TY - JOUR
AU - Kim, Dong Jung
AB - Abstract In contrast to growing public attention to geoeconomics as the new mode of conducting great power competition, the IR discipline has not actively engaged in conceptual and theoretical analysis from the geoeconomic viewpoint. This article examines issues that geoeconomics needs to solve to become a new theoretical framework in the positivist “American” IR scholarship that dominates research on great power competition. On the one hand, the concept of geoeconomics needs to be redefined and account for a phenomenon that is not already covered in extant IR scholarship. Thus, geoeconomics should be considered as a form of grand strategy and defined as the use of economic instruments to advance mid- to long-term strategic interests in a geographical region of the world. On the other hand, geoeconomics in positivist IR should take into account international economic structure and domestic politics in developing a parsimonious explanation for the conditions to employ geoeconomic grand strategy. In this process, the theorist needs to make an analytical choice to concentrate on certain factors and mechanisms to assure theoretical parsimony. This article concludes that addressing the issues of conceptual clarity and parsimonious theorization would potentially allow geoeconomics to become a new research program in positivist IR. Resumen A diferencia de la creciente atención del público a la geoeconomía como nuevo modo de llevar a cabo la competencia entre grandes potencias, las Relaciones Internacionales (RR. II.), como disciplina, no han participado de manera activa en el análisis conceptual y teórico desde el punto de vista geoeconómico. En este artículo se analizan problemáticas que la Geoeconomía debe resolver para ser un nuevo marco teórico en los estudios de las RR. II. positivistas «americanas», que dominan la investigación acerca de la competencia entre grandes potencias. Por un lado, el concepto de geoeconomía debería redefinirse para explicar un fenómeno que aún no se aborda en los estudios existentes de las RR. II. Por lo tanto, la geoeconomía se debe considerar una forma de gran estrategia y definir como el uso de instrumentos económicos para fomentar los intereses estratégicos a medio y largo plazo en una región geográfica del mundo. Por otra parte, la geoeconomía en las RR. II. positivistas debe tener en cuenta la estructura económica internacional y la política nacional al momento de elaborar una explicación parca de las condiciones necesarias para implementar la gran estrategia geoeconómica. En este proceso, el teórico debe hacer una elección analítica para enfocarse en ciertos factores y mecanismos a fin de garantizar la parquedad teórica. En este artículo se llega a la conclusión de que abordar las cuestiones de claridad conceptual y parquedad teórica posiblemente posicionaría a la geoeconomía como un nuevo programa de investigación en las RR. II. positivistas. Extrait Contrairement à l'attention croissante du public pour la géoéconomie en tant que nouveau mode de compétition entre les grandes puissances, cette discipline n'a pas été activement appliquée dans les analyses conceptuelles et théoriques des relations internationales. Cet article examine les problèmes qui doivent être résolus dans le domaine de la géoéconomie pour qu'elle devienne un nouveau cadre théorique des études « américaines » positivistes des relations internationales qui dominent les recherches sur la compétition entre grandes puissances. D'une part, le concept de géoéconomie devrait être redéfini pour être pris en compte comme un phénomène qui n'est pas encore abordé dans les études actuelles des relations internationales. Ainsi, la géoéconomie devrait être considérée comme une forme de grande stratégie et définie comme étant une utilisation d'instruments économiques visant à faire progresser des intérêts stratégiques à moyen et long termes dans une région géographique du monde. Et d'autre part, dans les relations internationales positivistes, la géoéconomie devrait prendre en compte la structure économique internationale et les politiques intérieures dans le développement d'une explication parcimonieuse des conditions d'utilisation d'une grande stratégie géoéconomique. Dans cette démarché, le théoricien devrait faire un choix analytique pour se concentrer sur certains facteurs et mécanismes et assurer la parcimonie théorique. Cet article conclut que le traitement des problèmes de clarté conceptuelle et de théorisation parcimonieuse positionnerait potentiellement la géoéconomie en tant que nouveau programme de recherche en RI positivistes. geoeconomics, grand strategy, great power politics, positivist IR, Palabras clave: Geoeconomía, gran estrategia, política de grandes potencias, RR. II. positivistas, Mots clés: géoéconomie, grande stratégie, politiques des grandes puissances, RI positivistes There has been a new wave of interest in geoeconomics in public discourse about the strategy and trajectory of great power competition in the twenty-first century (Gelb 2010; Asher, Comras, and Cronin 2011; Zarate 2013; Bergsten 2016; Blackwill and Harris 2016; Blanchard and Flint 2017; Cohen 2018; Lew and Nephew 2018). In leading think tanks and the writings of prominent policy analysts, geoeconomics is trumpeted as the new mode of conducting geopolitics. Economic instruments have also become attractive options for national leaders responsible for making strategic decisions. For instance, former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton (2011) argued that the United States must “develop and execute economic solutions to strategic challenges.” Similarly, former US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter (2015) suggested that, for the US strategy of rebalancing to Asia, trade deals with Asian states were “as important to me as another aircraft carrier.” For many observers, President Donald Trump's “trade war” with China is the manifestation of evolving a geoeconomic strategy that intends to check the rising power through aggressive economic means (Navarro 2008; Ferguson and Hast 2018; South China Morning Post 2018). In contrast to this enthusiasm for geoeconomics as a foreign policy practice (Scholvin and Wigell 2018), the international relations (IR) discipline—especially, the positivist, causal theory-oriented IR that powerfully affect research in the United States—has remained largely inattentive to developing theories based on a geoeconomic viewpoint. As Antto Vihma (2018) observes, scholars of critical geography have argued that geoeconomics is merely an application of IR realism or neoliberalism (Sparke 1998; Mercille 2008). Yet, their criticisms are misdirected because scholars of IR realism or neoliberalism have offered only limited treatment of geoeconomics. In analyzing international security and strategic issues, as well as great power relations, variants of “American” IR theories, despite their limits, still wield “benign hegemony” (Mearsheimer 2016). Then, from the perspective of both proponents and critics of geoeconomics, it is important to articulate whether and how the strategic practice of geoeconomics can be translated into a research program in positivist IR. This article examines two important and interlinked issues that geoeconomics needs to—and would be able to—address in the process of becoming a theoretical framework in positivist IR scholarship. First, geoeconomics needs to be defined as a concept that accounts for a new and important phenomenon. For sound theorization, it is necessary to come up with a clear and widely agreeable definition of geoeconomics. It is also important to clarify unique attributes of geoeconomics that make it a distinct strategy of great power competition. Nonetheless, geoeconomics is frequently conflated with other concepts that are used to describe economic rivalry or economic strategies. Moreover, while geoeconomics is a relatively new idea, its proponents often overlook existing concepts that are already widely studied in IR to understand diverse aspects of international economic affairs and the intersection of international security and economy. This article addresses this problem of unwieldy concept in two steps. I begin by discussing concepts that are not geoeconomics. New concepts should be introduced to address an important phenomenon that existing ones cannot effectively account for. Thus, I identify key attributes of widely studied economic measures, focusing on foreign economic policy, economic diplomacy, economic statecraft, and economic warfare. Then, I define geoeconomics as a concept that indeed accounts for policy options that are not well addressed in existing studies. I consider geoeconomics as a strategy of great power competition that is intimately related with grand strategy, and define it as the use of economic measures to advance mid- to long-term strategic interests of a great power in a geographical region of the world. Moreover, I discuss important attributes that can be considered to be the defining features of geoeconomics. Through this discussion, I suggest that geoeconomics can be incorporated into the rich positivist IR scholarship on grand strategy. Second, having defined geoeconomics as a form or component of grand strategy, this article suggests that geoeconomics needs to pursue parsimonious causal theorization to understand the conditions under which a great power can pursue geoeconomic grand strategy, and, in that process, should address external constraints and domestic considerations that pertain to the use of geoeconomic strategy. The main objective of positivist IR theorists is to develop a parsimonious causal theory that can account for the phenomena of interest across time and space. In order to construct a simple theory that has large explanatory power, a theorist must make a set of reasonable assumptions and deliberately focus on certain factors or mechanisms. Thus, a theorist of geoeconomics would need to carefully analyze unique attributes of geoeconomic strategies as a political decision, make simplifying assumptions, and examine a limited set of explanatory factors and relations. This article discusses that a causal theory of geoeconomics would have to deal with—or choose to assume away—the role of international economic structure and the intervention of domestic politics for parsimonious theorization. Then, it suggests that all prominent positivist IR theories take analytical bets and focus on limited number of factors and mechanisms in the process of constructing a parsimonious causal argument, and the study of geoeconomics can follow this path. This article cautiously concludes that addressing the issues of conceptual clarity and challenges to parsimonious theorization would allow geoeconomics to become a new research program in positivist IR. To be clear, this article does not claim that there is no sound academic treatment of geoeconomics. In fact, several scholars of geostrategy have advanced persuasive arguments on diverse theoretical and practical aspects of geoeconomics. For instance, Wigell and Vihma (2016) carefully distinguish geoeconomics from geopolitics, as well as the interplay between the two. Wigell (2016) identifies different geoeconomic strategies that can be employed by a regional power. In an edited volume, Mark Leonard (2016) examines whether and how global economic interconnectedness can be manipulated to attain strategic ends in today's international conflicts. There are also efforts to examine the use of geoeconomics in certain geographical contexts. For example, Hans Kundnani (2011) suggests that Germany has become increasingly willing to utilize its economic leverage in advancing its strategic interests. Glenn Diesen (2018) examines current and future Russian and US geoeconomic strategy in Eurasia. Rather than refuting these studies, I intend to clarify the hurdles that need to be overcome in order for geoeconomics to become a distinct and promising research program from the perspective of positivist IR theories. Defining Geoeconomics As Scholvin and Wigell (2018) note, there is no widely shared definition of geoeconomics. According to Edward Luttwak—one of the original proponents of geoeconomics—it is a concept that is devised to understand the post–Cold War era in which both the causes and instruments of interstate conflict have become economic (Luttwak 1990, 21). For many scholars, geoeconomics is often considered to imply states’ strategic uses of economic instruments (Vihma 2018, 3; Wigell, Scholvin, and Aaltola 2018) or “geostrategic use of economic power” (Wigell 2016, 135). Several analysts go further and argue that all domestic and foreign economic policies can be considered geoeconomics when they have significant strategic implications (Thirlwell 2010). In a recent study, Robert Blackwill and Jennifer Harris offer a more elaborate yet still extensive definition of geoeconomics, which they define as “The use of economic instruments to promote and defend national interests, and to produce beneficial geopolitical results; and the effects of other nations’ economic actions on a country's geopolitical goals” (Blackwill and Harris 2016, 20). These approaches to geoeconomics, nonetheless, have several discrepancies from the perspective of positivist IR literature. There are other concepts employed by scholars of IR in examining diverse aspects of international economic interactions and the strategic uses of economic instruments. Moreover, an overly extensive conception of geoeconomics dismisses existing ideas, personnel, and legal and institutional arrangements that are well developed to manage foreign economic interactions and strategies. In short, while several scholars of geoeconomics have offered useful theoretical guidelines to distinguish geoeconomics from geopolitics (Wigell 2016; Wigell and Vihma 2016; Scholvin and Wigell 2018), this article argues for the need to distinguish geoeconomics from other forms of economic policies in IR. Social scientists agree that a new concept should account for a set of phenomena that is not well addressed by existing concepts (Stinchcombe 1968; Goertz 2006). Moreover, a good academic concept needs to have a clearly delineated extension—which means the specific set of social phenomena to which the concept refers—and contains an elaborated intension—which refers to the attributes that define and distinguish the concept from others (Sartori 1970; Collier and Mahon 1993). Thus, defining geoeconomics requires a two-step process. It is first necessary to differentiate geoeconomics from other existing concepts that address the nexus of international politics and economy. Then, one must pin down attributes that make geoeconomics a concept that accounts for a distinct social phenomenon. What Are Not Geoeconomics? Geoeconomics is a relatively new concept compared with the extensive scholarship on diverse aspects of international economic relations and policies. Aside from geoeconomics, there are many varieties of policies that work by affecting economic conditions, actors, and interests. Decision-makers have employed these policies over the past several decades or even centuries. Among the policies that might be conflated with geoeconomics, four—foreign economic policy, economic diplomacy, economic statecraft, and economic warfare—stand out. There are overlaps among these policy realms, but they can be analytically distinguished from one another by their core goals, mechanisms, and involved actors. Foreign Economic Policy Today, every functioning state pursues foreign or international economic policies. Foreign economic policies refer to policy measures or orientations that govern a state's economic transactions with foreign entities. They aim to advance national development and domestic economic prosperity, as well as to create a desirable international economic condition (Krugman, Obstfeld, and Melitz 2014). At the broadest level, international economic policies include mercantilism and neoliberalism, which, respectively, are often related with protectionism and economic openness (Gilpin 2001). More specifically, trade policies such as the decisions to erect or remove tariffs and non-tariff barriers against foreign goods and services, monetary policies that determine a state's exchange rate regime, and policies on flows of foreign investments are widely considered to be key components of foreign economic policy. With the expansion of global economic linkages, states’ migration and industrial policies are also considered to be closely related with—or even part of—foreign economic policies (Milberg and Winkler 2013). Despite their differences in contents, these policies commonly attempt to create a favorable condition for the state's economic actors and facilitate economic development. Since foreign economic policies exist in almost all states across time and space, there is an enormous historical and contemporary literature on international economic policies. Recently, scholars of foreign economic policies focus on the strong influence of domestic economic interest groups and their interactions with domestic institutions (Frieden, Lake, and Broz 2017). The key mechanisms articulated in this literature involve competition between diverse economic interest groups, the bottom-up process of aggregating economic interests, the interaction between leaders and interest groups, and the intervention of bureaucratic organizations in the process leading up to the implementation of certain foreign economic policies. Moreover, the role of convictions in economic nationalism or open economy is taken seriously. It is often suggested that a state's foreign economic policies can be tailored to advance political and strategic interests. One might go further and suggest that economic neoliberalism is a manifestation of geoeconomics after the Cold War (Luttwak 1990). Indeed, considering the breadth of foreign economic policies, there are many different interests, actors, and goals involved in the making and implementation of international economic policies. Yet, the main and ultimate objective of any foreign economic policy is to address the state's economic stakes. Although neoliberalism had significant political and strategic consequences, it could be endorsed by Washington as a policy program because many believed that it would contribute to the United States’ economic prosperity (Serra and Stiglitz 2008). Foreign economic policy is a concept that is largely related with economic conditions and actors. Economic Diplomacy Economic diplomacy refers to the effort to create a favorable economic environment for a state's economic activities, actors, or policies through negotiations with foreign entities. Economic diplomacy is deeply intertwined with foreign economic policy, but they are not identical. While foreign economic policy largely refers to a state's domestic policy toward the outside world, economic diplomacy is about interactions with foreign actors. Economic diplomacy can aim to advance the objectives of foreign economic policies, such as the signing of trade deals with other states to open up new markets for the state's own firms. Yet, it can also aim to create an economic order that upholds certain agendas, rules, and principles. For instance, US effort to create an open economic order led by the World Trade Organization is a case of economic diplomacy (Bayne and Woolcock 2017). Moreover, economic diplomacy can take many different forms. It is largely conducted by national governments in bilateral or multilateral negotiations with foreign counterparts, but local governments can also play an active role. Some might suggest that economic diplomacy has only recently become an important aspect of states’ foreign relations, while diplomacy traditionally belonged to the realm of political and military affairs. This is not true. By the late nineteenth century, foreign ministries of all European great powers were paying careful attention to the conduct and management of economic diplomacy. For instance, British Foreign Office led commercial diplomacy and negotiations with other countries, and the Foreign Office and the Foreign Secretary were continuously informed about international economic exchanges and economic developments in foreign countries (Steiner 1969; Otte 2011). Even for states that pursued economic autarky, such as the United States in the nineteenth century, economic diplomacy was of critical importance. In the case of the United States, Alexander Hamilton advocated the importance of economic diplomacy that would allow the United States to obtain stable access to the European market and technology (Earle 1986). Economic diplomacy has historically been an important job for national governments. One might also suggest that the intensity of tension is relatively low in economic diplomacy, whereas geoeconomics is characterized by high level of tension with a strategic competitor in implementing economic measures. This assessment is misleading. Economic diplomacy is not characterized by friendly interaction or smooth process. On the contrary, it can take coercive forms and entail significant international tensions. It can utilize the threat or actual imposition of significant costs on the targeted state in trying to derive desired economic behavior. Economic diplomacy is distinguished from other diplomatic activities by its objective—to induce change in economic behavior—not necessarily by the magnitude of tensions. In this context, trade war can be understood as a form of economic diplomacy in which one state tries to change foreign economic policy of another state through the imposition of economic costs, and the targeted state replies by retaliating with economic countermeasures (New York Times 2018). Trade war as a form of economic diplomacy has occurred in different political and geographical contexts. In the late nineteenth century, Wilhelmine Germany experienced a tariff war with Russia, which was resolved with the signing of a new tariff treaty in 1894 (British Cabinet 1903). In the 1980s, the United States and Japan conducted a “trade war,” which was heavily motivated by large trade imbalances and what Washington considered unfair monetary policies of Tokyo. In these cases, the main objective has been to address others’ economic behavior and to establish a habit of “fair trade,” although there could also have been important strategic considerations. The concept and practice of trade wars have garnered academic and public attention well before the rise of geoeconomics. Economic Statecraft Economic statecraft can be defined as the use of economic techniques to shape another state's political or strategic behavior (Baldwin 1985; Blanchard and Ripsman 2015). While some scholars might claim that economic statecraft can be used to influence others’ behavior over any issues, the emphasis of the academic and public discourse about economic statecraft has been put on its utility in influencing the targeted state on salient strategic or human rights issues (Haass and O'Sullivan 2000; Asher, Comras, and Cronin 2011). In short, different from both foreign economic policy and economic diplomacy that deal with economic interests, economic statecraft is employed to address security-related interactions between states or sensitive political issues. Economic statecraft can utilize either negative or positive inducements. The former is usually called economic sanctions, and the latter can be called economic engagement. Economic sanctions can be defined as efforts to lower the aggregate economic welfare of a target state by reducing its access to international economy and thereby coerce the targeted state to change its strategic behavior (Pape 1997). Specific economic measures for sanctions include—but are not limited to—embargo, boycott, tariff increase, tariff discrimination, withdrawal of most favored nation status, blacklist, quotas, license denial, and preclusive buying, as well as preferential policies in transactions with other countries. Through these measures, the sanctioning state attempts to alter the calculation of the target government regarding specific strategic or domestic policies. It tries to persuade the targeted state that standing at odds with the sanctioning state in a given strategic issue incurs large costs. Moreover, the sanctioning state attempts to reconfigure the domestic balance of power between competing political groups within the target state, sometimes by inducing popular revolt to overthrow the government (Drezner 2011). In contrast, economic engagement that utilizes positive inducements employs the promise of economic benefits—or “economic carrots”—to affect the behavior of a target state (Mastanduno 1999; Nincic 2010). Specific policies for economic engagement include removal of tariffs and non-tariff barriers, free trade agreements, investment decisions, technology transfer, and financial support and loans, as well as an invitation to join leading global economic institutions (Haass and O'Sullivan 2000). Economic engagement increases the benefits that the targeted state can obtain by conceding to the demand made by the state utilizing the engagement policy. More ambitiously, economic engagement can be used to shape the preference of the targeted state by creating powerful interest groups within that state that have profound interests in maintaining friendly relationships with others. After the end of the Cold War, economic statecraft has garnered enormous attention because many considered it a better alternative to military force for manipulating a strategic competitor's calculation. With the spread of economic globalization, economic statecraft was often viewed as a particularly effective and less costly option for coercing or deterring strategic challengers (Hufbauer et al. 2007). Thus, there are many cases of economic sanctions. Yet, economic engagement has also been actively used by the United States, most notably in dealing with China (Friedberg 2011). In the 1990s, the Clinton administration decided to reverse its campaign pledge and renew China's most favored nation status, arguing that economic engagement with China will eventually help Beijing address its human rights issues. The George W. Bush administration also continued to implement an economic engagement policy toward China as a tool of economic statecraft (New York Times 2000). Economic Warfare Economic warfare means the employment of foreign economic policies to weaken the targeted state's material power (Førland 1991; Mastanduno 1992). In practice, economic warfare is observed when a state adopts restrictive economic measures that are designed to impede the targeted state's economic activities for the sake of weakening the targeted state. Economic warfare is distinguished from economic statecraft not by the policy measures it employs, but rather by the ends it pursues. Different from economic statecraft that attempts to shape the targeted state's behavior, economic warfare seeks to weaken the targeted state's material capacity, which is largely comprised of military force and economic capacity. Put bluntly, economic warfare does not aim to induce behavioral change in the target state. Economic warfare attempts to undermine the targeted state's material power in three ways. First, it tries to harm the target state's overall economic performance. Economic warfare tries to deny the target state access to foreign economic inputs—such as capital, skilled-labor, economic know-hows, natural resources, and technology—and markets in hopes of diminishing that state's economic efficiency, ability to achieve technological innovation, and real income. Second, economic warfare impedes translation of latent power into military power. Restrictive economic measures diminish the amount of surplus resources that the targeted state can muster for military purposes, undermine the efficiency of translating wealth to power, and increase the burden of maintaining both civilian and military economies (Knorr 1956). Third, economic warfare diminishes the targeted state's military power. The loss of access to international economy—especially, by measures often called strategic embargo—can thwart the targeted state's ability to build up its military by increasing the costs of making cutting-edge weapons or impeding military-related technological innovation (Paarlberg 2004; Brooks 2005). The targeted state's military power also can be undermined by measures that deny access to financial resources and critical raw materials such as oil and rubber that are crucial for operating mechanized army, naval vessels, and aircraft. When a state decides to implement economic warfare against another state, it will exploit one or more of these mechanisms. Economic warfare was employed or planned at important historical moments. Before World War I, Britain carefully prepared for economic warfare, which would be immediately adopted against Wilhelmine Germany when a war broke out in the European continent (Lambert 2012). By the end of 1947, as political relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated, the United States began to sever all major economic ties with the Soviet Union in order to “inflict the greatest economic injury to the USSR and its satellites,” rather than to affect the adversary's behavior (U.S. Department of State 1948; Funigiello 1988). More recently, Peter Navarro, President Donald Trump's economic advisor, has argued that the United States should economically strangle China and undermine the material foundation of China's ascendance as a peer competitor of the United States (Navarro 2008). An overview of existing concepts related with international economic interactions reveals that many important aspects of geoeconomics that are articulated in today's discourses are indeed not new. Scholars of international politics have thoroughly investigated diverse economic measures that are adopted to advance economic or strategic ends. In particular, foreign economic policy, economic diplomacy, economic statecraft, and economic warfare have long been discussed academically and implemented by numerous states in different historical periods. What Is Geoeconomics? When one takes into account the IR literature on diverse aspects of international economic interactions, geoeconomics needs to be defined as a concept that accounts for attributes that are not well addressed in that literature. It also needs to have precise extension and intension. In order to distinguish geoeconomics from other concepts and to emphasize its unique attributes, I define geoeconomics as the use of economic policies to advance a great power's mid- to long-term strategic interests in a geographical region of the world. Economic measures for geoeconomics can take many different forms. Geoeconomics can utilize promise or imposition of economic gains or losses in order to manipulate the mid- to long-term calculation of the states in strategically important locations. It can also attempt to encroach on a strategic competitor's important interests in certain regions of the world. Moreover, economic measures for geoeconomics can aim to provide alternative ways of governing IR, thereby weakening existing rules that represent the leading great power's interests (Mearsheimer 2019). Put bluntly, geoeconomics can be considered to be a component of grand strategy—which can be defined as ideas for deploying a nation's material resources to achieve its important strategic interests over the mid to long run (Art 2003; Brooks, Ikenberry, and Wohlforth 2012/13, 11). Meanwhile, great powers are likely to be the main users of geoeconomics, since powerful states tend to have an ability to project economic resources to distant regions of the world and establish the foundation for continuing influence for ambitious strategic goals. Moreover, I take this approach because, as Wigell and Vihma (2016) observe, geoeconomics is an economic equivalent of military force-oriented geopolitics. Then, if geopolitics is the manifestation of great power politics, geoeconomics can also be considered as a form of great power strategy. Geoeconomics serves as the means for conducting great power competition and entails four key attributes. First, geoeconomics is deliberately employed by national governments. Geoeconomics is a strategy that works by organizing a state's economic resources. Then, there is no authority other than the state—or the government—that can be responsible for effectively and legitimately mobilizing economic means for strategic purposes. In the aftermath of the Cold War, several experts claimed that state-centric approaches to international affairs became no longer convincing in the age of globalization. Today, many would agree that this claim was premature. Although there are other important actors in the international realm, states are still protagonists in the most important issue areas. Indeed, states have “re-emerged” as the central actor that can address discrepancies introduced by hyper-globalization (Serra and Stiglitz 2008). Although some specific measures for geoeconomics might be implemented by the private sector, a government adopting geoeconomics carefully and deliberately orchestrates overall direction of economic measures for geoeconomics. Second, geoeconomics intends to advance mid- to long-term strategic goals rather than immediate interests or economic stakes. These strategic goals include homeland security, stability of the neighboring regions, prevention of the spread of the weapons of mass destruction, and stable access to raw materials, especially oil (Art 2003). Moreover, for great powers, an important long-term strategic interest includes increasing the ability to organize international order in its favor (Gilpin 1981). Conversely, encroaching on the adversary's ability to advance some of these strategic interests is an important objective of geoeconomics. When a state's policy mainly aims to address issues of economic prosperity, then it should be considered foreign economic policy or economic diplomacy. If a state adopts economic measures to deal with short-term strategic goals—for instance, inducing desired outcomes during negotiations over ongoing military disputes—then the policy constitutes economic statecraft. Different from economic warfare that considers weakening of the adversary as its primary objective, economic measures for geoeconomics aim to lay the foundation for protecting the state's mid- or long-term strategic interests by affecting the calculation, domestic politics, and preference of the targeted state. In this context, as Wigell and Vihma (2016) suggest, geoeconomics can potentially fill a loophole in certain influential IR theories, most notably neorealism. Although neorealism recognizes close linkages between economic capacity and military force in the mid- to long-run, neorealist scholars have almost exclusively focused on examining military instruments and strategy. Geoeconomics can potentially allow researchers to address this “military bias” of neorealism. Third, in geoeconomics, economic consideration serves as a means, not an end. Some analysts suggest geoeconomics is about using military means for economic ends (Thirlwell 2010). In this view, when a state uses military threat to create an economic condition—i.e., the United States using “gunboat diplomacy” in the late nineteenth century to open Japan—or links security relations with economic concessions—i.e., US pressure on NATO states and Japan to accept Washington's economic demand during the Cold War—geoeconomics is in play. This approach, however, misunderstands the use of military instruments in theory and practice. When wars are fought for economic purposes, they are simply called wars that intend to obtain economic spoils of war (Liberman 1996). Moreover, in numerous historical cases, using military pressure to obtain economic benefits was called imperialism, not geoeconomics. A state's pressure over its military ally to accept an economic deal is often called issue linkage (Davis 2008/09). Reversing the means-ends chain in geoeconomics fails to take into account the extensive literature that examines the use of military means for economic ends. Fourth, geoeconomics has a clearly identifiable geographical scope. A state employing geoeconomics would attempt to increase its presence in a geographical region that is important for protecting its mid- to long-term strategic interests, as well as trying to undermine others’ influence in that region. A state can employ geoeconomic measures in regions close to its homeland in order to protect its security and regional stability. Geoeconomics can be also used to establish control over distant territories or, more subtly, organize political support from states in distant regions, and, in turn, allow the state to overcome geographical constraints in pursuing its strategic interests (Nye 2003). In this context, creating an economic sphere of influence through economic measures can be considered a typical example of geoeconomics in play. Moreover, by expanding or consolidating its influence in certain geographical areas, a rising state wielding geoeconomics can lay the foundation to encroach on the leadership position of the leading great power in the international system. Geoeconomics, in short, entails using economic means to project political will over certain geographical areas in order to serve broad strategic objectives and to prevent others from establishing influence in certain territories. This definition of geoeconomics is significantly more restrictive than ones that are often employed in public discourses. When these attributes are simultaneously present in a state's foreign economic measures, one can suggest that geoeconomics is in play. There are several historical cases that can be identified as outcomes of the geoeconomic thinking defined in this article. Before World War I, Britain discovered that Wilhelmine Germany deliberately created a customs union in Eastern Europe and built close economic ties with the Low Countries. From the British perspective, while Germany confronted the Triple Entente, Berlin signed a series of trade deals with states in its Eurasian hinterland in order to obtain alternative export destinations in case of a military crisis in Europe. Moreover, Germany deliberately expanded its economic linkages with neutral port cities such as Amsterdam and Rotterdam in order to circumvent a potential naval blockade by the Royal Navy and assure stable access to goods and materials that were crucial for maintaining its war-fighting capability (Lambert 2012). These developments are cases of geoeconomics since Germany deliberately used economic means in order to advance its critical mid- to long-term strategic interests on the European continent. A different case of geoeconomics is found in the United States’ decision to support Western European states through the Marshall Plan. To be clear, in a comprehensive and complex policy program such as the Marshall Plan, many different economic measures—foreign economic policy, economic diplomacy, economic statecraft, and economic warfare—are observed simultaneously. I do not intend to claim that this important US policy toward Europe should be explicitly designated as a case of geoeconomics. Instead, I suggest that the Marshall Plan exhibits attributes of geoeconomics as defined above. During the few years after World War II, the United States was reluctant to get directly involved in Eurasian affairs, even though it recognized the danger posed by the Soviet Union's rising power. Thus, as an alternative to direct and extensive military commitment to defend Western Europe, Washington intended to help the European states recover from the losses caused by the war. It expected that, when the economy of Western European states—Britain, France, and West Germany—prospered, they would pool their resources together and become an effective counterpoise against the Soviet expansion (Gaddis 2005). The United States exemplified geoeconomics when it enacted the Marshall Plan, which intended to conduct a protracted great power competition with the Soviet Union through economic means. More recently, many consider the failed US economic initiatives such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and ongoing Chinese economic endeavors like the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to be cases of geoeconomics (Blackwill and Harris 2016). Nonetheless, one needs to be cautious in identifying whether these initiatives indeed constitute geoeconomics. Washington repeatedly argued that the TPP aimed to advance economic opening and create new business opportunities, not to exclude any state from economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (McBride and Chatzky 2019). Similarly, Chinese authorities have persistently maintained that the BRI is largely aiming to open new markets and facilitate China's economic development, not attempting to increase political and strategic leverage in Central and South Asia (The Time 2019). In other words, although geoeconomic thinking might be involved in Chinese and US economic initiatives around the globe, there is also possibility that these initiatives turn out to be close to cases of foreign economic policy or economic diplomacy. Moreover, Chinese economic projects and US responses to those projects still cannot be indisputably identified as geoeconomic endeavors since they are still ongoing and in their early stages. A definition of geoeconomics that distinguishes it from other concepts related with international economic relations would facilitate a more organized discussion on geoeconomic strategies among the positivist IR scholars. When geoeconomics is articulated as a form or component of grand strategy, future research can apply central questions in the positivist IR research program on grand strategy to studies of geoeconomics. For instance, one can investigate the conditions under which a great power can indeed use geoeconomic measures to advance its important mid- to long-term strategic interests. One can also examine whether geoeconomics can be substitute for or complement to other grand strategic tools such as military intervention, institutional development, or soft power. Nonetheless, in order to engage these and other questions from the perspective of positivist IR, it is necessary for geoeconomics to address several issues in parsimonious causal theorization. Building a Parsimonious Causal Theory of Geoeconomics Most positivist IR theories that address an important aspect of international strategic relations attempt to provide parsimonious causal explanations. Causal theories can be defined as statements about the relationship between the phenomena of interest and the factor that account for the occurrence of the phenomena (Elster 1989). These theories usually do not try to offer a detailed explanation for one or a few specific cases. Rather, they value parsimonious theorization that has large explanatory power—which refers to the ability to account for a large number of similar events with a small number of factors (Przeworski and Teune 1970). Indeed, in order for a theory to effectively account for similar events that occurred at different times and in different spaces, it must be parsimonious. When the simple theoretical statement survives tough tests against numerous cases, scholars consider it to be a useful theoretical compass that helps policymakers navigate the complex world. In this context, for geoeconomics to become a promising research program from the perspective of positivist IR, it needs to pursue parsimonious causal theorization. Theorizing Geoeconomics as a Form of Grand Strategy When geoeconomics is understood as a form or component of grand strategy, then the positivist researcher of geoeconomic grand strategy would need to address the key question: what are the conditions under which geoeconomics can be employed as an effective grand strategy of a great power? From the perspective of positivist IR, clarifying the factors and mechanisms that enable or push a great power to pursue geoeconomic measures would be the main task of the theoretical enterprise on geoeconomics. In addition, the analyst would also need to investigate the effectiveness of geoeconomic grand strategies vis-à-vis other instruments of grand strategy in advancing mid- to long-term strategic interests. Building a theory of geoeconomic grand strategy would be able to benefit from the well-established positivist scholarship on grand strategy that has long developed and sharpened theoretical toolkits to understand a great power's grand strategy. Conversely, incorporating geoeconomic perspective into the traditional military force-centered approach to grand strategy would invigorate the overall research on a great power's choice and employment of specific grand strategy. Yet, it needs to be noted that, for parsimonious theorization, IR scholars who study grand strategy—who are mostly scholars of international security or strategic affairs—tend to focus on either international power structure or domestic politics. Moreover, most scholars of international security or strategy assume that security issues have priority over economic topics. Similarly, when one intends to construct a parsimonious causal theory of geoeconomics as a form of grand strategy, the theorist should inadvertently focus on specific factors or mechanisms and make simplifying assumptions over important aspects of a state's foreign relations. In particular, since geoeconomics entails utilizing tools and mechanisms that are different from military strategy, a theorist of geoeconomics would need to take a different analytical focus, as well as making assumptions that are different from “classic” theories of great power military grand strategy. Nonetheless, this does not mean that a positivist theorist of geoeconomics would necessarily run into the challenge of complex theorization. Since parsimonious theories are necessarily abstractions from a complicated reality, all IR theorists place some analytical bets when they make the decision to focus on certain aspects of IR and downplay others. Geoeconomics may be able to take similar analytical bets and pursue parsimonious theorization. As I discuss below, in attempting to build a parsimonious theory of geoeconomic grand strategy, theorists would need to address the role of international economic structure and domestic politics.1 The Role of International Economic Structure Many well-known IR theories are structural theories that investigate the impact of the factors exogenous of states in explaining international stability or state behavior in strategic competitions (Jervis 1998). For instance, theories in the structural realist tradition (Waltz 1979; Mearsheimer 2001), and, to some extent, power transition theory (Organski and Kugler 1980) and hegemonic transition theory (Gilpin 1981) focus on international power structure. In these theories, international power structure refers to the arrangement of important units in the international system. In the anarchic international realm, it is often equated with the distribution of material capabilities, or, more simply, with the number of great powers (Waltz 1979, 80–81). The structural theories of international politics expect variations are observed in the severity of international tensions and in the pattern of states’ security-seeking behavior depending on polarity or the shape of international power structure. Some structural IR theorists expect that great power relations are the most stable in bipolarity, others argue multipolarity is more stable than bipolarity (Deutsch and Singer 1964), while still others suggest unipolarity is the most stable of all structures (Wohlforth 1999). According to these theories, geopolitics is a different name for great power politics (Mearsheimer 2001, 168–266). It follows that, from the perspective of structural theories, international power structure plays a key role in understanding the development of geopolitical competition. One can derive simple propositions on the occurrence, severity, and trajectory of geopolitical competition, considering polarity or the shape of international power structure as the main explanatory factor. In contrast, theorizing the conditions to employ geoeconomics requires addressing both international power structure and international economic structure. Geoeconomics needs to take international power structure seriously because it examines the competitive process of advancing strategic interests. It can be easily expected that the employment of geoeconomic strategies and the trajectory of geoeconomic competition will be deeply affected by international power structure. Yet, an analysis of geoeconomics also needs to take into account the impact of international economic structure, which is equally important but distinct from international power structure. At the heart of any argument on geoeconomics is the employment of extensive economic measures that are geared toward achieving important mid- to long-term strategic objective. Different from the structural theories that consider military-security concerns trumps economic considerations—and, thus, assumes economic structure is subsumed by political-military structure—geoeconomics cannot assume away the influence of international economic structure. Then, it is necessary to analyze whether international economic structure indeed allows effective use of economic means for geoeconomic purposes. When one follows the insights of mainstream economics, international economic structure can be defined as the number of states that can play similar roles in an economic issue area. According to mainstream economics, international commercial, financial, and investment relations allow states to obtain diverse foreign economic inputs, which allow them to significantly increase their economic efficiency, performance, and income (Krugman, Obstfeld, and Melitz 2014). In this approach, key states in an economic issue area are not necessarily defined by the size of their domestic markets. Rather, they refer to the states that can advance another state's performance in an economic issue area by functioning as a provider of important economic inputs. When there are multiple states that can play similar roles in an economic issue area, then the economic structure is multipolar. When one state monopolizes an important aspect of international economic activities in an issue area, then there is a unipolar economic structure. Moreover, multiple economic structures can simultaneously exist. For instance, international trade structure can be multipolar—where multiple large export destinations exist—whereas international finance is bipolar—two currencies playing key roles in international financial exchanges. As long as geoeconomics is related with the use of economic means for political-strategic ends, a theorist of geoeconomics would need to visit the role of international economic structure in addition to the political-military structure. As many scholars of international interdependence have suggested, it is misleading to argue that international power structure always dominates international economic structures since power is not fungible across issue areas (Baldwin 2016). Moreover, the theorist of geoeconomics would need to take into account the existence of numerous economic structures across economic issue areas (Haas 1970; Keohane and Nye 2001). Put bluntly, in the process of theorizing the employment of geoeconomics, the analyst would need to take into account multiple structural factors—i.e., international military structure, international commercial structure, financial structure, and investment structure—that might affect the ability to effectively use geoeconomic measures. This point, however, should not be interpreted as suggesting that a theorist of geoeconomics should always engage in understanding the impact of complex international structures. One can try to understand whether and how different structures in diverse issue areas interact and simultaneously shape a great power's decision to utilize geoeconomics. Similar to the scholarship on complex interdependence (Keohane and Nye 2001), the analyst who pursues this path can attempt to pin down several convincing or interesting interactions among international structures. Nonetheless, one can also posit a situation where some structures should be given analytic priority. For instance, the analyst can theoretically articulate a situation where international financial structure dominates other economic structures and focus on constraints imposed by that economic structure and military power structure in making geoeconomic decisions. In short, while recognizing the existence of multiple international structures, the theorist can develop simplified arguments on complex international economic structures or put priority in one economic structure over others and examine the role of that structure. There can be several different options in theorizing the impact of international economic structures in the analysis of geoeconomics. The Intervention of Domestic Politics In theorizing the conditions to employ geoeconomics, analysts would also encounter the need to reinstate the role of domestic politics in international strategic affairs. Many traditional security and strategic studies scholars have considered domestic politics as the “black box” in order to focus on structural factors. Moreover, they tend to assume states to be unitary actors that are capable of making important decisions independent of domestic interest group politics (Mearsheimer 2001, 30–32). Under these assumptions, scholars derive simple propositions on state behavior in security affairs and the trajectory of geopolitical competition with other states. They also derive arguments on diverse military and political strategies that a roughly rational state might be able to wield in trying to advance diverse interests. These simplifying assumptions can be made reasonably when one analyzes international security and, by extension, geopolitics. Security and strategic studies scholars could safely dismiss the complexities of domestic politics because in national security affairs, the government—or the executive branch—usually has the superior responsibility and authority compared with other domestic institutions. In the United States, for instance, the President is endowed with the legitimacy and authority to handle national security matters, and Congress can intervene only through limited channels because effectiveness and expediency, rather than domestic consensus, are considered crucial in responding to threats to national security (Mastanduno 2015). Indeed, in most states, national leaders are expected to deal with security issues based on a conception of national interests rather than to serve the interests of their constituency or certain societal groups. For many scholars, geopolitics is equivalent to security competition between great powers. Then, an analysis of geopolitics can adopt these assumptions security studies scholars make and thereby present a parsimonious theory that explains the behavior of and interactions between governments. The situation is fundamentally different in geoeconomics because economic measures play a central role in any geoeconomic strategy. One cannot assume away domestic political factors in theorizing the use of geoeconomics. Most IR scholars agree that, in the making and implementation of economic policies, domestic politics needs to be taken seriously (Keohane and Milner 1996). The reason is straightforward. In economic policies, market forces and economic actors, such as private companies, play critical roles, and authority and legitimacy are significantly dispersed among domestic institutions. Different from security affairs, the legislative branch, experts, and media have powerful voices in the making and implementation of economic policies. Organized interest groups also play crucial roles because, different from national security policy, they can effectively pressure leaders to adopt or avoid certain economic measures, most notably through activities such as lobbying. Moreover, the government needs to pay careful attention to the expected impact of its geoeconomic measures on domestic economic interests or reflect economic interests in designing economic measures. Economic measures introduced by the government for geoeconomic purposes affect the interests of diverse economic actors within the state. Nonetheless, while the losses caused by military mobilization are justified by the need for national defense, the costs introduced by economic manipulations for strategic purposes have proved difficult to legitimize (Friedberg 2000). In many occasions, restrictive economic measures might be considered a form of political intervention into economic affairs. Accordingly, geoeconomics would be a sustainable strategy when it reflects the consensus made through extensive domestic political deliberation. A theory of geoeconomics would need to incorporate this deliberation process in advancing its theoretical mechanism. In sum, theorizing the conditions to use geoeconomics requires opening the “black box” of domestic politics. The analyst would need to study the domestic political process, paying attention to the interactions among interest groups, firms, government institutions, and leaders. In addition, it would be important to pay attention to competitions between a state's economic institutions and military institutions, between economic interest groups and security-oriented interest groups, and between these interest groups and institutions in order to theorize the bottom-up process of making decisions related to geoeconomics. These assessments, nonetheless, do not suggest that a positivist IR scholar of geoeconomics should always try to theorize all the complexities of domestic political processes. On the contrary, after thoroughly examining diverse domestic actors, interests, and institutions related to geoeconomics, the theorist can choose to focus on a specific aspect of domestic politics—i.e., interest group politics, bureaucracy, type of government, or state–society relationship—and engage in parsimonious theorization of the decision to employ geoeconomic measures. Indeed, this is an approach already taken by prominent positivist IR scholars who examine domestic sources of international conflict or put priority on domestic politics in analyzing a state's military strategy (Rose 1998; Lobell, Ripsman, and Taliaferro 2009). A researcher of geoeconomics who focuses on domestic politics can effectively follow this academic practice for parsimonious theorization. Conclusion Many policy analysts as well as prominent political figures believe that geoeconomics is a strategic practice that holds promise for prevailing in great power politics of the twenty-first century. From this practical approach, the IR discipline—most notably, major IR theories that examine and predict the trajectory and future of great power competition—should devote more efforts to construct diverse concepts and theories from the geoeconomic viewpoint. Yet, translating the strategic practice of geoeconomics into a positivist IR research program should be done carefully. There is already an extensive scholarship on diverse economic policies and strategies—including but not limited to foreign economic policies, economic diplomacy, economic statecraft, and economic warfare. Moreover, theorizing the use of geoeconomics requires reinstating the assumptions underlying traditional military force-based analysis of great power strategy. In short, building a parsimonious causal theory of geoeconomics can be a challenging task. This article presents assessments of these difficulties and offers one way of addressing the challenge of parsimonious causal theorization in the study of geoeconomics. It suggests that, in order to identify geoeconomics as a distinct international phenomenon and incorporate it into the positivist IR scholarship, geoeconomics needs to be considered as a component of grand strategy. While the scholarship on grand strategy has long existed as an influential IR research program, the analytic frameworks developed in that scholarship would facilitate geoeconomics becoming a new positivist IR research agenda. Conversely, the insights developed by the proponents of geoeconomics would allow traditional research on grand strategy to more effectively take into account economic aspects of great power competition. This article also suggests that theorizing the decision to employ geoeconomics can be significantly complex since it needs to consider the role of diverse international structures and domestic politics. Nonetheless, this assessment does not mean that all potential theorists of geoeconomics should engage in building a complex theory. Similar to all major IR theories that are employed to understand great power behavior and strategy, a theory of geoeconomics can make a deliberate analytical choice to focus on certain factors and aspects in order to offer a parsimonious explanation. In addition, this paper encourages the scholars of geoeconomics to more actively visit and reinstate classic IR works on strategic aspects of international economic relations. For instance, Albert Hirschman's seminal work (1945) laid out theoretical frameworks to understand how powerful states use asymmetric economic dependence to manipulate domestic interests in a target state to create long-term influence. By more closely engaging with the existing IR literature on the nexus of international security and economy, geoeconomics would be able to offer more productive research agenda and convincing policy prescriptions. In this process, an attempt can be made to theorize geoeconomics as a recurring feature of great power relations and articulate the nature of a “geoeconomic order” and the conditions under which different geoeconomic orders are created. Through these efforts, the scholars of geoeconomics would be able to contribute to narrowing the gap between academics and practitioners. Footnotes 1 One might suggest that many well-known parsimonious IR theories are theories of international politics rather than foreign policy and attempt to explain the outcome of interaction between states, not foreign policy behavior or strategy of states (Waltz 1996). In this approach, it might be misleading to argue that theorists cannot effectively come up with a parsimonious theory of geoeconomics because, while the idea of parsimonious causal theorization applies to the study of international outcomes, geoeconomics belongs to the realm of foreign policy or strategy. It can be further suggested that this article applies the wrong standard for parsimonious theorization to the study of geoeconomics. Although this paper does not attempt to refute the distinction between theories on systemic outcomes and state behavior, it differs from this approach and follows the perspective that suggests parsimonious theories of foreign policy and strategy can be derived from system-level theories (Elman 1996; Mearsheimer 2001, 422; Snyder 2004; Rosato and Schuessler 2011). Moreover, it advocates that parsimony is virtue applicable to all theories that seek generalization and broad applicability. 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TI - Making Geoeconomics an IR Research Program
JF - International Studies Perspectives
DO - 10.1093/isp/ekaa018
DA - 2020-11-12
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/making-geoeconomics-an-ir-research-program-AHh2UPswLS
SP - 1
EP - 1
VL - Advance Article
IS - 
DP - DeepDyve
ER -