TY - JOUR
AU - Gamso,, Jonas
AB - Abstract China has been a major market for elephant ivory for centuries. However, the Chinese government recently enacted bans on imports and exports of ivory (2015) and on the domestic ivory trade (2017). These bans appear to have come in response to intensive influence campaigns and public shaming from domestic and foreign activists, who cited declining elephant populations and highlighted China's role. However, this shaming-narrative is at odds with conventional wisdom regarding Chinese policy-making: China typically resists international pressures and its authoritarian government is thought to be largely insulated from domestic efforts by civil society groups. This article reconciles Beijing's ivory policy with these conventional beliefs about policy-making in China. I argue that the Chinese government saw unique benefits to banning the ivory trade, under growing international scrutiny, as doing so enhanced Chinese soft power while having very little impact on its sovereignty or development. Non-government organizations (NGOs) operating both inside and outside of China played a role as well: NGOs in China helped to shift Chinese public opinion towards favouring the bans, while those operating abroad led public relations efforts to publicize Chinese demand for ivory to foreign audiences. Efforts by the latter group of NGOs intensified pressure on the Chinese government to rein in the ivory market, while increasing the soft power benefits that banning ivory would bring to Beijing. In September 2015 the United States and China, two of the world's largest importers of illegal ivory,1 jointly agreed to ban the import and export of elephant ivory and to take steps to curtail their domestic markets.2 The US followed up by ending the domestic trade in ivory in July 2016, and China did the same in December 2017.3 With these policies, China agreed to stamp out the remaining illegal and licensed trade that had persisted long after the international community restricted the international commercial trade of elephant ivory in 1989.4 The bans imposed by China in 2015 and 2017 were seen as an especially significant victory for conservationists. For example, the chief executive officer of the World Wildlife Federation (WWF), Carter Roberts, declared that ‘China's announcement is a game changer for elephant conservation’ and that ‘the large-scale trade of ivory now faces its twilight years, and the future is brighter for wild elephants’.5 The scale of the victory reflected the importance of the Chinese market, which had been driving the decline of African elephants.6 During the years leading up to the bans, China's consumption had grown, driven by rising incomes, long-established cultural norms and an investment boom in the arts.7 The illegal trade had also flourished, thanks to the muddying effect of the legal market and persistent corruption.8 China's recent efforts to eliminate the ivory market owe much to intensive influence campaigns, including public shaming efforts, aimed at the government. These campaigns involved Chinese NGOs and activists (such as the former basketball star Yao Ming) as well as foreign governments, foreign NGOs (such as the Clinton Foundation) and prominent western individuals, including Prince William and the American actor Edward Norton.9 While campaigning by domestic and international interest groups is consistent with how scholars understand policy change to occur in most settings,10 Chinese policy-makers are often thought to be immune to such pressures.11 Thus the following question arises: how did interested groups inside and outside China achieve the ivory ban in an authoritarian state that does not bend easily to international pressure? With regard to influence campaigns by foreign states and activists, the conventional wisdom holds that the Chinese government is highly averse to acquiescing to outsiders on matters of domestic policy. This resistance is deeply embedded in the philosophy underlying China's public policy, based on the principles of sovereignty and non-interference,12 according to which domestic policy matters should not be subject to foreign interference. Within this context, China should not be expected to adopt policies such as the ivory bans at the behest of foreign actors—and yet it appears to have done just that. A concurrent puzzle emerges in the domestic policy sphere. Here, conventional wisdom holds that authoritarian governments are relatively unconstrained by the demands of the domestic population or civil society organizations.13 To the extent that authoritarian governments respond to the public interest at all, it is thought that they cater to elite interests.14 It is, therefore, surprising that this policy change in China was facilitated in part by campaigning from Chinese NGOs and activists. This article reconciles China's ivory bans with the conventional wisdoms mentioned above. I argue that China banned ivory sales under the influence of foreign actors and NGOs operating locally for three reasons. First, doing so contributed to China's environmental diplomacy efforts, offering a great deal of positive publicity for the government without visibly infringing upon sovereignty. This served the government in its pursuit of international credibility and enhanced its reputation, without compromising its image as a strong proponent and defender of political independence. Second, NGOs carried out distinct campaigns domestically and abroad, which simultaneously helped to shift local public opinion and amplified foreign pressures on the regime. Third, the corruption that accompanies the ivory trade put it in the cross-hairs of President Xi Jinping's crackdown on political corruption. From the perspective of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), these factors collectively increased the benefits of banning ivory trading while reducing societal opposition. China's ivory market Ivory has held an important place in China for centuries, owing to its cultural significance, economic and social value, and perceived medicinal properties. During the Ming (1368–1644) and Qing (1644–1911) eras, ivory carving flourished in Beijing, what is now Shanghai, Guangdong and Fujian. The major markets for ivory were traditionally upper-class groups, so that the material became a symbol of wealth and status. A series of economic and political crises sent the ivory industry into decline in the early 1900s. However, it rebounded in the latter half of the twentieth century, with imports from Africa spiking in this period.15 Growing demand from China in the 1970s and 1980s was accompanied by falling numbers of wild elephants, leading the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITES) to add the African and Asian elephants to its list of animals banned from commercial trade internationally.16 As a member of CITES, China was bound by this ban. It also ramped up its own efforts to reduce its imports of banned wildlife, particularly through its wildlife protection laws, enacted in 1988.17 Consumption of elephant ivory declined significantly from the late 1980s to the mid-2000s, as producers looked to alternative sources for their carving, such as bones from other animals.18 However, demand continued to exist in China and an illegal trade grew up.19 In addition to the budding illegal market, a legal market re-emerged in China in the mid-2000s, after CITES allowed several African countries to resume ivory exports under certain specified conditions and granted China special status as an ivory-trading nation. In this context, China became home to dual markets, with licensed ivory dealers approved by the government operating in the ‘white’ market and ‘black’ market dealers operating illegally.20 Both the legal and illegal ivory markets surged following the introduction of the white market, fuelled by growing Chinese incomes that created a greater demand than the legal market alone could fill. Regulation was also complicated by the dual market system, as differentiating illegal from legal ivory proved difficult.21 China's ivory ban: contributory factors China's ivory consumption attracted considerable scrutiny from domestic and foreign activists and from foreign governments. Domestically, local NGOs, including affiliates of the International Fund for Animal Welfare, WildAid and the WWF, carried out campaigns to educate the public in the hope of mobilizing popular opinion towards opposition to ivory.22 These efforts were amplified by prominent Chinese celebrities. China was also criticized by western and African governments, as well as by western NGOs and prominent western individuals.23 CITES also highlighted China as one of the countries driving the international ivory trade at its 2013 conference of the parties.24 China's initial reaction to these pressures was to deflect the criticism. The Chinese State Forestry Administration downplayed the extent of the country's ivory trade, suggesting that western activists were overstating the size of the market.25 Likewise, Chinese officials argued that their conservation laws relating to ivory were stronger than those of many other countries.26 Chinese officials were reportedly of the opinion that elephant poaching in African countries and the problems accompanying it were up to those countries to solve.27 The general perception among China watchers was that Beijing would not enact a blanket ban on the ivory trade.28 Even after the 2015 ban on international ivory trading, the conventional wisdom remained that China would not seek to eliminate the domestic market.29 This scepticism is consistent with evidence attesting to the ineffectiveness of attempts to shame the Chinese government.30 However, the CCP defied expectations by banning both international and domestic trading and threatening those who violated the bans with fines and imprisonment.31 The ivory bans as a deviant case As noted above, Beijing's decision to close the ivory market is inconsistent with conventional thinking about policy-making in China, as the apparent submission to foreign influence clashed with its well-known prioritization of sovereignty and its hostility towards foreign meddling in its domestic affairs. Likewise, conventional wisdom holds that authoritarian governments are relatively unresponsive to popular opinion and to lobbying by civil society groups. Yet in the case of ivory the Chinese government appears to have responded to both foreign and domestic pressure. China's ivory bans can therefore serve as a deviant case,32 in that they depart from what analysts should expect, given China's typical policy posture. In the sections below, each of the two conventional wisdoms from which this case deviates are discussed in greater detail. China's approach to international relations The principles that guide China's approach to international relations emphasize state sovereignty and reject foreign interference in domestic affairs.33 Since 1954, China has based its foreign relations on its Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: (1) mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity; (2) mutual non-aggression; (3) mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs; (4) equality and cooperation for mutual benefit; and (5) peaceful coexistence. Within this context, China does not discriminate against foreign governments on the basis of their domestic policies, be they democratic or authoritarian, socialist or capitalist, respectful of human rights or otherwise. China in turn expects foreign nations to respect its own domestic policy choices, whether in terms of its approach to human rights,34 its management of Xinjiang, Taiwan and Tibet,35 or its public health policies.36 China actively defends state sovereignty in its engagement with the international legal system,37 in its interactions with international organizations,38 and in its disputes with other states.39 Its general posture has been that ‘international’ standards are western constructs with imperial overtones, a stance that has endeared it to governments in other developing countries that resent policy intrusions by the United States and European countries and institutions.40 Beijing's emphasis on sovereignty thus serves it in two ways. First, it legitimizes China's domestic policies by recognizing the rights of all other states to choose their own policy paths. Second, it helps Beijing to generate soft power, by virtue of its contrast to the unwanted meddling that typifies western governments' relations with countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia.41 Within this context, yielding to outside influence on a matter such as ivory policy is inconsistent with both China's foreign policy philosophy and its foreign policy strategy. As noted above, Chinese officials were initially resistant to strengthen ivory policy in response to foreign criticism, suggesting that Beijing first reacted to outside pressure in a manner that fits its typical approach to foreign relations. However, this ultimately gave way to acquiescence, as the government decided to rein in the ivory market. China's authoritarian environmentalism The second puzzle that emerges from China's ivory bans relates to domestic politics. Authoritarian governments, such as China's, are often thought to be relatively immune to public and civil society pressures. This reflects the lack of electoral accountability faced by authoritarian leaders. For example, authoritarian countries increase social spending in economic crises to a lesser extent than democracies, suggesting that popular demands are less salient concerns to authoritarian leaders.42 Likewise, studies of monetary policy and international conflict indicate that authoritarian governments are relatively insulated from the demands of civil society.43 To the extent that domestic interests do shape policy-making in authoritarian contexts, it is elite pressures that tend to be the drivers.44 When authoritarian regimes do give way to non-elite public pressures, policy concessions are made with the intention of heading off rebellion.45 This framework for understanding policy change is also thought to inform environmental policy, including areas such as wildlife conservation, in authoritarian countries. A sizeable literature has emerged around the concept of authoritarian environmentalism, much of it focusing on China.46 For example, Gilley characterizes China's environmental approach as being ‘centred on the top-down, regulatory powers of the central state’ and ‘decidedly authoritarian’ in ‘its non-participatory nature’.47 Likewise, Mol and Carter argue that the Chinese public is largely excluded from the environmental policy process.48 While environmental organizations do operate in China and can enjoy productive roles in governance,49 they are subject to strict oversight and thus tend to ‘tread carefully, avoiding strong criticism of government environmental protection failures’.50 Despite China's supposed environmental authoritarianism, the ivory bans seem to have come about partly in response to efforts by civil society groups at the domestic level. One might expect such a response if the regime's political survival were in danger, but the CCP is not likely to see elephant advocates as a source of mass rebellion or as a threat to its power. Given the centralized nature of the Chinese environmental bureaucracy and its insulation from the demands of citizens, China's apparent responsiveness to domestic campaigns for wildlife protection is puzzling. Reconciling Chinese policy with conventional wisdom How, then, do we reconcile China's ivory bans with its usual dismissal of foreign influence campaigns and with its authoritarian governance? Three factors are particularly relevant to understanding how China's ivory bans came to fruition and why these policies deviate from conventional expectations. First, while Beijing has often resisted adherence to the norms of global governance51 and international law,52 in favour of an approach emphasizing its sovereign right to make policy as it sees fit, conservation policy has been an exception,53 particularly when the Chinese government sees soft power benefits.54 Second, campaigns by Chinese NGOs to shift Chinese public opinion were complemented by the efforts of NGOs operating outside China, including organizations with Chinese branches. While NGOs in China waged a soft campaign aimed at shifting public opinion locally, foreign NGOs took a harder tone, which served both to amplify foreign scrutiny of the ivory trade and to press the Chinese government to curtail it.55 Third, an embarrassing international incident occurred in which Chinese officials smuggled ivory from Tanzania on the presidential aircraft. This incident threatened to undermine China's soft power in Africa,56 while exposing the relationship between ivory and corruption. This in turn put ivory on the radar of President Xi Jinping's anti-corruption campaign, which had already targeted various luxury goods prone to black marketeering.57 All three factors, each of which is described in greater detail below, contributed to the CCP's decision to institute the ivory bans. China's environmental diplomacy Reconciling China's ivory policy with its foreign policy posture more generally requires a nuanced appreciation of the complexities that underlie the country's engagement with global governance. Consistent with the conventional wisdom discussed above, the Chinese government has dismissed foreign pressures in key areas such as territorial issues and human rights.58 However, it is an overstatement to portray China as resistant to the international regime in all areas. In fact, China has generally operated within the boundaries of the current international system.59 One area in which Chinese authorities have traditionally deferred to international norms and standards is that of conservation. China became a member of CITES in 1981, and its government instituted its own Wildlife Protection Law in 1988, the year before CITES banned commercial elephant trading.60 China also joined the Monitoring Illegal Killing of Elephants (MIKE) and Elephant Trade Information Systems (ETIS) frameworks, further signalling the government's commitment to international efforts to protect elephants.61 Following the CITES-sanctioned licensing of legal dealers in the early 2000s, the Chinese government intensified its efforts to crack down on illegal sellers.62 Mak and Song attribute these efforts to the Chinese government's wider strategy, from the late 1970s onwards, to ‘build up the country's political capital and international reputation as a law-abiding, cosmopolitan, treaty-enforcing nation’.63 Likewise, McBeath and Wang cite China's membership of CITES and other wildlife protection mechanisms as facets of its environmental diplomacy, through which the government sought to enhance its soft power.64 It does not follow that the Chinese government adheres to all multinational environmental agreements. China resists environmental conventions that intrude into its domestic affairs or threaten to undermine its development.65 However, it has been keen to adopt conventions that are high profile but come at a low cost— and banning ivory fits this mould. The ivory bans had a high impact, generating a great deal of media coverage and earning public praise from conservationists. For example, Save the Elephants, Space for Giants and the African Wildlife Foundation respectively hailed China's policy as ‘transformational’, ‘very encouraging’ and a ‘significant step’.66 These policies also came with a low cost, in terms of both economic effect and infringement of Chinese sovereignty: China's economic well-being was unlikely to be harmed by the bans, and the government could credibly claim that they constituted a logical extension of its own continuing efforts to combat illegal ivory trading, rather than submission to foreign pressure.67 Domestic civil society groups with international linkages and partnerships While NGOs and public attitudes and activism can have considerable impact in affecting environmental policy,68 they are not generally believed to have much effect on policy in authoritarian countries, which are thought to be susceptible only, or mainly, to pressure from elite interests.69 In China, indeed, civil society is tightly restricted by regulations governing the activities of NGOs, and by limitations on free assembly and association;70 and research suggests that policy-making in Beijing is driven by the interests of a small and elite ‘selectorate’.71 Nevertheless, there is reason to think that efforts by civil society groups to shape public attitudes in China have influenced the government's ivory policies. Yufang Gao argues that international diplomatic pressure and criticisms from abroad would not have compelled the government to ban domestic ivory trading in the absence of supportive public opinion.72 Likewise, Olander and Li write that ‘Beijing's policy change could not have happened without domestic public support’.73 In seeking to reconcile the ivory bans with common understandings of policy-making in authoritarian settings, it is useful to consider how civil society may influence policy in China, as well as the international linkages of Chinese civil society actors involved in ivory advocacy. Both of these factors challenge the application of a conventional framework of authoritarian environmentalism to the ivory bans. The first point to note is that authoritarian governments are not entirely insulated from the demands of their citizens.74 This is true in the context of Chinese environmental policy, where authoritarian environmentalism is moderated by mechanisms for civic engagement, such as public hearings and petitions.75 Evidence suggests further that Chinese policy is responsive, if only selectively, to the publicly expressed attitudes of citizens.76 Likewise, NGOs can have an impact on policy in authoritarian settings such as China. While Chinese law requires NGOs to register with government agencies, this registration offers environmental NGOs access to the agency officials who regulate them. Through these networks, NGOs are able to press for environmental policy change, including in the area of conservation.77 In the case of ivory, Chinese NGOs played a role in shifting public opinion in a manner that facilitated the bans by leading education and awareness campaigns in China. The campaigns took a soft tone that was not critical of the government and focused on the illegal trade, thereby appealing more to the Chinese public.78 These efforts appear to have contributed to a sufficient shift in Chinese public attitudes, coinciding with a declining interest in animal products and more attention to animal rights, particularly among young people and urban populations.79 The NGOs leading this effort were often Chinese branches of international NGOs (INGOs). While these local branches focused on public education, with a softer tone that appealed to the Chinese public and did not upset policy-makers, the INGOs themselves waged a public relations effort aimed largely at foreign audiences, expressed in a harder tone and calling for an end to the legal as well as the illegal ivory trade.80 WildAid, for example, partnered with Chinese social elites, including celebrities such as Yao Ming and the actress Li Bingbing, as well as non-Chinese celebrities such as Edward Norton, to produce videos and other materials about the ivory trade and the impacts of China's ivory consumption on the wild elephant population. The videos included provocative content, such as elephants being shot by poachers.81 This two-tiered effort by NGOs operating inside and outside China both encouraged and facilitated the ivory ban. The government, now facing even more intensive foreign scrutiny thanks to INGO-led public relations efforts, was becoming more open to the benefits of a high-profile change in ivory policy. Its soft power was increasingly diminished by public shaming; simultaneously, the image enhancement that the government stood to gain from banning ivory was increased by the growing outside attention. Although enacting the bans would have been difficult in the face of intense public opposition, education and awareness efforts by local NGOs helped to lead a shift in Chinese public opinion, making the ivory bans more palatable domestically. With domestic resistance sufficiently assuaged, the CCP saw little reason to continue its support for traditional ivory consumption, particularly as this support was damaging to its international reputation. In this context, the government could implement bans on the ivory trade that would enhance its international standing in the realm of conservation. Ivory and bribery President Xi Jinping's campaign against corruption also contributed to China's ivory bans, as the ivory trade in China has been closely linked to bribery:82 ivory smuggling is accompanied by bribes to border agents, and ivory itself can be used to bribe public officials.83 Consequently, the ivory business became a potential target for the government's anti-corruption crackdown, which focused largely on luxury goods and intersected with the President's efforts to consolidate his own power.84 While Chinese officials had denied the role of corruption in the illegal ivory trade,85 these claims became less tenable following an incident in which Chinese officials travelling with President Xi Jinping to Tanzania purchased thousands of kilograms of illegal ivory, which were then transported back to China on the President's plane.86 This incident, and the publicity it attracted in the international press,87 led to a diplomatic row between Tanzania and China,88 threatening the Chinese government's wider pursuit of soft power in Africa.89 The extent to which this incident played into the government's decision to ban the ivory trade is hard to quantify, but it is worth noting that public controversy has provoked environmental responses from Beijing in the past, particularly when such controversy threatens the government's soft power. For example, China's 1993 ban on the sales of medicines made with tiger and rhino parts appears to have been intended partly to offset international criticism and bolster soft power.90 Likewise, by adopting the Montreal Protocol on substances that deplete the ozone layer in 1990, the Chinese government may have been trying to improve its public image internationally in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square massacre of 1989.91 The ivory bans are consistent with these trends: given the current significance of China's soft power efforts,92 and the CCP's apparent belief that environmental diplomacy is an effective means of enhancing soft power,93 and in the context of the high-profile corruption crackdown being implemented across China, a response to the increasingly public corruption associated with the ivory trade became necessary. Conclusions: rethinking Chinese policy-making The analysis above speaks to the nuances of policy-making, which at times lead to policy outcomes that deviate from expectations. In the case of China, conventional wisdom would suggest that neither foreign influence campaigns nor efforts from local civil society groups would have the power to compel policy change. Beijing typically resists lobbying and shaming from foreign actors, emphasizing its sovereign right to implement whatever policies it sees fit. Likewise, efforts from NGOs and other civil society actors at the domestic level are typically thought to have little policy impact in authoritarian countries. However, China deviated from these expectations in enacting its ivory bans. While at odds with Chinese policy-making norms in some regards, banning the ivory trade is not inconsistent with China's environmental diplomacy strategy.94 As noted above, the government has been more responsive to international norms and pressures in the areas of environment and biodiversity than in some other areas, such as human rights or disputes over territorial claims. When juxtaposed with areas in which China has resisted global pressures, its efforts in the realm of biodiversity suggest that the government is willing to make policy concessions in response to international campaigns, particularly where by doing so it can improve its reputation without undermining the country's territorial integrity or economic development, or threatening the CCP's political survival. Banning ivory is consistent with this approach, as it is a relatively low-cost policy with a high public profile that stands to bolster Beijing's soft power. While ivory has traditionally carried important cultural significance in China, the government had little interest in maintaining the trade once the soft power benefits of ending it became clear. In addition, NGOs operating inside and outside China used a two-tiered strategy that helped to shift public opinion within the country while amplifying outside scrutiny of the Chinese government. This simultaneous lobbying from above and below maximized NGO influence on Beijing to implement the bans and diminished domestic support for the ivory trade.95 Also, the well-publicized links between the ivory trade and bribery put ivory firmly in the government's sights as it cracked down on political corruption. With the bans on international and domestic ivory trading fully implemented, questions now turn to the impacts of these policies and to their long-term viability. Analysts have expressed scepticism about the effectiveness of the ivory ban, worrying that the illegal trade will grow as a consequence or that the trade will merely be diverted elsewhere.96 There have been positive signs, as elephant poaching in Africa has declined considerably since the ivory bans came into effect; however, this may simply reflect China's economic slowdown.97 There are also concerns that China will change course. It has been suggested that the ivory bans were intended only to placate activists in the short term, and that they may later be lifted.98 Indeed, China recently overturned a rule restricting the use of tiger and rhino parts in medicines,99 raising the spectre that the ivory bans could also be reversed. Also, flagging US commitment from the Trump administration may lead the Chinese government to reconsider the value of its own efforts.100 Questions remain, then, about the viability of the ivory bans; but for now their significance should not be discounted. Elephants are among the Earth's most intelligent and emotionally sophisticated animals, and the Chinese government deserves the praise it has received for its bold policy actions.101 Other states should be encouraged to follow suit in order to ensure the future of the world's largest land animal. Footnotes 1 Beth Allgood, Marina Ratchford and Peter LaFontaine, ‘US ivory trade: can a crackdown on trafficking save the last titan?’, Animal Law 20: 1, 2013, pp. 27–77; Fiona M. Underwood, Robert W. Burn and Tom Milliken, ‘Dissecting the illegal ivory trade: an analysis of ivory seizures data’, PLOS One 8: 1, 2013, p. e76539. 2 Yang Yu, Andrew Wetzler, Xuan Yang, Ruchun Tang and Li Zhang, ‘Significant and timely ivory trade restrictions in both China and the United States are critical to save elephants’, Conservation Letters 10: 5, 2017, pp. 596–601. 3 Achyut Aryal, Craig G. Morley and Ian G. McLean, ‘Conserving elephants depends on a total ban of ivory trade globally’, Biodiversity and Conservation 27: 10, 2018, pp. 2767–75; Ross Harvey, Chris Alden and Yu-Shan Wu, ‘Speculating a fire sale: options for Chinese authorities in implementing a domestic ivory trade ban’, Ecological Economics, vol. 141, 2017, pp. 22–31. 4 On the persistence of the domestic ivory trade, see Yufang Gao and Susan G. Clark, ‘Elephant ivory trade in China: trends and drivers’, Biological Conservation, vol. 180, 2014, pp. 23–30; Yu et al., ‘Significant and timely ivory trade restrictions’, p. 596. On the international community's banning of the international commercial trade of elephant ivory, see Daniel Stiles, ‘The ivory trade and elephant conservation’, Environmental Conservation 31: 4, 2014, pp. 309–21. For analyses of the effectiveness of the 1989 ban, see Erwin H. Bulte and G. Cornelis van Kooten, ‘A note on ivory trade and elephant conservation’, Environment and Development Economics 1: 4, 1996, pp. 433–43; Rasmus Heltberg, ‘Impact of the ivory trade ban on poaching incentives: a numerical example’, Ecological Economics 36: 2, 2001, pp. 189–95; Jyoti Khanna and Jon Harford, ‘The ivory trade ban: is it effective?’, Ecological Economics 19: 2, 1996, pp. 147–55. 5 Maru Valdes, A monumental win for elephants: China will ban ivory trade by 2017 (Washington DC: WWF, 30 Dec. 2016, https://www.worldwildlife.org/stories/a-monumental-win-for-elephants-china-will-ban-ivory-trade-by-2017. (Unless otherwise noted at point of citation, all URLs cited in this article were accessible on 8 Sept. 2019.) 6 George Wittemyer, Joseph M. Northrup, Julian Blanc, Lain Douglas-Hamilton, Patrick Omondi and Kenneth P. Burnham, ‘Illegal killing for ivory drives global decline in African elephants’, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 111: 36, 2014, pp. 13117–21. 7 On rising incomes, see Yu et al., ‘Significant and timely ivory trade restrictions’, p. 596. On cultural norms, see Ginger Jun Ki Mak and Weiqing Song, ‘Transnational norms and governing illegal wildlife trade in China and Japan: elephant ivory and related products under CITES’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs 31: 5, 2018, pp. 373–91. On the arts investment boom, see Gao and Clark, ‘Elephant ivory trade in China’, p. 23. 8 Dan Levin, ‘The price of ivory: from elephants' mouths, an illicit trail to China’, New York Times, 1 March 2013, https://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/02/world/asia/an-illicit-trail-of-african-ivory-to-china.html?module=inline&region=Body&action=click&pgtype=article#. 9 Morgan V. Manley, ‘The (inter)national strategy: an ivory trade ban in the United States and China’, Fordham International Law Journal 38: 5, 2015, pp. 1511–86; Alex Williams, ‘How the elephant became the newest celebrity cause’, New York Times, 26 May 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/22/fashion/elephants-celebrity-cause.html. 10 Mark Evans and Jonathan Davies, ‘Understanding policy transfer: a multi-level, multi-disciplinary perspective’, Public Administration 77: 2, 1999, pp. 361–85; Hugh Ward and Xun Cao, ‘Domestic and international influences on green taxation’, Comparative Political Studies 45: 9, 2012, pp. 1075–103. 11 Naná de Graaff and Bastiaan van Apeldoorn, ‘US–China relations and the liberal world order: colliding elites, colliding visions?’, International Affairs 94: 1, Jan. 2018, pp. 113–32. 12 Mauro Barelli, ‘Preventing and responding to atrocity crimes: China, sovereignty and the responsibility to protect’, Journal of Conflict and Security Law 23: 2, 2018, pp. 173–201; Sophie Richardson, China, Cambodia, and the five principles of peaceful coexistence (New York: Columbia University Press, 2010); Chen Zheng, ‘China debates the non-interference principle’, Chinese Journal of International Politics 9: 3, 2016, pp. 349–74; Rosemary Foot, ‘Remembering the past to secure the present: Versailles legacies in a resurgent China’, International Affairs 95: 1, Jan. 2019, pp. 143–60. 13 On the domestic population, see David S. Brown and Wendy Hunter, ‘Democracy and social spending in Latin America, 1980–92’, American Political Science Review 93: 4, 1999, pp. 779–90. On civil society organizations, see Bruce Gilley, ‘Authoritarian environmentalism and China's response to climate change’, Environmental Politics 21: 2, 2012, pp. 287–307; Arthur P. J. Mol and Neil T. Carter, ‘China's environmental governance in transition’, Environmental Politics 15: 2, 2006, pp. 149–70. 14 Charles Boix and Milan W. Svolik, ‘The foundations of limited authoritarian government: institutions, commitment, and power-sharing in dictatorships’, Journal of Politics 75: 2, 2003, pp. 300–16. 15 Gao and Clark, ‘Elephant ivory trade in China’, p. 24. 16 Stiles, ‘The ivory trade and elephant conservation’, p. 309. 17 Li Zhang, Ning Hua and Shan Sun, ‘Wildlife trade, consumption and conservation awareness in southwest China’, Biodiversity and Conservation 17: 6, 2008, pp. 1493–516. 18 Gao and Clark, ‘Elephant ivory trade in China’, p. 24. 19 Mak and Song, ‘Transnational norms and governing illegal wildlife trade’. 20 There was also a market consisting of ivory art sold at auctions, which operated in a legal ‘grey’ area: see Gao and Clark, ‘Elephant ivory trade in China’, pp. 26–7. 21 Yu et al., ‘Significant and timely ivory trade restrictions’, p. 597. 22 Yufang Gao, ‘Elephant ivory trade in China: comparing different perspectives’, Tropical Resources Bulletin, vol. 32–3, 2014, pp. 101–107. 23 Manley, ‘The (inter)national strategy’, p. 1514. 24 Jafari R. Kideghesho, ‘The elephant poaching crisis in Tanzania: a need to reverse the trend and the way forward’, Tropical Conservation Science 9: 1, 2016, pp. 369–88. 25 Gao and Clark, ‘Elephant ivory trade in China’, p. 23. 26 Manley, ‘The (inter)national strategy’, p. 1515. 27 Gao, ‘Elephant ivory trade in China’, p. 101; Javier C. Hernández, ‘In banning ivory trade, China saw benefits for itself, too’, New York Times, 2 Jan. 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/02/world/asia/china-ivory-ban-elephants.html. On the problems accompanying poaching, see Leo R. Douglas and Kevin Alie, ‘High-value natural resources: linking wildlife conservation to international conflict, insecurity, and development concerns’, Biological Conservation, vol. 171, 2014, pp. 270–77. 28 Gao, ‘Elephant ivory trade in China’, p. 105. 29 Manley, ‘The (inter)national strategy’, p. 1516. 30 Alan M. Wachman, ‘Does the diplomacy of shame promote human rights in China?’, Third World Quarterly 22: 2, 2001, pp. 257–81. 31 Aryal et al., ‘Conserving elephants depends on a total ban of ivory trade globally’, p. 2767. 32 John Gerring, Case study research: principles and practices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Jason Seawright and John Gerring, ‘Case selection techniques in case study research’, Political Research Quarterly 61: 2, 2008, pp. 294–308. 33 Richardson, China, Cambodia, and the five principles; Xiaoyo Pu and Chengli Wang, ‘Rethinking China's rise: Chinese scholars debate strategic overstretch’, International Affairs 94: 5, Sept. 2018, pp. 1019–36. 34 Ian Taylor, ‘China's foreign policy towards Africa in the 1990s’, Journal of Modern African Studies 36: 3, 1998, pp. 443–60. 35 Larry Hanauer and Lyle J. Morris, Chinese engagement in Africa: drivers, reactions, and implications for US policy (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2014). 36 Christian Kreuder-Sonnen, ‘China vs the WHO: a behavioural norm conflict in the SARS crisis’, International Affairs 95: 3, May 2019, pp. 535–52. 37 Barelli, ‘Preventing and responding to atrocity crimes’. 38 Kreuder-Sonnen, ‘China vs the WHO’. 39 Wu Xinbo, ‘Cooperation competition and shaping the outlook: the United States and China's neighbourhood diplomacy’, International Affairs 92: 4, July 2016, pp. 849–67. 40 Lei Yu, ‘China's strategic partnership with Latin America: a fulcrum of China's rise’, International Affairs 91: 5, Sept. 2015, pp. 1047–68. 41 Chris Alden and Lu Jiang, ‘Brave new world: debt, industrialization and security in China–Africa relations’, International Affairs 95: 3, May 2019, pp. 641–58. 42 Brown and Hunter, ‘Democracy and social spending in Latin America’. 43 On monetary policy, see David Leblang, ‘Domestic political institutions and exchange rate commitments in the developing world’, International Studies Quarterly 43: 4, 1999, pp. 599–620. On conflict, see Andrew W. Bausch, ‘Democracy, war effort, and the systemic democratic peace’, Journal of Peace Research 52: 4, 2015, pp. 435–47; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson and Alastair Smith, ‘An institutional explanation of the democratic peace’, American Political Science Review 93: 4, 1999, pp. 791–807. 44 Boix and Svolik, ‘The foundations of limited authoritarian government’, p. 300. 45 Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, ‘Cooperation, cooptation, and rebellion under dictatorships’, Economics and Politics 18: 1, 2006, pp. 1–26. 46 Anna L. Ahlers and Yongdong Shen, ‘Breathe easy? Local nuances of authoritarian environmentalism in China's battle against air pollution’, China Quarterly, vol. 234, 2018, pp. 299–319; Geoffrey C. Chen and Charles Lees, ‘The new, green, urbanization in China: between authoritarian environmentalism and decentralization’, Chinese Political Science Review 3: 2, 2018, pp. 212–31; Sarah Eaton and Genia Kostka, ‘Authoritarian environmentalism undermined? Local leaders' time horizons and environmental policy implementation in China’, China Quarterly, vol. 218, 2014, pp. 359–80; Xiaoliang Li, Xiaojin Yang, Qi Wei and Bing Zhang, ‘Authoritarian environmentalism and environmental policy implementation in China’, Resources, Conservation and Recycling, vol. 145, 2019, pp. 86–93; Kevin Lo, ‘How authoritarian is the environmental governance of China?’, Environmental Science and Policy, vol. 54, 2015, pp. 152–9. For studies of authoritarian environmentalism outside China, see Heejin Han, ‘Authoritarian environmentalism under democracy: Korea's river restoration project’, Environmental Politics 24: 5, 2015, pp. 810–29; Heejin Han, ‘Singapore, a garden city: authoritarian environmentalism in a developmental state’, Journal of Environment and Development 26: 1, 2017, pp. 3–24. 47 Gilley, ‘Authoritarian environmentalism’, pp. 289–91. 48 Mol and Carter, ‘China's environmental governance in transition’, p. 161. 49 Jessica Teets, ‘The power of policy networks in authoritarian regimes: changing environmental policy in China’, Governance 31: 1, 2018, pp. 125–41. 50 Jonathan Schwartz, ‘Environmental NGOs in China: roles and limits’, Pacific Affairs 77: 1, 2004, p. 38. 51 Jessica Chen Weiss, ‘A world safe for autocracy? China's rise and the future of global politics’, Foreign Affairs 98: 4, 2019, pp. 92–102; Martin Hearson and Wilson Prichard, ‘China's challenge to international tax rules and the implications for global tax governance’, International Affairs 94: 6, Nov. 2018, pp. 1287–308. 52 Barelli, ‘Preventing and responding to atrocity crimes’, p. 173. 53 Mak and Song, ‘Transnational norms and governing illegal wildlife trade’, pp. 378–9. 54 Jerry McBeath and Bo Wang, ‘China's environmental diplomacy’, American Journal of Chinese Studies 15: 1, 2008, pp. 1–16 at p. 11. 55 Gao, ‘Elephant ivory trade in China’, p. 104. 56 On China's soft power efforts, see Hanauer and Morris, Chinese engagement in Africa. 57 Mary Szto, ‘Chinese gift-giving, anti-corruption law, and the rule of law and virtue’, Fordham International Law Journal 39: 3, 2016, pp. 591–628. 58 On China's dismissal of territorial pressures, see Isaac B. Kardon, ‘China can say “no”: analyzing China's rejection of the South China Sea arbitration’, University of Pennsylvania Asian Law Review 13: 2, 2018, pp. 1–46. On China's dismissal of pressures related to human rights, see Wachman, ‘Does the diplomacy of shame promote human rights in China?’. 59 Christopher McNally, ‘Sino-capitalism: China's reemergence and the international political economy’, World Politics 64: 4, 2012, pp. 741–76; Randall L. Schweller and Xiaoyu Pu, ‘After unipolarity: China's visions of international order in an era of U.S. decline’, International Security 36: 1, 2011, pp. 41–72. 60 China formally became subject to the CITES ban in 1991: see Stephen V. Nash, Still in business: the ivory trade in Asia, seven years after the CITES ban (Cambridge: TRAFFIC International, 1997). 61 Mak and Song, ‘Transnational norms and governing illegal wildlife trade’, p. 378. 62 Jiwen Chang, ‘China's legal response to trafficking in wild animals: the relationship between international treaties and Chinese law’, American Journal of International Law/AJIL Unbound, vol. 111, 2017, pp. 408–412; Xuehong Zhou, Qiang Wang, Wei Zhang, Yu Jin, Zhen Wang, Zheng Chai, Zhiqiang Zhou, Daniel W. S. Challender, Xiaofeng Cui and Douglas C. MacMillan, ‘Elephant poaching and the ivory trade: the impact of demand reduction and enforcement efforts by China from 2005–2017’, Global Ecology and Conservation, vol. 16, 2018, p. e00486. 63 Mak and Song, ‘Transnational norms and governing illegal wildlife trade’, pp. 377–78. 64 McBeath and Wang, ‘China's environmental diplomacy’, p. 3. 65 Ruth Gordon, ‘The environmental implications of China's engagement with sub-Saharan Africa’, Environmental Law Reporter 42: 12, 2012, pp. 11109–24; McBeath and Wang, ‘China's environmental diplomacy’. 66 Jill Craig, African conservationists praise China's ivory ban, Voice of America, 3 Jan. 2018, https://www.voanews.com/africa/african-conservationists-praise-chinas-ivory-ban. 67 On the low economic costs, see Gao, ‘Elephant ivory trade in China’, p. 106. Individuals in the ivory industry will be negatively affected: see Chang, ‘China's legal response to trafficking in wild animals’, p. 411. 68 On NGOs, see Wesley Longhofer, Evan Schofer, Natasha Miric and David John Frank, ‘NGOs, INGOs, and environmental policy reform, 1970–2010’, Social Forces 94: 4, 2016, pp. 1743–68; Thomas Princen, ‘The ivory trade ban: NGOs and international conservation’, in Matthias Finger and Thomas Princeton, eds, Environmental NGOs in world politics: linking the local and the global (Abingdon: Routledge, 1994), pp. 121–59. On public attitudes and activism, see Jon Agnone, ‘Amplifying public opinions: the policy impact of the US environmental movement’, Social Forces 85: 4, 2007, pp. 1593–620. 69 Boix and Svolik, ‘The foundations of limited authoritarian government’. 70 On NGOs, see Teets, ‘The power of policy networks’, p. 125. On free assembly and association, see Angeli Datt and Alex Beck, ‘Assessing freedom of peaceful assembly and association in contemporary China’, in Sarah Biddulp and Joshua Rosenzweig, eds, Handbook on human rights in China (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2019), pp. 397–424. 71 David A. Steinberg and Victor C. Shih, ‘Interest group influence in authoritarian states: the political determinants of Chinese exchange rate policy’, Comparative Political Studies 45: 11, 2012, pp. 1405–34. 72 Gao, ‘Elephant ivory trade in China’, p. 105. 73 Eric Olander and Peter J. Li, ‘Don't get too excited about China's ivory ban’, Foreign Policy, 10 Jan. 2017, https://foreignpolicy.com/2017/01/10/dont-get-too-excited-about-chinas-ivory-ban-enforcement-global-trade/. 74 Michael K. Miller, ‘Elections, information, and policy responsiveness in autocratic regimes’, Comparative Political Studies 48: 6, 2015, pp. 691–727. 75 Genia Kostka and Arthur P. J. Mol, ‘Implementation and participation in China's local environmental politics: challenges and innovations’, Journal of Environmental Policy and Planning 15: 1, 2013, pp. 3–16; Li-Jin Zhong and Arthur P. J. Mol, ‘Participatory environmental governance in China: public hearings on urban water tariff setting’, Journal of Environmental Management 88: 4, 2008, pp. 899–913. 76 Xiao Tang, Weiwei Chen and Tian Wu, ‘Do authoritarian governments respond to public opinion on the environment? Evidence from China’, International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health 15: 2, 2018, p. 266. 77 Teets, ‘The power of policy networks’, pp. 133–4. 78 Gao, ‘Elephant ivory trade in China’, p. 104. The formation of international linkages has proved useful for local NGOs in other authoritarian contexts as well: see Erika Weinthal and Kate Watters, ‘Transnational environmental activism in central Asia: the coupling of domestic law and international conventions’, Environmental Politics 19: 5, 2010, pp. 782–807. 79 Rachael Bale, ‘Chinese youth embrace new attitudes toward pets and wildlife’, National Geographic, 12 July 2017, https://news.nationalgeographic.com/2017/07/wildlife-watch-china-changing-animal-protection/; Chang, ‘China's legal response to trafficking in wild animals’, p. 408; Benjamin Haas, ‘Under pressure: the story behind China's ivory ban’, Guardian, 29 Aug. 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/aug/29/story-behind-china-ivory-ban; Kylie Knott, ‘China's growing animal rights movement is making its voice heard’, South China Morning Post, 5 Dec. 2016, https://www.scmp.com/lifestyle/article/2050730/chinas-growing-animal-rights-movement-calling-change. 80 Gao, ‘Elephant ivory trade in China’, p. 104. 81 Williams, ‘How the elephant became the newest celebrity cause’. 82 Hernández, ‘In banning ivory trade, China saw benefits’; Levin, ‘The price of ivory’. 83 On bribery of border agents, see Elizabeth Bennett, ‘Legal ivory trade in a corrupt world and its impact on African elephant populations’, Conservation Biology 29: 1, 2015, pp. 54–60. According to one estimate, border security officials at smuggling points along the China–Vietnam border receive over US$18,000 in bribes per day: see Wildlife Conservation Society, In plain sight: an analysis of transnational wildlife crimes in Quang Ninh Province, Viet Nam (Hanoi: Wildlife Conservation Society Viet Nam Program, 2012). Ivory smugglers may also regularly bribe Chinese border officials on China's border with Myanmar (Burma): see Vincent Nijman and Chris R. Shepherd, ‘Emergence of Mong La on the Myanmar–China border as a global hub for the international trade in ivory and elephant parts’, Biological Conservation, vol. 179, 2014, pp. 17–22. On bribes of public officials, see Gao and Clark, ‘Elephant ivory trade in China’, p. 27. 84 Elizabeth Economy, The third revolution: Xi Jinping and the new Chinese state (New York: Oxford University Press, 2018); Zhengxu Wang and Jinghan Zeng, ‘Xi Jinping: the game changer of Chinese elite politics?’, Contemporary Politics 22: 4, 2016, pp. 469–86. 85 Levin, ‘The price of ivory’. 86 US Environmental Investigation Agency, Vanishing point: criminality, corruption and the devastation of Tanzania's elephants (Washington DC, 2014). 87 See e.g. Dan Levin, ‘Report implicates Chinese officials in smuggled Tanzanian ivory’, New York Times, 6 Nov. 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/06/world/report-implicates-chinese-officials-in-smuggled-tanzanian-ivory.html. 88 Jonathan Kaiman, ‘China–Africa relations hurt by bad Chinese behaviour, says ambassador’, Guardian, 17 July 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/17/chinese-ambassador-tanzania-china-africa-relationship-ivory-smuggling-counterfeit. 89 Dominik Kopiński, Andrzej Polus and Ian Taylor, ‘Contextualizing Chinese engagement in Africa’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies 29: 2, 2011, pp. 129–36; Łukasz Fijałkowski, ‘China's “soft power” in Africa?’, Journal of Contemporary African Studies 29: 2, 2011, pp. 223–32; Pippa Morgan, ‘Can China's economic statecraft win soft power in Africa? Unpacking trade, investment and aid’, Journal of Chinese Political Science, publ. online 2018, doi.org/10.1007/s11366-018-09592-w. 90 McBeath and Wang, ‘China's environmental diplomacy’, p. 3. 91 Alastair Iain Johnston, ‘China and international environmental institutions: a decision rule analysis’, in Michael B. McElroy, Chris P. Nielsen and Peter Lydon, eds, Energizing China: reconciling environmental protection with energy demands of a growing economy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), pp. 555–601. 92 Joshua Kurlantzick, Charm offensive: how China's soft power is transforming the world (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2007); David Shambaugh, ‘China's soft-power push: the search for respect’, Foreign Affairs 94: 4, 2015, pp. 99–107. 93 McBeath and Wang, ‘China's environmental diplomacy’. 94 McBeath and Wang, ‘China's environmental diplomacy’. 95 Olander and Li, ‘Don't get too excited about China's ivory ban’. 96 Manley, ‘The (inter)national strategy’, p. 1516; Aryal et al., ‘Conserving elephants depends on a total ban of ivory trade globally’, p. 2769. 97 Erik Stokstad, ‘Elephant poaching falls dramatically in Africa’, Science, 28 May 2019, https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2019/05/elephant-poaching-falls-dramatically-africa. 98 Manley, ‘The (inter)national strategy’, p. 1576. 99 Javier C. Hernández, ‘China reverses ban on rhino and tiger parts in medicine, worrying activists’, New York Times, 29 Oct. 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/29/world/asia/china-rhino-tiger-poaching.html. 100 Rachel Nuwer, ‘US lifts ban on some elephant and lion trophies’, New York Times, 7 March 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/07/science/trump-elephant-trophy-hunting.html. 101 On elephant intelligence and emotional sophistication, see Farris Jabr, ‘The science is in: elephants are even smarter than we realized’, Scientific American, 26 Feb. 2014, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-science-is-in-elephants-are-even-smarter-than-we-realized-video/. © The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Royal Institute of International Affairs. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com. This article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (https://academic.oup.com/journals/pages/open_access/funder_policies/chorus/standard_publication_model)
TI - China's ivory bans: enhancing soft power through wildlife conservation
JF - International Affairs
DO - 10.1093/ia/iiz192
DA - 2019-11-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/china-s-ivory-bans-enhancing-soft-power-through-wildlife-conservation-AWVbJZKwU0
SP - 1389
VL - 95
IS - 6
DP - DeepDyve
ER -