TY - JOUR
AU - Nicholls, Daniel, Hywel
AB - Abstract In this article I adopt a relational-structural approach to hegemonic order, setting out two distinct forms of consensual order, which differ in their modes of control. The central argument is that patterned structures of relational interaction determine the way in which roles are developed, and this, in turn, conditions structural power asymmetries, legitimacy, and authority. Within an elevated hegemonic order, intraperipheral ties are sparse, and a well-connected hegemon has been able to control flows of meanings and understandings. This relational domination leads to the hegemon role-making its own role and alter-casting roles onto its periphery. The resulting role-structures generate hegemonic privileges and pronounced structural power asymmetries within an order that exhibits authority but wherein legitimacy is either absent or exists in the form of “submission legitimacy,” even though consent is forthcoming. In an ensconced hegemonic order, the periphery is densely interconnected, allowing secondary actors to establish common aims and negotiate collectively with the hegemon. Here, the hegemon cannot control role-creation to a significant degree, and dynamics of role-taking predominate, both for hegemon and periphery. This plays out in reduced structural power disparities and an order based on legitimated roles and functions. This relational-structural approach moves us away from the consent-coercion dichotomy toward interpretations of subtler forms of control, blending a relational-constructivist focus on the production, reproduction, and modification of actor-roles into a schematic causal account of how and why roles matter for hierarchy. The two models are then woven into an analytical narrative that interprets forms of hegemonic order in the Western Hemisphere during the post–Cold War period. hegemony, relationalism, role-theory Introduction During the 1990s, the United States encountered few difficulties in its attempts to shape political structures in South America in line with its own interests, ensuring that compliant local leaders embraced the precepts of democratic governance, neoliberal economic reforms, and their accompanying forms of state-society relations. However, over the course of the first decade of the 2000s, South American states began to work collectively to resist Washington's attempts to control political outcomes in the subregion,1 securing results that worked to further their own interests and against those of their erstwhile patron. Importantly, this occurred in the absence of significant shifts in relative levels of material power and despite repeated attempts by Washington to prevail in its relations with South America. What I contend here is that a shift in the relational structure of the region and a subsequent recasting of roles reformulated possibilities for political action, with the hegemon effectively robbed of its former privileges. The thrust of the argument is that actors are arranged into structured patterns of interaction that generate roles and privileges within the international system, and this conditions the way in which structural power, authority, and legitimacy are configured and assigned. The analysis is developed through two ideal-type models of relational2 hegemony (ensconced and elevated hegemonic orders), which distinguish between relational structures with a sparsely and densely interconnected periphery. Where a sparsely interconnected periphery maintains strong ties with the hegemon, the latter can develop and assign roles for the former through its control over the relational channels via which meanings and understandings are developed and diffused, thereby creating an authority role for itself and a structural power advantage. Where the periphery is densely interconnected, it can establish common goals and collectively negotiate effectively with the hegemon, giving it a greater say in the development of the roles corresponding to hegemon and periphery, as the core actor cannot take advantage of uncoordinated and isolated negotiating partners (Nexon 2009, 27, 52). This intersubjective process results in legitimated roles for both the hegemon and the periphery, with the hegemon ensconced within the order rather than elevated above it. The puzzle of shifting hierarchies in the Americas is particularly intriguing, as traditional interpretations of hegemony cannot fully explain the causes or processes that led to it. Although a commodity boom and the diversification of economic relations away from the United States and toward China worked to reduce patterns of economic dependency (Cooper and Heine 2009b, 11; Legler 2010), there was no significant shift in relative levels of material power that might explain alterations to hegemonic advantage from a realist perspective (Keohane 1984; Webb and Krasner 1989) or signal the emergence of balancing behavior (Waltz 1979; Walt 2005), nor was there evidence of a contracting process through which sovereignty was ceded in return for public goods such as a security guarantee (Lake 1999, 2007). Similarly, whilst the assignment of subordinate roles by the hegemon within an elevated hegemonic order during the 1990s overlaps with interpretations in which state elites are socialized into taking on the hegemon's values (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990, 285–90), these accounts focus clearly on legitimacy rather than unlegitimated authority, and there is no consideration of the relational structures or structural power asymmetries that facilitate this internalization of the hegemon's norms. And although the model of ensconced hegemonic order shares elements with liberal approaches that focus on rules-based negotiated orders, which hem in potentially coercive hegemonic power and provide voice opportunities to secondary states within institutional enmeshments to generate legitimacy (Ikenberry 2011, 71–2; Kupchan 1998, 41–2), these stress the will and strategy of leading actors, neither defining the relational structure that facilitates the participation of peripheral actors in the negotiation of this order nor considering the constitutive nature of relational interactions and structures. Rather than focusing on states pursuing preformulated interests through rule-creation, my relational approach unpacks the way in which roles emanate from relations and determine possibilities for action. Relational approaches to international hierarchy are nothing new, and those based more on imperial modes of control, where satellites are isolated into relations of bilateral dependency, explain the Cold War period of social and political control in the Americas well (Nexon and Wright 2007; Barkey 2008; Nexon 2009; MacDonald 2018). However, these stress the role of local intermediaries in either garnering social consent for external influence or imposing social control so as to clamp down on potential resistance to relations of patronage. Local elites with preformed interests and identities are co-opted into an order, not constituted by it, which means the interplay between relational patterns, roles, and structural power is overlooked. The models of hegemonic order set out within this article build on and respecify existing relational models, advancing an interpretation that sets out the crucial importance of relational spaces in defining whether roles are assigned by the hegemon or developed through intersubjective negotiation, with the resultant orders founded on relations of authority and legitimacy, respectively. Importantly, authority is not taken as a divisible sovereign “possession” to be traded away for greater gains in terms of public-good provision (Lake 2009, 343–44) but rather as the result of constitutive processes that configure roles and decide who gets to do what within an order. In contrast to substantialist accounts, which interpret and model a preconstituted social world, the focus here is on how authority is produced, reproduced, and modified within a relational-structural context, rather than on how preexisting authority is bartered between two actors within a bilateral hierarchical relationship.3 Within the model of elevated hegemonic order, a well-connected core actor is able to take advantage of a more sparsely interconnected periphery in order to control not only flows of material resources but also ideas and information. Indeed, information can be withheld or disseminated in such a way that perceptions, attitudes, and behavior are altered (Hafner-Burton, Kahler, and Montgomery 2009, 570). Power, therefore, inheres to relational structures, as core actors benefit from network centrality (they enjoy more numerous and/or stronger ties with other actors than other actors do amongst themselves) and are able to control flows of ideas and information that allow them to determine perceptions and acceptable actions, thereby constructing roles and meanings in line with their own interests. The core-manufactured roles of the order predetermine the expectations and actions of peripheral actors and lead to pronounced structural power asymmetries.4 Structural power advantage, arising from the roles and state functions corresponding to the structural categories of “hegemon” and “periphery,” is thus the source of authority through which the hegemon is able to gain deference from the periphery. In this form of order, peripheral states acquiesce to the hegemon's demands due to their being constituted as subordinates to a morally superior overlord who enjoys the right to decide how things get done. In line with Nexon and Wright's (2007, 255–59) characterization of hegemonic orders, the contract is homogeneous (each peripheral actor relates to the hegemon on the same terms), but the bargaining process is skewed in favor of the hegemon due to its relational advantage and the lack of coordination within the periphery. This contrasts with imperial orders, whereby heterogeneous bilateral contracts serve to fragment and weaken the periphery through the stoking-up of intraperiphery rivalries, resulting in a bidding war for patronage from the core (Simpson and Macy 2004, 1374–75). Significantly, whilst the order exhibits authority in that the periphery consents to the hegemon's commands, the hegemon may or may not be viewed as legitimate. Acquiescence is offered as peripheral actors have been constituted as subordinates whose structural position5 and assigned role precondition them toward obedience, regardless of whether they consider this to be fair or not. Thus, either legitimacy is absent, or there is a form of “submission legitimacy,” whereby secondary states’ role-acceptance leads them to view their own subordination as somehow “right” or necessary, with the hegemon's perceived superior level of social progress entitling it to take on functions of control. An ensconced hegemonic order, by contrast, exhibits a densely interconnected periphery that is better able to collectively negotiate a hegemonic bargain and enmesh the hegemon into an intersubjectively developed order. This form of order takes in the interests of peripheral actors, and their ability to freely collude to establish common goals and challenge the hegemon means they have greater control over outcomes, and as they are broadly satisfied with the order, they have a vested stake in its continuation. Within an ensconced order, roles are created through intersubjective legitimation processes, and actor-roles and the order as a whole are perceived as legitimate. This leads to a form of negotiated authority, wherein the hegemon is granted certain rights to command or lead in specific fields, and the periphery agrees to follow, with both believing in the right of the hegemon to carry out this role within the intersubjectively established limits and roles of the order. The key distinction to draw out here is that different relational configurations create differentiated dynamics in terms of role-creation and structural power asymmetries, and this generates distinct forms of control. In the following section, the article proceeds to set out the key relational concepts that underlie the models and explain how these play out in terms of role-creation, legitimacy, authority, and structural power. Then these ideas are brought together within detailed descriptions of the two models of hegemonic order, and the empirical sections thread together analytical narratives, which show how the models can help us to interpret processes of hierarchical change within the Americas in the 1990s and 2000s, as well as apply a relational analysis to Cold War relations between the United States and Europe. I conclude with reflections on the analytical value of the models and how a focus on the role effects of relational structures can lead us toward new conceptions of hierarchy. The Effects of Relations Relationalism and Structural Power Relational approaches to hierarchy are based on the ties which link actors together and the structures that these configure. As Qin (2016, 37–38) notes, relational models demonstrate the importance of analyzing relations and relational structures as causal determinants of political action, as social actors are constituted by, and act in terms of, the intensity and type of relations they share with others. Nexon (2009, 40) defines the ties linking actors as “any relatively durable transaction, whether economic or political, coercive or voluntary.” Crucially, actors assign meanings and shared understandings to these ties (Tilly 1998), and it is through analyzing the way in which actors are connected to each other that we can explain the behavior of individual actors and subgroups of actors. This approach to hierarchy and actor-roles allows us to develop a relational interpretation of structural power, which has important consequences for the underlying dynamics of each of our models. Barnett and Duvall (2005, 53) show how structures assign distinct capabilities, interests, and identities, meaning, therefore, they constitute different roles for different actors. The hegemon, from this perspective, exists in terms of its position within a structure in relation to its periphery and vice versa. Within an elevated order, the hegemon is constituted as the leading actor with corresponding role-privileges and functions, and peripheral states are constituted as dependent satellites without the will or capacity to manage their own destiny. Structural power, in this sense, derives from the structural form of the hegemonic order and the roles assigned to different positions within it. Structural power is not the power to create roles in the first place but rather the power that is inherent to the structure of the system and the categories of actor within it after roles have been established. Logically, then, the aims and actions of both the hegemon and peripheral states are conditioned by the type of hegemonic structure within which they are located, and for this very reason, we need to distinguish between different types of hegemonic form and the roles that underlie these. Importantly, structural power constitutes actors’ self-understandings and expectations, meaning that subordinate actors may not recognize their own subordination or may come to view it as somehow “normal,” thereby making resistance unlikely (Barnett and Duvall 2005, 51–53). Unequal structural relationships are thus perpetuated, and the hegemon's structural power advantage works its effects over the periphery even when the hegemon is not actively pressing for advantage, as satellites have been constituted as subordinates and look to satisfy the core without needing to be prodded or pushed. Within my relational models structural power derives from the structural privileges that come with network centrality and the opportunities for role manipulation which this affords. As elevated network centrality allows the core actor to formulate and channel ideas and meanings, it is in a position to establish actor-roles to favor its own interests, which results in hegemonic structural power that accentuates and reinforces hegemonic and subordinate roles. Defining Roles Within IR there is a complex yet underanalyzed distinction between identity and role. In broad terms, identity refers to the constant values, beliefs, and attributes that define who an actor is and what it represents (Ashizawa 2008, 575), whereas role refers to the behavior of an actor in a specific context, which is conditioned by both how an actor perceives itself and how it perceives the expectations of significant others with respect to its behavior. Although role and identity are not the same thing, they are interrelated, as playing out a role serves to underwrite an identity. The state's identity both conditions, and is conditioned by, the roles it plays. Identity does not spring from nowhere but is the result of the roles that an actor plays and the interactions in which it has participated (Ashizawa 2008, 575). As Hopf (1998, 173) observes, by intervening in Vietnam, the United States affirmed its “great power” identity and also reproduced the ideational structure that gave meaning to its action (great powers carry out military interventions). In this case, the United States cast itself in the role of “defender of freedoms,” which both flowed from and contributed to its “great power” identity. Similarly, the United States’ comforting big-brother role as Japan's “protective saviour” (Milliken 1999, 232–33) feeds into its identity as a “benevolent and efficient hegemon,” giving meaning to its privileged social location in relation to others and its exclusive rights to lead and organize (Doty 1997, 378). Identity is thus a socialized, rather than presocial, condition, being constituted through the social roles an actor plays out. Whilst roles can be viewed as the building blocks of identity, the analysis here focuses on roles rather than identity for the following reasons: first, shifts in roles are more readily observable; second, roles are more directly linked to action and forms of control; and, third, role shifts are more direct indicators of relational change. McCourt's (2014, 32–42, 171) micro-interactionist account sets out three processes through which roles are developed: role-taking, role-making and alter-casting. Role-taking is a process through which an actor attempts to second-guess or interpret signals regarding the expectations of others with respect to its own behavior, that is, it must interpret what others will think are acceptable roles for it to play in a particular context. Role-making is a more internal process, whereby a state defines what would be an appropriate role for it to adopt in a certain situation and which actions would fit in with this role. Alter-casting is a process through which an actor attempts to cast roles onto others in order to give meaning and relevance to its own actions and position. Roles are thus conditioned by the patterned interactions a state participates in with others. To set out my relational-structural account, I take on McCourt's relational-constitutive processes to explain how roles are developed and bring in an adapted framework of social structure, which I modify from role-theory approaches. Role theory posits that role expectations are highly dependent on a preexisting location within a social structure and a preconstituted social identity, which determine an actor's rights, privileges, duties, and obligations (Holsti 1970).6 To work around role-theory's substantialist focus, I adapt and “relationalize” its causality to show how the intersubjective processes of role-creation constitute actors and lead to social location. Obviously, as roles configure structural power, and structural power works its effects over an order, any reformulation of roles will be conditioned by existing ones. Just as we are not dealing with preconstituted actors with fixed identities and interests, neither are we at some form of historical “point zero,” wherein actors are empty vessels scurrying around in search of interactions to give themselves meaning. Rather social actors and structures are “entities-in-motion” (Go and Lawson (2017) in a constant whirl of reproduction and reconstruction. Where hegemonic and subordinate roles have been established, and corresponding structural positions determined, the role-baggage that actors carry around with them will influence the new roles they take on. However, relational shifts can radically alter the way in which roles are developed, as new significant others (with different perceptions on acceptable roles) are constituted and brought into play, and formerly predominant actors lose control over the relational channels through which they previously managed and manipulated roles. Although structural power inhibits change, at the same time it is dependent on the relational patterns that condition role-creation processes, and these may shift. As actors with a privileged relational position are able to control discursive channels, they have greater possibilities for alter-casting roles onto others and for communicating their expectations on the acceptable roles available to others. And where actors are relationally isolated, they will have fewer opportunities to voice concerns over a particular role. As would be expected, whether role-taking, role-making or alter-casting is the predominant dynamic depends on the degree of network centrality an actor enjoys and whether it is enmeshed in an ensconced or elevated order. In elevated orders, the relational advantage enjoyed by the hegemon creates more scope for it to role-make and alter-cast, and, conversely, the periphery has little scope for defining its own role. In ensconced orders, there is a more open role-bargaining process, and role-taking predominates for both the hegemon and periphery. Role-creation, here, is essentially an intra- and inter-elite process. As will be set out in subsequent sections, the rise of new elites in South America created a desire for new roles, and the intensification and weakening of certain relational ties shifted the positions of relevant others in generating external expectations of acceptable roles. This is not to black-box out the state but rather to acknowledge that the degree to which elites are penetrated by societal actors will vary from case to case. Where roles are unacceptable to wider society, depending on the domestic social structures in place, this may trigger processes that attempt to influence or supplant the current elite (the societal reactions to the subservient roles adopted by South American elites during the 1990s are a case in point). Legitimacy I use the term legitimacy in its moral or normative sense, whereby an actor is perceived as legitimate due to a normative belief that it is desirable and appropriate for this actor to carry out a certain role within a socially constructed system of meanings (Suchman 1995, 574). Working down to a more specific interpretation, Reus-Smit (2004, 48) contends that for a value system to be accepted as legitimate by others, it must be intersubjectively founded, which means that all actors must participate in its creation and play a role in ensuring it is upheld, as where a value system is subjectively defined as universal, others will view it as alien and imposed. In this sense, depending on how it was founded, an order may enjoy procedural legitimacy (both the order and hegemon have been constituted through processes based on participation and representation that are acceptable to all) and/or consequential legitimacy (it is seen to be working in the general interest of all members) (Koppell 2008, 183, 191). Legitimacy, from this perspective, cannot be self-ordained and must be granted from societies, that is, it is a relational and social phenomenon that cannot be unilaterally established by a hegemon and cast over a periphery (Finnemore 2009, 60–69). What is relevant to us here is that relational form will condition possibilities for the creation of legitimate hegemonic orders. Where actors are well connected across a network and where network centrality is less pronounced, the core actor will have fewer possibilities to control meanings and discourse so as to advance and consolidate its own interests, and the periphery will be better able to collude in its dealings with the hegemon in order to negotiate more effectively. This favors intersubjective processes that determine actor-roles and normative structures in the general interest, which plays out in an order with greater levels of both procedural and consequential legitimacy. Legitimacy, from this approach, is thus a function of relational structures and the interactions that these facilitate, rather than the result of hegemonic actors co-opting local intermediaries within subordinate units who act as local agents and pitch the hegemonic leadership claims of their patrons, thereby attaining societal acceptance for a degree of hegemonic control (cf. MacDonald 2018, 13–17). Authority Whilst from a Weberian interpretation, authority may be perceived as “legitimate power,” in its broadest sense, authority simply refers to compliance with commands and established practices without recourse to coercion on the part of the authority-bearing actor (Wendt and Friedheim 1995, 701). Authority may, in fact, exist in the absence of legitimacy or in conjunction with a manufactured form of “submission legitimacy.” Within an authority-based order, peripheral actors offer deference to the hegemon due to their self-perception as second-order subordinates who lack the right to question their position within a structure. This does not in itself, however, mean that the authority-bearer is considered to be legitimate, that is, the morally rightful actor to carry out a certain role (Coleman 1990, 470). Importantly, where the hegemon has been able to define and assign roles, any legitimation processes that take place are posterior to the hegemon constituting roles and expectations within the order unilaterally, which serves to consolidate its authority and facilitates acquiescence from the periphery. In this sense, we witness a form of submission legitimacy which is bounded by preestablished role-expectations and structural power asymmetries, whereby the periphery accepts its own subordination as corresponding to its lower level of social advancement. As Koppell (2008, 178) observes, whilst legitimacy can indeed serve to underwrite and consolidate authority (as peripheral actors perceive the intersubjective processes through which the order was established as being fair and believe the order works in their general interest, they defer to the hegemon's commands), the notion of authority simply implies an acceptance that compliance with commands is necessary or appropriate. Authority may, in fact, be grudgingly endured rather than gleefully embraced where it is not accompanied by legitimacy. This is relevant to our approach, as heightened network centrality leads to situations in which roles may be unilaterally assigned by the core in a way that hardwires structural power disparities into an order, leading to authority and acquiescence. The key to our analysis here is that role-authority is ultimately about gaining deference without resorting to coercive practices, regardless of how or why this deference is granted, so we need to decouple the seemingly inseparable concepts of legitimacy and authority and incorporate both into different forms of hegemonic order. Ensconced and Elevated Hegemonic Orders Ensconced Order Figure 1, below, illustrates the fairly symmetrical relational structure of an ensconced hegemonic order. The slightly stronger ties between the hegemon and peripheral states are represented by marginally thicker lines—for ease of interpretation—but all secondary actors are well connected and can negotiate effectively, and the heightened level of intraperiphery interaction facilitates the establishment of shared aims, which the order should uphold. Figure 1. Open in new tabDownload slide Ensconced Hegemonic Order Note: Ties between the hegemon and the periphery are seen in red in the online version simply for ease of interpretation Figure 1. Open in new tabDownload slide Ensconced Hegemonic Order Note: Ties between the hegemon and the periphery are seen in red in the online version simply for ease of interpretation What is particularly relevant to ensconced hegemonic orders is the legitimacy that they enjoy due to their being founded on negotiated relationships that incorporate at least some of the interests of all actors (Reus-Smit 2004, 48). In this sense, relational structures provide us with a useful explanatory framework through which to analyze legitimacy, as a shared social space is required for the entire order to negotiate and settle on acceptable processes and roles. Ensconced hegemonic orders facilitate this process, as peripheral actors are well-connected and they have an input into the content and form of the order. We thus witness an order that is founded on participative processes (procedural legitimacy) and that works toward an intersubjectively negotiated collective good (consequential legitimacy) as a result of its particular relational characteristics. Importantly, more equal bargaining positions mean that role-taking will prevail for both hegemon and periphery, with acceptable roles negotiated between all, resulting in lower levels of structural power asymmetry. Elevated Order Elevated hegemonic orders, in contrast, exhibit sparser ties between peripheral actors, who are thus less able to coordinate and set out common aims. This weakens the bargaining ability of the periphery, as different states may be focusing on different elements of the negotiation, meaning there is not a united front on key issues, and the dynamics of collective action are not as well developed due to the lower levels of interaction and trust between peripheral actors. In these cases the resultant hegemonic bargain will favor the hegemon, who has been able to effectively role-bargain and secure exclusive functions and privileges for itself. Figure 2, below, outlines the contours of an elevated hegemonic order. The medium-intensity and weak ties within the periphery are represented by thin black and dashed black lines, respectively, with the thicker lines between the hegemon and the periphery signaling stronger ties. Figure 2. Open in new tabDownload slide Elevated Hegemonic Order Note: Ties between the hegemon and the periphery are seen in red in the online version simply for ease of interpretation Figure 2. Open in new tabDownload slide Elevated Hegemonic Order Note: Ties between the hegemon and the periphery are seen in red in the online version simply for ease of interpretation The core actor will have greater possibilities to manage the development and diffusion of roles and meanings so as to shape the ideational structure of the order (Hafner-Burton et al. 2009, 570), with resultant roles granting it a more pronounced degree of structural power and accentuating its possibilities for control. This relational subordination creates roles of submission and structural power dominance that lead to unquestioning compliance with the core's hegemonic project, with role-structures assigning positions of social authority and dutiful deference, respectively (Bially Mattern and Zarakol 2016, 629). In this vein, the hegemon may alter-cast actor-roles such as “chaotic and helpless satellite” onto the periphery and role-make itself into a “responsible agent of order and progress,” using discursive practices to consolidate these roles and the dependence which they engender. Role-structures thus not only constitute actors but also allow them to understand themselves and their purpose in relation to each other through the opposing yet complementary role dyads in which they are enmeshed (Milliken 1999, 229). The role solidification that structural power creates leads to a level of “stickiness” within the order, meaning that change becomes unlikely. Roles are reified through hegemon-periphery interactions, which naturalize and internalize positions of control and subordination. Nevertheless, if the order and the roles around which it is structured are to endure, then the hegemonic actor must assiduously manage actor-roles, ensuring that peripheral actors continue to be constituted in terms of superordinate-subordinate relations. This means focusing ties around itself as the hub of the order and ensuring that intraperiphery ties remain weak, thereby forestalling alternative patterns of interaction, which could lead to a reformulation of roles and intraperiphery collusion in dealings with the hegemon (as will be discussed in the final section with respect to the Western Hemisphere). Due to hegemonic role-assignment and internalization, satellites view the order as the best that can be hoped for in light of the structural power differentials that exist, and the hegemon is subsequently not challenged over its right to command and control. We thus see an order in which either (a) “submission legitimacy” is manufactured through a prior constitution of roles and perceptions on the part of the hegemon that legitimates and justifies its ability and responsibility to control in line with its advanced social status,7 generating the acquiescence that symbolizes authority, or (b) the hegemon is not perceived as legitimate by the periphery but consent for the hegemon's rule is offered up regardless, thus rendering legitimacy somewhat redundant. Consent is thus a function of structural disempowerment, with the periphery consenting to control as the consequence of an unfair system, which they are resentfully locked into but cannot challenge. Case Selection Applying the models to Western Hemisphere structures over two consecutive time-periods is particularly illuminating. The contemporary nature of the cases draws on the need for new interpretations of structural change in the wake of the tumultuous transformations of the post–Cold War period, and the Americas illustrate, more than other regions in this period, purposeful relational change with the explicit aim of recasting roles. This isn't to say that the models are ideographic representations only capable of explaining the cases in question—changes to relational patterns and roles amongst the countries of the former Soviet Bloc, or, going further back, members of the Non-Aligned Movement, for example, would also have been illustrative—but the dynamics are more clear-cut and discernible in the cases selected. Likewise, whilst China's rise and the end of the Cold War have led to the tweaking of relational patterns in Asia, due to strategic alliances and security vulnerabilities, this is conditioned by a fear of abandonment by the United States from middle and lesser powers in the region, who struggle awkwardly to calibrate their relations with the United States and China rather than challenge their subordinate status. Relational patterns and role-structures are still immensely important in this region, just as they were in postwar Europe, but public-good provision muddies the waters and makes it harder to pick out relational and role-creation processes (Goh 2015, 203–7). And the US security umbrella over Asia provides the order with a degree of consequential legitimacy, even though core-periphery relations are bilateral and roles are alter-cast by Washington. South America, as a zone of peace and without an extensive US basing network, need not fret unduly about the security consequences of drifting away from its northern neighbor. From a more methodological perspective, by focusing on two cases that lead into each other, we can draw out a more dynamic analysis and examine the pathways that lead to change, which would not be possible in a more static comparison between two isolated cases. Elevated Hegemony in the Western Hemisphere during the 1990s The ideal-type model of elevated hegemony can help us to interpret the order of the Western Hemisphere of the 1990s, with the United States’ structural and economic power dominating a still-disconnected periphery. The old Washington-centered imperial order of patron-client relations with a fragmented periphery of the Cold War had been disbanded, but the new governing elites within South America were drawn from, or influenced by, the same groups as their forebears, which meant that relations were sought with the United States rather than with other South American states.8 From this Washington was able to place itself at the center of an elevated hegemonic order through which it could control roles and meanings, enabling it to promote liberal democracy and neoliberal economic reforms to a willing audience through the Organization of American States (OAS) and international financial institutions (IFIs), both of which it dominated (Panizza 2009, 1–48). The fall of communism allowed democracy to prosper in South America, as the threat of a rival ideology disappeared, and the United States became less fearful of leftist and reformist governments gaining power through competitive elections or taking advantage of shaky democratic regimes to seize control (Parish and Peceny 2002, 236). In this new regional context, Washington had neither the need nor the desire to prop up dictators in order to maintain global ideological hegemony, which would have proven incompatible with its strategy of democracy-promotion. Nevertheless, during the 1990s, the traditional economic elites still held influence (Panizza 2009, 94, 106, 198), and these elites had historically aligned with the United States rather than their closest neighbors, as it was Washington that had placed and kept them in power (Levitsky and Roberts 2011, 8). Furthermore, although the generals remained confined to barracks, national militaries, which had been heavily penetrated by the United States during the Cold War, retained certain powers and influence over political processes in many states in the first years of democratic rule (Smith 2005, 100–3), and this further contributed to preservation of cozy relationships with Washington. As Tussie (2009, 177–78) notes, Washington was actively looking to reshape the region's political and economic structures to further its own interests, and it encountered little resistance in this endeavor. This pattern of interrelations led to an elevated hegemonic order of strong core-periphery ties and a more sparsely interconnected periphery. The hegemonic bargain of democracy promotion and neoliberal reforms that was established was homogeneous in that the conditions and acceptable peripheral roles were broadly the same for all satellite states. However, there was little will or possibility to collude amongst the still weakly interconnected states of South America in order to negotiate a more favorable deal. South America was weakly connected in many senses. Diplomatically, the subregion was semifragmented and subsumed into pan-Americanism. Although fledgling initiatives were under way (the Río Group of twenty-four Latin American and Caribbean countries had been established in 1986), the United States-led Summit of the Americas process and the OAS (which, in 1991, spread into new ambits such as security, elections, and governance) were the dominant institutional sites (Rosenberg 2001, 84–88; Suarez 2007, 105). Neither UNASUR and its numerous councils nor the Bolivarian Alliance of the Americas (ALBA) had yet been founded, initiatives such as Summits of South American Presidents and the Initiative for the Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America were still a distant glimmer, and Brazil had not yet embarked on its concerted diplomatic offensive to unite and lead the subregion (Soares de Lima and Hirst 2006, 29–30). Although MERCOSUR had been established, economically South America was held back by a traditional reluctance to cede sovereignty and control to regional economic integration projects, and militarily there were no frameworks for cooperation (the South American Defense Council was created in 2008). Ruling through Roles Declarations from senior figures within the State Department's Bureau for Western Hemisphere Affairs during this period, often to Latin American audiences, made constant references to societal problems and inefficient governance in the region, highlighting the role of US leadership in guiding the politically immature societies of Latin America toward a higher social plane (see, for example, Davidow 1996; Noriega 2004). This view, which was not altogether out of line with the subregion's recent history, tied in with traditional conceptions amongst US policymakers of Latin America as a region that lacks the required level of human progress to take on the responsibilities of democratic rule (Kennan 1950, 124; Halle 1950; Hunt 1987, 166–67). What is striking here, though, is that the casting and acceptance of such submissive and dependent roles is indicative of who was pulling the strings in role-creation processes. The Summits of the Americas and IFIs were particularly relevant in this respect. Summits formalized the role of South American states as “potential democratic backsliders” and drew up a raft of actions that the OAS could take to solve breaches of democracy, with the United States settling into the role of a “responsible steward” who would strive to improve societies throughout the region for the general good. The creation of these role-structures was made easier by the fact that many democratic elites were more worried about enemies within than by control from outsiders, so external mechanisms to defend democracy would protect them from domestic reactionary forces (Parish and Peceny 2002, 236), and they were legitimated by the United States’ wider post–Cold War global role in spreading good practices. In the economic sphere, the states of the subregion were alter-cast as “incapable novices,” with the United States working in conjunction with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank to push through macroeconomic reforms (Rosenberg 2001, 84). Both these roles implied supervision and intervention where necessary and consolidated Washington's shepherding role as a “promoter of economic and social order.” In the field of security, Washington used its web of bilateral contacts to extend security deals to Andean states in order to combat drug production and trafficking, especially through Plan Colombia, which involved handing over large parts of the state apparatus to the United States’ administration (Marcela Rojas 2009, 122–23; Tickner 2008). The order had been set up to further the United States’ aims, with Washington set to gain from economic opportunities and the militarization of drug control. South America, on the other hand, would suffer in terms of economic instability, governance problems, and increased insecurity, which was compounded by a reduced role for the state. During this period, the relationally sparse periphery was faced with limited possibilities for significant interaction within multilateral spheres dominated by Washington, and it lacked the ideational cohesion or articulation necessary to intensify intraperiphery relational ties and act collectively. From this perspective, it is imperative to place the discursive element of hegemony within a relational context. As the elevated hegemonic model sets out, there is an important interplay between relational structure and the possibilities for diffusing ideas and acceptable roles, with strong core-periphery ties, although weakened following the end of the Cold War, still providing Washington with ample scope for ideational influence. And by working through IFIs to push through its agenda of economic reforms, the United States maintained an aura of multilateral good-neighborliness whilst masking its influence and accentuating the bilateral nature of relations, as IFIs worked bilaterally with individual states on structural adjustment programs (Panizza 2009, 33–37). By casting itself as a tough but well-intentioned sheriff who would save the wayward locals from themselves, Washington, through the institutions it dominated, generated a framework of structural positions that delimited who was empowered to do what within the region. It naturally followed that the “bad governors” would acquiesce to the preferences of the “good governors,” with the United States’ authority flowing from the “submission legitimacy” that it was granted by the governing elites in South America, who followed the course set out by their more socially advanced northern neighbor. Although pan-American structures were couched in terms of multilateralism, and there was a certain ideological harmony around democracy-promotion and free-market economics (Domínguez 2010, 2), institutions were heavily controlled by Washington (Suárez 2007, 105), which was the principal beneficiary of the order, and procedural and consequential legitimacy were largely absent. We thus see that Washington, helped along by US-owned media outlets in the region (Suárez 2007, 105–6), was able to project a role for itself as a socially and economically advanced actor who would promote responsible economic management and underwrite human progress through liberal democracy. As the decade wore on, role dissonance became heightened due to the failure of neoliberal reforms to provide economic stability, and the uneven distribution of the growth that did occur led South American societies to question Washington's role and privileges. Accounting for Causality To be sure, there are shades of neo-Gramscian approaches to hegemony here—US leadership is expressed in terms of universal interests, discourse plays an important role, and control over institutions reaps influence (Gill and Law 1989, 476). However, several differences stand out. First, the elevated order model schematically traces the way in which ideas are developed and disseminated within a relational environment, showing which actors have the capacity to diffuse ideas through relational ties and manage role-structures. Second, whereas neo-Gramscian analyses focus on the role of social forces and transnational capital (Saull 2012, 330–31; Bieler and Morton 2004, 85–87; Cox 1992, 312; Gill and Law 1989), the elevated hegemonic order model is more attuned to interstate relations, as it clearly maps out a model in which the United States controls an order; and whilst transnational capital may indeed benefit from the structures created by the United States, Washington's ultimate aim is to satisfy its own interests rather than those of global capital. Third, although there was a focus on extending free-market reforms throughout the region, the United States also coveted control over the region for reasons of security and to limit drug-trafficking. Indeed, in the first decade of the twenty-first century, Washington's actions switch more directly toward these spheres, and there is an overt security agenda in the region in order to prevent the rise of peer competitors (Tokatlian 2009). Fourth, the elevated hegemonic order model lays out the importance of authority as the underlying basis for the order, distinguishing this from various forms of legitimacy, which neo-Gramscianism fails to capture. Whilst contractual approaches (Lake 1999, 2007) are explicitly interstate in nature, we do not see the United States offering a trade-off of social order or public goods in return for the right to steer outcomes without dissent in the region. Although the region looked to Washington for guidance, and US approval for elites bought them a degree of legitimacy, the idea of Washington guaranteeing the public goods of economic stability and growth in return for compliance does not leap out as a causal factor. US aid to Latin America actually diminished over most of the 1990s (Meyer 2016, 2), South American access to the US market was unexceptional during this period (Estrella Morgan 2017, 16), and the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), which was proposed in 1994, was eventually rejected by Latin American states as working against their interests. Although the United States was the lead actor in providing the public good of democracy-promotion, this also provided a convenient backdrop from which to alter-cast the role of “potential backslider” onto the region, with Washington deftly sidestepping the costly provision of economic pubic goods. In terms of liberal-institutional approaches (Ikenberry 2011, 71–72), although Washington did work through institutions during this period (the OAS was heavily involved in democracy promotion initiatives, and economic reforms were handled by IFIs), rather than functioning as liberal restrainers, these were used to mask and channel US influence, not to rein in hegemonic power, and few meaningful voice opportunities were provided to the periphery, whose role had been defined by Washington. And whilst hegemonic stability theory takes in the idea of a materially preponderant state underwriting a stable normative order from which all benefit to some degree, there are two major drawbacks to this theory: first, it fails to take in the crucial aspects of structural power and relational context, which facilitate the use of material power and lock in structural advantage; and second, the order that Washington promoted ushered in an era of instability rather than stability. Similarly, elite-socialization models (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990, 285–90) fail to factor in the causal influence of relational context, role-creation, and structural power to explain how elites are socialized. Ensconced Hegemonic Order and Resistance in the New Millennium The Pink Tide and the Seeds of Resistance Toward the end of the 1990s, processes of social and political change within South American states culminated in the rise of new elites representing previously excluded or marginalized sectors of society (Levitsky and Roberts 2011, 8–9), who, over time, would alter patterns of interaction and change who were significant others in role-development processes. As a result, we witness a shift toward political autonomy from the turn of the twenty-first century onward, which is illustrated by numerous instances of the United States failing to obtain its desired outcomes in South America, despite the application of heavy diplomatic pressure and the threatened and actual withdrawal of material incentives. This resistance to Washington's aims was initially bilateral, but the states of the subregion gradually began to coordinate their actions and, from 2005 onward, started to collectively resist US advances. This banding-together was first evidenced in the negotiations for the FTAA, where Brazil led a cohesive and organized bloc, which advanced a different view of hemispheric free trade to that being put forward by the United States, thereby allowing for a more equal negotiating position for Latin American countries with respect to the United States and resulting in the process finally being abandoned. Popular protests against the Washington Consensus spread in the early 2000s, leading to changes of governments and an abandonment of, or re-accommodation with, neoliberalism (Panizza 2009, 119–20, 180–81), and we thus observe the rise of the left, or the pink tide, in the continent and the political representation of society beyond oligarchic elites. This change is illustrated by the rapid-fire collapse of the Sánchez de Lozada and Mesa governments in Bolivia due to their failure to meet societal demands related to US-backed neoliberal economic reforms and coca leaf eradication policies (Vanden 2007, 20–25). With traditional elites no longer dictating terms, governments now depended on popular suffrage for political success rather than suppression of democratic process and/or covert or direct support from the United States, and they therefore responded to societal needs rather than acting as conduits for oligarchic and US interests (Erikson 2011, 49). Relations, Roles, and Social Locations This rejection of hegemonic discourse and practices should be analyzed in terms of the relational context in which it occurred. The new state elites who rose to power at the beginning of the 2000s began to interact more intensely and productively, striving to recast state-roles and breaking away from the liberal consensus of the 1990s (Domínguez 2010, 15). Role-taking, role-making, and alter-casting processes were thus altered, with South American states role-taking in accordance with expectations from like-minded regional neighbors and role-making in line with the goals set by the new elites. Similarly, as core-periphery ties withered, and role-dissonance grew, the effectiveness of the United States’ alter-casting attempts diminished. At the same time, South American states shifted their role-expectations of the United States, rejecting Washington's former role as “promoter of economic and social order” and the corresponding social location and structural power that emanated from this. We thus see an interplay between relational structure and the diffusion of hegemonic ideas—as the United States had become relationally isolated, its network centrality had waned, and it could no longer control the roles and understandings around which the order functioned, which led to it no longer being perceived, and related to, as the region's natural hub. These new roles for the United States and South America altered Washington's structural position within the order and reconfigured structural power asymmetries, which squeezed US authority, as it could no longer gain compliance for its preferred modes of governance. As a result, Washington's structural position in the regional system no longer granted it automatic privileges to the extent it once did, and the states of the subregion were no longer prepared to accept subordination and control as normal. The fact that Washington's authority role was based on “submission legitimacy” rather than the procedural or consequential variety made it vulnerable to societal change within peripheral societies, and this is an inherent risk within elevated hegemonic orders. Exogenous societal change at the unit level (the rise of new elites with new perceptions of state role) affects patterns of interaction (new elites looked to intensify their relations with each other and weaken ties with the United States) and reconfigures relational structure. This new relational structure alters which actors are involved in role-development dynamics, which leads into role change. This role change then puts actors into new social locations, transforming structural power positions (and the rights, privileges, obligations, and duties that go with this). Domestic social change created the desire for new role-structures, but relational change was required to generate and reify these, as they are the result of intersubjective processes carried out within relational structures. Ultimately, Washington's role was redeveloped for it by processes within its sphere of actuation but beyond its control, illustrating that the producer of a given role may lose control over how this is perceived by others (Hopf 1998, 175). Ensconced Relations Applying the model of ensconced hegemonic order to South America in this period, we observe increased bilateral contacts amongst South American states and new multilateral institutional developments that created a dense network of relations (Rojas Aravena 2012, 24). This was particularly evident in the creation of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), which fed into the creation of a South American order centered around Brazil and a disconnection from the wider order of the Western Hemisphere (Domínguez 2010, 1). The nations of South America had been meeting regularly as a group at Summits of South American Presidents since 2002 and within the South American Community of Nations (later UNASUR) since 2004. In addition, subgroups of UNASUR members meet at Mercosur, ALBA, and Community of Andean Nations meetings, and UNASUR countries sometimes held special sessions within larger groupings, such as the Rio Group (now the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States—CELAC) and the OAS. There were also more technical contacts in the biannual meetings of UNASUR's Council of Foreign Ministers, the South American Defense Council (SDC), and its twelve sectoral councils. This heightened intraperiphery network density facilitated interactions that led to the development of common positions within South America on issues such as nonintervention in sovereign affairs, peaceful dispute resolution, defense cooperation, and acceptance of more participative models of democracy. A variety of complementary roles were intersubjectively developed, with role-taking and role-making the prevailing dynamics. Most states became “promoters of sub-regional autonomy,” Brazil took on a role as a “coordinating hegemon,” and some states (notably Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador) became “defiers of United States dominance.” Brokerage and Structural Change Stacie Goddard (2009) illustrates how structural change can be effectuated by catalyst actors who can link previously unconnected or weakly interconnected actors together to alter network structure, arguing that a particular type of switching effect—yoking—can create completely new actors. In a process of yoking, an actor with high brokerage power that connects two (or more) social sites can bring together actors from within those social sites and form them into a new unit. The broker thus goes beyond being the link between social sites to actually redrawing the boundaries, meanings, and identities that map out social and political space. To operate effectively, the broker must be an identity bridge, that is it must have strong ties to disparate actors, and the content of the broker's ideas must also be boundary shifting, that is, the ideas themselves must be convincing enough to encourage actors to break existing ties and form new ones. Network centrality is also important, as it is in the denser networks where trust is greatest and where an advantageously placed actor can use the social power that dense networks create in order to influence fellow members (Goddard 2009, 269–70). Brazil was a key player in developing the South American ensconced order, as it had consciously decided to create South America as a cohesive political unit, adopting a leadership role and using its material power resources to roll out an extensive diplomatic offensive to convince others of the benefits of such a project (notably, Argentina needed to be brought on board) (Soares de Lima and Hirst 2006, 29–32). Itamaraty (Brazil's foreign ministry) articulated an intersubjectively created hegemonic discourse based around the peripheral status shared by South American states and a shared history of dependency-theory thought. Importantly, secondary states voluntarily entered into the multilateral order without surrendering political autonomy and were able to collectively negotiate the terms of the hegemonic bargain with a strong hand. Brazil's brokerage position allowed it to create South America as a coherent and interconnected entity within which it would have a sufficient degree of network centrality to set out the contours of collective action. Brazil was favored in its catalyst role through being the only country in the subregion that maintains good relations with all other eleven South American states, and its moderate and pragmatic style allowed it to bridge the ideological differences that are present in the subregion (Hakim 2014, 1168). However, its reduced level of network centrality meant that it was not in a position to unilaterally define roles and common understandings, and thereby acquire a marked structural power advantage, although it was able to cleverly exploit and promote a shared desire for new relations and roles in the subregion. In this sense, the legitimacy of the order is the consequence of intersubjective negotiations and is not filtered through a prior manipulation of roles and meanings by the hegemon. The order thereby exhibited procedural legitimacy as a result of the participatory method through which it was enacted and consequential legitimacy in that it was seen as working toward a consensual collective interest (Burges 2008, 70–71). Significantly, subregional cohesion is a key element of the South American network space, as Brazil, in its role as fledgling “coordinating hegemon,” required the support of the periphery in order to have the moral authority to represent the region and to be able to collectively counter US power. These relations of mutual interdependence between the leading and secondary states of the order were reinforced by Brazil's need for unanimous support for UNASUR processes to progress, as well as by the periphery's desire for leadership and articulation in order to effectively advance its interests (Daudelin and Burges 2011, 40). The ensconced hegemonic order model can help us to interpret the structural contours of the South American order of the post-2005 period in several important ways. First, the periphery is densely connected, with ties amongst peripheral actors not being vastly weaker than those between the periphery and core, thereby facilitating collusion and collective negotiation; second, there are common aims that are shared between the core and periphery, such as peaceful resolution of disputes, respect for sovereignty, and a desire to keep the United States out of subregional affairs (Russell and Tokatlian 2008, 228–29), meaning authoritative control is less necessary in order for the periphery to work toward the aims of the order; third, due to its highly negotiated nature, the order reflects peripheral interests, and there are high degrees of identification with it; and fourth, the low levels of network centrality meant that rather than being centrally assigned by the hegemon, roles and common aims were developed and articulated through intersubjective processes. Within this form of order, ties between actors exhibit a degree of resilience, as they have been intensified through a negotiated process of defining and defending subregional norms, meaning that each tie takes on a specific function (Erikson 2013) that transcends more general relations between states, which may wax and wane over time. Moreover, these normativized ties have been consolidated within multilateral environments, making them less vulnerable to the vicissitudes of bilateral relations, which is a relevant issue in South America due to regular interstate wrangling and numerous ongoing bilateral disputes. UNASUR and the Rise of South America: 2005–2010 The results and effectiveness of this order can be seen in UNASUR processes. In 2008 UNASUR resolved the Bolivian constitutional crisis in terms of the Bolivian Government's interests, despite US democracy-promotion programs and funding being refocused toward empowering departmental governments and NGOs opposed to the Morales Government, which was seen to be acting against US interests (Burron 2009, 122–27). In 2009 UNASUR insisted that the Defense Cooperation Agreement between the United States and Colombia should specifically proscribe certain actions regarding regional air mobility for US forces—which US government and military documents had shown to be within the aims of the agreement and which formed part of the United States’ strategy for the region (US Air Mobility Command 2009, 11, 21–22)—due to their consequences for sovereignty and territorial integrity (Marcela Rojas 2012). In this case, it is particularly salient that Colombia, which had been highly dependent on the United States for aid in its fight against narcoterrorism, and which was thus something of an outlier within the South American relational structure (Arnson and Tickner 2010, 172; Marcela Rojas 2009, 122–23), agreed to setting limits on US actions carried out from within its territory. And in 2010, UNASUR negotiated a solution to the Venezuela-Colombia diplomatic crisis when tensions escalated between the two countries following allegations that Venezuela was harboring FARC guerrillas. What is of particular interest is that the United States was not even at the table in these cases, either as a direct participant or through the OAS, and its capacity for influence over issues in which it had a key interest was vastly diminished due to this relational isolation (Cooper and Heine 2009b, 303–4) and its inability to reproduce its former role within the Western Hemisphere. Alternative Accounts Alternative explanations for the diminishing role of the United States within hemispheric dynamics are benign neglect and bilateral positioning. According to the benign neglect account, as the United States has few crucial interests in South America, it largely ignores the subregion. Where key interests are perceived, Washington can temporarily deploy its superior material resources to secure outcomes in line with its goals (Wiarda 2006, 277–78; Pastor 1992, 36). This account rests on the twin assumptions that (a) Washington does in fact ignore the region, and (b) it can achieve its preferred outcomes through the timely deployment of material-power resources. There are numerous examples of Washington trying to impose itself on South America and failing to achieve its desired results over this period. As mentioned above, Washington was unable to get its way on the now-abandoned Free Trade Area of the Americas. In 2002, the US Congress enacted the American Servicemembers’ Protection Act, which aimed to shield US military personnel operating outside the United States from being turned over to the International Criminal Court. This was widely rejected in the Western Hemisphere, resulting in twelve Latin American countries having non-drug-enforcement US military aid cancelled, including Peru, Ecuador, Uruguay, Bolivia, and Brazil. However, rather than causing Latin American countries to backtrack and accept the clause, states whose military aid had been cut off looked to China for military assistance (Crandall 2008, 52–53), demonstrating the way in which exit options from a Washington-led regional order severely restricted the power of the United States to impose its preferences on the region. The United States eventually relaxed the clause, and in 2006, it resumed the cut military aid to all the receptor states with the exception of Venezuela. In the case of the failed Venezuelan coup attempt in 2002, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Otto Reich had met with the coup-plotters at the White House to discuss practical issues related to the imminent coup attempt, and logistical and financial aid was given to help with the establishment of a postcoup government (Emerson 2010, 38–39). In 2003, Defense Department and military officials began making explicit references to the security risks associated with terrorists carrying out attacks and trafficking arms and drugs from the vast ungovernable spaces within Latin American states, particularly the tri-border area between Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay (Emerson 2010, 42–45). Also, Washington was highly concerned with a spread of the Chávez model, spending vast sums on financing opposition groups in Venezuela and Bolivia and making diplomatic and military-cooperation overtures to potential allies, without any notable results (Burron 2009, 122–27; US Embassy, La Paz 2006a, 2006b; US Embassy, Santiago 2007). In fact, Venezuela was such a key concern for Washington that in 2007, it became one of six countries singled out by the National Security Agency for intense espionage activity (Shane 2013), with Washington attempting to link Hugo Chávez to FARC guerrillas (US Embassy, Bogotá 2008). The other key concern for Washington was drug production and trafficking, with Colombia receiving approximately $6 billion in United States aid between 2000 and 2008 (Tickner 2008). As part of its regional gendarme strategy, the Fourth Fleet naval forces, which had been disbanded in 1950, were relaunched and assigned to Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), and whilst senior officials in Washington did indeed focus their energies on the Middle East in the wake of 9/11, at the same time lower-ranking officials started tracing out ways to bring regional policy into line with the War on Terror, thereby securitizing relations (Emerson 2010, 38–41). So, whilst Washington was certainly more focused on the Middle-East, rather than losing interest in Latin America, it shifted its approach from the high-table diplomacy of the State Department toward a strategy of military preparedness at the Pentagon (Emerson 2010, 38–41). However, it was unable to dominate subregional processes or control roles despite the resources it ploughed into asserting itself. We thus see that the United States was both interested and active in South America but that it failed to control outcomes. The bilateral positioning account argues that changes to social and political structures within South American states have led to the adoption of new roles and autonomous state action, but that any resistance to Washington is not coordinated and that the sub-region's relational formation is characterized by a series of bilateral ties of either resistance or convergence between South American states and Washington. Unlike the benign neglect account, it is not assumed that Washington can successfully deploy its material power resources to entice or bully recalcitrant elites into acquiescence. Resistance or convergence may be fueled by ideological motivations in countries opposed to the US model of liberal democracy and/or by temporary economic power brought about by high raw material prices, as resource-rich governments can afford to put US aid money and trade privileges on the line, thereby meaning policy is not so easily framed by Washington's demands. In this line, more “responsible” leftist governments who do not clash directly with Washington over ideology, such as Brazil, will diverge from US interests due to their increased economic room for maneuver. In addition to resource revenues, this interest-driven autonomy is facilitated by access to alternative markets to the United States, principally in Asia (Legler 2010). However, whilst this account might inform policy decisions (Venezuela clashing head on with Washington whilst Colombia nestles up to US policymakers), it fails to explain outcomes in many cases. In the cases where UNASUR acted, although some state leaders were certainly more vociferous than others, the subregion was united, even bringing fringe-member Colombia on board. In the Colombian bases case, Washington failed to gain access to the Colombian bases on the terms it sought, as working through a single partner has limitations. Bilateral positioning's focus on dyadic relations means it fails to capture the collective nature of action in South America and the importance of broader structures. Ensconcing Hegemony Brazil has not offered material public goods to the extent that some partners think should come with the privilege of subregional leadership (Burges 2008, 65–67), nor does it act as a subregional power-broker in order to unilaterally provide social order. It does, however, promote and underwrite the less tangible public goods of subregional peace, crisis-resolution, and defense of sovereignty, but it does this in conjunction with subregional partners, not as a free-roaming gendarme. As Soares de Lima (2007, 181) argues, Brazil's main contribution to the region is the coordination of collective action in global and regional contexts, and this is what has permitted the subregion to act autonomously. Cooper and Heine (2009a, 10) follow through on this point, noting that since the 1990s, political cooperation in the region had reached new heights, and this increased network density and ideational consensus led to a regional diplomatic identity for the first time in history. So, whilst Brazilian leadership offers something to its partners, this is not a trade-off in which subordinates offer up packets of sovereignty in return for social order. Liberal-institutional approaches to hegemony (Ikenberry 2002, 220–23) argue that institutions bind and limit materially powerful states through rule creation and compliance, thus lengthening the shadow of the future and allowing governments to cooperate without free-rider issues. My model, however, takes a more flexible approach to institutions, noting that they may simply serve the interests of a dominant state, disguising its intentions and legitimizing its actions (as in the case of the United States in the Americas during the 1990s). Or, as in the case of UNASUR, a new institution may function as a forum that creates contact points, increasing relational interactions amongst group members, which generate common understandings and define roles, thereby facilitating the quest for collective solutions (Dorussen and Ward 2008, 191–94). Liberal approaches focus on rules, norms, and established limits, rather than roles and the constitutive dynamics of interaction that arise from varying relational forms, and this is where the models set out in this article bring in added explanatory value. Whilst processes within South America do reflect social forces rejecting the Washington Consensus and pushing for a new role for the state, neo-Gramscian accounts do not attempt to interpret the role of interstate relational structures in articulating collective action, nor do they analyze the resultant recasting of roles and structural power shifts. Furthermore, neo-Gramscianism's focus on capital accumulation neglects important goals that South American states wished to pursue, such as peaceful dispute resolution, management of subregional security, and respect for sovereignty (Russell and Tokatlian 2008, 228–29). In terms of elite-socialization approaches (Ikenberry and Kupchan 1990), rather than hegemonic values being ushered onto a passive periphery, we see an intersubjective process involving all actors, which crucially depends on relational structure. It is highly salient that this hierarchical shift occurred in the absence of major changes in relative levels of material power (United States’ GDP is almost five times that of South America's).9 And although, as mentioned above, access to China as a market reduces the impact of threats of US market closure, and high commodity prices create possibilities to act more autonomously, resistance to US goals was effective due to the relational isolation of Washington and the recasting of roles. So, whereas hegemonic stability theory does not countenance change if the system does not undergo historical shifts in the balance of material power resources, here we witness a process of change that expressly aimed to overturn the US-led Western Hemisphere order purely in terms of relational structures, roles, and structural power. The analysis focuses on the period from 1990 through 2010, showing how relational change interacts with role change in a particular context. The pink tide has since begun to recede, and there is now an incipient undertow of governments veering toward authoritarianism, on the one hand, and economic liberalism on the other, making consensus difficult. Indeed, disaffection with Bolivia's handling of UNASUR's rotating presidency has led some members to suspend or renounce their membership. However, whilst UNASUR may be gasping out its last breaths, seven South American countries have formed PROSUR as an alternative, more conservative, forum for subregional cooperation, showing that there is still a desire for interconnectedness and collective action. Despite these shifts, the United States has neither burst back onto the scene nor recentered relational structures and roles around itself, and South American states are neither pursuing nor settling for a more submissive and dependent role. Importantly, questions of redistribution are still highly relevant, and governments remain accountable to electorates rather than external patrons. Whereas the 1990s were marked by US-led efforts to avoid backsliding toward authoritarianism, we now see Washington unable to control events in South America, despite grave concerns over the actions of certain governments in restricting key features of democratic practice. Similarly, the mechanisms of the OAS-promoted Inter-American Democratic Charter have been spectacularly irrelevant. What remains to be seen is whether exogenous changes within states will have significant relational effects and whether roles will morph into something new. Hegemony in Europe Relational models can add another layer of interpretation to contractual and liberal models of hegemony, shifting the focus away from the motives for participating in a hegemonic order and toward the processes that define and reproduce its structures and dynamics. Whilst contractual models explain the construction of the Euro-Atlantic order of the post–World War II period well (Europe was clamoring for a security guarantee, both to protect it from the USSR and itself, as well as needing help with economic development, for which it was willing to offer up concessions; and the United States needed Europe to function as a bulwark against communist expansion), relational models outline the role-creation processes on which the functioning of the order was based. Europe was plagued by mistrust and division, meaning that intra-European ties were not strong, and positions were not coordinated, whilst ties with the United States were intensifying. Washington was thus able to alter-cast the roles of “security consumer” and “economic straggler” onto Western Europe, helping to create role-expectations for its own position as “security guarantor” and “economic steward,” tying in with role-conceptions of the United States as a morally advanced savior in the aftermath of World War II (Holsti 2010, 399) and naturalizing its hegemony. The structures that were created were multilateral and institutionalized (unlike the bilateralized relations between the United States and Latin American and Asian states) (Layne 2006, 197), and the provision of public goods also created consequential legitimacy. However, institutional sites were heavily controlled and used to transmit messages that reinforced the global hegemonic role of the United States in underwriting freedom, security, economic growth, and stability, helping Washington in its goal of shaping the political development of Western European states and bringing them into its orbit. The states of Europe were thus divided and dependent on the United States strategically but in the throes of economic integration to make them resistant to communism (Layne 2006, 195). The deal was not unfair or exploitative, and there were scale effects and efficiency gains for all from Washington's control, but the United States’ control over role development reflected its relational dominance within an elevated order. As the Cold War drew on and the United States became more dependent on European collaboration to stop the spread of Communism, and as the states of Europe became enmeshed in a denser relational structure themselves, roles were modified and the degree of hierarchy diminished (Lundestad 2005, 171–76). Whilst Europe's need for public goods and Washington's need to contain the USSR explain why the order was set up, it was relational dominance that allowed the United States to control the development of role-structures, which was particularly important given Washington's fervent desire to prevent European states from adopting more autonomous roles and doing their own deals with Moscow or challenging US hegemony in other ways (Layne 2006, 195–97). The resultant structural power advantage reinforced these roles and underwrote the hegemonic bargain that was struck. The important point to take away here is that public-good provision or side-payments are not a straight trade-off for acquiescence, as they act both as shapers and manifestations of relational patterns and role-creation processes. Whether public-good provision is negotiated bilaterally or multilaterally will affect how much of a say peripheral actors get and whether they can collude. And the terms of public-good provision are intimately bound up with the roles through which this is articulated (hegemonic savior, dependent straggler, agent of progress, incompetent governor, responsible steward, security-provider, etc.). Public goods, in this sense, mirror and undergird role structures, with role-signals acting as crucial signifiers. When Washington vacillates over its security commitment to Japan, for example, public-good provision is questioned on the grounds that the United States is reassessing its role in the region. Conclusions The models outlined here lead us beyond the dichotomy between unlegitimated coercion and legitimated consent (Lebow and Kelly 2001, 594–96), allowing us to understand other control mechanisms that may be consensual yet unlegitimated. By drawing out the importance of relational structure in conditioning bargaining positions, role-creation, and structural power, and analyzing the effects of these over an order, we gain crucial insights into causal processes that play out in different forms and levels of legitimacy and authority. This sets up a novel explanatory structural account of hegemony, which fills clear gaps in the existing literature and helps us to understand the emergence of different hegemonic orders within the Western Hemisphere. Significantly, we see that hierarchical change was brought about in the absence of any major shift in relative levels of material power, with alterations in domestic social structures leading to increased interaction intensity and the creation of new roles, which accounts for a move from elevated to ensconced hegemonic order. The theoretical claim here is not that material power serves no purpose but rather that its use is facilitated and constrained by relational structures, both due to the effects of these over roles and positions of resistance or compliance and through the possibilities for collective peripheral action that these determine. Material power may even be used to shape a relational environment, with extensive and effective diplomatic activity or cooperation agreements serving to tighten certain bonds and weaken others. The upshot here is that we need to move away from an attributional focus on material power and interpret its effects through an analysis of how it is used from a relational and role-bargaining perspective. Hierarchies are ultimately social structures that articulate authority, which is mediated through roles, though this is not to say material power cannot be astutely deployed to produce or shift the relations on which social structures are built. The qualitative focus on roles also takes us away from a ranking or stratification approach. The aim is not to assign status categories or create hierarchical mini-leagues where states tussle with each other over positions within a social-recognition pecking order. The objective, rather, is to understand the causal dynamics that constitute actor-roles and analyze how these empower or subdue states within a structural context. Structural form and the role-effects of this are ultimately of more interest to us than the precise position of individual actors on a scaled order of hierarchy. Also, by foregrounding the causal power of roles, we move away from a strategic-rationalist conception of elites as unrestrained foreign-policy wizards who freely devise strategy in line with national interest, with only material power considerations and the heights of their own brilliance limiting what they can achieve. Rather I bring in the effects of role-creation to understand how state-elites are constituted, constrained, and enabled by role-structures and the structural power that emanates from these. Depending on the relational structures in which they are embedded, elites may be locked into role-structures that define not only their choices but also their preferences and perceptions, with their agency a function of roles that have been tailored for them by others. For many, elite choice is something of an oxymoron. The approach is ultimately founded on a relational-emergent approach to structure. The analysis diverges from interpretations that focus on a series of disaggregated bilateral relations that can later be drawn into a structural whole, instead outlining the causal effects of structures themselves, which go beyond the aggregation of component parts in both magnitude and nature (Elder-Vass 2011, 5–6, 67–68). The way in which actors are arranged in relation to each other is crucial to the form of control that prevails within an order, and it is this structural vision that helps us to decipher the processes that generate roles and structural power. This relational-structural account allows us to work constructivist insights on roles into schematic structural models that draw out analytical generalizations, showing why and how roles work their effects over an order. The models I set out dovetail into a recent mini-resurgence of interest in hegemony, and hierarchy more generally, within IR (Ikenberry 2014; Kupchan 2014; Barder 2015; Nexon and Neumann 2018; Zarakol 2017; MacDonald 2018), and in line with this recent work, I stress the need to broaden out and reformulate the ontological prism through which we interpret hierarchy and change. This analysis will hopefully act as a stimulus to the development of new lines of research into the importance of roles within hierarchies. Notes The author would like to thank Bryan Mabee, as well as two anonymous reviewers and the editors of International Studies Review for comments, guidance, and observations, which have greatly improved the quality and coherence of the arguments. Footnotes 1 The term “subregion(al)” refers to South America. “Region(al)” denotes Latin America more generally or the entire Western Hemisphere. 2 There is a distinction to be drawn between a relational interpretation and more formalist network approaches. Relationalism emphasizes the intersubjective nature of ties between actors and the way in which actors are constituted through their interactions with others. Formalism represents a more essentialist interpretation, which obviates historical context or cultural content, focusing more purely on the power a particular network position provides. These effects often complement each other, and both are evident in the analysis within this article (network structure and centrality determine the way in which roles are constituted, for example), and both are used. However, the broader term of “relationalism” is generally adopted, as it best reflects the article's focus on how relational interactions carve out roles and structural power and the mechanisms of control which derive from this. For further analysis on this point, see Erikson (2013) and Go and Lawson (2017). 3 For an interpretation of how actors share out authority, see MacDonald (2018). 4 The interpretation of structural power used throughout this article is that of Barnett and Duvall (2005, 53). 5 The terms “structural position” and “social location” both refer to the way in which actors are constituted in relation to each other within hierarchies, though “social location” places more emphasis on status (the source of location) and “structural position” stresses authority (the effects of location). 6 For an overview of role-theory, see Wish (1980) and Walker (1987). 7 Submission legitimacy is neither procedural nor consequential in that the process through which the order and roles were created is not participative, and neither are the outcomes of the order beneficial to the periphery. 8 The focus is on South America rather than wider Latin America, as Central American states maintained higher degrees of dependency on the United States and were not so inclined to resist processes of control. 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TI - All Hegemons Are Not the Same: The Role(s) of Relational Structures and Modes of Control
JF - International Studies Review
DO - 10.1093/isr/viz028
DA - 2020-04-21
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/all-hegemons-are-not-the-same-the-role-s-of-relational-structures-and-6sdALg79WS
DP - DeepDyve
ER -