TY - JOUR
AU - Forster, Dion, A
AB - Introduction This article facilitates a critical theological conversation on religious populism and its role in contemporary South African politics. How could one identify or characterize religious populism in the South African social and political context? Moreover, in light of the role of religion and religious leaders in South Africa’s history, are all forms of populism inherently negative? What criteria could be used to judge whether a particular form of religious populism is good or bad? And finally, what is the current state of religious populism in South African political life? In order to engage these complex issues, we will consider one of South Africa’s most prominent contemporary mainline Christian denominations – the Methodist Church of Southern Africa (MCSA). The conversation takes place within the context of growing concerns of state corruption, the slow pace of transformation, and the re-emergence of identity politics in South Africa.1 From the side of the churches, there is a renewed interest in the theology of the 1985 South African Kairos document.2 This is particularly true in terms of the Kairos document’s notions of church theology, state theology, and prophetic theology.3 The theology of the 1985 Kairos South Africa document serves as a very helpful, and insightful, framework to texture and critique notions of religious political populism in contemporary South Africa. What Is Populism and Are All Forms of Populism Bad? The understanding and usage of populism in this paper is informed primarily by the work of philosophers Ernesto Laclau, Chantal Mouffe, Jan-Werner Müller, and the theologian Fredrik Portin. Laclau suggests that populist movements emerge when citizens unite into a new social body called “the people” that opposes what they view as a social or political “elite.” Often populist groupings arise out of a sense of frustration with how the policies, views, and actions of this elite disenfranchise, ignore, or deliberately oppress the concerns and needs of the people.4 Hence, populism frequently finds expression outside of, or in conflict with, the dominant institutional identities of a society (e.g., the state, dominant political and economic systems, accepted values etc.).5 This has a consequence that the elite and their positions are othered, even viewed as enemies of the people.6 Portin points out that as a result of this “othering” (the creation of an enemy of the people), populist movements are sometimes summarily dismissed or unfairly judged because of some extreme groups and extremist positions.7 Of course, one could immediately ask who dismisses or judges populism to be socially and culturally unacceptable? Are those who judge (politicians, academics, the media) not themselves part of the elite that the people are critical of? Müller presents the recent United States electoral race as an illustrative example – in this case both Donald Trump (on the political right) and Bernie Sanders (on the political left) were labelled as populists in the media and by various academics.8 As a result, one could at very least claim that populism is not restricted only to right wing, or left wing, social and political movements. This does not, however, offer any insight into whether populism, populist leaders, and populist movements are constructive or destructive in society. Müller asks whether we use the term populism too indiscriminately, saying, “might a populist simply be a successful politician one doesn’t like?”9 Indeed, there are many very concerning instances of both right-wing and left-wing populism (religious and otherwise) in history and contemporary society. Populism has led to violence, human rights abuses, and the destabilization of social order. Yet, as Portin notes, “the disruptive character of populist rationality should be valued because it makes it possible to imagine an alternative to the dominant political establishment.”10 The opportunity to imagine a different world, one in which divergent views find space for engagement and consideration, is in general a desirable social attribute. History has shown that authoritarianism, exclusivism, totalitarianism, and fascism are not desirable social constructions. In light of this, Chantal Mouffe’s contribution helps us to understand the necessity, even value, of certain forms of populism. Mouffe’s feminist perspective questions the construction of dominating social norms. Who decides what is right, what is normal, and what is desirable in a society? She rightly points out—in conversation with the controversial line of reasoning presented by Francis Fukuyama in The End of History?, which he revisits and revises in his most recent book, Identity—that modern democratic liberalism sought to create a society free from conflict and hostility.11 Liberal democracies are structured more or less along general lines of agreement upon certain shared values and social contracts. Yet, what happens if you live on the margins (or completely outside) of such dominant social values and norms (e.g., immigrants in Europe, sexual minorities in conservative cultures, or women in patriarchal societies)? An outcome of Western styled liberal democracy has been the weakening of the political conception, no longer allowing space for divergent, even conflicting, points of view. This is a common feature of such societies, which do not provide adequate space or resources for all social actors to address, and confront, conflicting social concerns – what Mouffe calls “passions.”12 Fukuyama suggests that it is precisely this lack of recognition that has led to such diverse populist movements as #MeToo and #BlackLivesMatter (on the left), and political phenomena such as Trump and Bolsonaro (on the right).13 Of course, the hegemony of certain social positions has been even more deeply entrenched in situations where neo-liberal capitalism has been unquestioningly adopted by political actors on both the left and the right of society. Portin rightly notes that because of this hegemonic liberal order, populist movements are once again emerging as an outlet for the concerns (passions) of persons in liberal democracies.14 So, in this sense at least, we could conclude that not all forms of populism are undesirable, or bad in a philosophical and political sense, since they give voice to and claim space for excluded persons, marginalized perspectives, and unheard voices. However, if this is true, then we should be able to judge between positive or constructive populist movements and groupings on the one hand and negative populist movements and groups on the other. How do we do that? Well, in this paper, we shall attempt to use the theological criteria of the 1985 Kairos South Africa document to assist us in this task. A Historical Perspective on South African Political and Religious Populism under Apartheid South Africa has a complex and conflicted history with regards to the relationships that exists between the church(es), the state, and the people. In some instances, the church and state have aligned as an elite group that is in opposition to the people. In other instances, the church has aligned itself with the people to engage and deconstruct the hegemonic power of elite political and economic actors in society. How the church positions itself in relation to political and economic power is a crucial element in the construction of these relationships. At different times in South Africa’s history, dominant power was held by particular Christian denominations and political parties. Perhaps the most widely considered of these relationships, in the academic literature, was the relationship that existed between the South African nationalist government and the Dutch Reformed Church during the apartheid era.15 The nexus of political power and social influence held by these two domains of society led to the contamination of both the role and mandate of the state and the witness and mission of the church. The outcome was that both of these institutions failed to serve the people of South Africa adequately. In particular, this corrupted political and theological relationship resulted in the development, and propagation, of theological heresy and religiously sanctioned human rights abuses on a mass scale.16 During the apartheid era, the Dutch Reformed Church and apartheid state became an abusive and unjust elite, an enemy of the people. This unjust alliance began in the colonial era, which laid the foundation for how the church(es) and the state would relate to one another under apartheid. During the years of the apartheid struggle, some South African churches, in various forms (i.e., ecumenical bodies/denominations, local congregations, religious communities, and individual members), witnessed in words and deeds against both the heresies of the apartheid state-supporting churches and the systematic human rights abuses of the apartheid state itself.17 Some would argue that these were acts of religious populism since these groupings condemned the state and certain religious elites, and gave a voice and a social identity to the people. The churches and religious leaders who worked against apartheid seemed to capture the will of the people, and their desire for social and political justice. Theologically, these churches also remained true to their theological identity and calling, to serve the will of God and the good of the people. A notable example was The Message to the People of South Africa, which was published by the South African Council of Churches (SACC) in 1968.18 There are also numerous titular examples of populist religious leaders who sided with the people against certain churches and the state in South Africa. They represented different Christian churches and theological traditions. Among them are Archbishop Desmond Tutu of the Anglican Church, Dr. Beyers Naudé who was a Dutch Reformed cleric until his dismissal for critiquing the apartheid theology of the Dutch Reformed Church, Bishop Peter Storey of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa, Rev. Dr. Allan Boesak from the Uniting Reformed Church of South Africa, and Dr. Frank Chikane of the Apostolic Faith Mission, to name but a few. These persons, and the churches they represent, played a significant role in the deconstruction of apartheid theology and the political and social systems of apartheid. Looking back on this period in South Africa’s history, these religious leaders are remembered with fondness for their contribution towards the deconstruction of apartheid and their work for the good of the people. So, too, is the contribution of their churches remembered fondly. Nelson Mandela, who was himself a prominent Southern African Methodist, said the following to Methodist leaders in 1994:19 The sense of social responsibility that the religious community has always upheld found expression in your immense contribution to the efforts to rid our country of the scourge of racism and apartheid. When pronouncements and actions against the powers-that-be meant persecution and even death, you dared to stand up to the tyrants…. The Methodist Church was the only Church to be declared an illegal organisation under apartheid, and for ten long years you were forbidden to operate naat e Transkei bantustan [here in the Transkei] …. The Church, like all other institutions of civil society, must help all South Africans to rise to the challenge of freedom. As South Africa moves from resistance to reconstruction and from confrontation to reconciliation, the energy that was once dedicated to breaking apartheid must be harnessed to the task of building the nation.20 Some would suggest that this is an example of constructive, or positive, religious political populism. It had a positive effect on South Africa political and religious life, giving voice to the concerns of the people, while challenging an unjust elite and working for a more just social order. This would seem to resonate with the line of reasoning presented by Laclau, Mouffe, Müller, and Portin earlier in the paper. Yet, as we shall see, it is necessary to maintain a critical regard of such historical and social alliances, since they can quickly change from good to bad, from constructive to destructive. One way in which the “value” or “appropriateness” of religious populism should be considered is by means of a theological critique. Shifts in Religious and Political Populism after the 1994 Democratic Elections in South Africa After 1994, the social actors of power in South African society changed from the apartheid political leaders, the National Party, and the apartheid sanctioning Dutch Reformed Church, to the first democratically elected political party, the African National Congress (ANC). At the same time, the mainline, largely English-speaking, multiracial, churches (such as the Methodist Church of Southern Africa, Anglican Church, and Catholic Church, etc.) came to occupy positions of social prominence in the religious, social, and political spheres.21 In a certain sense, a new elite was emerging. Numerically this elite was much more representative of the general South African population – the people. Sadly, it did not take long for abuses of social power and abuses of public trust to emerge. While the political and religious actors changed after 1994, a concerning and complicit relationship emerged between many of the formerly “populist” anti-apartheid churches and the ANC state. Growing concerns over corruption, poor service delivery, and the slow pace of transformation coupled with these compromised relationships between the new elites in church and state once again caused the people to distrust certain political and religious leaders. How these leaders and their churches are responding to this distrust is an example of negative religious populism that is challenging the witness and work of the church, as well as the credibility of the government in South Africa. The church is once again facing the threat of becoming embedded in the actions and intentions of the national state.22 However, what makes it concerning in this instance is that “majority churches” (i.e., churches that represent the majority demographics of the South African people) are employing religious rhetoric to offer veiled and misleading support for the policies and actions of an increasingly corrupt political and economic elite. This is extremely dangerous and indeed a denial of the high calling of the church since it is subjugating its prophetic work and witness to support party political aims and nationalist ideologies. This form of religious populism is both philosophically and theologically problematic, as we shall see. Müller argues that such abuses of power are frequently an inevitable consequence of populist movements gaining political power. These movements gain power by establishing the people as the only legitimate political authority in society. When they come to power, they often seek to silence voices, institutions, or movements (such as the media, academics, and other political parties) that appear to be at odds with their construction of the people. In some instances, they may even attempt to bring about constitutional changes that give the imagined people much greater power.23 Of course, this power is mediated by the now empowered political, social, or religious leadership. A further consequence of this type of political construction is that the other – the ones that cannot be regarded as the people – must constantly be cast as enemies of the people. Even though they are no longer a traditional elite (as proposed in earlier populist theories and literature, like that of Laclau), they are the enemies of the people since they threaten the power of the people if they gained social, political, or religious influence. Hence, even though these persons and groupings that now constitute “the other” no longer have power, they are still cast as powerful enemies that must be combatted and contained. There are aspects of such developments evident in contemporary South African political and religious life. Whereas the examples of religious and political populism in the previous section seem to have contributed towards the common good of the South African people while maintaining the theological integrity of the church, this section of the article seeks to highlight problematic examples of religious political populism that work against the common good of the people and also deny the theological identity and prophetic responsibility of the church. The church is not only engaging in politically problematic behavior, it is also developing a theologically problematic identity. When the church ceases to listen for the voice of God and stops advocating for justice for the people instead choosing to use its social capital and the trust of its members to gain social and political prominence from a corrupt and unjust state, it is both in political and theological error. This is what the 1985 Kairos Document called “state theology.”24 We will consider the theological critique brought by Kairos theologies in greater detail below. However, at this point, it can be argued that this form of populist political religious engagement (state theology) could be characterized as a negative form of religious populism. Such behavior is exemplified in the current relationship between the Methodist Church of Southern Africa (MCSA) and the governing party in South Africa, the ANC. Two examples of problematic religious political populism, as characteristic of state theology, will be shared to illustrate this problem. In the lead up to the most recent South African national elections (2014), there was increasing rhetoric of a religious nature that was intended to sweep up populist support in the speeches and pronouncements of ANC politicians. These religious overtones by politicians were often supported and sanctioned by clergy aligned with the ANC. This is not surprising when religious sentiments are so pervasive in South African society with 84.2 percent of South Africans self-identify as having Christian faith.25 The Christian “political constituency” forms a significant part of the voter base – they are, in large measure, the people. Moreover, most politicians have some form of relationship with churches or religious leaders by virtue of their own faith commitments or those of the communities from which they come. The last parliamentary census showed that 65 percent of current parliamentarians indicated that they are members of the MCSA.26 The most public displays of religious political populism were the activities of the Rev. Vukile Mehana, who was the Chaplain General to the ANC at the time and a very senior minister in the MCSA, serving on the denomination’s executive, holding the portfolio of human resources management. Rev. Mehana defended President Jacob Zuma’s statement that persons who voted for the ANC would go to heaven, while those who voted for other parties could go to hell.27 Here is what President Zuma said, I start from basic Christian principles. Christianity is part of what I am; in a way it was the foundation for all my political beliefs…. When you vote for the ANC, you are also choosing to go to heaven. When you don’t vote for the ANC you should know that you are choosing that man who carries a fork … who cooks people. When you are carrying an ANC membership card, you are blessed. When you get up there, there are different cards used but when you have an ANC card, you will be let through to go to heaven.28 This claim is very clearly politically motivated and holds very little theological credibility by any Christian standards. It seeks to develop a form of religious identity politics by creating a theological and political “in group” (the people) and an “out group” (evil ones, those who belong to the devil).29 Yet, Rev. Mehana defended Mr. Zuma’s claim saying the following:30 While the popular Christian understanding of heaven is equated to a physical place, theologically heaven can also mean the presence of God. When the President urged citizens to vote for the ANC, equating that with heaven, he meant that voters – theologically may miss the opportunity of being in the presence of God if they do not vote for the ANC.31 An analysis of Rev. Mehana’s statement shows that he too is engaged in religious populist rhetoric of the kind Müller describes earlier. He is trying to place the people, the ANC, and those who vote for the ANC on the side of God. He clearly states that those who do not vote for the governing party (ANC) will “miss the opportunity of being in the presence of God.” Rev. Mehana is employing what the Kairos theologians identified as a form of state theology, i.e., he is providing theological sanction for an inappropriate expression of political power by the head of state and the leader of the governing political party, who is seeking to capture a voting constituency using theological and religious rhetoric.32 It could be asked whether a majority political party, and a majority church, could be considered populist in their rhetoric. Are they not the elite? Indeed, their leaders make up the social, political, and religious elite of South Africa. However, their constituencies do not share in the same privileges as their elitist leaders. So, as described by Müller, what we see here is an attempt by corrupt elitist officials in both church and state to use (religious) populist rhetoric in an attempt to garner the “support of the people” by casting the aspersion that other political parties, other religious groupings, or persons who hold different opinions are “the enemy” and are outside of God’s blessing.33 A second example of negative religious populism comes from just before the 2014 elections when Rev. Mehana came under the spotlight himself for encouraging pastors in Cape Town to solicit votes for the ANC. He said to a group of gathered clergy, “[y]ou cannot have church leaders that speak as if they are in opposition to government … God will liberate the people through this (ANC) government.”34 This is another example of populist religious political rhetoric that is seeking to use the Christian faith, the church, and officers of the churches to garner political support for a particular political party. Once again, the Rev. Mehana is seeking to place God on the side of those who support a particular political party. The reference to liberation clearly shows that he is addressing persons who experience themselves as oppressed, enslaved, and in need of liberation from their oppressors. Who are these oppressors by implication? They are the ones who do not support the ANC; they are the ones who do not have God’s support. Rev. Mehana would have done well to heed the warning of former Methodist Bishop Peter Storey, that “the years since 1994 have surely persuaded us that democracy is not to be equated with the arrival of the reign of God.”35 Such examples of religious political populism are particularly troubling when one considers the social power dynamics of populist movements. Religion and political power are not good bedfellows. Historically, this combination has led to significant abuse. So why would a dominant political party, and a dominant Christian denomination, engage in religious populism of this nature? Well, apart from the general reasons related to the perpetuation of political power amongst populist leaders and movements, as suggested by Müller, there are also some contextual reasons. Vincent points out that the ANC had been facing a loss of public confidence as a result of poor service delivery, high rates of corruption, and political in-fighting in the governing party in the period leading up to the 2014 elections. He notes that leading up to the elections there was a growing “disillusion with politicians who seem far more concerned with in-fighting than with addressing [the needs of] citizens.”36 He suggests that this was a trend in the ANC’s overly confident style of politics after winning the 1994 elections so convincingly. After 1994, popular mobilization came to be pathologized in favor of a version of democracy that was more about elite pacting (building economic and political pacts) than about mass participation in politics.37 Such action has the tendency to create stark social divisions not only along the lines of class, but also along the lines of culture and identity. In order to try to recapture their image of being “the people’s party,” the ANC engaged in shallow forms of identity politics. While it was failing to keep its house in order, to deliver services to the people, to manage the national fiscus, and to combat rampant corruption, it began to blame social failures on the Black and White economic elites, thereby demarcating the people as a power bloc in opposition to these others who were identified as the primary source of South Africa’s ongoing struggles.38 In Mr. Zuma’s language, these are the others who are the enemies of God and the people. They are neither “blessed” nor going to heaven. Vincent identifies this as blatant populism: While this [class binaries and race binaries] may be true as a rough description, it avoids addressing the government’s failure to tackle this issue, and certainly avoids the increasing gap within South Africa between the black rich and the poor, as well as the growing immiseration of the poor. What it silences for the listener and the reader is complexity, process, and class dynamics. What it confirms is race populism.39 Laclau understood this as the “class character” of populism, the people are constructed as a homogenous power bloc of opposition to whatever is considered, in overly simplistic terms, to be the elite other.40 Herein lies the problem, both socially and theologically. In such approaches to religious political populism, opponents are not simply disagreed with but are branded as enemies of the people and of God.41 They are characterized as sub-human, sick, insane, unloved by God, or demonic. The former president of the ANC Youth League (now president of the Economic Freedom Fighters party) Mr. Julius Malema said, “[no] opposition party will ever defeat the ANC” and those who oppose the ANC are “suffering from a serious [mental] illness.”42 South Africa has a very painful and recent history of how such social and theological views, when coupled with state sanctioned power, can lead to massive injustices and human rights violations. Religion has far too often been the “software” that has allowed the “hardware” of oppression to function with moral sanction and divine conviction. Vincent thus comments that if “the populist leader can claim to be the voice of the people then it stands to reason that those who offer a different political or social vision are not simply political opponents but much more damningly, opponents of the people.”43 This seems to be precisely the strategy of leaders such as Jacob Zuma, and the clergy who support him. They want to divide both society and the church between those who are on the side of God and the people, and those who are on the side of Satan. The latter are the forces of evil in society who must be opposed. Yet, as we can see, the lines between the people and the elites are blurred at present. The Church and Political Populism? A Kairos Critique In 2015 the 30th anniversary of the South African Kairos Document was celebrated.44 This document was drafted by a group of concerned South African theologians during the darkest period of apartheid. It confronted the church in South Africa to consider how its theological identity and expression of faith shaped its presence and witness in society, both hindering transformation, or supporting injustice.45 The churches were challenged to move away from a theology that upholds and furthers the aims of oppressive nationalist power (with reference to the apartheid state – known as state theology), or theologies that retreated from society and only focused on the programs and priorities of the church (known as church theology). Such a closeted church theology denies the challenges and opportunities that are faced outside of the confines of the gathered worshiping community. The Kairos theologians advocated for a “prophetic theology,” and a “prophetic church,” that would witness to God’s will in the church and God’s will for the people.46 We as a group of theologians have been trying to understand the theological significance of this moment in our history. It is serious, very serious. For very many Christians in South Africa this is the KAIROS, the moment of grace and opportunity, the favourable time in which God issues a challenge to decisive action. It is a dangerous time because, if this opportunity is missed, and allowed to pass by, the loss for the Church, for the Gospel and for all people of South Africa will be immeasurable.47 The Kairos challenge to the church remains as important today as it was 30 years ago. What the Kairos Document did was to remind both the church and the state that each had a specific role to play within God’s intended will for the common good of the people, and the structuring of a just society. What makes the Kairos Document important is that it not only pointed out errors in the church and its theology, it also passed judgment on the unjust actions of the state. … the Kairos Document perceived that the church itself was a site of [the Apartheid] struggle…. Whereas Cottesloe and the Message did not challenge the legality of the State, the Kairos Document described the state as tyrannical and therefore one that had to be resisted through acts of civil disobedience.48 De Gruchy notes that the apartheid state sought to counter the contentions of the Kairos theologians by working “in tandem with right wing religious organizations.”49 In other words, parts of the South African church had become agents of the unjust state, expressing support for its views and acting as a social shield to deflect criticism against its policies, actions, and theology. They had been captured by nationalistic ideals, and in so doing, had given over their prophetic witness, listening to the voices of political leaders rather than the voice of God. They used their social position and the social capital of the church, not in the interests of God’s will for the people, but in the interests of the unjust state. This, surely is a destructive, or negative, form of religious political populism. It casts “the enemy” as both an enemy of the state and of God. As was noted in the previous section, there is a fear that this is taking place once again.50 However, the difference between 1985 and 2018 is that in 1985 the nationalist supporting church represented a minority of the South African population (predominantly White Afrikaners). Whereas, in 2018 the nationalist supporting church represents the people, the majority of the population. What made church theology and state theology so problematic was that they both sought the protection of self-interest in opposition to the will of God and the common good of the people. Prophetic theology called upon the church, which includes the “scattered church” (i.e., Christians in government, business, and society at large), to discern the will of God for the people and to act with commitment, courage, and conviction to establish God’s will in society. The Kairos theologians cautioned that those parts of the church that had succumbed to nationalistic ideologies (state theology), or were hiding from the social realities (within a form of church theology), were in theological error. They are denying their divine responsibility to be both a pastoral and a prophetic church. As Bonhoeffer notes, under Christ the responsibility of the pastoral office51 of the church is both to care for its members and to make the “government aware of its failures and mistakes that necessarily threaten its governmental office.”52 This requires a measure of theological discernment, to figure out who are the oppressive elites and who are the oppressed people? In this sense, one could argue that a truly prophetic theology would be consistent with the will of God and the good of the people, such a political theology, even if populist, could be considered constructive or positive in nature. What is clear is that both the church and the state fail God and the people (i.e., God’s will and the common good of the people) when the relationships between the church and the state are polluted and compromised for the sake of political or religious expediency. Hence, from the perspective of the 1985 South African Kairos Document, and its theology, one could conclude that the current forms of religious political populism in South Africa, as illustrated by the two examples offered in this paper, are examples of destructive or negative forms of religious political populism. They harm society and dishonor God. The church and the state each have a responsibility to safeguard the role and function of the other. When one oversteps its bounds, both are in error (one for committing the error, and the other for allowing it to take place unchallenged).53 Conclusion In this article we have seen that religious populism is a complex and nuanced social phenomenon. In South Africa’s past, religious political populism served the good of the people, and was theologically sound, as “prophetic” churches and “prophetic” church leaders worked for justice and peace. However, at present, a destructive form of religious political populism has emerged – it is a form of state theology. This current form of religious political populism seeks to divide society, supporting the unjust and corrupt actions of the state while offering moral and religious sanction to its leaders. Philosophically it could thus be judged as destructive to the common good of the people. Moreover, in the light of the Kairos critique, it is also theologically problematic since it aligns the church of the people with the aims, objectives, and values of political and economic elite for nefarious gains. Simply stated, it is selling out the people for the purposes of corrupt and unjust political and economic gain. Hence, it is important for all of the churches in South Africa to remind the governing ANC, and the MCSA, that a populist state theology, and the relationship that stems from it, is not in the interest of the church, the state, or the people of South Africa. A populist state theology is an offense to the nation, to the intention of God, and it jeopardizes the common good of South Africans. Let the church return to its prophetic calling, serving God and God’s interests for the good of the people, not the aims of the state. DION A. FORSTER (BTh Hons, MTh, Rhodes University, Grahamstown; SMDP, Stellenbosch University, Stellenbosch; DTh, University of South Africa, Pretoria; PhD, Radboud University, Nijmegen) is Professor of Systematic Theology and Ethics at Stellenbosch University, where he serves as the Chair of the Department of Systematic Theology and Ecclesiology and as the Director of the Beyers Naudé Centre for Public Theology. He is the author of The (Im)possibility of Forgiveness? An Empirical Intercultural Bible Reading of Matthew 18:15–35 (SUN Press, 2017) and co-editor (with Wessel Bentley) of Between Capital and Cathedral: Essays on Church-State Relationships (UNISA Research Institute for Theology and Religion, 2012). His other major recent publications are “A Kairos Moment for the Methodist Church of Southern Africa? Engaging Nationalism and State Theology in the Democratic South Africa,” Methodist Review: A Journal of Wesleyan and Methodist Studies 11 (2019); “Revival, Revolution and Reform in Global Methodism: An Understanding of Christian Perfection as African Christian Humanism in the Methodist Church of Southern Africa,” Black Theology: An International Journal 16, no. 1 (2018); and “Translation and a Politics of Forgiveness in South Africa? What Black Christians Believe, and White Christians Do Not Seem to Understand,” Stellenbosch Theological Journal 14, no. 2 (2018). His articles have appeared in Black Theology, Theology, The Methodist Review, and Stellenbosch Theological Journal among others. His special interests include public theology, political theology, theological ethics, and forgiveness. Funding was provided by Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD, Humboldt University Visiting Research Fellow, 2018), University of Gothenburg (Visiting Research Professor, 2018) and the South African National Research Foundation (NRF, Rated Researcher). Footnotes 1. Jan H. Hofmeyr and Rajen Govender, “SA Reconciliation Barometer 2015: National Reconciliation, Race Relations, and Social Inclusion” (Cape Town: Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, December 8, 2015), 1, http://www.ijr.org.za/uploads/IJR_SARB_2015_WEB_002.pdf. 2. The reception of the 1985 Kairos Document has been widespread and contested. In the years since it was first adopted in South Africa, numerous theologians in a variety of contexts have engaged, or developed, contextual Kairos theologies. See for example, Bonganjalo Goba, “The Kairos Document and Its Implications for Liberation in South Africa,” Journal of Law and Religion 5, no. 2 (1987): 313; William Storrar, “2007: A Kairos Moment for Public Theology,” International Journal of Public Theology 1, no. 1 (2007): 5–25; Ignatius Swart, “Revival of a Kairos Consciousness: Prolegomena to a Research Focus on Religious and Social Change in Post-Apartheid South Africa,” Studia Historiae Ecclesiasticae 39, no. 2 (2013): 85–111; John W. de Gruchy, “Kairos Moments and Prophetic Witness: Towards a Prophetic Ecclesiology,” HTS Teologiese Studies / Theological Studies 72, no. 4 (August 26, 2016): 7; Dion A. Forster, “A Kairos Moment for the Methodist Church of Southern Africa? Engaging Nationalism and State Theology in the Democratic South Africa,” Methodist Review: A Journal of Wesleyan and Methodist Studies 11 (2019): 1–23. However, the importance, and wide reception, of the Kairos Document has also led to some critique of both the original 1985 South African Kairos Document, and subsequent Kairos theologies and documents. The critique has centered around the contextual nature of the 1985 Kairos Document, and the manner in which it has been adopted, uncritically, into other contexts. Some critiques relate to the more contemporary applications of categories of Kairos theology in South Africa (and other contexts). See for example, Gerald O. West, “Tracing the ‘Kairos’ Trajectory from South Africa (1985) to Palestine (2009): Discerning Continuities and Differences,” no. 143 (2102): 4–22; Jakub Urbaniak, “Probing the ‘Global Reformed Christ’ of Nico Koopman: An African-Kairos Perspective,” Stellenbosch Theological Journal 2, no. 2 (2016): 495–538; Vuyani S. Vellem, “Prophetic Theology in Black Theology, with Special Reference to the ‘Kairos Document,’” HTS Theological Studies 66, no. 1 (February 19, 2010). Yet, there is generally an appreciation of the value that the three general categories of theology, that were identified in the 1985 Kairos Document, present for theological reflection. These categories will be carefully engaged in this article. 3. Kairos Theologians, Challenge to the Church: A Theological Comment on the Political Crisis in South Africa (Johannesburg: Kairos Theologians, 1985), http://www.sahistory.org.za/archive/challenge-church-theological-comment-political-crisis-south-africa-kairos-document-1985. 4. Ernesto Laclau, On Populist Reason (Verso, 2005), 73–74; Ernesto Laclau, “Populism: What’s in a Name?” in Populism and the Mirror of Democracy, ed. Francisco Panizza (London: Verso Books, 2005), 36–38; Roger Eatwell and Matthew Goodwin, National Populism: The Revolt Against Liberal Democracy (London: Penguin UK, 2018), 3–5. 5. Jan-Werner Müller, What Is Populism? (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016), 7–10. 6. Laclau, “Populism: What’s in a Name?” 39. 7. Fredrik Portin, “Legitimacy for Some: Right-Wing Populist Rationality and Antagonistic Politics,” Scripta Instituti Donneriani Aboensis 28 (April 3, 2018): 30–32. 8. Müller, What Is Populism? 7–10. 9. Müller, 9–10. 10. Portin, “Legitimacy for Some: Right-Wing Populist Rationality and Antagonistic Politics,” 32. 11. Chantal Mouffe, On the Political (Taylor & Francis, 2011), 1–2; Chantal Mouffe, “The ‘End of Politics’ and the Challenge of Right-Wing Populism,” in Populism and the Mirror of Democracy, ed. Francisco Panizza (London: Verso Books, 2005), 50–71. See Francis Fukuyama’s works The End of History and the Last Man (New York, NY: Simon and Schuster, 2006) and Identity: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment (London: MacMillan, 2018). 12. Mouffe, On the Political, 1–2; Portin, “Legitimacy for Some: Right-Wing Populist Rationality and Antagonistic Politics,” 33. 13. Fukuyama, Identity, 50–52. 14. Portin, “Legitimacy for Some: Right-Wing Populist Rationality and Antagonistic Politics,” 35. 15. cf. Richard Elphick and T. R. H. Davenport, Christianity in South Africa: A Political, Social, and Cultural History (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 1997); John W. de Gruchy, The Church Struggle in South Africa, Twenty-fifth anniversary ed., 1st Fortress Press ed. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2005); Richard Elphick, The Equality of Believers: Protestant Missionaries and the Racial Politics of South Africa (Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia Press, 2012). 16. For the development of theological heresy, see John W. de Gruchy and Charles Villa-Vicencio, Apartheid Is a Heresy (Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1983), 81–85. For the human rights abuses, see de Gruchy, The Church Struggle in South Africa, 46, 52, 97, 145, 256. 17. The use of the term “church” in these three forms comes from Dirk J. Smit, Essays in Public Theology: Collected Essays 1 (Stellenbosch, South Africa: AFRICAN SUN MeDIA, 2007), 61–68, however, it was adapted by Forster to be used in the specific manner in which it will be applied in this article cf. Dion A. Forster, “What Hope Is There for South Africa? A Public Theological Reflection on the Role of the Church as a Bearer of Hope for the Future,” HTS Theological Studies, Original Research: P. G. R. de Villiers Dedication, 71, no. 1 (2015): 1–10; Dion A. Forster and Johann W. Oosterbrink, “Where Is the Church on Monday? Awakening the Church to the Theology and Practice of Ministry and Mission in the Marketplace,” In Die Skriflig/In Luce Verbi 49, no. 3 (August 21, 2015): 1–9. 18. De Gruchy, The Church Struggle in South Africa, sec. 1517 of 4012. 19. For a detailed discussion of Mandela’s relationship to the MCSA throughout his lifetime, please see Dion A. Forster, “Mandela and the Methodists: Faith, Fallacy and Fact,” Studia Historiae Ecclesiasticae 40, Church History Society of Southern Africa 40th Anniversary Supplement (August 2014): 87–115. 20. Nelson Mandela, “Address by President Nelson Mandela to the Annual Conference of the Methodist Church,” September 18, 1994, http://www.mandela.gov.za/mandela_speeches/1994/940918_methodist.htm. 21. South Africa remains a deeply religious nation. The most recent survey of the South African population conducted by StatsSA was done in 2013. This survey shows that 84.2% of South Africa’s citizens self-identified as Christians “General Household Survey 2013,” Statistics South Africa, accessed May 2, 2019, http://www.statssa.gov.za/publications/P0318/P03182013.pdf; Willem J. Schoeman, “South African Religious Demography: The 2013 General Household Survey,” HTS Theological Studies 73, no. 2 (February 16, 2017): 3. 22. Edwin Arrison notes that when the 2012 South African Kairos Document was being discussed among church leaders in South Africa, Denise Ackermann warned the churches and their leaders to “engage, but not be embedded” in political parties and the aims of the state. This caution illustrates an important distinction in the current relationship between the church and state in South Africa, cf. Arrison in Ernst M. Conradie and Miranda Pillay, Ecclesial Reform and Deform Movements in the South African Context (AFRICAN SUN MeDIA, 2015), 12. 23. Müller, What Is Populism? 126–34. 24. Kairos Theologians, Kairos Document (KD), 1. 25. South Africa remains a deeply religious nation. The most recent survey of the South African population conducted by StatsSA was done in 2013. This survey shows that 84.2% of South Africa’s citizens self-identified as Christians “General Household Survey 2013”; Schoeman, “South African Religious Demography,” 3. 26. Dion A. Forster, “A State Church? A Consideration of the Methodist Church of Southern Africa in the Light of Dietrich Bonhoeffer’s ‘Theological Position Paper on State and Church,’” Stellenbosch Theological Journal 2, no. 1 (July 30, 2016): 70. 27. Vukile Mehana, “Zuma’s Remarks Explained – ANC Chaplain General,” February 7, 2011, http://www.politicsweb.co.za/politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71639?oid=220386&sn=Detail&pid=71639. 28. Quoted in Gareth van Onselen, “The ANC, Religion and ‘the Truth,’” Inside Politics (blog), August 17, 2015, https://inside-politics.org/2015/08/17/the-anc-religion-and-the-truth/. 29. Zúquete’s research suggests that in the relationship between religion and populism, there is an added dimension of social and political complexity, namely, the configuration of the “people” and the “elites” (or others) is located on a “good-evil spectrum,” in which the people (their ideals, their leaders, etc.) are placed on the side of the good, while those who are other are presented as evil. See Jose Pedro Zúquete, “Populism and Religion,” in The Oxford Handbook of Populism, ed. Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser et al., vol. 1 (Oxford University Press, 2017), 1–2. 30. Resnick suggests that one of the key challenges of populism in many African settings is the “predominance of personalistic leaders and the lack of policy ideology underlying many political parties.” These characteristics appear to be present in the case of Mr. Jacob Zuma (as is seen in the sections that follow). Yet, they are complicated by the intersection of the religious element. cf. Danielle Resnick, “Populism in Africa,” in The Oxford Handbook of Populism, ed. Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser et al., vol. 1 (Oxford University Press, 2017), 1–2. 31. van Onselen, “The ANC, Religion and ‘the Truth.’” 32. cf. de Gruchy, in Duncan B. Forrester, William Storrar, and Andrew Morton, Public Theology for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Duncan B. Forrester (London: A&C Black, 2004), 50–51; Wolfgang Huber and Willem Fourie, Christian Responsibility and Communicative Freedom: A Challenge for the Future of Pluralistic Societies: Collected Essays (Münster: LIT Verlag, 2012), 111; Allan Aubrey Boesak, Kairos, Crisis, and Global Apartheid: The Challenge to Prophetic Resistance (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), 15. 33. Müller, What Is Populism? 127–34. 34. Bekezela Phakathi, “Pastors Will Not Help ANC Win Votes, Says DA,” BusinessLIVE, February 6, 2014, http://www.bdlive.co.za/national/politics/2014/02/06/pastors-will-not-help-anc-win-votes-says-da. 35. Peter Storey, “Banning the Flag from Our Churches: Learning from the Church-State Struggle in South Africa,” in Between Capital and Cathedral: Essays on Church and State Relationships, eds. Dion A. Forster and Wessel Bentley (Pretoria: UNISA Research Institute for Theology and Religion, 2012), 5. 36. Louise Vincent, “Seducing the People: Populism and the Challenge to Democracy in South Africa,” Journal of Contemporary African Studies 29, no. 1 (January 2011): 2. 37. Vincent, “Seducing the People,” 2. 38. Gerhard Maré, “Race, Democracy and Opposition in South African Politics: As Other a Way as Possible,” Democratization 8, no. 1 (March 2001): 97. 39. Maré, “Race, Democracy and Opposition,” 97. 40. cf. Ernesto Laclau, “Universalism, Particularism and the Question of Identity,” in The Politics of Difference: Ethnic Premises in A World of Power, eds. Edwin Wilmsen and Patrick McAllister (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), 49; John Saul, “The Dialectic of Class and Tribe,” in The State and Revolution in Eastern Africa (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1979), 401. 41. Zúquete, “Populism and Religion,” 2–3. 42. Julius Malema in 2009, from Gareth van Onselen, “The ANC in Its Own Words: 50 More Quotes,” Politics Web, September 6, 2018, https://www.politicsweb.co.za/opinion/the-anc-in-its-own-words-50-more-quotes. 43. Vincent, “Seducing the People,” 6. 44. Kairos Theologians, KD. 45. The 1985 Kairos Document identified three types of dominant theologies at that time in South Africa’s history: a state theology that sought to uphold and support the ideology of the state through the church and theology; a church theology that sought a middle, or “third way,” of compromise; or a church theology that was completely disengaged from what was taking place in society and the political realm. See de Gruchy in, Forrester, Storrar, and Morton, Public Theology for the 21st Century, 51. The document advocated for a prophetic theology that would stand on the side of the oppressed and speak truth to the power of the state, seeking to voice the disapproval and judgment of God on state oppression and the weakness of the church Kairos Theologians, KD, 15–17; de Gruchy in, Forrester, Storrar, and Morton, Public Theology for the 21st Century, 51; Huber and Fourie, Christian Responsibility and Communicative Freedom, 110–14; Boesak, Kairos, Crisis, and Global Apartheid, 15. 46. For the use of the term “public” in this article, please refer to Dirk Smit, “What does ‘Public’ mean? Questions with a View to Public Theology,” in L. D. Hansen, Christian in Public Aims, Methodologies, and Issues in Public Theology, 1st ed., Beyers Naudé Centre Series on Public Theology, v. 3 (Stellenbosch: SUN Press, 2007), 11–46; Sebastian C. H. Kim, Theology in the Public Sphere (London: SCM Press, 2011), 3–26; John W. de Gruchy, “Public Theology as Christian Witness: Exploring the Genre,” International Journal of Public Theology 1, no. 1 (January 1, 2007): 26–41. 47. Kairos Theologians, KD, 1. 48. de Gruchy, The Church Struggle in South Africa, 198. 49. de Gruchy, The Church Struggle in South Africa, 197. 50. cf. Lizeka Tandwa, “SACC Is Just a Government Mouthpiece – Student Leaders,” News24, January 19, 2016, http://www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/News/sacc-is-just-a-govt-mouthpiece-student-leaders-20160119. 51. In his theological position paper on church and state, Dietrich Bonhoeffer understood that the “pastoral office is the power set in place by God to exercise spiritual rule with divine authority. It emerges not from the congregation but from God.” Bonhoeffer in Clifford J. Green and Michael DeJonge, eds., The Bonhoeffer Reader (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 2013), 700. 52. Bonhoeffer, in Green and DeJonge, 714. 53. cf. Bonhoeffer, in Green and DeJonge, 711. © The Author(s) 2019. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the J. M. Dawson Institute of Church-State Studies. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com This article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (https://academic.oup.com/journals/pages/open_access/funder_policies/chorus/standard_publication_model)
TI - State Theology and Political Populism? A Kairos Critique of Religious Populism in South Africa
JO - Journal of Church and State
DO - 10.1093/jcs/csz031
DA - 2020-06-01
UR - https://www.deepdyve.com/lp/oxford-university-press/state-theology-and-political-populism-a-kairos-critique-of-religious-2f0O9MLeAt
SP - 1
VL - Advance Article
IS - 
DP - DeepDyve
ER -