TY - JOUR AU1 - Watanabe,, Rie AB - (1) Introduction Like previous years, climate change was one of the most important environmental issues in Japan in 2017, particularly with respect to implementation of the Paris Agreement. Another issue in Japan that attracted the attention of policy-makers, as well as the general public, was energy policies, in particular, the future energy mix. Although the government decided to supply approximately 20–2 percent of total electricity from nuclear sources in the 2014 basic energy plan, as of December, almost seven years after the Fukushima accident, only five out of forty-five nuclear power plants had been re-commissioned. The amount of renewable electricity, which grew under the feed-in tariffs introduced in 2012, was not sufficient to make up for nuclear capacity. Under the circumstances, utility companies and steel companies, as well as trading companies, have planned to construct coal-fired power plants, which will have a negative impact on reductions of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and on the achievement of Japan’s targets under the Paris Agreement. The following sections of this contribution focus on Japan’s practices in the domain of climate as well as energy policies and, to a lesser extent, on ozone protection policy as related to the development of international environmental law. (2) Climate Policies (A) Preparation for Long-Term Strategies under the Paris Agreement Article 4, paragraph 19, of the Paris Agreement sets out that ‘all Parties should strive to formulate and communicate long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies, mindful of Article 2 taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.’ The twenty-first Conference of the Parties (COP-21) to the United Nations Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), pursuant to Decision 1/CP21, paragraph 35, invited parties to communicate mid-century, long-term, low-GHG emission development strategies to the Secretariat by 2020. As of 31 December, Benin, the United States, France, Germany, Canada, and Mexico had submitted their long-term GHG emission development strategies to the UNFCCC. The ‘Long-Term, Low-Carbon Vision’ Subcommittee, set up on 29 July 2016 by the Japanese Ministry of the Environment, continued to hold meetings throughout 2017, with the aim of developing Japan’s long-term GHG emission development strategies and achieving an 80 percent reduction in GHG emissions by 2050. In February 2017, the committee published its draft strategy, the main pillars of which concern total energy consumption, the low carbonization of energy sources, and changes in energy sources (for example, from electricity to heat). To achieve the goal of an 80 percent reduction in GHG emissions by 2050, it is necessary to become a zero-emissions economy while solving other structural problems Japan also faces, including economic growth, local development, and energy security. In changing stakeholders’ actions and stimulating innovations, carbon pricing—such as emissions trading or carbon taxes—could play an important role. In light of this, the Ministry of the Environment set up a study committee examining carbon pricing in June. The committee examined carbon pricing, with a focus on the following four points: the implications of carbon pricing in solving the economic and social problems that Japan faces; the effectiveness and limitations of various carbon pricing strategies; the diffusion effect/impact of carbon pricing on the economy and society; and desirable ways to utilize carbon pricing in Japan. In reaching the 80 percent target for reductions of GHG emissions, it is also necessary to introduce and implement policies and measures in all sectors, in particular, the transportation and household sectors, where carbon dioxide emissions have grown. In order to encourage behavioural changes and to facilitate independent change and innovation in lifestyles, the Ministry of the Environment also started providing financial support for ‘nudge’ projects, following model cases in the United States and the United Kingdom. (B) Japan’s GHG Emissions in 2015 Japan’s GHG emissions in 2015, which were reported in 2017, amounted to 1,325 metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent, which was 2.9 percent lower than 2014 levels (reductions of 39 metric tons of carbon dioxide equivalent) and 5.3 percent lower than 2005 levels, but 4.0 percent higher than 1990 levels. The decrease in emissions relative to 2014 levels resulted mainly from declines in electricity consumption, and a reduction in carbon dioxide related to electricity production due to improvements in emissions per unit produced in the power sector. The reasons for emissions reductions relative to 2005 levels were that energy-related carbon dioxide emissions in the industry and transportation sectors declined, while emissions from hydrofluorocarbons, with high global warming effects, increased significantly as a result of the replacement of ozone-depleting substances in refrigerants (more details can be found in Table 1). Table 1. GHG emissions in 2015 . Metric tons . Relative to 2005 levels (%) . Relative to 2014 levels (%) . Energy-related carbon dioxide 1,149 –5.7 –3.4 Non-energy-related carbon dioxide 78.4 –14.5 –1.1 Methane 31.3 –11.3 –2.4 Nitrous oxide 20.8 –16.1 –2.9 Perfluorochemicals 3.3 –61.6 –1.6 Hydrofluorocarbons 39.2 +206.7 +9.6 Sulfur Hexafluoride 2.1 –58.0 +2.7 Nitrogen Trifluoride 0.6 –61.2 –49.1 Total 1,325 –5.3 –2.9 . Metric tons . Relative to 2005 levels (%) . Relative to 2014 levels (%) . Energy-related carbon dioxide 1,149 –5.7 –3.4 Non-energy-related carbon dioxide 78.4 –14.5 –1.1 Methane 31.3 –11.3 –2.4 Nitrous oxide 20.8 –16.1 –2.9 Perfluorochemicals 3.3 –61.6 –1.6 Hydrofluorocarbons 39.2 +206.7 +9.6 Sulfur Hexafluoride 2.1 –58.0 +2.7 Nitrogen Trifluoride 0.6 –61.2 –49.1 Total 1,325 –5.3 –2.9 Source: Japan’s 2015 GHG Inventory Table 1. GHG emissions in 2015 . Metric tons . Relative to 2005 levels (%) . Relative to 2014 levels (%) . Energy-related carbon dioxide 1,149 –5.7 –3.4 Non-energy-related carbon dioxide 78.4 –14.5 –1.1 Methane 31.3 –11.3 –2.4 Nitrous oxide 20.8 –16.1 –2.9 Perfluorochemicals 3.3 –61.6 –1.6 Hydrofluorocarbons 39.2 +206.7 +9.6 Sulfur Hexafluoride 2.1 –58.0 +2.7 Nitrogen Trifluoride 0.6 –61.2 –49.1 Total 1,325 –5.3 –2.9 . Metric tons . Relative to 2005 levels (%) . Relative to 2014 levels (%) . Energy-related carbon dioxide 1,149 –5.7 –3.4 Non-energy-related carbon dioxide 78.4 –14.5 –1.1 Methane 31.3 –11.3 –2.4 Nitrous oxide 20.8 –16.1 –2.9 Perfluorochemicals 3.3 –61.6 –1.6 Hydrofluorocarbons 39.2 +206.7 +9.6 Sulfur Hexafluoride 2.1 –58.0 +2.7 Nitrogen Trifluoride 0.6 –61.2 –49.1 Total 1,325 –5.3 –2.9 Source: Japan’s 2015 GHG Inventory (C) International Climate Negotiations At the twenty-third Conference of the Parties (COP-23) to the UNFCCC, held in November in Bonn, Germany, and chaired by Fiji, Japan made various technical proposals on the relevant implementation guidelines of the Paris Agreement, including on nationally determined contributions, the transparency framework, and market mechanisms. Several developing countries argued that implementation of the Paris Agreement should differ between developed and developing countries, which was opposed by developed countries. Japan stressed that the guidelines should promote all countries’ efforts on climate change, and should not be bifurcated (). At the high-level segment, Minister Masaharu Nakagawa explained Japan’s domestic and international actions as well as Japan’s governmental assistance for the actions of non-state actors, and also expressed Japan’s intention to host the forty-ninth plenary session of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change to Japan. In addition, he referred to the establishment of the Partnership to Strengthen Transparency for Co-Innovation to enhance the transparency of various actors’ efforts to address climate change and Japan’s support, totalling US $500 million, for the Capacity-Building Initiative for Transparency; Minister Nakagawa also noted Japan’s support for action on climate change with the launch of IBUKI 2, a GHG observational satellite. (3) Energy Policies In order to drastically reduce GHG emissions while still ensuring energy supply and thus sustaining economic growth, the reform of energy policy is an urgent agenda item in Japan. The country’s current long-term energy plan expects an energy mix of nuclear at 20-22 percent, renewables at 22-24 percent, liquefied natural gas at 27 percent, coal at 26 percent, and oil at 3 percent in 2030. The country has faced difficulty recommissioning existing nuclear power plants; as of December, only five were in operation out of the forty-five existing nuclear power plants (Takahama third and fourth, Ikata third, and Sendai first and second). Although the capacity of renewable energy in 2016 was 2.5 times that in 2012 due to the introduction of feed-in tariffs, and the percentage of renewables in the total electricity capacity amounted to 15 percent in 2016, reducing costs and developing industrial infrastructure are necessary to utilize renewables as one of the country’s main energy sources. In order to make up for reduced nuclear capacities, utility companies and energy-intensive companies have proposed the construction of new coal-fired power plants. Despite being state-of-the-art technology, their emissions are still much higher than liquefied natural gas-fired plants. In light of such developments, as well as the fact that the long-term GHG reduction plan has been discussed in climate policy, in August, the Ministry of Economic Affairs also launched energy policy discussions with a view to 2042 and 2050. The basic policy committee of the Resource and Energy Agency of the Ministry of Economic Affairs examined the progress of the 2014 energy basic plan towards completing its 2030 targets. This progress is summarized in Table 2. Table 2. The progress of the 2014 energy basic plan . 2013 (%) . 2016 (%) . 2030 target (%) . Carbon dioxide reductions 10 17 26 Energy self-sufficiency 6 8 24 Zero emissions electricity sources 12 17 44 Renewables 11 Renewables 15 Renewables 22–4 Nuclear 1 Nuclear 2 Nuclear 20–2- . 2013 (%) . 2016 (%) . 2030 target (%) . Carbon dioxide reductions 10 17 26 Energy self-sufficiency 6 8 24 Zero emissions electricity sources 12 17 44 Renewables 11 Renewables 15 Renewables 22–4 Nuclear 1 Nuclear 2 Nuclear 20–2- Table 2. The progress of the 2014 energy basic plan . 2013 (%) . 2016 (%) . 2030 target (%) . Carbon dioxide reductions 10 17 26 Energy self-sufficiency 6 8 24 Zero emissions electricity sources 12 17 44 Renewables 11 Renewables 15 Renewables 22–4 Nuclear 1 Nuclear 2 Nuclear 20–2- . 2013 (%) . 2016 (%) . 2030 target (%) . Carbon dioxide reductions 10 17 26 Energy self-sufficiency 6 8 24 Zero emissions electricity sources 12 17 44 Renewables 11 Renewables 15 Renewables 22–4 Nuclear 1 Nuclear 2 Nuclear 20–2- (A) Revision of Feed-in Prices One important pillar in energy policy has been support for renewable electricity production. The Act on Special Measures concerning the Procurement of Renewable Electric Energy by Electric Utilities (Act no. 108 of 30 August 2011) established what is known as the Procurement Price Calculation Committee under the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Trade and Industry in 2011 (see previous editions of this yearbook). The feed-in price and its duration are reviewed by the Procurement Price Calculation Committee every year, reflecting the recommendations of the committee. Following the 2016 review, the prices for all renewable energies were reduced again this year (see Table 1). The rates for photovoltaics were further reduced. Unlike in previous years, in the 2017 revision, feed-in tariffs were set for three years, from 1 April 2017 to 31 March 2020, with staged rate reductions. (B) Nuclear Policy This year the Nuclear Regulation Authority—an independent agency of the ministry charged with handling nuclear power generation (that is, the Natural Resource and Energy Agency of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, Trade and Industry)—finished its inspections for the third and fourth Ōi Nuclear Power Plant ( May), the Genkai Nuclear Power Plant (January), the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa Nuclear Power Plant (December), and the underground uranium concentration and storage plant of Japan Nuclear Fuel Limited (May). (C) Coal-fired Power Plants Under the current long-term energy supply and demand plan, coal accounts for 26 percent of the total electricity supply. This year, five new coal-fired power plants (Osaki in Hiroshima, Sendai in Miyagi, Nagoya second in Aichi, Mizushima in Okayama, and Meinan in Aichi) went into operation, and another forty-four coal-fired power plants were under environmental impact assessment or under construction. Despite representing state-of-the-art technology, their emissions are much higher than liquefied natural gas-fired plants, let alone renewables. In light of this, groups of local citizens in Sendai (for Sendai-Takamats), Tokyo (for Sodegaura, Soga2, and Yokosuka), and Hyōgo (for Shinko and Takasago) protested against coal-fired plant construction. Plans for three plants (Akō in Hyogo, Ichihara in Chiba, and Takasago in Hyogo) were cancelled in 2017. For Akō, the Prefecture Governor of Hyogo stated that the ‘explanation of the CO2 emission-reduction plan is insufficient’ and ‘it is necessary to study, forecast, and assess harmful substances contained in coal.’ During the environmental impact assessment for Ichihara in Chiba Prefecture, the Minister of the Environment, Koichi Yamamoto, submitted an opinion to the Minister of Economic Affairs that the plan was extremely risky from the perspective of environmental protection. (4) Ozone Protection (A) Publication of the 2016 Ozone Monitoring Report In August, the Ministry of the Environment published the 2016 Ozone Monitoring Report, in accordance with the Law Concerning the Protection of the Ozone Layer by Regulating Specific Substances (1988 Law no. 53). The report noted that in 2016, the average amount of ozone stopped depleting and was stable. In the Antarctic, the average amount of ozone was smaller in 2016 than it had been from 1997 to 2006—sometimes over 10 percent smaller. The largest ozone hole that year, observed on 28 September 2016, had an area of 22.70 million square kilometres—the same as, or larger than, that which had been observed as the average from 2006 to 2015, but then receded in mid-October, and disappeared on 22 November. In the high latitude areas of the northern hemisphere, the total quantity of ozone changed depending on the weather conditions. From mid-February to the beginning of March 2016, the quantity of ozone in the northern part of the Russian Federation decreased (less than 280 milli-atmosphere centimetres, but from mid-March, there was almost no area with less than 280 milli-atmosphere centimetres. With regard to Japan, the monthly average of total ozone amount in 2016 was smaller than the average amount from 1994 to 2008 at all four monitoring sites (Sapporo, Tsukuba, Minamitorishima, and Naha). © The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com This article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (https://academic.oup.com/journals/pages/open_access/funder_policies/chorus/standard_publication_model) TI - 14. Northeast AsiaA. Japan JF - Yearbook of International Environmental Law DO - 10.1093/yiel/yvy062 DA - 2017-01-01 UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/14-northeast-asiaa-japan-8qz6WpGhFF SP - 375 VL - 28 IS - DP - DeepDyve ER -