TY - JOUR
AU - Lantis, Jeffrey, S
AB - Abstract Insights from the public policy advocacy coalition framework (ACF) may offer richer explanations of the scope and timing of US foreign policy changes toward the Syrian civil war (2011–present) than traditional approaches in foreign policy analysis (FPA). This article surveys the existing FPA literature and then probes the plausibility of a new ACF model of change through case studies of the reluctant engagement of the United States in Syria. Cases shed light on how, despite pronouncements of restraint by Presidents Obama and Trump, the government has armed and trained rebel fighters, deployed thousands of troops to the country, conducted airstrikes against the Islamic State, and moved to counterbalance Iranian influence in the region. This study helps draw connections between competition among rival advocacy coalitions and strategic drift in US foreign policy, including patterns of change and “purposive non-change.” The article concludes with a discussion of the added value of the ACF model and details its promise for application in other comparative cross-national contexts. advocacy coalition framework, foreign policy, Syria, foreign policy restructuring, intervention The Syrian civil war (2011–present) has been replete with widespread destruction, human rights violations, terrorism, and alleged war crimes. The war has also contributed to a migration crisis in Europe, with large influxes of refugees from Syria (Dixon 2019). These challenges have steadily drawn in many great powers, including the United States, despite public pronouncements of restraint by Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump. Indeed, the United States seems to have settled into a pattern of reluctant or grudging engagement in Syria over the past six years that defies easy explanation. The United States has armed and trained rebel fighters, deployed thousands of troops to Syria, conducted airstrikes against the Islamic State and Syrian facilities, imposed limits on the number of Syrian refugees it would accept, and tried to counterbalance Iranian influence in the region (Barron and Barnes 2018; Juul 2019). At times, US foreign policy has contradicted stated presidential positions and defied popular sentiments against intervention. These puzzling behaviors have seemed “almost immune to executive direction,” and critics have warned of a potential quagmire (Walt 2018; Yee 2018, 1). The strategic drift in US foreign policy toward Syria has not only surprised some policymakers and observers, it also highlights the limits of prominent theoretical models of policy change. Early studies of foreign policy analysis (FPA) advanced theories that challenged rational actor model assumptions of international relations (Holsti 1982; Goldmann 1988). Models of foreign policy change began to proliferate after the Cold War (Hermann 1990; Rosati, Hagan, and Sampson 1994; Welch 2005), highlighting key roles for decision-makers (Hermann 1990), parties (Rathbun 2004; Doeser 2013), role theory (Cantir and Kaarbo 2012), and parliaments (Strong 2015; Ihalainen, Pasi, and Satu Matikainen 2016). However, these frameworks have remained fairly eclectic, drawing insights from select research programs in FPA that may miss valuable contributions from other theories (Carlsnaes 1992; Wehner and Thies 2014). Scholars have continued to call for the development of more comprehensive, multicausal explanations of change (Brazys, Kaarbo, and Panke 2017; Brummer et al. 2019). This study argues that the contours of US foreign policy continuity and change in Syria are the product of a dialectical decision-making process that involves competition among advocacy coalitions in the domestic political arena. These groups have been instrumental stewards of both change and “purposive non-change” in Syria policy, resulting in a pattern of grudging engagement. Specifically, this study draws on the advocacy coalition framework (ACF) from public policy (Sabatier 1988), which offers several comparative advantages for studies of change. It looks beyond discrete “causes” of change or the tenures of individual leaders in office, and focuses instead on long-term competition among rival groups of governmental and nongovernmental actors that shape policy outcomes (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Pierce and Hicks 2019).1 The framework predicts that dominant coalitions favoring particular policies, either continuity or change in this study, can prevail in the struggle and drive the foreign policy agenda for certain periods (Mansfield, Milner, and Pevehouse 2007; Henry et al. 2014; Oppermann, Kaarbo, and Brummer 2017). This article highlights the added value of the ACF for understanding continuity and change in US foreign policy toward the Syrian civil war (2011–present), as well as details its promise for application to other foreign policy decision processes. It proceeds as follows. First, the article surveys the FPA literature on change and examines the contributions of the advocacy coalition model in relation to theories of the foreign policy process. Next, it probes the plausibility of the ACF model of stasis and change to explain a US foreign policy of grudging engagement in Syria from 2011 to 2019 (at this writing). The Syria case presents an opportunity for a longitudinal examination of foreign policy decision-making processes and outcomes (Cordesman and Nerguizian 2017). The article concludes with reflections on the utility of the ACF, including its potential to capture actors and nuances of the competitive policy process and to illuminate pathways of influence in Syria policy in the Obama and Trump administrations. Studying Foreign Policy Change FPA represents a broad and heterogeneous subfield of international relations. Among its many research programs, scholars have grappled with questions regarding foreign policy continuity and change. Early scholarship in this spirit sought to challenge the limits of traditional models of international relations that relied on the rationality assumption. FPA scholars examined the importance of leaders, organizations, and resources in decision-making processes (Snyder, Bruck, and Sapin 1954; Rosenau 1966). Subsequent studies addressed a wider range of actors and conditions shaping foreign policy in diverse contexts (Goldmann 1988; Hudson 2005). A general consensus emerged that foreign policy was best understood as the product of a combination of international and domestic pressures (Kaarbo 2017; Raunio and Wagner 2017). Over time, foreign policy analysts have advanced different theories of foreign policy change. For example, Holsti (1982, ix) developed a set of typologies that challenged the implicit bias of continuity in foreign affairs. He defined restructuring, a particular form of change, broadly as “the dramatic, wholesale alteration of a nation's pattern of external relations.” Goldmann (1988, 10) offered a fairly straightforward definition of change as referring to “either a new act in a given situation or a given act in a situation previously associated with a different act.” Later, Hermann (1990, 3) called for the subfield to try to capture “the pervasive quality” of change in policymaking. Hermann's (1990, 5) cycle model defined change as “a goal-oriented or problem-oriented program by authoritative policymakers (or their representatives) directed toward entities outside the policymakers’ political jurisdiction.” He identified both internal and external catalysts for change, including leader-driven change, bureaucratic advocacy, domestic restructuring, and external shocks (Hermann 1990, 13). Subsequent studies have zeroed-in on leader-driven change, including the significance of belief systems and complex cognitive processes, variations or gradations of levels of change, and applications in comparative case studies (Friman 1993; Risse-Kappen 1994; Mintz 2004; Karawan 2005; Bosold and von Bredow 2006; Ziv 2011; Aygul 2014), structural conditions, and strategic political leadership (Gustavsson 1998; Ozkececi-Tanner 2006; Doeser 2013; Mattes, Leeds, and Carroll 2016). Scholars have also applied prospect theory to attempt to explain foreign policy continuity and change as a function of loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). This work has challenged assumptions about rationality and highlights how loss calculations reflect cognitive biases in decision-making (Thaler 1980). For example, Kahneman et al. (1991, 199) argued that for individuals, losses are more impactful than potential improvements or gains. Welch (2005, 14, 42) suggested that dramatic foreign policy changes are more likely when leaders expect foreign policy continuity to generate painful losses.2 Finally, foreign policy analysts have recognized potential applications for the study of change in other theoretical frameworks, as well, such as bureaucratic politics models (Allison 1969, 1971), studies of crisis decision-making (Hermann 1972; Herek, Janis, and Huth 1987; Haney 2002), and even norms-based explanations (Thomas 2011; Brazys, Kaarbo, and Panke 2017; Dukalskis 2017). Additional perspectives on continuity and change have come from role theory (Wehner and Thies 2014), narratives (Barnett 1999; Subotić 2016), peace studies (Paul 2007), and constructivist theories of international norms (Brazys, Kaarbo, and Panke 2017; Jakobi 2017). Taken together, existing studies of foreign policy change illustrate both “promising ideas and analytical pitfalls” (Gustavsson 1999, 74). Subsequent theoretical progress and cumulation of knowledge on change appear to have been limited by several factors in FPA. First, the subfield remains fairly eclectic, and the scholarship has never coalesced around a defined set of agents or forces that drive it. Gustavsson's (1999) survey of the literature on change illustrates the problem: it identified a wide variety of models and dynamics associated with change, but then advanced a synthetic framework that seemed remarkably similar to other checklist and cycle models. Second, the foreign policy change literature remains somewhat weak on processes, focusing instead on the criticality of catalysts for distinctive change (Dyson 2006; Bleiker and Hutchison 2008; Alden and Aran 2011; Rapport 2017). Bureaucratic politics offers some promise to address this, exploring how group interaction and competition could influence policy outcomes, but it assumes that actors outside the executive branch may be less influential than those inside and contends that policy preferences are perfectly predictable as a direct function of organizational concerns (Destler 1972; Halperin 1972; Preston and t'Hart 1999). Third, while some popular models of change identify possible catalysts, scholars have spent far less time exploring the contours of decision processes that subsequently unfold. Few models present longitudinal studies of continuity or change involving different actors and processes (Rosati, Hagan, and Sampson 1994; Alden and Aran 2016). A particular challenge for FPA has been understanding how the balance of pressures for change or stasis plays out in decision-making processes.3 Nor has there emerged a substantial volume of work focused on the potential for purposive non-change, or the agency and processes associated with maintenance of the status quo (Karvonen and Sundelius 1990; Volgy and Schwarz 1994; Marsh 2014). In sum, explaining change remains a divisive and persistent challenge in the field of FPA, and the body of scholarship has produced as many promising theories of change as it has incomplete research programs. Policy Advocacy Coalitions This article argues that insights from public policy studies of the ACF offer a fresh alternative to explore dynamics of foreign policy change. They add value by helping us chart the motivations, actors, and challenges associated with change over time; they also capture resistance dynamics in the change process that may result in purposive non-change. In short, there appears to be some valuable synergy here. Both the ACF and FPA literatures emerged in reaction to dominant paradigms in their respective fields. They present challenges to unitary rational actor assumptions and linear approaches to policymaking, including works that develop an analytical focus on beliefs. And both have engaged with questions of policy stasis and dynamism and seek to offer “a simplifying lens for understanding the policy process” (Pierce and Hicks 2019, 3).4 In short, there appears to be real potential for synergy in these two approaches. The ACF offers specific propositions that augment traditional theories of foreign policy change. First, the public policy literature on advocacy coalitions recognizes the role of agents and strategies in contentious policymaking processes (Milward and Wamsley 1984; Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen 2009, Weible et al. 2011). Paul Sabatier (1988) advanced the ACF as a response to the traditional “stages” models of public policy analysis (e.g., Lasswell 1956; Easton 1965).5 Advocacy struggles occur in policy subsystems comprised of “actors from a variety of public and private organizations who are closely engaged with a policy problem or issue… and who regularly seek to influence public policy in that domain” (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999, 119) (see Table 1). Coalitions tend to form among “people from various governmental and private organizations who share a set of normative and causal beliefs, and who often act in concert” to achieve policy goals (Jenkins-Smith and Sabatier 1994, 180; Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen 2009). The ACF argues that “policy-relevant beliefs are a principal motivator of… behavior within policy subsystems” (Henry et al. 2014, 301). By examining players and dynamics in contested policymaking processes, Sabatier and Weible (2007, 191) suggest, the ACF is especially well suited to explain “wicked problems” or policy questions that involve conflicting goals and sets of actors. Accordingly, the ACF has grown in popularity in public policy studies over time (Pierce, Peterson, and Hicks 2017; Brummer et al. 2019).6 Table 1. Summary of the advocacy coalition framework Antecedent conditions External or internal shocks, as well as policy problems or opportunities, can prompt the start of a competitive process. Coalition formation in policy subsystems Advocacy coalitions are the primary unit of analysis within policy subsystems. They are comprised of all relevant actors (governmental and nongovernmental) with shared beliefs trying to influence policy within a polity. Competition Coalitions compete to translate their beliefs into policies. Strategies include resource allocations and legislative and non-legislative approaches such as issue framing. Policy outcome: change or continuity Policy outcomes represent projections of the beliefs of dominant coalitions in contested processes. Antecedent conditions External or internal shocks, as well as policy problems or opportunities, can prompt the start of a competitive process. Coalition formation in policy subsystems Advocacy coalitions are the primary unit of analysis within policy subsystems. They are comprised of all relevant actors (governmental and nongovernmental) with shared beliefs trying to influence policy within a polity. Competition Coalitions compete to translate their beliefs into policies. Strategies include resource allocations and legislative and non-legislative approaches such as issue framing. Policy outcome: change or continuity Policy outcomes represent projections of the beliefs of dominant coalitions in contested processes. Source:Jenkins-Smith et al. (2014) and Pierce, Peterson, and Hicks (2017) Open in new tab Table 1. Summary of the advocacy coalition framework Antecedent conditions External or internal shocks, as well as policy problems or opportunities, can prompt the start of a competitive process. Coalition formation in policy subsystems Advocacy coalitions are the primary unit of analysis within policy subsystems. They are comprised of all relevant actors (governmental and nongovernmental) with shared beliefs trying to influence policy within a polity. Competition Coalitions compete to translate their beliefs into policies. Strategies include resource allocations and legislative and non-legislative approaches such as issue framing. Policy outcome: change or continuity Policy outcomes represent projections of the beliefs of dominant coalitions in contested processes. Antecedent conditions External or internal shocks, as well as policy problems or opportunities, can prompt the start of a competitive process. Coalition formation in policy subsystems Advocacy coalitions are the primary unit of analysis within policy subsystems. They are comprised of all relevant actors (governmental and nongovernmental) with shared beliefs trying to influence policy within a polity. Competition Coalitions compete to translate their beliefs into policies. Strategies include resource allocations and legislative and non-legislative approaches such as issue framing. Policy outcome: change or continuity Policy outcomes represent projections of the beliefs of dominant coalitions in contested processes. Source:Jenkins-Smith et al. (2014) and Pierce, Peterson, and Hicks (2017) Open in new tab Second, the framework presents foreign policy problems or opportunities not as discrete causes of change, but rather as antecedent conditions that can initiate a process of advocacy and counter-advocacy in a policy subsystem. External events or shocks create opportunities “for a coalition to strategically and opportunistically act to influence the policy process” (Pierce and Hicks 2017, 5, 2019). Vested players also may determine that critical policy goals are not being met or new problems have arisen with implementation or objective definition (Sabatier and Weible 2007). To Kingdon (2003), this is a recognition by key actors that an idea's “time has come”—that there is a window of opportunity for policy change. Third, the ACF offers an alternative to existing change models by exploring how challenges or opportunities are interpreted by different coalitions of policymakers and nongovernmental actors, and how the contours of decision processes subsequently unfold (Rosati, Hagan, and Sampson 1994; Alden and Aran 2016). Advocacy coalitions can include actors from the executive and legislative branches and different levels of government, along with interest groups, think tanks, experts, and nongovernmental organizations (Sabatier 1988, 131; Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014). Members “share a set of basic values, causal assumptions, and problem perceptions… and show a non-trivial degree of coordinated activity over time” (Sabatier 1988, 139).7 This contribution speaks directly to limitations of popular foreign policy change cycle models that assign individual leaders central roles (Dyson 2006; Bleiker and Hutchison 2008; Alden and Aran 2011). Fourth, the ACF describes the policy process as driven by coalition competition for dominance in the policy subsystem. Coalitions often draw on resources, including “formal legal authority, public opinion, information, mobilizable troops, financial resources, and leadership” (Sabatier and Weible 2007, 192). Interaction, negotiation, and policy learning also help shape political processes and policy change (Moe 1990; Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen 2009). Not only do players stake out their own positions, they also compete in a contested policy process.8 Coalitions interact, negotiate, and even learn from one another in the process of policy development and change (Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014, 192).9 This represents a middle-range, more nuanced alternative to FPA models that favor continuity and characterize changes as “painful” and surprisingly “rare” (Goldmann 1988; Welch 2005, 4). Fifth, the model assumes that outcomes of these struggles influence foreign policy continuity or change. The process of contestation in democratic states involves struggles to dominate the discourse through framing and drive the legislative process and policy outputs. These exchanges involve direct challenges as well as policy learning (Bennett and Howlett 1992). Continuity and change can thus be explained by the success of advocacy coalitions in the two means of policy struggle (legislative struggle and framing contests), yielding a shift in the balance of power and foreign policy outcomes. The ACF would appear to offer a number of opportunities for application to FPA to understand the “complex process of policy change over periods of one or several decades” (Sabatier 1988, 130). It has the capacity to capture circumstances where key players, including the President, may favor policy changes, but outcomes are subsequently moderated or shaped by coalition competition.10 While several studies of foreign policy development in comparative perspective have employed insights from the ACF, with promising results (Haar 2010; Hirschi and Widmer 2010; Pierce 2011; Schröer 2014), we should also recognize that there may be potential limitations of these applications for FPA. For example, past work has identified potential qualitative differences between foreign policy and (domestic) public policies. The ACF derives from public policy studies that focus on distributional debates, which may be more likely to reflect coalition struggles rather than processes associated with strategic or “high politics” questions, for example (Pierce, Peterson, and Hicks 2017). FPA and public policy are also marked by different terminologies and understandings of key concepts, such as different understandings of policy subsystems and coalitions, as well as different treatments of technical and scientific information in the policy process (Lentner 2006; Kaarbo 2015; Pierce and Hicks 2017; Neack 2018).11 There are also potential differences in application. Public policy studies often apply a very strong standard of content analysis for the identification of coalitions of actors with shared policy core beliefs (Schlager 1995; Matti and Sandström 2011), for example, while FPA approaches sometimes adopt discourse analysis and broader frames of association. Research Design The central purpose of this article is to highlight the added value of the ACF for understanding continuity and change in US foreign policy toward the Syrian civil war (2011–present). Advocacy coalitions involve different groups of actors with shared beliefs who favor or challenge policy changes over time. Foreign policy outcomes can thus be understood as the product of a dialectical decision-making process that involves competition among advocacy coalitions. As noted above, the ACF looks beyond discrete “causes” of change or the tenures of individual leaders in office, and focuses instead on long-term competition among rival groups of governmental and nongovernmental actors that shape policy outcomes (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993; Pierce and Hicks 2019). The framework predicts that dominant coalitions favoring either continuity or change may prevail in the struggle. This study conducts a plausibility probe of the ACF for understanding US foreign policy toward the Syrian civil war (2011–present) using comparative case studies. Such an approach offers the opportunity to evaluate “whether evidence shows that the hypothesized causal mechanism linking variables was present and that it functioned as theorized” (George and Bennett 2005; Beach and Pedersen 2013, 11; Ragin 2014).12 Specifically, the study provides a succinct ACF overview of several case studies, capturing the primary elements of coalition structure and strategy and mapping beliefs onto policy pathways. Coalitions include actors with similar beliefs—what ACF scholars call common policy core beliefs—that are likely to form coalitions in democratic decision-making processes (Weible 2005; Matti and Sandström 2011). Possible foreign policy outcomes as a result of coalition struggles include: (1) continuity, where a dominant coalition drives policy and suppresses opposition to major changes in the tone or content of US foreign policy—here we might expect to see limited public record of contestation; (2) purposive non-change, where the President and/or a coalition favors change but other coalitions work against this objective to prevent substantial alterations in policy; or (3) change, where policy decisions are taken to produce substantial, lasting alterations in government resource commitments to an issue or challenge in another country. This definition acknowledges the power of the government with the authority to allocate state resources. To evaluate the merits of the ACF relative to other explanations, we should expect to see evidence that advocacy coalitions were actively engaged in the process, that they challenged the will of the executive, and that these interactions ultimately helped shape foreign policy outcomes. Case studies examine several dimensions of ACF applications in US foreign policy deliberations related to the Syrian civil war during the Obama and Trump administrations. First, the case studies present historical background and recognize policy problems or opportunities as antecedent conditions that can initiate processes of competition among coalitions in change processes.13 Second, the case studies describe coalitions, which are often made up of passionate advocates with shared beliefs for their causes and foreign policy entrepreneurs from inside and outside the government. Shared beliefs are demonstrated through public statements and efforts to coordinate strategies of engagement in the policy process. Third, the case studies analyze contestation among them in efforts to shape policy outcomes, including situations where dominant coalitions that favor either continuity or change prevail in contestation (Oppermann, Brummer, and van Willigen 2017). The ACF can also help fill in key gaps in explanations of the Syria case between leaders’ preferences and actual foreign policy outcomes. It focuses on agents and strategies in contentious policymaking processes (Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen 2009, 388) as an alternative to leader-driven models—and it explores how challenges or opportunities are interpreted by different coalitions of actors, and how the contours of decision processes subsequently unfold. Finally, the Syria case offers an opportunity for longitudinal analysis, allowing us to trace processes of foreign policy decision-making, including leader-driven initiatives, calculations of loss aversion, and advocacy coalition competition in response to perceived threats and opportunities (George and Bennett 2005; Levy 2008). Cases draw on diverse primary and secondary accounts of the policy process. Methods of data gathering include archival research and a review of accounts of policy debates from memoirs and interviews. Members of coalitions were identified through analysis of their discourse as recorded in these sources. Candidates for coalition membership include government officials and nongovernmental actors that rally around a set of shared beliefs regarding policy (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). While a more complete ACF account would seek to articulate who the key coalition players were, how their beliefs were structured (perhaps employing content analysis), and what forms of coordination were evident, this article seeks to provide a compelling succinct treatment of an ACF approach to continuity and change. The Obama Administration, Coalitions, and the Syrian Civil War The Obama administration faced a number of difficult foreign policy choices during the Syrian civil war. The conflict, which began in 2011 with government crackdowns against protests inspired by the Arab Spring, quickly turned into a civil war that pitted the Syrian military and pro-Assad loyalists against rebel groups and Islamists.14 Officials in the Obama administration were concerned about the Syrian civil war in the early years, but they seemed reluctant to change US foreign policy to intervene in the conflict. The United States and other Western governments imposed sanctions on Syria, froze its assets, and barred commercial transactions with the regime. Yet, even as the violence in the conflict worsened, the Obama administration seemed determined for years not to deploy troops or intervene directly in the civil war (Krieg 2016). Syrian Use of Chemical Weapons in 2013 Developments in the early years of the Syrian civil war appeared to pose serious challenges for US national security interests. Tens of thousands of Syrian citizens were killed in the first year of the conflict, for example, and millions more were displaced (Berti 2015). In 2012, when intelligence reports suggested that the Syrian regime might use chemical weapons against rebels, President Obama issued what became known as the “red line” declaration, stating that such an action would change his calculus and provoke a US military response (Obama 2012). One year later, though, the Syrian government forces unleashed a Sarin nerve gas attack against rebel-held areas on August 21, 2013, killing more than 1,400 civilians and injuring thousands (Warrick 2013). Obama immediately condemned the attack as “an assault on human dignity [and] a serious danger to our national security” ((quoted in Gordon and Landler 2013), and he seemed inclined to order a retaliatory military strike. However, the President's own reluctance showed through when he announced that he would not take action against Syria without congressional support. The ensuing debate drew out competing coalitions for and against a strike. Several different coalitions of actors became engaged in the policy debate in response to the chemical weapons attack in August and September 2013, including Cabinet officials, members of Congress, and civil society groups. One coalition of actors shared the belief that a strong punitive military response to Assad's use of chemical weapons was needed. Some of the most outspoken members of the coalition favoring engagement included Samantha Power, the US Ambassador to the United Nations, and Secretary of State John Kerry (Osnos 2014). Kerry said, “Assad should be punished in part because the credibility and the future interests of the United States of America and our allies are at stake” (quoted in Goldberg 2016). These players found support from key lawmakers on Capitol Hill, including Senate Majority Leader Harry Reid (D-NV) and House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi, and Speaker of the House John Boehner (R-OH) (Parlapiano et al. 2017). Ultimately, the shared belief structures of the pro-intervention coalition came to impact the relative saliency and perceptions of the causes of problems, as well as identify the preferred solutions. These players were joined by a growing number of civil society groups, including the Children's Defense Fund and Human Rights Watch, calling for some form of military humanitarian intervention. However, another coalition of actors at the time leaned against intervention, with those officials arguing instead for the effectiveness of international sanctions and isolation of the Syrian regime. Barack Obama himself campaigned on the promise that US military interventions would be scaled back, not expanded, when he became President. Once in office, he made clear his belief that military intervention in Syria represented yet another risky proposition (Krieg 2016). Similarly, his White House Chief of Staff Thomas McDonough was averse to US military intervention, regularly warning the President to avoid foreign policy “traps.” Secretary of Defense Robert Gates also resisted the call for intervention, asking in meetings of the National Security Council: “Shouldn't we finish up the two wars we have before we look for another?” (Goldberg, April 2016). This group also found supporters in Congress who also resisted military intervention, including a strange bedfellows coalition of left-wing Progressive Democrats and right-wing Tea Party/Freedom Caucus members (Baker and Weisman 2013), along with experts representing organizations like Peace Action, the United States Institute of Peace, and the Heritage Foundation. Coalition actors also trumped the fact that a majority of the public appeared to oppose intervention, as popular support for a military strike hovered around 20 percent (Sullivan 2013). Consistent with the ACF, competition between these coalitions took several forms. First, both groups engaged in rhetorical challenges and framing through public and private debates on the intervention question. The coalition supporting intervention attempted to frame the issue of military intervention in Syria as a “moral imperative” following the horrific chemical attack in 2013. Secretary Kerry said that the use of chemical attacks on civilians in Syria was “undeniable, and that the Obama administration would hold the Syrian government accountable for a moral obscenity that has shocked the world's conscience.” Kerry accused the Syrian government of the “indiscriminate slaughter of civilians” and of cynical efforts to cover up its responsibility as a “cowardly crime” (quoted in Gordon and Landler 2013). To underscore this framing, the White House held a series of briefings on Capitol Hill in which it shared classified signals intelligence that proved the culpability of Syrian military commanders, as well as videos of victim suffering (Gordon and Landler 2013). Meanwhile, opponents rejected the idea of Western moral responsibility for events in Syria and emphasized longer-term considerations. They warned that US military intervention would not solve the Syrian crisis alone, and that it actually represented a very slippery slope of involvement (Bierman and Viser 2013). They also called attention to the debate and vote by the UK House of Commons on August 29 in opposition to a British military strike as evidence that the United States might not receive support from key allies (Strong 2015). Experts from the Heritage Foundation argued that the President had not made a strong case that intervention was in the US national security interest. Another contribution to this oppositional frame came from a surprising source: in September, Russian President Vladimir Putin published an opinion-editorial in major US newspapers arguing that a military strike might be shortsighted and “could potentially spark reckless behavior by other states or parties in the region” (Putin 2013). When President Obama announced that he would refer the question to Congress in late August 2013, the focus of contestation became a legislative debate. This sparked a ten-day flurry of maneuvers for and against an authorization for the use of military force that included public debates over legislation, committee hearings, and extensive negotiations on Capitol Hill. This move also created another forum for advocacy coalition struggle. Senator Harry Reid (D-NV) took the initiative by introducing formal legislation to authorize the use of military force against Syria. The bill garnered support from key Senators, including John McCain (R-AZ) and centrist Chris Coons (D-DE). However, the coalition against intervention was both bipartisan and strident in its convictions. Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) opposed the bill, and Tea Party Republicans like Justin Amash (R-MI) said, “I don't think the American people are ready to go to war based on circumstantial evidence.” By the second week of September, the message was clear: a large number of Democrats and Republicans, along with civil society actors and the American public, were either undecided or outright opposed to a strike. The outcome of this contestation was purposive non-change. The Obama administration shifted away from consideration of a military strike. Following several surprising developments in September 2013, the White House ultimately settled on a diplomatic solution to the crisis that would include the removal of chemical weapons from Syria. The United States would have only limited, indirect engagement with events in Syria as a function of advocacy coalition contestation and other factors at work at the time. Confronting the “Caliphate” The rise of the Islamic State (IS) terrorist organization in Syria in 2014 and 2015 appeared to catalyze a process of foreign policy change in the Obama administration. Circumstances provided some momentum to the latent coalition favoring intervention and resulted in a grudging engagement of US military forces. Critically, though, the scope and timing of decisions again appeared to be conditioned by strong pressures from advocacy coalitions. This case began in the aftermath of the 2013 debate over a retaliatory military strike. President Obama said publicly that he felt justified in his reluctance to intervene and that he would prefer to take the United States “off a perpetual war footing” (“Text of Obama's Speech at the U.N.” 2013). However, Western intelligence agencies were growing alarmed at the increasing brazenness of jihadist groups in Syria and Iraq, particularly the rise of IS. The Syrian civil war created a vacuum of power throughout much of the country that IS and other groups were eager to fill. By 2014, the Central Intelligence Agency estimated that that there were as many as 31,500 IS fighters, occupying a territory of more than 34,000 square miles in Syria and Iraq. Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi's declaration of a “caliphate” under Sharia law and the posting online of videos of the killings of US and Western hostages signaled that conditions had clearly changed. Yet, even as IS seized control of more territory in Iraq and Syria, the President dismissed the group as a “Javee team” of terrorists. In early 2014, IS attacked and gained control of the city of Falluja and other territories in Iraq, but the President appeared unmoved. Obama continued to preach caution, calling an interventionist foreign policy “naïve and unsustainable” (Sinha 2015). What followed was a remarkable disjuncture. Even as Western experts recognized IS as one of the most virulent and highest-profile terrorist threats in the post 9/11 era, the United States did not take concerted action against it. Coalitions were again at work in a prolonged policy struggle. Members of the coalition opposed to intervention in Syria, including President Obama, administration officials, and moderate members of Congress, were reluctant to increase US involvement in the region after years of war. The President said that “a strategy that involves invading every country that harbors terrorist networks” as “naïve and unsustainable” (quoted in Sinha 2015). Reflecting the sentiments of a war-weary nation, the President maintained that any form of US intervention, including the arming and training of Syrian rebel groups, could draw it into a quagmire (“Text of Obama's Speech at the U.N.” 2013). These views dovetailed with broader civil society constraints, including groups actively opposed to a “forever war” such as George Soros’ Open Society Institute and the Charles Koch Foundation, which also demonstrated the commitment of a wide variety of actors in coalition. This position of restraint was also supported by moderate Democrats in Congress who believed in Obama's “smart foreign policy” to protect “what is truly in our national security interest, using our full array of national security tools” (quoted in Everett 2014). In June 2014, Senator John Walsh (D-MT), the only Iraq war veteran in the Senate at the time, urged the President not to put US lives at risk in the Middle East, stating, “I've seen war firsthand, and like too many American families, I've seen the costs of war up close. It is now time for the Iraqis to secure and defend their own nation.” Nevertheless, circumstances in this case appear to have changed. Coalitions began to activate in response to the new challenge, strategically defining the “problem” and framing the situation in ways that reflected their own positions. These advocacy coalitions included policymakers in the executive branch, members of Congress in both major political parties, and civil society groups who appeared to engage in a nontrivial degree of policy coordination. Indeed, one could argue that the competition among different advocacy groups at the time helps to explain the response from the Obama administration, as well as its slow and muted nature. The coalition that favored US intervention and attacks on IS was growing. Core members included many of the same players that had supported a military strike against Syria after the 2013 chemical attack. Moderate and more hawkish Republican members of Congress were alarmed by intelligence reports about the rise of IS, but so, too, were more moderate Democrats. Military leaders also seemed to favor greater engagement than in the past, in part to counter terrorism but also as a way to send powerful signals to Syria, Iran, and other countries about continued US interests in stability (Humud, Blanchard, and Niktin 2019). By June 2014, they seemed exasperated at US inaction, and Senators launched a coordinated set of speeches in the chamber, criticizing Obama for his caution. Senator Mitch McConnell (R-KY) said the pPresident's “attitude has left America weaker” and that, in turn, had “weakened the national security posture of the United States.” Senators McCain (R-AZ), Graham (R-SC), Sessions (R-AL), and others lashed out at the Obama administration, arguing that the President's withdrawal from Iraq in 2011 led to the collapse of security there and the rise of IS. Consistent with the ACF, competition between these coalitions took several forms. The groups used rhetoric in political debates, and they engaged in framing and lobbying, along with a dose of legislative challenges. Throughout the summer of 2014, for example, the pro-intervention coalition issued calls for administration responses. “The president of the United States goes fundraising and golfing and now is fiddling as Iraq burns,” said McCain. Senator Graham challenged: “We're letting our defenses erode all over the world. The enemies embolden, our friends are afraid. I will tell you this: If we continue on this track, it will come here again” (quoted in Everett 2014). Graham intentionally framed IS as a threat similar to al Qaeda and used references to 9/11 to try to punctuate his calls for action. Nevertheless, the Obama administration, some antiwar groups, and liberal Democrats appeared to practice counter-framing, warning that a rush to action against IS could further complicate US strategic engagement in the region. They expressed concern about “mission creep,” cautioning that their opposition to committing American ground forces in Iraq was resolute (Davis and Weisman 2014). To some degree, the coalition opposed to action also monopolized on a running controversy in the government over whether the President had the authority to order US troops into harm's way without a congressional authorization of the use of force. While the White House publicly rejected this limitation, it also knew that this uncertainty frustrated calls for direct military action. Even as the President ordered foreign policy changes in August and September 2014, these moves appear to have been moderated by competing pressures. When the President announced air operations, for example, he maintained the strikes would be limited. He first said that he had no intention of arming moderate Syrian rebels that August, and he only acceded six weeks later under tremendous pressure. Obama preached caution throughout the escalating operations, acknowledging in 2015 that “we do not yet have a complete strategy” for fighting IS (quoted in Saenz and Siegel 2015). The President authorized an acceleration of the training and equipping of moderate Syrian rebels, calling it an effort that had been “moving too slowly.” Once again, though, he reiterated, “This will not be quick—this is a long-term campaign.” Contestation continued throughout 2015. Republicans suggested that the administration had acted too slowly and timidly to confront IS in Iraq and Syria, and was continuing to move too cautiously against the group. Speaker Boehner said that while he supported action, the President's “parochial thinking” had emboldened the enemy. Senator McCain criticized the President's claims that US strategy was working, calling Obama's defense of his policies “an embarrassing performance by the leader of the free world” (quoted in Bennett 2015). Meanwhile, Senator Rand Paul (R-KY), long a champion of restraint, criticized Obama for not doing enough. In an interview in late 2015, Paul said, “What kind of idiot sends four people to war? If you go to war, you don't go with underwhelming force, you go to war with overwhelming force” (quoted in Roth 2015). Making Sense of Foreign Policy Change in the Obama Administration After several years of purposive non-change in Syria policy, events in 2014 appear to have represented a turning point for President Obama and top leaders in their assessment of the potential threat posed by IS. In June, the terror group took control of the northern Iraqi city of Mosul, providing it access to vast resources, and its leader al-Baghdadi declared the caliphate (Al-Salhy and Arango 2014). IS also began circulating videos online of brutal killings of Western hostages in August, and the group exhorted other Muslims to join their cause. The President took a number of actions that reflected his administration's changed calculus in the second half of 2014. He authorized limited airstrikes against IS militants in Iraq that August, framing this as a direct reaction to the advance of “barbaric” IS fighters toward the cities of Erbil and Baghdad, where hundreds of US diplomats, advisors, and private citizens were based. He also ordered airstrikes to break the siege of tens of thousands of Yazidis, a religious minority group allied with the Kurds. The President's rationale for the policy change was that protecting American lives and assets and averting a humanitarian disaster were clearly in US national security interests (Cooper, Landler, and Rubin 2014). Later that fall, the President also reversed course and pledged to train and equip moderate rebel groups in Syria (Humud, Blanchard, and Niktin 2019). By the winter of 2014–2015, it appeared that the United States had indeed undertaken a substantial, if reluctant, change in its foreign policy. Leaders perceived that their current policies were incurring painful costs. In a seeming nod to the theory, the President later explained that he had initially underestimated the peril posed by IS and overestimated the ability of the Iraqi Army, which allowed the group to establish areas of Iraq and Syria as “ground zero for jihadists around the world” (ibid). Obama's shift to engagement, albeit uneven and halting, appeared to reflect new realities and heavy internal and external pressure (Fisher 2015; Krieg 2016). Advocacy Coalitions and Syria Policy in the Trump Administration Sadly, the Syria civil war dragged on, and by 2016, the United Nations estimated that at least 400,000 people had been killed in conflict. More than half of the entire population of the country was displaced, and six million Syrians sought refuge in foreign countries. Nevertheless, presidential candidate Donald Trump criticized US engagement in Syria, and he took office determined to draw down engagement. Trump also downplayed the significance of Syria's civil war for US national interests. He criticized the Obama administration's decision to aid rebels in Syria, saying that whenever the United States helped such groups, “… you know what happens? They end up being worse than the people.” He concluded, “I don't like Assad at all, but Assad is killing ISIS. Russia is killing ISIS. And Iran is killing ISIS. And those three have now lined up because of our weak foreign policy” (quoted in Costa and Geltzer 2019). The President sought out support for withdrawal from a limited circle of advisors, conservative think tanks, and a strange bedfellows coalition of lawmakers on Capitol Hill, including Progressive Democrats along with Tea Party conservatives. Ultimately, though, the struggle among advocacy coalitions continued to drive a US foreign policy of grudging engagement in Syria. Trump Administration Early Efforts to Draw Down Forces in Syria Like its predecessor, the Trump administration confronted difficult choices in the Syrian civil war. In 2013, citizen Donald Trump made clear that he opposed intervention, tweeting, “We should stay the hell out of Syria, the ‘rebels’ are just as bad as the current regime. WHAT WILL WE GET FOR OUR LIVES AND $BILLIONS? ZERO” (quoted in Fandos 2017). Following the chemical weapons attack in August 2013, Trump tweeted dozens of warnings against US intervention, and he later suggested that Syrian refugees moving to the United States could be terrorists (Gregg 2019). Trump continued to articulate his opposition to involvement in the Syrian war from the White House throughout 2017 and 2018. He commanded 2,000 US troops in the country who were assisting Kurdish fighters in the struggle against IS and supporting formidable air operations. The President clearly believed that engagement would incur painful costs, and he took actions to change foreign policy course. He pressed his advisors to develop plans to withdraw during his first few months in office and announced that the United States was no longer focused on the ouster of Assad (Ackerman, 2014). When the Syrian military launched another chemical weapons attack against rebels in April 2017, Trump authorized a limited cruise missile strike on the base from which the attack originated (Gordon, Cooper, and Shear 2017). By early 2018, Trump had grown increasingly concerned about risks to US lives and national security interests; he was also frustrated by the expense of continued operations. The President complained that the United States had gotten “nothing out of $7 trillion [spent] in the Middle East over the last 17 years” (quoted in Gearan and Morello 2018). Trump told a cheering crowd at a rally in Ohio, “We're knocking the hell out of ISIS. We'll be coming out of Syria, like, very soon. Let the other people take care of it now” (quoted in Browne and Starr 2018). He clearly articulated his belief that continued US involvement in Syria would produce “painful” losses, and he advocated foreign policy retrenchment. However, a strong coalition of actors inside and outside the administration favored a continuation of US operations in Syria. This included top advisors to the President in 2017 like National Security Advisor McMaster, Defense Secretary Mattis, and Secretary of State Tillerson, who all saw value in strategic engagement in Syria and tried to counter drawdown demands by the President.15 They were joined by leaders of the Republican Party, including Senators Graham and McCain (R-AZ) and House Speaker Ryan (R-WI), who were sympathetic to the idea that selective military operations might help stem the humanitarian crisis and counter terrorism. Chairman of Senate Foreign Relations, Senator Corker (R-TN), argued that it was critical that Assad did not “enjoy impunity for his horrific crimes against his own citizens” (Parlapiano et al. 2017). Experts representing think tanks like the Center for Strategic and International Studies and the Atlantic Council advanced arguments in favor of engagement and stabilization programs. Advocacy coalitions competed for influence over Syria policy during the first years of the Trump administration. Chemical weapons attacks by the Syrian regime in 2017 and 2018 further compounded the antagonisms between opposing coalitions. Both sides practiced framing in the aftermath of the attacks. Supporters of retaliatory airstrikes claimed that the United States had a moral imperative to act. For example, Defense Secretary Mattis articulated the dilemma at hand, saying, “We are trying to stop the murder of innocent people. But, on a strategic level, it's how do we keep this from escalating out of control” (quoted in Baker, Gibbons-Neff, and Cooper 2018). Meanwhile, opponents argued that any action in Syria would be futile. Senator Paul argued that even with a congressional authorization of the use of force, “nothing we have done in the region makes us safer” (Parlapiano et al. 2017). And in an interesting move that showed Mattis’ commitment to purposive non-change, the Secretary of Defense provided only one military option to the President in April 2018 to respond to the chemical attack: a limited strike with cruise missiles. National Security Advisor John Bolton reportedly favored broader engagement in Syria, and he was furious with the Pentagon's position. Bolton said he believed Mattis was “an obstructionist. He seemed to forget that it was the president who was elected to office” (quoted in Filkins 2019). Rival advocacy coalitions also sought legislation in an effort to gain policy dominance. In 2017, for example, members of the House and Senate passed the Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act (H.R.1677). The bipartisan bill, introduced by Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee Ed Royce (R-CA) and Ranking Member Eliot Engel (D-NY), would impose sanctions on individuals and organizations based in the West that supported the Syrian regime, as well as encourage negotiations to end the war and prosecute war criminals. However, while members of Congress favored bolstering sanctions, they remained less eager to support any direct military intervention. The continued debate over prospects for an authorization of the use of military force (AUMF) for interventions also highlighted divisions across the government, both in major political parties, and in civil society. Some lawmakers favored broader intervention to respond to the Syria civil war, as well as expressed concerns about widespread human rights violations in that country. Meanwhile, opponents argued that even though the use of chemical weapons represented “barbaric and heinous war crimes,” the government had a high-bar requirement to pass a new AUMF. Congresswoman Barbara Lee (D-CA) said, the “Syria strikes are far beyond the scope of this [2001] war authorization. This is an act of war. Congress needs to come back into session and hold a debate.” Senators Paul and Tim Kaine (D-VA) also argued that any intervention required an AUMF. “While we all condemn the atrocities in Syria,” added Paul, “the United States was not attacked” (Seipel 2017). The outcome of these struggles was purposive non-change—continued US engagement in Syria. Calls by the President and his supporters for withdrawal were successfully countered by a network of actors committed to strategic operations and planning. One former senior national security official acknowledged that they chose to resist the President's demands by slow-walking any response. He said, “The President thinks out loud. Do you treat it like an order? Or do you treat it as part of a longer conversation? We treated it as part of a longer conversation.” The official added, “By allowing Trump to talk without acting, we prevented a lot of bad things from happening” (quoted in Filkins 2019). The stance of the pro-engagement coalition was also reinforced by circumstances, including the continued military attacks using chemical weapons and the looming influence of Iranian-backed forces in the region, which actors were able to leverage in support of their position. Even as the self-proclaimed caliphate of IS was pushed back to a sliver of territory in Syria, members of the pro-engagement coalition had a plan to remain involved in broader balances of power against Iranian and Turkish interests. Secretary of Defense Mattis stated that US forces were attacking the “last bastions” of IS in Syria, but quickly added, “As that falls, then we'll sort out a new situation. But what you don't do is simply walk away and leave the place as devastated as it is… You don't just leave, and then ISIS comes back” (Mattis 2018). Bolton worked with other actors in the engagement coalition to develop a more expansive plan for the mission of troops there. He announced at a meeting in the summer of 2018 that US engagement would evolve to focus on Iranian interests. Bolton reportedly told the group, “I don't care about Syria, but I do care about Iran,” and said that US troops would remain in Syria possibly for years to counter Iranian interests (Filkins 2019). This became the stated policy of the Trump administration in September 2018, when the President authorized a more assertive strategy: the United States would remain in Syria and shift its focus to compel tens of thousands of Iranian-backed troops inside Syria to depart the country. There and Back Again The coalition favoring continued engagement in Syria seemed quite satisfied with its victories in policy disputes in 2018, and Bolton and others believed they had effectively linked operations in Syria with a broader strategic effort to counterbalance Iran (DePetris 2019). Ambassador James Jeffrey stated that beyond defeating IS, US goals in Syria were clearly focused on “the removal of all Iranian-commanded forces from the entirety of Syria.” And he made clear, “We are not in a hurry to withdraw” (PBS News Hour 2018). When pressed, National Security Advisor Bolton stated bluntly that US troops would not leave Syria until the Iranians and their proxy forces left first (Lund 2018). However, President Trump and other officials were not content with the status quo. In December 2018, the President surprised many when he announced, “We have won against ISIS. Our boys, our young women, our men, they're all coming back and they're coming back now. We won” (quoted in Ryan and Dawsey 2018). Trump's more forceful stand to change US foreign policy represented another volley in coalition struggles and threatened to upend strategic planning. The only result of continued engagement, he telegraphed, would be painful costs. Trump followed up his order with tweets in which he asked, “Does the USA want to be the Policeman of the Middle East, getting NOTHING but spending precious lives and trillions of dollars protecting others who, in almost all cases, do not appreciate what we are doing? Do we want to be there forever? Time for others to finally fight.” In that spirit, the President called for Arab allies to take responsibility and to pay for stabilizing and reconstructing areas liberated from IS. Trump believed that by changing its foreign policy scope and direction, the United States could avoid painful losses. Trump concluded that all of the hand-wringing over Syria was pointless, arguing “Syria was lost long ago.” He believed the country offered nothing more than “sand and death” (Khanna 2018; Lieu 2018). However, as bold as the President's announcement seemed to be at the time, policy outcomes were not a foregone conclusion. In fact, the announcement again activated concerned coalitions and catalyzed the debate over foreign policy. Actors in the coalition in support of continued engagement in Syria rallied to the cause, loudly defending the importance of a US presence. Defense Secretary Mattis and Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman Joseph F. Dunford Jr. argued publicly that it would probably be months or even years before all troops could come home. Supporters of engagement came from conservative think tanks like the Heritage Foundation and the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, which echoed the value of commitment. Civil society groups like the Syrian Opposition Coalition to the United Nations (Hudson Institute, October 26, 2018) strongly agreed. Pentagon officials also sought to parse the meaning of the President's announcement—debating the definition of terms like “all troops,” plans for withdrawal “very soon,” and the pledge to “let other people take care of Syria now.” A former senior administration official told reporters that the news was likely met by leaders “drinking champagne in Damascus” (Filkins 2019). Within hours of the President's first statement calling for foreign policy change, members of the pro-engagement coalition pushed back hard. A Trump loyalist, Senator Graham said publicly that he felt “blindsided” by the decision and decried it as “dangerous” and “a disaster in the making.” Defense Secretary Mattis, who strongly objected to the President's shift in policy, requested a meeting with Trump in which he argued vociferously for continued engagement. Following a fiery exchange, Mattis abruptly resigned in protest. So, too, did Brett McGurk, special envoy for the global coalition to defeat IS (Lazaroff 2018). Reports at the time also suggested that Pentagon officials had begun to slow-walk the order, announcing that they were extending their timeframe regarding the President's call for immediate withdrawal due to logistical constraints (Starr 2018). Later, information was leaked to the press that at least 200 to 400 soldiers would remain in Syria for “stabilization operations.” Following the holiday break, National Security Advisor Bolton issued a new set of preconditions for US withdrawal from Syria and reassured key allies in the region that US troops intended to stay until IS was eradicated and regional governments could come to some agreement on the fate of the Kurds. The number of forces expected to remain also grew over time to a rumored 1,000 soldiers (Nissenbaum and Youssef 2019). US troops would remain in the country, and in close proximity to Iranian-backed forces, even as they faced the potential resurgence of IS in Syria. When pressed on this question, White House Press Secretary Sarah Huckabee Sanders said there was no firm departure date for troops in Syria. The President, she said, was “not going to put an arbitrary timeline.” Details of the President's order and implementation plans were limited. Bolton, who spoke to a reporter about this question in the spring of 2019, said coyly, “Sometimes you win, sometimes you lose” (quoted in Filkins 2019). Key developments in the summer and fall of 2019 threatened to once again change US Syria policy. Rising tensions with Iran led the President to announce the deployment of 2,500 more soldiers to the region. And on September 10, 2019, following a long-running series of battles with the President, Bolton was fired. The President appeared to believe that the ouster of Bolton and key deputies would help create a new space for policy maneuvering. On October 7, the President issued a series of tweets announcing a new policy for Syria: American troops would withdraw from northeastern Syria and no longer support America's Kurdish allies in the region. He said, “The United States was supposed to be in Syria for 30 days, that was many years ago. We stayed and got deeper and deeper into battle with no aim in sight. When I arrived in Washington, ISIS was running rampant in the area. We quickly defeated 100 percent of the ISIS Caliphate.” Trump went on: “It is time for us to get out of these ridiculous Endless Wars, many of them tribal, and bring our soldiers home,” Trump tweeted. “WE WILL FIGHT WHERE IT IS TO OUR BENEFIT, AND ONLY FIGHT TO WIN.” Trump said it was high time to let others, such as Russia, Turkey, and Iran, “figure the situation out” on their own. Accordingly, Defense Secretary Mark T. Esper announced the planned withdrawal of virtually all US forces from northern Syria in the face of a Turkish military offensive targeting Kurdish fighters in the region. The President and members of the coalition that favored disengagement from Syria argued that the move was appropriate, though the circle of supporters on this issue appeared more tightly drawn. Esper and other Cabinet officials defended the President's decision, for example, and Senator Paul once again made the case for withdrawal. Experts at some Washington think tanks such as the Cato Institute and the Quincy Institute agreed with the decision (Glaser 2019). The President's decision drew praise from some high-level academics who preferred grand strategies of restraint and offshore balancing. Michael Desch, the director of the Notre Dame International Security Center, argued that the President's move showed he understood that geopolitics is “cold-blooded business,” and he dismissed critics of the withdrawal as “naive” (Feaver and Inboden 2019). However, if the President believed the order would definitively end the debate over Syria policy, he was in for a surprise. Members of the coalition favoring continued engagement in Syria quickly activated to challenge or blunt the effects of the announcement—and in the process they actually expanded their coalition. A bipartisan array of members of Congress spoke out against the move, arguing that it would undermine US strategic interests and forsake America's allies, the Kurds. Republicans in Congress charged that the move was “weak.” Trump ally Senator Lindsey Graham (D-SC) called Trump's decision on Syria “the biggest blunder of his presidency” (quoted in Dixon and Itkowitz 2019). Democrats also leapt on the challenge: Senate Minority Leader Charles E. Schumer (D-NY), announced that both chambers were readying a joint resolution urging Trump to reverse his decision. One challenger, Air Force veteran Representative Adam Kinzinger (R-IL) argued against the move: “You hear the president and people like Rand Paul talk about endless wars all the time, and it's kitschy. But actually, we were preventing an endless war.” On the CBS show Face the Nation, House Intelligence Committee Chairman Adam B. Schiff (D-CA) called Trump's decision “a complete capitulation” to Erdogan and “an unmitigated disaster” that would result in the resurgence of IS (CBS News 2019). The coalition that supported continued engagement in Syria framed their counterpressure in two main ways. First, they argued that it would be a strategic misstep for the United States to withdraw from Syria and empower jihadist groups and Iranian interests. Second, they charged that the action represented a brazen act of disregard for Kurdish allies, who had supported US interests in the region for decades. For example, House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Eliot Engel (D-NY) said on Meet the Press, “I can think of nothing more disgusting, in all the years I've been in Congress, than what this president is allowing to happen with the Kurds.” Even ardent Trump supporter Representative Liz Cheney (R-WY) said the move would “imperil American Security.” The coalition also expanded in this case to include more experts and think tanks that had taken divergent positions on engagement in the past, including support from the American Enterprise Institute and the Center for American Progress, as well as garnered support across the political spectrum. Pursuant to Trump's orders, some US troops began withdrawing on October 9, 2019. Turkish warplanes launched strikes on Kurdish positions in border towns in northeast Syria, and a ground invasion soon followed. But as the Kurds fled the region, news percolated out that Turkish forces were targeting their convoys. Hundreds of IS prisoners also escaped or were freed from detention in northern Syria. In the face of serious challenges, though, the White House struggled to further refine Trump's orders. Officials quickly warned that if Turkey committed any war crimes against the Kurds in Syria, they would face serious sanctions. And within weeks of his original order, the White House partially reversed the decision and allowed hundreds of US troops to remain in Syria to “take the oil.” Even as some troops pulled out, in fact, others moved into Syria. According to reports, the total number of US forces expected to remain in Syria would be about 900, a figure very close to the 1,000 troops on the ground when Mr Trump ordered the withdrawal in the first place. Alexander Bick, a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, who oversaw Syria issues at the National Security Council in the Obama administration, said, “It's damage control. But the damage is already done in terms of partners’ alarm at the capriciousness of US policymaking” (Schmitt and Cooper 2019). Making Sense of Syria Policy in the Trump Administration These cases show that despite President Trump's ambitions to draw down US involvement in Syria, policy outcomes reflect purposive non-change. From the start of his presidency, Trump sought to reduce the American footprint in Syria, arguing that operations there did not serve US interests. He oversaw the final stages of operations against IS, and then in 2018 and in 2019 began calling for withdrawal. But these efforts were strongly opposed by a coalition of actors who were committed to strategic engagement in Syria and counterbalancing Iranian interests. The resulting shuffle of forces that followed these moves included the withdrawal of hundreds of soldiers but also the deployment of several hundred more troops, along with mechanized troops in Bradley fighting vehicles and tanks. The United States also launched a Special Operations raid against ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, in late October 2019, in which the terrorist leader blew himself up with a suicide vest. When asked whether troops in Syria would also continue the fight against IS, General Kenneth F. McKenzie Jr., the head of the military's Central Command, said, “We're under no illusion that they will go away because we killed Baghdadi. Since it's an ideology, you will never be able to stamp it out” (quoted in Schmitt and Cooper 2019; Schmitt 2019). The resulting policy of grudging engagement in Syria appeared to stymie President Trump's own personal wishes. Conclusion This article set out to examine the potential added value of the advocacy coalition framework in explaining the nuances of foreign policy change and continuity. Developments in Syria have presented a series of challenges to the United States and its allies, and policymakers have struggled to respond in an effective manner. The ACF adds important layers to our understanding of these limitations by highlighting the pressures and contestation associated with the formulation of Syria policy. The framework also shows how coalitions that oppose executive actions can attempt to slow or moderate requests by the executive, explaining gaps between policy formulation and implementation. A plausibility probe of the ACF model of foreign policy continuity and change helps us to evaluate whether evidence showed that the hypothesized causal mechanism was present and “that it functioned as theorized” (Beach and Pedersen 2013, 11). Evidence from a succinct overview of several case studies demonstrates that the primary elements of coalition structure are present, and that beliefs can be mapped onto policy pathways. Coalitions formed among actors with shared policy beliefs and different frames of issues or problems within the policy subsystem. Coalitions in this study included diverse sets of actors with shared beliefs who framed issues in similar ways, and they competed with other coalitions to influence policy outcomes. Membership in these coalitions and their duration extended beyond particular presidential administrations, and even the traditional legislative process. Advocacy group competition featured debates and issue framing, and the contestation patterns suggest ways that coalitions were able to influence the scope and pace of change. While a more complete ACF account might identify coalitions as a function of shared belief structures, this summary provides a compelling account of how an ACF approach can enhance explanatory power over more traditional foreign policy change models. This study of rival advocacy coalitions suggests that broad-brush treatments of external crises or leaders as catalysts of foreign policy change often belie a much more complex set of factors that figure into foreign policy development.16 This investigation also helps to identify themes for further exploration. For example, wider applications of the ACF to study foreign policy continuity and change in cross-national perspective or across issue areas could be quite interesting. A more direct comparison between the value added of the ACF and other prominent models, such as prospect theory and loss aversion (Welch 2005), might also yield valuable insights for theories of foreign policy change in FPA. Potentially interesting pairings of ACF models for two democracies engaged in conflict or cooperation might yield greater information about domestic versus external pressures. Advocacy coalitions appear to be effective in pluralistic systems, including countries like the United States where decision-makers are susceptible to domestic influences, such as Congress or lobby groups. But to what degree could the ACF be applicable to other types of states, including stronger, centralized regimes where foreign policy decision-makers are much more insulated from the domestic influences, as well as nondemocratic states? (Henry et al. 2014; Jenkins-Smith et al. 2014). Finally, there is a need for further exploration of scope conditions in which the balance of power might shift between the coalitions, as well as a question of the relative weighting of the influence of actors in coalitions. Footnotes 1 " This approach is informed by, yet distinct from, the public policy literature on policy advocacy and networks first developed in the 1970s (Heclo 1978; Milward and Wamsley 1984; Rhodes 1990; Peterson and Bomberg 1999, 8; Richardson 2000; Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen 2009, Weible et al. 2011), as well as bureaucratic politics models of foreign policy (Allison 1969; Halperin, Clapp, and Kanter 2006). 2 " Related studies have applied loss aversion to Russian foreign policy decision-making (Forsberg and Pursiainen 2017), great power commitments to distant conflicts (Taliaferro 2004; Berejikian and Early 2013), and trade disputes (Elms 2004). 3 " I credit an anonymous reviewer for this valuable insight. 4 " It should be noted that several published works have recognized potential connections between the ACF and cases of foreign policy development around the world. Past applications of the ACF to foreign policy include Haar (2010), Hirschi and Widmer (2010), Pierce (2011), and Schröer (2014). 5 " The ACF builds on pluralist works on the complex nature of policymaking in democratic systems (Dahl 1967; Diamond and Plattner 2006), recognizing connections between governmental authority and nongovernmental organizations that employ resources to attempt to influence the political process. 6 " Primary applications have been in issue areas such as social, economic, health, and environmental policies. Additional work has expanded the geographical scope of ACF applications, and has featured mixed methods (Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen 2009; Pierce and Hicks 2019). 7 " Pierce, Peterson, and Hicks (2017, 6) argue that coalitions are relatively stable, as a function of socialization and ideological background, and beliefs represent the “glue that binds” the coalitions together. These vested players share policy core beliefs regarding problems and solutions related to power, authority structures, and delivery and implementation of policy goals. However, given the challenge of measuring complex belief structures, Sabatier and Weible (2007) suggest that finding two or three policy core beliefs among actors may be sufficient to identify advocacy coalitions. 8 " To achieve their policy goals, Jenkins-Smith et al. (2014, 192) argue, players recognize that they “must seek allies, share resources, and develop complementary strategies” through coalitions. The model expects coalitions to then engage in “interaction, negotiation and policy learning.” 9 " Competition represents a key mechanism by which different coalitions seek to steer US foreign policy, as well, though the dynamics may be slightly different for structural (resource allocation) and strategic issues. ACF theory asserts that coalitions often struggle for dominance in the policy subsystem. These struggles often involve strategies of activism within existing governing structures, as well as the pursuit of grassroots pressure for policy development or change. 10 " For purposes of parsimony, this study defines the outcome as a dichotomous variable. The result of coalition struggles could be continuity, where the dominant coalition favors no major changes in the tone or content of US foreign policy, or change, where there is a significant alteration in the direction, tone, and content of policy. There could also be substantial variation in decision-making outcomes. 11 " The author thanks anonymous reviewers for their comments in guiding this discussion. 12 " This study also employs the comparative case study design (George and Bennett 2005; Yin 2009; Ragin 2014). Cases are “most similar” in that they both examine external security challenges and advocacy coalition formation and competition to try to change or maintain policies. Foreign policy decisions varied, however, with different outcomes in the dependent variable of study. The criteria for case selection were driven by theory and the research design, with special attention to variance in policies and outcomes (Ragin 2014). Case studies draw on archival research and primary and secondary materials related to the policy process. 13 " This approach is also informed by, yet distinct from, the public policy literature on policy advocacy and networks first developed in the 1970s (Heclo 1978; Milward and Wamsley 1984; Rhodes 1990; Peterson and Bomberg 1999, 8; Richardson 2000; Weible, Sabatier, and McQueen 2009, Weible et al. 2011). 14 " As of 2019, more than eleven million Syrians were either refugees or internally displaced (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2019). 15 " McMaster supported engagement in Syria, but he also sought to limit the scope of the mission to focus on countering IS. 16 " Adaptation of the ACF has provided insights on the agents engaged in contestation within a policy subsystem, as well as their strategies and exchanges and influence on policy outcomes. In so doing, this helps us to understand the “complex process of policy change over periods of one or several decades” (Sabatier 1988, 130). References Ackerman Spencer . 2014 . “ Transcript of Appearance on Last Word with Lawrence O'Donnell .” April 11. http://www.msnbc.com/transcripts/the-last-word/2017-04-11 . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Alden Chris , Aran Amnon. 2011 . Foreign Policy Analysis: New Approaches . London : Taylor & Francis . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Alden Chris , Aran Amnon. 2016 . Foreign Policy Analysis: New Approaches . London : Taylor & Francis . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC Al-Salhy Suadad , Arango Tim. 2014 . “ Sunni Militants Drive Iraqi Army Out of Mosul .” New York Times , June 10, p. A1 . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Allison Graham T. 1969 . “ Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis .” American Political Science Review 6 ( 3 ): 689 – 718 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Allison Graham T. . 1971 . Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis . New York : Little Brown & Company . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Aygül C . 2014 . “ Locating Change in Turkish Foreign Policy: Visa Policies of the Justice and Development Party in the 2000s .” Turkish Studies 15 ( 3 ): 402 – 18 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Baker Peter , Weisman Jonathan. 2013 . “ Obama Seeks Approval By Congress for Strike in Syria .” The New York Times, August 31. https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/01/world/middleeast/syria.html . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Baker Peter , Gibbons-Neff Thomas, Cooper Helene. 2018 . “ Trump Says Missiles Will Be Coming At Syria: Beyond That Lies Uncertainty .” New York Times, April 12, p. A1 . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Barnett C . 1999 . “ The Limits of Media Democratization in South Africa: Politics, Privatization and Regulation .” Media, Culture & Society 21 ( 5 ): 649 – 71 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Barron R. , Barnes J.. 2018 . “ Trump Policy in the Middle East: Syria .” Issue Brief, July 3 . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Beach Derek , Pedersen Rasmus Brun. 2013 . Process-Tracing Methods: Foundations and Guidelines . Ann Arbor, MI : University of Michigan Press . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC Bennett C.J. , Howlett M.. 1992 . “ The Lessons of Learning: Reconciling Theories of Policy Learning and Policy Change .” Policy Sciences 25 ( 3 ): 275 – 94 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Bennett John T. 2015 . “ Obama Assertion on ISIS ‘Embarrassing’ .” RollCall.com, November 17. https://www.rollcall.com/news/mccain-obama-isis-paris-attacks . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Berejikian J.D. , Early Bryan. 2013 . “ Loss Aversion and Foreign Policy Resolve .” Political Psychology 34 ( 5 ): 649 – 71 . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Berti B. 2015 . “‘ Generation War’: Syria's Children Caught Between Internal Conflict and the Rise of the Islamic State .” Strategic Assessment 18 ( 2 ): 45 – 56 . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Bierman N. , Viser M.. 2013 . “ Obama Faces Support, Skepticism in Congress: Boehner, Pelosi Aboard on Syria; Kerry Pressed .” Boston Globe . Accessed March 30, 2019. https://www.bostonglobe.com/news/politics/2013/09/03/top-lawmakers-back-obama-call-for-action-syria/o1x9tbkzTf56EnKSsUe8NN/story.html . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Bleiker Roland , Hutchison Emma. 2008 . “ Fear No More: Emotions and World Politics .” Review of International Studies 34 ( 1 ): 115 – 35 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Bosold David , von Bredow Wilfried. 2006 . “ Human Security: A Radical or Rhetorical Shift in Canada's Foreign Policy? ” International Security 61 ( 4 ): 829 – 44 . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Brazys Samuel , Kaarbo Juliet, Panke Diana. 2017 . “ Foreign Policy Change and International Norms: A Conceptual Framework .” International Politics 54 ( 6 ): 659 – 68 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Browne Ryan , Starr Barbara. 2018 . “ Trump Says U.S. Will Withdraw from Syria ‘Very Soon.’ ” CNN.com, March 29. https://www.cnn.com/2018/03/29/politics/trump-withdraw-syria-pentagon/index.html . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Brummer Klaus , Harnisch Sebastian, Oppermann Kai, Panke Diana, eds. 2019 . Foreign Policy as Public Policy? Promises and Pitfalls . Manchester : Manchester University Press . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC Cantir Cristian , Kaarbo Juliet. 2012 . “ Contested Roles and Domestic Politics: Reflections on Role Theory in Foreign Policy Analysis and IR Theory .” Foreign Policy Analysis 8 ( 1 ): 5 – 24 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Carlsnaes Walter . 1992 . “ The Agency-Structure Problem in Foreign Policy Analysis .” International Studies Quarterly 36 ( 3 ): 245 – 70 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat CBS News . 2019 . “ Transcript: Representative Adam Schiff on Face the Nation .” CBS Face the Nation , October 13. https://www.cbsnews.com/news/transcript-representative-adam-schiff-on-face-the-nation-october-13-2019/ . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Cooper Gordon , Landler Mark, Rubin Alissa J.. 2014 . “ Obama Allows Limited Airstrikes on ISIS .” The New York Times, August 7. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/08/world/middleeast/obama-weighs-military-strikes-to-aid-trapped-iraqis-officials-say.html?_r = 0 . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Cordesman Anthony , Nerguizian Aram. 2017 . “ The Case For and Against a ‘Realist’ Strategy in Syria .” Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 24 . https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/170124_A_Realist_Strategy_in_Syria.pdf . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Costa Christopher P. , Geltzer Joshua. 2019 . “ What Trump Gets Right—and Wrong—About Defeating ISIS .” Politico.com, February 12. https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2019/02/12/donald-trump-isis-aftermath-224986 . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Dahl Robert A. 1967 . Pluralist Democracy in the United States . Chicago : Rand McNally . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Davis Julie Hirschfeld , Weisman Jonathan. 2014 . “ Bipartisan Support, with Caveats, for Obama on Iraq Airstrikes .” The New York Times, August 8. https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/09/us/politics/bipartisan-support-with-caveats-for-obama-on-iraq-airstrikes.html . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat DePetris Daniel R. 2019 . “ Don't Believe the War Hype on Iran .” National Interest, May 27. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/dont-believe-war-hype-iran-59177 . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Destler I.M. 1972 . “ Comment: Multiple Advocacy: Some ‘Limits and Costs.’ ” American Political Science Review 66 ( 3 ): 786 – 90 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Diamond Larry , Plattner Marc F., eds. 2006 . Electoral Systems and Democracy . Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Dixon Chris , Itkowitz Colby. 2019 . “ Senator Graham Calls Trump Decision on Syria ‘Biggest Blunder of His Presidency.’ ” The Washington Post, October 10. https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/sen-graham-calls-trump-decision-on-syria-biggest-blunder-of-his-presidency/2019/10/10/f693741c-eb95-11e9-9c6d-436a0df4f31d_story.html . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Dixon Paul . 2019 . “ ‘Endless Wars of Altruism’? Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and the Syrian War .” The International Journal of Human Rights 23 ( 5 ): 819 – 42 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Doeser Fredrik . 2013 . “ Leader-Driven Foreign Policy Change: Denmark and the Persian Gulf War .” International Political Science Review 34 ( 5 ): 582 – 97 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Dukalskis A. 2017 . “ Myanmar's Double Transition: Political Liberalization and the Peace Process .” Asian Survey 57 ( 4 ): 716 – 37 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Dyson Stephen B. 2006 . “ Personality and Foreign Policy: Tony Blair's Iraq Decisions .” Foreign Policy Analysis 2 ( 3 ): 289 – 306 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Easton David . 1965 . A Systems Analysis of Political Life . Hoboken, NJ : John Wiley Publishers . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Elms Deborah Kay . 2004 . “ Large Costs, Small Benefits: Explaining Trade Dispute Outcomes .” Political Psychology 25 ( 2 ): 241 – 70 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Everett Burgess . 2014 . “ GOP Slams Obama on Foreign Policy .” Politico, June 19. https://www.politico.com/story/2014/06/obama-foreign-policy-gop-senators-policy-attack-108062 . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Fandos Nicholas . 2017 . “ Trump's View of Syria: How It Evolved in 19 Tweets .” The New York Times, April 7. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/us/politics/donald-trump-syria-twitter.html . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Feaver Peter , Inboden Will. 2019 . “ The Realists Are Wrong About Syria .” Foreign Policy, November 4. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/11/04/the-realists-are-wrong-about-syria/ . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Filkins Dexter . 2019 . “ Profiles: John Bolton on the Warpath .” New Yorker, May 6. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2019/05/06/john-bolton-on-the-warpath . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Fisher Max . 2015 . “ Unfixable: How Obama Lost Syria .” Vox.com, November 2. www.vox.com/2015/11/2/9643658/syria-obama-lost . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Forsberg T. , Pursiainen C.. 2017 . “ The Psychological Dimension of Russian Foreign Policy: Putin and the Annexation of Crimea .” Global Society 31 ( 2 ): 220 – 44 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Friman H. Richard . 1993 . “ Side-Payments Versus Security Cards: Domestic Bargaining Tactics in International Economic Negotiations .” International Organization 47 ( 3 ): 387 – 410 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Gearan Anne , Morello Carol. 2018 . “ Trump: U.S. Expenditures in Wars in the Middle East Have Been a ‘Mistake’ .” The Washington Post, February 12. https://www.washingtonpost.com/…/2018/…/12/684e7592-1010-11e8-9065-e55346f6d . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat George Alexander L. , Bennett Andrew. 2005 . Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences . Cambridge, MA : MIT Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Glaser John . 2019 . “ The Trump Administration's Syria Policy: Perspectives from the Field .” Testimony in Hearing before the House Committee on Oversight and Reform. https://oversight.house.gov/legislation/hearings/the-trump-administration-s-syria-policy-perspectives-from-the-field . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Goldberg Jeffrey . 2016 . “ The Obama Doctrine .” The Atlantic, April. https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/04/the-obama-doctrine/471525/ . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Goldmann K. 1988 . Change and Stability in the International System: The Problems and Possibilities of Détente . New York : Harvester Wheatsheaf . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Gordon Michael R. , Cooper Helene, Shear Michael D.. 2017 . “ Dozens of U.S. Missiles Hit Airbase in Syria .” The New York Times, April 6. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/06/world/middleeast/us-said-to-weigh-military-responses-to-syrian-chemical-attack.html . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Gordon Michael R. , Landler Mark. 2013 . “ Kerry Cites Clear Evidence of Chemical Weapon Use in Syria .” The New York Times, August 26. https://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/27/world/middleeast/syria-assad.html . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Gregg Aaron . 2019 . “ President Trump's Shifting Message on Syria .” The Washington Post, October 13. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2019/10/14/trumps-shifting-message-syria/?arc404=true . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Gustavsson Jakob . 1998 . “ The Politics of Foreign Policy Change: Explaining the Swedish Reorientation on EC Membership .” Lund Political Studies ( 105 ): 233 https://lup.lub.lu.se/search/publication/18734 . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Gustavsson Jakob . 1999 . “ How Should We Study Foreign Policy Change? ” Cooperation and Conflict 34 ( 1 ): 73 – 95 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Haar Roberta . 2010 . “ Explaining George W. Bush's Adoption of the Neoconservative Agenda After 9/11 .” Politics and Policy 38 ( 5 ): 965 – 90 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Halperin Morton H. 1972 . “ The Decision to Deploy the ABM: Bureaucratic and Domestic Politics in the Johnson Administration .” World Politics 25 ( 1 ): 62 – 95 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Halperin M.H. , Clapp P.A., Kanter Arnold. 2006 . Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy , 2nd edition . Washington, DC : Brookings Institution Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Haney P.J. 2002 . Organizing for Foreign Policy Crises: Presidents, Advisers, and the Management of Decision-Making . Ann Arbor, MI : University of Michigan Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Heclo Hugh . 1978 . “ Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment .” Public Administration Concepts Cases 413 : 46 – 57 . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Henry Adam Douglas , Ingold Karin, Nohrstedt Daniel, Weible Christopher M.. 2014 . “ Policy Change in Comparative Contexts: Applying the Advocacy Coalition Framework Outside of Western Europe and North America .” Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice 16 ( 4 ): 299 – 312 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Herek Gregory M. , Janis Irving L., Huth Paul. 1987 . “ Decision Making During International Crises: Is Quality of Process Related to Outcome? ” Journal of Conflict Resolution 31 ( 2 ): 203 – 26 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Hermann Charles F. 1972 . “ Some Issues in the Study of International Crises .” In International Crises: Insights from Behavioral Research , edited by Hermann C.F., 3 – 17 . New York : The Free Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Hermann Charles F. 1990 . “ Changing Course: When Governments Choose to Redirect Foreign Policy .” International Studies Quarterly 34 ( 1 ): 3 – 21 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Hirschi C. , Widmer T.. 2010 . “ Policy Change and Policy Stasis: Comparing Swiss Foreign Policy Toward South Africa (1968–94) and Iraq (1990–91) .” Policy Studies Journal 38 ( 3 ): 537 – 63 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Holsti K.J. , ed . 1982 . Why Nations Realign: Foreign Policy Restructuring in the Postwar World . Crows Nest, New South Wales : George Allen & Unwin . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Hudson Valerie M. 2005 . “ Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations .” Foreign Policy Analysis 1 ( 1 ): 1 – 30 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Hudson Institute . 2018 . “ Next Steps for U.S. Strategy in Syria .” October 26. https://www.hudson.org/events/1617-next-steps-for-u-s-strategy-in-syria102018 . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Humud Carla E. , Blanchard Christopher, Nikitin Mary Beth. 2019 . Armed Conflict in Syria: Overview and U.S. Response . Washington, DC : Congressional Research Service. March 25. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL33487.pdf . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Ihalainen P. , Matikainen S.. 2016 . “ The British Parliament and Foreign Policy in the 20th Century: Towards Increasing Parliamentarisation? ” Parliamentary History 35 ( 1 ): 1 – 14 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Jakobi Anja P. 2017 . “ Global Norms and U.S. Foreign Policy Change: The Governance of Transnational Crime .” International Politics 54 ( 6 ): 683 – 97 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Jenkins-Smith Hank C. , Nohrstedt Daniel, Weible Christopher M., Sabatier Paul A.. 2014 . “ The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Foundations, Evolution, and Ongoing Research .” Theories of the Policy Process 3 : 183 – 224 . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Jenkins-Smith Hank C. , Sabatier Paul A.. 1994 . “ Evaluating the Advocacy Coalition Framework .” Journal of Public Policy 14 ( 2 ): 175 – 203 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Juul Peter . 2019 . “ The United States Still Needs a Syria Strategy .” Foreignpolicy.com, October 15. https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/10/15/the-united-states-still-needs-a-syria-strategy/ . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Kaarbo Juliet . 2015 . “ A Foreign Policy Analysis Perspective on the Domestic Politics Turn in IR Theory .” International Studies Review 17 ( 2 ): 189 – 216 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Kaarbo Juliet . 2017 . “ Coalition Politics, International Norms, and Foreign Policy: Multiparty Decision-Making Dynamics in Comparative Perspective .” International Politics 54 ( 6 ): 669 – 82 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Karawan Ibrahim. 2005 . “ Foreign Policy Restructuring: Egypt's Disengagement from the Arab–Israeli Conflict Revisited .” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 18 ( 3 ): 325 – 38 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Karvonen Lauri , Sundelius Bengt. 1990 . “ Interdependence and Foreign Policy Management in Sweden and Finland .” International Studies Quarterly 34 ( 2 ): 211 – 27 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Khanna Honorable Ro . 2018 . “ Trump Was Right to Pull Out of Syria and Afghanistan: This is What He Should Do Next .” The Washington Post, December 22, 16 . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Kingdon John W. 2003 . Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies . London : Longman . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Krieg Andreas . 2016 . “ Externalizing the Burden of War: The Obama Doctrine and U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East .” International Affairs 92 ( 1 ): 97 – 113 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Lasswell Harold D. 1956 . The Decision Process: Seven Categories of Functional Analysis . College Park, MD : Bureau of Governmental Research, College of Business and Public Administration, University of Maryland . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Lazaroff Tovah . 2018 . “ McGurk, Mattis Resign in Wake of U.S. Pullout Declaration .” The Jerusalem Post, December 22. https://www.jpost.com/American-Politics/McGurk-Mattis-resign-in-wake-of-US-Syria-pullout-declaration-575132 . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Lentner H.H . 2006 . “ Public Policy and Foreign Policy: Divergences, Intersections, Exchange .” Review of Policy Research 23 ( 1 ): 169 – 81 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Levy Jack S. 2008 . “ Case Studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference .” Conflict Management and Peace Science 25 ( 1 ): 1 – 18 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Lieu Honorable T. , ed. 2018 . “ Statement on Withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Syria .” December 19 . Lund Aron . 2018 . “ The Making and Unmaking of Syria Strategy Under Trump .” The Century Foundation, November 29. https://tcf.org/content/report/making-unmaking-syria-strategy-trump/ . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Mansfield Edward , Milner Helen V., Pevehouse Jon C.. 2007 . “ Vetoing Cooperation: The Impact of Veto Players on Preferential Trading Arrangements .” British Journal of Political Science 37 ( 3 ): 403 – 19 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Marsh Kevin . 2014 . “ Obama's Surge: A Bureaucratic Politics Analysis of the Decision to Order a Troop Surge in the Afghanistan War .” Foreign Policy Analysis 10 ( 3 ): 265 – 88 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Mattes Michaela , Leeds Brett Ashley, Matsumura Naoko. 2016 . “ Measuring Change in Source of Leader Support: The CHISOLS Dataset .” Journal of Peace Research 53 ( 2 ): 259 – 67 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Matti S. , Sandström A.. 2011 . “ The Rationale Determining Advocacy Coalitions: Examining Coordination Networks and Corresponding Beliefs .” Policy Studies Journal 39 ( 3 ): 385 – 410 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Mattis Defense Secretary James . 2018 . “ Press Gaggle at the Pentagon with Secretary of Defense Mattis .” July 27. https://dod.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/1586807/press-gaggle-at-the-pentagon-with-secretary-of-defense-mattis/ . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Milward Brian , Wamsley G.L.. 1984 . “ Policy Subsystems: Networks and the Tools of Public Management .” In Wamsley Policy Subsystems: Networks and the Tools of Public Management , edited by Eyestone Robert. Stamford, CT : JAI Press . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC Mintz Alex. 2004 . “ How Do Leaders Make Decisions? A Poliheuristic Perspective .” Journal of Conflict Resolution 48 ( 1 ): 3 – 13 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Moe Terry M. 1990 . “ Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story .” Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 6 ( 2 ): 213 – 53 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Neack Laura . 2018 . Studying Foreign Policy Comparatively: Cases and Analysis . Boulder, CO : Rowman & Littlefield . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC New York Times . 2013 . “ Text of Obama's Speech at the U.N .” September 24. https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/25/us/politics/text-of-obamas-speech-at-the-un.html . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Nissenbaum Dion , Youssef Nancy A.. 2019 . “ U.S. Military Now Prepared to Leave As Many As 1,000 Troops in Syria .” Wall Street Journal, March 17. https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-military-now-preparing-to-leave-as-many-as-1-000-troops-in-syria-11552853378 . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Obama, President Barack . 2012 . “ Remarks By the President .” August 20. https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/20/remarks-president-white-house-press-corps . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Oppermann Kai , Kaarbo Juliet, Brummer Klaus. 2017 . “ Introduction: Coalition Politics and Foreign Policy .” European Political Science 16 ( 2 ): 457 – 62 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Oppermann Kai , Brummer Klaus, Van Willigen Niels 2017 . “ Coalition Governance and Foreign Policy Decision-Making .” European Political Science 16 ( 4 ): 489 – 501 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Osnos Evan . 2014 . “ In the Land of the Possible .” The New Yorker, December 22. https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/12/22/land-possible . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Ozkececi-Taner Binnur . 2006 . “ Reviewing the Literature on Sequential/Dynamic Foreign Policy Decision Making .” International Studies Review 8 ( 3 ): 545 – 54 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Parlapiano Alicia , Singhvi Anjali, Huang Jon, Kaplan Thomas. 2017 . “ Where Top Lawmakers Stand on Syria: Now and in 2013 .” New York Times. April 7. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/04/07/us/politics/congress-quotes-on-syria-airstrikes.html . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Paul T.V. 2007 . “ The US-India Nuclear Accord: Implications for the Nonproliferation Regime .” International Journal 62 ( 4 ): 845 – 65 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat PBS News Hour . 2018 . “ Is Trump Administration Changing U.S. Policy on Syria? ” PBS News Hour, September 28. www.pbs.org/newshour/show/is-the-trump-administration-changing-u-s-policy-on-syria . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Peterson John , Bomberg Elizabeth. 1999 . Decision-Making in the European Union . London : Macmillan . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC Pierce J.J . 2011 . “ Coalition Stability and Belief Change: Advocacy Coalitions in US Foreign Policy and the Creation of Israel, 1922–44 .” Policy Studies Journal 39 ( 3 ): 411 – 34 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Pierce Jonathan , Hicks Katherine. 2017 . “ Advocacy Coalitions in Foreign Policy .” In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics , edited by Thompson William R. . Oxford : Oxford University Press . http://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.355 . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Pierce Jonathan J. , Hicks Katherine C.. 2019 . “ Foreign Policy Applications of the Advocacy Coalition Framework .” In Foreign Policy as Public Policy? Promises and Pitfalls , edited by Brummer Klaus, Harnisch Sebastian, Oppermann Kai, Panke Diana. Manchester : Manchester University Press . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC Pierce Jonathan J. , Peterson Holly L., Hicks Katherine C.. 2017 . “ Policy Change: An Advocacy Coalition Framework Perspective .” Policy Studies Journal 48 ( 1 ): 64 – 86 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Preston Thomas , t'Hart Paul. 1999 . “ Understanding and Evaluating Bureaucratic Politics: The Nexus Between Political Leaders and Advisory Systems .” Political Psychology 20 ( 1 ): 49 – 98 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Putin V. 2013 . “ A Plea for Caution from Russia .” New York Times . https://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/12/opinion/putin-plea-for-caution-from-russia-on-syria.html . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Ragin Charles C. 2014 . The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies . Berkeley, CA : University of California Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Rapport A. 2017 . “ Cognitive Approaches to Foreign Policy Analysis .” In Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics . Oxford : Oxford University Press . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC Rathbun B.C. 2004 . Partisan interventions: European party politics and peace enforcement in the Balkans . Ithaca, NY : Cornell University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Raunio Tapio , Wagner Wolfgang. 2017 . “ Towards Parliamentarisation of Foreign and Security Policy ?” West European Politics 40 ( 1 ): 1 – 19 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Rhodes Rod A.W. 1990 . “ Policy Networks: A British Perspective .” Journal of Theoretical Politics 2 ( 3 ): 293 – 317 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Richardson Jeremy . 2000 . “ Government, Interest Groups and Policy Change .” Political Studies 48 ( 2 ): 1006 – 25 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Risse-Kappen Thomas . 1994 . “ Ideas Do Not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War .” International Organization 48 ( 2 ): 185 – 214 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Rosati Jerel A. , Hagan Joe D., Sampson Martin W., eds. 1994 . Foreign Policy Restructuring: How Governments Respond to Global Change . London : Reaktion Books . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Rosenau James N. 1966 . “ Pre-Theories and Theories of Foreign Policy .” In Approaches to Comparative and International Politics , edited by Barry Farrell R., 27 – 92 . Evanston, IL : Northwestern University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Roth Samantha-Jo . 2015 . “ Rand Paul on Obama's Foreign Policy .” Huffington Post, November 12. https://www.huffpost.com/entry/rand-paul-obamas-foreign-policy_n_56451fe7e4b045bf3dee865a . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Ryan Missy , Dawsey Josh. 2018 . “ U.S. Troops to Be Pulled Out of Syria Quickly, White House Says .” The Washington Post, December 19, 1 . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Sabatier Paul A . 1988 . “ An Advocacy Coalition Framework of Policy Change and the Role of Policy-Oriented Learning Therein .” Policy Sciences 21 ( 2 ): 129 – 68 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Sabatier Paul A. , Jenkins-Smith Hank C.. 1993 . Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach . Boulder, CO : Westview Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Sabatier Paul A. , Jenkins-Smith Hank C.. 1999 . “ The Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Assessment .” In Theories of the Policy Process , edited by Sabatier Paul, 117 – 66 . Boulder, CO : Westview Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Sabatier Paul A. , Weible Christopher M.. 2007 . “ The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Innovations and Clarifications .” In Theories of the Policy Process , second edition, edited by Sabatier Paul A., 189 – 220 . Boulder, CO : Westview Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Saenz Arlette , Siegel Benjamin. 2015 . “ President Obama on ISIS Fight .” June 8. https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/president-obama-isis-fight-complete-strategy/story?id=31606260 . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Schlager E. 1995 . “ Policy Making and Collective Action: Defining Coalitions Within the Advocacy Coalition Framework .” Policy Sciences 28 ( 3 ): 243 – 70 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Schmitt Eric . 2019 . “ U.S. Resumes Large Scale Operations Against ISIS in Northern Syria .” The New York Times, November 25. https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/25/us/politics/us-syria-isis.html . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Schmitt Eric , Cooper Helene. 2019 . “ How the New Syria Took Shape .” The New York Times, October 30, A1 . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Schröer A. 2014 . “ Lessons Learned? German Security Policy and the War in Afghanistan .” German Politics 23 ( 1–2 ): 78 – 102 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Seipel Brooke . 2017 . “ Rand Paul: Trump Needs Congress to Authorize Military Action in Syria .” TheHill.com, April 6. https://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/327736-rand-paul-trump-needed-congressional-authorization-for-military . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Sinha Shreeya . 2015 . “ Obama's Evolution on ISIS .” The New York Times, June 9. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2015/06/09/world/middleeast/obama-isis-strategy.html . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Snyder Richard C. , Bruck Henry W., Sapin Burton. 1954 . “ Decision-Making as an Approach to the Study of International Politics .” Foreign Policy Analysis Series No. 3 . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Starr Barbara . 2018 . “ Order to Withdraw US Forces from Syria Signed .” CNN, December 23. https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/23/politics/syria-withdrawal-pentagon-signed-order/index.html . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Strong James . 2015 . “ Interpreting the Syria Vote: Parliament and British Foreign Policy .” International Affairs 91 ( 5 ): 1123 – 39 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Subotić Jelena . 2016 . Narrative, Ontological Security, and Foreign Policy Change .” Foreign Policy Analysis 12 ( 4 ): 610 – 27 . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Sullivan Andy . 2013 . “ U.S. Public Opposes Syria Intervention As Obama Presses Congress .” Reuters, September 3. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-usa/u-s-public-opposes-syria-intervention-as-obama-presses-congress-idUSBRE97T0NB20130903 . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Taliaferro Jeffrey W. 2004 . “ Power Politics and the Balance of Risk: Hypotheses on Great Power Intervention in the Periphery .” Political Psychology 25 ( 2 ): 177 – 211 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Thomas Daniel . 2011 . Making EU Foreign Policy: National Preferences, European Norms, and Common Policies . New York : Springer . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees . 2019 . “ United Nations Calls for Sustained Support to Syrians and the Region Ahead of Brussels Conference .” March 13. https://www.unhcr.org/en-us/news/press/2019/3/5c88e57d4/united-nations-calls-sustained-support-syrians-region-ahead-brussels-conference.html . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Volgy Thomas J. , Schwarz John E.. 1994 . “ Foreign Policy Restructuring and the Myriad Webs of Restraint .” In Foreign Policy Restructuring: How Governments Respond to Global Change , edited by Rosati Jerel A., Hagan Joe D., Sampson Martin W. III, 22 – 42 . Columbia, SC : University of South Carolina Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Walt Stephen . 2018 . “ Good Riddance to America's Syria Policy .” Foreignpolicy.com, December 21. https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/21/good-riddance-to-americas-syria-policy/ . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Warrick Joby . 2013 . “ More than 1,400 Killed in Syrian Chemical Weapons Attack, U.S. Says The Washington Post .” The Washington Post, August 30. https://www.washingtonpost.com/ . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Wehner Leslie E. , Thies Cameron G.. 2014 . “ Role Theory, Narratives, and Interpretation: The Domestic Contestation of Roles .” International Studies Review 16 ( 3 ): 411 – 36 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Weible C.M. 2005 . “ Beliefs and Perceived Influence in a Natural Resource Conflict: An Advocacy Coalition Approach to Policy Networks .” Political Research Quarterly 58 ( 3 ): 461 – 75 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Weible Christopher M. , Paul A. Sabatier, Kelly McQueen . 2009 . “ Themes and Variations: Taking Stock of the Advocacy Coalition Framework .” Policy Studies Journal 37 ( 1 ): 121 – 40 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Weible Christopher M. , Sabatier Paul A., Jenkins-Smith Hank C., Nohrstedt Daniel, Henry Adam Douglas, DeLeon Peter. 2011 . “ A Quarter Century of the Advocacy Coalition Framework: An Introduction to the Special Issue .” Policy Studies Journal 39 ( 3 ): 349 – 60 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Welch David A. 2005 . Painful Choices: A Theory of Foreign Policy Change . Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC Yee Vivian . 2018 . “ Syria Faces Brittle Future, Dominated By Russia and Iran .” The New York Times, December 26. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/26/world/middleeast/syria-future.html . OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat Yin Robert K. 2009 . Case Study Research: Design and Methods . New York : Sage . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Ziv Guy . 2011 . “ Cognitive Structure and Foreign Policy Change: Israel's Decision to Talk to the PLO .” International Relations 25 ( 4 ): 426 – 54 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat © The Author(s) (2020). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the International Studies Association. This article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (https://academic.oup.com/journals/pages/open_access/funder_policies/chorus/standard_publication_model)
TI - Advocacy Coalitions and Foreign Policy Change: Understanding US Responses to the Syrian Civil War
JF - Journal of Global Security Studies
DO - 10.1093/jogss/ogaa016
DA - 2002-09-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/advocacy-coalitions-and-foreign-policy-change-understanding-us-93nyLn6BwL
SP - 1
VL - Advance Article
IS - 
DP - DeepDyve
ER -