TY - JOUR
AU - Riggs, Wayne D.
AB - 1. Introduction It will startle no one to hear that there is widespread disagreement among philosophers about the nature and criteria of epistemic justifica­ tion. There are many distinct notions of epistemic justification, distinguished from one another in a bewildering variety of ways. There are internalist justification, externalist justification, coherentist justification, foundation- alist justification, deontic justification, consequentialist justification, proposi- tional justification, doxastic justification, personal justification, situation­ al justification, objective justification, subjective justification, cognitive justification, and structural justification. None of these is quite equivalent to another, yet each is proposed as a way in which something can be epis- temically justified. A glance at all these different kinds of justification reinforces an idea that is rapidly gaining currency within contemporary epistemology: that not all of these notions can really be rivals to one another. By this I mean that they are not all rival conceptions of the very same pre-theoretical notion. Surely at least some of these conceptions of justification are de­ scribing importantly different notions. If so, then the question, "which of them is the correct conception of epistemic justification?" is ill-formed. More than one can be a correct conception of an appropriate type of justi­ fication. In fact, 
TI - What are the “Chances” of Being Justified?
JO - The Monist
DO - 10.5840/monist199881319
DA - 1998-07-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/what-are-the-chances-of-being-justified-9CGpFzxHdb
SP - 452
EP - 472
VL - 81
IS - 3
DP - DeepDyve
ER -