TY - JOUR
AU1 - Ahlquist, John S.
AB - 1026 Comparative Political Studies Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2006). Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press. DOI: 10.1177/0010414007301149 As the title’s allusion to Barrington Moore’s (1966) classic would suggest, Acemoglu and Robinson take on an ambitious project. They attempt no less than to synthesize the past 40 years of work on democratization into “the first systematic formal analysis of the creation and consolidation of democracy” (p. 80) while simultaneously providing a common modeling framework for considering questions of regime change. Acemoglu and Robinson largely succeed. Rather than detracting from their argument, the inevitable holes and hand waving will tend to stimulate productive future research, both theoretical and empirical. Acemoglu and Robinson’s major theoretical contribution is the application of dynamic game theory to the study of democracy and regime change. Although the ingredients of their models will be familiar to political scientists (the median voter theorem, redistributive pressures in democracies, the threat of revolt, etc.), the use of dynamic games buys them several novel predictions. Specifically, their models can account for gradual extensions of the franchise (e.g., Britain), persistent non- democracy (e.g., Singapore), and oscillations between democracy and rule by the elite (e.g., Argentina). 
TI - Book Review: Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2006). Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press
JF - Comparative Political Studies
DO - 10.1177/0010414007301149
DA - 2007-08-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/sage/book-review-acemoglu-d-robinson-j-a-2006-economic-origins-of-8zzL2gDikx
SP - 1026
EP - 1029
VL - 40
IS - 8
DP - DeepDyve
ER -