people’s council is defined as “the representative of the rights and interests of the multi-people” and “the organ of state power at locality.”102 Its general functions are to adopt “important legislation,” decide on “fundamental issues” on the local level, and supervise the activities of other state organs at the same local level.103 The amended Constitution stipulates that the local people’s council shall be created at the three local levels: provinces, districts, and villages. The Constitution, however, defines the position, functions, and structure of the local people’s councils at the provincial level, and authorizes the legislation to detail the creation of the local people’s councils at the district and village levels. Article 4 of the Constitution provides that members of the local people’s councils, like those of the National Assembly, are elected by the people through universal, equal, direct, and secret suffrage.104 The creation of the local people’s councils is a significant departure from the socialist principle of “democratic centralism” which also requires vertical centralization of power. My interviews suggest that one of the motives behind creating the local people’s councils is to facilitate the decentralization policy called Sam Sang (“Three Builds”) Directive detailed in Prime Minister’s Instruction Number 16/PM on July 15, 2012.105 “The Directive proposes villages as the development unit, districts as the integration unit, and provinces as the strategic unit.”106 The creation of the local people’s councils allows local government to have more autonomy to legislate at the local level, and to decide their own local affairs. To illustrate, the amended Constitution authorizes the provincial people’s council to adopt plans for socio-economic development and state budget; adopt “important legislation at that provincial level; and appoint and remove the provincial governors.”107 In addition, local people’s councils check the local administrative authority. In this regard, they are vested with the powers to nullify regulations issued by administrative authority found inconsistent with the law, and to interpellate the governor at their sessions.108 In addition to the structure of the local government, the amended Constitution creates two new independent institutions, namely, the state audit and the election committee. The two new chapters detail these institutions.109 My interview suggests that the motive to create the state audit office is to make it independent from the government.110 The state audit includes the audit authorities at central and regional levels. The President of the State Audit is selected and removed by the National Assembly and is responsible to the latter.111 The Constitution provides that the State Audit Authorities have the right “to conduct the audit independently in accordance with the law in order to certify the correctness of the financial reports, their legality and consequence of their implementation.”112 The election committees include the National Election Committee and election committees at the local levels, responsible for “leading and directing” the elections of the National Assembly and the local people’s councils, respectively. The National Election Committee shall be established by the National Assembly Committee.113 The creation of the local election committees shall be provided by a law.114 (d) Rights statism The amended Constitution does not have many changes to fundamental rights, and continues the spirit of rights statism,115 which allows the state to regulate the practice of citizens’ rights. It confirmed rights protected in the initial Constitution of 1991 and additional rights newly introduced in the 2013 constitutional amendments, namely, the rights to vote, work, rest, and lodge complaints and petitions, and the inviolable right to bodies, honor, and houses.116 However, the most important change in this aspect is that the Constitution explicitly recognizes “human rights” for the first time. This provision was added to the amended Constitution: “The State recognizes, respects, protects, and guarantees human rights and fundamental rights of citizens in accordance with the law.”117 My interviews indicate that the constitutional insertion of human rights is motivated by two concerns. First, this is a response to the international criticism118 of human rights restrictions in Laos.119 Second, the constitutional provision on human rights is to implement international treaties on human rights that Laos has recently ratified before the enactment of the amended Constitution.120 Laos ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 2009, the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) in 2009, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 2007, and the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in 2012.121 The new constitutional provision on human rights indicates both universalist and statist positions of human rights. On the one hand, human rights are considered something not granted but acknowledged, respected, and protected by the state. On the other hand, the provision allows the practice of human rights to be regulated by state law. Despite that, the new constitutional provision on human rights expresses a modification to the socialist, statist conception of rights. (e) Economic statism Economic statism is marked by the state’s centralized regulation of the economy and state ownership of major economic resources, such as land and other natural resources.122 The initial Constitution and the 2003 amended Constitution confirmed this socialist feature but already modified it by introducing liberal elements of market economy. These market elements include constitutional commitments to the multisector economy,123 the state’s promotion of foreign investment and protection of investors’ lawful assets and capitals,124 economic cooperation with foreign countries,125 protection of property rights,126 and the state’s promotion of “knowledge and invention in scientific and technological research and application” and protection of intellectual property.127 The commitment to these socialist and market features is continued and strengthened in the amended Constitution of 2015 with slight rewording. One important constitutional amendment, however, is the removal of the provision stipulating that the economy is “regulated by the state in the direction of socialism.”128 The new constitutional provision defines the nature of Lao economy as “the economic system that follows the socialist economic theory which consists of divergent forms of economy, and various forms of enterprises.”129 The economy is grounded on socialist economic theory, but the commitment to socialism is no longer a feature of the constitutional economy. This is connected to the constitutional provisions on the promotion of foreign investment and economic cooperation with foreign countries. The firm commitment to socialism may limit investment from and economic cooperation with the non-socialist world. 3.7. Implementation After the adoption of the amended Constitution, assembly deputies propagandized its new elements to their constituencies.130 In addition, the National Assembly has amended or passed new organic laws. Major organic laws on the government, the National Assembly, the courts and procuracy, and elections have been amended.131 The law on local government has been amended to create the people’s councils. The provincial people’s councils have been created through elections by the local people.132 The following laws have been amended or enacted after the promulgation of the amended 2015 Constitution: State Audit Law No. 09/NA dated November 11, 2016; Law on Government No. 04/NA dated November 8, 2016; Amended Law on Election of members of National Assembly and People’s Council of Provinces No. 66/NA dated December 14, 2015; Amended Article 41 and 42 of the Law on Election of members of National Assembly and People’s Council of Provinces No. 01/NA dated May 12, 2016; Law on People’s Council of Provinces No. 65/NA dated December 10, 2015; Amended some Articles of Law on People’s Council of Provinces No. 11/NA dated November 14, 2016; Amended Law on National Assembly 64/NA dated December 9, 2015; Amended some Articles of Law on National Assembly No. 10/NA dated November 14, 2016; Amended Law on Oversight by the National Assembly and People’s Council of Provinces No. 12/NA dated November 15, 2016; Amended Law on Local Administrative No. 68/NA dated December 14, 2015; Amended Law on People’s Court No. 22/NA dated May 10, 2017.133 4. Comparative analysis We are now in a position to analyze the Lao constitutional amendment from a comparative perspective. Sections 4.1 through 4.7 situate the Lao experience within the current themes in comparative constitutional amendment scholarship: factors of amendment; function of amendment; amendment power; unamendability; the distinction of amendment, replacement, and dismemberment; domestic participation in the amendment process; and transnational involvement in domestic amendment. 4.1. Factors of amendment A constitutional amendment project may be driven by internal factors (e.g. pressures to resolve socio-economic problems, such as poverty, unemployment, crimes, migration, the gap between the rich and the poor, governmental corruption)134 and/or external factors (e.g. regional and international integration).135 Lao constitutional amendment is first driven by the internal imperative to improve the material well-being of the living conditions of local people. “Material well-being refers to the physical support to life, to the attainments that make acquisition of physical attributes possible, such as education, economic power, good health, etc.”136 The socio-economic context in Laos explains why material well-being matters for constitutional amenders. Although the Lao People’s Democratic Republic created in 1975 is committed to transition to socialism without moving toward the capitalist path, several factors in other socialist countries effect Lao’s post-1975 developmental policy: the Perestroika (reconstructing the political and economic systems) in the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries in the 1980s, China’s Gǎigé kāifàng (“Reform & Opening up”) policy in 1979, and Vietnam’s reform policy in 1979 culminating in the comprehensive economic reform program called Đổi Mới (Renovation) in 1986.137 Consequently, Kaysone Phomvihane, conceived as the founding father of LPDR, advocated a slogan called Chintanakan Mai (New Thinking) in 1986, stating that “we think that changing the ownership of the means of production is the key to develop forces of production, which will automatically lead to the improvement of the people’s lives.”138 The slogan was used to promote “New Economic Management Mechanism,” a major market-oriented reform to improve the people’s material living conditions, including the multi-ownership and multisector economy, recognized in the 1991 Constitution.139 A new national goal was set by the Party in 1993: to “graduate” from the United Nation’s list of least-developed countries. The Sixth Party Congress in 1996 set the year of 2020 as the deadline for this graduation.140 One standard to judge the Party action created by the Party itself is “improving living standards and creating benefits for the people.”141 When it seemed likely that Laos would achieve the “graduation” goal, at the Tenth Congress in 2016, the Party announced Vision 2030, targeting a new goal of becoming an upper-middle-income state by 2030.142 One scholar summarized the national goals in the Lao development trajectory as “include[ing] the post-war normalization of people’s lives during the 1970s and 1980s, graduation from least-developed country status and becoming an upper-middle-income state by 2030.”143 Why has the improvement of the living conditions of the people been the preoccupation of the socialist regime in Laos in the last three decades? The reason is to consolidate the sociological legitimacy144 of the single-party rule. As the legal foundation of the legitimacy of this regime is limited (the absence of multiparty democratic and fair elections, corruption, the limits of rule of law and human rights145), the regime has to depend on the actual acceptance of the relevant public of its rule as justified and appropriate, which in turn significantly depends on how the regime can actually work to improve the living conditions of the population. Despite speedy economic development and social transition, Laos remains a country with a low ratio of poverty reduction per unit of gross domestic product growth.146 Lao transition is fragile because “there are structural factors which limit the ability of Laos to capitalize on recoveries and translate these into longer-term stability.”147 These constraints include “low industrial competitiveness, high corruption, and underperformance in the areas of education, rule-of-law and human rights.”148 The structural constraints on continuing socio-economic progress are constitutionally relevant. Consequently, the need to modify these impediments to ease the continuing improvement of the living conditions of the local people creates a need to improve the constitutional system. This explains why the official agenda of constitutional amendment and the amended constitutional preamble clearly indicate that constitutional amendments are driven by the pressures to boost socio-economic progress. In a constitutional consultation meeting, Dr. Sonexay Siphandone, the chair of the NCAC, said that “Legislative changes influence the government’s development vision until 2030 and the socio-economic development plans for 2016–25, so it has become necessary to amend the Constitution.”149 The expectation is that constitutional amendment will facilitate socio-economic progress. He said: “One of the expected outcomes of amendments to the Constitution is that it will enable the government to implement socio-economic development from 2016–25 more effectively.”150 In addition, after the amended Constitution was adopted, the Ministry of Home Affairs prepared a report on the Constitution on the occasion of the socialist country’s fortieth anniversary, stating that the enactment of the amended Constitution presented “the strong determination of the nation to altogether combat against difficulties” and especially to help the country “escape the fate of an underdeveloped country in 2020.”151 The regime’s hope is that the amended Constitution will provide a new fundamental framework to implement the long-term plan and vision of socio-economic development to improve the material well-being of the local people, which is instrumental to the consolidation of the sociological foundation of the regime’s legitimacy. In addition to internal factors, constitutional amendment in Laos is also driven by external factors. The country has actively integrated into the regional and international community. To illustrate, Laos joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) on February 2, 2013, and hosted the Seventh Asia–Europe Parliamentary Meeting and the Ninth Asia–Europe Summit in October and November 2012, respectively; the Sixth Cambodia–Lao PDR–Myanmar–Vietnam (CLMV) Summit and the Fourth Aryavady Chaophaya–Mekong Economic Cooperation Summit (ACMECS), March 12–13, 2013; and the Thirty-fifth ASEAN Parliamentary Meeting in 2014.152 In the view of the government, “all of these events have underpinned development and facilitated business investment, production, and services.”153 Moreover, while Laos retains important relationships with its neighbor countries, the country is adroit in diplomatic relations, which can be seen in the capital’s infrastructure: the construction of the National Assembly building is funded by Vietnam154; “airports built by Japan; an international conference hall built by China; and the Mekong riverbank redeveloped by Korea.”155 Laos also established the “Comprehensive Partnership” with the United States in 2016.156 With these international dynamics, it becomes imperative for Laos to have a new constitutional framework to further regional and international integration by adopting similar constitutional norms and institutions to those of the global community (such as human rights and judicial independence) and dropping the unfamiliar ones (e.g. regulating the economy in the direction of socialism) to gain more international legitimacy and attract foreign investments.157 This is, in turn, conducive to domestic legitimacy and the improvement of domestic living conditions. 4.2. Function of amendment Constitutional amendment literally means to improve the existing constitutional system, but functionally it is used in both abusive and progressive ways.158 The Lao experience illustrates the latter story. The function of constitutional amendment is progressive in substantial and directional ways. In a substantial sense, constitutional amendment aims to improve the material well-being of living conditions. Because of the socio-economic circumstances of the country, its preoccupation is the material betterment of the living conditions of the local people. In a directional sense, constitutional amendment facilitates the movement of the constitutional system to a better stage. Although the authoritarian regime remains (the single leadership of the communist party, centralized power, rights regulated by the state), constitutional amendments soften and modify the authoritarian arrangement and introduce elements which facilitate constitutional term limits, the creation of the state audit, accountable government, human rights, local autonomy, judicial independence, and adversarial trials. Particularly, the creation of the people’s council allows local government to address the developmental concerns of the local people. Many of the contents of these constitutional amendments are aspirational. A constitution includes not only legalistic rules but also a community’s aspirations for the future.159 The aspirational aspects of a constitution are particularly relevant to the developing countries which are struggling to improve the living conditions of their people by reforms, including constitutional reform.160 Lao constitutional amendment includes aspirational contents that the government cannot achieve immediately, but these contents are normative constitutional values, principles, and hopes to which the Lao people are committed and which they will attempt to realize in the long-term future throughout many generations. For example, the commitment to human rights, judicial independence, and adversarial trials are not prescriptions that the regime can implement immediately but aspirations the regime hopes to realize in the future. The initial constitutional amendment may include aspirational provisions which would be realized by generations over time, and new generations will come up with new aspirations that will be supplemented in the Constitution, which generates further constitutional amendments.161 4.3. Amendment power Drawing from Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès162 and Carl Schmitt,163 comparative constitutional theorists distinguish constitution-making power from constitutional amendment power.164 Yaniv Roznai further identifies three types of power: the primary constituent power by the people, the secondary primary power (constitutional amendment power) by a separate entrusted body, and the constituted power by the legislative and executive bodies.165 These three powers blur in Laos. The Constitution allows the National Assembly to assume three powers: constitution-making power, amendment power, and lawmaking power. This ordinary legislature is in fact the locus of both constitutional amendment power and legislative power. The fact that the Law on Making Legislation defines constitutional amendment rules indicates that legislative power can even define how the constitutional amendment power is practiced. Two possible explanations for the ambiguity of the three powers in Laos can be offered. The first lies in the Lao authoritarian setting. The distinction of constituent, amendment, and legislative powers rests on democratic foundations. Differently, the authoritarian constitutional amendment process in Laos is controlled by a centralized power and hence does not have the distinction of powers it might have in a democratic constitutional amendment process. The second explanation concerns the normative nature of the theoretical differentiation of the three powers. The theorization presents an aspiration on how democratic constitutional powers should be exercised rather than positively describing how they are actually used. In fact, during the process of post-communist democratization in the late twentieth century, there was no clear distinction between constitutional politics and ordinary politics, and the ordinary legislature operated as the locus for both ordinary lawmaking and constitutional-building.166 The merging of the amendment power and the legislative power into a single legislature is not a Lao constitutional aberration. Despite the same authority, the constitutional amendment rules seem to provide that the amendment power should be practiced in a process separate from the ordinary legislative process, e.g. a two-thirds super-majority requirement. In theory, “a two-thirds supermajority requirement, which may seem very demanding in the context of a competitive two-party or multiparty democracy, may not be demanding at all in a dominant party system or even after one party.”167 Despite a single-party rule, Laos requires a two-thirds super-majority on the constitutional amendment process. In the context of authoritarian constitutional amendment in Laos, a two-thirds super-majority requirement may have a legitimizing rather than constraining function: it is used to strengthen the legitimacy of the process and substance of constitutional amendment. 4.4. Unamendability The distinction of the constituent and constitutional amendment powers constitutes the foundation for the theory of unconstitutional constitutional amendment: the amendment power is constrained by core commitments or basic structures established by the constituent power.168 The idea of unamendability in the existing constitutional amendment literature is an idea of constitutionalism: the entrenchment of core constitutional constraints against the whim of power holders.169 Laos is an authoritarian polity, and so the constitution does not have explicit provisions limiting the amendment power.170 In theory, the National Assembly enjoys both constituent and constitutional amendment powers, and thus it is free to amend the Constitution. Neither does Laos have implicit constitutional unamendability since judicial review of constitutionality is absent as the consequence of authoritarian arrangement. However, this does not mean that there are no constraints on the amendment power in Laos in practice. The Lao story may indicate a functional sense of unamendability: certain constitutional elements cannot be amended in practice to protect the cores of the existing constitutional order despite the absence of textual and judicial constraints. These constitutional cores are what the regime is deeply committed to, and are not necessarily associated with liberal democratic values. What is established in the constitutional amendment agenda as “principles” of constitutional amendment can be understood as the functional constraints on the amendment power: constitutional amendment cannot change the nature of “people’s democracy,” the leadership of the communist party, or the unity of power. The actual limitations on constitutional amendment power enable incremental constitutional improvement and preclude a constitutional metamorphosis. Without judicial review, the communist party is gatekeeper of the constraints on constitutional amendment in Laos. The conjunction of the Party-state (phak-lat), the term used in Laos in everyday conversation, indicates that the Party “is, if not synonymous with, the state.”171 The Party closely controls the amendment process to make sure that constitutional evolution is circumscribed within the possible boundaries. The process and the substances of constitutional amendment are closely tied to the Party’s process of making political decisions, plans, and visions. The party decision was incorporated in the amended constitution; important changes to the constitution were approved by the Party in advance; the constitutional amendment bodies were responsible for not only proposing constitutional amendments but also preparing the Party’s political report; and the amended constitution is the base for implementing the Party’s long-term plan of socio-economic development. The amendment power is, therefore, constrained by the Party. 4.5. Amendment, replacement, and dismemberment A related distinction is that of constitutional amendment, replacement, and dismemberment. It is argued that constitutional amendment is exercised by the derivative constituent power and conditioned by the existing constitution, while constitutional replacement is carried out by the people’s original constituent power outside any legal restraints.172 Richard Albert goes further to differentiate amendment from dismemberment: “an amendment continues the constitution-making project in line with the current design of the constitution, while a dismemberment is incompatible with the existing framework of the constitution and instead seeks to unmake one of its constituent parts—its rights, structure, or identity.”173 The Lao experience complicates the story: a project of constitutional change is in line with the existing constitution but ends up by promulgating a new constitution which replaces the existing one without significant change to the existing constitutional order. Is this constitutional change a constitutional amendment, a replacement, or a dismemberment? The whole project of constitutional alteration is a constitutional amendment project, The Proposal for Amending the 2013 Constitution of Laos. The project followed the rules laid down by the 2003 amended Constitution. The body in charge of this project was the “National Committee for Amending the Constitution.” The new constitution was officially called the “amended Constitution” of 2015.174 But, article 119 of this Constitution provided that “This Constitution and its contents shall replace the previous version of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic Constitution of No. 25/NA dated 6 May 2003.”175 In this formal sense, Lao constitutional change seems a constitutional replacement. The regime may need to house old and new constitutional ideas, institutions, and principles in a new formal provenance to signal176 to the local and international audiences the regime’s commitment to continuing reform in the new globalizing era. Some changes echo the idea of constitutional dismemberment, such as the deletion of “socialism” as the core commitment in the state regulation of the economy. The theoretical distinction of amendment, replacement, and dismemberment may not fully capture constitutional reality.177 The Lao story is better conceived as a constitutional amendment project with “constitutional amendment” understood in a functional sense. In this sense, constitutional amendment is the formal change to the constitutional system or order, not a text.178 Constitutional amendment enables the constitutional system to incrementally and continuously evolve into a better stage (e.g. evolution from a repressive system into more responsive one) without destroying the existing system. Constitutional amenders may end up by enacting a new constitution that officially replaces the existing one, but the nature of constitutional change can be still conceived of as constitutional amendment if the new constitution only practically improves rather than replaces the existing constitutional system. The Lao story is a good example. Although the amended Constitution of 2015 includes progressive amendments, it retains the overall structure, major principles, and many provisions of the preceding constitution, and consequentially, the existing socialist constitutional order basically remains intact. The formal constitutional change in Laos is, therefore, a constitutional amendment, not a constitutional replacement. In addition, the whole project of constitutional change modifies rather than dismembers the socialist constitutional identity: the leadership of the community party, the Leninist constitutional structure, the statist rights, and the statist economy are not dismantled. 4.6. Participatory amendment Participation in constitutional building is now a norm, applied in both constitution-making and constitutional amendment.179 In the developing countries, the formal process of constitutional amendment operates as the platform for the participation of the domestic people, especially those who are vulnerable to depression and abuse, in a constitutional dialogue about a constitutional framework that facilitates the improvement of living conditions. For example, the constitutional amendment process enables domestic people to engage in constitutional debate about land issues and property rights in postcolonial Zimbabwe and South Africa.180 The process of constitutional amendment in Laos includes public consultations which allow the people in different regions of the country to have a say. Within Lao’s constitutional history, public constitutional discussion is not new.181 The 2015 circle continued this practice, which provides the base for the continued claim in the constitutional preamble that “This Constitution is the fruit of the process of the people’s discussion throughout the country.”182 To compare the Lao constitutional amendment process with that of two other socialist countries, the Lao process is more progressive than China’s albeit less so than Vietnam’s. The 2018 constitutional amendment process in China lacked public discussion, and critical comments on the amendment proposals were banned.183 The Lao story demonstrates a better practice: constitutional consultations are extended to private sectors and academic fora, as occurred in the National University of Laos. Yet, Lao constitutional consultation is less open than the Vietnamese practice was in 2013,184 such as the lack of the publication of the draft amendments for the public debates in mass media and other public fora.185 Unlike Vietnamese citizens,186 Laotian citizens did not actively engage in constitutional debate, activism, and mobilization, and they paid less attention to constitutional amendment.187 This is explained by the broader context in Laos: the weakness of civil society,188 the virtual absence of social mobilization and activism,189 “the absence of alternative political organizations and attendant political constraints,”190 and the regime’s control of information.191 So, what is the meaning the constitutional consultation after all? From an instrumentalist perspective, one may argue that populist leaders may employ constitutional consultation as a mechanism to legitimize their power and the constitution. From a consequentialist perspective, one may insist that the public participation may not help produce a better constitution. Instrumentalism and consequentialism have their own virtues but do not exhaust the way to conceptualize the meaning of constitutional consultation. The third way is essentialism: the meaning of constitutional consultation must be understood on its own terms. Constitutional consultation indicates a better relationship between the government and the people even under an authoritarian setting: the government allows people from rural to urban areas to have a constitutional say and engages in a dialogue with them. 4.7. Transnational amendment Nowadays, constitutional-building is not totally a national affair but involves the international community or transnational actors in some way.192 While this is more prominent in constitution-making as the external actors are more attracted by the projects of fundamental change, the case of Laos indicates that transnational engagement is also evident in the less radical moment of constitutional amendment. The transnational involvement in constitutional amendment in Laos takes two forms: actors and materials. In the first instance, transnational actors are involved in the domestic constitutional amendment process. In the second instance, constitutional amenders actively engage with international and foreign constitutional materials, especially the ones of the neighboring countries. The deliberation among constitutional amenders is informed by foreign constitutional experience and international law. They consulted the constitutions of all ASEAN countries, China, Japan, Russia, and Germany, and international treaties on human rights.193 The transnational engagement with the Vietnamese constitutional experience is especially notable. One member of the Ministry of Justice told me that among foreign constitutions, Laos consulted Vietnam’s Constitution first.194 That member of the National Assembly also said to me that “we looked at all contents of Vietnam [2013] Constitution.”195 There were in fact constitutional dialogues between members of the two governments. To illustrate, on July 30, 2014, in his visit to Laos, the Vietnamese Minister of Justice, Hà Hùng Cường, delivered a speech on the process of making Vietnam’s 2013 Constitution and its substantial contents, attended by some 400 Lao senior cadres.196 The Lao Minister of Justice said to the reporters before the speech: “This is a valuable occasion for Laos to learn from Vietnam in building the constitution, especially from the new points in the 2013 Constitution of Vietnam.”197 The president of the Laos National Assembly, Pany Yathotou, stated that “Laos always follows closely the development of Vietnam and is pleased with Vietnam’s achievements,” informed people that Laos was considering amending its Constitution, and “wanted Vietnam to share valuable experience in building the Constitution with Laos.”198 In addition, a member of the Vietnamese National Assembly’s Legal Committee also delivered a speech in Vientiane introducing Vietnam’s 2013 Constitution to the Lao legislators.199 I have interviewed the members of the Lao Ministry of Justice and National Assembly about the two above speeches. They said that the Vietnamese officers were invited to share Vietnamese constitutional experience because Vietnam had a constitutional system similar to that of Laos.200 There were no such speeches by experts or officials from other countries.201 As the consequence of transnational engagement, Lao’s amended Constitution of 2015 and Vietnam’s Constitution of 2013 share several new features, such as a human rights provision, independent judicial power, and adversarial trials. Another prominent example is the two independent institutions, the state audit and the election committee, which were introduced in the two constitutions for the first time. One Lao officer wrote: “The supplementation of the two institutions, the state audit and election committee, in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic is based on learning the Vietnamese experience of constitution-making. Therefore, the provisions on the structure, duties, and authorities of these independent constitutional institutions in the 2015 Constitution of Lao People’s Democratic Republic are completely similar to those in the 2013 Constitution of Socialist Republic of Vietnam.”202 In addition, Lao constitutional amendments share several new elements with Vietnam, which were reconfirmed in the 2013 Constitution, such as the creation of the people’s councils. The two constitutions in Laos and Vietnam have similar definitions regarding the nature of this local institution. One Lao officer writes that constitutional change regarding local government in Laos “is based on learning experience of constitution-making in socialist countries, especially Vietnam.”203 My interviews confirm that the creation of the people’s councils is based on consulting on the Vietnamese experience and the experiences of China and Japan.204 After the adoption of the amended Constitution, Laos has created the provincial people’s councils, and Vietnam and Laos have shared experiences in people’s council activities. For example, in his visit to Vietnam in August 2016, Bountone Chanthaphone, chair of the People’s Council of Xieng Khouang province of Laos, said that his visit is “to learn from Vietnam’s experience in organizing the activities of the People’s Councils, and wished that the Vietnamese legislature and localities will continue assisting Laos in this field.”205 More recently, on September 25, 2017, in Ho Chi Minh City, leaders of the Champassak province of Laos and of Ho Chi Minh City also shared their experience in operating people’s councils: “The two sides discussed their practices in managing people’s councils, communicating with people and informing them about results of the council conferences, implementing regulations and supervision, and training human resources.”206 How can we explain the transnational elements in Lao constitutional amendments? Benedikt Goderis and Mila Versteeg have identified several channels of deliberative constitutional learning, namely, common legal origin, geographic proximity, trade relationship, and military alliances.207 These channels are also relevant to explain Laos’ consulting on the Vietnamese constitutional experience. First, Laos has practical reasons to consult on recent constitutional changes from the country sharing the socialist legal system, the socialist political regime, and the socialist constitutional system.208 Second, Lao shares 2069 kilometers of border with Vietnam to the east. Geographic proximity enables easy interaction and exchange of constitutional experiences between the two countries. Third, after China, Vietnam is the second biggest foreign investor in Laos.209 The Minister of Planning and Investment of Vietnam reported that “Vietnam currently has 408 investment projects in Laos with a total registered investment capital of US$3.7 billion.”210 Laos may adjust the constitutional arrangement along the lines of those of their trade partners to ease cross-border transactions. Finally, military alliance is an important factor for Lao’s consulting on the Vietnamese constitutional experience. Martin Stuart-Fox indicates that “the course of the Lao revolution has been closely tied to events in Vietnam.”211 He further explains that “The ruling parties in Vietnam and Laos share a single origin in the Indochinese Communist Party, and stood shoulder to shoulder throughout the ‘thirty-year struggle’ from 1945 to 1975. During that time the military of both states forged especially close bonds, and in both countries military leaders of this revolutionary generation still wield considerable power.”212 In addition, the Lao-Vietnamese Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation was signed on July 18, 1977, “affirming the consistent solidarity, cooperation and support for each other in national construction and defence in either country.”213 The military closeness facilitates the exchange of constitutional information between Laos and Vietnam. However, Laos deliberately learns from, not simply copies, transnational experience. The creation of the people’s council is an example. The Lao amended Constitution of 2015 does not copy the three-level structure of people’s councils established by its Vietnamese counterpart. It only establishes the institution at the provincial level and allows flexible room for the legislature to decide on the details of local government by statutes. In addition, Lao’s amended Constitution of 2015 has many distinctive elements reflecting the Lao pluralist society, such as the recurrent references to the “multi-ethnic Lao people” throughout the constitution and the provision on Buddhism.214 Finally, Laos’ Constitution includes features that are more progressive than those of Vietnam’s Constitution, such as constitutional term limits, a parliamentary vote of no confidence, and a stronger emphasis on the independence of the judicial power. 5. Conclusion I conclude with some further reflections on a question for future research, namely, whether Laos can be contextualized with the comparative study of authoritarian constitutionalism. Mark Tushnet has recently argued that there is no a clear dichotomy between constitutionalism and authoritarianism and proposed the concept of “authoritarian constitutionalism.”215 Constitutionalism is an ideal and may be achieved partially under authoritarianism; conversely, authoritarianism may be partially practiced under a constitutionalist regime.216 Political scientists believe that although Laos remains an authoritarian regime, it “is less authoritarian than it used to be.”217 The political elite monopolizes power for their interests,218 but they are also compelled to work to improve the living standards of the local people, which is essential to the sociological legitimacy of their rule. Recent constitutional amendment indicates the improvement of its authoritarian constitution, which enables us to situate Laos within comparative study of authoritarian constitutionalism to some extent. To begin with, regarding its goal, authoritarian constitutionalism may evolve toward the direction of positive constitutionalism.219 The authoritarian leaders in the country may be less interested in imposing constitutional constraints on their power in the name of individuals’ liberty. But, for the sake of sociological legitimacy, constitutional amendment establishes the state’s positive constitutional duty to improve the material well-being of living conditions. The achievement of this aspirational goal requires empowering rather than negatively limiting the state. Regarding its mechanism, authoritarian constitutionalism may take the form of political constitutionalism.220 Because authoritarian constitutional arrangements in Laos lack judicial review, legal constitutionalism221 is not the case. Rather, the political (legislative) form of constitutionalism may be relevant. The Lao parliament “is typically dismissed as a ‘rubber-stamp’ parliament,” but “as one of the only institutions where concerns over development projects and other controversies can formally be raised, the parliament has played an increasingly prominent oversight function, even if this does not extend to the role of the Party itself.”222 It also enacted many legislations to implement the amended constitution. The Lao legislature may operate as the platform to put pressure on the enforcement of the state’s positive constitutional duty to improve the living conditions of the local people. Acknowledgements This article is a part of the project Constitutional Amendment in South East Asia supported by the National University of Singapore Faculty of Law’s Centre for Asian Legal Studies (CALS) where I previously worked as a research fellow. I am grateful for CALS’s support of the project and my field trip to Laos. I thank Tom Ginsburg, Yaniv Roznai, Cheryl Saunders, Mark Tushnet, and three anonymous reviewers for their useful comments. I also thank Ms. Khamphaeng Phochanthilath for her assistance in the fieldwork. Footnotes 1 Amended Const. Lao People’s Democratic Republic (2015). 2 United Nations Committee for Development Policy, List of Least Developed Countries (as of March 2018), available athttps://www.un.org/development/desa/dpad/wp-content/uploads/sites/45/publication/ldc_list.pdf. 3 For transition in Laos, see generallyChanging Lives in Laos: Society, Politics and Culture in a Post-Socialist State (Vanina Bouté & Vatthana Pholsena eds., 2017); Jonathan Rigg, Living with Transition in Laos: Market Intergration in Southeast Asia (2005); Yves Bourdet, The Economics of Transition in Laos: From Socialism to Asean Integration (2000). 4 Aurel Croissant & Philip Lorenz, Comparative Politics of Southeast Asia 113–139 (2018). 5 Soulatha Sayalath & Simon Creak, Regime Renewal in Laos: The Tenth Congress of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party, inSoutheast Asian Affairs 179, 179–180 (2017). 6 Simon Creak & Keith Barney, Conceptualizing Party-State Governance and Rule in Laos, 48 J. Contemp. Asia 693, 698 (2018). 7 To be sure, there are some rare English writings on the Lao Constitution. See Gerald Leather, Laos: A Constitution in Search of Constitutionalism, inConstitutionalism in Southeast Asia, Vol. 2: Reports on National Constitutions 125 (Clauspeter Hill & Jőrg Menzel, eds., 2008); Martin Stuart-Fox, The Constitution of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic 17 Rev. Socialist L. 299 (1991); Stephen T. T. Johnson, Laos in 1991: Year of the Constitution, 32 Asian Surv. 82 (1992); Joseph J. Zasloff, The Emergence of the Constitution in Laos, inOxford Constitutions of the World (Gisbert H. Flanz ed., 1992), available athttp://oxcon.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:ocw/law-ocw-cm134.document.1/law-ocw-cm134. 8 Ran Hirschl, Comparative matters: The Renaissance of Comparative Constitutional Law 192 (2014). 9 Vicki Jackson, Methodological Challenges in Comparative Constitutional Law, 28 Penn. St. Int’l L. Rev. 319 (2010). 10 Tom Ginsburg, Studying Japanese Law Because It’s There, 58 Am. J. Comp. L. 15 (2010). 11 See generallyThe Foundations and Traditions of Constitutional Amendment (Richard Albert et al. eds., 2017). 12 Interview with Inthananya Khieovongphachanh, in Vientiane, Laos, on October 4, 2017 [hereinafter Interview I]. 13 Interview with Amphay Chitmanonh, in Vientiane, Laos, on October 5, 2017 [hereinafter Interview II]. 14 I communicated directly with Inthananya Khieovongphachanh in English. Amphay Chitmanonh mainly spoke Lao and some English; when he spoke Lao, we had an English translator. 15 Scholarly writings in Lao language on the Lao amended Constitution of 2015 are virtually absent. Personal communication with a Lao lawyer, November 13, 2018. 16 I rely on a thesis by a Lao student written in Vietnamese, which substantively cites this document. Vilayvieng Thoumma, Những Điểm Mới Về Bộ Máy Nhà Nước CHDCND Lào Theo Hiến Pháp Lào Năm 2015 [New Points on the State Apparatus in the 2015 Constitution of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic] 24 (unpublished master’s thesis, Hanoi University of Law, 2017) (on file with author). 17 Lao PDR’s Ministry of Home Affairs, Summary of the Contents of the Amended Constitution of Lao People’s Democratic Republic of 2015 2 (2015) (on file with author). This document is translated into Vietnamese by Vilayvieng Thoumma. I thank her for sharing this document. 18 For an extensive study of this kingdom, seeMartin Stuart-Fox, The Lao Kingdom of Lan Xang: Rise and Decline (1998). 19 For this period, seeMartin Stuart-Fox, A History of Laos ch. 2 (1997). 20 Martin Stuart-Fox, Laos: Politics, Economics, and Society 17 (1986). 21 Id. 22 Id. 23 Id. 24 Id. at 17–18. 25 Stuart-Fox, supra note 19, at 62. 26 Id. at 65. 27 Id. 28 Id. 29 Id. 30 Id. at 129. 31 Id. 32 Id. at 133. 33 Stuart-Fox, supra note 20, at 18. 34 Id. 35 Id. 36 Id. at 19. 37 Robert Dayley, Southeast Asia in the New International Era 165 (2017). 38 Id. For more details on the triumph of communism in Laos, see Macalister Brown, The Communist Seizure of Power in Laos, inContemporary Laos: Studies in the Politics and Society of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic 17–38 (Martin Stuart-Fox ed., 1982). 39 Stuart-Fox, supra note 20, at 69. 40 Id. 41 Id. 42 Leather, supra note 7, at 135. 43 For the constitution-making process, see Stuart-Fox, supra note 7. 44 Leather, supra note 7, at 136 45 Martin Stuart-Fox, Laos, inCountries at the Crossroads: A Survey of Democratic Governance 371 (Sanja Kelly, Christopher Walker, & Jake Dizard eds., 2008). 46 Laos Issues New Constitution,Vietnamplus (Dec. 20, 2015; 18:20:00), available athttp://en.vietnamplus.vn/laos-issues-new-constitution/86486.vnp, 47 Lao National Assembly Standing Committee, Proposal for Amending the 2013 Constitution of Laos (2015), cited in Thoumma, supra note 16, at 25. 48 Lao National Assembly Standing Committee, Proposal for Amending the 2013 Constitution of Laos (2015), cited in Thoumma, supra note 16, at 25. 49 Const. of Lao People’s Democratic Republic art. 53 (2003). 50 Id., art. 79. 51 Id., art. 79. 52 Id., art. 67. 53 Law on Making Legislation of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic art. 15 (2012). 54 Law on Making Legislation of the Lao People’s Democratic Republic art. 15 (2012). 55 Lao National Assembly Standing Committee, Proposal for Amending the 2013 Constitution of Laos (2015), cited in Thoumma, supra note 16, at 25. 56 Id., at 26–27. 57 Id. 58 Id. 59 Id., at 26. 60 Id. 61 Interview II. 62 At the time of constitutional amendment, Laos had six National Assembly committees. Now it has two more committees: justice, and finance and audit. Interview II. 63 Interview II. 64 Interview I. 65 Interview II. 66 The following description of the constitutional amendment procedure draws on Interview I, Interview II, and Thoumma, supra note 16, at 27. 67 Thoumma, supra note 16, at 27. 68 Id. 69 Lao PDR’s Ministry of Home Affairs, supra note 17. 70 Id. 71 Amended Const. of Lao People’s Democratic Republic, preamble (2015). 72 Lao PDR’s Ministry of Home Affairs, supra note 17. 73 For more details on these principles, see Bui Ngoc Son, Globalization of Constitutional Identity, 26(3) Wash. Int’l L.J. 463 (2017). 74 William Partlett & Eric C. Ip, Is Socialist Law Really Dead?, 48 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. at 363, 480–481 (2016). 75 Const. of Lao People’s Democratic Republic art. 10 (1991); Const.of Lao People’s Democratic Republic art. 10 (2003). 76 Amended Const. of Lao People’s Democratic Republic art. 10 (2015). 77 Partlett & Ip, supra note 74, at 481. 78 Amended Const. of Lao People’s Democratic Republic preamble (2015). 79 Amended Const. of Lao People’s Democratic Republic art. 9 (2015). 80 Id., art. 3. 81 Partlett & Ip, supra note 74, at 482. 82 Amended Const. of Lao People’s Democratic Republic art. 52 (2015). 83 Id., art. 69. 84 Id., art. 90. 85 Id., art. 53. 86 Id., art. 53. 87 Id., art. 53. 88 Id., art. 56. 89 Id., art. 67. 90 Id. 91 Id., art. 69. 92 Id., art. 75. 93 Id., art. 70. 94 Id. 95 Id., art. 96. 96 Id. 97 Id., art. 71. 98 Id., art. 79. 99 Id., art. 90. 100 Id., art. 100. 101 Id., ch. VIII (2015). 102 Id., art. 76. 103 Id. 104 Id., art. 4. 105 Interview I and Interview II. 106 Adam Smith International, Report: Sam Sang In Practice: Early Lessons from Pilot Implementation iv (Dec. 2015). 107 Amended Const. of Lao People’s Democratic Republic art. 77. (2015) 108 Id., art. 83. 109 Id., chs. XI and XII. 110 Interview I. 111 Amended Const. of Lao People’s Democratic Republic arts. 53 and 106 (2015). 112 Id., art. 107. 113 Id., art. 108. 114 Id. 115 For rights statism, see Christopher Osakwe, The Theories and Realities of Modern Soviet Constitutional Law: An Analysis of the 1977 USSR Constitution, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1350, 1390–1395 (1979). 116 Const. of Lao People’s Democratic Republic arts. 36, 39, 41, and 42 (2003). 117 Amended Const. of Lao People’s Democratic Republic, art. 34 (2015). 118 See, e.g., US Department of State, Laos 2016 Human Rights Report, available athttps://www.state.gov/documents/organization/265560.pdf. 119 Interview II. 120 Interview I. 121 For Lao status of ratification of international human rights treaties, see Ratification Status for Lao People’s Democratic Republic, United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=94&Lang=EN. 122 See generallyPaul Gregory & Robert Stuart, Soviet and Post Soviet Economic Structure and Performance (2001). 123 Const. of Lao People’s Democratic Republic art. 13 (2003). 124 Id., art. 15. 125 Id., art. 20. 126 Id., art. 16. 127 Id., art. 24. 128 Amended Const. of Lao People’s Democratic Republic art. 13 (2015). 129 Id., art. 13. 130 Interview II. 131 Id. 132 Id. 133 I thank Khamphaeng Phochanthilath for updating the information about these new laws. Khamphaeng Phochanthilath, personal communication, Dec. 26, 2017. 134 For example, at the time of writing, the Philippines is considering amending its constitution to boost economic development. See Banyan, Changing the Constitution of the Philippines May Prove Perilous, The Economist, Feb. 3, 2018, https://www.economist.com/news/asia/21736153-are-presidents-justifications-adequate-and-his-motives-pure-changing-constitution. 135 Carlo Fusaro & Dawn Oliver, Toward a Theory of Constitutional Change, inHow Constitutions Change: A Comparative Study 411–412 (Dawn Oliver & Carlo Fusaro eds., 2011). 136 Abbott L. Ferriss, Does Material Well-Being Affect Non-Material Well-Being? 60 Soc. Indicators Res. 275, 275 (2002). 137 Norihiko Yamada, Legitimation of the Lao People’s Revolutionary Party: Socialism, Chintanakan Mai (New Thinking) and Reform, 48 J. Contemp. Asia 717, 722 (2018). 138 Id. at 725 (slightly modified translation). 139 Id. at 727. 140 Id. at 730. 141 Id. at 731. 142 Id. at 732. 143 Id. at 933. 144 For legitimacy as a sociological concept, see Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 1787, 1795 (2005). 145 Creak & Barney, supra note 5, at 698–670; Martin Stuart-Fox, Politics and Reforms in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Murdoch University’s Asia Research Centre, Working Paper No. 126, 23–8 (2005) [hereinafter Stuart-Fox, Politics and Reforms]; Martin Stuart-Fox, The Political Culture of Corruption in the Lao PDR, 30 Asian Stud. rev. 59 (2006). 146 Creak & Barney, supra note 5, at 700. 147 David Carment et al., Towards a Theory of Fragile State Transitions: Evidence from Yemen, Bangladesh and Laos, 36(7) Third World Q. 1316, 1325 (2015). 148 Creak & Barney, supra note 5, at 700. 149 Constitutional Amendments to Boost Economic Growth, RightsLinkLao, April 2, 2015, http://rightslinklao.org/?p=5978&lang=en. 150 Id. 151 Lao PDR’s Ministry of Home Affairs, supra note 17. 152 The Government of Lao PDR’s 8th Five-Year National Socio-economic Development Plan (2016–2020), available athttp://www.la.one.un.org/images/publications/8th_NSEDP_2016-2020.pdf. 153 Id. 154 News Desk, Laos, Vietnam Break Ground for New National Assembly Building, Asia News Network, Nov. 2, 2017, http://annx.asianews.network/content/laos-vietnam-break-ground-new- national-assembly-building-59904. 155 Sayalath & Creak, supra note 5, at 192. 156 US Embassy in Laos, United States and Lao PDR Unveil Comprehensive Partnership, https://la.usembassy.gov/united-states-and-lao-pdr-unveil-comprehensive-partnership/. 157 David Law, Globalization and the Future of Constitutional Rights, 102 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1277, 1281–1282 (2008) (constitutional rights are used to attract foreign investments). 158 For would-be authoritarians’ abusive use of constitutional amendment, see David Landau, Abusive Constitutionalism, 47 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 289 (2013). 159 Kim Lane Scheppele, Aspirational and Aversive Constitutionalism: The Case for Studying Cross-Constitutional Influence Through Negative Models, 1(2) Int’l J. Const. L. 296, 299 (2003). 160 See, e.g., Isaac Okello, The Constitutional Reforms Should Reflect Our Will and Aspirations, Parliament Watch, http://parliamentwatch.ug/constitutional-reforms-reflect-will-aspirations/#.W-UKbuIRWUk. 161 I thank Mark Tushnet for suggesting this idea. Mark Tushnet, personal communication, Nov. 3, 2017. 162 Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, What Is the Third Estate? (1963). 163 Carl Schmitt, Constitutional Theory (Jeffrey Seitzer trans., 2008). 164 Kim Lane Scheppele, Unconstitutional Constituent Power (unpublished paper), available athttps://www.sas.upenn.edu/andrea-mitchell-center/sites/www.sas.upenn.edu.dcc/files/uploads/Scheppele_unconstitutional%20constituent%20power.pdf. 165 Yaniv Roznai, Amendment Power, Constituent Power, and Popular Sovereignty: Linking Unamendability and Amendment Procedures, inThe Foundations and Traditions of Constitutional Amendment 26 (Richard Albert, Xenophon Contiades, & Alkmene Fotiadou eds., 2017). 166 See Ruti Teitel, Transitional Jurisprudence: The Role of Law in Political Transformation, Yale L.J. 106 (7) 2009, 2069 (1997); Andrew Arato, Parliamentary Constitution Making in Hungary, 4 E. Eur. Const. Rev. 45 (1995). 167 David Landau & Rosalind Dixon, Constraining Constitutional Change, 50 Wake Forest L. Rev. 859, 872 (2015). 168 Gary J. Jacobsohn, An Unconstitutional Constitution? A Comparative Perspective, 4(3) Int’l J. Const. L. 460 (2006); Yaniv Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments—The Migration and Success of a Constitutional Idea, 61 Am. J. Comp. L. 657 (2013); Mark Tushnet, Peasants with Pitchforks, and Toilers with Twitter: Constitutional Revolutions and the Constituent Power, 13(3) Int’l J. Const. L. 639 (2015). 169 For the relation of the idea of entrenchment to constitutional amendment, see Richard Albert, Amending Constitutional Amendment Rules, 13(3) Int’l J. Const. L. 655, 656 (2015). For a critical view on constitutional entrenchment, see Mila Versteeg & Emily Zackin, Constitutions Un-entrenched: Toward an Alternative Theory of Constitutional Design, 110(4) Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 657 (2016). 170 For the difference between implicit and explicit constitutional unamendability, seeYaniv Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: The Limits of Amendment Powers 15, 39 (2017). 171 Creak & Barney, supra note 5, at 698. See also Stuart-Fox, Laos: Politics in a Single-Party State, inSoutheast Asian Affairs 161 (2007) (discussing the Party congress as the platform to determinate the leadership of the country). 172 Carlos Bernal, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments in the Case Study of Colombia: An Analysis of the Justification and Meaning of the Constitutional Replacement Doctrine, 11(2) Int’l J. Const. L. 339, 342 (2013). 173 Richard Albert, Constitutional Amendment and Dismemberment, 43 Yale J. Int’l L. 1, 5 (2018). 174 Interview II. 175 Amended Const. of Lao People’s Democratic Republic art. 119 (2015). 176 For the signaling function of authoritarian constitutions, see Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser, Introduction, inConstitutions in Authoritarian Regimes 1, 8 (Tom Ginsburg & Alberto Simpser eds., 2013). 177 David Landau and Rosalind Dixon argue that the sharp distinction between constitutional amendment and replacement is problematic because these practices are both abused for anti-democratic ends. Landau & Dixon, supra note 167, at 860. 178 For the functional understanding of constitution as constitutional order or system, seeZachary Elkins, Tom Ginsburg, & James Melton, The Endurance of National Constitutions 40–47 (2009); Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 Yale L.J. 408, 412 (2007). 179 For a recent account, seeParticipatory Constitutional Change: The People as Amenders of the Constitution (Xenophon Contiades & Alkmene Fotiadou eds., 2017). 180 Heinz Klug, Constitutional Amendments, 11 Ann. Rev. L. Soc. Sci. 95, 96 (2015). 181 Stuart-Fox, supra note 7, at 299. 182 Amended Const. of Lao People’s Democratic Republic, preamble (2015). 183 Salvatore Babones, China’s Constitutional Amendments Are All About the Party, Not the President, Forbes, Mar. 11, 2018, https://www.forbes.com/sites/salvatorebabones/2018/03/11/chinas-constitutional- amendments-are-all-about-the-party-not-the-president/#6934b8d01615. 184 For the Vietnamese case, see Bui Ngoc Son, Contextualizing the Global Constitution-Making Process: The Case of Vietnam, 64(4) Am. J. Comp. L. 931 (2016). 185 Interview II. 186 Bui Ngoc Son & Pip Nicholson, Activism and Popular Constitutionalism in Contemporary Vietnam, 42 Law & Soc. Inquiry 677 (2017). 187 Interview II. 188 Gretchen Kunze, Laos, inRoutledge Handbook on Civil Society in Asia 204 (Akihiro Ogawa ed., 2018) (“although some kind of civil society will continue to exist and constructively contribute to the nation’s development, it will be limited to complementing the state’s policies and plans rather than being an activist force”). 189 Creak & Barney, supra note 5, at 700. 190 Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Laos: The State of the State, Southeast Asian Affairs, 129, 144 (2006). 191 Ian G. Baird, Party, State and the Control of Information in the Lao People’s Democratic Republic: Secrecy, Falsification and Denial, 48 J. Contemp. Asia 739, 741 (2018). 192 Tom Ginsburg, Constitutional Advice and Transnational Legal Order, 2(5) U.C. Irvine J. Int’l, Transnat’l & Comp. L. 5 (2017). 193 Interview I and Interview II. 194 Interview I. 195 Interview II. 196 Thu Hằng, Bộ trưởng Hà Hùng Cường giới thiệu Hiến pháp 2013 cho các cán bộ cao cấp Lào [Minister Hà Hùng Cường Introduces the 2013 Constitution to Lao Senior Cadres] BAO PHAP LUAT [31 July, 2014], http://baophapluat.vn/tu-phap/bo-truong-ha-hung-cuong-gioi-thieu-hien-phap-2013-cho-cac-can-bo-cao-cap-lao-191805.html. 197 Id. 198 Id. 199 Interview II. 200 Interview I and Interview II. 201 Interview I. 202 Thoumma, supra note 16, at 89. 203 Id. at 86. 204 Interview I and Interview II. 205 Vietnam, Laos Share Experience in People’s Councils Activities, Vietnamnet, Aug. 20, 2016, http://english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/government/162396/vietnam--laos-share-experience-in-people-s-councils-activities.html. 206 HCM City, Lao Province Share Experience in People’s Council Work, Vietnam Plus, Sept. 26, 2017, https://en.vietnamplus.vn/hcm-city-lao-province-share-experience-in-peoples-council-work/118433.vnp. 207 Benedikt Goderis & Mila Versteeg, The Diffusion of Constitutional Rights, 39 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 1, 3 (2014). 208 My interviews confirm that Laos consulted on the Vietnamese constitutional experience because of the shared socialist political regime. Interview I and Interview II. 209 Vietnam Now Laos’ 2nd Biggest Foreign Investor, VTV News, Aug. 22, 2015, http://english.vtv.vn/news/vietnam-now-laos-2nd-biggest-foreign-investor-20150926201118154.htm. 210 Anh Phuong, Vietnam, Laos Intensifying Investment Cooperation, Vietnam Business Forum Magazine of Vietnam Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Aug. 15, 2017, http://vccinews.com/news_detail.asp?news_id=34987. 211 Martin Stuart-Fox, LAOS: The Vietnamese Connection, Southeast Asian Affairs 191(1980). 212 Stuart-Fox, Politics and Reforms, supra note 145, at 44. 213 Lao Defence Ministry Celebrates Vietnam-Laos Relationship, Nhan dan Online, July 20, 2017, http://en.nhandan.com.vn/politics/external-relations/item/5360502-lao-defence-ministry-celebrates-vietnam-laos-relationship.html. 214 Const. of Lao People’s Democratic Republic art. 9 (2015). 215 Mark Tushnet, Authoritarian Constitutionalism, 100 Cornell L. Rev. 391 (2015). 216 SeeCan It Happen Here? Authoritarianism in America (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2018). 217 Hlaing, supra note 190, at 135; Creak & Barney, supra note 5, at 698. 218 Martin Stuart-Fox, Laos: Politics in a Single-Party State, Southeast Asian Aff. 161, 178 (2007). 219 For the distinction between negative constitutionalism and positive constitutionalism, seeStephen Holmes, Passions and Constraint: On the Theory of Liberal Democracy 7 (1995). For extensive accounts of positive constitutionalism, seeN. W. Barber, Principles of Constitutionalism (2018); Sotirios A. Barber, Welfare and the Constitution (2003). 220 See generallyRichard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy (2007). For constitutional amendment as a form of political constitutionalism, see Rosalind Dixon & Adrienne Stone, Constitutional Amendment and Political Constitutionalism: A Philosophical and Comparative Reflection, inPhilosophical Foundations of Constitutional Law 95, 96 (David Dyzenhaus ed., 2016). 221 For a recent account of legal constitutionalism, seeAndrás Sajó & Renáta Uitz, The Constitution of Freedom: An Introduction to Legal Constitutionalism (2017). 222 Sayalath & Creak, supra note 5, at 188. © The Author(s) 2019. Oxford University Press and New York University School of Law. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com This article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (https://academic.oup.com/journals/pages/open_access/funder_policies/chorus/standard_publication_model)
TI - Constitutional amendment in Laos
JO - International Journal of Constitutional Law
DO - 10.1093/icon/moz067
DA - 2019-09-09
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/constitutional-amendment-in-laos-C4ZJAgh6zc
SP - 756
VL - 17
IS - 3
DP - DeepDyve
ER -