TY - JOUR
AU - Wikforss,, Åsa
AB - 1. Introduction This is an important book for two reasons.1 First, it presents a useful guide to central positions on self-knowledge in the current debate and provides a thoughtful evaluation of these. Second, it develops and defends one such theory in great detail, the so-called ‘transparency theory of self-knowledge’. This theory is inspired by some famous comments made by Gareth Evans in Varieties of Reference (1982) and although some have tried to develop it in some detail (notably Gallois 1996), Byrne gives the most thorough defence of it so far. According to Byrne, the transparency account, properly developed, is not only capable of explaining the special epistemic qualities of self-knowledge, but can also be applied to all types of mental states, thereby allowing us to give a unified account of how we know our own mental states. I shall focus on the main part of the book, the development of the transparency theory in Chapters 4–8, but I will begin by saying a few words about how Byrne sets up the central challenges and why he thinks that many of the current theories of self-knowledge fail to meet these challenges. 2. The challenges The philosophical notion of self-knowledge concerns knowledge of one’s present mental states, such as knowing what one currently believes, desires, feels and thinks. In this, it differs from the talk of ‘knowing oneself’ familiar from self-help books, where the focus tends to be on the importance of knowing one’s own abilities and characters. A widely shared assumption, within philosophy, is that the access we have to our own present mental states has two distinctive features: It is privileged and it is peculiar. Byrne provides a helpful unpacking of these central notions. To say that the access is privileged is to say that it is more epistemically secure than third-person access. That is, my beliefs about my own current mental states are more likely to amount to knowledge than my beliefs about your current mental states. It can be debated how much more likely, and there is ample evidence from psychology that we are far from infallible in our beliefs about our own mental states. Still, Byrne stresses, there is a difference here and it needs to be accounted for by a plausible philosophical theory of self-knowledge. This is the first challenge. The talk of privileged access is sometimes mixed up with the access being peculiar, but Byrne makes quite clear that they are distinct: to say that the access is peculiar is to say that there is a special way of knowing one’s own mental states, a special method, which is not available when it comes to the mental states of others. And, of course, the access could be peculiar without being more secure, so the two notions are distinct. There are different proposals in the literature as to how this ‘peculiarity’ is to be understood. Byrne wisely rejects the common proposal that it is a matter of the access being ‘a priori’, in the sense of being independent of all experience. This way of describing peculiar access is unfortunate since some leading theories of self-knowledge hold that self-knowledge is indeed based on experience, a type of ‘inner sense’. Another challenge, then, is to explain in what sense first-person access is peculiar. In addition, Byrne lays down three desiderata of a plausible theory of self-knowledge. First, the theory should be economical. That is, it should avoid appealing to extravagant capacities and explain self-knowledge in terms of epistemic abilities that are needed for knowledge in other areas. Second, the theory should be detectivist. This means that the known facts should be assumed to hold independently of our capacity to detect them and, relatedly, that there should be a causal link between the states detected and our knowledge of them. Third, the theory should be unified. That is, it should apply to all mental states, providing a unified account of how we know not only our propositional attitudes, like belief and desire, but also of how we know our own sensations and emotions. Byrne then proceeds to discuss whether some contemporary theories of self-knowledge succeed in accounting for privileged and peculiar access, and to what extent they meet the three desiderata. He singles out four such theories: the inner-sense theory (as presented by Paul Churchland and David Armstrong), Donald Davidson’s account of self-knowledge of belief, Richard Moran’s rationalist account and Dorit Bar-On’s version of expressivism. Not every rival theory can be discussed, but I think it unfortunate that Byrne did not include a detailed examination of Cassam’s (2014) recent, inferentialist account, since this theory is more relevant to Byrne’s theory than either Davidson’s or Bar-On’s. Like Byrne, Cassam addresses the epistemology of self-knowledge in a serious way, and like Byrne, he offers an account that is both economical and detectivist. As Byrne notes, Bar-On’s neo-expressivism is a bit disappointing from the point of view of epistemology, since her focus is not on the epistemic security of avowals, on privileged access, but on some non-epistemic notion of security having to do with the special sociological role of avowals. And Davidson’s theory is rather limited in scope, applying only to the case of belief. Byrne’s reason for leaving out inferentialism seems to be that he thinks it clearly fails. However, this is far from obvious (see Wikforss 2019). Indeed, I shall suggest below, Byrne himself ends up endorsing inferentialism when it comes to mental states other than belief. The most interesting discussion concerns the inner-sense theory, to which Byrne devotes all of Chapter 2. This theory, like Byrne’s own theory, is a version of detectivism since it assumes that there are ‘causal mechanisms that give us access to an independently existing mental realm’ (26). Byrne accordingly defends the detectivist component of the theory. Indeed, he suggests that the leading objections to the inner-sense theory leave it more or less unscathed, and he scrutinizes a list of such objections, provided by Paul Boghossian, Crispin Wright, Sydney Shoemaker and others. This is interesting and I agree that the inner-sense theory has been rejected too swiftly; that there has been a tendency simply to assume it is a non-starter, one of those theories to be rejected out of hand before one sets up one’s own preferred theory of self-knowledge. It is, therefore, a bit surprising that, in the end, this seems to be what Byrne does too. Although the chapter is mainly a defence of the inner-sense theory, on the last two pages we are told that even though there is no knock-down refutation of the inner-sense theory there are grounds for dissatisfaction. The inner-sense theory, he suggests, offers a nice explanation of peculiar access: the postulated mechanism is only sensitive to the subject’s mental states (for neural reasons, presumably). When it comes to privileged access, he argues, things are less clear. Perhaps the access is privileged simply because the causal chain from one’s first-order mental state M to the belief that one is in M is shorter than the chain from another’s mental state to one’s belief that she is in M? Byrne says that this could be the answer but that it all depends on the details, on how we are to understand the postulated faculty of inner sense. This is a fair challenge, I think. The inner-sense theory needs to be spelled out in some further detail if we are to assess it properly precisely since inner sense is not like any other faculty we know, not like perception or like proprioception. So there is work to do. However, whether this is a reason to opt for another theory of self-knowledge, in the end, depends on whether there is another theory that fares better, and this, I think, is not at all clear. It is time to discuss Byrne’s positive proposal. 3. Byrne’s transparency account: the case of belief It is helpful, at the outset, to have the relevant quotation from Evans in mind: [I]n making a self-ascription of belief, one’s eyes are, so to speak, or occasionally literally, directed outward – upon the world. If someone asks me ‘Do you think there is going to be a third world war?’, I must attend, in answering him, to precisely the same outward phenomena as I would attend to if I were answering the question ‘Will there be a third world war?’. I get myself in a position to answer the question whether I believe that p by putting into operation whatever procedure I have for answering the question whether p. (Evans 1982: 225) The reason many people have been intrigued by this remark, no doubt, is that it moves away from the ‘Cartesian’ conception of self-knowledge as a wholly internal business, towards the idea that such knowledge (at least in the case of belief) involves directing one’s attention outwards, to the world. The question, then, is whether there is a possibility of developing this intriguing idea into a plausible account of self-knowledge. The central idea behind Byrne’s version of the transparency account is that beliefs and perceptions are transparent in the following sense: ‘one can discover that one believes that it’s raining, or sees a blue mug, simply by considering, respectively, the weather and the mug’ (75). How is this to be understood? One proposal is that knowing that one believes that it is raining, for instance, involves an inference from premises about the weather along the lines of what Gallois has labelled the ‘doxastic schema’: P –––––––––– I believe that p However, this immediately raises a puzzle since the doxastic schema seems to involve an obviously invalid inference, from facts about the world to psychological facts. How can one come to know that one is in a certain psychological state by considering topics that have little or nothing to do with one’s psychology, such as the weather? Chapter 5 stands at the centre of the book. Here, Byrne sets out to solve the puzzle of transparency in the case of belief, laying the ground for the following chapters where the theory is applied to perception, sensation, desire, intention, emotion, memory, imagination and thought. I shall focus on two questions: To what extent does Byrne’s version of the theory solve the transparency puzzle in the case of belief? And can the theory in fact be extended to all these other types of mental states? Applied to belief, the puzzle is the following: How can one come to know that one believes that p by inference from the premise that p? Byrne separates three different forms of the puzzle: It might concern reliability (how can reasoning in accordance with the doxastic schema be reliable?), evidence (how can p constitute evidence for I believe that p?) or reasoning through a false step (if it works, the procedure would seem to yield knowledge even when the premise is false). To address these three versions of the puzzle, Byrne proposes that we recast the puzzle in terms of following an epistemic rule. The proposal is that reasoning involves following epistemic rules of the kind: ‘If conditions C obtain, believe p’. For instance, there is the following epistemic rule: DOORBELL: If the doorbell rings, conclude that there is someone at the door. This is a good rule since it tends to produce knowledge. It is also a neutral rule, Byrne suggests, since it does not presuppose self-knowledge. To follow DOORBELL, I need to believe that the doorbell rings and form the belief that there is someone at the door in response, but I need not know that I believe that the doorbell rings. Byrne then proposes that we understand the transparency procedure precisely in terms of following an epistemic rule: BEL: If p, believe that you believe that p. The neutrality condition, it should be clear, is essential or else the proposal would be hopelessly circular. Following BEL must not presuppose knowing that one believes that p: One can know that condition C is met, that p, without knowing that one believes that p. Byrne then discusses the three forms of the puzzle, as applied to BEL. First, is it a good rule? It may seem as if this is obviously not the case. After all, that p does not in general make it likely that one believes that p. However, Byrne argues, while this is true it misses the point. The question is not whether this is a good inference, but whether following BEL is knowledge conducive, whether it reliably leads to true beliefs. And the answer to that question is clearly yes. Indeed, the rule is self-verifying: ‘if it is followed, then the resulting second-order belief is true’ (104). By comparison, DOORBELL is not self-verifying, even if it is a good rule, and when applied to the third-person case, BEL would clearly be a bad rule: If p believe that Fred believes p. This also takes care of the second worry, concerning inadequate evidence. Byrne grants that following BEL involves an inference, a move from the belief that p to the second-order belief, and in that sense self-knowledge is unlike basic perceptual knowledge which, he suggests, is non-inferential. However, the status of the second-order belief as knowledge, Byrne stresses, does not derive from this inference: ‘If one knows that one believes that it’s raining by following BEL, then one’s evidence – the fact that it’s raining – does not explain why one’s second-order belief amounts to knowledge’ (106). Some of our knowledge, he argues, is not explained in terms of an inference from evidence, and self-knowledge is one example of such knowledge. Similar points apply to the situation where one gets the external world wrong and reasons from p (which is false) to I believe that p. In such a case one only tries to follow BEL, Byrne suggests, but one will still reach a true conclusion and the second-order belief will count as knowledge – not in virtue of being inferential (then reasoning from a false premise would be fatal) but in virtue of the self-verifying nature of the procedure. According to Byrne the transparency account explains both peculiar access and privileged access. The procedure only works in the first-person case since it involves a causal transition between two states that I am in. There is no similar causal transition from my first-order belief to what Fred believes, and in that sense the method is peculiar. It is worth noting, as Byrne also does, that this explanation of the peculiar nature of self-knowledge is in effect the very same explanation that the inner sense theory offers: the access is peculiar since there is a causal connection between first- and second-order states within a single subject. Thus, the inner sense theory and Byrne’s theory are indistinguishable as far a peculiar access goes. However, when it comes to privileged access, Byrne suggests, the transparency account differs from the inner sense theory in that it need not postulate any extravagant epistemic capacities. That is, it is economical. Byrne’s explanation of privileged access also appeals to the self-verifying nature of the procedure. Like other good epistemic rules, such as DOORBELL, BEL produces safe beliefs, that is beliefs that could not easily have been false. In comparison with these rules, however, BEL does even better since there are fewer ways in which error could arise. When it comes to DOORBELL, I may mistakenly think that conditions C obtain (that the doorbell rings) and then the resulting belief will be wrong, or I may correctly believe that C obtains and still end up with a false belief (a wiring defect causes the ringing). Neither of these types of errors is possible in the case of BEL: If I mistakenly believe that it is raining following BEL will still produce a true second-order belief, and I cannot believe p without believing that p. In conclusion, Byrne states, ‘BEL is significantly more likely to produce knowledge than rules like DOORBELL. Privileged access is thereby explained’ (112). Having spelled out his transparency account in the case of belief, Byrne concludes that it has the desired features listed: It is economical (we have the capacity to follow BEL, no extravagant capacity need be postulated) and it is detectivist (there are causal mechanisms between the first- and second-order belief). Chapters 6–8 are devoted to showing that the theory is unified, that is, that it can be applied to all types of mental states. Before discussing whether that is correct, I want to examine the transparency account as applied to the case of belief, in particular Byrne’s appeal to epistemic rules, since this lays the foundation for what comes in the final chapters. The epistemic rules, recall, are said to have the following form: R: If conditions C obtain, believe that p. This follows the standard account of guiding rules: they tell us what to do in certain conditions. In the case of epistemic rules the conditions, plausibly, must (in some sense) be relevant to the truth of p; after all, such rules should be truth conducive. In the case of DOORBELL, this is rather obvious: that the doorbell rings make it likely that there is someone at the door. In an earlier paper, Byrne (2012) makes the same point, appealing to the following rule (also mentioned on p. 164): W: If the clouds are dark grey, believe that it will rain soon. In this case too, there is a clear evidential connection between conditions C being fulfilled and p being true: grey clouds tend to bring rain. Now, there are familiar worries relating to the idea that belief formation is rule guided. There is the concern that belief is not an action whereas being guided by a rule is an intentional action. On the standard construal, rule-following has an intentional condition such that one only follows a rule if one accepts the rule R and intends to do what it says. This is required if we are to draw the important distinction between being guided by a rule and merely acting in accordance with one, that is between rule-following and pure regularities. If belief formation is not intentional, then it cannot be understood as involving rule guidance (Glüer and Wikforss 2009). It is clear, however, that these questions do not worry Byrne. To follow an epistemic rule, on his view, it just has to be the case that the subject S forms the belief that p because she recognizes that conditions C obtain. This means that the subject need not intend to follow the rule or even know it. For instance, Byrne writes that ‘one may follow a rule without realizing that this is what one is doing’ (102). If so, however, rule-following in Byrne’s sense cannot be distinguished from mere regularities. To say that S follows DOORBELL is just to say that when S hears the doorbell she tends to form the belief that there is someone at the door, and to say that she follows BEL is just to say that when she believes that p she also tends to form the second-order belief, I believe that p. There is a regular connection here, but there is no rule guidance – the rule drops out as being of no importance. What is important is simply that the transition produces safe beliefs. This, in my view, is just as it should be. The suggestion that belief formation involves rule-following is problematic, in several ways. The question is, however, where this leaves Byrne’s version of the transparency account. If all we have is a reliable causal connection between the first- and second-order belief, then why is this not simply a version of reliabilism? Why bring in Evans in the first place? The answer might seem to lie in the role of reasoning. After all, DOORBELL involves a clear case of reasoning: from the belief that the doorbell rang (based in turn, presumably, on the experience that it rang) to the conclusion that there is someone at the door. Similarly, in the case of W, there is reasoning from the belief that the clouds are grey to the belief that it is raining. This is no mere causal connection between mental states but a transition from a premise to a conclusion. The trouble with this reply is that BEL simply cannot be compared with DOORBELL and W: There is no evidential connection between p and I believe that p. This sets BEL apart from the other examples given by Byrne of epistemic rules. Byrne is fully aware of this of course. As he writes, ‘that p is the case does not even make it likely that one believes that it is the case’ (103). This is why he insists that while the knowledge is not inferential (i.e. that is not its epistemology) there is nevertheless a piece of reasoning involved. However, notice that this means that Byrne relies on a very thin notion of reasoning. Inferential reasoning, as standardly understood, involves drawing a conclusion on the basis of evidence or on what one conceives of as evidence (when the reasoning is invalid). And in this sense, the move from p to I believe that p is not an inference. This is somewhat hidden by the fact that, in this case, the mental state to be known is a belief, a state having propositional content. However, as Byrne himself notes, it is not as if the subject treats the content It is raining as evidence for I believe that it is raining. Rather, the first-order belief (the psychological state) causes the second-order belief. To say that there is a self-verifying procedure here, then, is just to say that whenever I move from my belief that p to the belief that I believe that p, the resulting second-order belief will be true. And that, of course, we can all agree on (assuming, as Byrne does, that there is no time lapse between the two so that the belief that p has time to disappear). But this is not really to provide an account of self-knowledge beyond saying that the one belief tends to follow the other. To illustrate this, it is worth noting that even if we accept everything that Byrne says, an important question remains: Is it the case that we reliably move from our first-order beliefs to the corresponding second-order one and, if so, how are we able to do that? Take the question of privileged access. Granted, if we transition from the belief that p to the corresponding second-order belief then the resulting belief will be true, but do we? This would seem to be a wholly empirical question. Maybe, in fact, we often have first-order beliefs that do not cause us to transition to the second-order belief (that is surely true), and maybe we even have all sorts of first-order beliefs where the transition is difficult to make and our self-knowledge is far from privileged (as empirical research does in fact suggest)? Maybe, also, we often form second-order beliefs in other, wholly unreliable ways, without transitioning from the first-order belief? Byrne’s transparency account simply does not address these questions which means that, in the end, it does not tell us that much about how we know our own beliefs. Byrne might object that he simply takes privileged access as a datum to be explained. Everyone seems to agree that we have (some type of) privileged access to our own beliefs and the theory of self-knowledge is supposed to explain this datum. I think that is right, in a way. However, the question is how much of an explanation Byrne offers. Compare the inner sense theory. Byrne stresses that one important difference between that theory and his transparency account is that the former postulates ‘extravagant capacities’, a kind of faculty for scanning our own mental states, and that a theory which does not need to postulate such faculties is to be preferred. However, precisely because the inner sense theory appeals to such a faculty it provides a potentially fuller explanation of privileged access. According to the inner sense theory we have privileged access since we are able to scan our own states internally. According to Byrne, we simply tend to transition from the first-order state to the second-order, but there is no explanation of why we are so good at that. We simply reliably do. Interestingly, when Byrne moves beyond the case of belief, applying the transparency account to perception, sensations, desire etc. things look a bit different. 4. The transparency account applied to other mental states The first case Byrne discusses is that of perception. He notes that the puzzle of transparency arises here as well. Discussing the case where I see a hawk he suggests the following epistemic rule (130): HAWK: If it is thus-and-so at this place now, believe that you see a hawk. The puzzle, in this case, is how the scene before my eyes (it being thus-and-so) could have a relevant connection with my psychological state, in this case, a visual state. HAWK seems to be a bad rule. Byrne goes on to argue that the problem can be solved by revising the rule accordingly and appeal to the notion of visual experiences. He argues that visual experiences have contents, what he calls v-propositions, that concern sensible qualities such as shape, orientation, depth and colour. Assuming that [….x…]v expresses a v-proposition that is true at a world w only if x has certain qualities in w (such as being red or square), Byrne ends up suggesting the following rule (139): SEE If [….x…]v and x is an F, believe that you see an F. The idea, thus, is that if I know that x is revealed to me as having certain sensible qualities, and x is a hawk (say), then I should believe that I see a hawk. As Byrne notes, SEE may not be self-verifying since I could in principle know that the v-propositions are true without seeing x, but it is practically self-verifying: ‘in all ordinary circumstances one knows that [….x…]v only if one sees x’. It is worth reflecting on why there is this difference between BEL and SEE: In the case of belief, again, the move is from the very mental state that the second-order belief is about (i.e. the belief that p) to the second-order belief, in the case of SEE the move is rather from the knowledge that certain propositions are true to the second-order belief that I see a hawk. Byrne’s proposal is that this difference does not matter much, since in ordinary circumstances the transition will produce safe beliefs. This is an empirical assumption but it may well be true. Nevertheless, it is worth noting the structural difference here. In the case of belief, self-knowledge is explained by appealing to the idea that when you move from the belief that p to the corresponding second-order belief the procedure is self-verifying. In the case of perception, by contrast, there is a two-step explanation of self-knowledge. First, there is the idea that when conditions C are known then, in ordinary circumstances, the subject perceives x. Second, there is the idea that, therefore, if S were to move from the knowledge that conditions C are met to the self-ascription ‘I see x’ the resulting belief will be true and safe. This means that in the case of SEE there is actually something that looks like a valid inference: from evidence that one sees x to the conclusion that one sees x. But then, of course, the proposed account of self-knowledge is inferentialist: one knows that one sees x because one’s belief is based on evidence. And this makes the account of self-knowledge of perception very different from the account of self-knowledge of belief. As a result, Byrne’s account is not universal. To bring home this point, consider the proposed account of self-knowledge of sensations, such as pain. Byrne proposes a rule for pain that is similar to that of SEE. He suggests that the world of pain is the totality of p-facts, where a p-fact is understood as a true p-proposition, […x…]p and x is a disturbance in the body, for instance in one’s foot (149): PAIN: If […x…]p, and x is in your foot, believe that you feel pain in your foot. Just as in the case of SEE, and unlike BEL, the rule is not self-verifying: One could know the relevant p-fact and yet not feel a pain. The connection is not between feeling a pain and believing that one feels it, but between knowing a certain p-proposition and believing that one feels a pain. This is nicely illustrated by Byrne’s discussion of phantom pains. On Byrne’s account, this is a situation where the subject does not know the p-propositions (since there is no disturbance, no x) and hence cannot know that she feels a pain, which is rather counterintuitive. However, Byrne argues that the consequence is acceptable. If I feel a phantom pain I am not feeling a disturbance, a pain, I only seem to feel one, but, he suggests, ‘seeming to feel a pain is just as agonizing as really feeling one’ (155). Many people will no doubt reject this proposal. If one thinks that the one essential thing about pains is how they appear (as Kripke (1980) suggests, for instance) then it makes no sense to separate seeming to feel a pain from feeling a pain. But I think it is an option worth exploring further. After all, there are cases of pain illusions in more ordinary situations, as when one is scared at the dentist’s and confuses the feeling of a cold instrument with pain. It is not implausible, I think, to argue that in such a situation one only seems to feel a pain. However, note that if this is what we say, then the proposed epistemology is in fact inferential: I know that I have a pain in my foot as a result of an inference from certain propositions about disturbances in my foot. The inferential connection is not so strong that it guarantees the conclusion, but it is strong enough for my self-ascription to be safe and hence to constitute knowledge. Why is it strong enough? Because, in ordinary circumstances, if conditions C are met then M is in place; that is, in ordinary circumstances, pain appearances are connected with pains and so indicative of them. This is an inferential account of self-knowledge, plain and simple, and it is quite different from the account of self-knowledge of belief offered by Byrne. The same conclusion holds for the other cases discussed by Byrne in Chapters 7 and 8: desire, intention, emotion, memory, imagination and thought. Throughout, the account on offer is inferential. Would it be possible to make the two versions of the transparency account more similar? Perhaps one could simply say, as in the case of BEL, that the relevant transition is not from evidence of pain to self-ascription of pain but from the pain to the self-ascription? A moment’s reflection reveals why this would not work. Consider the following ‘rule’: PAIN*: When you feel a pain believe that you are in pain. The resulting rule, it should be clear, is self-verifying but it has a fatal flaw: it is not ‘neutral’ in Byrne’s sense since it presupposes self-knowledge. After all, to know that the antecedent is fulfilled I would need to know that I feel a pain – and how do I know that? The result, thus, is utterly unenlightening. BEL, by contrast, manages to be neutral since knowing that condition C is fulfilled (that p) does not require self-knowledge, but simply first-order knowledge, and it is self-verifying since one cannot know that C is fulfilled without having the belief that p. Since this only holds in the special case of belief, extending the transparency account to other mental states requires transforming the account into a version of inferentialism. Now, let me stress that I do not think that the fact that Byrne falls back on inferentialism is an objection to the theory. On the contrary, I think that inferentialism is the best option when it comes to self-knowledge (just like Cassam). However, the upshot is problematic for Byrne since it means that his account is not, after all, unified. The situation could be amended in one of two ways: Either Byrne could accept the hybrid nature of his account, and argue that belief is a special case. Or he could try to apply the inferentialist account to belief as well. I would favour the latter proposal and try to find evidence grounding beliefs about one’s own beliefs – not just behavioural evidence but also phenomenological (such as feelings of certainty) and other types of evidence (such as evidence provided by imagining what one would do in certain situations). However, I do not think that there is a knock-down argument here since I do not think that the unification requirement is non-negotiable. Perhaps indeed we need to be content with less. In the end, I therefore think that Byrne has done us a great service: He has made a very serious effort to investigate whether there is a version of the transparency theory that provides a distinctive and unified account of self-knowledge. And he has provided a theory that is sufficiently detailed, and clearly argued, to assess it. Perhaps the theory is less unified than one might have hoped for and perhaps it is only loosely related to Evans’s remarks. However, it may well be that this is the only serious and comprehensive account we can get out of remarks and, if so, that is an important finding in itself; one that the ongoing debate over self-knowledge will have to contend with. Footnotes 1 Transparency and Self-Knowledge. By Alex Byrne. Oxford University Press, 2018. xii + 228 pp. References Byrne A. 2012 . Knowing what I want. In Consciousness and the Self: New Essays , eds. J. Lio and J. Perry, 165 – 83 . Cambridge : Cambridge University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Cassam Q. 2014 . Self-Knowledge for Humans . Oxford : Oxford University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Evans G. 1982 . The Varieties of Reference . Oxford : Oxford University Press. Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Gallois A. 1996 . The World without, the Mind within: An Essay on First-Person Authority . Cambridge : Cambridge University Press . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC Glüer K. , Wikforss Å. . 2009 . Against content normativity . Mind 118 : 31 – 70 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat Kripke S. 1980 . Naming and Necessity . Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Wikforss Å. 2019 . Knowledge, belief, and the asymmetry thesis. In Knowing Other Minds , eds. Avramides A. , Parrott M. , 41 – 62 . Oxford : Oxford University Press . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS Google Scholar Google Preview WorldCat COPAC © The Author(s) 2020. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. 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TI - Transparency and Self-Knowledge
JF - Analysis
DO - 10.1093/analys/anz099
DA - 2020-04-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/transparency-and-self-knowledge-3wsATsem00
DP - DeepDyve
ER -