TY - JOUR
AU1 - Truden,, John
AB - Abstract Between 1877 and 1885, a Southern Cheyenne chief named Stone Calf gathered a coalition of Southern Cheyenne women and men, cultural intermediaries, ranchers, missionaries, and U.S. soldiers together in northwestern Indian Territory. Bound by kinship, gendered labor, economic opportunity, and political necessity, this alliance negotiated the transnational cattle industry’s access to the environmental resources of the Southern Great Plains. Using these powerful ties, Stone Calf’s coalition successfully shaped both the cattle industry’s expansion and displaced the Office of Indian Affairs’ influence in the region. By recognizing Stone Calf’s coalition as a powerful transnational force, this article illuminates both the weight of kinship and Indigenous participation in a globally interconnected world. On a Sunday morning, a Southern Cheyenne Indian named Running Buffalo rode away from a Mennonite church at Cantonment, a small outpost on the northern border of the Cheyenne and Arapaho Reservation (modern-day west-central Oklahoma).1 In the distance, he spotted a herd of horses consuming the grass that his family claimed by right of occupation. Anglo-Texan cowboys leading the horses were allowing the animals to strip his land bare. Running Buffalo’s kin had already informed the young leader of the cowboys’ presence; before leaving Cantonment, he asked a government official posted there to compensate him for the damages caused by the horses, but the official told him to go to hell.2 After that exchange—possibly with Mennonite hymns or a sermon in German-tinged Cheyenne echoing behind him—Running Buffalo loaded his gun and left to confront the Texans alone. When he reached the herd, the Southern Cheyenne man asked head cowboy E.M. Horton for several animals as payment for damages. Horton refused. Frustrated, Running Buffalo stampeded the trail drive’s horses. In turn, Horton’s cowboys whipped out their guns, shot and killed Running Buffalo, and then fled to Cantonment where the victim’s relatives had already received news of their kinsman’s death. Instead of killing the cowboys, the Southern Cheyennes demanded several hundred of the Anglo Texans’ horses in compensation for Running Buffalo’s death.3 In western Indian Territory, Southern Plains Indians living along the Great Western Trail used kinship to shape the transnational cattle industry. Running Buffalo’s relatives constructed an overlapping familial and political organization that incorporated Cheyennes, intermarried outsiders, and fictive kin into what Christina Gish Hill labels a “web of kinship.”4 Federal agents, cowboys, and settlers left few detailed descriptions of this alliance’s inner workings, but broadly speaking, members of this coalition understood the surrounding land’s environmental resources to have a distinct value defined by their web of kinship; they controlled and traded these resources by establishing and maintaining ties of kinship. Those that became kin had access to those resources, while Southern Cheyennes disrupted, removed, or killed those who tried to use their resources without becoming kin. When people such as Horton rejected kinship and threatened the entire web, Southern Cheyennes made kinship their only choice; Horton could honor his kinship obligations by giving away several hundred horses or he could perish. By shaping and enforcing local ties to transnational actors such as Horton, Stone Calf’s coalition became a transnational phenomenon. Seeing this coalition as a powerful force recognizes both the weight of kinship and Indigenous participation in a globally interconnected world. Between 1877 and 1885, Stone Calf manipulated the transnational cattle industry’s connection to the Southern Plains environment through complex, family ties bound together by gendered labor, economic opportunity, and political necessity. The story of Stone Calf’s web of kinship updates the regional historiography of the late nineteenth century western Cheyenne and Arapaho Reservation. In 1928, Edward Everett Dale first examined the cattle industry’s entry onto the Cheyenne and Arapaho Reservation, arguing that cattlemen “were the advance agents of civilization.”5 Cattle trail historians Wayne Gard and Donald Worcester did not openly embrace Dale’s Turnerian views, but they did paint stereotypes of “redskin raiders and beggars.”6 Robert Carriker and Donald Berthrong penned more detailed and even-handed accounts that remain standard interpretations of Southern Arapaho, Southern Cheyenne, and Fort Supply’s histories, but they still argued that the decline of Indigenous peoples in this region was total and inevitable.7 Some scholars have made observations about Southern Plains Indians and the cattle industry while examining other stories and supporting other theses, but no one has rewritten Carriker and Berthrong’s foundational but aging narratives to bring contingency back to Indigenous peoples on the Southern Great Plains.8 Figure 1. Open in new tabDownload slide Western Indian Territory, c. 1880 Figure 1. Open in new tabDownload slide Western Indian Territory, c. 1880 Running Buffalo’s death and his family’s negotiations with Horton in May 1884 reveal fragments of that Indigenous coalition’s rise and fall along the Great Western Trail, a transnational highway that flowed northward from the Rio Grande borderlands of Mexico and Texas to western Indian Territory, and then to Kansas. After the American Civil War, Tejanos, Mexicans, and Anglo-Texans discovered they could exploit a surplus of animals near the Rio Grande by driving them through the Southern Great Plains to Kansas and then shipping them on the railroad to Chicago. Cattle trails functioned as the central arteries of this transnational economy that impacted such diverse spaces as Sonora, Alberta, and New York City. In the 1890s, the transnational cattle industry evolved again, as more accessible railroads, invasive laws quarantining certain types of diseased cattle, environmental disasters, and internal changes within the industry led to the demise of the Great Western Trail. Between the Great Western Trail’s creation and demise, Southern Cheyenne people shaped the transnational cattle industry for their own purposes. Running Buffalo’s father, a powerful Southern Cheyenne chief named Stone Calf, knit the web together. Fifteen hundred people tied together by their specific economic, political, and familial interests—Southern Cheyenne women, Stone Calf’s relatives, cultural brokers, ranchers, missionaries and U.S. soldiers—made up this web.9 Stone Calf’s web of kinship is an opportunity to follow and further complicate Peter Iverson’s landmark book When Indians Became Cowboys, a work that deconstructed the idea that cowboys and Indians were opposing figures in the American West and instead argued that Indigenous people fluidly weaved in and out of the cattle industry.10 Six decades prior, Walter Prescott Webb interpreted the cattle industry’s massive expansion after 1865 through economic and environmental lenses.11 Several generations later, Terry Jordan, William Cronon, and Peter Iverson added new dimensions to Webb’s interpretation, emphasizing the cattle industry’s cultural ties to Europe, Africa, and the Caribbean, complicating contemporary environmental and economic connections between the Great Plains and growing metropolises and arguing that Indigenous peoples were often intimately involved in the industry.12 Subsequently, scholars have reinterpreted both the late nineteenth-century cattle industry and the ways Indigenous peoples moved through borderlands and borders. A generation after Jordan and Cronon, Alicia Dewey and Rachel St. John explored the same late nineteenth-century cattle trade from the perspectives of people and institutions in the Rio Grande borderlands; the business they describe maneuvered around borders and involved a diverse cast.13 In the same generation, scholars such as Jeffrey Means and Natale Zappia connected the cattle industry to an emerging historiography that argued Indigenous peoples could use contested spaces, or borderlands, to their advantage.14 They came to different conclusions about the relationship between Indians and the cattle industry. Means argued that the cattle industry pitted Oglala Lakota ranchers against each other, while Zappia explored how Mojaves, Utes, and Cahuillas built an existence raiding cattle herds.15 In western Indian Territory, members of Stone Calf’s coalition creatively carved out new roles for themselves; from their camps, they shaped the decisions of the transnational cattle industry’s workers and its owners: cowboys and cattlemen.16 In fact, Stone Calf’s web of kinship paints an entirely different picture from either Means or Zappia, suggesting that although the cattle industry and Indigenous people often blended together in borderlands, that blending looked different across the North American West. What made Stone Calf’s web of kinship come into being and how did it function? The answer to this question is rooted in the carnage and change created by the 1874–1875 Red River War. An Indigenous response to an environmental crisis, the Red River War erupted over the annihilation of the Southern Plains buffalo. Prior to 1874, Southern Cheyennes relied on buffalo as their main source of food, clothing, housing, and tools. In 1869, 2nd Lt. William H. Bower noted that the Indians camped at Fort Supply preferred buffalo meat over beef.17 An Algonquian people, over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries Cheyennes gradually transitioned from riverbank farming near the Great Lakes to nomadically hunting buffalo on the Great Plains. The food and products buffalo provided allowed the Cheyennes to establish political and military influence over much of the plains and to engage a transnational buffalo hide economy that stretched from Bents Fort in modern-day Colorado to London. For much of the nineteenth century, Southern Cheyennes sold millions of U.S. dollars’ worth of buffalo hides to fur traders such as the Bent brothers. The Bents operated several trading posts, briefly including Adobe Walls in what is now the Texas Panhandle.18 When U.S. hunters nearly exterminated the Southern Great Plains buffalo between 1870 and 1874, many Southern Cheyennes lost their main source of sustenance, shelter, and trade. Desperate, some joined an alliance of Comanches, Kiowas, and Southern Arapahos and in June 1874 attacked the hunters at Adobe Walls. In response, the United States waged an unrelenting campaign to crush Indigenous resistance on the Southern Plains.19 By May 1875, most Cheyennes surrendered rather than starve. Stone Calf’s actions between his rise to power in 1868 and his 1875 surrender in the Red River War reflected his multiple responsibilities as a leader. Within a web of family obligation, every Southern Cheyenne leader thought deeply about the future; each planned around contingencies with their entire community in mind, including the unborn kinwho inherited the world their elders built.20 Stone Calf balanced the future with the immediate demands of his constituents. In1871, he met with federal officials in Washington City; in 1873 he supported Cheyenne women in their fight to retain the value of their labor within the buffalo hide industry; and during the Red River War, he negotiated the release of several U.S. hostages.21 At the end of the war, Stone Calf chose to surrender. His people were hungry and afraid; they remembered the Sand Creek Massacre’s terrible violence a decade earlier. On March 7, 1875, Stone Calf led his 820 followers, white flag in hand, into a humiliating captivity under Office of Indian Affairs(OIA) agent John Miles at Darlington Agency.22 Some of the forty-nine families with Stone Calf subsequently left to join other bands or the Northern Cheyennes in the Powder River Country.23 After such serious losses, Stone Calf did not begin to regain his full influence until a new OIA ration policy began reshaping Southern Cheyenne society.24 Figure 2. Open in new tabDownload slide Stone Calf was the most visible leader within a web of kinship that stretched across what is now northwestern Oklahoma, but Southern Cheyenne women like his wife, whose name has been lost, made up the backbone of that web. c. 1871, Walter S. Campbell Collection #61, Western History Collections, University of Oklahoma Libraries. Figure 2. Open in new tabDownload slide Stone Calf was the most visible leader within a web of kinship that stretched across what is now northwestern Oklahoma, but Southern Cheyenne women like his wife, whose name has been lost, made up the backbone of that web. c. 1871, Walter S. Campbell Collection #61, Western History Collections, University of Oklahoma Libraries. In the post war period, the OIA—an organization designed by the federal government to control Indians—reorganized its ration distribution system to consolidate control over Indigenous people. Prior to the Red River War, Miles distributed cattle through chiefs. In 1877, the OIA directed its agents to distribute rations by family instead of by band, threatening the power of each chief.25 In the same order, Commissioner of Indian Affairs E.P. Smith ordered each daily ration to include three pounds of beef—the stand-in for buffalo meat.26 Every community on the reservation struggled with this change, a caloric reduction for the average Cheyenne. Although the OIA’s twenty-one pound beef ration more than met “modern minimum dietary energy requirement[s],” rations at Darlington did not reach the forty-two pounds per week a Cheyenne adult needed in the late nineteenth century.27Anticipating this problem, Smith argued that the OIA’s ration policy was a supplement, not a replacement for buffalo meat. However, Indians increasingly relied on U.S. rations when buffalo hunts failed.28 On the Southern Plains, OIA officials used the 1877 policy to force Indigenous people to reorient their meat-based diets towards Euro-American agriculture. The 1877 policy ignored Southern Cheyenne riverbank farming agriculture that complimented a buffalo-based economy. Consequentially, many Cheyennes “kept themselves from actual starvation by killing their horses and dogs, and a few wolves.”29 Rather than provide more food, Commissioner of Indian Affairs E.A. Hayt ordered that by 1880 Plains Indians must collectively double their crop output.30 In 1882, OIA officials again attempted to cut beef rations to further push Southern Plains Indians toward agriculture. In response, Miles and U.S. military officers at Fort Reno pitched a fit, arguing that the Southern Cheyennes and Southern Arapahos would seize the rations rather than suffer what one man termed “semi-starvation.”31 Although OIA officials relented after U.S. Army General John Pope advocated a return to the 1877 standard, the nature of OIA policies remained focused on agricultural production.32 In fact, local and regional actors on the Cheyenne and Arapaho Reservation possessed significant power to alter national and transnational forces shaping their corner of the North American West. Indians and agents alike manipulated national OIA policies and the transnational cattle industry to their advantage.33 Miles disagreed with the OIA’s goals; he held agency-organized buffalo hunts, encouraged Southern Arapaho freighting and cattle ranching, and eventually pushed the Indians at Darlington to lease their land to combat the specter of starvation.34 Even so, the agent rarely mustered enough cattle to even meet OIA requirements, so many Indians took animals from passing cowboys.35 As cattle drives cut what became the Great Western Trail in 1877, Southern Cheyennes used the expanding transnational cattle industry to obtain a steady source of beef. By 1880, Miles’s and Stone Calf’s spheres of influence became distinct as their responses to these political, economic, and environmental changes diverged. The western side of the reservation slipped out of the agent’s control. The transnational cattle industry, trafficking thousands upon thousands of animals across the Red River, through Indian Territory, and on to Kansas each summer, inadvertently fueled both Miles’s loss of power and Stone Calf’s growing influence. In hundreds of annual drives, cowboys directed thousands of animals up the Western Trail. Most of the time these were Longhorn cattle, a sturdy breed that originated in the Rio Grande borderlands. As beef demands in the northern United States skyrocketed after the U.S. Civil War, Tejano, Mexican and Anglo-Texan ranchers found that Longhorns were well suited to drive through the grasslands of Texas and Indian Territory.36 On a northern drive, ten to fifteen cowboys, typically led by Anglo-Texans but often crewed by Sonorans, Chihuahuans, Tejanos, and African Americans, rounded up five hundred to four thousand Longhorns in the Rio Grande borderlands.37 Most drives traveled to one of several railheads in Kansas depending on the year, where they sold their stock for up to ten times the animals’ Texas market value. Railroads then shipped the cattle to the Chicago Stockyards and eventually hungry mouths on the east coast.38 Anglo-American trader C.F. Doan, owner of a store on the border of Texas and Indian Territory, claimed that in 1881 between nine and twelve million U.S. dollars’ worth of beef passed by his establishment.39 Beef was the lifeblood of Stone Calf’s web of kinship. Stone Calf’s people got their own cattle from passing drives by trading local and temporary grazing rights along the Great Western Trail to cowboys driving herds in exchange for a couple of animals. Neither group planned these exchanges, but each generally understood what the other expected when they met. In between April and August, cowboys encountered both small parties of Indians and moving villages of several hundred people. Indigenous leaders almost always initiated contact.40 Anglo-Texans and Indians haggled, typically in Spanish, Comanche, Plains Indian Sign Language, and English, over which livestock and how many.41 Typically, a group of Indians got one or two animals from each drive. Negotiations varied from a few minutes to an entire day.42 Sometimes, Indians accepted horses or other desirable items, such as rubber balls or sugar, in lieu of beef.43 Once the two groups reached an agreement, they generally parted ways. A critical rereading of these exchanges within cowboy oral narratives leads to several important conclusions. First, Stone Calf’s constituents were not “ecological Indians.”44 They did not shape the transnational cattle industry’s use of reservation grasslands, rivers, and forests for the environment’s sake; the constituents did so for their own gain. Second, although cowboys sometimes recounted tales of shootouts in Indian Territory, more often these old men told stories of negotiation and cooperation with Indigenous peoples.45 Even though many twentieth-century historians only gathered the perspectives of Anglo cowboys and cattlemen, modern historians can find useful detail in American accounts recorded sometimes fifty years after the fact. Third, borderlands trade was based on two mutually recognized ideas: cowboys and Indians acknowledged that Cheyennes controlled the environmental resources the Indians lived on and that each party could measure those resources in a value that translated cattle into U.S. dollars. Cowboys accepted that Southern Cheyenne people owned, defined, and enforced the value of water, grass, and timber, and so paid for those crucial items. Finally, if a borderland is a “social, cultural, and economic interface between aboriginal peoples and others,” then these cowboy stories illuminate the efforts of an Indigenous alliance to shape both the transnational cattle industry and federal Indian policy through borderlands trade.46 Stone Calf’s kin might seem to have had the upper hand in this situation—they gained a valuable resource on a local level—but on a transnational level, cattle drivers realized these trades with their temporary Indigenous allies made financial sense in light of OIA policy. In 1880, the Office of Indian Affairs mandated that cattle drives obtain authorization to move through Indian lands, although the U.S. military or local OIA employees on the Cheyenne and Arapaho Reservation did not have the personnel to enforce that order. Going around Indian Territory was expensive, as was a government pass or the $1 fine per head if federal officials caught a drive without one.47 The larger the drive, the greater the financial loss from a potential OIA fine or pass and consequentially the more cowboys stood to gain by trading with Stone Calf’s coalition. In financial terms, a twenty-five hundred head drive stood to lose $2,500 to the OIA or roughly $450–$600 to Southern Plains Indians.48 In addition, cowboys gained their Indigenous customers’ protection and assistance; most importantly, Indians hid generous cattle drives from federal officials. For both groups, a quiet, quick transaction was in their best financial and political interests. At times, inexperienced crews attempted to avoid paying either the OIA or Indians, leading to disaster. In 1882, a party of Cheyennes and Arapahos rode to a drive’s cook and “demanded the meat the cook was preparing for dinner; this he refused, and was shot by these Indians.”49 Most cowboys did not understand that Stone Calf’s constituents dealt with outsiders by creating ties of kinship that required kin to be generous, but the cowboys did learn that those who displayed generosity avoided conflict, so gift giving became commonplace on the Great Western Trail. Those who refused to be generous faced severe consequences. Southern Cheyenne men could stampede herds that tried to bypass payment. Since a stampede could result in the death of fifty to a hundred cattle, experienced crews gave away a few animals rather than lose the herd or even their lives.50 This knowledge circulated across the transnational cattle industry. In 1903, Andy Adams, a cowboy turned writer, recounted a drive’s encounter with “a band of renegade Cheyennes” led by “Running Bull Sheep” in his famed western novel The Log of a Cowboy.51 Responding to his own responsibilities within the web of kinship, Stone Calf manipulated his relationships with passing cowboys and nearby ranchers to supply Cheyenne women with hides, feed his family, and draw on intermediaries to negotiate with outsiders. By 1882, Stone Calf’s web of kinship shaped borderland trade into something grudgingly understood across the region.52 Borderlands trade in western Indian Territory shifted the political geography of the region. Agent Miles lost control of the western side of the reservation, and a borderland emerged that stretched 150 miles along the Texas border from the North Fork of the Red River to the Cimarron River in the Cherokee Strip and about 100 miles from the Texas border to Cantonment. In 1881, the height of the Great Western Trail, Stone Calf’s alliance obtained enough beef that Miles lost influence, nearly one Longhorn for every member.53 This beef enabled many Southern Cheyennes to live out their lives as they saw fit, more so than their Darlington counterparts. In other words, Miles had no power over the animals coalition members killed, processed, and ate within their own camps on the western side of the reservation. He could not force women to abandon their polygamous marriages, compel men to farm, or place children in government-run schools by threatening all of these people with starvation. Occasionally, coalition members played both systems, getting both rations and trail beef. In August 1880, Captain C.W. Hailor noted that a few weeks after Stone Calf came to Cantonment for rations, one of Stone Calf’s kin negotiated a dispute between Indians and cowboys on the trail over a bull.54 Stone Calf’s system attracted many; by 1885 his camps numbered about twelve hundred people.55 Stone Calf and Miles developed loose multiethnic alliances to fight for economic control of the region. Both men thought in eventualities. Miles relied on cattle drives to provide his own constituency with beef, so each cow Stone Calf’s people ate weakened Miles’s influence over roughly 3,800 people connected to the Fort Reno–Darlington community, while strengthening Stone Calf’s coalition of 1,500 at Cantonment, Fort Supply, and the surrounding river systems.56 Miles’s alliance was made up of OIA employees, legal ranchers, cultural intermediaries, Darlington Indians, and Fort Reno military officials, while some Southern Cheyenne women, Stone Calf’s extended family, interpreters, illegal ranchers, missionaries, and Fort Supply military officials made up the latter. Of the two alliances, the second slowly tore influence from the first. Figure 3. Open in new tabDownload slide A powerful alliance down the North Canadian River at Fort Reno opposed Stone Calf's web of kinship. Office of Indian Affairs Agent John Miles (center left) organized this alliance. Miles' son sits on the far left. John Miles' allies initially included Southern Cheyenne chief Little Robe (upper right), who later joined Stone Calf in protest of John Miles' leases. Ben Clark (lower right), a Cheyenne-speaking Anglo American scout married to a Northern Cheyenne woman, was John Miles' most important cultural intermediary, 10689.A, Oklahoma Historical Society. Figure 3. Open in new tabDownload slide A powerful alliance down the North Canadian River at Fort Reno opposed Stone Calf's web of kinship. Office of Indian Affairs Agent John Miles (center left) organized this alliance. Miles' son sits on the far left. John Miles' allies initially included Southern Cheyenne chief Little Robe (upper right), who later joined Stone Calf in protest of John Miles' leases. Ben Clark (lower right), a Cheyenne-speaking Anglo American scout married to a Northern Cheyenne woman, was John Miles' most important cultural intermediary, 10689.A, Oklahoma Historical Society. These coalitions were fluid. Indigenous peoples and allies alike moved from one coalition to another, depending on their economic and political circumstances. Ranchers, soldiers, missionaries, and cowboys lived on the margins of these alliances to gain access to as much grass, timber, and water as possible. These men protected their national or transnational interests, yet immediate considerations within the borderland forced them to honor their local obligations as kin. Local interactions, shaped by kinship, had repercussions across the transnational cattle industry, but those ties were not unbreakable. In 1879, James Morrison negotiated a ranching deal with what was perhaps an early version of Stone Calf’s coalition on the Cimarron River, only to have Miles remove him from the reservation.57 Barely on the margins of Stone Calf’s alliance, Morrison easily moved into Miles’s coalition. In 1883, Morrison leased land directly through Miles’s Indigenous constituency.58 As Stone Calf’s web of kinship developed connections to powerful Southern Plains actors such as Southern Cheyenne women along the North Canadian River, U.S. Army officers at Fort Supply, and cattlemen on the western side of the Cheyenne and Arapaho Reservation, the landscape of the borderland shifted, creating and disrupting opportunities for outsiders and borderland residents. Southern Cheyenne women were the stable, beating heart of Stone Calf’s web of kinship. Few people who ventured into western camps to meet Southern Cheyenne women wrote about them. Government officials and cowboys who did journey into the heart of the borderland were more concerned with either exploiting or controlling Indigenous women’s sexuality than understanding them as a powerful force.59 However, contemporary evidence from other Cheyenne bands as well as statistical and ethnographic data reveals a different picture. Women and their children made up 71 percent of Stone Calf’s band in 1875.60 As “the rulers of the camp,” Southern Cheyenne women raised children, foraged for food, farmed gardens, planted “extensive fields of corn” near Cantonment, and processed cattle hides—the main means of exchange on the western Cheyenne and Arapaho Reservation in the 1880s.61 What did these women gain by partnering with Stone Calf rather than living at Fort Reno? Stone Calf’s web of kinship shielded their marriages and economic interests from Miles’s efforts to ban polygamy on the reservation.62 In its late nineteenth-century incarnation, Southern Cheyenne polygyny strengthened both female and male economic and political stability. On the trail, men brought more raw hides to the camp than they had the time or the ability to process. As a group, two or three women could tan those hides while also working together to maintain their social autonomy from their husband and influence his political weight within the larger camp.63 If Stone Calf protected their interests, then they influenced their husbands to support him, which in turn strengthened his entire web of kinship. In return, men provided women and their children with meat, something women could not accomplish while tanning hides, farming, and managing camp affairs. In contrast to the Comanche practice that took power away from women by one Indigenous man employing many of them solely as laborers to process buffalo hides, Southern Cheyenne hide tanning offered women influence and stability.64 These late nineteenth-century women were connected to an economy particular to an environment transitioning from buffalo to cattle. In this economy, Indigenous men could not demand labor from Indigenous women because the raw materials needed—either the once-plentiful buffalo or cattle on the Great Western Trail—were far more limited than a decade earlier. Therefore, the Comanche practice was no longer feasible, and Indigenous women regained control over manufacturing.65 Southern Cheyenne women in the borderland stood to gain more from polygamous marriages than their ancestors and wielded more political, economic, and social power than their Darlington counterparts.66 As the hide manufacturers of each Southern Cheyenne village, women monitored water and timber. They needed both to process cattle hides. Normally, Cheyenne women butchered the cattle their husbands brought from the trail, made everyday objects out of their bones and organs, and processed the animal hides to sell them to traders for goods, such as gunpowder and iron utensils.67 Women spent several months at a winter encampment, tanning hides and gathering water and wood from a nearby river. It took one woman up to ten days of labor and processing before a hide was ready for sale.68 If cattle polluted or drained her immediate water supply or ranchers cut down nearby timber, a Southern Cheyenne woman could not process hides or even set up her camp. These women watched their surroundings closely and tied the fate of Stone Calf’s alliance to those nearby riparian resources. Furthermore, while the reservation covered a vast range, Southern Cheyennes set up winter camps within a few sheltered areas, generally forested floodplains along a body of water.69 A lieutenant colonel charged by the U.S. Army to establish Cantonment noted that after he made camp there on March 6, 1879, “the Indians began to arrive, locating themselves on the river and creeks, claiming the lands and timber.”70 Southern Cheyenne people were not opposed to harvesting this timber; after the Lee and Reynolds trading firm offered to pay Cheyenne men at Cantonment to cut timber in 1880, an entire band quickly shaped their economy around those contracts. In fact, some complained when the lieutenant colonel and later Miles banned Lee and Reynolds from continuing their operations at Cantonment.71 So that passing cowboys and nearby ranchers would understand the relationship between kinship, environmental resources, and power, Stone Calf used numerous cultural intermediaries to negotiate with outsiders. These intermediaries were acknowledged members of Southern Cheyenne society, people familiar with Southern Cheyenne language and culture, but also savvy with others.72 Intermediaries included Indigenous people, such as John Otterby and Cheyenne Belle Belanti, as well as people whom the Cheyennes grafted into their society, such as William Wells and Wesley Warren.73 By 1878, Stone Calf’s daughter married the chief’s most valuable cultural intermediary—the U.S. Army scout Amos Chapman—and solidified Chapman’s position in the web.74 Stone Calf’s son, Running Buffalo, also enlisted as a scout and he often traveled with Chapman.75 Chapman’s familiarity with the U.S. military helped Stone Calf to integrate soldiers into his coalition. In 1882, Stone Calf rode to Cantonment, Chapman’s station, and complained to U.S. Army officer J.J. Beretov that ranchers were on the reservation illegally.76 This complaint really meant that the ranchers refused to give Stone Calf’s people beef, not that he objected to small ranching outfits on Indigenous land.77In response, Beretov sent Running Buffalo and Chapman to remove the ranchers.78 Stone Calf’s relationship with the Fort Supply community suggests that his coalition viewed water, timber, and grass as political and economic resources with values they defined through action. He and his allies made a conscious choice to allow the soldiers to transform to the environment around the fort. Even through Indigenous women, men, and children encamped around Fort Supply vastly outnumbered soldiers living on the post, they allowed U.S. Army cattle to strip the surrounding pastures.79 After their officers at the fort initiated a massive 1877 construction project, African American and Anglo soldiers chopped down forty acres of “mammoth cottonwood timber” at Beaver Creek, disrupted precious local bodies of water, and reshaped the fort’s prairie hinterland to feed the soldiers.80 At this same creek existed “a veritable forest of Indian tepees” in need of firewood, clean water, and grass for their horses.81 By 1881, the fort consumed all the timber in a twenty-mile radius.82 Why did the coalition’s constituents allow this to happen? In other regions and on the Cheyenne and Arapaho Reservation, Indians violently grappled with soldiers, cowboys, settlers, and other Indigenous peoples over resources.83 What made Fort Supply different? Figure 4. Open in new tabDownload slide This 1886 photo of four Southern Cheyenne women is physical evidence of the web of kinship's impact in the region surrounding Fort Supply. Mary Long Neck (lower left), Stone Calf's daughter and Amos Chapman's wife, holds her daughter. She later learned English, became an American citizen and ultimately outlived both men. Mary's sister (upper right) is standing next to her. The infant is Mary Chapman (lower left), who later married prominent local rancher Lee Moore and helped the Chapman family transition from a world dominated by the web of kinship to one centered around Anglo-American agriculture at Seiling, Oklahoma Territory. An unnamed Afro-Cheyenne girl (lower right) is clothed in similar garb, including moccasins with detailed beadwork, to the other Southern Cheyenne women pictured. 2554 Oklahoma Historical Society. Figure 4. Open in new tabDownload slide This 1886 photo of four Southern Cheyenne women is physical evidence of the web of kinship's impact in the region surrounding Fort Supply. Mary Long Neck (lower left), Stone Calf's daughter and Amos Chapman's wife, holds her daughter. She later learned English, became an American citizen and ultimately outlived both men. Mary's sister (upper right) is standing next to her. The infant is Mary Chapman (lower left), who later married prominent local rancher Lee Moore and helped the Chapman family transition from a world dominated by the web of kinship to one centered around Anglo-American agriculture at Seiling, Oklahoma Territory. An unnamed Afro-Cheyenne girl (lower right) is clothed in similar garb, including moccasins with detailed beadwork, to the other Southern Cheyenne women pictured. 2554 Oklahoma Historical Society. At Fort Supply, the political and economic advantages Stone Calf’s coalition gained by incorporating soldiers as kin outweighed the U.S. military’s use of water, timber, and grass. Stone Calf’s relationship with Chapman allowed him to center the web of kinship around Fort Supply and Cantonment. In 1938, Anglo settler Neely Mason noted that “the Indian relatives of Chapman preferred to be around Fort Supply because Chapman was there.”84 Hill argues that Cheyenne people often shared resources with non-kin and viewed these relationships as reciprocal.85 By sharing resources, Stone Calf’s people built a trust between themselves and the soldiers, obligating the latter to assist the coalition. In 1880, one officer at Cantonment called Stone Calf “one of the most reliable Indians of my acquaintance.”86 Trust gave Stone Calf powerful tools. For example, the Southern Cheyenne chief repeatedly utilized Chapman’s rapport with Col. J.H. Potter, Fort Supply’s commander, to advance the goals of the larger coalition. Potter had the personnel and authority under U.S. law to confront outsiders, such as the transnational cattle industry, timber thieves, and even other U.S. government officials.87 He proved to be a valuable ally. Furthermore, Stone Calf’s web of kinship organically tied the soldiers at Fort Supply to Indigenous people. After Running Buffalo’s 1884 death, Sgt. Maco on the Cloud wrote Potter that he trusted the Anglo-American to arrest and charge Running Buffalo’s killer, despite Maco on the Cloud’s own inclination to pursue and kill E.M. Horton.88 Nowhere was the coalition’s reach more apparent or its web of kinship more useful than in a crisis. After Horton shot Running Buffalo five miles from Cantonment on May 4, 1884, Stone Calf’s kin retrieved the body and surrounded the cowboys at the Mennonite school. S.S. Haury, a German-speaking Mennonite missionary who knew Running Buffalo intimately, threw himself into the role of negotiator. Recognizing Haury’s place in their web of kinship, Running Buffalo’s relative shielded the missionaries from Southern Cheyenne guns during the first tense moments of the standoff.89 Haury’s actions stabilized the situation for a day, allowing Chapman to arrive on May 5 and negotiate with Lt. A.J. Gibbon and Horton for compensation.90 On May 6, Chapman and Haury gained 213 horses for Running Buffalo’s mourning kin. At about $15–$20 a head, Chapman’s $3,200–$4,360 of horseflesh was far more than the $30–40 Running Buffalo had asked Horton for two days earlier.91 Well before Running Buffalo’s demise, Miles threatened the coalition’s environmental, economic, and political security by flooding the reservation with cattle. In large herds, cattle change the biological composition of the areas they graze for the worse.92 Herds on the Great Western Trail and at Fort Supply created intense but manageable strains on local grasslands, but in January 1883, Miles successfully pressured his Darlington constituency to lease most of the reservation to cattlemen. Although he did not receive signatures from Stone Calf or other Southern Cheyenne chiefs in the west, Miles leased the land they lived on anyway.93 The leases, which the agent negotiated on his own initiative, allowed him to disrupt Stone Calf’s alliance while expanding his own influence. Over the next two years, Anglo-American cattlemen unfamiliar with the borderland—mainly businessmen from Kansas, Missouri, and Washington City—overstocked the reservation with cattle and began destroying its water sources, timber, and grasslands.94 They refused to comply with the mutually understood institutions Stone Calf’s coalition built. Furthermore, as Miles negotiated leasing agreements with his Darlington constituency in 1883, cattlemen were stocking or negotiating to stock every surrounding area of the Southern Plains.95 Collectively and unintentionally, ranchers and cattlemen covered the entire region with animals and fenced Stone Calf’s coalition into a tight geographical space, all in two years. Fencing such an immense area required large amounts of timber, almost all of which was located primarily along the scarce riparian environments that Southern Cheyenne people camped in and drew their firewood from. The new cattlemen consumed far more wood than anyone else in the region, including the U.S. Army, which in 1881 chopped down a thousand trees to erect one telegraph line between Fort Supply and Fort Dodge, Kansas.96 From 1883, ranchers began persistently hacking away at reservation river valley forests to enclose the prairie. By December 1884, they completely fenced the reservation, consuming a huge amount of timber, inhibiting the hide economy, and destroying many campsites in the process.97 On a smaller scale, the cattle industry’s consumption of all the timber in the region echoed the buffalo hide industry’s overhunting on the Southern Plains a decade earlier and the obliteration of the Arkansas river valley’s forests by goldminers rushing to the Rocky Mountains two decades before that. In all three cases, the loss of such essential resources brought profound environmental and political consequences to Southern Cheyenne men and women.98 The land leases, much like allotment a decade later, threatened to tear apart the ties that bound Stone Calf’s web of kinship. The transnational cattle industry’s overtaxing of reservation resources brought political and environmental consequences on the heads of average Southern Cheyennes. These consequences not only upset the balance that the web of kinship created but came close to destroying the basic resources that fueled the web. As cattlemen brought animals onto their leases, built wooden structures, and fenced the prairie, illegal ranchers lost the land they gained through the coalition and drives found it difficult to move their herds around new fences. All this activity cut Stone Calf’s constituents off from their beef supply. Herds of cattle ate their way through grasslands, trampled corn fields, drained and polluted rivers, and knocked down entire encampments, leaving Indigenous women unable to process hides or even perform daily activities that allowed Southern Cheyenne society to function.99 It is no coincidence that as cattle cut off the coalition from vital environmental, economic, and ultimately political resources over two years, Stone Calf and his allies increasingly agitated to void the leases. Almost immediately, the most prominent coalition chiefs vocally opposed the leases at Fort Supply. In July 1883, Stone Calf told Potter, with Chapman translating his indignant speech, that the landscape “is now literally covered with cattle.”100 Sitting Medicine, later shot and then decapitated by cowboys while traveling in July 1885, predicted the problems that killed him: “I think the agent is playing the wolf—trying to ‘beat’ us out of the land…. We now wish the Commander Officer [Potter] here to do what he can for us. The way things are we shall not be able to live two more years on our land.”101 Running Buffalo also predicted that cattle ranchers would exhaust reservation resources in roughly two years.102 While Potter tried to convince Miles that to avoid an eventual incident the agent must negotiate directly with the coalition over the leases, Miles demanded that the coalition representatives leave Fort Supply immediately.103 Sitting Medicine and Running Buffalo’s predictions paralleled the climax of the leases’ environmental impact in 1885. Mathematically, rough environmental estimates support the assertions of the coalition’s representatives.104 Using data from the U.S. Department of Agriculture over a modern eight-county area that once made up the Cheyenne and Arapaho Reservation, it is possible to measure the environmental damage cattle caused between 1883 and 1885 by calculating that land’s carrying capacity, a figure modern ranchers use to know how many animals will overtax the landscape. Since the USDA does not provide nineteenth-century statistics and historical accounts do not record the weight (a central point in calculating carrying capacity) of the hundreds of thousands of animals that traveled onto the reservation in this period, when they arrived, or their distribution across the reservation, only a broad estimate is possible. The entire reservation’s carrying capacity, calculated by creating an average from modern USDA data of the eight-county area and multiplying that by the acreage leased under Miles’s administration, is just over two billion pounds per acre. Nearby OIA Agent P.B. Hunt estimated that each cow the government received weighed about 800 pounds. Ranchers use weight to estimate how much an animal will eat. In 1885, 210,000 Longhorns on the reservation, weighing an average of 800 pounds, consumed 4.2 million pounds of per acre a day. Therefore, 210,000 Longhorns could potentially have devoured the grass on the reservation’s leased lands in about 496 days, or roughly a year and four months. Even at half that rate, which allows for the lack of data about when the cattle arrived and how they were distributed between 1883 and 1885, this calculation supports the assertions of coalition representatives that cattle were rapidly destroying their resources. Instead of addressing the obvious problem, Miles suppressed dissent from coalition allies such as Southern Cheyenne rancher Belle Belanti, also known as Cheyenne Belle. Over an eighteen-month period, one of Stone Calf’s most trusted cultural intermediaries, Belanti fought Miles tooth and nail to retain her Washita River ranch, ultimately losing her land but ruining Miles’s OIA career and critically weakening the agency’s influence. Belanti’s struggle highlighted Miles’s troubled balancing of the federal government and the western coalition’s expectations.105 Belanti, the daughter of prominent German fur trader Charles Rath and Southern Cheyenne Making Road Woman, married Hungarian immigrant soldier Michael Belanti at Fort Reno.106 In September 1882, the Belantis established a ranch on the Washita River, only to have a frustrated Miles try to run them off in March 1883. Although Rath vouched for his daughter, Miles pressured the two to relocate to Cantonment.107 Even after the Belantis buckled and Miles resigned in frustration on March 31, 1884, a rancher drove them off their Cantonment property. Belle subsequently mailed a letter from Fort Reno to Secretary of the Interior Henry Teller, prompting a December 1884 congressional investigation of leases in Indian Territory.108 At the climax of the land leasing policy’s environmental impact on the Cheyenne and Arapaho Reservation, the OIA replaced Miles on April 1, 1884 , with Daniel B. Dyer. The transition further weakened Darlington Agency’s influence. John Seger, a longtime agency employee, speculated that individuals within the transnational cattle industry used Dyer to protect Miles’s 1883 leasing agreements.109 Dyer worked for five years at the Quapaw Agency in northeastern Indian Territory, but he had no familiarity with Southern Plains Indians; fear defined his career at Darlington.110 The new agent argued that the annual $25 per capita payout from the lessees kept many Indians at Fort Reno from starving, but he had almost no interaction with Southern Cheyennes in western camps.111 From April 1884 through June 1885, Dyer continually called for more troops at Fort Reno rather than responding to the slow-moving tidal wave of political protest emanating from the coalition over the leases.112 In December 1884, an infuriated Stone Calf; allied Southern Cheyenne chiefs Little Robe, Spotted Horse, White Shield; and their interpreter, Chapman, again met with Potter about the leases. White Shield said that “everywhere I go I see white men stealing timber.”113 Stone Calf was even more direct, stating that “The white men are like wolves, they have come on to the Washita and are trying to force us out of that Country…we don’t want this, we want our wood to stand.”114 Spotted Horse angrily recorded that “wherever there is a stream of water [White men] are putting up fine houses…I want the letter to say that I have never taken the lease money [or] signed any paper giving away land or grass or timber.”115 Commander Potter mailed their protest letters to George Vest, a Missourian on the U.S. Senate’s Committee on Territories, but Vest chose instead to assist Dyer’s successful defense of Miles’s leasing policies during the ongoing congressional investigation.116 As a new summer dawned, Stone Calf’s coalition continued to adapt to the changing political, environmental, and economic landscape of the borderland, setting off a chain reaction that reached people in Washington City. Throughout the first six months of 1885, Southern Cheyenne men increasingly took animals from the lessee herds to replace the trail beef warded off by newly erected fencing and in compensation for environmental resources destroyed by overstocking.117 These acquisitions were largely peaceful, since cattlemen and their workers were often not present when Indians took cattle, but Dyer panicked. On June 10, he telegraphed the U.S. Army’s commanding general that Stone Calf had fifteen hundred men ready to burn the agency, an exaggeration that revealed how poorly Dyer understood the reservation’s politics and demographics.118 In the realm of reality, scout Ben Clark claimed that Stone Calf and his “saucy” allies strategically cut the Darlington Indians off from agency rations, thereby weakening Dyer’s influence.119 On June 15, the U.S. Army sent soldiers from Fort Sill, led by E.V. Sumner, a U.S. officer unfamiliar with the web of kinship. Sumner repeated Dyer’s troubled assertions in his June 17 report, while J.H. Potter emphasized his now two-year-old conclusions that the leases were the root of the problem in his own June 19 communique to Washington City.120 Motivated to protect southwestern Kansans, President Grover Cleveland listened to J.H. Potter, Stone Calf’s kin, and sent General Phillip Sheridan into the borderland. Although he may not have perceived how his actions supported Stone Calf’s alliance, Sheridan became a marginal ally of the coalition. In shaping the general’s actions to support their interests, Stone Calf’s allies repeated practices they had long established with cowboys, ranchers, soldiers, and missionaries. Cleveland’s actions allowed Stone Calf’s constituents to incorporate Sheridan into the outer rim of the coalition. Even while serving his own interests, the general inadvertently protected the alliance’s economic wellbeing. As U.S. officials within the borderland speculated about the causes of what Dyer erroneously labeled an uprising, hundreds of southwestern Kansans became terrified. In response, many residents of these towns telegraphed Kansas Governor John Martin for help; he in turn contacted Cleveland.121 On July 10, 1885, Cleveland chose to listen to Potter’s recommendations; he sent Sheridan, commanding general of the U.S. Army, to Fort Reno.122 Sheridan knew Stone Calf from a tense 1868 encounter at Fort Larned, Kansas.123 After talking with the chiefs who lived to the west, he sent a July 22 report to Cleveland. In it, Sheridan repeated a distilled, somewhat paternalistic version of the coalition’s complaints. He recommended that the president sack Dyer and assign a U.S. Army officer to replace him, as well as void all leases and give ranchers forty days to leave. On July 23, Cleveland published a proclamation ordering the cattlemen to vacate the reservation.124 Figure 5. Open in new tabDownload slide Amos Chapman and his family remained connected to their Southern Cheyenne relatives, even as they ranched and farmed lands around Seiling, Oklahoma. Until 1905, no bridges existed across the two unpredictable rivers that cut Seiling off from the rest of the world, and the Chapmans used this relative isolation to build alliances with both Cheyennes and settlers that protected them from racial violence occurring in other locations such as El Reno and Cheyenne, Oklahoma. As late as 1991, Amos' son Sam remained interconnected within the Seiling community 20738.N5.26, Oklahoma Historical Society. Figure 5. Open in new tabDownload slide Amos Chapman and his family remained connected to their Southern Cheyenne relatives, even as they ranched and farmed lands around Seiling, Oklahoma. Until 1905, no bridges existed across the two unpredictable rivers that cut Seiling off from the rest of the world, and the Chapmans used this relative isolation to build alliances with both Cheyennes and settlers that protected them from racial violence occurring in other locations such as El Reno and Cheyenne, Oklahoma. As late as 1991, Amos' son Sam remained interconnected within the Seiling community 20738.N5.26, Oklahoma Historical Society. Stone Calf’s coalition shaped federal Indian policy and the transnational cattle industry through Cleveland’s July 1885 decision, yet the web of kinship that bound them together almost immediately collapsed under the weight of great environmental, economic, and political change. Stone Calf, a man whose carefully constructed alliance successfully influenced the president of the United States, died in November 1885.125 The following winter, an unusually destructive, icy event, gave many people across the transnational cattle industry pause. New railroad lines outmoded cattle drives, while expanding quarantine laws that banned diseased cattle from entering the certain areas of the United States and fencing erected by ranchers and farmers blocked existing cattle trails. Some ranchers began advocating new ways of doing business as several harsh winters in a row froze or dehydrated many cattle on the Great Plains to death. Within a few seasons, much of the transnational cattle industry stopped using the Great Western Trail, which cut off the coalition’s beef supply.126 Simultaneously, the U.S. Army stationed soldiers along the trail, making it more difficult for Indians to obtain the increasingly limited amount of beef available on that route.127 Under this growing weight, Stone Calf’s web of kinship grew less visible and ultimately disintegrated. Between 1877 and 1885, Stone Calf successfully knitted together a web of kinship that included Southern Cheyenne women, allied families, cultural intermediaries, U.S. soldiers, missionaries, and small ranchers through gendered labor, economic opportunity, and the expanding transnational cattle industry’s connection to environmental resources on the Southern Plains. This story is significant for several reasons. As a Southern Cheyenne story, it reshapes the history of the reservation period, recognizing Cheyennes as dynamic people instead of describing their inevitable decline. As an Oklahoma story, the coalition is a reminder of a complex, relevant, and understudied region with the potential to speak to other areas of North America. As both a transnational and borderlands story, Stone Calf’s coalition indicates that Indigenous people exploited contested spaces that served their purposes and that influenced events thousands of miles away. Finally, this story is a reminder of the enduring power of alliances and kinship in the North American West, even as settlers, empires, and industries moved into the interior of the continent. JohnTruden is a Ph.D. student at the University of Oklahoma.This article took shape in a seminar and a workshop led by Kathleen Brosnan in 2017, and in a presentation at the 63rd annual meeting of the American Society for Ethnohistory. The author thanks Brosnan, Jeff Widener, and two U.S. Department of Agriculture officials at Taloga and Woodward, Oklahoma. He appreciates the financial support received from the University of Oklahoma Department of History, the American Society for Ethnohistory, and the Phi Alpha Theta History Honor Society for travel and research in Manitoba, Oklahoma, and Texas. Footnotes 1 Cantonment is five miles northwest of modern Canton, Oklahoma. 2 Sam P. Ridings, The Chisholm Trail: A History of the World’s Greatest Cattle Trail, Together with a Description of the Persons, A Narrative of Events, and Reminiscences of the Same(1936, repr., Medford, OK: Grant County Historical Society, 1975), 181. 3 S. S. Haury, “Mennonite Missionary S.S. Haury’s Account of the Running Buffalo Shooting, 1884,” trans. Levi Wilkins and ed. John Truden, Chronicles of Oklahoma 95, no. 4 (Winter 2017–18): 473; J. D. Darlington, “Report,” 22 September 1884, 142–8, Roll 4, M1070, RG 75, Reports of Inspection of the Field Jurisdiction of the Office of Indian Affairs, 1873–1900, National Archives, Washington, D.C., hereafter cited as Reports; A.J. Gibbon to Post Adjutant, Fort Reno, 9 May 1884, 194–9, Roll 275, M689, RG 94, Letters Received by the Office of the Adjutant General 1881–1889, National Archives, Washington, D.C., hereafter cited as LR81-89. 4 Quoted in Christina Gish Hill, Webs of Kinship: Family in Northern Cheyenne Nationhood (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2017), 9, 59; Although Hill’s work is largely about Northern Cheyennes, Southern Cheyenne society continued to function with many of the same institutions and the two peoples maintained contact making her Northern Plains study relevant to this Southern Plains example. 5 Quoted in Edward Everett Dale, “Ranching on the Cheyenne-Arapaho Reservation, 1880–1885” Chronicles of Oklahoma 6, no. 1 (March 1928): 35–59. 6 Quoted in Wayne Gard, The Chisholm Trail (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954), 128; Donald E. Worcester, The Chisholm Trail: High Road of the Cattle Kingdom (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1980). 7 Robert C. Carriker, Fort Supply, Indian Territory: Frontier Outpost on the Plains (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1970); Donald J. Berthrong, The Cheyenne and Arapaho Ordeal: Reservation and Agency Life in the Indian Territory, 1875–1907 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976). 8 William T. Hagan, Quanah Parker, Comanche Chief (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1993); James E. Sherow, “Water, Sun, and Cattle: The Chisholm Trail as an Ephemeral Ecosystem” in Fluid Arguments: Five Centuries of Western Water Conflict, ed. Char Miller (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 2001), 141–55; Peter Iverson, When Indians Became Cowboys: Native Peoples and Cattle Ranching in the American West (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1994), 88–90. 9 Phillip Sheridan to Grover Cleveland, 24 July 1885, 120, Roll 363, LR81-89; Return, Fort Supply, January 1883, Roll 1244, M617, RG 94, Returns from U.S. Military Posts, 1800–1916. 10 Iverson, When Indians Became Cowboys, xiii. 11 Walter Prescott Webb, The Great Plains (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1931), 205–69. 12 Terry G. Jordan-Bychkov, North American Cattle Ranching Frontiers: Origins, Diffusion, and Differentiation (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1993), 8; William Cronon, Nature’s Metropolis: Chicago and the Great West (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1991), xv. 13 Rachel St. John, Line in the Sand: A History of the Western U.S. Mexico Border (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011), 73–5; Alicia Dewey, “Ranching Across Borders: The Making of a Transnational Cattle Industry in the Texas-Mexico Borderlands, 1749–1945” in Farming Across Borders: A Transnational History of the North American West, ed. Sterling Evans (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2017), 221–46. 14 For borderlands, see David G. McCrady, Living with Strangers: The Nineteenth-Century Sioux and the Canadian-American Borderlands (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006); Pekka Hämäläinen, The Comanche Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); Joshua L. Reid, The Sea is My Country: the Maritime World of the Makahs, an Indigenous Borderlands People (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2015); Clarissa Confer, Andrae Marak and Laura Tuennerman, eds., Transnational Indians in the North American West (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2015); Michel Hogue, Metis and the Medicine Line: Creating a Border and Dividing a People (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2015). 15 Jeffrey D. Means, “’Indians SHALL DO THINGS in common’: Oglala Lakota Identity and Cattle-Raising on the Pine Ridge Reservation,” Montana The Magazine of Western History 61, no. 3 (Autumn 2011): 3–21, 91–3; Natale A. Zappia, “Indigenous Borderlands: Livestock, Capacity, and Power in the Far West,” Pacific Historical Review 81, no. 2 (May 2012): 194. 16 Jacqueline M. Moore, Cow Boys and Cattle Men: Class and Masculinities on the Texas Frontier, 1865–1900 (New York: New York University Press, 2010), 21. 17 William H. Bower to M.R. Morgan, 23 October 1869, Camp Supply Letter Book,201-04, Camp Supply Collection, hereafter cited as CSC, Western History Collections, University of Oklahoma, Norman, Oklahoma, hereafter cited as WHC; Modern day Fort Supply, Oklahoma is located about fifteen miles northwest of Woodward, Oklahoma. 18 John H. Moore, “The Significance of Cheyenne Work in the History of U.S. Capitalism” in Native Americans and Wage Labor: Ethnohistorical Perspectives, ed. Alice Littlefield and Martha C. Knack (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996), 125–7; George E. Hyde, Life of George Bent: Written from his Letters, ed. Savoie Lottinville (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968), 68. 19 Hyde, Life of George Bent, 357–67; Hämäläinen, The Comanche Empire, 338–9. 20 Hill, Webs of Kinship, 46. 21 Stan Hoig, The Peace Chiefs of the Cheyennes (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1980), 152–5. 22 Darlington Agency was two miles north of modern day El Reno, Oklahoma; Thomas H. Hill to R.C. Drum, 7 March 1875, 639-40, Roll 9, M1495, RG 393, “Special Files” of Headquarters, Division of the Missouri, Relating to Military Operations and Administration, 1863–1885, National Archives, Washington D.C. hereafter Special Files. 23 Interview with Loren Ooley, 29 December 1937, Indian Pioneer Papers, hereafter cited as IPP, WHC; Thomas H. Hill to R.C. Drum, March 7, 1875, 639-40, Roll 9,“Special Files”; Martin Gibbons to E.P. Smith, May 19, 1875, 881, Roll 719, M234, RG 75, Letter Received by the Office of Indian Affairs, 1824–1881, National Archives, Washington D.C. hereafter cited as LROIA. 24 Henry A. Hambright to Sebastian Gunther, 4 January 1878, 31, Roll 2, Camp Supply Letters Sent, hereafter cited as CSLS, Panhandle-Plains Historical Museum and Archives, Canyon, Texas, hereafter cited as PPHM. 25 E. P. Smith, Circular, 1 February 1877, 43–7, Roll 5, M1121, RG 75, Records of the Bureau of Indian Affairs: Procedural Issuances: Orders and Circulars, 1854–1955, National Archives, Washington D.C. hereafter cited as Circulars. 26 E.P. Smith, Circular, 1 February 1877, 46, Roll 5, Circulars; John Miles, Estimate for Subsistence, 1 June 1877, C731, Roll 122, LROIA. 27 Quoted in Catharine R. Franklin, “’If the Government Will Only…Fulfill Its Obligations:’ Colonel Benjamin Grierson, Rations Policy, and the Kiowa Indians, 1868–1872,” Southwestern Historical Quarterly 118, no. 2 (October 2014): 185; Shepard Krech III, The Ecological Indian: Myth and History (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 1999), 132. 28 E.P. Smith, Circular, 1 February 1877, 46, Roll 5, Circulars; United States Office of Indian Affairs, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, for the Year 1878 (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1878), 54–5, hereafter cited as ARCIA1878; United States Office of Indian Affairs, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, for the Year 1879 (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1879), 58 hereafter cited as ARCIA1879. 29 Quoted in Henry A. Hambright to E.R. Platt, 2 January 1878, 29, Roll 2, CSLS, PPHM. 30 E. A. Hayt, Circular No. 30, July 14, 1879, 205, Roll 5, Circulars. 31 Quoted in Post Adjutant, Fort Reno to R. Williams, 3 April 1882, 103, Roll 88, LR81-89; John Pope to R.C. Drum, March 23, 1882, Roll 88, LR81-89. 32 John Pope to Phillip Sheridan, 9 April 1882, 117, Roll 88, LR81-89. 33 Tamara Levi, Food, Control, and Resistance: Rationing Indigenous Peoples in the United States and South Australia (Lubbock: Texas Tech University Press, 2016), 26–30, 34; Jacki Thompson Rand, Kiowa Humanity and the Invasion of the State (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2008), 56–7; Franklin, “’If the Government Will Only…Fulfill Its Obligations,’” 186. 34 Berthrong, The Cheyenne and Arapaho Ordeal, 91; USOIA, ARCIA1878, 54–5; USOIA, ARCIA1879, 58; Loretta Fowler, Wives and Husbands: Gender and Age in Southern Arapaho History (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2010), 140–1; Phillip Sheridan to Grover Cleveland, 24 July 1885, 131, Roll 363, LR81-89. 35 R. J. Mackenzie to John Miles, 7 July 1877, 723, File 256, Roll 72, RG 75, Special Files of the Office of Indian Affairs, 1807–1904, National Archives, Washington D.C. hereafter cited as SFOIA. 36 Joshua Specht, “The Rise, Fall and Rebirth of the Texas Longhorn: An Environmental History” Environmental History 21, no. 2 (April 2016): 348–50, 352. 37 Ridings, The Chisholm Trail, 369; Worcester, The Chisholm Trail, 31. 38 Specht, “Texas Longhorn,” 352; Webb, The Great Plains, 216. 39 C. F. Doan, “Doan’s Store,” 3, 8 October 1926, PPHM; Webb, The Great Plains, 216–7. 40 F. M. Polk, “My Experience on the Cow Trail” in Trail Drivers of Texas, Volume 1, ed.J. Marvin Hunter (New York: Argosy-Antiquarian LTD, 1963), 144; T. T. Hawkins, “When George Saunders Made a Bluff ‘Stick,’” in Trail Drivers of Texas, Volume 1, ed. J. Marvin Hunter (New York: Argosy-Antiquarian LTD, 1963), 393–6. 41 Ben Butler Dancey, (n.d.), IPP, WHC; Hawkins, “Bluff ‘Stick,’” 391; Henry Alec Davis, 17 February 1938, IPP, WHC; W.H. Thomas, 3 January 1938, IPP, WHC. 42 Henry Alec Davis, 17 February 1938, IPP, WHC; Hawkins, “Bluff ‘Stick,’” 394–6. 43 George Gerdes, “Some Things I Saw Long Ago,” in Trail Drivers of Texas, Volume 1,ed.J. Marvin Hunter (New York: Argosy-Antiquarian LTD, 1963), 462; Albert Armstrong, 19 April 1938, IPP, WHC. 44 Quoted in Krech, The Ecological Indian, 16. 45 The author primarily drew these stories from the Trail Drivers of Texas and the Indian Pioneer Papers. 46 Quoted in David G. McCrady, Living With Strangers: The Nineteenth Century Sioux and the Canadian-American Borderlands (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006), 2. 47 E. J. Brooks, Circular No. 54, 20 July 1880, 217, Roll 5, Circulars. 48 All calculations are estimates; The data in this calculation is drawn from the following sources: Webb, The Great Plains, 216; E.J. Brooks, Circular No. 54, 20 July 1880, 217, Roll 5, Circulars; Each animal in a cattle herd was worth $30–40. The OIA always took $1 per head, regardless of the size of the herd. This meant that the OIA always collected 3% of the drive's profits. Various groups of Indians collectively took 10–15 cattle over the course of a drive’s journey across Indian Territory, about $450–$600. The larger the drive, the cheaper it was for a drive to simply trade with Indians and avoid the OIA. 49 Quoted in John Flint, 15 December 1937, IPP, WHC. 50 Henry Alec Davis, 17 February 1938, IPP, WHC; Nat Love, The Life and Adventures of Nat Love (New York: Arno Press Inc, 1968), 58–9. 51 Quoted in Andy Adams, The Log of a Cowboy: A Narrative of the Old Trail Days (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1903), 182–5; Wilson M. Hudson, Andy Adams: His Life and Writings (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1964), 3–9, 24–6. 52 Abram E. Wood to John Miles, 27 May 1882, 78, Roll 1, M1189, Cantonment on the North Fork of the Canadian River, Selected Letters Sent, National Archives and Records Administration, Donald J. Berthrong Collection, University of Oklahoma Libraries, Norman hereafter Cantonment Letters. 53 The data in this calculation is drawn from the following sources: C.F. Doan, “Doan’s Store,” 3, 8 October 1926, PPHM; Henry Alec Davis, 17 February 1938, IPP, WHC; If 300,000 cattle passed Doan’s Store and an average herd was about 2,000 cattle, then roughly 150 drives passed by that year. If each drive gave away fifteen animals (Davis’ estimate) in total while they were in Indian Territory, that amounted in 1881 to 2,250 animals. The Kiowas and Comanches on the Kiowa-Comanche-Apache Reservation received about half of these animals and Cheyennes and Arapahos received the other half, or 1,125 animals. Stone Calf’s people controlled much of the Great Western Trail on the Cheyenne and Arapaho Reservation, so this calculation estimates they received ninety percent of those 1,125 animals given away on the Cheyenne and Arapaho Reservation, or roughly 1,013 animals. Stone Calf’s band had an estimated 1,000 people in 1881, meaning his constituents received about one animal for every person. 54 C. W. Hailor to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of the Missouri, 11 August 1880, 45–7, Roll 1, Cantonment Letters; C.W. Hailor to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of the Missouri, 30 August 1880, 54, Roll 1, Cantonment Letters. 55 Phillip Sheridan to Grover Cleveland, 24 July 1885, 120, Roll 363, LR81-89. 56 R. J. Mackenzie to John Miles, 7 July 1877, 723, Roll 72, SFOIA; Phillip Sheridan to Grover Cleveland, 24 July 1885, 137, Roll 363, LR81-89; Returns, Fort Reno, January 1885, Roll 999, Returns; This measurement is based upon data from 1885, since Miles’ censuses of reservation communities were inflated. 57 James Morrison to John Miles, 18 January 1879, Folder 75-2, Box 194, Cheyenne and Arapaho Nation Agency Records (CANAR), Oklahoma Historical Society, Oklahoma History Center, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, hereafter cited as OHS; John Miles to James Morrison, 21 January 1879, Cheyenne-Arapaho Agency Letterpress Books, Roll 1 (CALB1), El Reno Carnegie Library, El Reno, Oklahoma. 58 D.B. Dyer, 19 December 1884, U. S. Congress, Senate, Testimony taken by the Committee on Indian Affairs of the Senate in relation to Leases of Lands in the Indian Territory and Other Reservations under Resolution of the Senate of December 3, 1884,1884, S. Rep. 1278, 49th Cong., 1st sess.,serial 2362, 9 hereafter cited as S. Rep. 59 Lt. Col., Cantonment to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of the Missouri, 4 March 1880, 284, Roll 1, Cantonment Letters; Oliver Nelson, The Cowman’s Southwest: Being the Reminiscences of Oliver Nelson, ed. Angie Debo (Glendale, CA: Arthur H. Clark Co., 1953), 143–4. 60 Thomas H. Hill to R.C. Drum, 7 March 1875, 639, Roll 9, M1495, Special Files. 61 Quoted in George Bird Grinnell, The Cheyenne Indians: Their History and Ways of Life, Volume 1 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1923), 128–9, 209–10; Quoted in Phillip Sheridan to Grover Cleveland, 22 July 1885, 30, Roll 362, LR81-89. 62 Fowler, Wives and Husbands, 170. 63 Katherine N. Weist, “Beasts of Burden and Menial Slaves: Nineteenth Century Observations of Northern Plains Indian Women” in Patricia Albers and Beatrice Medicine, The Hidden Half: Studies of Plains Indian Women (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1983), 43. 64 Hämäläinen, The Comanche Empire, 247–9. 65 The exact quality and time Southern Cheyenne women spent manufacturing these products is uncertain. Little data is available to describe hide processing in Stone Calf’s camps. In other regions, both dressed robe and hide quality declined over the course of the nineteenth century as increasing market demands pushed more indigenous women to emphasize speed over quality. However, indigenous women in Stone Calf’s camps had more power over their manufacturing process than women thirty to fifty years earlier, principally due to the limited availability of materials and their political influence within the web of kinship. This article uses the term hide and assumes that indigenous women continued to emphasize quantity since their mother’s and grandmother’s generation, who taught this generation how to process hides, used practices focused on speed, but it is certainly possible that Southern Cheyenne women began making higher quality products as they gained more autonomy. Larry Barsness, Heads, Horns, &Hides: The Compleat Buffalo Book (Fort Worth: Texas Christian University Press, 1985), 97. 66 Fowler, Wives and Husbands, 172–4; Alan Klein, “The Political-Economy of Gender: A 19th Century Plains Indian Case Study” in Albers and Medicine, The Hidden Half 155. 67 Carriker, Fort Supply, Indian Territory, 148–9. 68 Mary Inkanish, “Native Methods of Tanning of the Cheyenne Indians,” Folder 7, Box 66, Alice Marriott Collection, WHC; Morgan Baillargeon, North American Aboriginal Hide Tanning: The Act of Transformation and Revival (Gatineau, QU: Canadian Museum of Civilization Corporation, 2010), 15. 69 James E. Sherow, “Workings of the Geodialectic: High Plains Indians and their Horses in the Region of the Arkansas River Valley, 1800–1870,” in James E. Sherow, A Sense of the American West: An Anthology of Environmental History (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1998), 100, 103. 70 Quoted in Lt. Col., Cantonment to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of the Missouri, 4 March 1880, 286, Roll 1, Cantonment Letters. 71 Lt. Col., Cantonment to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of the Missouri, 4 March 1880, 286–8, Roll 1, Cantonment Letters. 72 Hill, Webs of Kinship, 66–7. 73 Phillip Sheridan to Grover Cleveland, 24 July 1885, 123, Roll 363, LR81-89; A.S. Dallas to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of the Missouri, 2 May 1879, 214, Roll 2, CSLS, PPHM; Berthrong, The Cheyenne and Arapaho Ordeal, 98. 74 Peter T. Lieneman, 28 January 1938, IPP, WHC. 75 H. I. Walck, 4 April 1938, IPP, WHC; Post Adjutant, Camp Supply to E.R. Platt, 18 May 1878, 87, Roll 2, CSLS, PPHM. 76 Amos Chapman to J. J. Beretov, 6 February 1881, Folder 75-2, Box 194, CANAR, OHS. 77 Edward Everett Dale, The Range Cattle Industry (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1930), 139. 78 J. J. Beretov, Special Orders No. 7, 3 February 1881, Folder 75-2, Box 194, CANAR, OHS. 79 Interview with Loren Ooley, 29 December 1937, IPP, WHC; William H. Bower to M.R. Morgan, 27 August 1869, Camp Supply Letter Book, 34, CSC, WHC; Commander, Camp Supply to E.R. Platt, 3 February 1878, 46–7, Roll 2, CSLS, PPHM. 80 Quoted in Peter Lieneman, 1 March 1938, IPP, WHC; Carriker, Fort Supply, 137–40, 158. 81 Quoted in Peter Lieneman, 30 November 1937, IPP, WHC. 82 J.H. Potter to Charles A. Sargent, 24 October 1881, 266, Roll 2, CSLS, PPHM. 83 Richard White, “The Winning of the West: The Expansion of the Western Sioux in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,” Journal of American History 65, no. 2 (September 1978): 334–42; Elliott West, The Contested Plains: Indians, Goldseekers, and the Rush to Colorado (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 232. 84 Quoted in Neely Mason, 1 February 1938, IPP, WHC. 85 Hill, Webs of Kinship, 94. 86 Quoted in Lt. Col., Cantonment to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of the Missouri, 4 March 1880, 285, Roll 1, Cantonment Letters. 87 Post Adjutant to J.M. Day, 11 March 1882, 47, Roll 2, CSLS, PPHM; J.H. Potter to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of the Missouri, 17 September 1882, 11, Roll 2, CSLS, PPHM; J.H. Potter to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of the Missouri, 6 March 1882, 77-78, Roll 2, CSLS, PPHM. 88 Maco on the Cloud to J.H. Potter, 11 May 1884, 216, Roll 275, LR81-89. 89 Haury, “Mennonite Missionary,” 475–6. 90 J. D. Darlington, 22 September 1884, 146, Roll 4, Reports. 91 C.W. Chadwick, 17 January 1938, IPP, WHC; J. D. Darlington, 22 September 1884, 148, Roll 4, Reports. 92 R.M. Moore and E.F. Biddiscombe, “The Effects of Grazing on Grasslands” in Grasses and Grasslands, ed. C. Barnard (London: MacMillan & Co. LTD, 1964), 221–6. 93 Phillip Sheridan to Grover Cleveland, 24 July1885, 127–31, Roll 363, LR81-89. 94 John W. Morris, Charles R. Goins and Edwin C. McReynolds, Historical Atlas of Oklahoma, 2nd ed. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976), 51. 95 A.G. Evans, 6 January 1885, 39, S. Rep.; Lester Fields Sheffy, The Francklyn Land and Cattle Company: A Panhandle Enterprise, 1882–1957 (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1963), 31; William W. Savage, The Cherokee Strip Live Stock Association: Federal Regulation and the Cattleman’s Last Frontier (1973, repr., Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1990), 51.; B.B. Groom to Brown, 31 May 1883, Folder 3, B.B. Groom correspondence, Francklyn Land and Cattle Company Collection, PPHM; Hagan, Quanah Parker, 32. 96 Return, Fort Supply, August 1881, Roll 1244, Returns. 97 D. B. Dyer, 19 December 1884, 10, S. Rep. 98 Elliott West, The Way to the West: Essays on the Central Plains (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1995), 28–9; Sherow, “Workings of the Geodialectic,” 103. 99 Phillip Sheridan to Grover Cleveland, 24 July 1885, 123–5, 132–34, Roll 363, LR81-89. 100 Quoted in Lewis Johnson, Record of Statements made by ‘Little Robe’ and other Indians to the Commanding Officer Fort Supply, I.T., on July 14, 1883 relative to unlawful leasing of land, which they claim by right of Treaty in the Indian Territory, 14 July 1883, 173, Roll 124, M1635, RG 101, Letters Received by the Headquarters of the Army 1828–1903, National Archives, Washington, D.C., hereafter cited as LRHA. 101 Quoted in Johnson, Record of Statements, 14 July 1883, 175, Roll 124, LRHA; J.H. Potter to Phillip Sheridan, July 28, 1885, 116, Roll 363, LR81-89. 102 Johnson, Record of Statements, 14 July 1883, 175, Roll 124, LRHA. 103 John Miles to J.H. Potter, 16 July 1883, 134, Roll 2, CSLS, PPHM; J.H. Potter to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of the Missouri, [18 July 1883?], 134, Roll 2, CSLS, PPHM. 104 The following data is drawn from the “USDA Web Soil Survey, 21 August 2017, https://websoilsurvey.sc.egov.usda.gov. All data was set on “bad year,” simulating the ongoing drought that occurred in this period: Calculate the carrying capacity of leased lands on the Cheyenne and Arapaho Reservation Calculate average pounds per acre for the eight county area: 2174.000407 Multiply the average pounds per acre by the number of acres leased by October 15, 1883 (3,831,880): 8,330,508,679 pounds per acre on average for leased reservation lands. Multiply this new average by .25 to create a rough estimate of the available carrying capacity of leased reservation lands, since cattle typically consume only one fourth of the native grasses they eat: 2,082,627,170 Calculate the amount 210,000 cattle will eat per day Average weight of a government cow: 800 pounds; P.B. Hunt to G.V. Henry, March 20, 1882, 64, Roll 89, LR81-89 Multiply 800 by .025 for a rough estimate of how much grass each animal needs each day, about 20 pounds. Multiply that figure by 210,000: 4,200,000 pounds per acre a day, “Grazing Stick Instruction Manual,” The Samuel Roberts Noble Foundation, accessed 29 November 2017, http://georgiaforages.caes.uga.edu. Calculate the speed by which cattle consumed the grass on the reservation’s leased lands 2,082,627,170 pounds per acre/4,200,000 pounds per acre per day = 495.863 days 105 Berthrong, The Cheyenne and Arapaho Ordeal, 99. 106 Ida Ellen Rath, The Rath Trail (Wichita, KS: McCormick-Armstrong Co., Inc., 1961), 10, 132. 107 Belle Belanti to Henry M. Teller, 19 May 1884, S. Rep., 6; Charles Rath to John Miles, 12 March 1883, Folder 75-2, Box 194, CANAR, OHS. 108 Belle Belanti to Henry M. Teller, 19 May 1884, S. Rep., 7. 109 John H. Seger, Early Days Among the Cheyenne and Arapahoe Indians, ed. Stanley Vestal (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1979), 94–5. 110 D. B. Dyer, 19 December 1884, S. Rep., 7. 111 Ibid. 112 United States Office of Indian Affairs, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, for the Year 1884 (Washington, D.C: Government Printing Office, 1884), 71. 113 Quoted in White Shield to George Vest, 23 December 1884, 181, Roll 124, LRHA. 114 Quoted in Stone Calf to George Vest, 23 December 1884, 179–80, Roll 124, LRHA. 115 Quoted in Spotted Horse to George Vest, 23 December 1884, 177, Roll 124, LRHA. 116 Johnson, Record of Statements, 14 July 1883, 170–2, Roll 124, LRHA; Marian Elaine Dawes, The Senatorial Career of George Graham Vest (master’s thesis, University of Missouri, 1932), 51–2; D.B. Dyer, 19 December 1884, S. Rep., 13–6. 117 E. V. Sumner to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of the Missouri, 17 June 1885, 96, Roll 124, LRHA. 118 D. B. Dyer to Phillip Sheridan, 10 June 1885, 61, Roll 124, LRHA; E. V. Sumner to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of the Missouri, 17 June 1885, 96–7, Roll 124, LRHA. 119 Quoted in Ben Clark to Phillip Sheridan, 26 June 1885, 90–1, Roll 124, LRHA. 120 E.V. Sumner to Assistant Adjutant General, Department of the Missouri, 17 June 1885, 94–7, Roll 124, LRHA; J.H. Potter to John D.C. Atkins, 19 June 1885, 170–2, Roll 124, LRHA. 121 John Martin to Phillip Sheridan, 20 July 1885, 27–8, Roll 362, LR81-89. 122 L. Q. C. Lamar to D.B. Dyer, 22 June 1885, 81, Roll 124, LRHA. 123 Grover Cleveland to Phillip Sheridan, 10 July 1885, 20–1, Roll 362, LR81-89; Paul Andrew Hutton, Phil Sheridan and His Army (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1999), 35. 124 Phillip Sheridan to Grover Cleveland, 18 July 1885, 25, Roll 362, LR81-89; Phillip Sheridan to Grover Cleveland, 19 July 1885, 26–7, Roll 362, LR81-89; Phillip Sheridan to Grover Cleveland, 22 July 1885, 28, Roll 363, LR81-89. 125 Berthrong, The Cheyenne and Arapaho Ordeal, 128. 126 Jordan-Bychkov, North American Cattle-Ranching Frontiers, 237–8. 127 Return, Fort Supply, May 1887, Roll 1244, Returns; Return, Fort Reno, June 1886, Roll 999, Returns. © The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Western History Association. All rights reserved. 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TI - Where Cowboys and Indians Meet: A Southern Cheyenne Web of Kinship and the Transnational Cattle Industry, 1877–1885
JF - Western Historical Quarterly
DO - 10.1093/whq/whz072
DA - 2019-10-01
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SP - 363
VL - 50
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DP - DeepDyve
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